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SUPPLEMENTARY

DESPATCHES, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY HIS SON,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

VV. d 6

VOLUME THE EIGHTH.

PENINSULA AND SOUTH OF FRANCE.

[JUNE, 1813, TO APRIL, 1814.]

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LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCCLXI.

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SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES.

CHAPTER VI.—PENINSULA.

ORDERS ON THE FIELD DURING THE ACTION OF THE 21ST JUNE, 1813. [658.]

21st June, 2 P.M.

Sir Thomas Graham will be so good as move forward and press the enemy. He will judge, from the force of the enemy, and the obstinacy or otherwise of his resistance, whether it will be most expedient to move wide of Vitoria, leaving it to his right, or to move direct upon that place. If the enemy appear to be strong and persevering, it would not be expedient to undertake any movement which separates our corps too much. If, on the contrary, the enemy seem decidedly in retreat, Sir Thomas Graham's movements should be directed in whatever manner will enable him to reap the most effectual advantages from our success.

Pray send frequent reports, and keep up a certain communication with the other columns on your right.

Additional Instructions to Sir T. Graham during the Battle of Vitoria.

If Sir Thomas Graham should perceive that the enemy maintains his positions opposite the right and centre of the army with considerable obstinacy, he will be so good as direct the movements of the troops under his orders upon Vitoria; but should he observe that the enemy gives way before the attacks of the right and centre, Sir Thomas Graham will in that case make a wider movement, and endeavour to cut off the retreat of the enemy by gaining possession of the great road beyond Vitoria.

WELLINGTON.

[659.] ARRANGEMENT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY ON THE 22ND JUNE.

Vitoria, 21st June, 1813.

The army will move forward to-morrow to Salvatierra in three columns as follows, beginning their movement at 10 A.M.

The right column, composed of the troops under the orders of Sir Rowland Hill, will move by El Burgo, Alegria, and Gaceo to Salvatierra.

The centre column, composed of Major-General V. Alten's brigade of cavalry, the 4th division, the Light division, the 3rd division, the 7th division, the hussar brigade, and Major-General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, will move by Ylaszas and Arbulo to Salvatierra. The mule reserve ammunition will move with the 7th division.

The left column, composed of the troops under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, will move by Arzabiaga, Audicana, and Dollo, to Salvatierra. Brigadier-General D'Urban's brigade of cavalry will move with this column.

Head-quarters will move to Salvatierra.

The baggage of the columns will move in the rear of the whole of the troops composing the column to which it belongs.

The baggage of head-quarters will move immediately in rear of Major-General Ponsonby's brigade.

The 6th division, which will arrive to-morrow at Vitoria, will continue its march by the route of the centre column to El Burgo.

The brigade of Household cavalry will remain in the vicinity of Vitoria till further orders, as will also Captain Parker's brigade of reserve artillery.

A captain, one subaltern, and 30 men from each battalion, British and Portuguese, are to remain at Vitoria till further orders. A field officer will be appointed to command these detachments.

An hospital station will be established at Vitoria, to which the divisions of infantry and brigades of cavalry will send such sick as they may find it necessary to disencumber themselves of.

A separate instruction will be communicated to the Spanish corps under Major-General Giron, to which corps two of the brigades of reserve artillery will for the present be attached.

WELLINGTON.

To the Marquess Wellesley. [660.]

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, Salvatierra, 22nd June, 1813.

I write to inform you that I attacked the enemy under King Joseph, near Vitoria, yesterday, and gained a complete victory, having taken from them 151 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, baggage, &c. I believe we killed and wounded vast numbers. But we have not taken many prisoners. They went off very fast, much more expeditiously than we could follow them, and the ground was so much intersected by ditches that we could not use our cavalry, nor they theirs. They say, however, that they have lost 20,000 men.

The manœuvres of the day cut them off from the direct road to France, and I am now pursuing them to Pamplona.

I have been much concerned to hear that you have been unwell; but I learn that you are better, and I hope that the warm weather will re-establish your health entirely. I am quite well, but have occasionally the complaint of all old soldiers, the lumbago.

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

It is a curious circumstance that the battle was fought yesterday on the ground, called in the country the *English Hills*, on which the Black Prince fought a battle against the French, and gained a victory in favour of Don Pedro, called the Cruel. I don't recollect the date of this battle.

The Quartermaster-General to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Vitoria, 22nd June, 1813.

It appears to me from the map that by moving a part of the left column of the army upon Villafranca we might be enabled to cut in upon the Bayonne road, and intercept perhaps some part of the enemy's force, or of his artillery, or other convoys. I have sent to procure information here respecting the roads by which such a movement could be made, and I shall go myself by the route marked out for the left column to gain further information, and also to prepare Sir T. Graham for acting upon any order your Lordship may think proper to send to him upon this subject.

I should suppose that it might be sufficient to send the 5th division (or the 1st) and a regiment of cavalry if the thing should appear expedient, and without artillery if the roads are bad. The 6th division could replace, if requisite, the division sent from the left column.

It occurs to me that perhaps General Giron may be retarded on the great road by some fortified post (besides that his chief attention and his movement will be upon Mondragon), and that any convoy going off by the great road of Bayonne may escape possibly without much effectual molestation.

Faithfully yours,
G. MURRAY.

I have just learnt that there is a road leading upon Villafranca which shortens the distance four leagues, it being by the great road twelve leagues from this to Villafranca, and only eight by the direct road to Villafranca. The left column of the army is now about a league nearer that direction, I should think. I have got the names of the places through which the road passes, and I am told that the country carts go by it, but that a part of it, called the Puerto de St. Adrian, is very steep and difficult.

G. M.

3 P.M.

[I approve of this if it be not now too late. Probably the two Portuguese brigades and 1st division had better go; and that part of the cavalry which has not marched. I have sent to the 6th division to halt at Vitoria, or wherever the order might find them, as I hear that Clausel was in march in that direction; and it would not answer to allow him to touch our hospital or plunder.]

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Camp in front of Vitoria, 22nd June, 1813.

It is my duty to report with as little delay as possible the circumstances which occurred under my own observation in the course of yesterday, in so far as that column which your Lordship did me the honour to place under my command was concerned.

As soon as Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton had assembled the 3rd division on the summit of the hill above Los Guetas about 8 o'clock A.M., and that we observed by the fire on our right that your Lordship was advancing, the division and part of its artillery moved down to the near neighbourhood of that village, and there waited orders. I previously detached to the right to endeavour to communicate with the right column, but did not think it necessary to do so on the left till Sir Thomas Graham should appear in movement.

On receipt of orders by Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, Sir Thomas Picton pushed across the bridge, in front of the village of Mendoza, directing part of his light troops to the left, and part to the heights immediately in his front. This last he supported with General Brisbane's brigade. I directed General Power to form his Portuguese brigade on the left of the former,

on the heights, and General Colville to support those light troops that were pushing the enemy back on the left bank of the river.

The 1st brigade of the 7th division followed close the 3rd division, and this brigade, under Colonel Grant of the 82nd, I placed in the interval between General Colville and General Power. At this moment my brigade of guns, under Captain Cairnes, came up to me. The 1st brigade your Lordship directed me to form and advance into line, which accordingly was done.

These four brigades advanced in their several directions most admirably. I leave to Sir Thomas Picton to report particularly as to the 3rd division under his immediate command: I will only presume to add, that nothing in my opinion could surpass the steadiness of the advance of Generals Colville, Brisbane, and Power, nor the firmness and resolute gallantry with which Colville maintained his post on the left, without support, for a considerable time, and under a very heavy fire.

My own station during the day, and my particular attention, I thought best directed towards the attack of the village in our centre, and the maintaining a connected line of attack from right to left. I therefore kept my brigade of artillery constantly moving forward in support of Colonel Grant. For a moment I was obliged to halt this brigade and wait support, which your Lordship at that moment sent me in General Vandeleur's brigade of the Light division: as soon as he formed we again advanced, passing through the village, and pushing on until the cavalry formed in front of Vitoria: then this brigade returned to its own division.

At the same moment that General Vandeleur formed in my support, General Barnes also formed his brigade of the 7th division in support of General Colville; and my Portuguese brigade of General Le Cor I desired to follow up General Vandeleur. These two brigades of the 7th division had been unavoidably delayed in the early part of the morning by several accidents to the artillery in mounting the hill path, and in spite of all the anxiety and exertions of Generals Le Cor and Barnes, they could not reach me sooner. For many reasons I lamented the want of those brigades, but chiefly I feared your Lordship might think our attack of the centre slow, to what it ought to have been.

These, my Lord, were the general outlines of what passed with me.

I cannot express to your Lordship the admirable manner in which Colonel Grant of the 82nd led and commanded that brigade, with a cool and collected gallantry that attracted the notice of every one. He was wounded in the groin early in the day, but nothing could persuade him to leave the field until the enemy was driven beyond Vitoria.

I beg also to name Major Roberts, commanding the 51st; Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, 68th; Major King, 82nd; and Major Du Hautoy of the Chasseurs Britanniques, whose conduct throughout commanded my fullest approbation.

To Captain Cairnes and his brigade I owe my warmest thanks. He was ready, active, zealous at every point, and his fire answered my very best wishes.

Your Lordship will allow me to add the names of Major Hawkins, who commanded the 68th after Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone left the field from three wounds; Major Crespigny, whom I detached with four companies; and Major de Combremont, an old and experienced officer

of the Prince de Condé's army. These officers I had occasion to notice as eminently brave and active.

By Lieutenant-Colonel D'Oyley, Assistant-Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, and Major Drake, Assistant-Quartermaster-Generals of my division, and by my personal staff, Captains Couper and Sparrow, I was most zealously assisted throughout the day, and I beg to express to your Lordship in the strongest terms the obligations I feel myself under to those officers all individually.

I cannot omit to mention the manner in which General Vandeleur formed and moved his column forward while he acted with me; it was everything I could desire.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient and most faithfully,
DALHOUSIE.

P. S. I feel, my Lord, I should do a great injustice did I not mention Brigade-Major Chalmers of the 1st brigade, for I saw him most active, zealous, and enterprising, in the hottest part of the day.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Manain, 22nd June, 1813.

In compliance with your Lordship's instructions relative to the proceedings of the right column of the army in the attack of yesterday, I directed Brigadier-General Morillo, with the Spanish division under his command, to ascend and carry the heights on the left of the enemy's position, at the same time that the remainder of the column moved along the main road. Brigadier-General Morillo's division advanced to the attack of the heights with the greatest gallantry and order: finding, however, that it had a larger force opposed to it than had been expected, I directed the 71st regiment and the light companies of the 1st and 3rd brigades of the 2nd division to his support, and the enemy was immediately driven from the heights.

Finding the importance of the point thus gained, I ordered the remainder of the brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, 92nd regiment, and a battalion of Colonel Ashworth's brigade of the 2nd division, to join the troops already there. Previous, however, to their arrival, the Spanish and 71st regiments had gained another ridge in prolongation of the one before mentioned, but separated from it by a deep ravine, and were then completely in rear of the enemy's position. The enemy, who became aware of the importance of this point, attacked it again with a very large force before it could be sufficiently supported; and the ammunition of the Spaniards, who were on the right, being totally expended, they were forced to give way, and, together with the 71st regiment, to fall back to the first ridge, which, under cover of the 50th regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, they effected with the greatest steadiness, and immediately formed thereon. The conduct of the 71st on this occasion was highly distinguished, as was also that of the Spanish division, the 50th regiment, and the light companies of the British under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald of the 60th foot,

and those of the 3rd brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Paterson. I regret to have to add that our operations on this side were attended with considerable loss. The Honourable Colonel Cadogan, than whom the British army cannot boast of an officer more distinguished for zeal, for gallantry, or talent, was mortally wounded whilst cheering on his men to the attack of the first ridge; Lieutenant-Colonel Paterson of the 28th regiment was also wounded at the head of the light companies; and Brigadier-General Morillo, displaying on this occasion his usual intrepidity and zeal, animating his troops by his example, was also wounded, but did not quit the field. Whilst this was passing on the heights I received your Lordship's orders to occupy the village in front of the enemy's left, which was immediately done by the 3rd brigade of the 2nd division, under the Honourable Colonel O'Callaghan, supported by the light companies of General Byng's brigade, the enemy having no troops in it, an error which he endeavoured to repair by three successive attacks upon it, all of which were repulsed in the handsomest manner by that brigade: the conduct of Colonel O'Callaghan and of his brigade, and of General Byng's light companies under Major Dogin, 66th regiment, deserve every encomium.

From this time the enemy in our front began rapidly to retire, and were followed up by the right column: the difficulty, however, of the ground over which it had to pass threw it behind the other columns of the army, and it had not an opportunity of closing with the enemy. Lieutenant-General the Conde de Amarante and the Honourable Lieutenant-General Stewart commanded these divisions in a manner to merit my best acknowledgments; and both them and General Morillo speak in the highest terms of praise of the conduct of the Generals, officers, and troops under them respectively, as also of the assistance they derived from the Staff officers attached to them. Of the cavalry under Major-General Fane I think it unnecessary to say anything, as I understand they were employed under your Lordship's immediate observation. I feel particularly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Abercromby, Lieutenant-Colonel Roche, and all the officers attached to my Staff.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
R. HILL.

I must not omit to mention that Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton, commanding the 71st regiment, distinguished himself much, as did Major M'Kenzie, who succeeded to the command on Colonel Cotton's being wounded. Brigadier-General Morillo reports to me that he took upwards of 400 prisoners on the heights.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Zuazo de Salvatierra, 23rd June, 1813.

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that, having in the morning of the 21st instant placed the left column of the army according to orders on the great road from Murguia to Vitoria, near the bottom of the hills, with the roads opened to us on the left, I considered myself justified (about half-past twelve o'clock at noon) in advancing towards Vitoria, in

order to draw the enemy's attention to his right, and so to assist the progress of the army from the side of Miranda, where the enemy seemed to make an obstinate resistance in the successive strong positions which the country afforded.

The enemy had a division of infantry, with some cavalry advanced on the great road, resting their right on some strong heights covering the village of Gamarra Maior. Both Gamarra and Abechuco, on the great road, were strongly occupied as têtes du pont to the bridges at these places over the Zadorra. Major-General Pack with his brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Colonel Longa with his Spanish corps, were directed to turn and gain these heights, supported by Major-General Anson's brigade of Light Dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry, commanded by Major-General Oswald, who was requested to take charge of all these troops.

In the execution of this service the Portuguese and Spanish troops behaved admirably. The 4th battalion of Caçadores of General Pack's brigade, and the 8th Caçadores of the 5th division, particularly distinguished themselves. Colonel Longa being on the left, got possession of the village of Gamarra Menor; and as soon as the heights were cleared of the enemy, the village of Gamarra Maior was most gallantly stormed by Brigadier-General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division (formed in three columns of battalions, which advanced under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry without firing a shot), assisted by two guns of Major Lawson's brigade. The enemy suffered severely by this attack, and lost three guns.

Meanwhile the great road being now open through the plain, all the artillery of the left column (excepting the two guns above mentioned), Major-General Bock's brigade of cavalry, and the 1st division of infantry were advancing on the great road, and Major-General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry (detached early in the morning to the hills on the right to endeavour to communicate with the centre column of the army at Las Guetas) was ordered back. At this period I received your Lordship's orders, dated at 2 P.M.,* to move forward and press the enemy on our side.

A disposition for attacking the village of Abechuco, defended by a numerous artillery on the left bank of the Zadorra, was immediately made by forming a strong battery against it with Captain Ramsay's Horse Artillery and Captain Dubourdieu's brigade on the left of the chaussée; and under cover of their well-directed fire Colonel Halkett's brigade advanced by it to the attack of the village, which was carried, the light battalions charging and taking three guns and a howitzer on the bridge. At this critical time Brigadier-General Bradford's brigade arrived on the right of the chaussée, and supported the attack of the village.

During this operation on the right the enemy made the greatest efforts to repossess themselves of the village of Gamarra Maior by a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, and having at least two divisions of infantry in reserve on strong ground behind. But the enemy's repeated attacks were successfully repulsed. It was, however, evidently impossible to push a column across the river by this bridge in the face of such a force so posted. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on Major-General Oswald for the dispositions he made to defend this village; and he speaks in the highest terms of the conduct of Brigadier-General Robinson and the troops

* See page 1.

of his brigade, which suffered severely in maintaining the post they had so gallantly won, and of that of Major-General Hay and of Major-General Spry, successively called to support the 2nd brigade. The whole of Major Lawson's brigade of guns having joined the 5th division, performed excellent service by their well-directed fire on this occasion. I am sorry to say Lieutenant-Colonel Fane of the 59th, and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the Royals, with many other officers, are among the wounded at this point.

Major-General Oswald particularly recommends to your Lordship's notice Captain Hay, Major-General Hay's Aide-de-Camp, who was wounded in the active discharge of his duty in the village.

Your Lordship with the army being now in possession of Vitoria, the enemy fled from every point, and so rapidly that it was impossible for any of the troops of the left column, having all to file over narrow bridges, to come up with any of them till they had gained the wooded plain (intersected with deep brooks and ditches), by which they retreated.

But the greatest eagerness in the pursuit was manifested by all the different corps. The Caçadore battalions of both the Portuguese brigades, supported by their respective line battalions, followed with the cavalry, while part of Colonel Longa's troops harassed the enemy on their flank.

The enemy's flight was, however, so rapid that no material impression could be made on them, though more than once charged by squadrons of General Anson's brigade. The pursuit was continued on the left to El Burgo, when night obliged the troops to halt.

I cannot conclude this report without assuring your Lordship that I feel particularly indebted to the great assistance I received throughout from Colonel De Lancey, Deputy-Quartermaster-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bouverie, Assistant-Adjutant-General, and to the zeal of all the officers of my personal staff.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—Your Lordship will allow me to name afterwards such individual officers as may be reported to me to have particularly distinguished themselves. I omitted to mention that Major-General Oswald expressed his great satisfaction at the conduct of the Staff officers of the 5th division, Lieutenant-Colonels Berkeley and Gomm, and of his Aide-de-Camp, Captain Ware. I have not yet had any report from Major-General Howard, but Colonel Halkett supported the high character he has long held, and Lieutenant-Colonel Upton and Major Hope were most active in the discharge of their duty.

MEMORANDUM BY THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

At the commencement of the year 1812 the regular army of England was as follows, independent of artillery:

	Men.
At home	65,909
Abroad	153,040
Total	218,949

At the commencement of the year 1813 the army was:

	Men.
At home	62,018
Abroad	167,131
Total in 1813..	229,149
Total in 1812..	218,949
Increase*	10,200

At the commencement of 1812, in addition to this regular force at home of 65,909 men, ministers had the following armed force:

	Men.		
Regular militia	77,159;	cost	£3,099,965
Local militia..	202,983	.. ..	720,078
Volunteers and yeomanry of Great Britain (not Ireland)	68,000	.. ..	531,169
Total men	348,142	Total expense ..	£4,351,212

(Exclusive of the volunteers and yeomanry of Ireland.)

The total expense of the ordinary service, viz. pay, allowances, and agency of the regular army of England, was:

In 1812	£7,667,408
Staff	531,169
	2)8,198,577
Half is	£4,099,288
Expense of militia, volunteers, &c.	4,351,212

Thus, then, it appears that this armed force of militia and volunteers, maintained for the defence of the country, and especially for its internal tranquillity, costs the country more than four millions sterling, and more than half the expense of the whole regular army (English and not foreign corps) of Great Britain.

The foreign corps in the service of England exceed 30,000 men, and they are maintained at an expense in 1812 of 1,146,652*l.*, that is, not one-fourth of the cost of the armed force maintained for internal defence and tranquillity.

I contend, therefore, that this armed force, maintained at such an expense (more than four millions sterling), ought to be amply sufficient for its purpose, especially at a time when the enemy not only cannot menace this country with invasion, but when the whole of his disposable army is engaged in an arduous contest at a great distance from his own country, and with a military power (Russia) of the first class.

In addition to this armed force of militia, it is to be recollected that there are bodies of regular troops which also contribute to the defence of the country, and which are not included in the number of 65,000 regular troops above stated as being "at home" at the commencement of 1812: I mean part of the corps of marines and of artillery. Of the latter, amounting to 24,497 men, upwards of 14,000 were "at home" at the commencement of 1812.

* Chiefly foreign troops.

The average casualties of the army are from 20,000 to 22,000 men. This includes deaths, desertions, and discharges.

The average number of men raised by recruiting of all descriptions is from 20,000 to 22,000. The recruiting is performed by enlisting men and boys in the usual manner, either for life or for a limited term of years, and by volunteers from the regular militia. The volunteering takes place at different periods, according to circumstances. In 1812 there were three different periods * of volunteering: the first in April and the last towards the end of November. The men ought to be ready for service within a month, at furthest, after joining their depôts; but it generally occurs that, in order to induce the militia to volunteer, furloughs are promised and granted to them previous to their joining the depôts of the regiments into which they volunteer, or immediately after joining.

As the volunteering is a legislative measure, it might take place at earlier periods, if Parliament thought fit. This might be inconvenient, certainly, but not impracticable.

Ministers indeed say that there is no precedent for volunteering at an earlier period than April or May; to which it may be answered, that there was no precedent for the critical necessity which called for the measure at an earlier period. If you restrict your efforts to precedent, you should not only assign the same limits to your ends, but prevail upon Providence to bind down the events and revolutions of this age within the precedent of former ages.

	Men.
The casualties of the army in 1812 are stated in the return to have been	17,570
Add the last quarter, say	5,500
Total casualties in 1812	23,070
The recruiting in 1812 was as follows:	
Ordinary recruiting	14,432
Volunteers from militia	9,903
Total recruits in 1812	24,335

The foreign recruiting in 1812 produced 11,327; of this number, 5240 were enlisted "at home," and the recruits raised generally in 1812 will have produced in England near 30,000 men.

I have entered into these particulars to show what the ordinary means of the country were in 1812. I should observe, that of the 65,000 regulars at home at the commencement of 1812, about 8000 or 9000 consist of veteran and garrison battalions,† and a large portion of the rest of depôts, recruiting companies, detachments, &c. But although these bodies are not immediately disposable for foreign service, they contribute mainly to the home defence, and would enable ministers to send every corps abroad fit for service, except a few troops to perform the duty of household troops.

Thus in the York, North-West, and Inland districts, comprehending

* The volunteering generally begins in May.

† There are six garrison and twelve veteran battalions. Many of these are on service.

fifteen counties, in 1812 there were regular infantry 1747. This number composed the depôts of eleven regiments of infantry, many of whom were on service. These depôts varied from 70 to 300 and 400 men; and though these regular troops could not immediately be sent on foreign service, yet it is evident that they contributed greatly to the strength of the military power in the districts in which they were stationed.

Early in 1812 there were, more or less, about fifty-four battalions of infantry in Great Britain and Ireland, and sixteen regiments of cavalry. If eight or nine battalions are deducted from the infantry for garrison and veteran battalions, there will at least be forty-five battalions of infantry and sixteen regiments of cavalry from which ministers, without resorting to extraordinary means, might have drawn their reinforcements; and knowing, as I do, that many of these battalions and regiments * were fit for service, and were actually sent in the autumn of 1812, I ask whether it can be sup-

* At this moment, February, 1813, there are thirty-nine battalions of regular infantry and nine regiments of cavalry in Great Britain and Ireland, besides veterans, depôts, &c.

I have a letter from Colonel Ross, dated Canterbury, 11th February, 1813. He says the following is now the disposable force in Kent, which might be sent to the Peninsula:

	Rank and File.	
Cavalry:		
3rd Hussars (Germans)	504	
Depôt	201	
		— 705
Infantry		1642
Artillery		904
		3251

This shows what might be done if ministers were determined to send off every man.

The German Hussars, which would have been an invaluable addition to Lord Wellington, are chiefly employed in suppressing smuggling. This is a fact, and should be noticed. Now that the Luddites are quieted, the Scotch Greys might be brought from Yorkshire, or the North, to take the London duty, which would spare the 7th Hussars.

Here, then, is a reinforcement at once of a fine brigade of Hussars.

In March, 1812, I find in the 'Military Chronicle' a list of battalions ordered for foreign service. This I am told was not the case; but the fact shows that these battalions were at least notoriously fit for service, and some of them actually did embark in September, 1812.

The following is the list:

23rd Light Dragoons.	
6th regiment Foot, two battalions ..	One has joined.
20th	Has joined.
26th.	
91st	Ditto.
37th regiment.	
42nd, one battalion.	
53rd.	
76th.	
75th.	
Ten battalions of infantry, of which three have joined.	

posed that it was impossible, from such resources, to have drawn a reinforcement of 10,000 to 15,000 men at an early period of 1812, when such an effort would have decided the fate of the campaign?

The means which the government had in their possession at the commencement of 1812 were:

	Men.
1st, Subject to the remarks regarding garrisons and veterans, depôts	65,000
Deduct garrisons and veterans	8,000
Remains	57,000

Distributed into forty-five battalions of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, and depôts, &c.

In addition, the recruiting at home furnished nearly 30,000 men in 1812.

By referring to the returns, it will appear that the number each quarter does not vary essentially. In the three first months, therefore, that is by the 1st April, the recruiting service, if the volunteering from the militia had been earlier, would have produced 7000 men, from which, if the casualties at home are deducted, there would be at least 5000 men fit for service by the month of May, or even by the 24th April.

Take, then, all these circumstances together:

1st, You have 57,000 regular soldiers distributed into depôts, sixteen regiments of cavalry, and forty-five battalions of infantry; the Foot Guards at home alone amounting to upwards of 4000 men.

2nd, You have a recruiting service which produced in England,* in 1812, about 7000 men a quarter, subject to casualties "at home."

3rd, You had the Cape of Good Hope and other foreign stations which might have been reduced † with great safety, at this particular crisis, to a standard below the ordinary strength.

And 4th, You had an armed force of militia and volunteers of 350,000 men, besides marines, artillery, garrison and veteran battalions, for your home defence, in addition to your powerful navy, employing upwards of 140,000 seamen at a time when France was engaged with Russia and Spain, and the navies of your enemies were afraid to appear on the ocean.

I ask whether, under all these circumstances, it was an impracticable effort for ministers to send those reinforcements in April which they afterwards sent in September, or to have added a few thousand men to those reinforcements, and thus before the battle of Salamanca have sent 15,000 men to Lord Wellington, which would not only have replaced his casualties (not 5000 men), but have given him an effectual augmentation of 10,000 men, which augmentation alone, even with the failure of the Sicilian expedition and the imperfect state of the Spanish and Portuguese armies, would have decided the fate of the campaign; but with the improvement of those armies (which might easily have been accomplished), and with the success of the Sicilian expedition (which ought to have been certain), would have ensured, I think, the expulsion of the French from Spain, or at all events such a pressure on their army and power in Spain as would have

* I mean "at home."

† Gordon says that he could have collected 30,000 men from the Cape, Mediterranean, and other foreign stations.

rendered it impossible for Buonaparte to continue the war both against Russia and in the Peninsula?

I think that enough has been said to prove (almost) that by a proper management, even of our ordinary resources, complete success might have been obtained in the Peninsula.

But this was a crisis which demanded an extraordinary effort, and it is for ministers to justify themselves for not having made it.

Upon what principle otherwise can they justify the bills introduced last session for putting down the disturbances in the north of England? Were the measures then adopted of an ordinary course of proceeding, or were they not called for by the extraordinary nature of the crisis?

When Parliament imposed the Bank restrictions in 1797, could that (necessary if you please) act of violence against the ordinary principles of circulation in this country have been justified except by an extraordinary emergency?

Will anybody contend that the crisis of 1812 was not one which called for efforts of the most extraordinary description?

The war in the Peninsula was one which admitted of precise calculation. We ought to have ensured its success; and if the ordinary military resources of the country were inadequate, ministers should have adopted extraordinary measures, and have converted this great armed force of 350,000 militia, local militia, and volunteers, into an instrument of effectual warfare against the enemy, since prolonged and fruitless warfare is not only the most cruel burthen, but the most ruinous of all miseries to a nation.

But ministers think they answer these charges by talking generally of their exertions, and by saying that they have spent eleven millions in eleven months for the deliverance of Spain, and that they have sent so many thousand men and horses to the Peninsula.

The first point is too absurd to require any reply. Is the army, is the navy, employed off Spain, maintained expressly for the war in Spain? Would it be disbanded if it were not for that war? Some of the charges, indeed, in 1812, are less in 1812 than in former years:

In 1809, transports	£3,000,000
In 1812, they were	2,678,092
Vote of credit	4,500,000
Ireland	500,000
Prussia	180,000
Extraordinaries, 1806	793,710
Ditto of 1807	3,550,000

Upon the whole of this topic, see Lord Wellington's admirable letter to Lord Liverpool of the 23rd November, 1812.

As to men, the strength of the allied army in July, 1811, was 48,000 effective men, exclusive of artillery. This was after Masséna's retreat, the battles of Fuentes de Oñoro and Albuera, and the failure at Badajoz.

In December, 1812, the effective allied army was 45,000 men.

In neither case had the reinforcements joined from England.

In July, 1811, there were 8000 men on their passage to the army.

In December, 1812, there were about the same number on their route to the army.

If the expedition from Alicante be excluded, the allied army (including Cadiz) was as strong, if not stronger, in July, 1811, as it was (including Cadiz) in July, 1812.

If there be a reference to the general army returns, it will be found that

	Men.
In June, 1811, the troops "abroad," that is, all over the world, were	147,613
In June, 1812, were	159,662
Increase in 1812	12,049

in all the troops abroad, including the whole world; of which it is to be observed that the increase has principally taken place in foreign corps, of which five corps and two independent companies have been added to the army in 1812.

It is evident, therefore, that no considerable increase has been made in our efforts, generally, in 1812.

Lord Liverpool says that many thousand men and horses have been sent to the Peninsula. The question however is, how many have joined Lord Wellington to be of use in the campaign?

I answer 1400 men between the months of July and December, 1812.

In the same space of time the enemy reinforced their army by at least 20,000 men.

But Lord Liverpool compares the effort of this day to that made in the time of King William. To this Sterling says: "The force employed by the ministers of the present day might have fully accomplished our national purposes in the time of King William; but had the armies of Louis XIV. amounted to half the numbers brought into the field by Buonaparte, the exertions made by England in the beginning of the eighteenth century would have been recorded as ridiculous, inadequate, and contemptible. Godolphin would have been handed down to posterity as the weakest minister, and Marlborough himself as the least successful officer, that ever mistook the proportion between his means and his objects."

In order to give also any force to his allusion, Lord Liverpool ought to prove the equality between the population and resources of England in those days and her faculties of the same nature at the present era. He ought also to prove that the necessity for extreme exertion was then equal to what it now appears, and that the success of our efforts at the present day does not fall short of its amount at the former period. According to every true principle of reasoning, the magnitude of the means employed, if they be not employed with wisdom, constitutes the guilt, not the merit, of ministers; and if these means have not been followed by success, they may be designated as the weakness, rather than the power, of the empire.

Lord Bathurst also says that we cannot everywhere have a force superior to the French. But we ought to have that superiority on any given spot where it is practicable to have it; and, in various instances, the force employed would have effected the desired superiority had it been sent in time.

The only remaining point to notice is the moral impression adverted to by Lord Bathurst. This topic is perfectly familiar to Lord Wellesley.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Clinton to General the Marquess of Wellington.

Botoyo, ½ mile N.N.W. of Vitoria,
MY DEAR LORD, 22nd June, 1813, 8 P.M.

In consequence of your letter to General Pakenham I have put two battalions of Portuguese, with General Bradford, into the town of Vitoria. We have piquets of infantry on the two roads leading to La Guardia, and one on that leading to Miranda, as General Pakenham received information of there being 2000 of the enemy moving towards Vitoria from that side; and he so far verified this report as to go with the guerrilla who made the report, until he fell in with a patrol of French cavalry. This happened up a road striking off from the great Miranda road, and leading towards Logroño.

As I understand General Clausel to be superior in artillery, I shall, in case of his approach during the night, move into the town. The cavalry will patrol a league upon the above road during the night, and farther at daylight.

I beg leave heartily to congratulate you upon the complete success of one of the grandest moves ever attempted.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,
Your faithful and most obedient servant,
H. CLINTON

Arrangements for the 23rd June.

Salvatierra, 22nd June, 1813.

General V. Alten's brigade and the Light division will move on the great road of Pamplona to Echarri-Aranaz.

The Hussar brigade and 4th division will move forward at 5 A.M.

General Ponsonby's brigade and the 3rd and 7th divisions will follow at 7 A.M.

The Right Column will be put in motion as soon as the road is cleared.

The 5th division will follow the infantry of the Right Column. Sir Thomas Graham, with General Anson's brigade and the 1st division, and Pack's and Bradford's, will proceed to Villafranca upon the great road from Vitoria towards Bayonne. This corps is to act against the enemy or any of his convoys moving on the great road to France, and also against a corps understood to be retiring from Bilbao. General Giron, who is moving to Mondragon, will co-operate with Sir T. Graham.

Brigades of cavalry not mentioned will halt to-morrow.

Head-quarters will be at Echarri-Aranaz.

G. MURRAY.

Earl Bathurst to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, London, 23rd June, 1813.

The Armistice will not, I think, enable the French to send back to Spain any reinforcements intended for Germany unless it should be followed by a peace. The situation of the French army, and of the Allied army too, is at present critical. The declaration of Austria, one way or the other, would be in a great measure decisive. The last accounts from the Allies on

this subject were not as sanguine as they had been; and I saw a private letter to Munster from Vienna which impresses me with little hope of any real good-will, and almost none of any manly decision. But Austria looks to her own aggrandizement; and even if she succeeds in this only, much will be gained. Buonaparte must exert himself to the utmost to be able to make even a good arrangement with Austria, and this therefore will prevent his thinking of Spain at the present moment. Our last accounts from the Allies were dated the 1st. At that time the Armistice which had been originally proposed by Buonaparte was not concluded, and the Emperor of Russia had declined to receive Caulaincourt, and would not listen to a longer term than fifteen days. I do not know what made the alteration in so short a time.

There is, unfortunately, a party (of which Mons. Stein forms a part) at head-quarters against the Crown Prince. They have succeeded in preventing any troops being placed under his command. By the (unauthorized) offer made to the Danes by Prince Dolgoroucki, they have excited his jealousy; and by thus preventing his having the power to advance with effect, and giving him a disgust to the cause, he has been on the point of returning, which probably would have made a complete rupture. I believe him to be sincere, but he has his objects; and he will get them if he possibly can, as his influence in Sweden depends so much on his succeeding in them. If he cannot get them by being an ally of Russia, he will try the reverse. He professes to be entirely satisfied with us, and I believe we have been the means of preventing a decided quarrel.

The Allies, notwithstanding their retreat, had their spirits unshaken. Several successes in their retreat had encouraged them. The worst was the jealousies among the Generals, and the want of any person whom all would gladly obey. The Russians will never submit long to be commanded by a German, and Wittgenstein has been bothered out of his senses by the constant presence of Alexander and the King of Prussia, who would never leave him. Last year, when the existence of the empire was in question, they forced the Emperor at the commencement of the campaign into a post-chaise, and carried him off to Petersburg, to raise a new army there.

Many at head-quarters are, I understand, beginning to express a wish for your Lordship. I should be afraid that there would be so much cabal always at work as to make such a command (however flattering) hazardous for your reputation, particularly if the Emperor were to continue with the army. But I throw this out for your consideration in case the war on the Continent should continue another year, and you terminate the campaign this year in Spain, so as to be able to leave it with a part only of the British army to defend the front which we may occupy. For I think that if the prospects continued next year to look favourable on the Continent, we need not make a point of driving the French from every [redacted] in Spain before we diverted our force (or rather part of our force) to Germany, if by so doing we could take such leading share in the campaign as would follow from your having the chief, or even a great command.

I throw this out for your consideration now, and I shall be glad to have your opinion.

But we must be prepared for what is more probable; that this Armistice will be followed by a Continental peace, more or less favourable to the

Allies, but by no means equal to what we have been induced to hope would be the result of this campaign.

An offer will most likely come from Austria that we should be included in the negotiation for peace. Spain is the great point which we must make. If France should consent that the Ebro should be the boundary, and there should be a reasonable expectation of favourable arrangements in other particulars, will the prospects before us with respect to Spain justify our breaking off on that? My own opinion is that if we cannot get beyond the Ebro this year, we shall not the next. First, because if France makes a separate peace with the Allies, she can send such reinforcements as will make it impossible; secondly, that Portugal is getting daily more and more adverse to us; thirdly, that the Liberales at Cadiz will never permit the Cortes to remove from thence, and will have influence enough over the government to make it quarrel with the clergy and with us; so that they will disgust the body of the people, incline many to France, and counteract you in all your operations. I am strongly inclined to think that the only chance of avoiding the evil to be apprehended from this party is to declare for the Church, the *Inquisition*, &c., and overturn the party before it gets too strong.

I have written you a very long letter, much too long to address to a Commander-in-Chief in the midst of a campaign; but it relates to our future prospects, and as I have written without reserve, it will in some measure put you in possession of what may be in time more fully stated to you.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck to General the Marquess of Wellington.**

MY DEAR LORD, Alicante, 23rd June, 1813.

I prefer putting in a private letter my opinions relative to the intelligence we received from Murat of the project of Buonaparte to attack Sicily.

I cannot tell whether this intelligence is true or false, or for what reason Murat may have made the communication.

If 10,000 Neapolitan troops could be landed in Sicily, the island would fall, because they would be immediately joined by our Neapolitans, and on our side we should only have our own British force, of which a part is very ill composed. There exists no national force, and from the little military spirit there is in Sicily, and from the want of energy in the government, together with the impossibility of making the Parliament adopt a conscription, the island for some time to come must wholly depend upon our protection. They are contented to do so, and they are desirous, upon this reliance, to avoid the pecuniary and personal sacrifices of an army of their own. This was the feeling of the last Parliament. A new one is about to assemble, which I hope may entertain juster sentiments. But even if they would act as I wish, they have not the means of forming a

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. x., p. 481, letter to Lord W. C. Bentinck, 1st July, 1813.

Sicilian army, as they have no officers, and have voted that none but native Sicilians shall be admitted as officers. This vote had reference to the Neapolitans, whom they consider as the instruments of their oppression. They also voted that no Sicilian should be *forced* to serve either in the army or navy. We had therefore no resource but to attempt voluntary enrolment, by the strongest inducements we had to offer of rank to the recruiters, and of a sufficient bounty to the recruit. The attempt has entirely failed. We have not succeeded in obtaining 200 men. The country is also in a state of extreme poverty, and time alone can bring them out of their difficulties, made greater than is necessary by their ignorance and prejudices.

Your Lordship is the best judge how far it is practicable for the Toulon fleet to get to Sicily. I have given to this subject my best consideration, and I confess my opinion to be that the Toulon fleet are not going to Sicily. We on our passage fell in with a boat full of deserters that had escaped from Toulon, who confirm what we had heard from the in-shore squadron, that the fleet is very imperfectly manned since the detachment of all the cannoneers for the Army of the North; and I should think, under the apparent importance of the expedition from Sicily remaining in Spain during the summer, that unless further intelligence is received which shall confirm Murat's communication, the risk may be run. Although *I* think it possible for the Toulon fleet to get to Sicily, yet I think it difficult; and upon this difficulty, combined with the importance of keeping the Sicilian detachment in Spain, my opinion is founded. I must, at the same time, say very decidedly, that when the summer is over, Sicily cannot be considered safe for a moment without the return of all the British force that is at present detached from it.

I give these opinions from the sincere desire to promote as far as I can the policy which has been adopted by our own government. As you have seen from my despatches, my sentiments have been very different, and every day has added to my conviction upon this subject. I am sure last year Italy would have been taken, and a much more powerful diversion made both for Spain and Russia than by the employment of our force at Alicante. In Spain we have 12,000 men; in Italy we might have had 25,000. The time is no longer as favourable. The Viceroy is returned, and is forming an army, and Murat has been straining every nerve to increase and make good his own. It is, however, only Neapolitan. I believe at this moment if all the force was in Sicily, Murat could be *compelled* to declare himself against Buonaparte. He would, I think, fear the effect of it upon his own power, and prefer acting in conjunction with it against Buonaparte. I am aware that these are speculations of uncertain good, to which a positive advantage ought not to be sacrificed; but, at the same time, the object is a great one, and the possession of Italy is of infinitely more value to Buonaparte than that of Spain.

If your Lordship should be of opinion that during the summer there is no danger to Sicily from the Toulon fleet—and I think there is none independent of that fleet—I would propose that not only the two battalions should be ordered from Sicily that were lately sent there, but a portion

also of the Neapolitans. I shall not send for them without your Lordship's concurrence in this opinion.

I remain, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

The transports have not yet appeared. I have informed the Duque del Parque of their expected arrival, as well as of the return of Suchet, and have recommended to him not to allow Suchet to fall upon him before we join him.

I enclose a Mémoire upon the subject of Italy, which, at your leisure, is worth your perusal. It is written by Count Latour.

I find the army in the best spirit, and, mixed as it is, I shall be much disappointed if it does not behave well. I forbear, from motives of delicacy, saying anything upon the siege of Tarragona, the issue of which has given rise to very general dissatisfaction.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Les immenses ressources que fournissent à Buonaparte les vastes états soumis à sa domination lui avoient déjà en 1812 procuré les moyens d'avoir simultanément des forces prépondérantes en Pologne et en Espagne. Sa prépondérance en Pologne a été prouvée par l'invasion des Etats Russes jusqu'à Moscow; et sa prépondérance en Espagne l'a été d'une manière encore plus incontestable par la retraite à laquelle Lord Wellington a été obligé, malgré les grands succès qu'il venoit d'obtenir dans une des plus belles campagnes dont l'histoire fasse mention. D'après ces faits, qui sont à la connoissance de l'Europe entière, il est évident qu'en 1812 les moyens militaires de Buonaparte étoient supérieurs à ceux des Alliés. Mais cette vérité a été rendue encore bien plus frappante par les événements de 1813; en effet, dans les mois de Novembre et Décembre, 1812, l'immense armée Françoise du Nord a été anéantie par le climat et la brave nation Russe; et au commencement de 1813 cette armée avoit à la lettre cessé d'exister. Malgré cette terrible catastrophe, et malgré que les Prussiens se soient joints aux Russes, cinq mois (c'est-à-dire depuis Décembre, 1812, jusqu'à Mai, 1813) ont suffi à Buonaparte pour puiser dans ses vastes dominations des moyens militaires suffisants pour tenir tête à ses ennemis au Nord, et même pour prendre l'offensive sur eux, ainsi que le prouvent la bataille de Lutzen et la nouvelle invasion de la Saxe. L'arrivée des Suédois apportera, il est vrai, un nouveau poid dans la balance, mais en évaluant ce poid, joint à celui des insurgés du Nord de l'Allemagne, comme égal à celui des ressources que Buonaparte puisera de nouveau dans ses dominations pendant les mois de Mai et Juin, on l'évalue sûrement à toute sa valeur; ainsi, on peut poser comme base qu'en Juillet, 1813, les énormes et subites pertes militaires que l'ennemi a souffertes au Nord seront reparées, que l'équilibre des forces sera rétabli, et le théâtre de la guerre fixé entre Elbe et Oder, et peut-être même entre Elbe et Vistule. Cela fait, l'attention, et une partie considérable des moyens militaires que Buonaparte puise chaque mois dans son empire, seront dirigés sur l'Espagne, qu'au moment de la crise de ses affaires au Nord il a été forcé de négliger; ainsi, pendant le courant des mois de Juillet, d'Août, et de Septembre, il rassemblera aux Pyrénées des forces respectables qui en Octobre ou Novembre déboucheront en Espagne, et par leur prépondérance numérique nous y enleveront une grande partie des provinces qui nous y auront occupées pendant la belle saison. Alors Buonaparte ayant

rétabli ses affaires au Nord et au Midi, dira à l'Europe, "J'avois perdu ma principale armée, et mes ennemis n'ont pas pu vaincre; actuellement elles sont toutes plus nombreuses et plus belles qu'elles ne le furent jamais. Comment peuvent-ils espérer la victoire?" Ce langage menaçant et malheureusement vrai jetera l'effroi sur le Continent et le découragement parmi les Alliés. Il y aura des paix séparées, des médiations, des armistices, et l'Angleterre finira par rester de nouveau seule chargée du poid de la guerre.

La divine Providence nous avoit offert les moyens de détourner cette situation affligeante, par suite des désastres soudains que l'ennemi avoit souffert au Nord. L'Italie, la plus riche des possessions de Buonaparte, et peuplée par 15,000,000 d'hommes en général mécontents de sa domination, avoit été laissée sans défense, et pendant les six mois qui viennent de s'écouler cette belle contrée a été une proie facile offerte à l'Angleterre. En employant à cet objet l'expédition d'Alicante, ou une force équivalente jointe aux troupes que nous avions en Sicile, l'Italie était à nous presque sans "coup férir;" et Buonaparte, privé des ressources qu'il a puisé dans cette riche et populeuse contrée, n'auroit pas pu rassembler au Nord les forces prépondérantes qui y ont arrêté les progrès de nos Alliés. La guerre seroit venue au Rhin et aux Alpes, et l'ennemi, privé des ressources de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie, n'auroit plus pu résister aux efforts de l'Europe.

Afin d'écarter ce danger, Buonaparte, dans les guerres précédentes, conservoit toujours une forte réserve en Italie; mais cette année-ci la nécessité où il a été de rassembler subitement tous ses moyens militaires au Nord, et celle où il va être d'envoyer de prompts renforts en Espagne, le forcent de renoncer à cette précaution. Ainsi il est extrêmement probable qu'il n'y laissera pas d'autres forces inactives que celle de Murat; lesquelles peuvent pour un certain tems être paralysées par des négotiations, ou par des démonstrations sur les Calabrèse. Ainsi, pour cette armée, l'Angleterre conserve encore la chance de la conquête de l'Italie, et elle peut par cette conquête fixer en sa faveur la balance des ressources militaires qui sans cet événement est, et reste ainsi qu'il n'est que trop prouvé en faveur de Buonaparte; mais passé cette année et la crise extraordinaire qui y a eu lieu, l'ennemi reviendra à l'établissement de sa réserve en Italie, et nous aurons perdu la possibilité de lui enlever cette fertile contrée. Les événements qui viennent de se passer au Nord ont prouvé que tant que Buonaparte conserve ses ressources, la perte de ses soldats n'est pour lui qu'un mal passager, et promptement reparé. C'est donc ses ressources plutôt que ses soldats qu'il faut attaquer. En Espagne nous faisons la guerre à ses soldats, tandis qu'en Italie nous la ferions à ses ressources. Ce motif seul devrait engager l'Angleterre à employer à la guerre d'Italie une partie des forces qu'elle employe à celle d'Espagne, mais à ce motif il s'en joint d'autres qui ne sont pas moins pressants. En Espagne nous trouvons un ennemi préparé à nous combattre: en Italie il ne l'est pas. En Espagne nos conquêtes n'enlèvent à l'ennemi aucune de ses ressources, et augmentent fort peu les nôtres. En Italie chaque conquête diminue sensiblement les ressources de l'ennemi, et augmente dans la même proportion les nôtres. En Espagne l'influence politique se termine aux Pyrénées, derrière lesquelles habite un peuple ennemi. En Italie nous trouvons à la frontière le Tirol et la Suisse prêts à se déclarer pour nous, et dont l'exemple ébranleroit et affoibleroit l'influence Françoise en Allemagne. En Espagne, enfin, nous devons employer une force d'environ 80,000 hommes pour y soutenir une guerre dont, malgré un tel effort, l'issue est encore douteuse, et laquelle même dans le cas du succès le plus complet ne prive encore l'ennemi d'aucune de ses ressources, tandis qu'en ajoutant 15,000 ou 20,000 hommes de l'expédition d'Alicante aux troupes que nous avons en Sicile, il y a encore pour quelques mois la presque certitude

d'enlever Italie à Buonaparte, et de la priver ainsi du pays qui, après la France, lui fournit le plus de ressources.

On terminera cette esquisse en observant que Dieu a produit cette année-ci des événements extraordinaires et inattendus qui nous présentent la possibilité d'abattre notre implacable ennemi; mais si nous n'en profitons pas pour frapper sa puissance dans sa source, il y a, humainement parlant, peu à espérer que l'avenir nous présente des chances aussi favorables. Tant que Buonaparte restera le maître de la France, de l'Italie, et de l'Allemagne, ses ressources militaires seront supérieurs à celles des Alliés, ainsi que le prouvent les événements des années 1812 et 1813; et si on lui laisse cette supériorité de ressources dont l'Italie est la seule grande base qu'il soit actuellement au pouvoir exclusif de l'Angleterre de lui enlever, il doit, suivant les calculs de la prudence humaine, finir par terminer la guerre à son avantage.

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*Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Murray to General the Marquess of Wellington.**

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Alicante, 23rd June, 1813.

If I would have allowed the Admiral to command the army, you never would have been troubled with the long letter which accompanies this. I would not do so; and although we have been on friendly terms, I have never perceived that cordiality which might have made things go on pleasanter. The Admiral is certainly a very zealous officer, and at all times exerts himself; but there is a great difference in acting with him when he approves or disapproves a measure. This Catalonian Expedition he has all along condemned, and has repeatedly told me I ought not to have undertaken it, and that when united with the 2nd and 3rd armies I ought to have attacked Suchet. On the day I raised the siege he wanted me to attack Decaen, and pressed me very much to remain longer, assuring me that the guns would be preserved. I have no doubt that the Admiral would have done everything that man could do to save the guns, but as his promises could neither prevent the march of the enemy nor control the winds, I did not think it prudent to confide in them. Unfortunately, too, the Quartermaster-General, with whom the Admiral has long quarrelled, was of an opinion different from his; and as it coincided with my own, it was followed, and the Admiral thinks that the prejudice led me to act as I did. These are the real grounds of all this outcry. You know how readily people blame even successful officers, and on this occasion I am sure that there is not one-tenth of those who now do so, that knew where the enemy was, or what his force when I raised the siege. Much and anxiously did I look at the works, in hopes of being able to storm, but it was quite impossible; the walls were in general supposed to be about 30 or 35 feet high, and the approach to them difficult. Although the French have destroyed the outer works, the place is still strong, and unfortunately they had just finished the reestablishment of a fort detached from the works when we arrived: this work would have been stormed on the evening of the 11th, but it was useless to throw away men's lives when the siege was to be raised the next day. The ship with the fascines from Iviça arrived

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. x., p. 488, letter to Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Murray, 1st July, 1813.

only on the 5th, and by the 11th, on the morning, we had five batteries open, and every preparation made for an active continuance. It will give you some idea of the strength of the place that Major Thackeray declared on the 7th or 8th that he could not answer for taking the place in less than fourteen days. It was a great disadvantage to us having so many foreigners; they neither would nor could work, and some of them, when they got into fire, threw away the ammunition they were carrying to the batteries.

I shall feel a great anxiety till I shall hear from your Lordship. I have done the utmost in my power to succeed, but the enemy's force was too great for us. In your letter of the 23rd of May your Lordship predicts what we found to be the case; they were too strong for us.

The long letter which I have written is not perhaps very clear. I shall be happy to give any further explanation in my power, and I am sure I have the most perfect conviction that no Alicante army would now have existed if either of these columns had ever engaged us whilst the other was so near.

Lord William's courier is just going, and I can add no more. I look with confidence to your Lordship's decision, and beg you will believe me,

My dear Lord Wellington,

Yours most sincerely,

J. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Murray to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Alicante, 23rd June, 1813.

On the 14th instant, when much occupied, I had the honour to inform your Lordship that I had been obliged to raise the siege of Tarragona, that I had left the cannon in the most advanced batteries, and that I had embarked the army.

Deeply as I regret the necessity of these measures, I am convinced they were inevitable; that from the appearance of affairs at the time, I could not act otherwise without risking the existence of the army; and that, compared with the misfortune which must have followed a longer perseverance in the siege, the sacrifice I made was trifling in the extreme.

The subsequent statement will, I should hope, fully substantiate what I have here asserted; and if your Lordship is satisfied with it, I shall bear with patience the unmerited blame which is often cast on those who conduct an unsuccessful operation without the circumstances being considered which led to failure, or, in this instance, the consequences which must have ensued had this army been captured or rendered ineffective for the campaign.

As the justification of the measures adopted must depend on the statement which I have now the honour of addressing to your Lordship, I hope your Excellency will excuse me if it runs to some length, and if it touches upon points with which your Lordship is already acquainted.

I am anxious to bring the whole subject under your Lordship's view at once, and to render it clear and intelligible to His Majesty's ministers, to whom I conclude your Lordship will submit it.

Your Lordship's orders* directed that I should proceed to the siege of Tarragona, provided a body of 10,000 infantry or more, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery, could be embarked; and that other measures should be adopted, if that number could not be provided for on board the transports. Means were found adequate for embarking about 13,000 infantry, and with this force I sailed from Alicante on the 31st of May.

On the evening of the 2nd of June the fleet anchored to the eastward of the point of Salon. The divisions ordered to land were put into the boats, but the surf ran so high that, in Admiral Hallowell's opinion, they could not land.

The disembarkation took place on the 3rd, and the town was immediately invested.

In this operation your Lordship, as appears from the orders above alluded to, had two objects in view, the capture of Tarragona itself, and a diversion in favour of the 2nd and 3rd Spanish armies. In the latter it has been perfectly successful, and it was scarcely possible that it should be so in both. This your Lordship evidently foresaw, well knowing the force which the enemy, in a certain time, could collect in Catalonia; and in the 7th paragraph of your orders your Lordship observes that the second object (the capture of Tarragona) must be a question of time and means, and the advantages which will result from the return of this army into the kingdom of Valencia are stated, "should Suchet, notwithstanding the junction of the 1st army, oblige me to raise the siege, and to embark without accomplishing the object in view."

As the 13th paragraph of the General Instructions so clearly points out your Lordship's views as to the mode in which the General officers should conduct the campaign, and the degree of risk they should run, I take the liberty of quoting part of it. "It must be understood, however, by General officers at the head of these troops, that the success of all our endeavours in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beaten, of which the operating armies will be composed;" and concludes thus: "I will forgive anything excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed."

In reference then, my Lord, to the 7th paragraph, I beg to state that I had neither time nor means: time, because Suchet collected an army in my immediate neighbourhood before the least impression was made, or could have been made, on the body of the place; nor means, because I could not form a covering army to protect the besieging one from attack. When I found this to be the case, I conceive that a compliance with your Lordship's instructions required that I should abandon the enterprise; and I trust I shall be enabled to show that no time was to be lost when I decided on the measure, unless I chose in opposition to your Lordship's intentions to risk a general action with a superior force, which, if defeated, could with safety retire beyond my reach, and when, should the battle prove unfortunate, the destruction of the allied army must have been the inevitable consequence.

From the most accurate statements which I have had it in my power to

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. x., p. 297: Memorandum of the Operations to be carried on on the Eastern Coast of the Peninsula, 14th April, 1813.

procure, Marshal Suchet's force in the kingdom of Valencia amounts to 23,000 or 24,000; and the army of Catalonia, including the garrisons, is stated to be 22,900; making, it may be called, an army of 46,000 men. I do not, however, mean to assert that the enemy could bring all this force to act against the allied army in Catalonia; but allowing that he left in Valencia 11,000 men (and it appears he has not left so many), and 10,000 in the garrisons in Catalonia, a disposable army of 24,000 men at least was still at his command.

To oppose this army, in as far as the late expedition was concerned, I had about 13,000 men; and, from General Copons's statement, his disposable force amounted to 8500 men, and these latter without pay, without discipline, without a single piece of cannon, without the means of subsisting, and totally incapable of acting in the field with other troops. Of all descriptions, therefore, it appears that the allied army consisted of 21,500 men, of which about 4500 were British and Germans, 1300 or 1400 Sicilians, 600 Calabrese, and the remainder were Spaniards. In point of cavalry a very great superiority existed on the part of the enemy. Such was the strength and composition of an army with which I was to meet the enemy's army, composed as it is of the best troops of France, and long habituated to act together. But the difference in the situation of the armies is no less striking. The French General possessed in every direction fortresses around me, to cover his army if defeated, to furnish his supplies, or to retire to if he wished to avoid an action for the purposes of bringing up more troops, or to wait the movements of a detached column.

The allied army, on the contrary, was in the open field, without one serviceable point d'appui, and without a place to halt even for a day, however necessary. But, in case of retreat, where could it retire? to its ships. There indeed the army would have been safe, if it ever reached them; but your Lordship knows too well what a three days' embarkation must cost an army (and it would have required three days at least to complete it), to wish that I should have exposed it to such an operation on an open beach; on a beach where, as we had found by experience on several occasions during the eight days we were on shore, that it was impossible to disembark but in the lightest boats.

Had affairs come to this extremity, we must have lost every animal belonging to the army; every piece of field artillery; and, in all probability, the greater part, if not the whole, of the covering division of infantry. To probable misfortunes of so extensive a nature I am sure your Lordship would never have wished that the army should have been exposed. I say probable, not only from the superiority of the enemy, but from the want of sufficient equipments, which it was impossible to take with us, and which we had not sufficient time to procure.

If, as I can hardly doubt, your Lordship should be of opinion that these risks were not to be incurred, it will still rest with your Lordship to decide whether it would have been in my power to avoid them if I once permitted a strong column of the enemy to get in contact with me, whilst another of greater strength was in fact within one day's march of me (although I believed it within two), and in my rear. That I could have defeated the column approaching from Barcelona, I have no doubt, had it waited an attack; but what hope could I entertain that it would do so?

and, whilst making the attempt, I must have left the besieging army without field artillery and without cavalry, exposed to the attack of Marshal Suchet's army, without artillery likewise, it is true, but greatly superior in cavalry, and with a more numerous body of infantry, whilst that division of the allied army must have left a corps to protect itself from the garrison of Tarragona, which, though weak, would not have been kept in check with less than 2000 men. Nothing but absolute destruction could have followed.

Having enumerated in a former part of this letter the force which the enemy might employ, it remains to state what, from the best information I could procure, he actually did employ, to force me to raise the siege of Tarragona. I can assure your Lordship that I believe my accounts to have been accurate, and certainly they are not exaggerated.

The first report which reached me of the enemy's movements was, I think, on the 7th of June, when I learned that the disposable column from Gerona was in march for Barcelona, and that every effort was making to collect immediately 10,000 men at that place, to which would be attached fourteen pieces of artillery. This was confirmed from every quarter: General Copons stated it to be the case; Colonel Manzo, who commanded the advanced posts, and who had a constant communication with Barcelona daily, made the same reports, and, on one occasion, stated the enemy's force to be 12,000 men; and, in short, from whatever source I derived intelligence, I found the numbers perfectly to agree. But I have no reason to believe that the column exceeded 8000 men when it did march; and from the examination of deserters since, I am satisfied that that was nearly its force. On the 10th this column occupied Villa Reyna, and on the 11th established itself at Villa Franca, which is about twelve hours' march from Tarragona, and from whence it had the option of three carriageable roads for that place. With my inadequate disposable force every one of these roads must have been occupied, and the two corps (such is the difficulty of communication), posted where the enemy did not advance, could not have joined the third body, which would have been exposed to the whole force of the enemy. This corps of the enemy suddenly broke up, but after we were embarked, alarmed, as I have every reason to believe, by the appearance of Sir Edward Pellew's fleet in the Bay of Rosas, an event with which I was totally unacquainted.

On the other hand, from Valencia to Tortosa, Marshal Suchet was advancing with the utmost rapidity. On the 9th I received by express advice that he had left Valencia on the 7th with 9000 infantry, and from the corps in his rear he had ample means to reinforce this body. I knew that 1000 men had actually arrived at Tortosa before this time, and that 2500 men had reached Lerida. Late in the evening of the 11th I received the information that Suchet had quitted Tortosa on the 10th, and it was clear that, if he chose to pass by the mountain roads (as he actually did) to the plain of Tarragona, he could be before the allied army on the 13th. The head of one of his columns appeared on the plain in the course of that day, and the British cavalry was actually engaged with it.

To advance with artillery certainly would have lengthened his march, but this he thought unnecessary, as in fact it was, as he would have found none to oppose him. He would have had to contend with infantry alone,

of which a very small proportion would have been British, occupied in a siege, and obliged to divide its attention between a more powerful enemy on the one side, and an attack which might fairly be expected from the garrison of Tarragona on the other.

Such, my Lord, would infallibly have been the state of the army had I delayed the embarkation if the French Generals chose to push forward; and where the stake was so great, I had every reason to expect they would do so.

Upon a review of this case I believe your Lordship will rather be of opinion that I continued the siege too long than that I abandoned it too soon, and I can only plead an extreme anxiety to carry your Lordship's views into execution as my excuse. I saw the moment when in all prudence the cannon ought to have been embarked and the enterprise abandoned; but that moment followed so closely the commencement of the siege and Suchet's march, and the consequent possibility of his return, that no diversion would have been made in favour of the 2nd and 3rd Spanish armies. I should, besides, by too precipitate a measure of this nature, have relinquished every chance of the fortunate occurrences which sometimes happen in war, and nowhere was there greater reason to hope for and to expect them than at the siege of Tarragona, where the garrison was weak, and reported in part to be dissatisfied. The line of Suchet's operations, besides, was not ascertained till his actual arrival at Tortosa; a delay might have given us the place, and the movements of his columns might have been deranged. These and other chances of success I should have given up if the cannon had been withdrawn from the batteries on the 8th, or perhaps the 9th, and if they remained a day longer they were exposed to be lost. But, my Lord, calculating the importance of the objects your Lordship had in view, I determined to persevere in the siege to the last possible moment I could do so without sacrificing the efficiency of the army for the field; and I determined to risk a proportion of the battering-train, to the loss of which I attach less importance than others seem to do. This, my Lord, is not an opinion formed for this occasion. I approved of cannon being used to the last moment, and abandoned, at the battle of Castalla; and when at the siege of the Coll de Ballaguer there appeared to be a necessity either of withdrawing the cannon or of losing them, I directed that they should be used to the last, and then spiked and left.

Here, my Lord, I shall conclude, and I venture to hope that your Lordship will excuse my having entered so much at length into the subject. I know that it is the opinion of some that the cannon might have been saved; but I trust that your Lordship will not think that, threatened with an attack on both flanks, the attempt should have been made, whilst it would have required three days at least, under the most favourable circumstances, to embark the army, and, in the event of blowing weather, it could not have been embarked at all.

With respect to the general issue of the expedition I can only say that it was my opinion, and it appears no less to have been that of your Lordship, that both the objects in contemplation could not succeed, although one of them might be considered as ensured. Had Suchet remained in Valencia, Tarragona fell; if he marched in force to its relief, it was inevitably saved, but the Duque del Parque remained unopposed on the

Xucar. I shall only add my belief, that where a siege is pushed to the last moment, and does not ultimately succeed, the loss of the battering cannon is almost inevitable; and they must be particularly endangered where the only place of retreat is a fleet, to reach which they must depend upon the weather and inactivity of the enemy.

I have omitted, when speaking of the force with which I had to oppose the progress of the enemy, to mention that two Spanish and two British battalions were detached at the Coll de Ballaguer, and that that force could not be weakened, and was much exposed. It may be necessary to add that in any action which I might be obliged to hazard, I must ever have had in view, in case of defeat, the retreat of the Catalonian army to the north, which, if not secured, it, with the province, was lost, and the retreat of the allied army to the fleet. I believe it would have been impossible to connect these two objects when opposed by so powerful an enemy.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient and humble servant,
J. MURRAY.

Arrangement for the Movements on the 24th June, 1813.

Major-General V. Alten's brigade and the Light division will move forward at day-break by the great road of Pamplona towards Irurzun. The baggage of those corps will follow the Light division.

The 4th division, followed by its baggage, will move at 5 A.M. by the same route.

The brigade of Hussars and Major-General Ponsonby's brigade will halt where they now are, but will be prepared to move in the afternoon, in case ordered to do so. The 3rd and 7th divisions, each followed by its baggage, will move at 5 A.M., and follow the route of the 4th division, and the infantry of the Right Column will follow these divisions.

The 5th division will be ready to move. The cavalry at Salvatierra will continue there.

The baggage of head-quarters will follow the 4th division.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Segura, 24th June, 1813, ½ past 7 A.M.

In addition to my own report, I have the honour to enclose General Howard's, covering one from Colonel Halkett to him. I understand from him that the officers he names behaved in the most intrepid manner.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—I fear the enemy will pass down to Villafranca before the troops can possibly move from hence, so much are they exhausted.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Major-General Howard to Lieut.-General Sir T. Graham.

SIR, Segura, 24th June, 1813.

I have the honour to enclose for your information Colonel Halkett's report of the proceedings of the brigade of the King's German Legion under his command, in the attack on the village and bridge of Arriaga on the 21st inst.

The attack was made by Colonel Halkett with the two Light battalions, and the remainder of the division was moved up towards the village to support the attack, had it been necessary.

Colonel Halkett has fully detailed the affair: all I have to add is that every arrangement was made by Colonel Halkett with the greatest judgment, and the place carried with great gallantry.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

H. HOWARD.

II.

Colonel Halkett to Major-General Howard.

SIR, Camp near Vitoria, 22nd June, 1813.

In conformity with your instructions I have the honour to report the proceedings of the German brigade under my orders in the action of the 21st inst. On being ordered to attack the village and bridge of Arriaga, I detached Major Prince Reuss, 2nd Light battalion, with four companies, on the right to support the movement, whilst the bridge was charged in front by myself, with two companies of the 1st and one of the 2nd Light battalions, the advance of which was gallantly led by Lieutenants Hedeman and Witgendorff, of those corps. Captain Wyncken, 2nd Light battalion, crossed the river with two of the companies placed under the orders of Prince Reuss, covered by Captain Langrehr, commanding the riflemen of the Line battalions, and moved on the church to the right of the village. Having dislodged the enemy from the cover on the right, the advance of the centre was facilitated, and the village was carried by the companies that forced the bridge. A howitzer was taken in the village, and three guns fell into our possession on the left, the officer in command of which defended them most obstinately, and did not surrender until he was himself wounded. I cannot sufficiently express my satisfaction at the conduct of all the troops, and it would be unjust to particularize individuals. I must, however, thank Colonel Ompteda and Major Hurtzig, in command of the Light battalions, and Colonel Klingsohr, who advanced with the battalions of the Line in support of the whole. I am indebted to the Staff of the brigades, Brigade-Majors Baron Drechsel and Wiegman, and to my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Baron Gustavus Marschalk. Your orders were delivered to me in the most distinct manner by the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Upton and Major Hope, who rendered me every assistance in the formation of the troops agreeable thereto. I am happy to state that the loss has been small, considering the heavy fire of grape and musketry through which we advanced. I have not, however, been able to collect the exact returns.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

T. HALKETT.

Arrangement for the Movements of the Army on the 25th of June, 1813.

Major-General V. Alten's brigade of cavalry and the Light division will be prepared to move forward when the 4th division has closed up to them, but these corps are not to be put in march till further orders.

The 4th division will move at 5 A.M.

The baggage of the above division and brigade of cavalry will move in rear of the 4th division, when the troops are put in motion towards Pamplona.

The baggage of head-quarters will follow immediately in rear of the 4th division.

Colonel Grant will put the Hussar brigade in motion (by regiments, each followed by its baggage) at daybreak, and proceed by Lacunza and Irurzun towards Pamplona, and forward an officer to the Light division for further orders.

The infantry in front of the Hussar brigade will not move until it has passed. The 3rd and 7th divisions will follow the Hussar brigade; and Lieutenant-General Sir T. Picton will send forward an officer to the Light division to receive further orders respecting the march of the two divisions.

Major-General Ponsonby will put his brigade of cavalry in march at 9 A.M., and will close up as near as may be convenient to the 7th division at the close of its march.

Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill will put the infantry under his orders in march when the corps above mentioned have moved forwards, and will make such a march as he may judge expedient, according to the time when it may have been found possible to put the troops in march.

Sir Rowland Hill will be so good as to send an order also for the cavalry of the Right Column of the army to move from the neighbourhood of Salvatierra, and move forward after the infantry of that column by the most convenient route.

Sir Rowland Hill will be so good as to continue the movements of the troops of the Right Column of the army on the 26th inst., sending forward to head-quarters for further orders.

Major-General Ponsonby will be so good as to leave a letter-party of his brigade at Echarri-Aranaz until it is relieved by the cavalry of the Right Column of the army.

Major-General Oswald will be so good as report where the 5th division has halted, in the event of its having moved forward from Salvatierra. That division will remain in its present situation till further orders.

Major-General Bock will place the brigades of cavalry remaining near Salvatierra in the most convenient cantonments in the neighbourhood of that town, and will be so good as establish his own head-quarters at Salvatierra.

Major-General Bock will be pleased to station letter parties at Olazagustin and at Echarri-Aranaz, and will also establish communications with Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham and with Vitoria.

Lieutenant-General Clinton will order the two squadrons of cavalry of the Right Column which are with the 6th division to march to Salvatierra, and Major-General Bock will direct them to proceed from thence by easy marches, following the route of Lieutenant-General Sir R. Hill's column.

G. MURRAY.

Arrangement for the Movements on the 26th June.

Orcoyen, 25th June, 1813.

The 3rd division will march at daybreak by Berrioplano to the neighbourhood of Villaba, where it will take up the position occupied by the Light division to-day.

The 7th division will move also at daybreak, and take up the ground occupied to-day by the 4th division near Berrioplano.

As soon as the 3rd division has reached Berrioplano, the Light division will be put in motion, and move round (leaving the fortress of Pamplona at a sufficient distance to the right) to the neighbourhood of Noain, which is one league from Pamplona, on the great road leading to Tafalla.

The 4th division and Major Ross's troop of Horse Artillery will march by the village of Arazun (crossing the river Arga there), and proceed to the neighbourhood of Noain.

The Hussar brigade will march at daybreak to Noain, preceding the 4th division.

The Earl of Dalhousie and Sir Thomas Picton will push forwards their posts towards Pamplona in concert with each other, and invest the fortress of Pamplona upon the right bank of the Arga.

Lieutenant-General Sir L. Cole and Major-General C. Alten will invest the place in like manner upon the left bank of the Arga.

Colonel Grant will place such vedettes as may be necessary with the posts of the 4th and Light divisions, and will furnish also a squadron of support to the posts; and Major-General V. Alten will place vedettes and furnish an officer's piquet of support to the posts of the 3rd and 7th divisions.

The regiment of General V. Alten's brigade which is near Villaba will send patrols to a considerable distance along the road by which the enemy's army has retired towards France.

Major-General Ponsonby's brigade will move at 8 A.M., and will take up the cantonments occupied to-day by the Hussar brigade.

G. MURRAY.

To General Espoz y Mina. [661.]

SIR, 26th June, 1813, 9 P.M.

I have just now received your letter of half-past two.*

If you had been able to reach the bridge of Lodosa before the enemy, the plan settled last night would have answered. As it is, you must now move towards Tudela, so as to secure that point till I shall arrive.

The enemy will probably destroy the bridge of Lodosa; but you might order some cavalry and light infantry to remain to follow their rear if they should leave the bridge standing. These light troops must watch the enemy's movements on this side of the river, and give me the earliest notice of them.

I shall be to-morrow at Tiebas, unless the enemy's movements should be decided, in which case I will send word on the line from Estella to Lerin, where I shall be.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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* In the Spanish language. General Mina sent a report, and proposed to move on Lodosa.

[662.]

To Colonel Malcolm.

MY DEAR MALCOLM, Orcoyen, 26th June, 1813.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 22nd May, which I received by the last post, and the sword which you have given me.

You will hear of events here. I have taken more guns from these fellows in the last action than I took at Assye, without much more loss, upon about 70,000 men engaged. The two armies were nearly equal in numbers, but they cannot stand us now at all.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Ulterior Movement of the Army on the 26th June, 1813.

Orcoyen, 10 A.M.

The Hussar brigade and the 4th and the Light divisions will continue their march from Noain by the great road leading to Tafalla.

The Hussar brigade will lead the column, and will proceed to Mandevil and Barasoin, and Lieutenant-General Sir L. Cole will carry forward the divisions of infantry as near to Mandevil as he finds the troops can be moved without too much fatigue.

Sir L. Cole will be so good as to ascertain by what roads this column can be directed to-morrow upon Fuente la Reyna, in case circumstances should render it expedient to move that way.

Colonel Grant will leave one of the regiments of the Hussar brigade near Noain to observe the garrison of Pamplona, until they are relieved by Major-General Ponsonby's brigade.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, Orcoyen, 26th June, 1813.

We have intelligence of General Clausel's troops being in Mentavia and Lusaguria: it would appear from this that his movement is likely to be down the Ebro towards Tudela. Arrangements are therefore making here for a movement in that direction, and Lord Wellington desires that you will be so good as put your column in march towards Pamplona. I beg you will let me know when the troops begin to move, that I may be enabled to judge where the head of the column should halt this evening. I request you will have the line of communication towards Salvatierra still kept up.

Major-General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry will continue its march to-day, following the Hussar brigade, through the village of Arazuri, to Noain, where it will halt.

Major-General Ponsonby will place posts of observation towards Pamplona, and will put himself in communication with the 4th and Light divisions near Mandevil, on the great road to Tafalla.

Major-General Ponsonby will leave a letter-party of his brigade at head-quarters in passing the village of Orcoyen.

Believe me, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

Arrangement for the Movements of the Army on the 27th of June.

Orcoyen, 26th June, 1813.

The Light division and the 4th division will move at daybreak by the great road to Tafalla, to Mandevil, and Barasoin. The Hussar brigade will move to Tafalla.

Major-General Ponsonby's brigade will be prepared to move if ordered.

The 3rd and 7th divisions will move by the most convenient routes into the great road from Pamplona to Tafalla; the 3rd division passing the river Arga above Pamplona, the 7th division below the town by the bridge near the village of Aseguri: these divisions will halt near Sielvas. The artillery of the 3rd division will move with the 7th division. The 2nd division, under Sir R. Hill, will move forward to-morrow towards Pamplona, and take up the ground of the 3rd and 7th divisions, which will not march till the approach of Sir R. Hill's column, leaving also the posts they occupy till relieved by that column. Head-quarters will move by the bridge of Aseguri to Sielvas on the great road from Pamplona to Tafalla. Sir Rowland will direct the Portuguese division of the Conde de Amarante and General Morillo's Spanish corps to halt to-morrow in the situation they at present occupy.

Major-General Victor Alten's brigade will also halt.

G. MURRAY.

Disposition for the 28th June, 1813.

The 7th and 3rd divisions will move from Mandevil at 5 A.M., by Olleta and Serja to Caseda.

The Hussar brigade and General Ponsonby's will move from Olite by Caperose Melida and Carcastillo to Caseda.

The Light division will move by Beyre, Morillo del Feuto, and Galipienzo.

The 4th division will move by St. Martin de Ujue to Galipienzo.

The artillery of the 4th and Light divisions will join the cavalry at Olite at half-past 4, to move with them to Caseda.

The Hussar brigade to send a patrol to Tudela.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Orcoyen, 29th June, 1813, 7 P.M.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th, 8 P.M., by Major Canning, who arrived here about 4 o'clock this evening.

I shall do my utmost to fulfil your Lordship's wishes relative to the blockade of Pamplona. Major Goldfinch is now out examining the place, with the view of carrying into effect your instructions. I shall have the honour of reporting to your Lordship on the subject to-morrow.

Your very faithful and obedient servant,

R. HILL.

30th June, 7 A.M.

Major Goldfinch and the officers of the Royal Engineers are not yet come in: I will not therefore detain Major Canning, but will have the honour of writing to your Lordship in the course of this day.

R. H.

[663.] BLOCKADE OF PAMPLONA.

Orcayn, 30th June, 1813.

Towards effecting the entire blockade of Pamplona, and the ulterior objects proposed, with the four brigades, the following dispositions appear desirable.

The line of circumvallation should be divided into four districts, to which the brigades would be distributed as follows:

The Conde de Amarante, with the Algarve brigade, to take charge of the eastern front, detaching one battalion to support, and form a reserve to the troops acting upon the bank of the river opposite to, and northward of, the town. The head-quarters of the Conde would be on the right bank of the river, his right extending as described, and his left crossing the river by the bridge in front of Villaba, and extending as far as the road leads to Pamplona, leaving the village of Mendillore and the height in front of it on the left hand. Brigadier-General Campbell's brigade would be posted near the bridge Miluz. The battalion of Caçadores to extend themselves along the right bank of the river, opposite the town, with the remaining battalion. Brigadier-General Campbell would occupy the ground on the western side of the town from the river, touching upon it, and holding the tower which is near it in force, to support the right of the Caçadores to the high road which leads from Pamplona to Puente la Reyna, resting his right upon this road.

The left of the 3rd brigade would be contiguous to the right of Brigadier-General Campbell, and embrace the front of the citadel and town as far as the high road from Pamplona to Tafalla. The 1st brigade to rest their left upon the right of the 3rd brigade on the road described, occupy the ruins of the horn-work contiguous to it in force, and extend their right to the heights in front of Mendillore, where the left of the Conde de Amarante's division will join it.

The brigades should be posted in the most convenient spots contiguous to their districts in readiness to debouche and

advance upon the town at the same time on all points. The light troops of the brigades to advance in front, and to be followed by one wing of each regiment, acting as irregular or light troops, the remaining wing being kept in reserve at the most convenient place to support and protect those in their front.

The Caçadores, as before observed, are to advance and occupy the bank of the river; the other troops will push up as close as possible to the works on every side, and put themselves as near to the enemy as the nature of the country affords cover. Care is to be taken not to expend ammunition unnecessarily: it is, however, expected that this distribution will keep down the enemy's fire effectually on all points. When lodged under sufficient cover, the troops will remain at their posts until recalled, keeping a steady watch on the works in their front. Advantage will be taken by officers commanding brigades and regiments of this opportunity to examine minutely the ground in front of their respective posts: proper points will be chosen for posting the requisite piquets. The communications and cover of every kind to be well ascertained, and every step taken to insure their holding their ground for the future with as little fatigue and risk to the men as possible.

A proportion of intrenching tools will be sent to each brigade, which, together with those of the respective regiments, will be kept in readiness to make use of at night to farther secure the posts of the different brigades. For the post of the Caçadores on the river a particular provision, both of tools and workmen, will be made from the battalion which will be posted to support them.

Officers commanding brigades will bear in mind that, in order to distress the enemy, it is desirable to carry off or destroy all the corn that may be within reach of the town, and will consider and adopt the most effectual mode of completing this object in their respective districts. The destruction of the principal aqueduct of the town, which passes near the village of Tajonar, can be effected at any period, and without material injury to it or the slightest difficulty. It appears that the town is also supplied with water from a second source, which runs within 300 or 600 yards of the citadel to the westward of it, and is from thence conveyed by an aqueduct through the citadel to the town. This it will also be advisable to destroy: it will

fall into the district of the 3rd brigade, and a party provided with the necessary implements should be destined for this service. Independent of the water conveyed by these aqueducts, and supposing the river to be effectually guarded, from all the information I have been able to obtain, there are wells sufficient in the citadel and town to prevent them suffering great inconvenience for the want of water.

The site of the redoubts proposed can only be decided after possessing the ground by the method before suggested. The old hornwork appears, however, to be capable of being turned to some advantage without great labour: it is one of the most important posts to secure in every respect, and should therefore be prepared for resistance by a sufficient working-party, and in the first instance; it is at the same time more exposed to annoyance from the enemy than any other part of the line proposed to be occupied.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Alicante, 30th June, 1813.

I went yesterday to Castalla to concert with the Duque del Parque our future movements.

In reference to the supposed case that the siege of Tarragona would not succeed, and that Sir J. Murray would return here to act in conjunction with the Duque del Parque, your Lordship directed that the Duque should act upon the enemy's flank, while the British corps should attack in front. You conceived that the Duque would be obliged to go as far as Utiel and Requeña.

The Duque has with him between 11,000 and 12,000 infantry, the greater part of which I saw yesterday, and some of the regiments are extremely fine. The men have the best appearance, but the proportion of officers is very small, and, as I judge from the conversation of the Duque and his staff, not very good. It was observed that Whittingham had made of the very worst materials the best troops in the Spanish army from the power he possessed of getting rid of his worst officers. The artillery consisted of a very few pieces, of which some were well animalled, some bad. I only saw a very small portion of the cavalry, of which there were two very fine squadrons of the regiment of Almanzar formed by Whittingham. The Duque proposes to give the command of his whole cavalry to Whittingham, and I have arranged with the latter officer that the best of it shall be brigaded together, placed in the reserve, and taken as much care of as possible.

If your Lordship could see this Spanish army, I think you would be of opinion that alone, and not supported by troops in whom they have more

confidence than in themselves, they are good for little or nothing. I think 3000 or 4000 French troops would destroy the whole of the Duque's army. I was much pleased with the Duque. I found him very reasonable, and I have no doubt of our acting cordially together. They all seem to understand perfectly their real condition. They do not disguise it. They all seem anxious not to commit their troops, and, above all, to obey most strictly and willingly your Lordship's orders. We were perfectly agreed in one point, that the non-separation of the two armies was indispensable to our success.

We then considered the question of attacking the line of the Xucar in front. There are two passages across the river for carriages over bridges, which are strongly intrenched. The Xucar itself is fordable for infantry in several places, but the ground on the opposite side is very unfavourable for us; and we all were of opinion that the passage of the Xucar would be very difficult, and would expose to great danger an army, part of which cannot manœuvre at all, and the other part, our Sicilian army, unaccustomed to move together. Such an operation appeared positively forbid by your Lordship's orders.

We were finally of opinion that the best plan would be to turn the enemy's flank by the whole army, either by possessing ourselves of the pass by Utiel and Requeña, or by marching to Cuenca, and from thence falling into the Madrid road to Saragossa, and passing the chain of mountains, of which the Sierra de Albarracin is the highest point. Over this chain there are only two carriage roads, the one by Utiel and the other by the Saragossa road. The first operation by Utiel would be attended with difficulty, as the pass is very strongly fortified. Having possessed it, we must be compelled to attack Suchet. We preferred the latter plan. The march would be long, but so soon after the harvest there was no apprehension for the want of subsistence. We should compel Suchet to cross the Ebro at once, or to give us battle in such position as we might ourselves choose; and by thus approaching your Lordship's army, it would enable you either to reinforce us for this operation, if you thought us too weak, or to employ us in any other manner you might think fit. It seemed of all others the safest and most economical in point of men, of any plan that had occurred to us for the execution of the object in view. In the event of failure we should have had the whole of Spain open to us; and as your Lordship's success could alone authorise this movement, so Marshal Suchet could never venture, even in the event of beating us, to advance so far to the southward as to cut us off from Alicante, or, at any rate, from Carthagena.

It was agreed, however, as neither army had for the present the means of moving, in consequence of the want of carriage for the British army, and both of carriage and provisions for the Spanish army, and in consequence also of the backwardness of the harvest in Cuenca, which will not be collected in less than fifteen days, that we should wait your Lordship's further orders. It was agreed in the mean time that the British army should be placed at Villena, so as to be able to assist the Duque del Parque at Castalla, if attacked; and if we should obtain sooner the means of moving, it was proposed that we should move to our left towards Utiel.

The chief of Elio's staff was at Castalla. He informed us of the strength

of the pass by Requeña: he also told us that Elio had been obliged to retire from Utiel from the want of provisions.

The Duque del Parque is in equal difficulty. The country where he is is quite eat up, and the new harvest not yet in. His army has been subsisted for the last ten days by the assistance of Mr. Tupper, who has given them grain for the Duque's bills upon Granada and Jaen, the provinces allotted for his subsistence. The Duque has only carts to convey one day's provisions, and spare ammunition only at the rate of ten rounds per man.

I am sorry to say that a most unfortunate mistake has been committed with respect to the equipment and carriage of this army. At the time of its going to Tarragona there were 350 carts and 700 mules: they were all dismissed with the exception of 150 carts and 100 mules. Every endeavour has been making to reassemble them, but your Lordship must well know the difficulty of doing so. It had, in the first instance, taken many weeks to complete this equipment, and the Duque del Parque with some reason complained, that as we did not want this carriage for ourselves, we had not given it up to him.

So affairs were arranged yesterday evening.

This morning has arrived an account, published under the authority of General Castaños, of a decisive victory gained by your Lordship over the main French army. I cannot doubt this intelligence, and the result must be, I think, the immediate retreat of Suchet across the Ebro. I have, in consequence, proposed to the Duque del Parque that we shall immediately march on upon the direct route to Valencia, first driving the French across the Xucar, and then deciding, according to circumstances, upon our future movements.

The first division and advance will move to-morrow to Alcoy, taking possession of the pass of Albayda. I have begged the Duque to close towards our left. I am obliged to keep the remainder of the army to feed at the magazine at Alicante, while all the carts are employed in carrying biscuit and barley to Alcoy.

The French occupy a fortified position across the valley at Moxente, Allaria, and San Felipe. Suchet lately returned from the north, and brought within these few days 12,000 men to San Felipe. The whole French force in Valencia I calculate at about 25,000 men. They appear to take little notice of the Spanish corps on their flanks.

I hope we shall be able to move in about a week.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

W. C. BENTINCK.

I am happy to say that of fourteen transports that went aground off the mouths of the Ebro, all have got off excepting four, which have gone to pieces. All the horses were saved, as well as men and stores, with the exception of three or four new 24-pounders. The rest of the fleet reached this place the day before yesterday.

Arrangement for the 1st July.

Monreal, 30th June, 1813.

3rd division and Light division to halt at Sanguessa.
4th division to halt at Aybar.
6th division and Household brigade, Lerino.
General d'Urban's cavalry, Lodosa.
Hussars and General Ponsonby's to halt at Tafalla.

General Hill's corps to move to-morrow to the Villaba side of Pamplona, and next day towards St. Estevan and the upper part of the valley of the Bidasoa river.

The 7th division to move at daybreak to-morrow morning from Barrasoin to the side of Pamplona which is towards Orcoyen and Noain, and relieve the posts now occupied by General Hill's troops.

The artillery of the 3rd, 4th, and Light divisions will move from Tafalla on the 2nd July to Noain. The carriages of head-quarters will move from Tafalla on the 1st July by Noain to Huerta, where head-quarters will be to-morrow.

G. MURRAY.

Distribution of the Army on the 2nd of July, 1813.

Head-quarters, Huerta, 1st July, 1813.

Household brigade	No alteration.
Major-General Alten's brigade	Do.
Hussar brigade	Do.
Major-General Anson's brigade	Do.
Major-General Bock's brigade	Do.
Brigadier-General Ponsonby's brigade	Do.
Major-General Fane's brigade	Do.
Major-General Long's brigade	Do.
Portuguese cavalry	Do.
1st division of infantry	Do.
2nd	Move from Pamplona.
3rd	Occupy the ground quitted by the 2nd division.
4th	Monreal.
5th	No alteration.
6th	Do.
7th	Do.
Light	Occupy the ground quitted by the 2nd division.
Brigadier-General Pack's brigade of infantry	No alteration.
Brigadier-General Bradford's	Do.
Spanish troops	Do.
Head-quarters	Do.
Civil department	Do.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Murray to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Alicante, 1st July, 1813.

I have to apologize to your Lordship for not having sooner sent the return of casualties at the sieges of Tarragona and Fort St. Felipe. It could only be completed a few days ago, when the army was assembled at this place.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient and humble servant,
J. MURRAY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

RETURN of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Allied Army commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir JOHN MURRAY, Bart., at the Sieges of Tarragona and Fort St. Felipe from the 4th to the 12th June, 1813.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
British loss	14	60	5
Sicilian loss	..	15	..
Spanish loss	1	7	..
Total loss	15	82	5

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 1st July, 1813, 12 at noon.

I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 28th ult. from Caseda this morning. By a memorandum on the outside it appeared to have been twice at Salvatierra, instead of having been forwarded directly from Irurzun to Tolosa at first. I mean to station an officer at Irurzun in order to prevent these mistakes, and to get Penne Villemur's cavalry to relieve Anson's on the road to Tolosa, that the brigade may be more together.

The enemy has crossed the Bidasoa, and Irun is occupied by the Spaniards. The heavy rain yesterday morning prevented the troops intended to be employed in forcing the enemy to quit Irun, moving early enough to make it possible to attack him yesterday to advantage; for the nature of the ground was such that the number of the enemy near Irun could not be ascertained, and it would have been imprudent to have advanced by the great road without having Longa's corps thrown up into the mountains on the right, especially as it was still reported the enemy continued in some force at different points higher up the river and on this side of it. We saw three battalions and a piquet of cavalry on this side of Irun, and a considerable number of troops between it and the bridge, on a hill which covered the bridge and the road on both sides of the river from our view. On a strong range of heights two or three miles beyond Irun, and over which the Bayonne road from the bridge passes, we could

plainly see a large camp. It is quite a defensive position, but it conceals whatever the enemy may wish to assemble beyond it.

General d'Armagnac, with a considerable body of troops, certainly has been at St. Estevan. I don't know by what road they came. By the report of the principal people of every town on this line the enemy had not less than 12,000 men in the divisions and garrisons which Generals Foy and Maucune commanded: 3000 of these were marched from Urnieta to Goyzueta, and from thence to Lesaca, and I have not yet had any report of their having quitted it.

I enclose your Lordship a short memorandum of Major Smith, R.E., concerning St. Sebastian: a fuller, with a sketch taken from a large plan in General Giron's possession, will be sent to-morrow; meanwhile the Spaniards blockade the place by land, and I hope Sir G. Collier will do the same by sea. But I am disappointed to find that the general report we received at first is contradicted by a letter, of which I send your Lordship an extract, and which General Giron considers to be authentic, and that there is provision for three months in the place. I likewise send an intercepted letter from Jourdan to the Minister of War, which Giron gave me, with some other papers. I cannot believe there is any enemy at Guetaria, but if there is, they must share the same fate as those at Pasages, the two forts of which, with about 150 men, surrendered last night to Longa.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—I am much obliged by your Lordship's inquiries and advice. I have remained quiet all this day, as riding occasioned some inflammation; but it can be of no consequence, though uneasy at times.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Major A. S. Frazer to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Thomas Graham.

SIR, Deba, 30th June, 1813, 2 P.M.

I beg to report to you my arrival here with six ordnance transports with the battering train for the siege of Pamplona.

I reached Santander yesterday at 7 A.M., having left Lord Wellington's head-quarters near Pamplona on the 26th, and an hour after my arrival at Santander had the satisfaction of seeing the convoy from Coruña under charge of H.M.S. *Lyra*, Captain Bloye.

Three victuallers, forming part of the convoy, were sent into the harbour of Santander. The six ordnance transports are here, and I hope that some of the stores may be landed to-night, and the remainder, with the guns, in the course of to-morrow.

Captain Fremantle embarked in H.M.S. *Sparrow* (Captain Taylor) at 7 A.M. on the 27th inst.; the wind was then E. by N. Captain Fremantle embarked off Bilbao, and in the opinion of Sir George Collier, with whom I have communicated, may reach London by July 3rd.

Sir George Collier is at this moment off Santoña, but will be here in H.M.S. *Surveillante* to-morrow, when Captain Bloye, of H.M.S. *Lyra*, requests me to say two letters from you, addressed to Sir George Collier, shall be delivered to him.

500 of the enemy are reported by the alcalde to be about three leagues from hence to the eastward, at Guetaria; but two companies of the armed peasantry are in the mountains in that direction, and I consider the disembarkation of the ordnance and stores as safe.

I remain, Sir, your very obedient servant,

AUG. S. FRAZER.

P.S.—I request you will have the goodness to give the necessary directions for the forwarding of the accompanying report to Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, commanding the artillery.

II.

Major Smith's Note on St. Sebastian.

It will be difficult to give any perfect idea of the defences of St. Sebastian without reference to a sketch, which is preparing, and will be in readiness to forward by to-morrow. In the mean time the following general observations may be of use to communicate:—The castle being situated upon a promontory very much elevated above the level of the sea, and the isthmus that connects it with the main land being occupied and embraced by the town and front of fortification on the land side of it, is naturally very difficult of approach, and appears open to no other sort of attack than that of shells, for which the adjacent ground is extremely advantageous, even within range of the smallest nature of mortars. I have not been able to discover that they have any bomb-proofs, and the space that they occupy is so extremely confined that they could not long withstand such an attack. The front of the town has a horn-work in advance, which, with the front itself, is open to a commanding fire within 600 yards in front and on both flanks. The ground is favourable for all our operations, and guns may be landed either at the mouth of the Ovio or at Pasages. The annexed return will show the numbers of artillery mounted.

Fuerzas del Castillo Mirando á la Mar.

Baterias:			
Basclocas	Cañones	3 de 12 de fierro.	
Del Rey de Roma ..	id.	2 de 16 de bronce.	
De las Damas ..	id.	2 de 18 de fierro.	
Santa Clara ..	id.	3 de 18 de fierro y una culeburia de bronce.	

Mirando á Tierra.

Barrera de Santa Clara	2 de 8 de bronce.
Principe	2 de 6 de bronce y un mortero Pequeño.
De Napoleon	4 de 16 de bronce y uno de ellos Obus Real.
De la Reyna	2 de 12 de fierro.
De Dufalgar	2 morteros grandes de bronce.

En el Machen o fuerte del Alto no hay cañon alguno.
Hay como unos 700 hombres. Arinas y viberes para 3 meses.

Plaza de S. Sebastian.

En las murallas á saber.

A la parte que mira á la torre de Igueldo, en toda la cortina, desde el Cubo

al Presidio hay cinco cañones, uno de fierro de 18 peligroso, 3 cañoncitos de 8 de bronce, y un obus de id., que cogieron á los Ingleses. En el Presidio hay 3 cañones (2 de bronce de 16, y uno de fierro) y dos morteros.

En la cortina desde el Cubo á la Turriola.

Hay cinco cañoncitos de 12 de bronce.
Hay 850 hombres de guarnicion. Viberes para tres meses.

En el Muelle mirando á la Concha y entiada del Puerto.

2 cañones de fierro.
Ayer cortaron los Arboles del Prado y Santa Catalina.
Han pedido 600 sacos para Salchichones.

III.

RETURN of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Left Column of Infantry, under the Command of Lieutenant-General Sir THOMAS GRAHAM, K.B., in action with the enemy near Villafranca, on the 24th June, 1813.

Killed	19
Wounded	74
Missing..	1

RETURN of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Left Column, under the Command of Lieutenant-General Sir THOMAS GRAHAM, K.B., in action with the enemy near Tolosa, on the 25th June, 1813.

Killed	40
Wounded	242
Missing	44

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 2nd July, 1813.

After my letter was sent off yesterday, I found that the enemy had occupied in the morning the same positions on both sides of Irun in which I had seen them in the afternoon of the 30th June; and that the advanced guard of the Spanish army under General Giron, consisting of some squadrons of cavalry, and a brigade of infantry commanded by General Cantañon, attacked and drove them across the bridge, but that the enemy still retained possession of a strong stone blockhouse, by way of tête du pont, on this side, as well as of several houses loopholed for musketry at the other end of the bridge. It was necessary therefore to employ some artillery against them. General Giron, who went there himself, sent for four Spanish guns and Captain Dubourdieu's brigade of 9-pounders, which cannonaded the enemy with such effect that he evacuated the blockhouse and blew it up, and set fire to the bridge, on which combustibles were ready placed.

The enemy had four guns, by the fire of which Captain Dubourdieu lost one artilleryman. Another was wounded by a musket ball, and also a horse.

In these attacks I understand the Spanish troops behaved extremely well, and suffered some loss, especially by imprudently exposing themselves to the musketry fire from the loopholed blockhouse at the end of the bridge.

The enemy, on seeing some of our ships off Deba, left the fort and town of Guetaria at 2 A.M. yesterday, and went in boats to St. Sebastian, which garrison by this reinforcement has received an accession of near 500 men.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—The enemy left a slow match burning, connected with a mine under the Castle of Guetaria, which blew it up about 2 P.M. yesterday; and I am sorry to learn about 50 Spaniards lost their lives by the explosion. General Giron speaks highly of the excellent practice of Captain Dubourdieu's brigade yesterday evening at Irun.

Major Smith has been ill, which has retarded his sketch; but he sends it to Sir R. Fletcher by Mr. de Roos, the bearer of this.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 2nd July, 1813.

I trust your Lordship, on looking over my report again from Tolosa, of the 26th, will think that there is no occasion to qualify anything that concerns the Portuguese and Spanish troops. There were none of the latter engaged except Longa's (who have always distinguished themselves) and two battalions of Giron's, which, with a Portuguese battalion, formed a column on the left of the chaussée, and attacked on the left of the town, and who all behaved gallantly.

On the right of the chaussée and river, Bradford's brigade, supported by the three line battalions King's German Legion, were more or less engaged in skirmishing the whole day, and afterwards advanced by the Pamplona road and the ground on the right bank of the river. I particularly allude to the conduct of the German line battalions, without saying anything of Bradford's brigade, and this, I should think, would convey sufficiently that I did not so much approve of their conduct. Many of them, both officers and men, behaved very gallantly, exposing themselves unnecessarily in open ground to the fire of the enemy hid in the woods; but, on the whole, the officers did not seem to understand well what they were about, or how to keep their men in their proper places, and certainly a good number of them kept back altogether. What I said to Murray about the Spaniards arose more from Giron's own diffidence about their behaviour by themselves (not being *aguerris*) than from anything else; for at the time I wrote none had been engaged but those mentioned in the first part of this note. The officers who saw them yesterday speak very highly of their intrepidity.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Admiral Martin to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Lisbon, 2nd July, 1813.

Permit me to offer you my sincere congratulations upon the very brilliant victory which has been obtained by the army under your Lordship's command near Vitoria, and to assure you of my best wishes for your health, and every other blessing this world can bestow.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your sincere and humble servant,

G. MARTIN.

Arrangements for the Movements of the Army on the 3rd July.

Huarte, 2nd July, 1813.

Sir R. Hill will be so good as to move the 1st and 3rd brigades of the 2nd division to-morrow to Lanz.

The Conde de Amarante's division will move to-morrow (when relieved) to Sorauren, about two leagues from Villaba. The two brigades of artillery of that division will move round from Berrioplano this afternoon or to-morrow morning, and will accompany the division in its march to Sorauren.

Captain Mannell's brigade of artillery will continue at Berrioplano till further orders.

Sir R. Hill will be so good as place one brigade of infantry on the road which leads from Zubiri to Egui, and thence by the ruined foundry of Egui towards the French village of Les Alduides. The head quarters of this brigade should be in the first instance at Egui, and a communication should be established between it and the troops under Major-General Byng by Zalbeti and Lanzoin.

The 14th regiment of light dragoons will move to-morrow to Lanz, where it will join the 2nd division and receive further orders from Lieutenant-General Sir R. Hill.

The 1st regiment of hussars will move on the 4th July to Lizaso, whence the regiment will move with the 7th division, which will also be at Lizaso on the 4th instant.

Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie will be pleased to move the 7th division on the 4th instant by Berriosuno, Marcalain, and Eguaras, to Lizaso.

The 1st regiment of hussars will join the 7th division at Lizaso, and move with it when the division is ordered forward from thence to Estevan.

The artillery of the 7th division will remain at Berrioplano till further orders.

The 4th division will relieve the posts now occupied by the 7th division in the afternoon of the 3rd and in the morning of the 4th instant, on which latter day Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole will be so good as place the 4th division at Orcoyen and in the other situations occupied by the 7th division at present.

Head quarters will move to-morrow to Ostiz. The wheel-carriages of head quarters will proceed to-morrow by Modin to Orcoyen, where they will remain till further orders.

The 6th division will move on the 5th of July to the neighbourhood of Zarza la Mayor, and take the blockade of Pamplona, from the posts occupied on its right by the 3rd division to the river Arga below the fortress.

The 4th division will on the 5th instant take the blockade from the river

Arga below the fortress to Villaba when relieved from the ground to be taken up as above mentioned by the 6th division, and, extending to the left so as to relieve the Light division, will move on the 5th instant to Ostiz. Major-General C. Alten will be previously apprised whether or not the artillery of the division is to move with it.

G. MURRAY.

Earl Bathurst to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 2nd July, 1813.

Two days ago we received intelligence of your Lordship's rapid progress up to the 19th ult. This was communicated by Mr. Commissary Ogilvie to the naval officer stationed at Santander, who immediately transmitted it to government.

I understand that you have sent the official despatches by Coruña, from whence we have only heard yesterday down to the 14th ult. from Colonel Bourke. He says that your Lordship was approaching Burgos when he last heard from you, and that you had directed the battering-train and stores to proceed to Santander. Mr. Commissary Ogilvie has stated that he had your orders that everything should in future be sent to Santander. Whether by this it is intended to include the reinforcements, horses as well as infantry, I shall learn by your answer to my letter of the * ult.

There is a very general satisfaction felt at the success of your movements, which have exceeded the most sanguine expectations. The blowing up of Burgos has been particularly gratifying, as we had made up our minds to the loss of time and men in the capture of that place; and this having been accomplished without any loss, made the friends of the officers on service look very happy at the Regent's ball on the night the news arrived.

I have taken this opportunity of making an arrangement for three regiments being sent to you, in addition to the detachments, which will, I understand, amount to more than 2000, and notice of which I have already given you. The 85th in England, and the 76th in Ireland, are both represented to be fit for service in the field. They are to be sent to you. The first will embark 600, the second 650. The 84th, in Ireland, is a very strong regiment, upwards of 1100 men; but a considerable part consists of young recruits, and it is fit only for garrison duty. It has been arranged to-day that this regiment shall go to Gibraltar, and that the 37th (which will be made up from the second battalion now at home to 1000 rank and file) shall be sent to you from Gibraltar.

The 76th from Ireland, and the 85th from England, will arrive probably about the same time at Santander, or at whatever port you will direct in your answer to my letter; and with regard to the detachments, it is not my intention to make those which shall be first ready wait for the rest; but in all probability there will arrive at the port of disembarkation about the same time much more than 2000 men (including the two regiments) about the first week in August. You will perhaps, therefore, think it better to send a General officer down to conduct them from the port of disembarkation. None will be sent from hence, as you have already more

* Blank in manuscript.

on the staff than you know what to do with. I enclose to you a copy of my instructions to Major-General Gibbs, who is to proceed to Stralsund with some troops, which are to form part of the garrison at Stralsund. The principle on which we have acted in this particular is stated in the instruction itself, and I will not therefore trouble you with further particulars.

The Regent has given directions for the Red Ribbon to be given to Clinton.

I am, my dear Lord, ever yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Earl Bathurst to Major-General Gibbs.

SIR, Downing Street, 30th June, 1813.

Lieutenant-General Sir A. Hope having been authorized by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Sweden to represent that it would be of important assistance to him if some British troops were sent to form a part of the garrison of Stralsund, so as to enable His Royal Highness to advance with as large a force as possible on the enemy in Germany, which he had informed Sir A. Hope it was his determination to do on the expiration of the Armistice, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, anxious to contribute as much as possible to the furtherance of this most important operation, and to testify his readiness to comply with the wishes of the Crown Prince, has directed that the troops as per margin* should be sent forthwith to Stralsund, and has been graciously pleased to entrust to you the command of them. You will therefore proceed to Stralsund, and place yourself under the command of the Crown Prince.

The troops which are placed under your command are not at present in a fit state for active service in the field. All the disposable forces of that description are sent to or destined for Spain. You will therefore not consider yourself as authorized on any representation to engage your troops in advance in any active operations in the field, but confine them to the immediate defence of Stralsund, acting under the orders of the General officer whom His Royal Highness the Crown Prince may appoint governor of that place.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent confidently relies on the activity and zeal for which you are so eminently distinguished, that you will exert yourself to the utmost in the defence of a place of so much importance to the Swedish army in its advance into Germany.

As His Royal Highness the Prince Regent is desirous of not placing his troops at the charge of the Swedish government, a commissary will be attached to you, who will receive the necessary instructions for the due provisioning of this force placed under your immediate command.

I am, Sir, &c.,

BATHURST.

* *Embarking.*

25th, 2nd battalion	..	..	..	..	315
54th ,,	..	..	..	..	470
91st ,,	..	..	..	..	396
73rd ,,	..	..	..	..	454

To follow.

33rd, 2nd battalion	..	..	..	..	535
Royals, 4th battalion		..	..	..	950

II.

Earl Bathurst to Major-General Gibbs.

SIR, Downing Street, 30th June, 1813.

If during the time you continue at Stralsund an opportunity should present itself of undertaking an enterprise the success of which would be highly advantageous to the common cause, and add lustre to His Majesty's arms, and the failure of which would in your judgment not endanger the safety of Stralsund, to the defence of which you are primarily to attend, you may consider yourself as authorized to undertake it, if called upon so to do; provided that the enterprise be one not calculated either by the length of the march or any other cause to expose the health of the British forces, and provided also that the chief command of such an expedition be entrusted to you.

I am, &c.,

BATHURST.

[664.]

To Earl Bathurst.

* MY LORD, Ostiz, 3rd July, 1813.

I enclose the copy of a despatch from Lord W. Bentinck* regarding the supposed danger in Sicily, and of my answer.†

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 3rd July, 1813.

I had this morning the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches Nos. 54, 55, and 56,‡ containing the intelligence of the splendid and complete victory obtained over the enemy at Vitoria, on the 21st ultimo, by the forces under your Lordship's command.

I lost no time in laying these despatches before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and Captain Fremantle had the honour of presenting to His Royal Highness Marshal Jourdan's bâton, taken on the field of battle.

I am commanded by His Royal Highness to convey to your Lordship the high sense he entertains of the importance of this victory, as well for the deliverance of Spain from the subjugation of France as for the giving the best chance of concluding a protracted and eventful war by an honourable and secure peace.

Your Lordship will have the goodness to convey to Sir Thomas Graham, Sir Rowland Hill, the General and other officers under your command, His Royal Highness's most gracious consideration of their eminent services on this ever memorable day. To Sir William Beresford also your Lordship will communicate His Royal Highness's congratulations on the valour and discipline displayed by the Portuguese troops; and your Lordship will not fail at the same time to assure the non-commissioned officers and men that

* See *Supplementary Wellington Despatches*, vol. vii. pp. 648-9.

† See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. x. p. 481, 1st July, 1813.

‡ See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, Despatches dated 19th, 22nd, and 24th June, 1813, vol. x. pp. 444, 446, 456.

His Royal Highness is fully aware of the zeal, courage, and perseverance which they displayed on that day and during the whole progress of the rapid march which preceded the battle,

I wish it were in my power to convey to your Lordship all that His Royal Highness felt on reading your despatches, in which are detailed the march previous to the battle, the dispositions you made for the attack of the enemy, the ability with which you executed them, and the promptitude with which you followed up every advantage which the valour of your troops and the dismay of the enemy presented in the course of the engagement. His Royal Highness cannot but feel highly gratified that during the time he has been called upon to administer the government of this country in consequence of His Majesty's lamented indisposition, a victory has been obtained in extent of as great importance as can be found in the records of any country.

As a mark of the sense he entertains of your Lordship's distinguished services, he has conferred upon your Lordship the rank of Field Marshal. If this promotion be unexampled in our military service, it must be also recollected that the occasion on which it is granted cannot be matched.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 3rd July, 1813.

When I wrote my letter of yesterday, I had not received the account by telegraph of the splendid victory of the 21st, of which Captain Fremantle has brought the particulars this morning. It is impossible to express the exultation felt by everybody on this occasion. An express has been sent off to Stralsund, in order that it may be communicated without delay to the Allied army.

The Admiralty will send out a reinforcement of cruisers for the north of Spain, and will direct inquiries to be made by what mismanagement it has happened that you have experienced any impediment in having the stores conveyed from Lisbon to Santander.

I have given directions for flour, biscuit, and salt meat to be sent out immediately to Santander.

Unfortunately the *Nymph* had sailed for Lisbon before this news arrived. She carried money out. But I hope to send you some direct to Santander by the end of next week.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

BATHURST.

I cannot say how grieved I am at the loss of poor Colonel Cadogan.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Fife House, 3rd July, 1813.

I cannot resist the pleasure of sending you a few lines by the vessel which is directed to sail for Santander, to express the gratification we have

all received on your late most splendid and complete success. The Prince Regent has conferred upon you the rank of Field Marshal, which will be notified to-night in the Gazette in which your despatch will be published. The information of your success, which will be transmitted to the north of Europe this night, will arrive there most opportunely, and cannot fail to produce the most important effects. If Austria would now declare, we might really hope to put an end to the tyranny which has been so long oppressing the world; but on this event no reliance can, I fear, be placed. The dispositions of Russia and Prussia are good, and Bernadotte is using every endeavour to persuade them not to make peace, promising, with the force which he will now have under his command, to act offensively on the rear and flank of the French armies, and desiring them only to keep upon the defensive until Buonaparte shall have considerably reduced his own force by detaching to his rear to secure his communications. We calculate that the Russians, Prussians, Swedes, &c. &c., will have about 250,000 at the expiration of this Armistice; but we have not sufficient data to be able to form any decided judgment as to the amount of the French force at that time. We shall be very desirous of learning your sentiments as to ulterior operations: the inclination of my opinion is to favour that course of operations which will be most likely to keep your army in its present state of equipment together, rather than divide it into separate corps for different objects.

I regret the loss of poor Colonel Cadogan, for whom I had the most sincere regard.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 3rd July, 1813.

Amidst the acknowledgments of your glorious despatches which will be conveyed to you by the present opportunity, and the consequent congratulations which will reach you at the same time, I cannot withhold my assurance that, exclusive of the joy which every well-wisher of his country must experience upon such a great occasion, there is no individual who more heartily rejoices in your success personally. And although my feelings upon such an occasion are of too humble a nature to command attention or to attract consideration on your part, yet, having the merit of sincerity, and as proceeding from the heart of a friend who has ever been attached to you, the expression of them may perhaps not be displeasing.

Your victory is the greatest event in our annals, and its consequences, both in regard to the affairs of the Peninsula and as affecting those in Germany, may be to the greatest extent that a sanguine disposition might in reason anticipate.

Allow me to congratulate you also upon being made a Field Marshal.

You may possibly have heard that the Duke of York has hitherto thought that such promotion would embarrass the public service; but without entering into any explanation upon such a point, it is a justice I owe His Royal Highness to assure you most solemnly that I never saw him forward

any measure with so much eagerness and self-satisfaction as your promotion upon this occasion, which will be announced to you both by the Prince and His Royal Highness.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully and sincerely yours,

H. TORRENS.

Alas! my poor friend Cadogan!

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 3rd July, 1813.

I send several letters by this courier, and I enclose one which I have received from General Donkin. I am very glad that Lord William Bentinck has taken the command; for whether Sir John Murray was right or wrong, the army, both British and Spanish, had certainly lost all confidence in him.

I hope that the news of your victory may reach the North in time to prevent the effects of this fatal Armistice. We have no intelligence from England of a later date than the 16th June.

I have not yet received your letter of the 22nd.

Ever yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

I am in great hopes I shall get some money in the way of loan, the Regency having consented to pay the interest.

[ENCLOSURE.]

General Donkin to the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

H.M.S. *Bristol*, at anchor off Coll de Balaguer,

SIR, 19th June, 1813.

Presuming on some former acquaintance, and the polite attention with which you have always had the goodness to honour me whenever I have had occasion to communicate with you, I now take the liberty of writing to you concerning the late events before Tarragona, about which a great outcry has been raised by the Rear-Admiral employed, which never would have been raised had the enemy pressed on and destroyed our field train and cavalry, as he might have done, in consequence of our waiting (owing to the advice of some persons in Sir J. Murray's confidence) three days after he knew of the enemy's advance.

As Quartermaster-General, I have been loaded with my share of censure. This will be fatal to me, though I have had but little to say in Sir J. Murray's councils, should the Marquess of Wellington adopt the same opinions.

I have never been consulted by Sir John Murray, and he decided himself on the 12th of June on immediate embarkation on my delivering to him a letter from the Spanish General Copons, announcing that De Caen's column was only nine hours off, he having previously learnt that Suchet's was at about an equal distance, and both in march towards him from opposite points, making in number 17,000 men. This was the intelligence he received from the Spanish Generals and staff, and on this he decided, after having discussed with me the time and distance of march, and the relative strength of the Allies and the

enemy. It was not till after he had decided and given his orders to raise the siege that I gave any opinion; but I then did take the liberty of saying that I thought, as I still think, that he had decided well; and the following were my reasonings on the subject:

The utmost number of all sorts the Allies could oppose to the enemy's two columns was 13,738 rank and file, as the enclosed paper will show. Composed as it was, I did not think it a match for more than 10,000 French troops. No accounts had made the united force of the two converging enemy's columns at less than 16,000 men; most of them, and the number admitted was, 17,000. This was the information sent by the Spanish staff. Together they would be too strong: to attack and destroy either separately was not to be expected; for, had we marched on the column of De Caen, it would have fallen back towards Barcelona, and, had we followed it, Suchet would have passed by our rear, have entered Tarragona, taken all our guns in the batteries, and have had us between him and De Caen, one in Tarragona, the other in Barcelona. Had we marched the other way after Suchet, the same process would have been carried on from the other side.

The enemy was within nine or ten hours of us on both sides, and in [redacted]ment. We had committed the fault of letting them approach thus near. Were [redacted] to wait and fight a battle for the guns we have left behind? Had I been asked, I should have said, "No. We are placed here by the Marquess of Wellington to produce a diversion in favour of his great movements and plans. Should this corps be beaten completely or dispersed, that diversion is at an end, and Suchet might detach 15,000 or 20,000 men from these provinces at a time when his Lordship was calculating (and had a right to calculate) that we should tie that force down." I should have argued that we had no right to volunteer playing a most desperate game for a deep stake, the chief part of which might be paid by the Marquess of Wellington in consequence of our letting loose on him a corps which we were sent hither to keep in check. I did not think, and do not think, a few battering cannon worth the risk of the total disorganization of this corps; and that it would have lost its field train and cavalry if it had been attacked by even 5000 men on an open beach seems certain; for that number would have kept us in play till others came up, and thus the waiting all the night of the 12th, as the Rear-Admiral advised, would be to expose this corps to the loss of those essential arms, and consequently incapacitate it from taking the field or operating any diversion in favour of the grand army.

As it is, we are complete. We are a corps, and shall immediately take the field again in Valencia.

"But," it is exclaimed, "De Caen's corps did not advance from Villafranca on the 12th." This is true; but nobody ensured this, or could ensure this, to Sir John Murray. Was it to be expected that a corps which had made forced marches for ten days to relieve Tarragona, should halt within nine hours' march of it? Would any General have been justifiable in waiting on such an improbable possibility, which never entered anybody's head till after we heard the thing was so?

I never can lose sight of the recollection that the total defeat or dispersion of this corps might produce the most serious consequences at a most critical moment to the Marquess of Wellington's plans; and I shall always think, till I am taught otherwise, that its commander has no right to play a desperate game with it until his Lordship has no longer occasion for its services in the way of diversion.

The situation of the enemy, our inferiority of force, even numerically, to say nothing of its composition, and the above reasonings, would have deter-

mained my opinion for embarkation, had it been asked; but it was not. On my translating the Spanish report to Sir John Murray, and stating to him the times of march and the considerations on both sides, accompanied by an earnest request that he would decide one way or the other (for we had been several hours in doubt), he did decide on embarkation.

It would be unmanly in me to shrink from the responsibility, if any there be, of approving this measure. I confess I do approve it, though I did not cause it.

May I entreat your aid to place what I have done and said in its right point of view with the Marquess of Wellington?

He is not to be carried away nor warped by clamour: he will judge what has happened on its own merits. He will decide whether or no this corps ought to have been risked in a desperate struggle, without necessity, the upshot of which, if favourable, might not and probably would not have given us the object in view: for, during the conflict, Tarragona could have been relieved; and, if unfavourable, would have produced total destruction to this corps. Were it not for my excess of anxiety that we should be judged favourably by our great General, I should feel a perfect confidence in the soundness of my reasoning, and a security that we had done right.

From the situation I hold, I must naturally be most sensible to all that befalls this corps; but I have never influenced any of the late measures. Sir John Murray has commanded, and I have obeyed.

Excuse this long intrusion from, Sir,

Your most truly obedient humble servant,

R. H. DONKIN.

The following is a statement of our rank and file in Catalonia, June 4, 1813:

Total infantry of all sorts on paper, stated effective ..	12,818
Deduct the garrison of Coll de Balaguer	1,080
Remain	11,738
Deduct the number destined by Sir John Murray to remain and carry on the siege	3,000
Leaves for the field	8,738
Add Copons's promised effective force	5,000
Makes total allied force	13,738

Our 11,738 men are thus composed:

British and German	4,558
Two Italian regiments	1,331
Sicilian troops	974
Calabrian Free corps	493
Whittingham's division	4,382
Total	11,738

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 3rd July, 1813.

I cannot allow the public acknowledgment of your despatches to be forwarded without an expression of my individual congratulations upon your glorious success.

Your victory is most important in itself, and I am certain that in its consequences it will be doubly so, exclusive of the liberation of the Peninsula, by which it will be most probably followed. I look with some confidence to the effect which such a defeat of the enemy may have towards the breach of the existing Armistice between the French and the Allies in Germany, as well as upon the councils of Austria.

It affords me peculiar pleasure to acquaint you that the Prince Regent has been pleased to think the present a fit occasion to promote you to the rank of a Field Marshal. I will candidly confess that my apprehension of the effect of that spirit of jealousy which might possibly have been excited by unusual promotion led me formerly to imagine that a measure of this nature would have embarrassed the public service, as well as the officer on whom it was conferred; but your brilliant success is of a nature to overcome every difficulty, and to prevent the expression of any murmur that might otherwise have proceeded from those you have superseded; and I assure you that I am the most urgent advocate for the propriety of your well-earned and deserved promotion.

I am ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 3rd July, 1813.

The packet from England is just arrived, and I see it stated in the 'Times' of the 21st that the government mean to send a minister to the Congress, and that that minister is to be Lord Cathcart. I think it very important that you should be apprised of the determination of the Spanish government, in the event of a Congress being assembled, and I therefore send you a copy of my despatch of this day's date, which will go by the packet to-morrow. You will make such observations upon it as you please to the government at home.

Ever yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

You will see by the enclosed paper of the 22nd a report that the Armistice is broken off. All these papers will probably have reached you before this time.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

*De l'Armistice.**

Loin du théâtre de la guerre, privés de données positives sur la conduite des puissances qui peuvent faire pencher la balance en faveur du tyran ou des souverains armés pour défendre la liberté des peuples et les droits du trône, il nous serait difficile de prononcer sur la sagesse de la suspension d'armes qui a inopinément glacé les espérances des peuples et ranimé celles de leur ennemi.

* From the 'Courier d'Angleterre' of June 22, 1813.

Mais la durée de l'Armistice suffit pour faire juger qu'il n'était pas nécessaire, nous dirons même, pour faire présumer qu'il a été proposé par Buonaparte. Si les Alliés avaient été réduits à proposer un Armistice, Buonaparte en eût dicté les conditions ; des négociations eussent été ouvertes sur-le-champ, et la capitale de la Silésie, occupée par une division Française, n'eût pas été évacuée.

L'Armistice n'étant pas l'effet de l'impuissance où étaient les Alliés de continuer la campagne, il ne peut avoir d'avantages que pour Buonaparte : il lui procure le temps de discipliner et d'aguerrir ses nouvelles levées, et de former sa cavalerie ; il lui donne les moyens de recourir à des négociations, et d'employer la perfidie et la corruption, pour obtenir un traité qu'il n'est pas en posture de dicter. Les troupes Françaises reparaissant de nouveau dans les contrées qu'elles ont désolées, et dont les souverains ne les regardent plus comme les ennemis irréconciliables, la haine nationale s'affaiblira, l'esprit de vengeance s'éteindra ; et, ce qui n'est pas moins funeste à la cause de la liberté, les princes vassaux, ces instruments dociles du tyran qui les méprise assez pour leur laisser une ombre d'autorité, continueront à gouverner sous son nom et à achever par-là de dégrader le rang suprême, et de détruire toutes les idées sur lesquelles repose le respect des peuples pour l'autorité légitime et la loi.

On a dû remarquer que Buonaparte n'a pas conservé tout le terrain occupé par ses troupes, et qu'il a évacué Breslau. Cette concession a, probablement, été le prix de celles qu'ont faites les Alliés en consentant à ce que les places assiégées fussent ravitaillées, et que le terrain déclaré neutre ne pût être occupé *même par la levée en masse*. Cette dernière clause enlève aux Alliés une partie de leurs forces, celles parmi lesquelles il était important d'entretenir la haine des Français afin de conserver à la guerre son caractère national. En la stipulant, Buonaparte a voulu éteindre cette haine que la guerre eût rendue implacable, immortelle, en Allemagne, comme elle l'est en Espagne.

Nous le répéterons sans cesse, quand bien même les Souverains trahiraient leur dignité et les intérêts des peuples au point de négocier et de signer la paix avec un brigand couvert de crimes : "Il faut que les armées de la France révolutionnée soient détruites, ou que l'Europe périsse, et avec l'Europe le monde." La gloire de détruire les armées Françaises est réservée aux nations, et non aux armées. C'est la nation Espagnole qui a défendu l'Espagne contre les armées de Buonaparte, et a exterminé sept cents mille Français. C'est la nation Russe qui a exterminé cinq à six cents mille Français en Russie. C'est la nation Allemagne qui exterminera les armées envoyées contr'elle. Les armées ne sont que les auxiliaires des nations opprimées par la France ; mais la France n'a d'autre moyen de puissance et de domination que ses armées. Or, c'est par la paix que la France peut conserver une armée ; c'est par la paix qu'elle peut réparer et entretenir sa population ; c'est pendant la paix qu'elle peut former de nouvelles armées.

En lisant attentivement les Bulletins qui ont précédé cet Armistice, que la nécessité seule aurait pu justifier (et cette nécessité n'existait pas), il nous paraît à-peu-près certain que c'est Buonaparte qui l'a sollicité ; et c'était une raison de plus pour ne pas le signer. Il nous semble que la publicité qu'il a donnée aux démarches de la Cour d'Autriche ne laisse aucun doute à cet égard. Nous remarquons aussi, que dans le Bulletin qui a suivi celui qui contient les conditions de l'Armistice, Buonaparte annonce son intention de se rendre à Dresde, et que ses journaux annoncent que l'Empereur d'Autriche se rend à Prague. Cette circonstance nous confirme dans l'opinion que nous avons déjà annoncée sur le rôle que l'Empereur d'Autriche s'est déterminé à jouer dans la situation présente du Continent. Nous ne croyons pas du tout à la force des liens du sang en matières politiques. François II. a sacrifié sa fille pour conserver une partie de ses Etats, que Buonaparte voulait lui ravir

malgré le traité qu'il venait de signer à Vienne ; et, par la même raison, il ne manquera pas l'occasion de rentrer dans ses Etats, parce que sa fille est devenue mère d'un fils de Buonaparte.

L'Empereur d'Autriche se croira-t-il plus tranquille possesseur des provinces dans lesquelles il rentrerait par la rétrocession que lui en ferait Buonaparte, que s'il y rentrait à la suite de son alliance avec les Puissances coalisées? Non ; puisqu'après avoir signé le Traité de Vienne, Buonaparte n'a cessé de menacer de rentrer dans le territoire Autrichien qu'après avoir arraché l'Archiduchesse Marie-Louise à sa famille. Et comment ceux qui craignent que l'Autriche ne se décide par calcul en faveur de Buonaparte, font-ils calculer cette Puissance?

Les Alliés ont proclamé qu'ils voulaient rétablir l'ancien équilibre de l'Europe, c'est-à-dire, réduire la puissance de la France à ce qu'elle était avant la révolution. Or, l'équilibre de l'Europe peut-il être rétabli sans rendre à l'Autriche tout ce qu'elle a perdu? La France ne peut-elle pas toujours envahir l'Allemagne et l'Italie, si l'Autriche ne redevient pas une puissance prépondérante sur le Continent? Dira-t-on aussi, que les liens du sang ont beaucoup d'influence sur la politique de Buonaparte, et qu'il veut faire un Prince redoutable du grand-père maternel du prétendu Roi de Rome?

L'Autriche calcule ; cela n'est pas douteux : mais, du moment qu'elle a connu les désastres de l'armée Française en Russie, elle a été décidée en faveur des Alliés. L'envoi du Comte Stadion en Gallicie au moment où l'Empereur de Russie partait pour Wilna et Lord Walpole pour Vienne ; la signature de l'Armistice illimité avec l'Autriche ; le choix du Comte Stadion au quartier-général de l'Empereur de Russie et du Roi de Prusse ; toutes ces circonstances ne laissent aucun doute sur la détermination de l'Autriche. C'est, précisément, parce qu'elle calcule, qu'elle doit se déclarer en faveur des Alliés ; elle a tout à attendre d'eux, et elle ne peut rien espérer de Buonaparte. Il faut, d'ailleurs, se ressouvenir que l'Autriche a l'expérience de la perfidie de Buonaparte, et que, le Traité de Vienne signé, et exécuté en partie, Buonaparte n'a voulu retirer ses troupes que lorsque l'Empereur a eu consenti à sacrifier l'Archiduchesse Marie-Louise. Il faut aussi se ressouvenir qu'au moment du départ de Buonaparte pour l'Allemagne il est arrivé un Ministre Autrichien à Paris, qui n'a pas été bien accueilli.

Les événements de la campagne n'ont pu avoir d'autre effet sur l'Autriche que celui de lui donner le sentiment de sa force relative en ce moment ; et à moins que l'Empereur de Russie, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur d'Autriche n'aient perdu tout sentiment de leur dignité ; à moins que l'Autriche ne soit aveugle sur ses intérêts les plus évidents, l'Armistice ne conduira à aucunes négociations qui n'auraient pas pour base le rétablissement de l'équilibre de l'Europe. Buonaparte l'a bien senti quand il a publié qu'il consentirait à un Congrès, mais qu'il était probable que l'Angleterre se refuserait à la base du traité de paix générale.

II.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Cadiz, 3rd July, 1813.

A few days ago a Spanish frigate arrived from Portsmouth, and brought intelligence of the Armistice concluded in the North. Having learnt that a Spanish courier had reached Cadiz by this conveyance, I waited upon M. Labrador to ask him whether he could furnish me with any particulars concerning the Armistice. He said that he was apprised of no circumstance relating to it which I had not seen in the English newspapers ; that however, he was very glad of this opportunity of seeing me, in order to communicate to

me the determination of the Regency, under the supposition that the Armistice was preparatory to a general Congress, to which the belligerent powers were to be invited to send plenipotentiaries.

He then said that it was the fixed determination of the Spanish government not to send any minister to such a Congress, or to suffer the interests of Spain to be discussed in it, until every French soldier in the Peninsula had passed the Pyrenees, and until the King was restored to his people unfettered by any engagements with France. That not long since the government had been led to believe that some attempts would be made by Buonaparte to prevail upon them to enter into a separate negotiation for an accommodation, but that no consideration could induce the Spanish nation to separate its interests from those of Great Britain, or to listen to any proposals for a peace in which Great Britain was not to be equally included. He said that the Spanish government and nation had the fullest confidence in the honour and good faith of their ally, but that the Regency felt it necessary to make this early communication of the conditions upon which alone they would consent to treat with France, as it would save trouble, in the event of any overture being made to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to send a plenipotentiary to a Congress.

M. Labrador concluded by saying that he was directed to send instructions to the same effect to the Spanish ambassador in London, in order that he might be prepared with his answer, if any communication upon this subject should be made to him by your Lordship.

In my reply I ventured to assure M. Labrador that the government of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent would not consent to treat with France upon any conditions short of those which he had stated, and I expressed my satisfaction at hearing from him that the Spanish government were constant in their resolution to continue the war until all the objects for which it was undertaken were completely attained.

I own I was agreeably surprised at meeting with this disposition on the part of the present Regency, considering likewise that it was manifested at a moment of great depression, occasioned by the news of the Armistice, and when the intelligence of the glorious victory of the 21st June had not reached Cadiz.

I have the honour, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. J. W. Croker to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD AND FIELD MARSHAL, Admiralty, 3rd July, 1813.

I cannot refrain from giving you joy on these new and most opportune successes. Though I never write to you but on a victory, my letters are tolerably frequent, and you seem likely to be still oftener bored with my correspondence.

You will perceive that I had the first accounts by the telegraph yesterday, and I have had a fast sailing vessel ready at Falmouth for the purpose of taking out the acknowledgment of your despatches. I rejoice that she will take out your brevet of Field Marshal.

Sir George Collier is directed to put himself in communication with your Lordship, and to acquaint you that, besides his own squadron, three small vessels are appropriated to the conveyance of despatches between your Lordship and England. We are also going to furnish Lord Bathurst with

means of transport in men-of-war for the reinforcements which he is about to send you.

The *Nymphen* frigate, with General Leith on board, and 330,000 dollars, and about 60,000*l.* in gold, sailed yesterday for the Tagus: if we could have stopped her, she should have been ordered to Santander. Lord Bathurst will, however, endeavour to forward some money to the latter place.

We are despatching your Gazette in French, Dutch, and German, to all corners of Europe; and it is sanguinely expected that the day of Vitoria will be felt on the Elbe and the Oder.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord,

With the truest regard, yours most faithfully,

J. W. CROKER.

Disposition for the 4th July.

Ostiz, 3rd July, 1813.

Lieutenant-General Sir R. Hill will be pleased to move forward the troops at Lanz to-morrow morning to Almamdes and Berrueta.

One brigade of the Conde de Amarante's division (without artillery) will move from Sorauren by Zellaldieu and Zubiri to Egui, where it will remain till further orders, establishing its advanced posts at the ruined foundry of Egui, and communicating on the right by Zelbeti with the letter party stationed by Major-General Byng at the village of Lanzoin, and on the left with Olague, which is on the road between Ostiz and Lanz. The remainder of the Conde de Amarante's division (with the two brigades of artillery) will move by Ostiz to Olague.

Head-quarters will move to Lanz.

The cavalry before Pamplona will send to-morrow a letter party to Ostiz, and another to Larrasaena, on the road to Belsuneguio. This letter party is to remain there till further orders. Sir R. Hill will be so good as to order a letter party of the 14th Light Dragoons to be stationed at Lanz.

G. MURRAY.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 4th July, 1813.

I shall send down a messenger to-day in hopes of overtaking the one who went last night, before the first has sailed. It is for the purpose of sending the Supplementary Gazette, in which an erratum is corrected which appeared in the Extraordinary Gazette of yesterday. The Red-Ribbon given to General Clinton ought to have appeared as given at the same time that Sir Alexander Hope's was given previous to the intelligence of the battle of Vitoria. Published as it was by mistake in the Extra Gazette with the date of July 3rd, it appears as if it had been given for the battle of Vitoria.

I have directed some ammunition to be sent off without delay.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 4th July, 1813, 2 P.M.

Your Lordship's letter of yesterday noon reached me in the night. The enemy, probably to ascertain by whom the place of St. Sebastian was blockaded, made a sortie late last night, and got hold of the Spanish advanced posts, but were driven back to the convent when the troops in the rear could be brought up. I have not heard whether the Spaniards suffered any loss. It is a part of General Mendizabal's corps that is employed on the duty before St. Sebastian.

I forgot yesterday, in mentioning the circumstance of the French mail from Irun having been brought here, to tell your Lordship that the plague has broken out in Malta. This appears certain from an official letter which I opened from the Spanish consul at Naples, addressed to the Duke of Santa Fé, written on purpose to announce it, that the necessary precautionary orders may be sent to the ports of Spain. Giron got the whole bag of letters to examine, and will of course, I should think, have communicated this intelligence to the Spanish government.

The account of the Tarragona expedition is melancholy enough, and the conduct of it seems to be but too well calculated to break the spirit of any troops. I trust, however, that Lord William Bentinck's arrival will prove fortunate; and I should think he would not be likely to fall into the worst of all errors for a soldier, that of indecision.

There is an officer of the *Surveillante* (Lieutenant Douglas) now here.

Sir G. Collier is himself off the mouth of the Bidasoa, having chased a brig (an American prize) in there, and he wishes to get the vessel, giving the cargo (fish and rice) to the Spaniards. General Giron will not take any step about it, and will probably inform your Lordship of the circumstance; meanwhile they have determined to make use of the cargo, and he offered to divide it with us. I accepted a share of the rice, which will be very useful, as we cannot get bread for more than from day to day. Sir G. Collier has English papers to the 22nd ult., without any material news. Sweden gets Guadeloupe and a million sterling. I hope Bernadotte will now act with vigour should the Armistice be broken off, as may be expected from the glorious results of your Lordship's combinations.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Sir G. Collier thinks Fremantle might be in London yesterday.

Disposition for the 5th of July.

Lanz, 4th July, 1813.

That part of the Conde de Amarante's division which is at Olague will move to-morrow morning by Lanz to Berrueta, where it will receive further orders from Lieutenant-General Hill. The two brigades of artillery will, however, not move from Olague until it is ascertained whether or not the road to Berrueta is practicable for guns. If this be not ascertained before the troops move,

the Conde de Amarante will leave a detachment to assist the artillery if an order should afterwards arrive for its march to Berrueta.

The brigade which moved to Egui this day will continue there till further orders.

Head-quarters will remain to-morrow at Lanz.

G. MURRAY.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 5th July, 1813.

I have to request that your Lordship would communicate to Sir George Collier, commanding His Majesty's ships upon the coast of Biscay, your wishes with regard to the place at which the battalions and detachments now under orders to join the army under your Lordship's command should be disembarked; and would desire him to station a cruiser off Cape Machicaco expressly to communicate your orders to the several divisions of transports, all of which will be instructed to proceed to that point of rendezvous.

In addition to the detachments proceeding to join your Lordship's army as detailed in my despatch of the 16th ultimo, the following arrangement has been made, by which three battalions will be added to the British infantry under your command. The 85th regiment will be embarked in about ten days at Deal, and will sail for the coast of Biscay. The 76th will be embarked at Cork for the same destination. The 2nd battalion of the 84th regiment will go from Cork to Gibraltar, in order to relieve the 37th regiment; and I have to request your Lordship would communicate to Lieutenant-General Campbell your wishes as to the place to which the 37th should proceed (when relieved), whether to the north coast of Spain or to Catalonia.

Former instructions from this department have shown to your Lordship the desire which had been felt by His Majesty's government that some British troops should remain in Cadiz; but the decisive successes obtained by your Lordship have changed the aspect of affairs, and you will consider yourself authorized to draw a company of artillery and the 29th regiment from Cadiz, if your Lordship shall deem it advisable.

I have not failed to represent to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the great importance of giving sufficient naval security to the coasts of the Peninsula from Lisbon to St. Sebastian.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 5th July, 1813, 12 at noon.

I have not had any report this morning from the front. Captain Stanhope is just returned from a reconnaissance he went upon yesterday along the banks of the Bidasoa.

He could see that the enemy occupied the ridge of high ground, at some

distance below Vera, down towards Irun, with a regular camp of huts, and having advanced small camps on all the projecting points, which in many places command the road on this side of the river, where the valley is very narrow, so as to interrupt all communication by it. It is, however, a good car road, wide enough for artillery. There was likewise a camp at Vera, with outposts on this side of the river. He found stragglers of the enemy in Linzoain plundering, and therefore could go no higher up the river.

I was disappointed to hear that he did not find in his way the posts of observation which I had requested General Giron to direct Longa to place all along that line.

Longa went himself to Goyzueta, and was desired to observe all along the river, and to send strong posts up to Zubieta, and to patrol more to the right towards Elgoriaga and Doña Maria, to feel for the advance of the columns moving on St. Estevan. I have written to him to-day by a staff-officer of Giron's, who is sent up to ascertain what he has done.

I have always found Longa not only willing, but intelligent, and desirous of executing punctually any orders he received. But I fancy Giron treats him as being still merely a kind of guerrilla, and Longa feels it; for he told me one day that nothing would make him so happy as to be taken away entirely from Giron, and attached to us. Perhaps the very bad weather may have retarded the march of some of his people.

I have applied, in consequence of General Murray's letter, received last night, to General Giron to collect wood and other materials necessary for a siege, and I shall employ the men who understand it in making fascines, gabions, &c. Major Smith has just brought me the note of heavy ordnance which he thinks would be necessary to carry on the attack with vigour, besides the 18-pounder brigade and the field brigades. I annex a copy of it.

The 5th division will be at Tolosa to-morrow, ready to be moved forward whenever required. I hope, by means of some old guns in the fort of Pasages, to be able to attack the convent in a day or two.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Copy of Major Smith's Memorandum.

8 8-inch howitzers.
4 mortars.
8 24-pounders, heavy.*

The supply of 5½-inch shells ought to be very considerable, as from the situation in which the 24-pounders would be placed much shell-work will be required of them.

* The Commodore can furnish two 24-pounder carronades. N.B. The port of Pasages is certainly the most convenient place in all respects for the landing of the heavy guns and stores.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 6th July, 1813, 12 at noon.

I feel a good deal of difficulty in answering your Lordship's question about the Spaniards being fit to carry on principally the operations of the siege of St. Sebastian.

In general, Giron's own troops, which *appear to be in the best order*, have been very little tried before the enemy: probably many of them have never fired a shot in action. But those that were employed at Tolosa (a battalion of light infantry and one of the line) behaved very well, as did the brigade in advance towards Irun; and in this last affair they were left to themselves, no other troops being near them. I should, however, have more confidence in Longa's troops, as being more *aguerris*. But they are perhaps the fittest to occupy the posts in the mountains on the right of this great road, and to watch the fords of the Bidasoa, and the roads leading from them.

Longa has his quarters at Goyzueta, with detachments at Arañas, Zubieta, Saldias, and other points, with small posts of observation in others.

The Spaniards who blockade St. Sebastian at present are part of Mendizabal's force, and I believe more particularly belonging to Don Gaspar and Pastor. These men do not seem to understand well what they are about; they fire away a great deal of ammunition without seeing the enemy. I believe they were completely surprised the other night, and some say they lost a great many men, taken prisoners in different houses which they occupied near the Convent of St. Bartolomé, where the enemy has established himself. If this is true, General Giron has kept it to himself. Several of these houses were burnt by the French that night, which is rather an advantage perhaps.

This corps, consisting of a brigade of four battalions, I should certainly say *could not be depended on* without a considerable proportion of better troops.

It is a question whether they will work well, especially under fire. Major Smith is much afraid the Spaniards generally will not answer the purpose of working parties very near the enemy well, from awkwardness, and the impossibility of making them keep silence, though he does not apprehend that the working parties will be exposed to much risk from the fire of the enemy. I have always observed among the Spaniards, both officers and men, a great degree of emulation from pride, and therefore I am persuaded a good proportion of them might be safely employed in the different duties of the siege. But I would by no means answer for their doing as well if left entirely to themselves in the execution even of the most ordinary duties of the siege. *On occasion of assault* it is quite certain that other troops would be necessary, and Major Smith is quite of opinion that it is only on such that the casualties are likely to be considerable.

Then your Lordship will advert to the necessity of the operation being so strongly covered towards Irun as to bid defiance to any effort of the enemy. At present Giron's corps only is forward; mostly cantoned at Lozo, Renteria, and Oyarzun, with an advanced guard of a brigade at Irun, and another at Fuenterrabia and adjacents.

It would not do, however, to trust to them only. I have sent De Lancey this morning to examine all that country. From what I saw myself, there might be a first line (covering the chaussée, as well as the old road from Irun by Renteria to St. Sebastian) on the heights in front of Oyarzun, very necessary to cover the harbour of Pasages, and a shorter second line with the left at Renteria, and having the river which passes by Oyarzun in the front all the way, from the hills on which the right would rest. Probably some works should be constructed to strengthen these lines. I should think that it would be advisable to mix British and Spanish troops both on this front and in the duties of the siege, in order to give security to the lines, and to carry on the siege with all the despatch and energy possible.

Sir G. Collier came here yesterday, and left this in the morning. He received one of your Lordship's letters; I don't know whether that to which you allude. He mentioned your desiring him to provide a passage for General Anson. But I read to him that part of your Lordship's letter to me in which you mention having desired him to watch St. Sebastian, and of your having ordered the ordnance transports to Pasages.

Unfortunately the vessels of his small squadron are scattered about so that he cannot lay hold of any of them without going himself in quest of them. I got him to write to Captain Bloye, of the *Lyra* (a 10-gun brig), who has charge of the ordnance transports, and I sent the letter by Guetaria to Deba, at one of which places it is probable it may find him, as the re-embarkation of the ordnance stores cannot have been completed yet, the bar and surf being so great as to make it a very tedious operation, so that I hope the transports will soon be with us. Sir George Collier wants much to send to the Admiral in Basque Roads for more small cruisers for this blockade, but has nothing with him. He applied again to General Giron to get the use of the brig (the American prize) for this purpose, but I understand General Giron declines any interference, having referred it to your Lordship; but as Sir George Collier pledged his honour to restore her in the same state, if not found by the Court of Admiralty to belong to the English owner, I was in hopes he would have given him this accommodation. This brig hoisted French colours when she ran into the Bidasoa, believing the French to be in possession of Fuenterrabia, and this I am told ought to decide the point against the Americans at all events. We have got two of Sir George Collier's short 24-pounders on shore at Renteria, and I hope the officers of artillery will be able to contrive to bring them forward, as then Colonel Hartmann will have no pretence for not driving the enemy out of the convent.

The 9-pounders probably would have set fire to the roof, but, as he said otherwise, and as the walls are very thick, I did not insist on it.

I understand, however, that Major Frazer, who came here yesterday from Deba, thinks they would have answered for setting fire to the roof. On receiving your Lordship's last letter I have desired Major Frazer, who seems to be a most willing, intelligent officer, to wait here till he hears from Colonel Dickson, as he will be very useful to us till Dickson comes. Sir R. Fletcher will probably send some young men of his corps. Major Smith has one here (Lieutenant Tapp), and we shall get Jones from the 5th division.

General Giron, at my request, has ordered the alcaldes of the different villages to collect and send in such wood as can be found fit for platforms, &c., as also two tons of junk, and some iron. We began yesterday morning to make fascines, gabions, &c.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—The enemy sent 200 men over at a ford, above the bridge of Irun, this morning, and drove in the Spaniards, but retired, and seeing a company in reserve advancing, they burnt some houses. By Longa's report the enemy is retiring by Sumbilla towards Vera from St. Estevan.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Fife House, 7th July, 1813.

I trust you will be satisfied with the impression which your great and splendid victory has made upon the public in this country. I have no doubt it will produce a state of feeling not less gratifying upon the Continent, and I only hope it will arrive in time to counteract the political machinations of the enemy. We calculate that Buonaparte would receive the intelligence at Dresden nearly about the time when we received it in London; and he will certainly have some days to avail himself of his own knowledge of your success, and of the ignorance of the Allies and of Austria respecting it. Every precaution was, however, taken to transmit the Gazette in French, Dutch, and German, to the different parts of the coast, with as little delay as possible, besides a messenger being sent to Stralsund, and to the head quarters of the Russian and Prussian armies. The event therefore will, I hope, be known before any prolongation of the Armistice can have been settled.

We received yesterday the account of the treaties of alliance and concert being signed between this country, Russia, and Prussia.

The intentions of Austria were still problematical. She was driving at peace, and the result of her endeavours will probably depend upon the degree of sacrifice and concession which Buonaparte will be induced to make, under present circumstances, to obtain it.

Although the suggestions I am about to make have certainly occurred to yourself, I think it right, however, at this particular moment to mention them.

We may now entertain a reasonable hope that we shall succeed in driving the French out of Spain. The next object will be to *keep them out* of that country.

A British army of so large an amount as that now under your command cannot always remain there. It is material, therefore, to consider what measures can be adopted for rendering the Peninsula secure without the necessary aid of a British force; or at least with a British force to a small and limited extent.

In the first place, would it be practicable to apply the principle upon

which the lines before Lisbon have been formed to the passes of the Pyrenees? and in what degree would such a system afford security to the country?

Secondly, might not a permanent force be raised in the five northern provinces of Biscay, Navarre, Catalonia, Aragon, and the Asturias (where, from all accounts, the inhabitants are of a much more warlike character than in any other part of Spain), for the defence of the Pyrenees, to be equipped for this particular purpose, and to act in concert with the regular army? And could such a force in any degree be officered by British officers?

Thirdly, would it be expedient and practicable to combine these two objects with a British and Portuguese force to a limited extent—say twenty, twenty-five, or even thirty thousand men? And would these different measures, reduced into a system, afford any reasonable security against the renewed invasion of the French, regard being had to the nature and strength of the country in which they must in the first instance be compelled to operate?

I throw out these suggestions, not with a view to the present moment, being fully persuaded that it cannot now be expedient to reduce the Allied armies in that quarter, or to divert them from operations in the south of France, if the war on the Continent should continue, and such operations should appear to be practicable. But having always considered the independence of Spain and Portugal as the first Continental object to which this country, under present circumstances, ought to look, it is material to form some opinion upon the practicability of a permanent system, the expense of which we may be able to maintain, independent of the extraordinary exertion which we have been recently making for the deliverance of those countries from French dominion.

Lord Castlereagh has written to your brother, Sir Henry Wellesley, to instruct him strongly to urge the Spanish government to return to Madrid. Such a measure appears to be of the utmost importance, not only with a view of delivering that government from the influence of the local prejudices of the town of Cadiz, but likewise for the purpose of giving an impression to the people of Spain at large, and to the other nations of Europe, that the government of Spain entertain a just confidence in their own strength, an impression which may be productive of the most important consequences both in the Peninsula and in Europe at this time.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Speaker of the House of Commons to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, House of Commons, 7th July, 1813.

In the name and by the command of the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, I do hereby deliver to your Lordship their unanimous thanks for the energy and distinguished ability with which you have conducted the late operations of the Allied forces in Spain, and particularly for the splendid and decisive vic-

tory obtained upon the 21st of June last, near Vitoria, when the French army was completely routed, with the loss of all its artillery, stores, and baggage.

I have also the honour to transmit to your Lordship the unanimous thanks of the House of Commons to the several Lieutenant-Generals, Major-Generals, and other officers of His Majesty's service under your Lordship's command, together with their unanimous thanks to Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, and the several General officers and officers of the Portuguese service, for their great exertions upon that memorable day.

By other unanimous resolutions, which I have the honour to enclose, the House of Commons has also acknowledged and highly approved of the distinguished zeal, courage, discipline, and good conduct displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of His Majesty's forces, and also of the Portuguese and Spanish forces respectively serving under your Lordship's command in that glorious victory.

A victory so signal and complete in itself, prepared with such skill and foresight by a long course of antecedent operations, achieved with such consummate valour, and leading to consequences of such magnitude in the present situation of Europe, has filled the minds of all men with the strongest sentiments of admiration, and called forth the spontaneous homage of a great and generous people.

Allow me also to congratulate your Lordship upon the merited honours which your Sovereign has conferred upon you by placing your name in the highest rank of military command for services unparalleled in the military history of this nation.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most faithful servant,

CHARLES ABBOT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Mercurij, 7° die Julij, 1813.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the thanks of this House be given to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, for the energy and distinguished ability with which he hath conducted the late operations of the Allied Forces in Spain; and particularly for the splendid and decisive victory obtained upon the 21st day of June last, near Vitoria, when the French army was completely routed, with the loss of all its artillery, stores, and baggage.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House be given to Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill, Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie, Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, Lieutenant-General Sir Galbraith Lowry Cole, and Lieutenant-General the Honourable William Stewart; to Major-General George Baron Bock, Major-General Charles Baron Alten, Major-General the Honourable Charles Colville, Major-General George Anson, Major-General John Oswald, Major-General John Ormsby Vandeleur, Major-General George Murray, Major-General Frederick Philips Robinson, Major-General Lord Aylmer, and to the several other officers of His Majesty's service, for their great exertions upon the 21st of June last, when the French army was completely defeated by the Allied Forces under the Marquess of Wellington's command.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House be given to Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and to the several General officers and officers of the Portuguese service who were present at the glorious battle of Vitoria upon the 21st day of June last, for their great exertions upon that occasion, when the French army was completely defeated by the Allied forces under the Marquess of Wellington's command; and that the Marquess of Wellington be desired to convey to them the present Resolution.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That this House doth acknowledge and highly approve of the distinguished zeal, valour, and discipline displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of His Majesty's forces serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, in the glorious victory obtained upon the 21st of June last, near Vitoria; and that the same be signified to them by the commanding officers of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant and exemplary behaviour.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That this House doth highly acknowledge the zeal, courage, and discipline displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the Portuguese forces serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington in the glorious victory obtained upon the 21st of June last, near Vitoria.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That this House doth highly acknowledge the distinguished zeal, valour, and good conduct displayed by the several General officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the Spanish forces who served under the command of the Marquess of Wellington in the splendid and decisive victory obtained over the French army upon the 21st of June last, near Vitoria, and that Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington be desired to communicate to them the present Resolution.

Ordered, That Mr. Speaker do communicate the said Resolutions to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington; and that he be requested by Mr. Speaker to signify the same to Lieutenant-Generals Sir Thomas Graham and the Earl of Dalhousie, and to Major-Generals George Baron Bock, Charles Baron Alten, the Honourable Charles Colville, John Oswald, John Ormsby Vandeleur, George Murray, Frederick Philips Robinson, and Lord Aylmer.

J. Ley, Cl. D. Dom. Com.

G. O. Irurita, 9th July, 1813. [665.]

1. The Commander of the Forces is anxious to draw the attention of the officers of the army to the difference of the situation in which they have been hitherto among the people of Portugal and Spain, and that in which they may hereafter find themselves among those of the frontiers of France.

2. Every military precaution must henceforward be used to obtain intelligence and to prevent surprise. General and superior officers at the head of detached corps will take care to keep up a constant and regular communication with the corps upon their right and left, and with their rear; and the soldiers and their followers must be prevented from wandering to a

distance from their camps and cantonments on any account whatever.

3. Notwithstanding that these precautions are absolutely necessary, as the country in the front of the army is the enemy's, the Commander of the Forces is particularly desirous that the inhabitants should be well treated, and private property must be respected, as it has been hitherto.

4. The officers and soldiers of the army must recollect that their nations are at war with France solely because the ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers, and their cruelties authorised and encouraged by their chiefs towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country.

5. To revenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to whom the Commander of the Forces now addresses himself, and at all events would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large than those which the enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula, and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interests.

6. The rules, therefore, which have been observed hitherto in requiring, and taking, and giving receipts for supplies from the country, are to be continued in the villages on the French frontier, and the Commissaries attached to each of the armies of the several nations will receive the orders from the Commander in Chief of the army of their nations respecting the mode and period of paying for such supplies.

WELLINGTON.

Vice-Admiral Sir W. S. Smith to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, *Hibernia*, off Toulon, 9th July, 1813.

Knowing all your family as I do, I cannot help feeling well enough acquainted with you to venture on sending the enclosed letter to your excellent brother through you. I curbed my pen in expressions of admiration and gratitude to you who have opened this short road, since it occurred to me while writing that I would send it open for your perusal, as it contains some things of more use to be known by your Lordship, who can act on the information or propose it in London, than sending it direct thither

through a quarter that can only goad where requisite; whereas you, from the high ground you occupy, can guide as well as lead. It does not become me, not being authorized by my secondary situation, to add a word of opinion direct to yourself on any question; but I will venture to say you will find, when you come to correspond, as I trust you soon will, with my intelligent chief, a man capable of seconding your views, extensive as they are, and extending, as no doubt they will, beyond the Pyrenees. If Bayonne is the properest place to sign the arrangement securing the independence of Spain, there first attacked, Toulon is that for dictating the liberation of France, with her fleet under the Ferula, being of the same combustible materials as that we destroyed in 1793, and the political elements not very different, locally speaking. I trust I did you a little good lately by alarming Murat, so as to prevent him sending his proportion of the conscription out of Italy. Knowing me to be at Cagliari, he sent a flag of truce across from Naples, under pretence of inquiring about the plague at Malta, but in fact to learn what the Vice-Admiral of the Mediterranean fleet, in a first-rate, could be doing there. The officer seeing, as I took care he should, field artillery and mortars on the decks ready for a landing, took for granted that this ship was the forerunner of more with an army, and I trust he may be ultimately right; meanwhile, as that is not immediately probable, it is as well the apprehension should exist.

The King of Sardinia is able and willing to furnish about 4000 wild fellows as good sharpshooters, to act about Nice and Genoa, where he has partisans enough in the mountains to bar the communications between Italy and France both ways. His Majesty told me he had last war a good corps of that description in Russian pay, under the title of "Corps Auxiliaire Sarde." Perhaps it would be more politic for us to have it in British pay, and under such British direction as yours. A suggestion of this kind from you might bring them forward. Pardon this digression, on account of the motive, and accept, my dear Lord, the heartfelt congratulations of

Your Lordship's faithful and obedient humble servant,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

Lord Wellington will see by the enclosed specimen that there is a press on board the *Hibernia*, and consequently the means of circulating good news eastward.

Bulletin.

Hibernia,
Off Toulon
8th July, 1813.

Received per Telegraph by the Paulina, July 8th, 1813.

Glorious News from Spain.

French Army entirely broken, 151 *Cannon all their Baggage Ammunition and Treasure captured by Lord Wellington. Spaniards salute to Day. Official.*

P.S. 9th July.—The battle took place on the 21st of June near Victoria (the Capital of the province of Alava.) The Enemy (Commanded by Joseph,) being cut off from the direct road to France, retired on Pamplona.

Mina is approaching Tudela, and a considerable Spanish Force is at Calatayud, Gen. Sir R. Hill is advancing on Saragossa with 20,000 *men and* 3000 *Cavalry.*

[666.] G. O. Zubieta, 11th July, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the General officers and commanding officers of regiments in a very particular manner to the orders which have been given for the regulation of the march of the baggage of the army, which he begs may be attended to. He directs that the bâtmen and men attending cattle may be made to carry their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, on the march of their several regiments at all times.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Col. Sir Richard Fletcher to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Olaz, near Pamplona, 11th July, 1813.

It may be interesting to your Lordship to be informed that I saw yesterday some inhabitants of Pamplona, who appeared to be intelligent, and who had come from the town the day preceding.

They say positively that the convoy of 400 cars, which arrived a short time before the place was invested, consisted chiefly of clothing, that it conveyed some spirits, and but a small proportion of provisions. They add that the garrison had been eight days on half allowance. They think that the quantity of cattle or salted meat is not considerable. About 2000 inhabitants remained in the place, out of 16,000.

I am sorry to say that having found much stone or rock in the ditches of the redoubts, their completion will necessarily be delayed somewhat beyond the time I had mentioned.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

RICHARD FLETCHER.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Murray to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Alicante, 13th July, 1813.

Owing to your letter to Lord William Bentinck having made a détour by Alicante to Valencia, and from thence to Alicante again, it did not reach me till yesterday evening. I shall endeavour, as speedily as possible, to send you a detailed narrative of our operations; but as I have now no access to some necessary papers, perhaps it may not be so full as your Lordship might wish. The absence, too, of the Engineer and Artillery officers will make it impossible for me to ascertain precisely some dates, but these will not be of much importance.

I assure you, my dear Lord Wellington, that I had no wish that the present question should be referred to government. On the contrary, to me it would have been most satisfactory that you had pronounced judgment; and when I mentioned H.M. government in my official letter, it was merely

as knowing that my statement must necessarily come before them that I wished to make it as clear as possible, to prevent future references.

I still believe the decision will rest with you; and I venture to hope, when the whole case is before you, that your Lordship will see that the event, which certainly is to be regretted, was not to be avoided, or at all events that I should have acted a most imprudent part had I, under the then existing appearances, risked the very existence of this army. As I consider this merely a reply to your private letter, I hope you will excuse my observing that I cannot think that the loss of the guns materially cripples this army. The whole of its field equipment is as entire as when it left Alicante, and it has only lost seventeen serviceable pieces of its battering train, out of, I believe, eighty-nine. The only other article of consequence is the platforms, but these can easily be replaced; and as for the shot and shells, to have embarked them would have required a time which we certainly never could have spared; but had we lost our cavalry, had we lost our field artillery, and all the animals belonging to the army and with us, never again could it have recovered; whereas at this moment it is in the field, and had it not been for some transports getting on shore on its return, would have been so much sooner. I certainly ever looked with more anxiety to preserve the army entire for the field than for any other purpose; and had it not been for the astonishing success of your army, every article lost might have been replaced from Sicily, Malta, or Gibraltar over and over again before they could have been wanted. But I do not on that account consider the loss of the guns as a trifle; on the contrary, I sincerely lament it, but I cannot help thinking that the losses to which we were exposed would have been infinitely more fatal. Had these been sustained, Suchet's army would have been at perfect liberty; as it is, I should hope that still having so much means to carry on a siege, and entire in every part of field equipment, the loss of seventeen guns will not enable the French General to adopt other plans than those he would have followed had these guns been preserved.

Any observations I may have to make on the statement of Suchet's force found in King Joseph's papers will come more naturally in my official letter; but as I am anxious to show your Lordship that I was not much mistaken, I beg to say a few words on this point. You may recollect I stated Suchet's force to be about 24,000 men.

The return you sent makes present, without noticing sick and detached	15,846
Severoli's division, four battalions, say 700 each	2,800
.Do. cavalry	150
Pannetier's division is totally omitted, and that, I have ever heard, is stronger than Severoli's, but state it, to make the sum a round one, at	3,204
	22,000
To this number of 22,000 must be added the garrison of Murviedro, about	500
Do. Peniscola, I suppose	300
Denia, Gandia, and the moveable column, &c.	500
	23,300

Then ought to be included his sick and wounded and his detachments, which alone would bring his number beyond that at which I stated it. I perceive too that there are some regiments not mentioned which we knew were in our front: I suppose these were drafted after the action with us, or they may be perhaps with Pannetier. In the return no notice is taken of artillery, of which I suppose he had a considerable number, as he had so many pieces mounted in position, and brought to Castalla a considerable number of cannon.

Of the strength of the Catalonian French army I cannot be so good a judge, but I am not at all disposed to believe that Cabanes has overrated it at 22,900. I know it was always believed that the Spanish officers stated it too low, with the view of inducing us to send troops to the province; but if I should have been deceived on this point, it cannot be much, and I had no better source of information than the Spanish staff. I am quite aware that this business will occasion a great outcry, but it does not follow from that circumstance, and more particularly when we consider the quarter from whence it comes, that there are grounds for it. We have within these few years seen many instances of this; and where so much private pique has been mixed with the question, it is clear what the consequence must be. I think your Lordship will allow that it is a very unusual measure to send an officer of the navy with such despatches, and could only be done with the view of giving all possible publicity to the affair, and certainly in this case was perfectly unnecessary. But it is not the raising the siege, it is not the loss of the guns, which occasions all this outcry; it is that the expedition was undertaken at all, and because I chose to command the army myself.

I am afraid some of my letters from Tarragona have not reached your Lordship. I sent an official statement of the capture of the Coll de Balaguer, and I know I wrote a private letter on the 7th. I am pretty sure I wrote likewise before that day. The letters were sent on board the *Malta*, to be forwarded as opportunities offered, and should have gone with Captain Carroll. Copies of all these, except the letter of the 7th, are with the army, and I can now only get copies of them by writing to Lord William.

The reinforcements I expected were from Sicily: the regiments, the 44th and 6th German Legion, and some addition of Italians and Sicilians. Lord William meant to have sent them, but found it afterwards inconvenient.

With regard to the messenger the Admiral sent, I have reason to believe that he volunteered the service, and consequently his accounts will be as unfavourable as possible; but what he can know of the business I am at a loss to conjecture, further, indeed, than that he might be disappointed of promotion, and the loss of prize money is, I hear, a very prevailing reason amongst the navy for their condemnation of my conduct. I am far from imputing such motives to Captain Carroll, but I have known such feelings weigh with the navy on former occasions; and of this I am sure, that he knew nothing of the information I had, or the orders under which I was acting.

I remain, my dear Lord Wellington,

Yours ever sincerely,

J. MURRAY.

Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Office, 14th July, 1813.

I have great satisfaction in being the channel of transmitting to your Lordship a commission from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, appointing you Field Marshal in the British army from the 21st June, 1813, inclusive.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

PALMERSTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

In the name and on the behalf of His Majesty.

GEORGE, P. R.

George the Third, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith, &c. To our right trusty and entirely beloved cousin and councillor Lieutenant-General Arthur Marquess of Wellington, K.G., greeting. We, reposing especial trust and confidence in your prudence, courage, and loyalty, do by these presents constitute and appoint you to be Field Marshal of all and singular our forces employed or to be employed in our service. You are therefore carefully to discharge the said trust of Field Marshal by doing and performing all and all manner of things thereunto belonging wherever you are employed by our orders. And we do hereby command all our officers and soldiers who are or shall be employed in our service upon such occasions to obey you as their Field Marshal, and you are to observe and follow such orders and directions as you shall from time to time receive from us, according to the rules and discipline of war, in pursuance of the trust we hereby repose in you. Given at our Court at Carlton House, the twenty-first day of June, 1813, in the fifty-third year of our reign.

Entered with the Secretary-at-War,
ROB. LUKIN.

Entered with the Commissary-General of Musters,
THO. BUTTS.

By the command of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty,
SIDMOUTH.

Arthur, Marquess of Wellington, K.G.,
Field Marshal.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 14th July, 1813.

As it appears not improbable that your Lordship may find it advisable, in following up the great successes which have attended your recent operations, to cause the Allied army or portions of it to enter France, I have considered it proper to acquaint you that His Majesty's government will entertain no objection to your pursuing the great objects of the war by

whatever course your Lordship shall deem the most effectual; and I have at the same time to convey to you full authority to levy within the territory of France such contributions, whether of provisions, forage, military equipments, means of transport, or specie, as you may consider expedient and may require for the service of the Allied army under your Lordship's command.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY. DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 14th July, 1813.

It is proposed to create four additional Knights of the Bath for distinguished military services in the Peninsula, viz., two Lieutenant-Generals, Earl of Dalhousie and William Stewart, and the two heads of your Staff, Pakenham and Murray. I think, by drawing this line, we should give as little occasion for complaint with those who may have pretensions to this honour as any. It has, however, been observed that in your account of the battle of Vitoria you have said, "It was late before I knew that the column, composed of the 3rd and 7th divisions, under the command of the Earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at the station appointed for them." This has been construed into something like censure; and there is certainly in that despatch no expression of commendation of his conduct.

This has created a doubt as to his Lordship being included, and yet the omission of him, if the Ribbon were given to others, would become more marked than it ought to be, on the mere conjecture that some little blame was intended to be imputed in your letter.

Nothing shall be done on the subject until I hear from you; and it shall not be known that I have applied to you. If you think we can extend it to a *few* others, pray let me know. Possibly we might add the Prince of Orange.

I am, my dear Lord, yours, &c.,
BATHURST.

Major Fremantle's uncle applied to me to get your aide-de-camp *two* steps, on the precedent of Lord Clinton. I explained the peculiarity of that promotion, and the decision taken that it should not be brought as a precedent. He then applied to the Regent, and construed a civil answer into a promise, which indisposed the Regent against the nephew.

Mr. Fremantle has said that from various circumstances you take an especial interest in this young man, and selected him on this occasion as one the most likely to procure him extraordinary promotion. If this be the case, the Duke of York will, I believe, take an early opportunity of considering him.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 14th July, 1813.

I have received the copies of two despatches from Sir John Murray to your Lordship: the one dated 9th June, relating the attack on the Coll de Balaguer; the other dated the 14th ultimo, stating to your Lordship the reasons which induced him to raise the siege of Tarragona.

His Majesty's government have at the same time received a copy of a letter addressed to Sir Edward Pellew by Admiral Hallowell, and it appears that a copy of this letter has been also transmitted to your Lordship.

I have doubted how far it would be expedient to publish Sir John Murray's despatch of the 14th ultimo. It contains a very unfavourable representation of the character of the Spanish forces; the publication of which might be the more prejudicial to the common cause, inasmuch as it implies your Lordship's concurrence in that opinion. On the other hand, I should not have done justice to Sir John Murray, if, under his peculiar circumstances, I had published his letter in a different shape from what he had written it; more particularly if I had omitted a passage which forms a material part of his justification. I have, therefore, thought it more advisable to postpone at least its publication until I shall receive it officially from you, and have the advantage of any comments with which your Lordship may possibly accompany it.

I shall also postpone giving any opinion as to what should be the nature of the proceedings which should be adopted for the purpose of affording Sir John Murray an opportunity of making his defence against the charges which are brought against him.

It appears to me advisable that such investigation of this business as may be necessary should take place in the Peninsula, according to the judgment and under the direction of your Lordship, as well as for the greater convenience of examining witnesses on the spot, instead of recalling them to this country. In this, however, I shall be guided by your Lordship's opinion.

Your Lordship's instructions give you full authority to detach any officer to take the command of the troops on the eastern coast of Spain, if from Lord William Bentinck's absence, or any other cause, it shall appear to you to be expedient.

If Sir John Murray shall have left the Peninsula for Sicily, he will in that case be withdrawn from your Lordship's command. In order to meet that contingency I shall enclose a letter to him, which I must beg your Lordship to forward with all possible despatch.

This letter will enclose a copy of Admiral Hallowell's letter, and direct Sir John Murray's recall from Sicily. He will be instructed to proceed to Gibraltar and wait for further orders.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

BATHURST.

The Duc de Berri to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MYLORD, Londres, le 14 Juillet, 1813.

Il y a bien longtemps que j'ai exprimé au gouvernement le désir que j'avais d'aller servir sous vos ordres, et je regrettrai toujours de n'avoir pas été témoin des manœuvres habiles et des victoires éclatantes par lesquels vous avez délivré deux royaumes; mais votre gloire, toute grande qu'elle est, ne doit pas se borner là: il vous reste une tâche plus facile que vous en croyez peut-être, qui est de délivrer la France du joug de l'usurpateur, et de la rendre à son Roi légitime. Cette intention, qui est, je le sais, le vœu du Prince Régent et de son gouvernement, sera secondée par beaucoup de Français, si, en entrant en France, on leur montre un Prince Français. Je puis vous affirmer, Milord, et je ne le fais pas avec légèreté, ou sans avoir la preuve de ce que j'avance, que si j'obtiens par vous que je parte sans délai pour aller vous joindre, et que vous entriez en France, je rangerai en peu de semaines sous vos drapeaux une armée de plus de vingt mille Français, qui sont enrégimentés, formés et même armés en partie; mais ces mêmes hommes qui combattront sous vos ordres, m'ayant pour chef, seront contre s'ils ne voyent pas un Bourbon avec vous. Les fidèles Royalistes Français sont commandés par des officiers qui ont servi sous mes ordres pendant dix ans en Allemagne; et ils ont dernièrement envoyé un homme sûr pour demander les ordres du Roi, et ma présence, si comme ils n'en doutoient pas vous alliez entrer en France à la tête de votre armée victorieuse.

En renouvelant dans ce moment-ci aux Ministres ma demande d'aller vous joindre, laquelle est appuyée et présentée par l'ambassadeur de Russie, je les ai trouvés plutôt disposés à l'écouter favorablement; mais comme je suis assuré que l'on ne fera rien là-dessous sans vous avoir consulté, je m'adresse à vous avec confiance.

Je ne veux pas vous fatiguer par une plus longue lettre: vous sentirez l'importance de ce que je demande; je finis en vous priant d'accepter le faible tribut de mon admiration, et l'assurance des sentiments distingués de

Votre très affectionné,

CHARLES FERDINAND DE FRANCE.

[667.] ARRANGEMENT FOR ENCAMPING THE TROOPS ABOUT LESACA.

15th July, 1813.

The Light division will encamp two battalions of the 95th on the heights of Sta. Barbara, one brigade on the heights near the bridge of Vera, and one brigade at the bridge of Lesaca.

The 7th division will encamp on the heights between Echalar and the rocky point on which they now stand. They will occupy that point.

General Longa will place two battalions on the height on

the left of the Bidasoa, one battalion in Salain, and one battalion on the heights between Salain and Endalaza, having a piquet at the ford of Endalaza.

The remainder of the troops under General Longa will be at Lesaca.

The brigade of the 4th army ordered to Salain will encamp this day in that neighbourhood.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Murray to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Alicante, 15th July, 1813.

Having at considerable length reported to your Excellency the situation of the Allied army on the morning of the 12th of June, and the measures which, in my opinion, were prescribed to me by the rapid approach of a superior force of the enemy, I shall now, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, proceed to state the transactions of the army previous and subsequent to that day, the positions of the Catalonian army, and my communications with the General who commanded it. I trust I shall be enabled to give your Lordship all the information you require, although the absence of the engineer and artillery officers with the army will prevent me from giving a daily account of the stores as they were landed. I can assure your Excellency, however, that no time was lost in this operation, tedious in itself at all times, but at Tarragona particularly so, on account of the heavy swell that very frequently sets in, and which on the 8th and 9th almost entirely interrupted the communication with the transports. On these days no stores could be landed, and the lightest boats only could pass to the shipping. To this inconvenience the whole coast in that neighbourhood is exposed. For days an embarkation might be impracticable, and that consideration made me extremely anxious, when the continuation of the siege became impracticable, to profit of the state of the beach, as it could not be depended upon from one day to another.

On the 2nd of June, as I have reported to your Lordship, the fleet anchored to the eastward of the Point of Salon, and the brigades which had been previously ordered to hold themselves in readiness were put into the boats, but the surf ran so high that, in Admiral Hallowell's opinion, it would have been unsafe to land them, and they returned to their ships.

Previous to the fleet coming to an anchor, the brigade commanded by Colonel Prevost, and composed of the 67th regiment and the battalion of Roll-Dillon, with a proportion of artillery and the necessary engineer officers, were detached to the Coll de Balaguer, and General Copons, in compliance with a request I made him, detached during the night two battalions to co-operate in the attack on Fort St. Felipe. On the 5th two other Spanish battalions were sent there, in consequence of some movements of the enemy from Tortosa. On the 7th the fort capitulated, as I have reported to your Lordship in a former despatch.

Colonel Prevost landed to the eastward of the fort, and within about one mile of it. On the 3rd of June soon after sunrise the disembarkation commenced; and during the course of that day the whole of the infantry nearly, with some field-pieces, but without their horses, were landed. In the evening some stores and baggage and some of the staff officers' horses were landed likewise, but in very small proportions. The place was immediately reconnoitred and invested, the point of attack decided on, and the places for the depôts of engineer and artillery stores fixed.

Having reconnoitred the fortress, I decided on attacking it on the western side, which is not only the weakest, but was likewise the most convenient, and saved great labour in bringing up the stores to the batteries. Unfortunately, however, the enemy had very nearly completed the re-establishment of the Fuerte Reale, which it was indispensably necessary to take before any batteries could be erected against the town. The enemy was still at work on the fort, and to prevent his strengthening it two batteries were begun on the evening of the 4th, although we were in no state of preparation to carry on the operations of the siege. On the morning of the 6th these batteries (the one of four howitzers and the other of two 24-pounders) opened their fire with good effect; but it was found expedient to erect another battery of two 24-pounders, which was begun and completed in the night of the 6th. At day-break on the 7th this battery opened its fire, and on the morning of the 8th the Fuerte Reale was reported to me by Major Thackeray, the commanding engineer, as practicably breached.

The Fuerte Reale lies between 350 and 400 yards from the body of the place. When, however, Major Thackeray made his report to me, he requested that the work should not be stormed, informing me that he could turn the immediate possession of it to no account, and that retaining it would cost the lives of many men. Every delay was to be regretted; but as the state of the fort was now such that it could be taken when convenient, I consented to defer the attack, and directed that the fire upon it should continue only sufficiently to prevent its re-establishment.

During this time artillery and engineer stores, and the cavalry and artillery horses, were landed, when the weather would permit, and the engineer officers continued their preparations for the siege. On the 8th these were sufficiently advanced to enable Major Thackeray, at a distance, I think, of about 450 yards from the body of the place, to commence two heavy batteries to enfilade the face proposed to be attacked. In the one, six 24-pounders, and in the other four howitzers and two mortars, were placed in the night of the 10th, and on the 11th, at day-break, their fire was opened; but although the fire was well directed, and kept up with great spirit, no diminution of that from Tarragona was perceived during the course of the day.

Major Thackeray having reported to me that he was now perfectly prepared to push the siege with vigour, the fire on the Fuerte Reale was increased during the 11th, and it was decided to storm that work and the Marina in the night; but the intelligence I received late that evening of the approach of Marshal Suchet, combined with the march of the column from Barcelona, prevented me from carrying my intention into execution. I thought it would have been an useless waste of the lives of British sol-

diers to carry a work which I was sure must be abandoned the next day, without any possible advantage being derived from it.

So far, my Lord, had the operations against Tarragona proceeded when the siege was raised.

On the first view of the case, your Lordship may perhaps be of opinion that more might have been done, and under more favourable circumstances no doubt we might have been further advanced; but under no circumstances materially so. Your Lordship, in judging of this point, will, I hope, take into consideration the strength of the place, which, although the outworks (with the exception of the Fuerte Reale) were destroyed, was still in a most formidable state of defence; such, indeed, that Major Thackeray, on the 8th or 9th, declared it his deliberate opinion that it could not be taken in less than fourteen or fifteen days from that time. It is likewise to be recollected that the army invested the place without a single preparation having been made for a siege. We had not a single fascine or gabion, nor did the vessel arrive which had been sent to Iviça for the materials collected there, till the evening of the 4th or 5th. It was not, therefore, till the day following her arrival that the materials could be brought to the depôt, and these most necessary articles for a siege begun to be made. A considerable delay was further experienced by Major Thackeray from the irregularity in landing the stores. Much of this, from the surf and weather, was probably unavoidable, but much likewise proceeded from the irregularity of the transport boats, and from their working in the night, when they could not be seen.

A considerable delay arose likewise from the slowness and the great unwillingness with which the foreign troops worked. This was a most serious inconvenience, and delayed the opening the two last batteries for twenty-four hours. It required an additional party of 200 British soldiers to carry to the batteries the ammunition which one of these parties threw away when they came under fire.

All these circumstances together tended to retard our progress; but still, from the 4th at night to the 11th in the morning, five batteries were constructed, and we were then in a state to prosecute the siege without fear of delay, had we, by good fortune, been enabled to continue it.

Before I conclude this part of the subject, I beg to state that it was not till after the fall of the Coll de Balaguer that in point of fire we derived any material assistance from the naval branch of the expedition.

The bombs and gunboats came from thence on the 8th and 9th, and I think, but I cannot for certain recollect if it was so, that some of them were again sent back on the 10th and 11th.

It will, my Lord, be difficult to give any detailed account of the communications I had with the Spanish General. They were principally verbal, and always friendly. On every occasion I found General Copons most willing to assist us, in as far as his power and means extended, which, however, were both limited. I should, indeed, have wished to have had the Baron d'Eroles with the army, but General Copons thought his services of more importance elsewhere, and he objected to call upon the Catalonians to arm themselves, which is a measure that in all probability would have been attended with important advantages.

General Copons was at Reus when the army landed, and he continued there till the 10th. To my regret I soon found that his army was much weaker than I had been led to expect, and that it was without the means of subsistence, and without cannon.

Four battalions were with the General at Reus. A considerable proportion of the army were near Barcelona, and a part of it with General d'Eroles in the northern part of the province. It was arranged at an interview on the 3rd that the corps near Barcelona should draw nearer Tarragona, that we might be better enabled to support it, and to prevent its being separated from the army employed at the siege. This corps was rather placed to observe the enemy than to oppose him; for it could have made no resistance if he advanced in the force we had to expect.

From the time of our arrival to the 10th various unimportant movements were made by these troops, but on that day and on the 11th they were thus posted:—Two battalions were at the Coll de Balaguer; two, with Baron d'Eroles, at Vich; two in garrison; what was stated to be 1400 men at the Coll de St. Christina; and the remainder, with General Copons, on the coast road which leads from Barcelona to Tarragona. The General then stated his whole force to be about 8500 men of every description.

On the 11th I had an interview with General Copons at Vendrell, and being then ignorant of the rapid approach of Marshal Suchet, I decided on joining him with a considerable detachment of the besieging army, and to give battle to the Barcelona column if it continued to advance. This, from the intelligence I received on my return, became unadvisable; and having apprised the General of my intention of raising the siege, he crossed the Kaya, and marched towards the Coll de St. Christina.

Of the movements of the Catalonian army after the 12th I can give your Lordship no accurate account. I know, however, that when the enemy retired from Villafranca some troops followed him towards the Llobregat, and that General Copons returned to Reus. But on the approach of the enemy on the 15th, he again retired to the mountains, although he knew that the Allied army was at the Coll de Balaguer, and this was in conformity to the resolution he had taken, never to place his army, even in conjunction with ours, in a situation where that retreat was not open to him. He stated to me, and he stated with great truth, that our lines of operation were totally different: that we might retire upon the sea; but that if his army was cut off from the northern part of the province, it must be taken or dispersed, and the province must be entirely lost. Embarrassing as this was, I could not but admit the justice of his observations and the propriety of the resolution he had made, although it almost to a certainty would deprive me of the assistance of his army in case of a general affair, and without his army I could scarcely have brought 9000 men into the field. General Copons repeatedly told me that he could do nothing against this column from Barcelona. I mention this merely as a proof (a corroborating proof at least) either of the strength of this column of the enemy, or of the weakness of the Catalonian army, and because I know the former has been as much diminished by report without foundation as the other has been increased without information on the subject.

It was, my Lord, about noon on the 12th of June that I received in-

formation that the enemy had, by a night march, arrived at Villafranca, which is about eighteen or twenty miles from Tarragona, and I knew that Marshal Suchet had quitted Tortosa with the remainder of his force about mid-day on the 10th; and it was in consequence of the approach of both these corps that I raised the siege.

To either of them those that were in my confidence knew I should have given battle; but to both, I then thought, and still think, I was unequal.

On this part of the subject, however, I have addressed your Lordship at such length in my letter of the 23rd ult., that I shall merely, in reply to your Lordship's question as to the enemy, state that at the time I directed the siege to be raised the main body of one column of the enemy was at Villafranca, distant only eighteen or twenty miles, and that this column never was stated to be less than 8000 infantry, with a proportion of cavalry and ten field-pieces, and that Marshal Suchet's army was on its march to Tarragona. One part of it was at Perillo, and a strong division had arrived at Bandillos, whose advance on the morning of the 13th was engaged with our cavalry in the plain of Tarragona.

I really believe, my Lord, that whatever might have been the opinion of some at the time, there is no officer now acquainted with the positions and strength of the two armies who is of opinion that the siege could have been prosecuted; but I know it is still said that by a delay of a few hours the cannon might have been saved. A delay of a few hours, I affirm, would have done nothing. A delay of nearly eighteen hours might; but in these eighteen hours we should have been exposed to all the misfortunes I wished to avoid, and this your Lordship will clearly observe by adverting to the distance at which the enemy's corps then were; but it is further necessary to advert to this circumstance, that from noon till it should be dark no gun could be removed from the batteries. Here was at once a delay of nearly nine hours. To take the guns and stores from the batteries, to convey them to the beach, and to embark them, if the weather permitted them to be embarked at all, could not have required less than six or seven hours at least, and that, too, could only be effected by exposing a very great number of them under fire at the same time. It would therefore have been five, or more probably seven, o'clock in the morning of the 13th before a single man could have been put into the boats. Your Lordship will observe further, that as the enemy was approaching us a separation of the troops became almost impracticable by this delay; and still, as the transports were lying at three different places, this must have been attempted, or we must further have waited till they were all collected, and that, too, where the wind would permit them to assemble, whether in other respects suitable or not; for, under the idea of being attacked, I could have risked no partial embarkation. I might have had my choice, perhaps, whether I chose to lose my infantry or my cavalry, and artillery horses; but both, in the presence of the weakest of these corps of the enemy, I could not have saved. In short, my Lord, I had but this choice; and delay was destruction: I must either have marched both against the column from Tortosa and that from Barcelona (both being nearly equally pressing), or I must have decided immediately to embark. As my strength did not admit of the first, I venture to hope, however much it is to be regretted, that your Lordship will not condemn me for having adopted the latter line of conduct. It has, I

am inclined to believe, been represented to your Lordship that the army might have retired on the Coll de Balaguer, and have embarked to the westward of that place. In my extreme anxiety to save the cannon, I was persuaded by Admiral Hallowell to decide on attempting this operation, although it was allowed that with an easterly wind, and in presence of an enemy, the embarkation would have been impracticable. The consent I gave was reluctant, and the approach of the enemy rendering this line of conduct much less advisable, I was obliged to change my plan. The difficulties may be simply stated to be these: that I should have been obliged to march through a country for about twenty-five miles where there was not even water to be procured; that on our arrival there we should have been exposed to the same want during the whole time of the embarkation, both for the men and animals, which were about 1700; that the whole time of the boats would have been taken up in landing provisions, forage, and water, and consequently that the embarkation must have been extremely retarded, if not absolutely prevented; and that lastly, all this must have been done in presence of Suchet's army in the first instance, and in a few days (two, probably) of both corps; and I beg your Lordship here to recollect that under no circumstances would it have been practicable to have embarked the army in less than three days.

The operations of the army after the siege was raised were of little importance.

An express from the Coll de Balaguer received during the night of the 12th, informing me that the enemy had passed a large body of infantry towards Tarragona, induced me to go there immediately. The cavalry and a part of the field train had been sent to the Coll de Balaguer to be embarked, and on my arrival there I found that the cavalry had been engaged, and that it would be necessary to land more infantry than what was stationed there, to protect the embarkation. As the remainder of the infantry arrived, I was induced to land it likewise, in the hope of being enabled to cut off the division of the enemy which was stationed at Bandillos, to which it had retired on the arrival of the fleet at the Coll de Balaguer. In the night of the 15th, however, Marshal Suchet withdrew the corps, and on the 16th the division of the Allied army which had been opposed to it returned to the Coll de Balaguer. On the 17th I expected a general attack, as the corps from Barcelona had advanced to Cambrils, which is only about ten miles from the position we occupied; but for what reason I know not, it withdrew to Reus during the night. In the afternoon of this day his Excellency Lord William Bentinck arrived, and carried into execution my determination of embarking the army.

In one of my former letters I stated to your Lordship that the expectation of reinforcements, amongst other reasons, induced me to continue the siege of Tarragona longer than I otherwise should have done; and your Lordship desires to know from whence these reinforcements were to come. In reply, I beg to acquaint your Excellency that about a fortnight or three weeks before I left Alicante I was informed by Lord William Bentinck that he intended to send me the 44th Regiment, the 6th Battalion King's German Legion, and some more Sicilian and Italian troops, and that I might expect them in ten days. The two regiments would alone have amounted to very nearly 2000 men, and so considerable a reinforcement, I thought, might

make a very essential difference in the prospect of our affairs, and I expected them hourly.

In your Lordship's letter of the 1st of July is enclosed a statement of Marshal Suchet's force on the 15th of May. I conceive that this return has been made in reference to some particular object which the French General had in view. It is not improbable that it was in the view of again attacking the position at Castalla, which I understand he had in contemplation, for your Excellency will observe that those troops only are mentioned which were in that neighbourhood and consequently applicable to that purpose, and that no notice is taken of sick men or detachments of these corps. The return is expressly of men *present*, and of three divisions only.

On the first inspection of this return, it would appear that I had overrated Marshal Suchet's army; but I believe I can show, and in a great measure from this return itself, the contrary has been the case, and particularly so in cavalry. I take the liberty of adding to this report a statement which will account for the apparent difference.

I have always calculated that Marshal Suchet's force in the kingdom of Valencia amounted to 24,000 men of all arms, and that of these about 2000 were cavalry.

Having now brought under your Lordship's notice everything that occurs to me on the subject of the expedition to Tarragona in this letter and in that of the 23rd of June, I submit the whole for your Lordship's decision, and I feel confident that what I have advanced will be coolly considered. It was neither the province nor in the power of any in this part of the world to know as much of our situation, or to reflect upon it as deeply, as I necessarily did, before I was called upon to act. Perhaps a more minute acquaintance with it would have changed the opinions of many with whom I may at present differ.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient and humble servant,
JOHN MURRAY.

Statement of Marshal Suchet's Force.

General St. Cyr states three divisions present at	12,378
Troops from Catalonia, known to have been long in Valencia	1,601
Severoli's division, four battalions, at 700 men per battalion	2,800
Total of St. Cyr's return	16,779
Omitted by St. Cyr.	
Pannetier's division, mentioned by Suchet as having marched towards Tarragona lately, at least	3,000
Garrisons of Valencia and Murviedro	900
Garrisons of Peniscola and Tortosa	700
Denia, Gandia, and the moveable column on the coast	400
Requeña and Morella	250
Total infantry	22,029

Brought forward		22,029
Cavalry.		
General St. Cyr's statement	1,867	
With Severoli's division	150	
Remainder of the 12th Hussars, supposed	350	
9th Hussars, from their own state	450	
Total cavalry	2,817	2,817
Independent of sick, wounded, and men on detachment of these troops mentioned by St. Cyr. A moveable column under Roufort is likewise omitted; but all these together will, it is supposed, make a total, without including the artillery, which is numerous, of		2,000
Grand total		26,846

N.B. The 12th Hussars were not known to be in Valencia till St. Cyr's return was sent.

JOHN MURRAY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 15th July, 1813.

As soon as I had received your letter of the 3rd instant, with its enclosures, I called together the persons therein mentioned, and read its contents to them. I afterwards communicated to them the Minister of War's letters to you, with your reply. I then apprised them of what had passed between me, the Minister of War, M. Labrador, and M. Agar, as stated in my letter to you of the 17th June.

Having made these communications to them, I observed that although I had been assured by M. Agar and by the Minister of War that the motives for the recall of General Castaños and General Giron had been made known to you, yet a perusal of the Minister of War's letters would show that not one syllable had been said upon that subject. That if the motives had been fairly stated to you, and that he had been recalled in a regular manner, I was persuaded that although you might have lamented it on account of the public service, you would not have opposed the wishes of the government. But admitting that there were really motives for the recall of General Castaños, and that the government had only been guilty of an omission in having neglected to apprise you of them, I desired to know in what manner they could justify the appointments of General Lacy and General Freyre without consulting you, which was a manifest breach of the conditions upon which you consented to accept the command. That you had come to Cadiz for no other reason than to arrange these conditions, and that you considered them so necessary to the exercise of the command, that in your correspondence upon the subject you positively declined accepting it unless it were judged expedient to grant them to you.

M. Arguelles replied that he had no influence over, nor no communication with the government, and that any information which reached him he

obtained more through general report than in any other way. That he was extremely concerned for what had passed, and that he deprecated your resignation; but that you had put them to a cruel alternative, if they were to decide between that and allowing General Castaños to continue in his command. That it was notorious that General Castaños was an active opposer of the measures of the Cortes; that he (Arguelles) knew it when he was here with you, having been apprised of all his conversations and proceedings at Seville; and that nothing but his respect and consideration for you would have prevented him upon that occasion from making a motion in the Cortes, insisting upon the enforcement of the law by which councillors of State are precluded from holding any other situation, and which would, of necessity, have compelled General Castaños to have remained at the seat of the government. That the state of Spain required prompt and active measures on the part of the government, and particularly that the agents employed should be in its confidence. That he lamented extremely that the Regents had not communicated with you as they ought to have done previously to taking the measures which they thought necessary, but that he was persuaded that nothing disrespectful was meant towards you personally, and that the many sacrifices which you had made in support of the cause would, he hoped, induce you to pardon what had passed, and to continue in the command, upon a consideration of the mischievous effects which would be produced by your resignation of it. M. Arguelles, in the course of a long speech, wandered so much from the point in discussion, that I was frequently obliged to bring him back to it. I observed to him that I was not pleading the cause of General Castaños, but that I was complaining of the violation of the conditions upon which alone you consented to accept the command; and that unless a proper reparation were made to you by the Regency, and a pledge given to you that the same thing would not happen again, I had no doubt that you would resign.

The next day I saw M. Ciscar (the deputy), whom I found much more rational than either Arguelles or the Conde de Torreno. He entirely disapproved the conduct of the government, but said that he was persuaded that nothing personal towards you was intended. He likewise disapproved the conduct of Castaños, who, he informed me among other things, is known to have declared that he would not excite the people to insurrection, but that if they called for him he would place himself at their head. He said he would speak to his brother and see me again, and I hope I shall see him in the course of to-day.

I have since seen the Minister of War and M. Cano Manuel, at present at the head of the Foreign department, M. Labrador having been turned out for the reasons stated in the enclosed letter. The Minister of War said he was certain that nothing but a new arrangement would satisfy the Regency, and that you had expressed yourself to him, when he was with you at Freneda, to be willing to accede to a new arrangement. I concluded my conversation with him by saying that you had never said one word to me of your readiness to make a new arrangement, but that if any new proposal was to be made, I recommended that reparation should first be made to you for what had passed, and security given to you that the same thing would not happen again.

I was very glad to have an opportunity of conversing with M. Cano Manuel, because he is much in the confidence of the Regency. After repeating to him nearly what I had said to M. Arguelles, I observed that it might happen at no very distant period that the present Regency would be turned out, and other persons of different principles appointed to the government. That I would suppose, for argument's sake, that the officers appointed by the present Regency would gain your confidence; but that the moment their successors came into office their object would, of course, be to remove from their employments all those who had been instrumental in carrying into effect measures which they disapproved. The consequence would be, that there would be a perpetual succession of General officers in the interests of the different governments, to the utter destruction of the army, and that nothing proved more the necessity of the conditions upon which you had insisted than the circumstance which I had stated, which might be expected to happen in the course of the different changes which would probably take place.

M. Cano Manuel insisted that the state of Gallicia required prompt and decisive measures, and, above all, that a General officer should be appointed to command there who would do his utmost to carry them into effect. He assured me that he would make a faithful report to the Regency of what I had stated to him, and would take an early opportunity of informing me of the result.

16th July.

Since I began this letter I have seen Mexia, Felice, Salazar, Arispe, and other deputies, and I am assured that this business will immediately be taken up in the Cortes. I therefore beg that you will suspend everything until you hear from me again, but I send this letter in order that you may be apprised of what has passed.

The Minister of War is extremely ill, and it is reported that he is to go out.

I have not time to send you a copy of the letter respecting Labrador's dismissal from office. The whole correspondence relative to the dispute between Russia and Spain for the right of precedence was referred to the Cortes, with a report from Labrador, in which he thought proper to accuse the British government of having been the sole cause of the dispute. The Cortes have conceded the point to the Emperor, and intimated to the Regency that they were sorry to see the Foreign Department in such bad hands, upon which Labrador was instantly dismissed. It is this dispute that has prevented the arrival of the Russian Minister, and I should not be surprised if it were to have some influence over the Emperor in making a separate peace, if such a measure should be in his contemplation. The misunderstanding is entirely owing to Labrador's obstinacy, and I own I have some doubt of the steadiness of his principles.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

16th July.

I have this moment seen La Vega, who tells me that Ciscar (the deputy) saw his brother last night, and told him that unless the Re-

gency submitted to the Cortes all their correspondence with you relative to these changes, he would himself call for it. The Regents have accordingly agreed to send the correspondence to the Cortes, and it will be referred to the Committee to which the conditions proposed by you were originally referred. Vega and Mexia are of this Committee; and if even the conduct of the Regents should be approved in the Committee, which he (Vega) thinks not likely, still he thinks that his opinion and Mexia's will prevail in the Cortes. In short, he is in very good spirits about it.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 16th July, 1813.

I think it is evident from the conduct of Messrs. Agar and Ciscar that they wish to get rid of you; but this is by no means the feeling in the Cortes, who, I am certain, are unanimous in their desire that you should continue at the head of the army. The only party in the Cortes which supports the government is that of the Liberales, and there is no doubt that they would be turned out immediately if the Liberales were not supported by the populace, which keeps the other parties in awe. The Liberales are, however, I believe, to a man, anxious that you should continue in the command. But there is no doubt that either before or at the change of the Cortes, a new government will be appointed. As usual, the pretensions of the Princess of Brazil have been revived, and I have some doubt whether I should have influence enough to prevent her appointment.

Under these circumstances I feel some inclination to listen to a proposal which has been hinted to me, if it should be made to me in any regular form. The proposal is as follows:—

1st. That the Princess of Brazil should be placed at the head of the government, assurances being given that she will co-operate cordially with the British government.

2ndly. That the British ambassador shall be consulted before any of the other members of the new Regency or any ministers are appointed.

3rdly. That some arrangement shall be made for the pacification of South America through our mediation, and for giving us a share in the commerce with South America.

I wish you would, without loss of time, send me back your opinion upon these propositions by a courier.

I have had so much experience in the nature of Spanish governments, that I despair of ever being able to make any tolerable arrangement for the administration of affairs. But certainly we cannot be worse off than we are at present, and any change would be for the better.

Ever, my dear Arthur,

Most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Address from the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Sheriffs, Commons, and Citizens of the City of Dublin.

Be it remembered, that at a General Assembly of the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Sheriffs, Commons, and Citizens of Dublin, held on Friday the 16th day of July, 1813, the following Address was unanimously agreed to be presented to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter.

MY LORD,

When the gratitude of the empire has been called forth by the triumph of the gallant army under your command, the corporation of Dublin would feel itself wanting in that respect and affectionate attachment which it has so often manifested to you, if it did not embrace this public opportunity to express the lively and grateful sensations excited by your eminent services, your distinguished heroism and transcendant abilities, which on no occasion were more happily exemplified than on the late memorable victory obtained by you and your brave associates in arms over the French on the 21st of June last, near Vitoria; a victory most humiliating to our enemies, most glorious to the Allied arms, and ranking with the greatest and most important that ever has been obtained. After such a victory, achieved in a cause at once so great and glorious, we cannot but feel confident that the energies, the magnanimity, and the resources of your great mind will, under Divine Providence, effect the re-establishment of a brave and generous people in their rights and national independence, and ultimately secure the liberties of Europe.

Permit us, my Lord, to renew to you the assurances of our unalterable attachment, and our sincere wishes that you may long continue to enjoy the affection and veneration of your admiring country.

In testimony whereof the common seal of said city is hereunto affixed the day and year aforesaid.

The Earl of Mulgrave to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Harley Street, 16th July, 1813.

I do not write to trouble you with congratulations, which, however mixed with personal feelings of interest in your success, could but faintly convey an adequate idea even of the general impression made upon those who know nothing of you but your public services; but I write to communicate to you the satisfaction I feel in having had it in my power to manifest my sense of the great event of the 21st of June by bringing under the consideration of the Prince Regent the peculiar and striking circumstance of the whole of the artillery of your army having been engaged at Vitoria, and the whole of the artillery of the enemy having been taken; circumstances, as far as I know, unexampled in former military exertion and success; and His Royal Highness has most readily and cordially sanctioned a grant of allowance for good service to every officer of artillery employed on that day in the command either of a division or a brigade of

guns:—To Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, as commanding the artillery, 20s. per diem; to the officers commanding divisions 10s.; to those commanding brigades 5s. If this mark of distinction to those who well and zealously executed your orders on that glorious day should prove satisfactory to you, it will be to me a ground of lasting gratification to have recommended it.

Believe me, with great truth,
My dear Lord, ever yours sincerely,
MULGRAVE.

G. O. Lesaca, 17th July, 1813. [668.]

1. The time of the Commander of the Forces is occupied very much by complaints from different parts of the country of the use of the green corn by the cavalry, without giving regular receipts. These complaints are made particularly of Major-General V. Alten's brigade.

2. The Commander of the Forces again requests the General officers, and officers commanding regiments, to attend to this point.

3. It is most desirable, as well for the inhabitants as for the army itself, that the green and unthrashed corn should not be used as forage; and considering that there is still so much grass in the country, it appears to the Commander of the Forces that the use of green and unthrashed corn might be entirely avoided; at all events, if it be necessary to use forage of this description, it must be regularly taken, and regular receipts given for what is taken.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 17th July, 1813.

The course of your Lordship's brilliant operations since the commencement of the war in the Peninsula has afforded many opportunities for officers to distinguish themselves in commands superior to what would have fallen to their lot if it had not been for the accidents and casualties of a protracted service. Upon many occasions brigades have been led to victory under your Lordship's orders by Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels, and in the arduous assault of Badajoz the Light Division was eminently distinguished under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard.

In some instances the gallant officers who have thus eminently proved themselves equal to fill superior commands have fallen in the action. The recent loss of Colonel Cadogan, while distinguishing himself in the command

of a brigade at the battle of Vitoria, has drawn the attention of His Majesty's ministers very forcibly to this subject; and as the strongest disposition prevails to mark the high sense which is entertained of the service rendered to their country by the brave officers under your Lordship's command, it has been determined that the motions for erecting monuments at the national expense shall not be confined as heretofore to officers actually possessing the rank of General officers, but shall extend to those who may lose their lives in the command of divisions or brigades, whatever may be their rank, upon occasions which shall be honoured by the thanks of Parliament. It is necessary, however, that a distinct line should be drawn in order to prevent the embarrassment from multiplied or undefined applications; and I have therefore determined (after having consulted with His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief) to establish the rules contained in the annexed paper, as those by which the motions for bestowing such honourable marks of national gratitude shall be regulated for the future.

Upon these principles monuments have been moved and voted to Colonel Cadogan and to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Myers, who are known to have fallen most nobly in the actual command of brigades. If other instances shall have occurred since your Lordship has held the chief command in the Peninsula, I shall be obliged to your Lordship to transmit to me the names of the officers and the particulars of the cases, in order that motions for monuments may be made at the opening of the next session.

Upon future occasions when the army under your Lordship's command may again earn the honourable reward of Parliamentary thanks, and that the country may have to lament the fall of officers fulfilling worthily the duties of General officers, I have to request that your Lordship would transmit to me by the earliest opportunity such a statement as may enable His Majesty's government to pay this last tribute of honour to their memories.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Regulations by which the Motions for erecting Monuments to Officers who may fall in Action with the Enemy are limited.

1. The motions for erecting monuments to General officers killed in action will be made upon the same principle as heretofore.

2. This mark of honour shall be extended to any field officer who may fall in the actual command of a division or brigade, provided that he shall have held such command previously to the commencement of the action: observing that monuments can be proposed for such officers only upon occasions when the importance of the victory shall have caused it to be honoured by the thanks of Parliament.

3. A certificate or official report from the General officer commanding the army in the action for which the thanks of Parliament may be voted, stating that the officer who has fallen actually commanded a division or brigade pre-

vious to and during the engagement, must be received before a motion can be made for the erection of a monument.

4. These regulations shall have effect retrospectively to the 1st of August, 1808, being the day upon which the British troops commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley first landed in Portugal.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Near Pasages, 18th July, 1813, 2 P.M.

Having written this morning, I need only now say that Sir R. Fletcher has not yet furnished me with the statement of the necessary labour for completing the batteries; but he seems quite confident that everything will be ready on both attacks to open at daybreak on the 20th, and that 150 men on the right to work in the night will be sufficient.

I shall therefore suspend making any change till I hear again from your Lordship. The 1st division shall resume their camp early on the 20th. I desired Sir R. Fletcher yesterday to write his opinion generally on the subject of the siege to General Murray for your Lordship's information, and I have just got his letter, which accompanies this note. I am happy to find that Sir R. Kennedy has given a good supply of transport, and Colonel Dickson hopes to get through his difficulties. The work on both sides has gone on well last night, and without any material loss.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, St. Sebastian's Road, 20th July, 1813, 5 A.M.

Immediately on receiving your Lordship's letter of yesterday morning at ½ past 7 P.M. I went to Pasages de Calzada to see Sir R. Fletcher and Colonel Dickson together. They were both most decidedly of opinion that there was no risk of a good breach being made too soon, as all that is to be done on the esplanade will be executed in two days; and if fortunately the wall of the town should come down easily, it would be a vast object to extend the breach beyond the tower next the sea, there being only about 120 feet between the two towers, which would make it hazardous, should the enemy, as is reported, have intrenched the streets at that corner of the town. Indeed considering the circumstance of the assault being necessarily to be made during low water, it would be most desirable to have such a breach or breaches as would admit of a large body of men entering at one time. I enclose for your Lordship's information Sir R. Fletcher's and Colonel Dickson's demands for working parties, and on this ground I acceded to General Oswald's wish of having the 5th division united on this side, as he thought the whole of the men fit for duty would not be too much to satisfy these demands.

General Bradford's brigade takes the duty on the right, and General Pack's go to-day to the camp in front of Oyarzun. This was the disposition

agreed on yesterday, but I send Captain Calvert over with this to request to have your Lordship's orders definitively. Such is the state of the cross roads that the relief from the camp would come sooner to this left side than to the right. I should be glad too to know whether the 1st division (if the duty be done on the right by detachments from camp) is to take the ordinary turn, and whether any part of it should be employed in the assault. Part of General Bradford's brigade might go to camp, though if it be true that at low water there is a practicable ford at the mouth of the Urumea, a cavalry party of some strength should be at hand.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—I have detained Captain Calvert just that he might tell your Lordship of the opening of the batteries. The road at the back of Ganquibel is very passable for infantry. Sir R. Fletcher told me last night that by the scale of the great plan the town wall appears to be 12 feet thick.

I beg to ask if your Lordship would wish any summons to be sent in before the assault.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM.

19th July, 1813.

Left Attack.

It appears that for the 20th at night it will be necessary for the approach and parallel in the Isthmus, and for the repairs to the batteries above, to have a working party of 800 men, and a covering party of the same number; and as the working party will not probably on this occasion get to work till an hour or two after dark, they should remain till six in the morning, after which a constant working party of about 400 men, and a covering party of 800 to give every possible security against sorties in strength, which from this time may be expected. It would be desirable to have a battalion encamped or in bivouac at the back of the convent hill as a support.

Right Attack.

On the night of the 20th 150 working party, and on the day after 21st 50 men; on that night 150 working party; and so on for the remainder of the siege, with supports in the rear to the covering party, which will be 50 men. It would appear therefore from the above that with three reliefs for the working parties, and two for the covering parties, about 3000 men on the left attack and about 1000 on the right will be required for the engineer department exclusively, without taking into account artillery working parties, or any camp, regimental, or other duties.

RICHARD FLETCHER.

II.

MEMORANDUM.

Pasages de la Calzada, 19th July, 1813.

Left Attack.

After the ordnance is in battery a working party of 100 men will be neces-

sary during the day for conveyance of ammunition to the batteries. No party will be required at night unless when the guns require moving.

Right Attack.

After the ordnance is in battery a working party of 400 men during the day will be necessary for conveyance of ammunition to the batteries, and no party will be required at night except when the guns require moving. The necessity of this party being so great arises from its being requisite to take the ammunition to the heights by hand a considerable part of the way.

A. DICKSON.

III.

Calculation of numbers required by the Engineers on the left.

Working party required during the night	800
Working parties during the day	400
	1200
At two reliefs for the working party day and day about..	2
	2400
Covering party at two reliefs	1600
Men required for this side for the engineers	4000

N.B. The 5th Division is nominally about 4600, including bands, bâtmen, &c.

THOMAS GRAHAM.

The Lord Chancellor to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, 20th July, 1813.

In obedience to the commands of the House of Lords, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the several accompanying Resolutions of that House.

It is with the most heartfelt satisfaction that I obey those commands; and I think I may venture to assure your Lordship that there is not a man in this kingdom who thinks it possible for either House of Parliament to thank you sufficiently.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most faithful servant,

ELDON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

Die Mercurij, 7° Julij, 1813.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the Thanks of this House be given to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, for the energy and distinguished ability with which he hath conducted the late operations of the Allied forces in Spain, and particularly for the splendid and decisive victory obtained upon the 21st day of June last near Vitoria, when the French army was completely routed, with the loss of all its artillery, stores, and baggage.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Mercurij, 7° Julij, 1813.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the Thanks of this House be given to Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill, Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie, Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, Lieutenant-General Sir Galbraith Lowry Cole, and Lieutenant-General the Honourable William Stewart; to Major-General George Baron Bock, Major-General Charles Baron Alten, Major-General the Honourable Charles Colville, Major-General George Anson, Major-General John Oswald, Major-General John Ormsby Vandeleur, Major-General George Murray, Major-General Frederick Philips Robinson, Major-General Lord Aylmer, and to the several other officers of His Majesty's service, for their great exertions upon the 21st of June last, when the French army was completely defeated by the Allied forces under the Marquess of Wellington's command.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Mercurij, 7° Julij, 1813.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That the Thanks of this House be given to Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and to the several General officers and officers of the Portuguese service who were present at the glorious battle of Vitoria upon the 21st day of June last, for their great exertions upon that occasion, when the French army was completely defeated by the Allied forces under the Marquess of Wellington's command; and that Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington be desired to convey to them the present Resolution.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Mercurij, 7° Julij, 1813.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That this House doth acknowledge and highly approve of the distinguished zeal, valour, and discipline displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of His Majesty's forces serving under the command of General the Marquess of Wellington, in the glorious victory obtained upon the 21st of June last near Vitoria; and that the same be signified to them by the commanding officers of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant and exemplary behaviour.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Mercurij, 7° Julij, 1813.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That this House doth highly acknowledge the distinguished zeal, valour, and good conduct displayed by the several General officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the Spanish forces who served under the command of the Marquess of Wellington in the splendid and decisive victory obtained over the French army upon the 21st of June last near Vitoria; and that Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington be desired to communicate to them the present Resolution.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Mercurij, 7° Julij, 1813.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, That this House doth highly acknowledge the zeal,

courage, and discipline displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the Portuguese forces serving under the command of General the Marquess of Wellington, in the glorious victory obtained upon the 21st of June last near Vitoria; and that the same be signified to them by the commanding officers of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant and exemplary behaviour.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 21st July, 1813.

I feel it a justice due to Sir John Hope to enclose you the copy of a letter which I have received from him, expressive of his satisfaction at your promotion, and readiness to serve under your orders. The style of the letter is so creditable that it would be unjust to him not to make you acquainted with it.

I had a letter of the same description last year from the Duke of Richmond, and I equally feel it my duty *now* to make you acquainted with it. You will understand, and I hope you will do justice to the motives which induced me not to send this letter to you while the question of your promotion remained unfavourably decided. His Grace most probably wrote to you himself; but it was too delicate a point for me to agitate by a communication direct to you. Allow me to say that, in my humble opinion, it is as well that you did not get this promotion at a former period, but that it should be reserved as the marked result of the most brilliant and skilful conduct that the annals of our military history afford.

It does not appear that there ever has been an English bâton; and no better occasion can ever occur of establishing one than the present. I am therefore getting one prepared to present to each of our Marshals; and if I am not interfered with from *the fountain of taste*, I trust it will be found an appropriate badge of command. To confirm the expression in the Prince's letter, you must have the "bâton of England."

Murray's failure has caused a devil of a breeze in this country. You know, right or wrong, John Bull will condemn ill success; but although I cannot subscribe to all the illiberal and unfounded aspersions thrown out against Murray, yet, as far as one can judge of what we have heard, it is impossible not to condemn the fatal error of judgment which led to such a precipitate abandonment of the siege of Tarragona. It should never have been undertaken unless he could have made up his mind to risk an action against a probable superiority of force in the event of interruption. Murray, I think, might have placed more confidence in the troops he had with him; and he ought to have known this country better than to have adopted a course of too great caution when once committed in an enterprise.

I confess I am very sorry for him; for although not a popular man in the service, there appeared to me to be professional points about him which deserved a better fate; and I fear that, unless he can refute the charges contained in Admiral Hallowell's letter, he is a ruined man. You may remember that we have often had much conversation respecting Murray,

and, although you could not approve him in all things, I believe you had a favourable opinion of his professional talents.

You will hear so much of our great fête at Vauxhall from other quarters that I need not touch upon it. Your brilliant successes were celebrated in good style.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully and sincerely yours,

H. TORRENS

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Colonel Torrens.

MY DEAR SIR, Dublin, 5th July, 1813.

In common, I believe, with the whole army, I rejoice at and applaud the recent elevation of Lord Wellington to the rank in the army which he has so well deserved.

It is, however, difficult to divest oneself altogether of a selfish feeling on the occasion; and I own to you that I should consider it as a gratifying consequence of Lord Wellington's promotion if it should afford me an opportunity of sharing in the service going on under his conduct.

I am quite aware that a just feeling towards several officers, my juniors, who have had the good fortune to participate in the brilliant events of the war, who are serving with great distinction in Spain, and have established high reputations, may operate as an objection to my wishes.

I owe it, however, to myself, and perhaps even to a feeling of duty, while I have yet health and strength for foreign service, not to withhold the expression of those wishes.

I therefore venture to hope that the Commander-in-Chief will not look upon it as an improper intrusion on my part if I request you, as I now do, to mention the subject to His Royal Highness, and to say that I should feel the highest gratification if His Royal Highness's views and arrangements admitted, either now or hereafter, of my serving in the Peninsula.

I remain, my dear Sir, yours very sincerely,

JOHN HOPE.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. the Duke of Richmond to Colonel Torrens.

DEAR SIR, Phœnix Park, 24th Sept., 1812.

The report of its being intended to promote the Marquess of Wellington to the rank of Field Marshal has been so prevalent, that, without presuming to ask if it is so or not, I beg, through you, to offer to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief my services, to act under him as a Lieutenant-General, should his Lordship obtain that rank. It may perhaps appear extraordinary that I should make the offer at a time when it is probable I shall continue for some time longer in the situation I have now the honour to hold; but it is on that account that I trouble you with this letter. When I supposed I was likely to quit Ireland, I had intended making a personal application to His Royal Highness; but as my return to England seems postponed, I venture to make the offer in this way. I consider political situations as so uncertain

that I should not be surprised at being relieved at any moment: the object therefore of this letter is to say, that when that moment arrives I shall be ready to serve under Lord Wellington, should he have a superior military rank to myself.

I have, &c.,

RICHMOND.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-General Byng.

DEAR BYNG, Head-quarters, Lesaca, 21st July, 1813.

I will be much obliged to you if you will send me the best information you can upon the following points:—

1st. What are the best communications by which you could move the troops under your orders into the valley of Les Alduides, or that of Baygorry; a description of these roads; and an estimate of the time it would take you to make the movement.

I wish to have this information with a view to the case of your having to move to the support of the troops under Brigadier-General Campbell, or your having to replace him, or your taking the above direction in order to join Sir Rowland Hill in the valley of Baztan.

2nd. I wish to have whatever information you can procure respecting the roads leading upon St. Jean Pied de Port; whether it is possible to turn that place, either to the right or left, out of reach of the enemy's fire; and a description of the roads, places, and distances that lie in the direction of Bayonne from St. Jean Pied de Port.

3rd. If you can obtain me any further particulars about St. Jean Pied de Port itself, they will also be very acceptable: for instance, a more particular description of the figure and size of the works, what parts are in the modern style of fortification and what are ancient, what number of guns they contain, and what garrisons they require.

I should be glad to know something, also, of the roads which lead from St. Jean Pied de Port to Oleron and to Navarrena.

Excuse my asking you to take all this trouble, and believe me, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 21st July, 1813, 4 P.M.

I am just returned from the batteries on the right: the wall proves solid and hard; hitherto no earth appears, and the progress to-day against the inside (composed of small stones grouted together) does not quite answer the expectations formed by yesterday's firing against the outside masonry.

However, Dickson thinks it will do, and that it goes on as well as could reasonably be expected at the distance of 670 yards, which, by the elevation, Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer thinks the truth. The four carronades will be brought into play to-morrow.

Nine guns only in the breaching-battery could fire when I was there, owing to different accidents, particularly to the wheels, which have suffered by the enemy's shot.

I shall receive a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson at night, which I will forward in the morning. He complained to me that the two Portuguese brigades could not satisfy all the demands of the two departments for labour.

I need scarcely send your Lordship a copy of my summons,* for it was not received. Yet all the fire of the enemy's batteries was suspended on the white flag being shown on our works at 10 A.M.; and Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne was allowed to pass our advance at the cork-works on the road. The officer who came out told him he had positive orders not to admit any one, but would go back to ask about receiving the letter. Another officer from the horn-work ordered him not to take it; so the firing on both sides recommenced about a quarter before 11.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, St. Sebastian's Road, 21st July, 1813, ½ past 6.

I have delayed sending off any report to your Lordship till I could ascertain the progress of the work on the Esplanade. Sir R. Fletcher tells me that nearly all he intended has been executed, though the night was so extremely dark, and the weather otherwise so bad, that it was with the greatest difficulty that the men could be kept to their work. I enclose Colonel Dickson's report.

I have been myself confined to this side by an attack of lumbago, probably from having got so wet the preceding night and yesterday morning; but I shall go to the right to-day as soon as the flag of truce returns.

I have ordered the batteries to cease firing at 10 A.M., when an officer will be sent forward.

Sir R. Fletcher is of opinion that if the Governor will treat, we should give him *any terms* to get the thing over. But I have little expectation of his entering into any negotiation. The messenger is still here, there being no communication with the ships all yesterday. The last letters for Lord Bathurst that came this morning have been delivered to him.

Sir G. Collier came on shore on the evening of the 19th, and has not been able to get on board since.

The *Surveillante* was at anchor till yesterday evening, but is not now in sight, though I hope safe, notwithstanding the violent gale last night.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. I have been forced to retain General Wilson's brigade on the right, the demand for working-parties being so great as to fully employ both Portuguese brigades.

* See p. 99, Enclosure No. II.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Colonel A. Dickson to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

DEAR SIR, Pasages de la Calzada, 20th July, 1813, 6 P.M.

The weather, as you can easily imagine, has been most unfavourable to our arrangements and fire. The practice, however, of at least the breaching-battery has been good: the wall between the towers is much shaken, although we have not got through it in any part. It certainly appears a strong wall; but, considering the breaching-ordnance that has borne upon it (only seven pieces), I think there is as much done as might be expected. The advanced or real breaching-battery was completed last night to 11 guns, 8 long and 3 short, on ship carriages; one long gun was hit in the muzzle and disabled at the beginning of the day; and from the construction of the embrasures it was impossible to use the short guns at all; indeed I don't think they could ever be used for five rounds in these sand batteries; they are so low and short that the explosion would choke up the embrasure; but finding they will just answer (and no more) to mount on the field-carriages, I shall send in my spare ones for this purpose, by which we shall have all in play in the morning. The battery No. 3 assisted considerably, but the weather has been frequently so thick as to prevent my observing the general effect of the fire of the more distant batteries. I am sorry I have to add Captain Dubourdieu has been mortally wounded by the splinter of a shell; two artillerymen have been killed, and several wounded: indeed the French direct most of their fire against the breaching battery.

I would have written to you earlier, but the Spanish orderly went somewhere else; and as I had no means of sending more than one letter, I deferred writing until I had carefully examined the effect of our fire in clear weather.

I beg your permission to give the artillerymen an extra allowance of grog daily, as has been done heretofore on similar occasions.

I delivered your message to Sir George Collier.

I trust that we may be able, by having finer weather, to make a good impression on the wall to-morrow.

I remain, dear Sir, very truly yours,

A. DICKSON.

I beg you will have the goodness to order the enclosed to be forwarded by the first opportunity; it is the order for the brigade to come nearer.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to the Governor of St. Sebastian's.

SIR, Casa de Ayete, St. Sebastian's Road, 21st July, 1813.

Being charged by Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, Commander in Chief of the Allied armies, with the conduct of the operations of this siege, I have the honour at this period, while it is still in your power to save the lives of many brave men, to send an officer with this letter to summon you to surrender St. Sebastian's to the arms of the Allies.

I have directed the fire of the batteries to be suspended for one hour (from 10 to 11 this morning) to receive your answer.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, . Casa de Ayete, St. Sebastian's Road, 22nd July, 1813, 5 A.M.

I enclose Colonel Dickson's report of last night, which confirms what I wrote on my return from the right yesterday afternoon.

We can see the enemy hard at work, and there is little doubt of their having time to intrench themselves within the breach before it becomes at all practicable.

I see the sap has got quite across to the river in front of the round houses at the end of the burnt bridge. But I shall not send this till I see Sir R. Fletcher.

Half-past 6.

Sir R. Fletcher has just been with me. He is very well satisfied with the progress of the sap, but finds that it will take a great deal of work to make the breach wide and deep enough to give cover from the castle for the troops to assemble in. I see plainly too that he thinks another breach would be not only desirable, but necessary to ensure success. There is no chance, I imagine, of the present breach being made good before to-morrow night, for the wall must be cut quite through.

I am to meet Sir R. Fletcher and Colonel Dickson on the right this morning, and, after examining everything narrowly, shall write again. It is evident, however, that Major Smith thought too lightly of the strength of the place.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. I enclose a letter received last night from Sir George, but written before I saw him at Colonel Dickson's quarters. I cannot learn positively this morning about any of the men-of-war. There were two ships in sight at day-break, but since it is grown hazy.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Col. A. Dickson to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

Pasages de la Calzada, 21st July, 1813,
DEAR SIR, 10 minutes past 7 P.M.

I waited at the battery as long as I could, in hopes of getting a sight of the breach, but the sun being directly behind, rendered it impossible to see with any degree of distinctness; but this I can state, that the general feature appeared the same, having a rough perpendicular of a certain height and a slope at bottom. I have no doubt, however, but that the excellent practice which was making must have made a good impression. The 68-pounder carronades will be got in this night; but if it is still wall that we continue to batter, to-morrow there will be no use in opening them.

I remain, dear Sir, truly yours,
A. DICKSON.

II.

Commodore Sir G. R. Collier to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

MY DEAR SIR, H.M.S. *Arrow*, at noon, 21st July, 1813, Pasages.

What a terrible night was the last! Of the six men-of-war off the port at sunset, the *Lyra* is the only one that has held her ground, and the *Arrow*, which fortunately put in here before dark. I am much concerned for the *Sparrow*, and fear she must have gone ashore. The *Constant* must be in a critical situation as well as the *Sylvia*. As to the *Surveillante* I can form no opinion, but I cherish the hope that if the gale moderates we may yet see her again; but all is uncertain, as she must have parted in the night, when, I fear, the wind was dead on the shore and blowing hard, and a tremendous sea. Signal guns of distress were seen about 11.

I am very uneasy, as you may suppose.

I fear it may be some days before the King's messenger can be despatched. Whenever it moderates, and a vessel appears, I will let you know. Perhaps it may be as well if Lord Wellington be acquainted, as he may choose to send other letters.

I sincerely hope you are not the worse for your uncomfortable wetting the other night. What weather for July!

Very faithfully your obedient servant,

G. R. COLLIER.

Will you be good enough to forward the accompanying?

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, St. Sebastian's Road, 22nd July, 1813, 7 P.M.

Your Lordship's letter of 9 this morning was brought me about an hour ago, and I shall attend to its contents by immediately sending forward whatever field artillery can be manned. At all events there will be two troops of horse artillery, as I have sent for Ramsay's to come up from the rear, and Webber Smith's is already at Oyarzun.

There has been considerable progress made by the breaching battery to-day; there is a part of the top of the wall all the way between the two towers cut down. Colonel Dickson is afraid of running short of shot, and has stopped the fire of the more distant batteries, except the howitzers and 18-pounders. To-morrow two or three guns will be kept on the main breach, and the rest applied to endeavour to open the piece of wall between the first tower next the front and the rampart of the front face or curtain; the breaching battery will have its full complement of 12 guns to-morrow morning, and we all hope that it may be in that state to-morrow evening as to enable us to make the assault on the morning of the 24th.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—A respectable inhabitant of St. Sebastian's tells me that the place where the destroyed bridge in front of Irun is, goes by the name of Behobia.

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Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 22nd July, 1813.

I have received the honour of your Lordship's letter, No. 61, with the several enclosures.

As it appears that Admiral Hallowell did not transmit to your Lordship a copy of the official letter which he addressed to the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's naval forces in the Mediterranean, dated the 14th ultimo, containing matter of charge against the conduct of Sir John Murray, I have enclosed a copy for your Lordship's information. It is perhaps in substance, however, not very materially different from the letter Admiral Hallowell addressed to your Lordship on the same occasion.

It does not appear possible that this business should be permitted to pass over without investigation; and I am clear that the most convenient as well as the most satisfactory place for such an investigation is in the Peninsula, under your Lordship's auspices and command.

If the answers of Sir John Murray to your Lordship's queries should be fully satisfactory to your Lordship, and that you should declare them to be so, I question very much whether Sir John Murray would not apply for an inquiry, being (as I have thought fit to place him) in possession of the charges made against him in Admiral Hallowell's official letter above mentioned.

But if these answers should not be entirely satisfactory, your Lordship will, I am sure, see the necessity of some further proceeding. The honour of Sir John Murray, the character of his accuser, the glory of His Majesty's arms, all require that a court, competent to decide on this question, should pronounce an opinion by which the conduct of Sir John Murray may be justified or condemned.

In what shape this investigation should proceed your Lordship will be the best judge, when you have received Sir John Murray's answers, and have compared them with his two letters, Admiral Hallowell's charges, and any other information you may have in the mean time obtained.

Generally speaking, it must be observed that courts of inquiry seldom come to decisions which are satisfactory, and that it is therefore very desirable that this question should be submitted to a Court Martial, if that with which Sir John Murray may be charged can be brought within the range of the Articles of War.

I had directed Sir John Murray to repair to Gibraltar and there wait for further orders, in case he should have proceeded to Sicily. I shall now direct him to proceed from Gibraltar to Cadiz, and place himself under your Lordship's command.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Admiral B. Hallowell to Vice-Admiral Sir E. Pellew.

SIR, H.M.S. *Malta*, off the Coll de Balaguer, 14th June, 1813.

My letter of the 12th instant announced to you the determination which Sir J. Murray had taken of immediately raising the siege of Tarragona, and em-

barking the army. The embarkation accordingly commenced that morning. I am sorry to inform you that as no measures whatever had been previously adopted towards retiring, it took place with great precipitation; and twenty-one pieces of ordnance were, in consequence, abandoned and left behind in their batteries, namely, eleven 24-pounders, five 10-inch mortars, and five 10-inch howitzers, which were spiked, and their carriages burned, by order of the Commander of the Forces, although it was my decided opinion and advice to wait till night, when I promised to embark the whole.

The embarkation continued all night; and after the troops were on board our boats were employed in bringing off a brigade of artillery, staff horses, mules, &c., the whole of which, with everything appertaining, were got on board by eleven in the forenoon of yesterday, without the smallest molestation.

When we began to embark, a great part of the cavalry and field artillery were sent on to the Coll de Balaguer. Having received information in the night that the enemy had found a pass to come round that fort, and were getting in their rear, I sent the *Volcano* and gun-boats to protect them, and the General himself took a passage in the *Volcano*.

From the various reports we have had respecting the garrison of Tarragona, it consisted of from 1200 to 1600 men at the time of our arrival; but no report has made it exceed 1600. I have never yet learned that any of the enemy's moveable force was nearer to us than Villafranca; and there is no ground for believing that the division which had come thither from Barcelona, under De Caen, consisted of more than 5000.

The *Strombolo* returned from Torredembaria yesterday evening, and Captain Stoddart relates that he there saw a person who had left Villafranca at half-past seven the same morning, by whom he was informed that the French had not then left the place, nor seemed to have any immediate intention of leaving it; that their number was 5000, and that their artillery was composed of two small mountain guns carried upon mules, two field pieces, and one howitzer.

Yesterday morning we saw the enemy destroying the batteries and removing the ordnance therefrom into the garrison; but we could not perceive their numbers to be greater than when we were besieging the town.

As soon as the embarkation was completed at Tarragona I came round to Balaguer in the *Malta* to assist in embarking the cavalry and artillery sent hither. Before my arrival, however, Captain Adam had embarked all the latter, and Sir J. Murray has since signified his resolution to disembark the whole army here, for which purpose I have, by his desire, ordered all the transports hither, and they are now coming in. Suchet is within a few miles of us.

As our whole forces must be supplied with water from the ships, and knowing as I do, by experience, the indecisiveness of the General's character, I do not augur any favourable result from his intended operations. We have already been disgraced more than any British army ever was, and I fear every movement made by the present commander will add to its disasters.

Deeming it of the greatest importance that Lord Wellington should be early and certainly acquainted with these deplorable proceedings, I have sent Captain Carroll in the *Hyacinth* to land at Alicante, and make his way across the country to his Lordship's head-quarters.

I have put Lieutenant Boxer, first Lieutenant of the *Malta*, in the temporary command of the *Volcano*.

I beg leave to mention that the embarkation of the troops was effected under the immediate direction of Captains Bathurst, Inglefield, and Carroll, to whose exertions I am much indebted; and it would be unjust if I omitted

to represent that every commendation is due to those of Captain Withers and the agents for transports under him, who have been indefatigable in the performance of their laborious duties throughout the whole of this service.

I have, &c.,

BEN. HALLOWELL.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 22nd July, 1813.

I have the honour of transmitting to your Lordship the copy of an Act "for the more speedy and effectual Trial and Punishment of Offences committed by Soldiers detached in places beyond the Seas out of His Majesty's dominions."

I am aware that the provisions of this Act will not enable your Lordship to repress that spirit of plunder, outrage, and insubordination which I most deeply regret to find has broken out, since the battle of Vitoria, in the army under your command.

These flagrant acts of violence are calculated to counteract the advantages to be derived by the battle of Vitoria, and to tarnish, if anything could, the glory of that memorable day; and it is no small aggravation of this misfortune that British officers appear to have participated in some of these atrocities.

It is essentially necessary that the discipline of the army should be forthwith restored: the fate of the campaign may depend upon it. Your Lordship, therefore, must not imagine that by transmitting at this time a copy of the Act in question, it is thereby intended to deprive you, or to limit you in the exercise of your right, by virtue of your command, to execute, in cases of such urgent necessity, summary justice upon those under your command who may be detected in acts of violence and outrage. On the contrary, I hereby instruct you, by command of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to inflict this exemplary punishment on those to whom it may apply, without regard to the rank which the offender may hold in the army.

It is to be hoped that by some such seasonable instances of this severe measure of justice, coupled with the encouragement to good conduct recently held out to the non-commissioned officers by order of the Prince Regent, the discipline of the army may be speedily restored, and that your Lordship will then find the provisions of this Act calculated to preserve it.

But in furtherance of this most desirable object your Lordship will receive by this mail a letter from His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, by which you will be assured that any officer whom your Lordship shall think fit to suspend and report accordingly for neglect of duty (particularly with regard to the observance and enforcement of discipline), shall, upon a representation thereof being submitted to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, be dismissed forthwith from His Majesty's service, whatever may be the rank he holds in the army.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

ANNO QUINQUAGESIMO TERTIO GEORGII III. REGIS.

CAP. XCIX.

An Act for the more speedy and effectual Trial and Punishment of Offences committed by Soldiers detached in places beyond the Seas, out of His Majesty's dominions. [7th July, 1813.]

Whereas by an Act passed in the present Session of Parliament, intituled "An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters," it is enacted, that General Courts Martial to be held in places beyond the seas out of His Majesty's dominions may consist of any number not less than seven: And whereas it is expedient to amend the said Act, and to provide that such General Courts Martial may consist of a less number than seven, in the cases hereinafter specified: Be it therefore enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that it shall be lawful for any General or other Officer commanding any station, or commanding any division, brigade, detachment, or distinct party, belonging to any army of His Majesty, which may at any time be serving in any place beyond the seas out of His Majesty's dominions, upon complaint made to him of any crime or crimes, offence or offences, done or committed against the property or person of any inhabitant of or resident in any such countries, by any non-commissioned officer, soldier, or other person serving with or belonging to His Majesty's armies in the field, being under the immediate command of any such General or other Officer, to summon and cause to assemble a Court Martial, which shall consist of not less than three officers at the least, for the purpose of trying any such person or persons accused or suspected of having committed any such crime or crimes, offence or offences as aforesaid, notwithstanding such General or other Officer shall not have received from His Majesty, or from any person having His Majesty's authority in that behalf, any warrant or warrants empowering such General or other Officer to summon or assemble Courts Martial.

II. And be it further enacted, that every Court Martial so assembled under the authority of this Act shall have power to try any such person or persons so accused or suspected as aforesaid, and to adjudge any such person or persons to suffer any such punishment, as by any Act for the Punishment of Mutiny and Desertion which may be in force at the time such crime or crimes, offence or offences, shall have been committed, or by any Article or Articles of War issued by His Majesty under the authority of any such Act, shall be prescribed for any crime or crimes, offence or offences, with which any such person or persons shall be charged before such Court Martial: Provided always, that no sentence of such Court Martial assembled under the authority of this Act, shall be executed, until the General commanding in Chief any army, of which the division, brigade, detachment, or party, to which any person so tried, convicted, and adjudged to suffer punishment shall belong, shall have approved and confirmed the same.

III. Provided always, and be it further enacted, that every Court Martial assembled under the authority of this Act shall have such and the same powers for summoning and examining witnesses, and witnesses guilty of perjury on examination before them shall be subject and liable to the same penalties and punishments, as by any law or usage belong to any Court Martial authorized by law; and the sentence of such Court Martial acting

under the authority of this Act shall, after such approval and confirmation as aforesaid, be equally valid and effectual to all intents and purposes as if the same had been pronounced by any Court Martial summoned, assembled, and acting under any Act or Acts of Parliament heretofore made or now in force respecting Courts Martial.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Horse Guards, 22nd July, 1813.

It is with extreme concern that I have learnt from your Lordship's letters to Earl Bathurst of the 29th of June and 2nd instant, the great and unexampled acts of irregularity and insubordination of which the army under your Lordship's command has been guilty after the glorious victory of Vitoria, and which throw a stigma upon them which neither their valour nor their other exertions before the enemy can at all efface.

This stigma, however, does not attach to the privates alone: on the contrary, much the greatest share of it must lie with the officers, to whose want of exertion and attention to the discipline and conduct of their men, the irregularity of the troops must be wholly attributed.

I have therefore to desire your Lordship not only not to recommend any promotion in such corps as may continue to be guilty of the like breaches of discipline, but also, in all cases which you may consider to be peculiarly flagrant, that you will immediately suspend and send home any officers, be their rank what it may, whose neglect of duty may attract your disapprobation; and your Lordship may be assured that I shall feel it a duty incumbent upon me to recommend to the Prince Regent their immediate dismissal from His Majesty's service, without further inquiry.

I am, my dear Lord, yours,

FREDERICK.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 22nd July, 1813.

The nature of your representations upon the shameful state of indiscipline of the army has induced me to write to you officially in terms as strong and as concise as possible, with a view that you may insert my letter in public orders if you think it advisable, and I trust that it may have the effect of exciting officers to such exertions as may remedy an evil which if not checked in time may extend to the most fatal consequences.

But it must not be to the junior part of the army alone that the remedy must be applied; and I must, therefore, strongly urge you, my dear Lord, to make examples, if necessary, among the higher ranks of the officers under your command, to whose indolence and want of attention the principal blame must be attributed; and you may depend upon receiving my cordial support in the dismissal of any officer, from *the senior General* to the lowest Ensign.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 22nd July, 1813.

I hope you will receive by this mail what you will think sufficient power to restore a little better discipline in the army. The 18th Light Dragoons left England with a very indifferent reputation for discipline. I shall be much disappointed if you find the 7th guilty of the same irregularities.

As Parliament is no longer sitting, it is easier for me to send you the instruction I have done than during the session. Some doubt may possibly be entertained about its strict legality; and if given during the session the objection would be taken that these doubts ought to have been removed by a bill; but the Parliament will, I am sure, not enact what they would not disapprove after it has been done. At all events you will be fully justified by the instruction.

Yours ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 22nd July, 1813.

I have the honour of enclosing, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch addressed to Sir Henry Wellesley by Lord Viscount Castlereagh, together with an enclosure. They contain a strong remonstrance on the part of the British government against the measures recently taken by the Spanish government to recall General Castaños and General Giron from their respective situations under your Lordship's personal command.

As this measure has been adopted without any previous reference to your Lordship, they thereby violate the conditions on which alone, with the full concurrence of the Spanish government, your Lordship accepted the command of the Spanish armies.

Under a full persuasion that the Spanish government will be eager to demonstrate their unqualified confidence in the officer who has, at their express desire, charged himself with the responsible trust of commanding the Spanish forces, I am commanded by the Prince Regent to instruct your Lordship to suspend the execution of any orders you may have received for the recall of these distinguished officers till the further pleasure of the Spanish government is signified thereupon.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

SIR, Foreign Office, 22nd July, 1813.

Your despatches have been received and laid before the Prince Regent. His Royal Highness approves of the judicious remonstrances made by your

Excellency upon the recent infraction of the conditions upon which the Marquess of Wellington accepted the command of the Spanish armies.

Upon a question so important to the success of the campaign, and so essential, in the eyes of the whole nation and army, to the military authority of the Commander in Chief, His Majesty's government must suppose that the decision of removing General Castaños and General Giron, without reference to the Marquess of Wellington, has been taken without a due consideration of the ruinous effects which a measure of this nature is calculated to produce.

Under a full persuasion that the Spanish government will be eager to demonstrate their unqualified confidence in the officer who has, at their express desire, charged himself with the responsible trust of commanding the Spanish forces, the Prince Regent has been pleased to signify his orders to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington that he should suspend the execution of any orders he may have received for the recall of these distinguished officers till the further pleasure of the Spanish government is signified thereupon.

This order is given in the full confidence that, unless the Marquess of Wellington should think fit to dispense with their services, the Spanish government will not disturb a system of command under which the character of the national troops has so recently acquired the highest distinction; and your Excellency will present an official note of the enclosed tenor, representing, on the part of the Prince Regent, that His Royal Highness considers the fate of Spain to depend on the Allied armies being permitted to act under the undivided command of one General, sustained by the avowed and unqualified support of the respective governments.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

II.

The Prince Regent having heard with the deepest regret and surprise that, in the midst of a campaign commenced under the most flattering auspices for the deliverance of the Peninsula, the Spanish government have taken measures for removing Generals Castaños and Giron from their situations on the Staff of the army under the Marquess of Wellington's personal command, without any communication with the Field Marshal, and in direct contravention of the express stipulations entered into when he was called upon by a decree of the Cortes to assume the chief command of the Spanish armies, loses not a moment in directing the undersigned to remonstrate in the most energetic manner against a measure destructive of all confidence, and obviously subversive of the Marquess of Wellington's essential military authority.

The high sense of honour with which the government of Spain is known to observe all its public engagements, and the evident impossibility of the Marquess of Wellington's fulfilling the important trust to which he has been expressly called by the government of Spain if his authority is not upheld, His Royal Highness doubts not, will at once determine that government to recall the orders referred to, if not already done.

The undersigned is commanded to signify that, in the confident persuasion that the Spanish government could not for a moment hesitate in rendering this act of justice, as well to the Commander in Chief as to themselves, the Prince Regent has directed the Marquess of Wellington to suspend the execution of the measure in question till the pleasure of the Spanish government shall have been declared upon the representation which the undersigned is now commanded to make, and which His Royal Highness is confident will correspond with those principles of friendship which so happily unite the feelings as well as the interests of the two nations.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 22nd July, 1813.

I hope you will see no objection in obeying my instruction to suspend the recall of Generals Castaños and Giron until the effect of our remonstrance is known. If you ask me by what authority I can give you instruction to this effect, I shall be much puzzled to answer you; but I depend upon your reputation in the Peninsula, and the little estimation in which the Spanish Regency is held, for your not having any difficulty in the business. After your splendid success they dare not resist, and their submission will go a great way to overthrow them. Your Lordship's private letter to me on this subject has given us all the information almost which it was the object of my letter to you, written ten days ago, to procure.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 22nd July, 1813.

There has been an unaccountable confusion between the Transport Board and the Ordnance respecting the second battering train, which will have occasioned a delay of a few days. The battering train has been down at Portsmouth for more than two months, and judging that you might have an early occasion for it, I had given directions three weeks before I received your Lordship's letter for transports to go down to Portsmouth for them and to begin lading; but in this and in the lading there has been so much misunderstanding apparently between the two Boards, that I have found it necessary to send down last night a clerk expressly for the purpose of ascertaining the truth of the case. By one report it would appear that part have actually sailed, but this has been contradicted. However, I believe there can be no doubt of every thing being ready by Saturday next.

I am, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

Colonel Torrens to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, Horse Guards, 22nd July, 1813.

Your letter of the 22nd ult., acquainting me with the glorious success of the battle of Vitoria, was by some means delayed, and only reached me within these two or three days.

I am equally obliged to you for thinking of me during the bustle of such a moment, as if your letter had been the first communication of the glorious event which exalts our national character as a military power to a greater extent than any triumph of our arms in the history of the country. The great genius who has so admirably combined the operations leading to so glorious and successful a result is deserving of anything the country

could possibly do for him; and what is more gratifying to him and his friends, he richly deserves the exalted position his great character maintains in the estimation of the world.

God bless him! and send him health and continued success.

Without going out of my way to pay you any compliment, I must say that it is a fortunate circumstance that the army have had the advantage of your services during this brilliant campaign.

It would be an injustice to such a man as Lord W. to be allowed to work with even indifferent tools. And I am certain it is needless to say how much gratified I have been by the well-earned credit you have gained from Lord Wellington. I think I never saw mortification more strongly marked in the countenance of a friend of ours than apparently at the reflection of not having been able to remain for this glorious event. I do not mean to do him the injustice of saying that there was any jealousy in this towards you. Quite the contrary. But I really should have had an unfavourable opinion of his military feelings had he appeared otherwise than mortified after all that has passed. On subjects of this kind, however, he is ever silent.

I cannot say a word to you upon the disastrous occurrences upon the eastern coast.

I have had several letters from Kempt alluding to an official reference which Colonel De Lancey told him had been made to this office respecting the issue of his allowances during the period of his absence in this country upon the occasion of his wounds. No such communication has ever been received by me. But having stated the circumstances, as explained by Kempt, to the Commander-in-Chief, His Royal Highness is clearly of opinion that considering the cause, and the sole cause, of Kempt's absence from the field, the expenses attending his cure, and the necessity he was under of keeping up his equipments during the period, in the sanguine hope of being able to return, he is justly entitled to the receipt of the allowances to which he lays claim.

Ever, my dear Murray,

Most sincerely and faithfully yours,

H. TORRENS.

Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Viñaroz, 22nd July, 1813.

I cannot help thinking that Suchet is going to retreat altogether from this part of Spain; and if he does not, we and the Catalonians together could, I think, force him to do so. It is possible that he may stop upon the Llobregat; but if he meant to go no farther, he would not have blown up Tarragona, which would have embarrassed our advance upon him, and which, if he had any hopes of relieving Tortosa, he would have been glad to have had in his rear. The destruction of the guns at Tarragona had already taken place before Captain Adam wrote. I confess that it appears to me a loss of time and of means to employ 30,000 men, which force we have at our command, exclusively of Copons', upon a place like Tortosa,

having a garrison only of 3000 men. I really think it would be better to move on, to try and drive Suchet quite out of Catalonia, if we are able; and I think we should be able, with the Catalans and other corps on his flank and rear; and, if driven out or retiring, to attempt the siege of Barcelona. We have a great power of artillery, and with the assistance of the fleet, we could have a great superiority of fire. Or we might take such a forward position in Catalonia as would enable the Catalans and other Spanish corps completely to blockade all the Spanish forts and fortresses in Catalonia. The Bays of Rosas and of the Alfaques are the only ones upon this coast where the transports could ride with safety during the winter. The Bay of Salo is also a good anchorage, but not entirely safe in the winter.

We know nothing of your movements since the 1st, not even by report. We have heard that the Armistice is broken, but we have no confirmation of this intelligence. I attribute the retreat of Suchet to the defenceless state of the frontier of France in consequence of the destruction of Joseph's army. He is just now gone alone to Lerida, but with what object I do not know. He cannot, I think, mean to force his retreat by Yaca, and so effect his junction with Joseph.

When the communication was not open through Spain to you, Sir John Murray was ordered to send copies of his reports to you to Lord Bathurst; but as the route is now open, and is the shortest and quickest by your head quarters to England, it appears to me more regular that reports of the operations of all corps under your orders should be made by you alone, and I have intimated my intention to Colonel Bunbury of pursuing this course in future.

I propose, unless you wish to hear from me oftener, to send a courier regularly on the 1st and 15th of every month.

Sir John Murray came here to-day on his way to Sicily, and sailed immediately. He has been so long detained from the want of a ship.

I remain, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Colonel Abercromby.

DEAR ABERCROMBY, Lesaca, 22nd July, 1813.

I should wish to have it ascertained whether troops could move by the tops of the ridges on the right of the Puerto de Maya, so as to get upon the heights which overlook the village of Ainhoué. You will understand that I wish to know what can be done by a flank operation upon the hills in the event of our making any movement hereafter towards Ainhoué by the road which leads to that village from the Puerto de Maya.

In reconnoitring the heights with a view to the above object, it is desirable that the attention of the enemy should as little as possible be drawn that way.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir L. Cole.

MY DEAR COLE, Lesaca, 23rd July, 1813.

I should be glad to know from Bell the result of his reconnoissance about Pamplona and along the line of the road from Pamplona to Roncesvalles.

I am desirous of having it ascertained also, as soon as possible, whether we could take up the following line of defensive position :—

Our right to be in the passes of Roncesvalles, and as far beyond that as may be necessary to prevent these passes from being turned by Orbaizeta.

The line of defence to run from the passes of Roncesvalles by those between the foundry of Egui and the village of Les Alduides, and to extend from these latter to the pass of the Puerto de Velate, between Lanz and Almandoz.

The above appears to be the direction of one of the principal ridges of the mountains, and it would probably form therefore a more secure and a stronger line of defence than any which descended into the valleys, to rise again over the several branches which run out from the main ridge and separate these valleys from each other.

The doubt is whether communications exist, or could be formed without much difficulty, along the main ridge or immediately behind it, so that the several posts of the line of defence might have a secure connexion with each other, and might afford each other mutual support.

I wish you would allow Bell to reconnoitre in the direction I have mentioned, and to make me a report, accompanied, not by a finished sketch, but a mere outline, showing the situations of the principal mountains, and their line of connexion with each other; as also the course of what may appear to be the most practicable line of communication along the chain or immediately behind it.

A good deal of information respecting the right of the line I have mentioned may be obtained from General Byng; and I will give directions to Mr. Mitchell, who is sketching the country about Les Alduides and Egui, to furnish to Bell all the information he can.

I should mention that I do not look for a line of communication for anything but infantry in the direction I have mentioned.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir L. Cole.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Lesaca, 23rd July, 1813.

It is intended that you should support Major-General Byng in the defence of the passes in front of Roncesvalles as effectually as you can without committing the troops under General Byng and the 4th division against a force so superior as that the advantage of the ground would not compensate it; making allowance also for the feeling of inferiority which may influence the enemy at present in meeting our troops.

You will be so good as make arrangements farther back also for stopping the enemy's progress towards Pamplona in the event of your being compelled to give up the passes which Major-General Byng now occupies, and to retire in that direction.

It is very essential that certain and speedy means of communication should exist between the troops towards Roncesvalles and those under Brigadier-General Campbell at Les Alduides and the foundry of Egui, in order that either may be informed as quickly as possible of any retrograde movement which the others might be obliged to make.

A sure communication should exist also between both these quarters and Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton; and Sir Thomas should in like manner be apprised of any movements of the troops either upon the Roncesvalles road or upon that of Egui and Les Alduides, in order that he may make such arrangements as circumstances may dictate for giving support to either as they fall back, should such an event occur.

You will be so good as request Major-General Long to give whatever assistance by dragoons may be necessary in rendering the communications more prompt and effectual between the several corps above mentioned.

It is desirable that you should transmit a daily report for the present to head-quarters.

A duplicate of this letter is transmitted (open) under cover to Sir Thomas Picton, with directions to him to act accordingly.

Believe me, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Picton.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Lesaca, 23rd July, 1813, 3 P.M.

I send (open for your information) duplicate of a letter which I request you will forward to Sir Lowry Cole when you have read it; and I am to beg that you will take measures accordingly for being informed of what occurs in the quarters mentioned, and for giving support as may be necessary to the troops on either of the roads pointed out, in the event of their retiring.

Believe me, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

Major-General V. Alten, who is at Doña Maria, is requested to establish a communication between Olague and head-quarters.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, Lesaca, 23rd July, 1813.

Since receiving your letter of yesterday, dated at 5 P.M., and that from Captain Churchill, dated at 12 at night, I have written the enclosed letter to Sir Lowry Cole, which it may be right to communicate to Brigadier-General Campbell. I have sent a copy of it to Sir Thomas Picton, requesting at the same time that he would take his measures accordingly.

Believe me, my dear General, faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. L. Cole.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Lesaca, 24th July, 1813.

Since writing to you yesterday Lord Wellington has desired that I should express still more strongly how essential he considers it that the passes in front of Roncesvalles should be maintained to the utmost, and I am to direct therefore that you will be so good as make every necessary arrangement for repelling effectually every direct attack that the enemy may make in that quarter.

You will be so good as see established in a solid manner the connexion between the left of the posts occupied by Major-General Byng and the right of those held by Brigadier-General Campbell, and take also the necessary precautions to secure the right of Major-General Byng's posts from being turned on the side of Orbaizeta.

Lord Wellington attaches very little importance to any wider movement which the enemy might attempt for the purpose of turning the right of our positions. The difficulties and delays in which such an operation would engage him are of themselves very considerable obstacles, and would retard the enemy sufficiently to give time for other arrangements to stop his progress, without giving up the hold we now have of the passes upon the frontier.

You will be so good as understand that in so far as relates to any military operations that may occur on the extreme right of the army, the troops commanded by Major-General Byng are under your direction as the senior General officer in that quarter.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, St. Sebastian's Road, 24th July, 1813, 5 A.M.

I am sorry to say the burning houses close to the breach made it impossible to attack this morning. Everything was ready, and the low water would have suited the head of the column filing out of the parallel about the dawn of day. There is no saying when this burning will be sufficiently subsided to allow of another attempt: meanwhile the enemy no doubt will have the advantage of intrenching more completely all round the breach. Sir R. Fletcher does not consider any advantageous change can be made in the batteries of the left: though, hitherto, I think their fire has been useless as to ruining the defences, it certainly has kept under their fire against our breaching battery. To-day that battery will direct a good part of its fire on the long curtain and any other points which it may be thought material to annoy; but the quantity of shot remaining is not considerable, I am afraid, as yesterday morning there were only 7000 out of 17,000 we had at first. Should it not be possible to attack to-morrow, I shall be much at a loss how to proceed. The most effectual way would be by shells, &c., to endeavour to set fire to the town near to the enemy's strongest posts, unless an attack in front on this side could be

made by making a lodgment in the hornwork, which it is probable the mine or globe of compression would assist in.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 24th July, 1813.

Since my last letters to you I have received despatches from England which render it impossible to support the pretensions of the Princess of Brazil under any conditions whatever. It appears first, that the Prince, if she were appointed Regent of Spain, would not allow her to leave the Brazils; and by a letter from her agent here which Lord Strangford has seen, that he *is in* communication with the "agents of France," who had told him that the recognition of the Princess's claims might very likely be obtained from Buonaparte.

Under these circumstances Lord Castlereagh has desired me to express the Prince Regent's disapprobation of her nomination to the Regency, if there should be any probability of its taking place.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 24th July, 1813.

The postscript to my last letter will have informed you that some of our friends in the Cortes meant to take up the question relative to your command. On the 22nd a Mr. Amat stated his intention to move for the correspondence which had passed between you and the government upon this subject. He was immediately attacked by the Liberales, who insisted upon it that the discussion should be in a public session, and they became so violent that the President broke up the session, and reserved to himself the naming of a future day for the discussion of the question. There were at least two-thirds of the Cortes in favour of Mr. Amat's motion, but such is their terror of the Liberales and of the populace that not one deputy rose to support him.

It is evidently the object of the *Serviles* and of the *Americans* to make use of this question in order to get rid of the government. The Liberales are determined to support the government, and their object is to discuss the question in public, in order that they may have the support of the mob. They would then endeavour to make it appear that General Castaños was an enemy to the Constitution, and a supporter of those of the clergy who had resisted the decree for the abolition of the Inquisition, and that the sole object of the motion was to support him. The result of the discussion would therefore probably be the ruin of General Castaños.

You will observe that all this has nothing to do with you. I still believe that every individual in the Cortes is anxious that you should retain the command; but they will not separate this question from others in which the parties have opposite interests.

Upon reflecting, therefore, upon the turn which the debate had taken in the Cortes, and that although the question might be carried the Liberales would be against it, who were the principal promoters of your appointment to the command, I determined to make another effort through the Minister of War to obtain some explanation from the Regency which should satisfy you, and to desire our friends in the Cortes if possible to prevent the question from being brought forward again.

I saw the Minister of War yesterday; and after adverting to what had passed in the Cortes, I told him that I would not suffer the opinion to go abroad that you were merely pleading the cause of General Castaños, neither would I allow you to be made the tool of a party for the removal of the government. That you had very justly complained of the violation in a variety of instances of the conditions under which you had consented to accept the command; that you expected that some satisfactory reason should be assigned for it; and that if the Regency thought that an adherence to these conditions was incompatible with the administration of public affairs, they had only to explain the reasons, and to propose a new arrangement, when it would be for you to decide whether you could exercise the command with advantage to the service under any conditions short of those upon which you now hold it.

General O'Donoju replied that you would receive the answer of the Regency by Colonel Croquenbourg. That the recall of General Castaños was not to be dispensed with, but that all the reasons for it could not be explained to you until his arrival. That General Giron would be allowed to remain with the Gallician army. That the motives for the appointment of General Lacy had been communicated to you; and that General Freyre had been sent under a conviction that his appointment would be approved by you. That the Regency were only bound by the conditions which had been agreed to by the Cortes, and that those they would religiously keep; but that they were not bound by those which had been entered into by the last Regency, and that there were two which they thought incompatible with the due administration of affairs, viz., the removal and appointment of officers. That you would be written to upon this subject, and would be requested to propose an arrangement upon a new basis.

Before I took leave of General O'Donoju I observed to him that I wished to be satisfied upon one point before I wrote to you. That I had been assured that the Regents, Messrs. Agar and Ciscar, were desirous that you should resign the command, and that this was the foundation of all the proceedings of which you complained; and I desired to know from him, as a man of honour, whether it was or was not so. He assured me upon his honour that they entertained no such sentiments. On the contrary, that if it were to be a question whether you should resign or continue to hold the command under the present conditions, they would request you to continue in the command, and would themselves resign their offices. He repeated this several times, adding that your resignation would be ruinous to the cause, both in Spain and the rest of Europe.

I told the Minister of War that I was ready to accompany him to the Regency, and state to them what I had stated to him. He said he did not think that such a step would be advisable at present, as my motive might be misconstrued. He said that a day or two after the letters of which Colonel Croquenbourg is to be the bearer were despatched he would communicate them to me. Upon my asking him whether there was any objection to showing them to me now, he said that it would not be regular to do so, but assured me upon his honour that they contained exactly what he had stated to me in conversation.

The discussion in the Cortes has at least produced these good effects, that the Minister of War has been more explicit, and that there appears to be a more conciliatory disposition in the Regency than was before perceptible. I do most sincerely hope that their letters will be so far satisfactory to you that you will consent to remain in the command. It is the only bond of union between the British and Spanish armies, and perhaps the principal one between the two nations; and I really think that your resignation would be almost fatal to the cause.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I should mention that the Minister of War always insists upon your readiness to come to a new arrangement. He complains that the Regency is insulted by its officers, and particularly that the Duque del Parque has written a most insolent letter to the government.

I believe that Colonel Croquenbourg will start to-morrow for headquarters. He carries with him the title-deeds of the Soto de Roma, conferred upon you by the Cortes. I send this letter by a courier, because I wish you to be apprised of all that has passed before you receive the Minister of War's letters.

I have sent 100,000 dollars to O'Donnell, and 260,000 will be embarked to-morrow for General Elio, the Duque del Parque, and General Copons. I have deducted 40,000 from the Duque del Parque's share on account of some provisions furnished to him at his own desire by Mr. Tupper.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Col. Dickson.

MY DEAR SIR, Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

I beg you will let me know, as soon as you can, where our reserves of ammunition now are (either gun or musket ammunition, but particularly the latter), or if not at the destinations intended, how soon they will arrive there. Also whether the divisions have been completed.

I look in particular to the possibility of a supply being wanted by the troops on the right and in the centre, viz., the 4th division at or near Roncesvalles, the 3rd division at Olague, and the 2nd division in the front line to these from Roncesvalles to Elizondo and Maya.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Colonel De Lancey.

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

The enclosed copy of an instruction to the commandant at Vitoria respecting the march of detachments from thence to Ernani is transmitted for Colonel De Lancey's information.

Colonel De Lancey will be so good as report the arrival at Ernani of all such detachments as do not belong to the left column of the army, in order that instructions may be sent from head-quarters respecting their further march.

G. MURRAY.

P. S.—Some copies of routes for Ernani, issued at Vitoria, are also enclosed.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Picton.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

It is a great object to have a good communication opened as quickly as possible between San Estevan and Olague, and I beg you will be so good as give every assistance you can towards making or improving it on the Olague side, whilst Major-General Pack does the same towards San Estevan.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

It looks very much as if Soult were going to make an effort against Byng and Cole upon the Roncesvalles road. If he does so, he will probably make some demonstration at least on other points, and be prepared to follow these up if he has any success in his principal attack.

In the latter case I should think Campbell would be obliged to fall back from Les Alduides; and that happening, you would have to evacuate your most advanced positions in the valley of Baztan.

The enemy would of course follow up these retrograde movements, and the result, I should think, would be our having to draw back also the 7th and Light divisions, and to take up for the moment a more retired line.

If the accounts from the right continue to threaten active operations on the part of the enemy, head-quarters will probably move more that way.

Lord Wellington is gone towards St. Sebastian. An assault was made upon the breach there this morning, but it failed. I do not understand that our loss has been very considerable.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

MY DEAR DALHOUSIE, Lesaca, 25th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

It will be a proper precaution that your division should be prepared to make a movement this evening, should it be necessary.

Pray give me the earliest intelligence you can of whatever occurs towards Sir Rowland Hill's posts.

If the enemy has any decided success in the valley of Baztan, your division may have to move towards San Estevan.

I can say nothing more at present. Lord W. is towards St. Sebastian.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-General C. Alten.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Lesaca, 25th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

It would appear from a report I have from Lord Dalhousie that the enemy is attempting something against the Puerto de Maya.

Let your division know they may have occasion to move on a short notice.

You will of course let Major Ross know also, that his horses and mules may be kept at hand in case his troop of artillery should be required to move.

G. MURRAY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to General the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 25th July, 1813.

I have nothing to add to my letter of the 24th, excepting that La Vega tells me that General O'Donoju has communicated to him the letters addressed to you by Colonel Croquenbourg, and that he thinks you will be satisfied with them. I shall be extremely happy to have this confirmed by yourself.

I am told that the cavalry at Port St. Mary's is in a dreadful state, the horses starving, and the men naked. Lord W. Bentinck has put all the Spanish cavalry, amounting to 2000, under Whittingham, who writes me word that the horses and men are good, but that they are in want of everything. By your direction I make over all the cavalry clothing, appointments, &c., to the Minister of War. I hear that they are as yet untouched.

Ever yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

I forgot to mention in my last that M. Ciscar (the Regent) had not complied with the assurances given to his brother that the correspondence with you should be transmitted to the Cortes, which was the cause of Mr. Amat's motion.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General the Marquess of Wellington.

Casa de Ayete, St. Sebastian's, 25th July, 1813,

MY LORD, half-past 5 A.M.

The attack has failed, owing to the quantity of musketry and hand-grenades the enemy brought upon the column in its advance and on its arrival at the breach.

I shall have the honour to transmit a particular report as soon as I am better informed of all the circumstances.

I cannot now form an estimate of the loss, but there is a number of officers wounded, and probably from two to three hundred men. Sir R. Fletcher has received a contusion on his leg, and Captain Lewis and Lieutenant Jones, of the Royal Engineers, who led the columns, were wounded and taken. Major Stanhope, too, is severely wounded. I have not yet heard the names of other officers.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. Lieutenant Machell, R.E., after returning from the attack was killed in the trenches. As Lieutenant-Colonel Burgh is just going, I do not send over any officer with this.

[669.] ARRANGEMENT FOR THE 26TH JULY.

Lesaca, 26th July, 1813.

Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill will be so good as make his arrangements so as to hold as long as possible the road, for artillery, which passes through Sumbilla, Narvarte, and Irurita to Berrueta, and by which the artillery of the Light division is ordered to move this morning.

Major-General Pack will place two brigades of the 6th division on the side of Legasa, in the situation most favourable for supporting the left of the troops under Sir Rowland Hill; and the other brigade of the 6th division will continue posted near St. Estevan to cover and sustain that point.

Lord Dalhousie will move upon Sumbilla that part of the 7th division not already detached. The baggage of the 7th division will precede it, and will move a little beyond St. Estevan, in the direction of Doña Maria. Lord Dalhousie will maintain Sumbilla, and will connect himself on the right with the 6th division.

The Light division will place itself on the left bank of the Bidasoa, in such a situation as to be able to move by its right to St. Estevan, or by its left towards Yanci and Lesaca. It will communicate on its right with the troops at St. Estevan and Sumbilla, and on its left with the troops of Brigadier-General Longa.

The baggage of the Light division will move off as soon as possible to Yanci; and Major-General Alten will regulate the

withdrawing of his troops in such manner as may best cover the march of the 7th division upon Sumbilla, as also that of his own baggage.

The baggage of head-quarters will move off as soon as possible by Yanci and Elgoriaga, near St. Estevan, where it will receive further orders.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill to the Quartermaster-General.

SIR, Heights behind Irurita, 26th July, 1813.

Last night I reported to you that I had judged it advisable to retire to the position in front of the pass of Almandoz, which has been done without any obstruction from the enemy. They show nothing on the heights above the valley in our front, nor have they followed us on the main road.

The force of the enemy in our front yesterday is generally estimated at 14,000 men.

Our loss I have not ascertained, but I am sorry to say we were so pressed on the height that it was impossible to bring away the four guns which were there. They were spiked, and thrown over the cliff.

I fear our loss yesterday cannot be less than 600.

I have, &c.,

R. HILL.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Berrueta, 26th July, 1813, 6 P.M.

I saw General Long this morning, and expressed to him my anxiety to receive intelligence from Sir L. Cole. In consequence of that, Long, who is now at Lanz, took the liberty of opening a letter from Sir L. Cole addressed to you, a copy of which he sends me, at the same time forwarding the original to you at St. Estevan, which of course you will not receive for some time. I therefore forward this without loss of time.

R. HILL.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Picton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Zubiri, 26th July, half-past 8 o'clock.

When I joined Sir Lowry Cole he had taken up a position about two miles in front of Zubiri, where he was attacked about half-past three by a very superior force. The enemy was not able to make any impression on the post, though he drove in our sharpshooters, and extended himself much to our right and left, particularly to our right, which was easily turnable. The affair terminated with the day, and the country offering no post

between this place and Pamplona where it would be safe to hazard anything like an effectual stand against such superior force, I agreed with Lieutenant-General Sir L. Cole in opinion that it was advisable to retire, and we have in consequence ordered the baggage, &c., on the Vitoria road, where we shall take up a position at as short a distance as practicable from Pamplona. If I had known your Lordship's intentions sooner, I would have joined Sir L. Cole before he had retired from the passes, and in that case would have endeavoured to give effect to your Lordship's wishes.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's faithful humble servant,
T. PICTON.

[670.] *To the Quartermaster-General.*

At the Bridge near Lairasoaña, 27th July, 1813, 11 A.M.

Our troops are formed on the heights on this side of Pamplona, the enemy in their front. The enemy's right is close to the road to Ostiz, near this village. The road therefore by Ostiz can no longer be used.

The artillery and other carriages at Ostiz must march immediately to Olague.

As soon as the 6th division have cooked, they and all the artillery at Olague, and that now at Ostiz, are to march to Lizaso.

Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill should march this night, if possible, to Lanz, leaving a post at the head of the Pass, which he should withdraw in the morning.

I will send orders to Lanz and Lizaso for further proceedings.

The 7th division should also march on towards Lizaso.

WELLINGTON.

Olague, 27th July, 1813, 1½ P.M.

Referring to No. 5 of my instructions to Major-General Pack, he will observe that a post should be left at Olague when he leaves it.

G. MURRAY.

[671.] *Instructions for Major-General Pack.*

Olague, 27th July, 1813, 1 P.M.

1. To observe the road from Egui to Olague, and prevent the enemy advancing by that line should he attempt it.

2. To send off towards Irurzun (a memorandum of the road is enclosed) all the artillery, wheel-carriages, &c., with directions

to the senior officer to ask at Lizaso, as he passes near it, if there are any further orders for him.

3. The reserve of small-arm ammunition, upon mules, was with Sir Rowland Hill, who has been instructed to send it to Olague. Major-General Pack will send this ammunition by the route above alluded to as expeditiously as possible, with instructions to halt at Lizaso.

4. Major-General Pack will be in communication with Brigadier-General Longa at Lanz, and through him with Sir Rowland Hill, sending to them all intelligence of any consequence.

5. Major-General Pack must be aware that it is necessary that he should maintain himself at Olague, under all circumstances, as long as the roads upon Lizaso and Irurzun are necessary to the army. Sir Rowland Hill, as well as the 14th light dragoons, will have to use these roads.

6. The 6th division will cook as soon as it comes in, that it may be prepared to move in the afternoon, if required.

7. General Pack will send a copy of this instruction to Sir Rowland Hill.

WELLINGTON.

ORDERS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY. [672.]

On the Heights in front of Villaba, 27th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

The 6th division, and all the artillery carriages and the other troops this night at *Lizasó*, are to move to-morrow morning at the dawn of day from Lizaso upon *Ollocarizqueta*, on the road to Berrioplano.

Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill and Lord Dalhousie, with the troops under their command respectively, are to move at the same time from the stations at which they will be this night to *Lizaso;* and thence, if the men should not be over-fatigued, to *Ollocarizqueta,* at as early an hour as may be in their power.

The baggage of head-quarters to proceed by Ollocarizqueta to Orcoyen to-morrow.

The wounded to be taken to Berrioplano. Copies of this order to be sent by staff officers to Sir Rowland Hill at Lanz; or if not there, at the pass of Velate, between Lanz and

Almandoz; and to Lord Dalhousie at Doña Maria, or on the road between Doña Maria and Lizaso.

General Pack will communicate the order to all concerned at Lizaso.

WELLINGTON.

[673.] MEMORANDUM.

Villaba, 27th July, 1813, ½ past 8 P.M.

Some of the enemy, said to be about 1200 infantry, crossed the road and river on their right this afternoon; and they may go into the hills which are on the left of the road coming from Lizaso.

I have ordered 2000 Spanish infantry to Ollocarizqueta, with directions to throw piquets on those heights, which will protect that road.

The following measures must be adopted:

First, The baggage of head-quarters and of the troops must march from Lizaso to Irurzun, the troops bringing with them meat and bread for two days.

Secondly, The artillery must follow the 6th division; and if there should be any difficulty in passing the road, the artillery must return, and go from Lizaso to Irurzun.

Thirdly, The 6th division, if the opposition should be of a description to render it necessary, must quit the road and go upon the hills on the right of the valley coming from Lizaso: but they must arrive at their destination.

WELLINGTON.

Let this be left for Sir Rowland Hill and the Earl of Dalhousie; and General Pack will let them know when he will arrive at Ollocarizqueta.

The great reserve of musket ammunition must come with the 6th division.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. L. Cole to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, Linzoain, 27th July, 1813.

I am so far on my retreat to Pamplona. From my letter to Lord Wellington of yesterday you must now be, if you were not, tolerably well

acquainted with the strength of the force opposed to me. I believe it no less than 35,000 men, and probably more. What I can do to stop or check their progress towards Pamplona, without committing the troops, I will.

Colonel Arbuthnot is now with me from General Picton, who is with his division at Egui. I understand he proposes, in the event of our retiring, to form us at Zubiri. Our future proceedings from that will of course depend on him; but I had otherwise intended to have taken the road to Vitoria, if obliged to fall back farther than Pamplona. General Campbell sent me word yesterday that he would retire upon the foundry of Egui. Whether he has done so or not I cannot say, but presume he has. I have written to General O'Donnell, Sir S. Cotton, and the commanding officer of the depôt, to mention my intention, that they may be prepared accordingly.

Pray let me hear from you soon. I have no reason to complain of the troops. On the contrary. But the force was too much to contend with. I did not receive your letter of the 24th until nine o'clock yesterday, just as Byng's people had driven back the enemy in their first attack.

Ever yours most truly,

G. LOWRY COLE.

Having had no sleep for two nights, and on horseback from four o'clock until eleven at night, I am somewhat fagged, and cannot be as particular just now as I could wish.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-Gen. C. Alten.

Almandoz, 27th July, 1813.

Lord Wellington desires that the Light division may be extended to its left, so as to have some troops in Yanci and a post of observation at least at Lesaca.

Major-General Alten will close from his right in the above direction as he may judge necessary for the above arrangement.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, 27th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

I have this instant received the order of the day by Colonel Arentschildt, and by him retiring to Lizaso, I only hastily state that I shall remain here to-night, and until I am forced away or get further orders. I am so near Doña Maria that my present ground is the proper position, and behind Doña is a pass that nothing can hurry me from except movements in my rear.

The Light division will not get their copy of the order till very late to-night.

I have wounded here in a bad way, nothing scarcely to move them with; but I'll do my best, and come away as clean as I can.

Yours most truly,

DALHOUSIE.

The Quartermaster-General to Col. Arentschildt and Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Head-quarters, Lizaso, 27th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

The 1st Hussars, King's German Legion, will move, on receiving this order, to Lizaso, and encamp near it.

The 7th division (or part of it with Lord Dalhousie) will march also to the vicinity of Lizaso. But Lord Dalhousie will leave a post of observation in the passes, and Colonel Arentschildt will leave a few hussars with that post, to bring reports from it.

The 1st Hussars will send a small party under an officer to the village of Lecumberri, on the great road between Tolosa and Pamplona. This party is stationed there to keep up the communication between the right and left of the army. The officer commanding it should put himself in communication as soon as possible with Major-General C. Alten at Zubieta, and report his having done so.

G. MURRAY.

Lord Dalhousie and Colonel Arentschildt will report to Lizaso when they expect to arrive there.

Memorandum.

Lizaso, 27th July, 4 P.M.

All the artillery coming from Lanz or Olague ordered to halt at Laranzar, and there wait further instructions.

All sick, carts, and other obstructions ordered to proceed to Irurzun.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. L. Cole to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Heights in front of Pamplona, 27th July, 1813.

Having received a letter from Major-General Byng, whom I had been directed to support, late on the night of the 24th inst., stating that he expected to be attacked on the following morning in the position which he occupied in the pass of Roncesvalles, covering the great roads leading from St. Jean Pied de Port to that place and to the foundry of Orbaizeta, I directed Major-General Ross's brigade to march at daybreak from the village of Espinal to the Puerto de Mendichurri to strengthen his left flank, and to preserve his communication with Brigadier-General Campbell's brigade of Portuguese at Les Alduides. Major-General Anson's brigade marched at the same time to Espinal, followed by the Portuguese brigade under Colonel Stubbs.

On my arrival at Major-General Byng's post I found him warmly engaged with a very superior force of the enemy, whose attack was repulsed with great gallantry and considerable loss on their side. As their numbers still increased, and it appeared evident that they had not abandoned their object, I directed Major-General Anson's brigade to move to Orbaizeta in support of the regiment of Leon, and Colonel Stubbs to place his brigade at the head of the valley of Valcarlos (which village Major-General Byng

had occupied with the 57th Regiment, giving piquets on the heights of Eroles), in support of either Major-General Byng's post or the heights of Mendichurri. The enemy having in the course of the night turned those posts, were now perceived moving in very considerable force along the ridge leading to the Puerto de Mendichurri. I therefore proceeded in that direction, and found their advance had nearly reached the road leading from the pass of Roncesvalles to Les Alduides, from which it is separated by a small wooded valley. Owing to the difficulty of the communications, the head of General Ross's brigade could not arrive there sooner: the Major-General, however, with great decision, attacked them with the Brunswick company and three companies of the 20th, all he had time to form; these actually closed with the enemy, and bayonetted several in the ranks: they were, however, forced to yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley. The enemy attempted to follow them, but were repulsed with loss. The remainder of the brigade having come up, and being supported by Major-General Anson's brigade, whom I had recalled for that purpose, I was enabled to maintain this point until night. Brigadier-General Campbell, who had moved up to my support from Les Alduides, reported the enemy's force to be at least 15,000 men; and Major-General Byng reporting at the same time that he had been again attacked with increased force, and compelled to fall back to a second position, which gave the enemy possession of the road by Orbaizeta to our rear, I therefore determined to retire from the passes, which it was evident could not be maintained against the very great superiority of the force opposed to me, amounting to from 30,000 to 35,000 men. This was effected in the night, and on the following morning I occupied some heights on the Pamplona road, in rear of Linzoain. Here I was joined by Sir Thomas Picton, who informed me that the 3rd division were at Zubiri, and Brigadier-General Campbell's brigade at Egui. The enemy's advanced guard appeared about 2 P.M., and the greatest part of his force was formed in my front at 4; and having got possession of the chain of heights on my left, which my force would not admit of my occupying, I retired about a mile to a strong post, where I maintained myself till dark, when Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, having moved the 3rd division to my support, of course took the command.

I have great reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the whole of the troops. I have the honour to enclose Major-General Byng's report of his.

The 20th Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wauchope, were principally engaged on the 25th, and the conduct of the three companies which, with the Brunswick company, formed the advance, was particularly distinguished. Major-General Ross mentions particularly Captain Towey, of that regiment.

Major-General Anson's brigade, which formed the rear-guard on the 26th, was likewise distinguished, particularly the light companies, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of the 48th Regiment, who repulsed a charge of the enemy's cavalry upon his rear while warmly engaged with their infantry in his front. Lieutenant-Colonel M'Lean with the 27th Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Toole with the 7th Caçadores, and Captain Heyland (severely wounded), commanding the 40th Regiment, likewise distinguished themselves.

From my own observation and the report of Major-General Byng, I am of opinion that the loss of the enemy on those two days must have amounted to from 2000 to 2500 men.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

G. LOWRY COLE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-General J. Byng to Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole.

SIR, Linzoain, 26th July, 1813.

The enemy drove in my piquets at 6 in the morning yesterday, and immediately attempted to turn the right of my position, in which they completely failed, as well as in repeated attempts to force the front of it. At about ten they desisted, and I could perceive them employed in bringing up immense reinforcements, and in marching several large columns on the heights to my left. Before 12 they again made an attempt to force me from my situation, but were driven back with loss three successive times, and we never gave up an inch of ground; but towards 3 o'clock my ammunition was nearly expended. I had a force of 22,000 men in my front, under Marshal Moncey, as communicated to us by an officer, badly wounded, who fell into our hands; and perceiving your division opposed to a very superior force, which had reinforcements coming up to them, and which, if successful in forcing you, would prevent my retreat, I deemed it prudent to withdraw my troops to another commanding situation, much nearer to you, but still occupying the pass of Roncesvalles, which I was enabled to do in good order, without losing a single man taken prisoner; and I brought off all my wounded except about thirty, whose lives would have been endangered by an immediate removal with the small means we had for that purpose. The enemy advanced but slowly, and never attempted to renew the attack. At 5 a thick fog came on, and it was impossible to perceive any movement of the enemy. The road to Orbaizeta was open to them, and their force would enable them to send a sufficient number to overpower the regiment I had there. It therefore appeared necessary to retire, and I received your orders to do so at 8. I find the enemy made two attempts to force the regiment of Leon at Orbaizeta, but were repulsed in both, and they made good their retreat when they received my orders to do so.

When under the painful necessity of reporting upon a retreat, it is some consolation to me that you witnessed the force which opposed us, and the exertions that were made to resist them by two British regiments and four Spanish battalions, the remainder of my force being necessarily detached in the Pass of Valcarlos and at Orbaizeta; and I trust that having kept our ground for nine hours with that force against 20,000 men will be a satisfactory proof that we did our duty. I can truly say that I witnessed the most earnest desire on the part of every officer and man to obey the orders I gave. I therefore do not think it right to particularise any one individual, except General Morillo, whose conduct was everything that was praiseworthy, and to whom I am obliged for good advice on that and many occasions since I have had the honour of having his division under my orders.

Enclosed is a return of my killed and wounded, which I am happy to say is not considerable, for the time we were engaged, and the enemy having been

able to bring up six guns. The loss of the French, I think, may fairly be estimated at near 1500 men.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very obedient humble servant,

JOHN BYNG.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My LORD, Oyarzun, 27th July, 1813, 10 A.M.

I have waited till now, before sending to head-quarters, for Colonel Dickson's report of what he could do last night. I enclose it; and Mr. Moore, who brought it, was told by Colonel Dickson that this morning the enemy made a sortie unperceived by the Portuguese troops in the trenches, and got round their right, and took a number of prisoners. I have had no report from Major-General Oswald. I enclose your Lordship a letter of Sir R. Fletcher's: on receiving it I went with Major-General Oswald to talk the matter over with Sir Richard, and, after calculating what it would be necessary to keep the trenches and the requisite reserves, it appeared to us that not less than 3000 men on the left and 1000 on the right would answer the purpose; in short, that it would nearly require the 5th division for this service. I am anxious to receive your Lordship's orders on this head. I told Sir Richard in this conversation last night that the right of the trench could never be safely occupied, as the enemy might get round them, and the fire from the convent hill could afford them no protection in the mêlée that would ensue.

I suspect that this has happened this morning, though I trust, when the report from Major-General Oswald arrives, it will be found that the artillery officers on the right magnify the loss of the Portuguese. Colonel Dickson wished to leave a piece of ordnance in each battery, and to mask the other embrasures, in order to conceal, if possible, the removal of the guns from the enemy; so that there is at present a 68-pound carronade more left than your Lordship mentioned.

I have, however, very little doubt of the enemy seeing too well from the castle everything that passes on both sides to be long deceived, and I hope your Lordship will decide whether all the artillery now left should remain in the batteries. There are four of the 18-pounders still in the left battery on the hill. Were some of the 12-pounders sent from Vitoria, Sir R. Fletcher considered they would be equally serviceable; but I am not certain that there is shot for them.

I find General Giron here thinks himself responsible for the position he is placed in, and only wishes for support in case of attack. He has a brigade in reserve here behind our camp, and does not wish to put them forwarder.

General Stopford was at Irun early this morning, and saw the French line under arms, and thinks their number more considerable. It is not, I confess, a very pleasant situation to have so few British with the Spaniards in front. I should have wished much to bring up a part of the 5th division; but this sortie, of which I have as yet heard nothing more,

makes it impossible while more than the convent hill is attempted to be held, and I doubt that being long kept by indifferent troops.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—I have no letter from your Lordship since that of yesterday at 4 A.M.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Col. Sir R. Fletcher to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

SIR, 25th July, 1813.

I have the honour to make the following general statement of the operations before St. Sebastian up to this day.

On my arrival at Ernani on the 15th instant I found that a battery of six 18-pounders had been opened on the convent of St. Bartholomew on the morning of the preceding day.

The building was much ruined by our fire; but an attempt to burn it by hot shot had not succeeded.

On visiting the right attack I found that ground had been opened by Major Smith of the Engineers, to place in battery twenty 24-pounders and six 8-inch howitzers, the former to batter in breach a part of the left front of the town works, and the latter to act against the defences.

He explained to me the general outline of his plan of attack, which had been submitted to the Commander of the Forces and approved, the leading features of which have been since followed.

The convent of St. Bartholomew and the works connected with it were carried on the 18th. In the evening of that day batteries were commenced on the same ridge for six 18-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers, to enfilade and take in reverse the works which cross the Isthmus, and communications were made to the ruined village of St. Martin's, at the extremity of the Isthmus.

On the evening of the 19th a parallel was extended right and left of St. Martin's, as a support to farther operations.

On the morning of the 20th the gun and howitzer batteries, both on the right and left attack, having been completed, they were opened to batter in breach and to annoy the defences.

The same evening a second parallel was begun on the Isthmus, in distance from the crest of the glacis from 160 to about 120 yards, and was carried about two-thirds across. The necessary approaches from the first to the second parallel were also opened.

During the 21st the above parallel and approaches were continued, and on the following night the former was extended to the water on the right.

On the 22nd the above works were completed, and an approach towards the breach was made on the right of the second parallel. A communication connected with the aqueduct and leading into the ditch of the hornwork having been discovered, it was decided to make a mine near the end of it, to blow in the counterscarp, and which it was supposed might operate as a diversion in favour of the assault.

On the 22nd our breach, about 100 feet in length, became practicable; but, as it was considered to be advisable to make a second to turn any intrench-

ments that might have been made in rear of the first, the assault was not given.

On the 23rd four 10-inch mortars and four 68-pounder carronades opened on the defences, and on the same day a practicable breach was effected on our right of the first; and a powerful musketry fire, to keep down that of the enemy, having been established in the parallel, it was decided that the assault should take place on the morning of the 24th at daylight. It was, however, postponed in consequence of some houses having taken fire, which it was supposed were immediately in the rear of the breaches.

On the 24th at night a kind of cavalier de tranchée was opened in front of the second parallel on the right, to command more powerfully the covert-way of the left branch of the hornwork, and an approach was carried on towards the glacis opposite the right demi-bastion, as a communication with the town, should the enemy be driven into the citadel.

On the morning of the 25th, the troops intended for the attack having assembled in the parallel, and a battalion of Caçadores having been so placed as to command by close musketry such works of the enemy as might possibly annoy the approach to the breaches, at daylight, the mine having been previously sprung, which ruined a part of the counterscarp of the hornwork, the assault was given.

The right wing of the Royals advanced to the foot of the main breach without difficulty, but did not succeed in carrying it. The left wing of the same regiment halted under cover of the walls till the right wing should have mounted the breach; but the latter, having suffered considerably from the various means of defence resorted to by the enemy, retired into the parallel without effecting the object. The 38th Regiment moved out as a support; but being prevented, by the space occupied by the Royals in their front, from arriving at the smaller breach, and finding that the advance of the storming corps had failed, retired also into the trenches without much loss.

I have had great reason to applaud the exertions of the officers of the Engineers under my orders.

Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne assisted me in the direction of the works on the left attack. Major Smith had before my arrival not only opened the battery against the convent, and commenced others on the right, but had made the most able arrangements for continuing the siege. To Major Ellicombe, Major of Brigade, I am in every way most particularly indebted for his judicious and indefatigable exertions.

The conduct of Captain Lewis has been equally marked by zeal, industry, and ability. He was employed as the senior officer of engineers with the storming corps, and Major-General Hay reports most highly of the assistance he rendered: he lost a limb while doing his utmost to promote the success of the operation.

General Hay speaks in strong terms of the gallantry and judgment manifested by Lieutenants Jones and Machell, the former of whom led the advance, and the latter conducted a party with various implements for removing obstructions, and was unfortunately killed during the operations of the day. Lieutenant Reid has been throughout the whole operation most conspicuously useful.

To the officers who have been employed as assistant engineers I am much indebted for their exertions, particularly to Major Thompson of the 74th Regiment and to Captain Blackistone of the Engineers of the East India Company's Service.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

R. FLETCHER.

II.

Lieut.-Col. Sir R. Fletcher to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

DEAR SIR, St. Bartolomé de la Calzada, 26th July, 1813.

As the works about which you communicated your ideas to me this day apply merely to a blockade, I think it right to mention that it seems highly important to preserve our trenches by the usual covering party. If they are left to themselves, the enemy will certainly fill them in at night; and I apprehend we shall never again acquire the same ground with so little loss, besides the time that would be occupied in working forward to the same extent. A covering party of 800 men in the trenches, with some support on the heights right and left of the convent, would perhaps quite as effectually continue the blockade as they would do in any other situation; and the preservation of our trenches is, as to the impression that would be given to the enemy by their being abandoned, as well as to their positive value to save men and time to ourselves, extremely important.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Your most faithful servant,

R. FLETCHER.

III.

Colonel Dickson to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

DEAR SIR, Pasages de la Calzada, 27th July, 1813.

With every exertion of all our artillerymen, bullocks, and an infantry working party of 700 men, we only succeeded in getting the whole of the guns out of the trenches by daylight. The artillerymen and bullocks are now resting, and another infantry party is employed in dragging the ordnance to the beach. A party has gone to the hill to bring down the two guns and two howitzers by hand, as our bullocks cannot work again for some hours.

I will let you know in the course of the afternoon our progress, and you may depend on every exertion to complete the work as quickly as possible.

I remain, dear Sir, truly yours,

A. DICKSON.

Count Nugent to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Prague, in Bohemia, 27th July, 1813.

Allow me to congratulate your Lordship upon your victory of Vitoria, and to express the pride and satisfaction of a countryman that it is you who have decided the fate of Europe. This action is acknowledged by every one to be the most glorious of the whole twenty years' war; and besides its importance relative to Spain, it is by far more so by its influence on the state of affairs here. The first account penetrated very rapidly through France. I brought the Gazette from Reichenbach, where it came with a courier just arrived from England. It was received with the greatest joy by the Emperor, who spoke of nothing else during the time I was at Brandeiss. He told me he would be happy to give you the command of the army if you could come here, and the Emperor of Russia said the same thing.

I had not before now an opportunity to write to your Lordship and inform you how I executed the orders you gave me. Though I regret not to

have been able to serve under you in this campaign, yet I must now perfectly agree with your Lordship as to the importance of my coming here. The account of the state of affairs in Spain and your plans, in short everything you desired me to say, had the greatest effect, and contributed very much to the decision of the Austrian government; and the battle of Vitoria, I think, finished the matter. Things are now so far advanced that I am authorized to inform your Lordship that there is no more doubt that hostilities will commence on the 16th of August. I send you this account by a person of confidence, straight through France, to whom I give only a few lines for your Lordship to inform you of the day, as it is important it should reach you as soon as possible.

The principal Austrian army is formed in Bohemia under Prince Schwarzenberg, and will be about 200,000 men by the middle of next month. It is to act in concert with the Russians and Prussians, with whom this government is in the most perfect harmony. 20,000 men on the Danube, and 30,000 in Styria, are to cover the Austrian dominions as much as possible against the forces which the enemy has in Italy and Bavaria, until the reserves can act, or a decisive blow is struck by the grand army. A small corps of 5000 men is to be put at my disposal to pass the Save, penetrate through Croatia, and endeavour to open the communication with the Adriatic, and unite with His Majesty's forces there. This body is to be in British pay. The Austrian forces in the south are inferior to the enemy, but it was necessary to collect as great an army as possible on the decisive point, which is certainly here. To occupy part of the enemy's forces in Italy, this government has requested that Lord William Bentinck should create a diversion. I know that formerly your Lordship was not for this measure. It influences, however, materially the conduct of Austria by diminishing the apprehensions for the south of the empire and the capital; and to throw the Austrian power into the balance is a most important object.

I set off this day for Croatia, and shall continue to inform your Lordship of the further proceedings in those parts.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful humble servant,

NUGENT.

I request you will have the goodness to forward immediately the enclosed.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Count Nugent to Colonel Bunbury.

MY DEAR SIR, Prague, 27th July, 1 13.

I could not have for this long time past the pleasure of writing to you because I had not the cypher with me which Mr. Penn had given me, and I did not think it advisable to write in plain. Circumstances are now altered. I hope the whole power of Austria will soon be in action for the common cause. All my endeavours since I have been here were to contribute to bring about this important event. One of the principal means I employed was the prospect of support in the south by an expedition of Lord William's. Whatever difficulties this may have, it was of such importance to throw the power of

Austria into the scale that I did not hesitate. I wrote to Lord William upon the subject, and informed him that hostilities would probably commence the 16th, and likewise to Admiral Freemantle. 5000 men are to be at my disposal to open the communication, in the expectation that I shall be joined by the forces in the Adriatic. Small as they are, they will be of importance by the diversion they will create.

I was so taken up with all this, and in such continual motion, that I could not wait for the arrangement of my own affairs, nor receive answers from England. But as Lord W. Bentinck appointed me and gave me the commission for the levy, I made use of it, as it was necessary here. I request you will arrange that in the best manner, not so much for myself as for the benefit of the service, and to make me most useful. It seems Lord W.'s commission will give me local rank, which will be absolutely necessary. I shall set off to-day for Vienna, and shall then go to Croatia, where I shall commence. I hope soon to open my way to Lord William, and to bring him cavalry, which he wants. Now is the time to send out to him all the Italians you can. The 1st and 2nd Regiments will of course join him.

I hope for the future I shall be able constantly to communicate with you, and am, my dear Sir,

Most truly yours,

NUGENT.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 27th July, 1813.

You will see by the enclosed the state of affairs in the North. They are certainly much more promising than they were a fortnight after the signature of the Armistice. At that period our accounts were by no means such as to lead us to expect the co-operation of Austria, or even the perseverance of Russia and Prussia. I think that the interview of the Crown Prince with the Sovereigns of the two last powers will confirm their resolutions. It is clearly his interest that the war should continue. He has lost character by the fall of Hamburg, and he knows Buonaparte will not forgive him. As for Austria, I cannot have much confidence in her. But it will be a grand crash if they all fight.

As upon the issue of this contest so much depends, I would give much to have you in the command for *a month* after the termination of the Armistice; but I believe you judge right both for the country and for yourself in wishing to remain where you are.

I take this opportunity also of enclosing an extract of Lord Castlereagh's despatch, which is an answer to an old application from Russia for us to make a diversion on the frontiers of Spain, to which, until the victory at Vitoria, it was rather premature to reply.

To Austria a diversion in Italy would be, I imagine, more desirable. Murat may effect this, but I am much afraid that Lord William would arrive much too late to be of service; for it is not the policy or the practice of Buonaparte to forbear pushing on with every possible despatch, and he will either fail in his attack upon Vienna or succeed before Lord William can arrive.

If it be true that the Viceroy has raised 60,000 men in Italy in so short

a time, it shows the vast resources of Italy, and the importance of depriving France of them; but I am afraid it at the same time must make us apprehend that there is no great indisposition to Buonaparte in a country where so large a force has been so readily furnished. I am much inclined to think the statement greatly exaggerated.

I am ever, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Extract of a Despatch from Viscount Castlereagh to Viscount Cathcart, dated 5th July, 1813.

"In the first place, your Lordship will inform the Emperor that, in conformity to the wish some time since expressed by His Imperial Majesty to that effect, it is the intention of the British government (in the event of the enemy being expelled from Spain) actively to employ the Allied armies on that side of France in such manner as may best serve to occupy the attention and military resources of the enemy, and thereby to favour the exertions of the Allies in the other parts of Europe."

II.

Heads of Intelligence contained in the Despatches and Letters received the 25th of July from Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart.

1. In a private letter, dated Berlin, July 2nd, Sir Charles Stewart describes the fortress of Spandau. General Bülow is at Berlin, having under his command 15,000 regulars, and above 20,000 of the landsturm. The public spirit higher than ever. An intrenched camp is formed at Charlottenburg. The arms and supplies from England have arrived at Colberg.

The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia are to meet the Prince Royal at Trachenberg on the 9th. In addition to the corps already placed under the orders of the latter, the Emperor now gives him Winzingerode's corps.

2. *In ditto, from ditto, dated Stralsund, 11th July.*

"I have just received a letter from Berlin of the 7th, which states that Bubna and Metternich left Dresden on Saturday the 3rd, their proposals being refused, and it was not doubted that Austria would join the Allies. It was reported that Buonaparte would enter Bohemia before the expiration of the Armistice."

3. *A private Letter from Lord Cathcart, dated Reichenbach, 6th July.*

Count Metternich is returned from Dresden. "I have, upon the whole, every reason to believe that Count Metternich has returned with good information in regard to Buonaparte's intentions and state of preparation, and with a conviction that war cannot be avoided."

Metternich's audiences with Buonaparte were *very* long: one lasted eight or nine hours. Buonaparte's temper changed very often, and he was in several violent passions. He said he knew Austria could not go to war, and that he would not forget her having proposed humiliating conditions. That he would be in Vienna early in September. That Austria was a fat country, and his army should pass the winter in it. That the Russian and Prussian troops

were very fine, and fought well, but that they had no head, and he would always beat them, and that Austria should never forget the visit he would now make.

III.

Précis of a secret Despatch from Lord Cathcart, dated Reichenbach, 6th July.

Immediately on the Emperor Alexander's return from Bohemia Count Metternich went to the French head-quarters at Dresden, where he stayed some days, and, returning, made his report to the Emperor Francis at Gitschin, and then came on the 3rd to the frontier, where he was met by Counts Nesselrode, Stadion, and Hardenberg. Since Metternich's return the Hungarian insurrection has been called out, and superior officers of engineers have been sent to mark positions. The army in Bohemia is completed to 100,000 men in the highest order; its head-quarters at Brandeiss. Another army is assembling to cover Vienna. The French reinforcements will be up by the 20th. An army is forming at Wurtzburg, to which 30,000 Bavarians will be united. "Negotiations will go on through Austria in the manner proposed. Not that I have any reason to suppose that Buonaparte will accede to any one sacrifice proposed to him, or that he is not highly offended at the conduct of Austria; but I am convinced he wishes the Armistice not to be interrupted until he is prepared. Russia and Prussia will send persons accredited to the Emperor Francis with special instructions, but with no full powers to treat with France. Everything seems to promise that Austria will persist in her demands, such as they are, and that all of them will be refused."

If the concert now prepared should ripen into action, the Austrian, Russian, Prussian, and Swedish forces will exceed 600,000 men.

"If, unfortunately, Austria should not persevere, still the Allies will go on, and their dispositions will be framed accordingly."

The cause has sustained a great loss in the death of General Scharnhorst, to whose measures Prussia owes her present power. Nothing can exceed the national spirit, but all his plans for calling that spirit into action have succeeded. The great losses suffered in the late battles are completely replaced by the reserves, and these are recruiting as fast. The militia exceeds all expectation.

"I am fully authorised to make these renewed declarations of perseverance and of expected force."

"I am to accompany the Emperor to meet the Prince Royal of Sweden at Trachenberg, and by the request of the Emperor Francis, Count Stadion will also be there."

IV.

Précis of a secret Despatch from Lord Cathcart, dated Reichenbach, 8th July.

"This morning Baron Anstedt came from the Emperor to show me all the documents to which Count Metternich's residence at Dresden has given rise."

Nos. 1 and 2 are preliminary notes between the Count and the Duc de Bassano.

No. 3 is a despatch from the Duc de Bassano to Count Metternich, covering a projet of convention. That a Congress should assemble at Prague or Vienna, to which England, the King of Spain, the Regency at Cadiz, and all the powers engaged in the war might send plenipotentiaries; and the negotiations might continue like those of Munster, &c. &c., although any of the powers should put an end to the Armistice. This despatch very artfully

drawn up, to establish a separation of interests between Austria and the Allies, and to declare that Austria did not interfere "comme arbitre, mais comme médiatrice armée et parfaitement désintéressée." Count Metternich rejected this projet, upon which the Duc de Bassano desired to recall it; but Count Metternich refused to return it, declaring his intention eventually to print it.

No. 4. A note from Count Metternich, reciting that Russia and Prussia have accepted the mediation of Austria, and are ready to submit to arbitration: he desires to know if Buonaparte is ready to do the same.

No. 5 is a report from Prince Schwarzenberg to the Emperor Francis, dated 28th June. Sets forth the expediency of prolonging the period of negotiation from the 20th July to the 10th August, because the vast and unexpected preparations of France render necessary an increased armament on the part of Austria. Every regiment, the Austrian landwehr and the Hungarian insurrection, must be called into activity. The distant regiments on the south-east frontier could not reach Znaim and Presburg before the 14th August. Besides the great force in Bavaria, 66,000 men under the Viceroy of Italy have passed the Tagliamento. Reserves are formed at Wurtzburg and Fulda. These measures directly menace Vienna and Gratz, and it is necessary to assemble forces to cover them. It is for the interest of the Allies that these defensive measures should be carried into effect without detaching from the Bohemian army. Sufficient carriages cannot be procured within a specified time to supply the provisions which Prussia desired to receive from Bohemia; and that as the extension of the French upon the Elbe would make it expedient that part of the Allied army should move into Bohemia, it was very desirable that there should be time to prepare the means of supplying these troops. In the mean time the Allies may be supplied from Gallicia.

No. 6. A Convention signed on the 30th June by Metternich and Bassano.

Art. 1. Austria offers her mediation.

Art. 2. France accepts the mediation offered.

Art. 3. Plenipotentiaries of France and Austria, and also of Russia and Prussia, to assemble at Prague on or before the 5th July.

Art. 4. The period limited for negotiation, viz., to the 20th July, being too short, the Emperor and King agrees to extend the same to the 10th August, and the Emperor of Austria reserves to himself to endeavour to obtain the accession of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia to this prolongation.

No. 7. A Cabinet Despatch of the 3rd July. The Emperor Francis ratifies the Convention, agreeing to prolong the "terme obligatoire de négociation" to the 10th August.

The anxiety for Gratz is not less than for Vienna, as it is the key to most of the military resources.

It is asserted that all the troops on their march from France will have arrived by the 20th July. Of this there is no clear evidence.

Austria has allowed both the Allies and the French to draw supplies and forage from Bohemia. This indulgence is now likely to be withheld, but the Allies will still procure supplies from Moravia and Gallicia.

No answer has been given by Russia as to prolonging the Armistice. This question will be considered at Trachenberg.

Envoys extraordinary from Russia and Prussia will be accredited to the Emperor Francis. They will be positively instructed not to enter into any direct communication whatever with the French negotiator.

Lord Cathcart encloses a calculation of the numbers of the Allied armies :—

In Silesia	Russians	80,000	150,000
	Prussians	40,000	
	Ditto Landwehr	30,000	
In Pomerania under the Prince Royal.	Swedes	25,000	85,000
	Bülow	25,000	
	Walmoden	11,000	
	Woronzow	4,000	
	Tauenzein	6,000	
	German Legion	6,000	
	Winzingerode	8,000	
Russian Reserves			104,000
Prussian ditto			90,000
Austrian Armies			150,000
Ditto Reserves			100,000

V.

Heads of Secret Information from the French Lines.

Augereau has six divisions, including cavalry. The 1st and 2nd marched from Frankfort upon Wurtzburg on the 26th June. They might arrive on the Egra about the 13th July.

In this army are the 6th, 9th, and 10th regiments of French, and 1st of Italian Light Infantry; the 18th, 39th, 40th, 63rd, 95th, 96th, 100th, and 103rd of the Line, French, and 4th Italian regiment. Most of these come from Spain, and are supposed to be completed. They are rated at 40,000 men. The Generals of Division are Friant, Boyer, Sahuc, Milhaud, Pernetti, and Dodé. They have 140 pieces of cannon.

The camp at Bautzen contains 25,000 or 30,000 men. They have suffered much from want of bread and of pay. There has been a great desertion, and great numbers are in hospital.

In a despatch from Sir Charles Stewart, dated Stralsund, July 10th, he states that General Adlercreutz had just received a letter from the Prince Royal, dated Landsperg the 8th. His Royal Highness says there were the best possible hopes of Austria, and that the Emperors Alexander and Francis had had a secret meeting. The latter went to a large stud in Bohemia, and the Russian Emperor met him as a traveller. That the conference was most satisfactory. That the French have suddenly moved 30,000 men with a large train of artillery from Lusatia to Pyrna, on the Bohemian frontier. That the French were making the greatest exertions in fortifying the new town at Dresden. The Prince Royal directs General Adlercreutz to hasten the works at Stralsund, and to prepare 15 days' provisions for the troops to march at the shortest notice.

VI.

Count de Lieven to Viscount Castlereagh.

MYLORD, Londres, ce 3 [15] Mai, 1813.

Je m'empresse de m'acquitter auprès de V.E. des ordres qui m'ont été transmis par ma Cour.

L'Empereur est instruit des différentes parts que la France a déjà retiré une partie de ses forces de l'Espagne, et qu'elle se dispose à placer le reste sur l'Ebre, dans la vue de pouvoir plus facilement disposer de ses troupes pour les employer en Allemagne ; aussi est il certain qu'il en est déjà arrivée en nombre considérable en France pour cette destination. Dans cet état de choses il im-

porte à S.M. Impériale de connaître des à présent quelles sont les résolutions que votre gouvernement, Milord, a prises relativement à la guerre en Espagne, et l'Empereur, confiant dans l'abandon que le gouvernement Britannique ne cesse de lui témoigner, et convaincu surtout de l'unité d'intérêts qui lie les deux puissances, ne croit pas se tromper en attendant de ce double motif des notions positives sur la marche que le gouvernement Britannique est intentionné de suivre lorsque les Français auront été chassés au delà des Pyrénées. Si alors les relations intimes qui existent entre l'Angleterre et la Russie, lorsque toutes les deux combattent le même ennemi, n'engageront pas la première à porter la guerre au delà des limites de l'Espagne, et à chercher à pénétrer en France.

Vous reconnaîtrez, Milord, dans cette démarche combien l'Empereur s'occupe à prévoir les différentes opérations que la guerre actuelle peut nécessiter, et combien il lui tient à cœur que ses efforts dans le Nord soyent secondé par une marche ferme et active dans le Midi. S.M. Impériale est persuadée que l'Angleterre sera prête à lui confier ses vues et ses déterminations à ce sujet, tant comme elle pense que ce n'est qu'avec cette confiance et cette cordialité que l'on pourra assurer pendant la durée de cette guerre une heureuse combinaison dans les opérations militaires et des résultats qui répondent à la grandeur du but commun.

J'ose solliciter V.E. de me mettre ou plutôt à même de transmettre à ma Cour des notions qu'elle attend avec la plus vive impatience, et je vous prie d'agréer, Milord, les assurances, etc.,

LE COMTE DE LIEVEN.

Colonel Rooke to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Lanz, 28th July, 1813, 4 A.M.

Sir R. Hill desires me to acquaint you that he has just received a verbal report from Colonel Douglas (8th Portuguese) at Olague, stating that the enemy were in very considerable force, cavalry and infantry, within a league of him, having yesterday evening turned off the Roncesvalles road in that direction.

This is the substance of his report. Vague, however, as it is, he thinks it right to acquaint you with it, observing at the same time that General Long's cavalry piquet there has sent no such information, having, on the contrary, patrolled yesterday to Ostiz, and reported that the enemy were not in force in that direction.

None of our troops could get farther last night than Velate, it having been impossible for the guns to get on in the dark. They were to move again at daybreak, and Sir Rowland will do what he can to get them on to Lizaso, but the animals of the Portuguese guns are much knocked up.

When we left Almandoz yesterday the enemy had taken up their position for the night just in front of Elizondo.

Colonel Ashworth's brigade forms the rear guard, and has orders to hold the pass of Almandoz this morning as long as it can be done without risk.

I remain, my dear General,

Yours very faithfully,

W. ROOKE.

The enemy showed at least 10,000 or 12,000 men in the valley of Baztan yesterday.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 28th July, 1813, 9 A.M.

I enclose a note from Sir G. Collier, which should have been sent yesterday, but it had been carried by mistake to Colonel Bouverie's quarters without his knowing of it. I mentioned the circumstance yesterday when I wrote to Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

I have been forward this morning at Irun, where everything is quiet, except that the French fire from four different batteries at the Spaniards, who began last night a battery in front of the ruined castle on the prolongation of the height where your Lordship stood for some time in front of Irun.

General Giron has sent the brigade from Fuenterrabia to his right, leaving General Mendizabal only there, and requesting me to send some troops on the Gaizquibel mountain.

Having only the 1st division forward, I can ill spare this detachment to the left, but it shall be watched. I enclose your Lordship a copy of Colonel Dickson's last report, and a letter of Sir G. Collier's with my answer. I am sorry to find that an officer and some men of the 38th were made prisoners in the trenches yesterday morning. As it was a complete surprise at *six* in the morning, I have directed General Oswald to make a strict inquiry into all the circumstances of such disgraceful neglect, and as soon as I hear from him, I shall lay the result before your Lordship for your consideration. Had there been a man looking out, the thing could not have happened.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Commodore Sir G. R. Collier to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

MY DEAR SIR, At Colonel Frazer's Quarters, 27th July, 1813, 2 P.M.

I think best to submit the following questions for your decision :—

1. Are the ordnance and artillery transports to be got out of the harbour as soon as they are filled or complete?

2. Where shall they be sent?

3. Are the ordnance and ammunition vessels which may be at Santander to be sent up to Pasages or Bilbao?

4. When are the remaining victuallers to be ordered out?

It is to be observed that the victuallers are ordered now out of harbour, but that in general they can only be got out with a fair wind.

I am anxious to see Colonel Gibbs, as I am told he is charged with despatches, in which case the *Fancy* will convey him to England. I have not seen him.

Neither Colonel Dickson nor Frazer can decide upon the above queries.

Your things are with Commissary Young.

I hope for an answer as soon as possible.

I fear Mr. Digby Marsh, who was wounded in the battery, may lose his arm. Captain Taylor is doing well.

I hope we shall soon see you again. In the mean time,

I remain very truly and sincerely yours,

G. R. COLLIER.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Commodore Sir G. R. Collier.

MY DEAR SIR, Oyarzun, 27th July, 1813.

I have just received yours of 2 P.M. of this day; and though I have received no orders from Lord Wellington on the subject of your questions, I shall answer them meanwhile to the best of my judgment.

1. The difficulty of ships getting out of Pasages harbour seems to determine the first question in favour of the ordnance transports going out as soon as they are filled.

2. For the present, perhaps Guetaria roads would be the best place, if considered sufficiently safe anchorage at this season.

3. Till further instructions from head-quarters, the ordnance transports that may be at Santander should not come farther than Bilbao.

4. I understood from Mr. Young, the Commissary-General, to-day that there remained in the harbour only one large victualler; but as Sir Robert Kennedy, Commissary-in-Chief, has given directions on that head, I shall leave it to Mr. Young, who is still here, to communicate with you.

I am very truly yours,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

III.

Colonel Dickson to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

DEAR SIR, Pasages de la Calzada, 27th July, 1813, 5 P.M.

The greatest part of our ordnance and stores are at the wharf; but we have been able to embark but little, as all the boats have been employed in taking off the sick and wounded.

There is only a certain number of hours in each tide that guns or stores can be embarked; the tide is now falling fast, and we can do nothing more until between two and three in the morning, except in drawing everything close to the wharf; in the mean time, with that and the afternoon tide to-morrow, I trust we shall get the best part of our things on board, provided a sufficient number of boats are furnished, and Captain Bloye, of the *Lyra*, who is charged to assist in the embarkation, will use every exertion to that effect. All the ordnance we had boats for this afternoon were one 24-pounder (*Surveillante*), three 68-pounder carronades, and two howitzers. The remainder of the frigate guns will be embarked the first thing in the morning, as soon as boats proper for them arrive.

I remain, dear Sir, truly yours,

A. DICKSON.

The Quartermaster-General to Colonel Arentschildt.

Heights above Villaba, 28th July, 1813, ½ past 11 A.M.

The 1st Hussars to remain at Lizaso.

Colonel Arentschildt to keep a good look out towards the valley in which Lanz, Ostiz, &c., are situated, to get information whether the enemy move any troops from the valley of Baztan by Lanz, or from San Estevan by Doña Maria.

A letter party to be established at Irurzun.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, Lizaso, 28th July, 1813, ½ past 1.

Your order to retire to Lizaso did not reach me till seven o'clock last night. I moved all night, but could not reach this till twelve to-day. Barnes, with his four battalions, will be here in half an hour hence.

I am cooking, and shall move again at five with that part of my division that first came up, but I hope to take the others also. Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, of the Artillery, has requested to move with me, and I shall take charge of him. I do not expect to reach Ollocarizqueta to-night, but shall be there very soon after daylight.

Sir R. Hill has this instant been with me, and desires me to say that the head of his column is just closed up to me, that Barnes joins my division, and that he will himself report to you this evening.

I have left a battalion of Caçadores on the summit of the hill, and looking down to the two passes of Doña Maria. I have a report from him that at five this morning no enemy had been heard of near St. Estevan.

Shall that battalion remain there?

Yours most truly,

DALHOUSIE.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

Near Orcayn, 28th July, 1813, 3 P.M.

If Sir Rowland Hill has received no other orders from Lord Wellington, he will be so good as move on the head of his infantry with as little delay as possible, directing it by the route the 6th division marched by this morning towards Orcayn, sending a report of his progress.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Stapleton Cotton.

Heights above Villaba, 28th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

Sir Stapleton Cotton is apprised that it is intended to make use of Brigadier-General D'Urban's brigade of cavalry at daylight to-morrow morning to assist in conveying the wounded from the vicinity of the field of battle to Berrioplano. Sir Stapleton will be so good therefore as place this brigade this afternoon in such a situation near Huarté as that it can proceed with facility to-morrow morning to execute the above service.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Lizaso, 28th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

The night was so extremely bad and dark, and the roads so bad, that I have been unable this day to get farther than Lizaso. Unless I receive

other orders from you, I shall at dawn of day move to Ollocarizqueta. Our rear guard has reached this without seeing the enemy, but Colonel Ashworth informs me he was told by a respectable person flying from the French that the head of their column entered Almandoz about ten this morning. She understood the whole force they had in the valley of Baztan to be moving that way. The 7th division move off from hence at five o'clock this morning. I am sorry to say that the Horse Artillery left a howitzer, which Colonel Ross was obliged to bury, having been so broken that he could not repair it. One of the Portuguese 9-pounders also fell over the cliff, and was entirely destroyed; and Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh was obliged to destroy and throw over the cliff four of his waggons, from its being impossible to get them on.

Yours faithfully,

R. HILL.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, Heights above Villaba, 28th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

The enemy has been repulsed in all his attempts here.

It is necessary to take effectual precautions against any attempt the enemy might make to move a corps upon Irurzun. This attempt he might make with troops that may have followed your march upon Lanz, or such as may have followed Lord Dalhousie by Doña Maria.

It is Lord Wellington's desire that you will give directions therefore to Lord Dalhousie to continue with all the 7th division near Lizaso, that he may be prepared to oppose any attempt of the above tendency.

The 14th Light Dragoons and the 1st Hussars should both be left in the same neighbourhood, and every precaution taken to have early information of the enemy's motions and force, and to communicate the same to you and to head-quarters by Berrioplano also.

It might become necessary to make a movement from your left to support the 7th division, and therefore an officer should be employed to reconnoitre the country, with a view to such a movement; and though the head of your column is brought far enough on to be at hand to support the left of the troops here (the 6th division), the rear of the column should not be farther this way than the village of Marcalain.

Lord Wellington will be found on the heights of the position or at Villaba.

The baggage of head-quarters is at Berrioplano.

The sick and wounded are sent to Irurzun.

Faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, Villaba, 28th July, 1813, 10 P.M.

I wrote to you at four this afternoon about leaving the 7th division at Lizaso to oppose any attempt of the enemy to move upon Irurzun, sup-

posing the 7th division would arrive later than you at Lizaso. If, however, the 7th division is so placed as to arrive to support the left of our position here before you, Lord Wellington desires the 7th division may come on, and that you will be so good as remain in observation near Lizaso.

I beg you will report how this is arranged.

It appears that Lord Dalhousie left a Caçadore battalion in the passes of Doña Maria, acting on the instruction to observe these passes. Steps should be taken to secure the retreat of this battalion upon Lizaso, or if necessary into the Tolosa road.

I beg an officer may be sent to it with instructions.

Faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Wimbledon, 28th July, 1813.

Being aware that the Secretaries of State have occasionally received from you and from Sir Charles Stuart representations on the supposed inadequacy of the naval force on the coast of Portugal and the north coast of Spain, I think it best in a case of that description, without entering further into formal official statements and rejoinders, to put you confidentially in possession of the whole case; and though it embraces matters foreign to your more immediate concerns, you must permit me to treat you as unreservedly and with the same reliance on your discretion as I have been heretofore accustomed to do. I am quite content to be abused in Parliament or the newspapers for events over which I never had and never could have any control; and with the exception of yourself, to whom I feel that some explanation is due, I have no inclination to divert from my own person any share of the clamour which is very easily excited against any department under circumstances where their means must, even to their own knowledge, be comparatively inadequate, though the public interest requires that such inadequacy should neither be avowed nor perhaps immediately remedied. Having thus explained to you my motives for troubling you on this subject, I shall not attempt any further apology for the length to which this letter may possibly reach.

It is fit, in the first place, that you should know that when I came to the Board of Admiralty, though the number of line-of-battle ships was nearly the same, the number of frigates and smaller vessels was nearly *ninety* fewer than it had been three years before.

Since that time the American war has come upon us; and when I state that within the course of a few months after we were apprised of it our force on that station was augmented in the number of men (a mode of computation which you will readily comprehend) from 8000 to 17,000, I leave you to judge whether it was possible, without resorting to means to which I shall advert presently, to produce that particular increase without drawing it from other quarters. But that was not all: instead of sending our West India and Quebec and Halifax convoys, and also our East India fleets, from

St. Helena with single frigates, we have employed on those services a considerable number of line-of-battle ships and additional frigates and sloops; and when I state this increase, over and above what was sent to the American station, at 5000 men, I know positively that I am below the mark. Again, we have been compelled to make the following additions: to Lord Keith and Sir E. Pellew, in consequence of the augmentation of the enemy's force, 3000 men; to the Lakes in Canada 400, and now again 300 more, our prime seamen; and to a general increase of the complement of all our large frigates 1500; making for all those extra demands, during the short time that I have been at the Admiralty, not less than 19,000 men. Against those augmentations we can only set the diminution of our North Sea fleet from 24 to 12 sail of the line (equal to 7000 men), and which we have accomplished partly by employing Russian ships and partly by trusting to the war in Germany compelling Buonaparte to withdraw from Antwerp a large portion of the crews of his ships for military service in his armies. You will be somewhat surprised to learn that our force in the Baltic is very little less than if we had continued at war with Russia and Sweden; and without entering into further details on that point, I shall only state that this is a sore subject at the Admiralty, because it is very much unconnected with naval or commercial reasons, and proceeds chiefly on grounds of Continental policy as between Sweden and her neighbours. I do not mean you, however, to suppose that this is a measure in which we do not fully concur; on the contrary, I think it essentially necessary, and I only wish we could spare some more ships for that service, even if they should be taken from the coasts of Portugal or Spain.

Having thus given you the general outline of the difficulties which I have had to meet, I will frankly avow to you that, according to our views of the service, neither Lord Keith, nor Sir Edward Pellew, nor Sir John Warren are by any means adequately provided in frigates and smaller vessels for the objects to which their attention is necessarily directed; but I cannot admit the same proposition in regard to Admiral Martin on the Lisbon station, who has always been amply provided.

By a considerable exertion in building with great rapidity, and perhaps with less durability, a number of fir frigates and of sloops, we are now well provided in ships, and we have a great many ready to be sent to sea if we could procure men for them; but exclusive of the increased complement of the crews of large frigates, I have not been able during the last six months to increase the general total of vessels employed by more than twenty; so that we are still seventy short of what were in commission in 1809.

You will naturally ask, Why don't you raise more men? To which I reply, that nothing short of a strong legislative measure would produce them within the period in which they are most essentially required, though they may possibly be got slowly and gradually. I have no difficulty moreover in stating that any such levy would probably interfere materially with the recruiting of the army, and in the present circumstances of the country and the nature of the war I had much rather have to encounter ten times the abuse for want of naval exertion than the evil of really cramping our military exertions. I must scramble on as well as I can with the means in my power, and resort to those extreme measures only when they are manifestly unavoidable. The employment of a body of troops to destroy the

shipping in some of the enemy's ports in France or America would at once liberate a large portion of our naval force and diminish greatly the public expenditure; but would *you* think that we were acting wisely, even in making those diversions, unless we could secure at the same time, without the possibility of failure (which I apprehend cannot be done), the means of maintaining to the fullest extent our military superiority on the Peninsula?

I have gone far enough into general topics as relating to the distribution and extent of our naval force: it may be a question at the close of the year for the government, and not merely for the Admiralty, to consider whether we must not endeavour to limit the scale and extent of our naval operations; but we cannot change our system *now*, during the present campaign in Europe or even in America. I shall only farther advert, therefore, to the details of the squadrons in which you are more immediately interested, and I enclose for your information a statement of their force, according to the last returns.

Independently of the necessarily limited number of frigates and smaller vessels under Lord Keith, from the causes to which I have adverted, it happened unfortunately, but of course unavoidably, that at the period of your approach to the north coast of Spain an unusual number of his cruisers were in port refitting: this is a contingency to which all naval operations are subject, and against which it is utterly impossible to provide. You will perceive, however, from the additions recently made, that though he had before enough to maintain his superiority on all points of the coast, he has amply sufficient for *every* purpose that your operations can require. Sir George Collier has requested also a few gun-boats; a species of force which is sometimes employed in the mouths of rivers where larger vessels cannot penetrate, but which we never should have dreamt of sending to *his* station: they are ready, however, and only wait a fair wind to proceed.

With regard to the Lisbon station, it is necessary that you should be apprised of some circumstances which can scarcely have come to your knowledge. When Admiral Berkeley commanded there, the limits of his station extended from the 43rd to the 32nd degrees of north latitude, and as far west as 30° degrees; but as his cruisers were sometimes found pursuing slave-ships near Sierra Leone, instead of looking for French privateers on the coast of Portugal, and as the American war rendered it probable that the Western Islands would be a favourite cruising-ground in search of prizes, Admiral Martin was limited to the 43rd and 30th degrees of latitude and 15 degrees of west longitude. He was expressly and repeatedly cautioned by myself and by other members of the Board as to the indispensable necessity of confining himself to the protection of the coast, and a separate squadron of two sail of the line and several frigates and sloops was appropriated to the neighbourhood of the Western Islands and Madeira, but which I have *not* included in my enumeration of additions to our foreign stations in consequence of the American war: in fact, therefore, they are an increase to the Lisbon squadron. Soon after Admiral Martin went to Lisbon, we found that several of his most efficient cruisers were detached to the Western Islands and off Bordeaux and other places at a great distance from the limits of his station, and this at a time when, *with his knowledge*, you were complaining of his want of adequate force. The continuance of this practice, of course, was not to be tolerated, and we required

copies of the orders under which those vessels acted and of their logs: the result was, the superseding, without further trial, the captain of one small frigate, who was busy off Bordeaux in search of American prizes, and the ordering to England two others (one of them Captain Gordon, of the *Magicienne*, brother to Lord Aberdeen), to answer for their deviations from their *written* orders, with the details of which I need not trouble you. Captain Gordon admits the fact; but as in his public letter, addressed to Admiral Martin, he more than insinuates that he had the Admiral's verbal sanction for what he did, which the Admiral in his reply does not deny, the latter has been called upon for further explanation on this most serious and extraordinary circumstance, and in the mean time further proceedings against the Captains are suspended. Exclusive of the force appropriated to Gibraltar, and from thence to Cape St. Vincent, I believe it will be found that Admiral Martin had never less than twelve vessels applicable to the sole object of protecting the coast from Cape St. Vincent to Cape Finisterre, which is more in proportion to the object than any other British Admiral in any quarter of the globe. I have no doubt that his cruisers have required more repairs than if they had not been tearing themselves to pieces in long and distant excursions; and this appears decidedly in the case of the *Magicienne*, a new frigate, which is now obliged to be docked, though launched only about eight or nine months ago.

There is only one other point to which I feel it necessary to advert. You have occasionally complained that the coast is unprotected, and the safety of your naval communications endangered, because privateers have been seen and have made some captures of vessels sailing, in defiance of law and repeated injunctions to the contrary, without convoy. On that subject I shall only state that during nearly twenty years of war no Board of Admiralty has been able to guard the coasts of *England* from annoyance of that description, and from captures much more numerous in proportion to the extent of trade than have ever taken place on the coast of Portugal. Ten times the amount of Admiral Martin's force could not give that entire protection against an active and enterprising enemy, such as we have now to deal with in the case of the American privateers. All we hope to attain is, to make it very hazardous for an enemy to appear there; but certainty of capturing him is out of the question with any force which could be employed.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord,

Yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Disposition of His Majesty's Ships on the Lisbon Station, under Vice-Admiral Martin.

Stately, Tagus, 10th July, 1813.

One 64, one troop-ship—In the Tagus.

One frigate—At Gibraltar, refitting.

Two 20-gun frigates—Cruising to the westward.

One 20-gun frigate, two sloops, two gun-brigs—Cruising between Cape Coneledo and Cape St. Vincent, and Cadiz.

One frigate, two sloops—To Corunna with several convoys.
One gun-brig—To Figueira, for convoy bound to Santander.
Two sloops, one gun-brig—At Gibraltar, on the service of that part of the station.
One sloop—With convoy to Madeira.
One sloop—With Newfoundland trade to longitude 15 degrees west.
One cutter—To join.
Total—One 64, five frigates, eight sloops, five gun-brigs.

II.

Disposition of the Channel Fleet, under Admiral Lord Keith.

Admiralty Office, 25th July, 1813.

Two first-rates, five 74, one frigate—Off Brest.
Five 74, one sloop, one gun-brig—To watch the enemy in the Charente and Aix Roads.
One frigate, one sloop—Off Bordeaux.
One frigate—Off Belleisle.
One frigate, three sloops, one gun-brig—North coast of Spain.

Additional.

One cutter, one hired cutter—Sailed for north coast of Spain.
One cutter—Ordered to proceed.
One cutter, one hired cutter—Supposed to be now at Santander.
One cutter—Just returned from Sebastian with despatches, and will rejoin.
One 20-gun frigate—Sailed for Santander with money, and may be appropriated to the services of that station.
Total—Two first-rates, eleven 74, nine frigates, six sloops, five gun-brigs, three hired cutters.
Additional—One frigate, two gun-brigs, one hired cutter.
In port—One 74, four frigates (one of which appropriated to the services of the north coast of Spain), one sloop.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, War Department, 29th July, 1813.

I understand that you have had some correspondence with Mr. Marcus Crosbie on the subject of shoes of his invention, having false soles, for the purpose of conveying written intelligence in a secret and unsuspected manner. I avail myself of Major Fremantle's return to send your Lordship a box of these shoes, which Mr. Crosbie has desired may be forwarded. The key is enclosed herewith.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully yours,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Col. Sir R. Fletcher to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 29th July, 1813.

Major Smith has informed me of your Lordship's opinion that, whenever the siege of St. Sebastian shall be continued, the original plan ordered should be carried on upon a more extended scale, by laying open both towers and the low bastion on the left, and connecting the present

breach with the rampart. For this purpose I conceive it will be necessary to again make up the number of 24-pounders to at least twenty on the right attack; and to still further ensure the success of the assault it would, I think, seem desirable that the low flank (stained yellow in the sketch) should, if possible, be counter-battered from the opposite side of the river. It would also seem important to batter that part of the curtain of the main land front which crosses the gorge of the left bastion, and which I believe could easily be effected by seven 24 and six 18-pounders placed on the height on which the French had an intrenchment on their left of the convent. These guns might also lay open the parapet of the face of the left demi-bastion, take in reverse the left branch, and assist in the destruction of the left bastion, as well as of that of the palisades in the covert way.

If the above objects were effected, we could rather improve the access to the breaches by striking out by the approaches (stained yellow in the sketch), and from thence obtaining further cover by a direct sap, as far as the nature of the breach and the tides would admit of. The troops from this point would be covered on their left flank by the retaining wall of the glacis coupé, in their advance to storm the low bastion and the breaches connected with it.

Though Major-General Hay states that in the late attack the right wing of the Royals arrived at the foot of the main breach in perfect order, yet the more extensive openings proposed, and the additional precautions which could then be taken, ought, I conceive, to render success more certain. Should this be considered to be the best mode of attack that could be adopted, it would certainly save much time and labour, compared with a regular siege of the very powerful defences crossing the isthmus. It might be carried on by one more of the equipments from England in addition to the 18-pounders, and could be effected in about a week if the trenches in the isthmus remain open, and in fifteen or sixteen days should they be filled in by the enemy. The ammunition with one equipment of fourteen 24-pounders was not sufficient to effect the whole of the above objects, as I am told only about 1500 round shot remained at the time of the assault.

Towards the isthmus the works of St. Sebastian are very formidable, from having a double enceinte, and being strongly supported by the castle; and their attack would be attended with peculiar difficulties, as many of the faces cannot be enfiladed, and therefore can only be battered in front to ruin their defences. To effect a lodgment in the horn-work on an extended front, it would be necessary to breach the faces of both demi-bastions, and at least one face of the ravelin, from the crest of the glacis, and to counter-batter the flanks. There would then remain to open the main front, to batter its flanks, and to ruin the defences, which would be a work of great difficulty; and the whole could not be effected but by a numerous battering-train, nor probably in less time, admitting that the garrison made an obstinate defence, than from thirty to thirty-five days.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

RICHARD FLETCHER.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

Heights near Villaba, 29th July, 1813, ½ past 6 A.M.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND,

Your report of the enemy moving on Lizaso has been received. The 7th division (now near this) has been ordered back to your support.

Your objects must be to prevent the enemy moving towards Pamplona by the direct road on Berrioplano from Lizaso, as also to prevent his moving or sending detachments upon Irurzun.

With the support of the 7th division you will probably be equal not only to ensure the first object effectually, but even to act offensively in case that should appear to be the most effectual means of preventing the enemy moving upon Irurzun.

Should you perceive that the enemy returns his force into the road of Olague and Ostiz, you will of course send back the 7th division to its destination on the left of this position.

Be so good as report if you have any information from the Light division, and communicate with it by the party of the 1st Hussars at Lecumberri.

Major-General Fane's brigade of cavalry is on its way to Berrioplano.

Very faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Colonel Dickson.

Heights near Villaba, 29th July, 1813, 8 A.M.

Sparkes's reserve is almost exhausted. His empty mules are sent to Irurzun, on which point I expect you will have been good enough to direct small-arm ammunition, both from Vitoria and from Ernani.

The enemy is still in our front, but he has made no fresh attempt yet since his repulse of yesterday.

G. MURRAY.

Be so good as show this to Sir Thomas Graham.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-Gen. C. Alten.

Position near Villaba, 29th July, 1813, ½ past 9 A.M.

It is probable that the withdrawing of Sir Rowland Hill towards Pamplona, and also of the 7th division, and the movements of the enemy following these troops, may have induced Major-General Alten to move the Light division from Zubieta towards the great road that comes from Tolosa to Pamplona.

If Major-General Alten has not already made the above movement, he will make it immediately on receiving this order; and at all events he

will direct his march, when on the great road above mentioned, towards Pamplona, and report to head-quarters. The division is not to come beyond Irurzun, however, without further orders.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-General Fane.

DEAR FANE, Position near Villaba, 29th July, 1813, 10 A.M.

When your brigade gets near Berrioplano you will be so good as send one squadron to Irurzun. Let the officer commanding it be instructed to patrol towards and up to Lizaso, and endeavour to communicate in that way with Sir Rowland Hill (near Lizaso). Let him communicate also with the party of the 1st Hussars at Lecumberri.

Be so good as be yourself in communication with Sir Rowland Hill.

Let us know when any reserve ammunition arrives at Irurzun from Vitoria or from Ernani.

Yours faithfully,

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to the Earl of Dalhousie and Sir R. Hill.

Heights above Villaba, 29th July, 1813, ½ past 6 P.M.

The force of the enemy which approached from the side of Lanz appears to have halted and encamped in the vicinity of Ostiz. From the lateness of the hour it does not seem likely that any serious attack can take place this evening.

Lord Dalhousie will be so good as close his division towards its right, so as that it may be in a situation where it can with facility move to the ground on the wooded ridge where Major-General Pack's left now is. Lord Dalhousie will also ascertain whether one of his brigades could be moved up to a high ridge which lies between the wooded ridge above mentioned and the great hill in its front.

Lord Dalhousie will be so good as have it ascertained also whether (with the assistance of men) guns could be got up upon the wooded ridge, to be placed where the left of the 6th division now is.

Sir Rowland Hill's last report states his having sent the Conde de Amarante's division to Marcalain. This division should continue in a situation to be moved to its right towards the 7th division.

The remainder of the force under Sir Rowland Hill had better continue where it is. Sir Rowland will be so good, however, as have the roads leading upon Ostiz ascertained, and posts of infantry pushed forward in the direction of that place. The cavalry should also keep posts as forward as possible towards Olague and Lanz. These measures will tend to keep the enemy in some degree of jealousy for their right and rear, and may be the direction also of an offensive movement against them should any circumstances hereafter give a favourable opening for such a measure.

Reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Sturgeon (on the great hill in Lord Dal-

housie's front) state the enemy's force near Ostiz, at half-past 3 P.M., to appear to him to be about 8000 or 9000 men.

G. MURRAY.

Posts of observation should be kept on the most commanding hills all day, and should be on the look-out as soon as it is light in the morning.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, Villaba, 29th July, 1813, 10 P.M.

As it is understood that there is a road from Ostiz to Marcalain, Lord Wellington thinks it advisable that some British troops should be early in the morning with the Conde de Amarante's division, and requests you will make an arrangement for that purpose.

It will be desirable to have a report from you at as early an hour in the morning as possible.

Faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

Position of Villaba, 29th July, 1813.

Any detachments that are near to Irurzun on their way from Vitoria to the army are to be collected at Irurzun. These detachments are to be in reserve there, and in case any parties or patrols of the enemy should approach towards Irurzun they are to be effectually resisted by the detachments.

Irurzun is every way a strong post, but in particular on the side by which the great road comes from Tolosa and Lecumberri there is a pass where a few men could withstand a very superior force.

Ammunition is coming from Vitoria to Irurzun. Its arrival is to be reported.

G. MURRAY.

30th July, 1813, 8 A.M.

Sir Thomas Picton will be so good as do no more in the first instance than put himself in a situation for advancing by the Roncesvalles road, but will not move on by that road until it is sufficiently ascertained that the enemy is not employed in any arrangement to enable him to act against our left flank.

Sir Thomas Picton will be so good as throw up a sufficient body of light troops on to the heights on the right of the Roncesvalles road.

G. MURRAY.

Ostiz, 30th July, 1813, 9 P.M.

The troops will continue to follow the enemy to-morrow morning at daybreak, according to the following arrangement :—

The right column will continue to move by the Roncesvalles road, Sir Thomas Picton regulating its advance according to circumstances.

The column on the Ostiz road will move forward in the same order as this day, subject, however, to the following arrangement on the march, viz., at Olague the 6th division will move off to the right to Egui, and the 13th Regiment of Light Dragoons (except the squadron with the advanced guard) will move with the 6th division. The farther destination of these troops is to march by Zilbeti to Linzoain, and there join the 3rd division. They will not leave Egui, however, till they are replaced there by other troops.

Sir Lowry Cole will move the 4th division, where he most conveniently can, into the Ostiz and Lanz road, and will replace the 6th division in the column upon that road.

Sir Rowland Hill will direct the movements of the troops under his orders towards Lanz, making his dispositions so as to turn always the right flank of any post taken up by the enemy, and pressing him as much as circumstances admit of.

That part of the Conde de la Bisbal's force which moved this afternoon to Marcalain is to support the troops under Sir Rowland Hill. Sir Rowland will therefore communicate the arrangement to the Conde de la Bisbal or the officer commanding these troops.

The ultimate destination of the 7th division is to move by the pass of Doña Maria. Lord Dalhousie will therefore give that direction to the division when he perceives it can be done without affecting the more immediate operations against the enemy; and Lord Dalhousie will concert with Sir Rowland Hill about the passing of the division to the left of Sir Rowland's troops which are destined to move upon the valley of Baztan.

Sir Rowland Hill will direct the 1st Hussars to send one squadron with the 7th division by the route of Doña Maria.

Sir Rowland Hill will also make arrangements for the march of Brigadier-General Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry by Olague or from Lanz to Egui. Its destination from thence is to move by the foundry of Egui to the passes leading into the valley of Les Alduides.

The General officers commanding the several columns will be so good as make the best arrangements they can for keeping up means of communicating with each other, and by that or a more direct channel, as may be, with head-quarters.

The artillery of the 3rd division will move as far forward on the Roncesvalles road as Sir Thomas Picton may deem expedient.

The artillery on the Lanz road will not proceed beyond Lanz without a special order.

The 6th division will not move any artillery towards Egui.

If Sir Rowland Hill thinks that Major-General Fane's brigade of cavalry could be of use to-morrow by moving by Irurzun upon Lizaso, he will be so good as send orders for that movement to Major-General Fane through a letter party at Berrioplano, or to the detachment of the brigade stationed at Irurzun.

Head-quarters will move by the road of Lanz.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-General C. Alten.

Position near Villaba, 30th July, 1813.

The enemy have been withdrawing all this morning from the front of this position, but as yet it cannot be positively stated that their movement is a retreat by the roads of Roncesvalles and of Lanz, by which their two columns made their advance.

The object of pressing the march of the Light division towards Irurzun, however, no longer exists, and Major-General C. Alten will therefore do nothing to fatigue his troops, although at this moment his movement into the great road at or near the point of Lecumberri cannot be countermanded.

G. MURRAY.

To be given to the party of Hussars at Lecumberri.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-General C. Alten.

SIR, Ostiz, 30th July, 1813.

The army is following the enemy in the direction of the passes of the mountains. You will be so good therefore as put the Light division in movement towards Zubieta.

Be so good as keep up the communication with Lecumberri, and establish a nearer one when it can be done.

One column will move from this side by Doña Maria.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
G. MURRAY.

This is written at Lizaso 31st July, at 11 A.M.
We took 3000 prisoners yesterday.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

Heights above Villaba, 30th July, 1813.

Arrangement for the Advance of the Army.

The 3rd division, with two squadrons of light cavalry, will follow the enemy by the Roncesvalles road.

Sir Thomas Picton will be informed what other troops are to follow the 3rd division.

The 4th division will, for the present, act upon the heights that are between the Roncesvalles road and the Ostiz road. This division will connect the columns which advance by the other two roads. Its advance must of course be slow, from the nature of the country; and besides, Sir L. Cole is instructed not to press the enemy by any direct attack where his post is strong, but to wait a little in these cases the operations of the columns moving by the roads, whose progress will of course alarm the enemy for his flanks.

The column moving by the Ostiz road will be composed as follows :—
Major-General Byng's brigade and one squadron 13th Light Dragoons.
The 6th division.
The remainder of the 13th Light Dragoons.
The troops under the Conde de la Bisbal.

The 7th division will move by the hills on the left of the valley of the Ostiz road, and Lord Dalhousie will regulate his advance in a manner similar to that of the 4th division.

Lord Dalhousie will communicate on his right with the columns on the Ostiz road, and on the left with the troops under Sir Rowland Hill.

Sir Rowland Hill will be so good as point his movements upon Lanz and upon Olague, regulating them according to those of the enemy, and communicating frequently to head-quarters whatever he can ascertain respecting the enemy's march.

Head-quarters will be with the column on the Ostiz road.

The 3rd division, 6th division, and 2nd division will move with one brigade of artillery each. The remainder of the artillery is not to move for the present.

Major-General Long's brigade of cavalry will move with Sir Rowland Hill.

Major-General Fane's brigade of cavalry will continue near Berrioplano.

The remainder of the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, will continue in the neighbourhood of Pamplona.

All the troops will send for their baggage.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 30th July, 1813.

I forward to your Lordship a letter just received from Sir George Collier, with a newspaper of the 17th.

We do not find ourselves here so comfortable with regard to our right as to wish to have many ships in Pasages harbour.

Longa has asked urgently for reinforcements, as he says troops have been marching to his right and rear on the heights on the right bank of the Bidasoa, with a view, he thinks, to attack Yanci, where his force, much scattered, is but small. A Spanish brigade is gone to support him; but your Lordship will see, by the style of his letter (which I enclose), that it is not improbable but that he will retire on the heights and pass of Arrichunuguri; and the idea of being turned seems to be strongly felt by all the Spaniards. I mean to go to-morrow towards Goyzueta, as we do not know that country; and if not obliged to retire from being turned, I should not fear an attack by Irun, unless the enemy's force should be greatly increased by a counter-march from their left.

It is stated to Giron that those who marched by or towards Lanz are returning to Elizondo. While the Light division remained near Zubieta our right was covered: at present there is nothing beyond Longa's post at Yanci.

I have the honour to remain

Most faithfully and obediently yours,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 30th July, 1813, 5 A.M.

I most sincerely congratulate you on the good news which your Lordship's letter, written before and after the action of the 28th, contained, and which I received by Major Hare, while Generals Giron and Howard were at dinner with me.

It was a full compensation for some time of anxiety at not being able to hear any authentic accounts from Longa or the Spanish officers in observation of the movements of head quarters. On the evening of the 28th the enemy attacked General Longa at Vera, and towards Salain. I enclose his reports, as well as that of an officer of the 16th Light Dragoons I had sent to remain with him for intelligence, and likewise a letter of Colonel Ruman's, which, if true, shows that the enemy employed a considerable force against him. I think he deserves great credit for maintaining the position of Vera, and I trust your Lordship will signify your approbation of his conduct.

As both General Giron and I agreed in thinking the enemy would probably renew their attack in greater force, General Giron moved a brigade in reserve from this to the right to support him and cover the roads of Lesaca, &c., and I brought up from before St. Sebastian Major-General Robertson's brigade of the 5th division. I have, however, sent it back on General Oswald's urgent representation, the enemy having made another sortie in the night of the 28th, and the remainder of the division being, he says, quite inadequate to the duty. The casualties increase, too, from the enemy throwing their shells with more precision now they have little else to attend to. I likewise enclose for your Lordship's perusal General Oswald's letter, with General Hay's and Major O'Hallorân's report relative to the sortie in the morning of the 27th instant.

If your Lordship has not already directed any letter to be written to General Giron, perhaps it may be as well to defer it, as he will feel hurt probably, and we go on very well when together. It is only when I have occasion to employ any Staff-officer in communicating with him that there appears a marked desire to show his independence. He seemed anxious yesterday, on hearing of Soult's being repulsed, to undertake an offensive operation against the Puerto de Vera, which I could not encourage, persuaded that his troops would not succeed against so strong a post by a front attack, and that their failure might be very prejudicial. Neither he himself nor any of his staff seemed to know anything of the country, or how the attack was to be gone about, which, from what I had heard from your Lordship, I suppose could only succeed by a manœuvre to turn the position of the enemy.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Major-General Oswald to Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham.

DEAR SIR, St. Sebastian Road, 2nd July, 1813.

I have directed reports to be made by the superior officers on duty in the trenches when the sortie took place. The Portuguese, who composed the

principal force of the covering party, cannot easily be kept vigilant when they first come; still there was a proportion of British, who ought to have prevented so disgraceful a circumstance. Everything was quiet last night. We have considerably curtailed our line, which will, I trust, enable us to occupy it with fewer men; and it is a great object to get them out of the range of shells, which I am sorry to say are now thrown with too much precision.

I have sent Gomm to inquire about the detachment at Ernani: that from the 5th division joined it yesterday.

Ever most faithfully yours,

D. OSWALD.

I regret to say the prisoners made amount to more than 100: the Portuguese surrendering in the way they did is unpleasant. There was, either at sea or nigh to you, much firing this morning.

II.

Major-General Hay to Major-General Oswald.

SIR, Camp near St. Sebastian, 27th July, 1813.

This morning, before daylight, I sent to Major O'Halloran, of the 4th regiment, who commanded the covering party, to know if anything had happened in the night, and what were his casualties. He reported his casualties, and that all was otherwise well.

I went to the trenches about five o'clock, and was returning to make a verbal report to you, when, on looking over the old 18-pounder battery, my attention was called by a discharge of musketry in the trenches, when I saw the enemy there and advancing in considerable force along the causeway from the town, and in another body from the right of the ditch.

The covering party, consisting of 600 of the 3rd and 15th Portuguese regiments, and 100 of the 9th and 38th British, under Major O'Halloran, were leaving the trenches and scattered over the low ground.

I directed a working party of the 9th and 38th regiments, who were near me, to follow me to the trenches, and, with their assistance, Major O'Halloran rallied the Portuguese of his party and drove the enemy back to the town.

The distance between the right of our trenches and the entrance, where our men principally rallied, made it easy for the enemy to carry off a considerable number of prisoners whom they had taken on the right.

On the preceding evening, when this covering party went on duty, I gave the most pointed orders to Major O'Halloran that every fifth man of the covering party was to be on sentry, and that the officers were to be constantly patrolling to keep their sentries on the alert. I explained to the whole of the officers, both Portuguese and English, the absolute necessity there was for the greatest vigilance, as from the fire from our batteries on the other side of the river having slackened, and the intrenching tools being taken out of the trenches the preceding evening, I had every reason to suppose the enemy would attempt a sortie.

The return of casualties has been sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Berkeley, and I herewith enclose the report which I have received from Major O'Halloran on the subject.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

ANDREW HAY.

III.

Major O'Halloran to Major-General Hay.

SIR, Camp, 28th July, 1813.

Agreeable to your order, I have the honour to report to you that, as field officer of the trenches, on the 26th I marched down 100 of the 1st brigade and 600 of General Spry's. I posted them in the following manner:

70 English on the right of the whole.

30 English in rear of the small redoubt on the causeway.

400 men of the 3rd and 15th Portuguese regiments I arranged on the right of the road, so as to occupy the whole of the trenches from the sea to the redoubt; and the remaining

200 men I posted on the part of the trenches to the left of the causeway as a support.

I received from the officers posted in the different places of the trenches reports every half hour during the night, and at an hour before daylight I roused the whole of the covering party. They remained with their arms in their hands, their bayonets fixed, and ready for what might happen.

The enemy made their sortie, as nearly as I can recollect, at six o'clock, in two places; from the ditch of the horned work to the right of the causeway, and from the end of the ditch close to the breach.

They entered our trenches at the place occupied by the Portuguese, and between the party of the 70 English and the causeway. I regret much that the Portuguese went off in such confusion, that though their officers did every thing that could be done, they could not rally them till they saw the English marching down from the convent and batteries. The enemy then retreated, and took with them from 20 to 30 English and upwards of 100 Portuguese. The whole of these men were taken in consequence of their running towards the ruined village;* and as the French retreated principally by that way, they swept them into the town before them.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

GEO. O'HALLORAN.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 30th July, 1813, 7 A.M.

Having waited for some returns to be sent to the Adjutant-General, by which your Lordship will see the loss before St. Sebastian has been very considerable, I take the opportunity of sending the duplicate of a former letter, sent through Longa, but which may not have reached your Lordship, and which I wish your Lordship to see, both on account of Sir G. Collier's questions and what I had said about the sortie.

I believe, from the last information I received from Colonel Dickson, that the embarkation of the guns and stores is nearly completed. I sent patrols of cavalry yesterday by Goyzueta towards Zubieta and Erasum to gain intelligence, and, from the first report received, I have reason to think the Light division is at or near Zubieta, which I hope will prevent any attempt

* He means that at the end of the bridge, not St. Martin.

to turn Longa from the valley of Baztan. The enemy has, however, so short a line and so good a road back from St. Jean Pied de Port to Orogne, that it is not improbable he may reinforce his right so as to make some attempt on this flank of the army.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. Sir R. Fletcher, on account of the contusion on his leg, is at Ernani, having left Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne in charge of the operations at the Convent Hill, where defensive works are constructing.

Should Sir G. Collier send off the *Sparrow*, which he wishes much to do on account of the Captain (Tailor) being severely wounded, the *Fancy* cutter will be detained for your Lordship's despatches, though Lord Keith ordered that she might return to him immediately.

T. G.

To the Quartermaster-General. [674.]

Heights at Irurita, 31st July, 1813, 3 P.M.

I have just received yours of 11 A.M. Things cannot be better than as settled last night, with the alteration of the direction of Sir Rowland Hill's corps. Will he be strong enough without Campbell? Let Morillo attend him, and the Conde de la Bisbal, if necessary.

Nothing has marched on this road excepting from 500 to 1000 infantry, with a convoy of biscuit, now at Elizondo, which I have sent a detachment there to take.

I have Byng's brigade up, and the 4th division following.

I shall make the troops dine, and see what is to be done in the evening. I have sent a patrol towards St. Estevan. I have written to order the Light division at Zubieta to act on the enemy's rear at St. Estevan, if possible; if not, at Sumbilla.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 31st July, 1813.

The day after the departure of Colonel Croquenbourg the Minister of War called at my house and left a copy of his letter to you. As it was by no means conformable to the tenor of his conversation with me, and could in no way be deemed satisfactory, I addressed a letter to him, of which a copy is enclosed. My letter, it seems, has given him great offence, and

he has thought proper to consider it as official. He accordingly sent Dr. Curtis to me with a note addressed to him, of which a copy is likewise enclosed, as well as my reply addressed to the Doctor. I told Dr. Curtis besides, that so far from wishing to have any private communication with the Minister of War, I could have none whatever until he made me an apology; and I believe Curtis hinted this to him, as he came the next morning and told me that the Minister of War had desired him to assure me that he meant no offence to me, and that he would read my letter over again as a private one. I have not heard anything of him since. He probably is angry because he knows that my letter contains facts which it is impossible for him to contradict. So much lying, shuffling, and meanness I have never yet had to contend with.

I have received your letter of the 24th, and will do as you desire. I have no hope, however, of being able to make any impression upon the government or upon the Minister of War. The government is supported by all the clubs in the town, which are composed of all the turbulent spirits and all the needy adventurers in the place, and their sole object is mischief. These people would rejoice if you were to resign the command, and their next attempt would be to place General Ballesteros at the head of the army; but there is not a respectable man in the place who would not consider your resignation as destructive of the cause, and I still hope that a consideration of the injurious effects which it would produce will induce you to retain the command, at least till the end of the campaign.

I send you a letter from La Vega which I think very sensible. There is no doubt, I think, that if the question were to come before the Cortes in the way he suggests, every thing would be settled satisfactorily.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Don Juan O'Donoju.

SIR, Cadiz, 28th July, 1813.

I am very sorry I did not happen to be at home yesterday when you did me the honour to call at my house. I will own to you, however, that the letter which you had the goodness to leave for my perusal is not what, from our last conversation, I was taught to expect. It does not convey to Lord Wellington any explanation of what has passed: it merely contains some complaints of the conduct of the General officers commanding corps, to which it is required of his Lordship to apply a remedy by a new arrangement.

Lord Wellington is informed in your letter that the present Regency never subscribed to certain conditions under which he holds the command. The nomination of Lord Wellington to the command was the spontaneous act of the Cortes. He came to Cadiz for no other purpose than to arrange the conditions under which he was to exercise it, stating his determination to decline the acceptance of it unless those conditions could be complied with. I cannot admit that in a case of such immense importance one government has a right to break the engagements made by another, without the least previous explanation with the Cortes, or even with the individual whom they principally concern.

You, Sir, are fully aware of the consequences of leaving this matter

unexplained; and I must beg to call to your recollection that in the last conversation which passed between us, you informed me that Lord Wellington would be told that the Regency were concerned that any thing had happened which could give him offence, but that it was unintentional; that the recall of General Castaños was indispensable, but that all the motives for it could not be disclosed until his arrival at Cadiz; that General Giron would be left in his command; that the motives for the appointment of General Lacy would be or had been explained to him, and that General Freyre had been sent to him under a conviction that he would approve his appointment. Not one word of all this is contained in your letter. You will recollect that I asked you if there were any objection to my seeing the letter previously to its being sent to Lord Wellington. You replied that it was not consistent with the rules of office to show it to me, but that you pledged your honour for its being conformable to the tenor of our conversation.

It is possible that the letter of which you have had the goodness to transmit me a copy is accompanied by another which contains the required explanation. If not, I must express my apprehension that the next courier will bring Lord Wellington's resignation. It is not, however, too late to prevent this by a few lines of explanation, which I will undertake to send by a courier if you will write them.

I cannot doubt the sincerity of your desire that Lord Wellington should continue in the command of the Spanish army. You passed four months at his head-quarters, during which period you had an opportunity of appreciating the advantages which the cause would derive from his holding the command. You have repeatedly stated them to me and to others of your friends; and it was a matter of singular satisfaction to me that an officer of your experience and talents, who had been upon Lord Wellington's Staff, and who would be fully disposed to co-operate in his exertions for the improvement of the army, was placed at the head of the War Department.

I have no doubt, Sir, that the Regency is sensible of the immense responsibility which rests upon His Highness if Lord Wellington should resign the command. It is not so much the consequences with which this event will be attended in Spain, as the effect which it will produce in England and in the North, of which I am apprehensive. What will be the feelings of our Allies in the North if, after a campaign unexampled I believe in the military annals of any nation, the success of which depended principally upon the combined movement of the whole force of the Peninsula, and consequently upon its being directed by one head, the chief who conducted it should be compelled to relinquish the command of the army of that power principally concerned in the success of the contest? The natural inference must be that there is not that cordiality between the Allies in the Peninsula which is necessary to ensure the object for which the contest was undertaken. Such an inference could not fail to produce the most dangerous effects upon the councils of our Allies in the North, and if they should be undetermined as to the prosecution of the war, might very likely tend to hasten the conclusion of a peace, which would leave us once more to contend with the whole power of France.

This is no exaggerated view of the consequences of Lord Wellington's resignation at the present moment. It is for those upon whom the responsibility rests to determine whether it will be worth while to try to prevent it in the manner I have pointed out.

I am, Sir, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

II.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Don Juan O'Donoju.

SIR, Cadiz, 29th July, 1813.

In consequence of the communication which you made to me this morning, I think it necessary to state to you that the letter which I addressed to the Minister of War yesterday was a private letter. You saw the draft of it, which was marked "private." The cover of the copy addressed to the Minister of War had "reservada" written upon it, which I conceive to mean private.

I think this explanation necessary, because it seems to be imputed to me that I am so ignorant or so regardless of diplomatic forms as to address the Minister of War officially.

A perusal of the letter will sufficiently explain the motives with which it was written, viz., an anxious desire to prevent a circumstance which I cannot but consider as highly injurious to the cause of the Allies.

I am, with great regard, &c. &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

MY DEAR GRAHAM, Lizaso, 31st July, 1813, 11 A.M.

We pressed the enemy yesterday in the Roncesvalles and Lanz roads, and we made about 3000 of them prisoners.

We are going to act immediately against a column which is retiring by the Doña Maria road. We have plenty of troops in the proper directions, and if we can overtake the column I hope its rear will suffer considerably.

Our troops on the Lanz road were through that place (the leading brigade of infantry) by seven o'clock this morning.

I send to the Light division to move from Lecumberri towards Zubieta.

Faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

Details of the Arrangement for the Troops under Sir R. Hill.

Lizaso, 31st July, 1813, 11 A.M.

Brigadier-General Campbell's Portuguese brigade to proceed, as already directed, to Egui.

The 2nd division to be directed into the valley of Baztan by the road of Almandoz and Berrueta. Of this division one brigade (Major-General Byng's) is already beyond Lanz on the direct road.

Sir Rowland can probably direct the remainder of the division upon Velate (the ruin between Lanz and Almandoz) up the ravine, without its going round by Lanz.

A part of the force under Sir Rowland Hill should move by the road by which the 6th division retired from Lizaso and St. Estevan to Olague. The destination of these troops should be the heights on the left of the Bidasoa, which overlook the neighbourhood of Legassa. These troops

should be the left of the force under Sir Rowland, and they should act in support of the left of those which go in by Almandoz, co-operating also with the right of the 7th division, which advances by Doña Maria; and likewise commanding the road along the Bidasoa near Legassa.

Sir Rowland Hill will direct upon the Almandoz and Berrueta road all that part of his infantry which is not allotted for the operations upon Egui (Brigadier-General Campbell), or for that upon Legassa.

One strong brigade will be sufficient probably for the road leading upon Legassa, but this is left to Sir Rowland Hill to determine.

Orders have been given for an officer from the 6th division to join Sir Rowland Hill, who knows the road referred to above.

The Light division is ordered to move from Lecumberri upon Zubieta.

Sir Rowland Hill is requested to have a copy of this instruction given to the Earl of Dalhousie.

G. Murray.

It is to be understood that the acting upon this instruction is only momentarily suspended by the arrangement made this morning for answering the column of the enemy now retiring by the Doña Maria road.

Head-quarters will be to-day at Lanz.

G. M.

To the Conde de la Bisbal. [675.]

Irurita, 1st Aug., 1813, 6 A.M.

I have just received your note of half-past nine last night. As far as I can judge, the enemy have six divisions between Doña Maria and St. Estevan. They were still quiet at twelve last night. There are three divisions certainly about Engay and Roncesvalles, &c.

I have here the 4th division and General Byng's brigade. The latter took a convoy yesterday evening in Elizondo going to St. Estevan.

I have sent the 4th division upon St. Estevan with the intention of aiding Dalhousie's advance, and to endeavour to cut some off. Byng's brigade shall wait here till a later hour in the day, when I shall know better how things are situated on all sides, how far Sir Rowland has advanced, &c. &c.

I am only afraid that Dalhousie will be too weak in the enemy's front.

I sent in triplicate to the Light division at Zubieta yesterday to desire that General Alten would move towards St. Estevan, and at all events get hold of Sumbilla if he could. I have heard nothing of him.

Wellington.

I likewise sent to Longa to apprise him of the enemy's retreat by St. Estevan.

Velaté, 1st Aug., 1813, ½ before 10 A.M.

This is sent to the Conde de la Bisbal, with the request that his Excellency will order the remainder of his force to follow the 2000 men he has been already this morning requested to march by the passes, in order that there may be a sufficient force at hand should it be requisite.

G. MURRAY.

[676.] *To the Quartermaster-General.*

St. Estevan, 1st Aug., 1813, ½ past 9, A.M.

The enemy have fled from hence by the road of Sumbilla: 30,000 men have passed through this town since yesterday at twelve o'clock.

The 4th division are following on upon Sumbilla, and they shall be pushed on, if possible, to Lesaca, where I shall stay this night. But my station will be known at Sumbilla.

The 7th division are ordered to follow the 4th.

I will order the Light to move upon Yanci and Lesaca from Zubieta.

Upon seeing this order, Major-General Byng must move his brigade from Irurita by Elizondo, and, if possible, get possession of the Puerto de Maya, throwing his piquets into Urdax.

Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill will be so kind as to support the position of Major-General Byng by occupying Elizondo, and, if possible, Ascain, with those troops of the column under him which will first come up.

If General Sir Rowland Hill's troops should not have made a long march this morning, it would be desirable that they should occupy the Puerto de Maya this day; and that in that case Major-General Byng should this evening take possession of the position of Ainhoué, to be supported in the morning by the whole of Sir Rowland Hill's corps. Sir Rowland Hill is requested to report by a staff officer where his troops will be this afternoon, including Major-General Byng.

Morillo might halt this day at Lesaca.

I have no knowledge of what is passing on the right, so as to give any orders about the 3rd and 6th divisions. But the 6th, at least, ought to be so placed this day as to be able to support

the right of the troops taking the position of Ainhoué in the morning.

Let the baggage of the 4th division be ordered to follow them to Sumbilla, and thence towards Lesaca.

Let head quarters come up to Irurita, or Berrueta.

My light baggage to follow the 4th division.

I have just received your letter of half-past six A.M. Let head quarters come to St. Estevan by Cronoy from Berrueta.

I have heard from the Light division near Zubieta, and they will follow the disposition above pointed out.

I have not heard of Dalhousie yet.

WELLINGTON.

[To be shown to General Byng, Sir Rowland Hill, the Officer in charge of the baggage, &c. of the 4th division at Irurita, my servants and Sir William Beresford's at Irurita head quarters.]

The Quartermaster-General to the Conde de la Bisbal.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, A St. Estevan, le 2 Août, 1813.

D'après ce que j'ai su depuis des mouvemens qu'eut faites les troupes de Votre Excellence hier matin, il me paroit qu'il y a eu quelque méprise à ce sujet que n'aurait pas d'arriver.

La première communication que je me suis fait l'honneur d'adresser à Votre Excellence dans la journée de 31 Juillet était envoyée de Lanz par le Colonel Camac, et portoit que comme c'était alors l'intention du Duc de Ciudad Rodrigo que votre corps d'armée ne devoit point passer les montagnes, Votre Excellence voudrait bien faire camper les troupes dans la situation la plus commode aux environs de Lizaso, et me faire savoir le nom de village où vous aviez établi votre quartier-général.

Cette communication a été donné ouverte au Colonel Camac, à qui je l'ai fait lire pourqu'il peut savoir et comprendre l'intention du Duc lui-même, pour l'expliquer avec plus de détail que ne faisant l'écriture qu'il portoit, si Votre Excellence le désirait.

Je croyais donc d'après cette communication que les troupes de Votre Excellence se trouveraient campés aux environs de Lizaso, et qu'elles ne se metteroient point en marche dans la matinée de hier sans une nouvelle ordre à cette effet.

Les circonstances étant cependant changés un peu par les informations reçues dans la matinée d'hier, avant que je n'eut quitté Lanz, je l'ai cru de mon devoir de communiquer ce changement au Général Hill en le priant, s'il n'étoit déjà trop tard, de porter une partie des forces sous ses ordres plus vers la gauche que la passage de Doña Maria, qu'il eut la bonté d'envoyer ma lettre et l'officier qu'en étoit le porteur à Votre Excellence, pour vous prier de porter les troupes Espagnoles dans la direction indiquée. Et

avant de quitter Lanz j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser une lettre (envoyée aussi par le Colonel Camac) pour expliquer le changement fait dans les premières intentions du Duc, que vos troupes ne passassent point les montagnes.

En arrivant à Velaté, j'ai su que toutes les troupes de Votre Excellence avec l'exception de deux mille hommes, envoyés plus vers la gauche, marchoient pour la même route que la division du Général Hill, quand au contraire je les croyoient (avec l'exception de ces deux mille hommes) encore dans leur camp aux environs de Lizaso, comme il avoit été indiqué par la communication que j'avois envoyée a Votre Excellence vers les quatres ou cinq heures d'après midi du trente et un, par le Colonel Camac.

Mais actuellement je ne puis expliquer les contretemps que sont arrivés qu'en supposant que cette première communication n'est jamais parvenu à Votre Excellence.

G. Murray.

[677.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

My dear Lord, Lesaca, 3rd Aug., 1813.

I feel a great regard for Fremantle on his own as well as his father's account, but I should be sorry if any irregularity were committed in promoting him only because I felt a regard for him. Lord Clinton obtained two steps of promotion on taking home the accounts of the battle of Salamanca, as I believe, not because he took home the accounts of a great victory, but because he had been promised promotion, and was on the point of being, if not actually, promoted before he arrived, and then the second step of promotion was given to him.

I should be delighted and obliged by any favour done by His Royal Highness to Fremantle; but I acknowledge that if I were in His Royal Highness's situation, I would not depart from the old rule of one step of promotion for the officer who bears the tidings of a victory on any account. If that rule should once be departed from, there will always be a question whether a victory is deserving one or two steps of promotion to the bearer of the news, which might be awkward.

I hope that success will not be wanting to enable me to send Fremantle home again with the intelligence to obtain for him the other step of promotion, and, if it should, I rely upon His Royal Highness's goodness to promote him when a fair opportunity shall offer.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

G. O. Lesaca, 3rd Aug., 1813. [678.]

1. The Paymasters of regiments are to wait upon the Paymaster-General to receive the balances due upon their several estimates to the 24th February and to the 24th March last, at Tolosa.

2. Under the orders of the Commander of the Forces of the 24th January, 1810, the balances due to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers on the face of their accounts to the 24th January and to the 24th February would now be to be paid; but the Commander of the Forces being desirous of establishing the system of giving the soldier a day's pay on every day, desires that the amount of the balances may be settled as follows:

3. The balance due to each corporal, trumpeter, and private man of the two regiments of Life Guards, on the 24th January and on the 24th February, is to be consolidated; and the non-commissioned officers, trumpeters, and privates are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sum of 45*s.* for each corporal and trumpeter, and 30*s.* for each private man.

4. The sums of 45*s.* for each corporal and trumpeter, and of 30*s.* for each private, are to remain in the hands of the Captain, from which he is to give the corporals and trumpeters each 1*s.* 6*d.*, and the privates each 1*s.*, a day, till the whole sum will be paid.

5. The balance due to each corporal, trumpeter, and private of the Royal regiment of Horse Guards, on the 24th January and 24th February, is to be consolidated, and the corporals, trumpeters, and privates are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sum of 37*s.* 6*d.* for each corporal, and of 22*s.* 6*d.* for each trumpeter and private man. The sums of 37*s.* 6*d.* for each corporal, and of 22*s.* 6*d.* for each trumpeter and private, are to remain in the hands of the Captain, from which he is to give the corporal 1*s.* 3*d.*, and the trumpeter and private 9*d.* per day, till the whole sum will be paid.

6. The balance due to each non-commissioned officer and soldier of the cavalry, and of the Foot Guards and other regiments of infantry, on the 24th January and on the 24th February, is also to be consolidated, and the non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sums of 30*s.* for each serjeant, 20*s.* for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15*s.* for each

private. The sums of 30*s.* for each serjeant, 20*s.* for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15*s.* for each private, are to remain in the hands of the Captain, from which he is to give the serjeants each 1*s.*, the corporals and the trumpeter, or drummer, 8*d.*, and the soldiers 6*d.* a day each, until the whole sum will be paid.

7. In case the balances due to any non-commissioned officer or soldier, on their accounts to the 24th January and 24th February, should not amount to 30*s.* for each serjeant, 20*s.* for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15*s.* for each private, the officer commanding the troop or company is to divide whatever sum the balance to any non-commissioned officer or soldier may amount to by 30, and is to give such non-commissioned officer or soldier on each day the proportion of whatever the balance may be.

8. It must be observed, that in case any soldier wants necessaries, the Captain must take care to stop their price from the daily payment above ordered to be made to the soldier, either by stopping the whole sum ordered to be paid daily, or a proportion, as may be settled by the officer commanding the regiment.

9. The soldiers will see, however, what an interest they have in taking care of their necessaries, and it is to be hoped there will be but little occasion for stoppages on this account.

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir C. B. Vere to General Sir George Murray.**

MY DEAR SIR GEORGE, 8th Aug., 1839.

In the notes upon the Pamplona operations which I sent you there are errors which the enclosed paper may correct, particularly regarding the action of the 28th July, which was the battle. The notes I sent you were written down from memory, not a long time after the events took place, but with an intention to correct them, as to dates and times, from my notes taken on the days of the movements, &c. These notes I had not with me when I wrote last; but I have referred to them, and now send you the substance of them as regards the 28th July particularly, to which they are mainly confined.

Believe me yours very sincerely,

CHARLES BROKE VERE.

* These notes have been found among the papers of the late General Sir George Murray, and are here inserted, as they explain some of the movements before Pamplona.—ED.

[Enclosure.]

26*th July*.—Head-quarters to Almandoz.
Light division to Yanci and Lesaca.
7th division to Sumbilla.
6th division to St. Estevan.
2nd division to Irurita, &c.

27*th July*.—3rd and 4th divisions in position covering Pamplona, with General Byng's brigade, General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, and Generals O'Donnell's and Morillo's Spanish corps.

The 6th division moved to Olague, afterwards to Lizaso.
The 2nd division to the pass of Velate.
The 7th division ordered to the pass of Arraiz.
The Light division to Zubieta.
Longa commanded at Lesaca on the Bidasoa.
General Graham occupied the position of Oyarzun.

28*th July*.—The 6th division joined the left of the 3rd and 4th divisions about half-past eleven o'clock on this day. At twelve o'clock the enemy attacked our position, which was occupied as follows:—

The 4th division, General Byng's brigade, General Campbell's brigade, and some of the Spanish corps of O'Donnell, occupied a high branch of the mountains, flanked on each side by the two rivers which join near Villaba, and form the stream passing near Pamplona. Along these rivers run the roads of Roncesvalles and Ostiz. The nature of the position is extremely strong. The 3rd division was on the right, retired and thrown back towards the heights which formed the right of the valley of Monreal. It occupied the height of Huarte. O'Donnell's corps occupied the heights of Villaba, and on the left the heights which overlook the valley of Urroz, &c. (suppose this the position called of St. Christoval). The enemy held the mountainous heights opposite the 4th division, and to his left the heights which overlooked the plain in Sir T. Picton's front, thus extending equally to either side of the Roncesvalles road, his right being on the Ostiz road, occupying the village of Nicain.

After filing troops across the mountain from the Roncesvalles road, his attack commenced by moving a strong column of infantry by the Ostiz road upon an abrupt height on the left of the 4th division, on which was a chapel overlooking the village of Sorauren. The presence of the 6th division defeated the movement, and he immediately on its failure moved to attack the right of the 4th division. The attack was repulsed; repeated, and again repulsed. Here some of O'Donnell's corps acted with the 4th division. In the mean time he collected his columns under the village of Sorauren, and twice again attempted the left of the position. In each attack he was defeated, though in both he gained the chapel; but the charge of the British down the principal height soon compelled him to relinquish it. General Byng's brigade and General Campbell's Portuguese brigade acted with the Fusilier brigade on the left of the position in repelling these attacks.

On the 29th all was quiet. General Hill moved towards our left, and the corps of the enemy opposed to him entered the valley of Ostiz.

The 7th division moved up to the left of the 6th division, occupying the heights on the left of the valley of Urroz, on our left of the Ostiz road.

On the 30th, the movements of the enemy indicated retreat or the carrying of his force to our left. Lord Wellington opened a cannonade on the troops filing across the heights, and attacked.

Sir T. Picton moving over the heights left by the enemy into the Roncesvalles road, the 4th division forced the enemy's centre, and moved along the moun-

tainous ground. The 6th division attacked by the Ostiz road. The 7th division moved upon the heights left of it, and came to the support of the 2nd division, in whose front the enemy was in augmented force. The whole of the enemy's force retired in great disorder, but the enemy's right column halted in position in front of Lizaso.

31*st July.*—The army moved on, and the enemy fell back through the passes. Head-quarters, Berrueta.

1*st Aug.*—Movement continued, following up the enemy. Head-quarters St. Estevan.

2*nd Aug.*—Head-quarters, Lesaca.

3*rd Aug.*—Ditto.

The army distributed as follows :—

2nd division, Maya, guarding the pass.
3rd division, near Roncesvalles, &c.
6th division, Alduides, &c.
4th division, Echalar, &c.
7th division, on the passes.
Light division, heights opposite Vera.
Conde de la Bisbal's corps, Yanci.
Morillo's corps, with General Hill.

The enemy occupied the positions he held before his forward movement.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 4th Aug., 1813.

I have little to add to what I said yesterday. I went to see what was doing on the left before St. Sebastian. There seems not quite so much done as I expected in the way of strengthening the two convents and closing the old French work, and another agreed on with Sir R. Fletcher, in order to enable fewer troops to hold the blockade with security. There is, I fear, frequent intercourse of boats. Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne thinks the possession of the island the best chance of interrupting that. The naval means are very small, and I should doubt Sir G. Collier choosing to undertake an operation with such boats and marines as he could furnish. He is anxious about the restoration of a sea battery at the mouth of the Bidasoa, to protect his small cruisers. Probably the Spaniards could do this were they pressed to it. I have desired Major Smith to give me a projet of defence by works for the whole of the position of the lower Bidasoa; but the Spaniards will not execute it.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

Thomas Graham.

P.S.—General Bock is at Ernani.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 4th Aug., 1813, ½ past 5 P.M.

Since I had the honour of writing to your Lordship some hours ago, I have received your Lordship's letter of 9 this morning, and have given the different orders to Colonel Dickson.

I did not, in my letter to-day, mention particularly the works carrying on on the left attack of St. Sebastian. There is a 13-gun battery in front of the French redoubt, on the right of the Convent of St. Bartolomé, which is nearly finished.

Sir R. Fletcher proposes the six 18-pounders and seven 24-pounders for this, to breach the left bastion, and ruin all the defences of the left of the place, which he thinks can be done better from that commanding ground than by going down into the plain. There are but few men employed, as there was no lime. Others are making fascines and gabions.

I shall stop the sailing of the ordnance transports; but till the boats are repaired, or others come, little can be done, I imagine, in relanding artillery or stores. I shall attend as much as possible to get the different preparations forwarded. If General Castaños, who I believe is come or coming to Ernani, were to order peasants to assist, for payment, in the repairs of roads, &c., and to enforce the requisition of boats by sending the Spanish armed boats for them to the different ports, I should think the effect would be good, both in forwarding everything, and convincing the people that the Spaniards are as anxious about taking St. Sebastian as we are. On that account I wish we could have a Spanish brigade on the duty of the siege.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
Thomas Graham.

To the President of the Junta of Aragon. [679.]

Señor, Lesaca, 5th Aug., 1813.

I have received with much pleasure your letter of the 22nd July. I am much gratified that the heroic and patriotic city of Zaragoza is at last relieved from its long oppression, and I beg leave to offer my congratulations to its brave inhabitants on the occasion.

I thank you and the Junta for the kind attention in attributing to me and the army under my immediate command the advantages acquired at the battle of Vitoria; they have since been increased by the late important events; and I have the honour to assure you that I shall have great pleasure in contributing to the utmost of my power to the happiness of the meritorious kingdom of Aragon.

I have, &c.,
Wellington.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 5th Aug., 1813.

There are strong reports of much personal altercation between Major-General Donkin and Admiral Hallowell (possibly with other persons) on

the subject of the late unfortunate termination of the Tarragona expedition. I trust that there exists no disposition to bring these disputes to a conclusion by personal combat. On every account it would be highly unfit that this should be the termination of them.

That nothing, however, may be omitted to prevent such engagements, I must beg of you to take an early opportunity of conveying to Lord William Bentinck the wish of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent that such measures should be taken by his Lordship as may give the officers under his command reason to understand that such conduct would incur His Royal Highness's severest displeasure.

I shall desire Lord Melville to make a similar communication in the proper quarter.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 5th Aug., 1813.

Having in my letter of yesterday to Lord FitzRoy Somerset expressed an expectation that a certain arrangement would be made for attaching a pay or allowance to the situation of a Field Marshal upon the Staff, upon what I supposed a precedent in the case of the Duke of Cumberland, I think it necessary to explain confidentially to you that I have been mistaken in the view I had been taught to take of the matter. It appears upon a reference to the records that the Duke of Cumberland had an allowance of 12,000*l.* a year while commanding the army in the field, both in Flanders and Scotland, exclusive of the usual pay of 10*l.* a day, but that while not in the field he only had the latter.

I believe that you will be put on a footing in regard to allowances with what the Duke of Cumberland enjoyed, and that you will therefore have 7000*l.* a year in addition to your present 5000*l.*

I received your letter of the 18th ult. respecting Captain Ramsay. Of course I have nothing to say. And the Duke desires me to say that he entirely concurs in the propriety and necessity of your decision.

I have seen a letter from General Long to his brother, wherein he expresses his high satisfaction with his present command, having, through your kindness, got the brigade which of all others in the world he prefers, and that nothing will ever induce him to *think of England* in the shape of a wish to return while a British soldier remains in Spain! As near as I can recollect, these are his words; and I determined to lose no time in apprising you of them, as being likely to create embarrassment upon the subject of his removal to the home staff.

I had a letter from Grant at Santander, which I have answered; and it is well for him that he decided upon returning to the army.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully yours,

H. TORRENS.

Dr. Curtis to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Cadiz, 5th Aug., 1813.

Were I to consult my own feelings alone, I should, instead of delaying so long, have been among the first in having the honour of sincerely con-

gratulating your Excellency on your glorious triumph at Vitoria, with all its momentous consequences, and the noble emulation of Great Britain and Spain in paying your Excellency the just tribute of their admiration and gratitude. But I could not presume to intrude sooner on your precious time, and am apprehensive even now of being troublesome, though I only mean to express my unfeigned sentiments.

However, my Lord, as I take the liberty of addressing your Excellency, I must beg leave to assure you that I had been well persuaded of the vast importance of your appointment to the supreme command of the Spanish army, long before that salutary measure took place; but since I have been here I am every day more and more convinced of the absolute necessity that the same wisdom that adopted should continue to sustain it, not only in order to vanquish the common enemy, but also to prevent the military force of this country from becoming a dangerous instrument in the hands or under the influence of one, or perhaps of both, the contending parties, that seem much more intent on each other's mutual destruction than on procuring the welfare of the nation, whose true and real friends, that, thank Heaven, are still numerous even here, turn their weeping eyes towards you Excellency, from whom alone, under God, they expect with confidence their redemption and chief support.

I must own, indeed, that several members of both parties, men of abilities and merit, with whom I have been long acquainted, and even intimate, assure me that as well themselves as their respective parties have the most pacific views, wish only to promote the public good, and are all extremely attached to your Excellency (and, as far as mere personal regard and admiration go, I am inclined to believe them); but as to the rest, I cannot think them sincere, nor will palpable facts allow it; and the levelling faction in particular are suspected, and take but little pains to conceal their intention, of making very soon some further revolutionary attempts, for which they probably think your Excellency would stand as a powerful obstacle in their way.

I should have long since ventured, my Lord, to mention something on this head to your Excellency, but that I always supposed you had much better and more secure channels of information, particularly that of your most worthy brother, who knows this ground perfectly, and is the only personage, I believe, here that is universally respected and esteemed by all parties, who would think themselves happy could they but engage his Excellency to patronize, in the smallest degree, their peculiar plans.

I heartily wish your Excellency a continuation of the most brilliant success, with every blessing and happiness, and

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Excellency's faithful, humble servant,

P. Curtis.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Colonel Dickson.

Sir, Lesaca, 5th Aug., 1813.

The Commander of the Forces directs that you will be so good as cause such of the reserve ammunition as is conveyed upon carriages, and is for-

ward with the army, to be detained for the present at Tolosa, as a central point from which it can with facility be moved in the directions where it may be expected it will be required. I beg you will be kind enough to let me know when these carriages have reached Tolosa, and also the amount of the supply which they contain.

G. Murray.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 6th Aug., 1813.

I meant to have rode over this morning to Lesaca, to have had an opportunity of congratulating your Lordship in person on the glorious and signal success of the late operations of the army under your Lordship's immediate command, the extent of which I was not fully aware of till lately; but I have got a severe attack of rheumatism, which obliges me to stay at home.

The Prince of Orange sailed in the *Fancy* cutter yesterday at noon. Sir George Collier had nothing better ready for sending off immediately, the *Parthian* brig having been sent up to Santander, and not returned as he expected.

I am afraid between Sir George Collier and Mr. Young that some of the victuallers which came off the port of Pasages, and which at that time it would not have been advisable to bring in, have gone off to Bilbao; but as they were ordered back both by sea and land expresses, I trust they must be at hand: meanwhile there is nothing at Pasages to send by the mules which have come from the different divisions.

I understand Lieutenant-General Sir J. Leith may be daily expected to join the 5th division, having sailed from Lisbon on the 23rd ult. His arrival will supersede Major-General Oswald, who mentioned to me yesterday that, if there was not to be any immediate operation, he should wish for a few days' leave to go to Santander or Bilbao, as Mrs. Oswald was coming round from Lisbon in the *Pomone* frigate, which was to sail on the 28th ult.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
Thomas Graham.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

My dear Sir Rowland, Lesaca, 7th Aug., 1813.

The following is the only alteration to be made in the arrangement transmitted to me by Lieutenant-General Abercromby for the changes of position in the centre and in the right of the army.

Lord Wellington directs that the 3rd division shall be in the vicinity of Ariscun instead of being forward towards Maya, and that Sir Thomas Picton should place a brigade nearly in the situation where the 82nd formerly was, upon the hills to our left of the Puerto de Maya.

By this arrangement the 3rd division will have two brigades in a situation

to support the 6th division by the valley of Maya, and secure its retreat should it become necessary in that direction; and from Ariscun Sir Thomas Picton can also watch the pass of Ispigui, which appears to be rather too far forward to be effectually secured except by the troops in the valley of Les Alduides.

The brigade of the 3rd division which is placed on the hills will at the same time give additional security to the left of the 6th division upon the pass of Maya.

All the passes from the valley of Les Alduides farther back than that of Ispigui must be secured by the troops in the valley of Les Alduides.

I beg you will be so good as communicate this letter to Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton and to Major-General Colville, as also the arrangement respecting the cavalry, of which a copy is enclosed.

Believe me, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Lesaca, 8th Aug., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers:—			
Field Officers	28	10	38
Captains	77	19	96
Subalterns	150	52	202
Staff	82	51	133
Quartermasters of Cavalry	23	4	27
Serjeants:—			
Present	472	73	545
Sick:—			
Present	4	1	5
Absent	11	..	11
Command	75	14	89
Prisoners of War and Missing	3	..	3
Trumpeters:—			
Present	88	41	129
Sick:—			
Present	1	..	1
Absent	2	4	6
Command	4	3	7
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File:—			
Present	5922	1235	7157
Sick:—			
Present	160	22	182
Absent	391	160	551
Command	833	390	1223
Prisoners of War and Missing	152	3	155
Horses:—			
Present	5849	1179	7028
Sick	451	111	562
Command	325	266	591

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula, under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Lesaca, 8th Aug., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	4	7	11
Lieutenant-Colonels	57	24	81
Majors	69	36	105
Captains	357	169	526
Lieutenants	736	186	922
Cornets or Ensigns	243	322	565
Staff	331	467	798
Quartermasters of Cavalry	23	4	27
Serjeants :—			
Present	2363	1236	3599
Sick :—			
Present	41	43	84
Absent	576	219	795
Command	421	266	687
Prisoners of War and Missing	46	5	51
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	934	498	1432
Sick :—			
Present	14	4	18
Absent	133	51	184
Command	29	52	81
Prisoners of War and Missing	34	9	43
Rank and File :—			
Present	31,443	20,017	51,460
Sick :—			
Present	1020	499	1519
Absent	13,456	7442	20,898
Command	3466	2404	5870
Prisoners of War and Missing	2511	645	3156
Horses :—			
Present	5849	1179	7028
Sick	451	111	562
Command	325	266	591
Alterations :—			
Joined	4	12	16
Dead	18	166	184
Discharged	1	23	24
Deserted	1	45	46
Transferred	1	..	1
Promoted	1	1	2
Reduced	..	2	2

E. PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

[680.] *To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Lesaca, 9th Aug., 1813.

I have received your letter of the 31st and that from Vega. These fellows are sad vagabonds, but we must have patience

with them; and the state of Europe and of the world, and of Spain in particular, requires that I should not relinquish the command of the Spanish army if I can avoid it; nor, considering the general prejudices in Spain against strangers, can even I venture to push them too hard against the wall. I enclose a letter which I have written to the Minister at War,* which will either settle the matter or make them still more wrong than they are. You may show that letter to Arguelles, Vega, &c. &c. There is nothing new.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Tell Vega that I am much obliged to him for his letter.

[The following copy of a letter from Don A. A. de la Vega has been recently found among the manuscripts of the Earl of Liverpool, and is in part reply to a letter from the Duke of Wellington, given in 1st edition of *Despatches*, under date 29th January, 1813. See vol. x., p. 61.]

Don Andres Angel de la Vega to the Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo.

MY DEAR LORD, Cadiz, 28th April, 1813.

In the letter which, under date of the 11th instant, I had the honour of writing to you, I mentioned that I had taken back from the Ambassador my answer to the letter which you were pleased to address to me on the 29th January last, several reasons having subsequently induced me to alter it in some of its parts. Perhaps I may one day be able to inform you what were the motives that made me make the alterations in question; for the present, I shall only assure you that they are not of sufficient importance to create any material change in the picture I am about giving you of the persons and opinions of this city. It has been my endeavour to state everything with the most scrupulous exactness; and for this purpose I have been obliged to inquire into several facts which it was indispensably necessary that I should know. Thus the information I had to acquire, its varying nature, the additional facts which I afterwards learned and which made it necessary to introduce several modifications, have been the reasons which compelled me to delay answering you.

I have shown to my friends the extract of King Joseph's letter; and although I made to them some observations censuring the theories contained in the letter itself, many of them did not say anything further than express their surprise that anybody should not appreciate these very theories, which they look upon as the end of all discoveries which the human mind can reach in matter of government. They then attributed the expressions of Joseph to the mortification he feels at the establishment of the Constitution

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. x., p. 607, letter dated 7th August, 1813.

of the Laws, which being so grateful to the feelings of the people, will oppose to him a greater obstacle to the subjugation of the Peninsula, which in this letter finds the confirmation of her happiness. Some of them thought thus honestly enough, to be sure; but there were not wanting others, more distrustful, who pronounced Joseph's letter to have been fabricated by some enemy to the Constitution hired to calumniate it.

Although, from the predilection which people have here for their work and their endeavours to support it, it would be easy for you to foresee what effect it would produce were you to expose to them the defects of their fabric and propose to them the remedies you recommend, yet I shall make you acquainted with their manner of thinking; I shall detail to you unreservedly their principles and maxims, and even the objects which they have in view; for how could I otherwise justify the confidence which your Lordship is pleased to repose in me? Then, after I shall have given you a picture of the opinions of parties here, the source from which they arise, and the ends they wish to attain, you will be able to judge of the advantage it would produce to make them acquainted with the evils they are labouring under, and the remedies you propose.

Perhaps in giving you a plain statement of the parties that are here raging and of the principles by which they are guided, it may be of some use in calling your attention towards their examination, in order that no wrong effect may be produced by the picture I am giving you, and in which I may possibly commit a mistake. It will belong to you in the course of time to make what use you think proper of these materials. You will use them to the advantage of my country, for which you interest yourself so much, and in which I at the same time foresee that you may possess much influence; and if, after all, my hints become of no use, I hope that they will remain buried in oblivion, forming one among many proofs of the honest intentions of the writer.

After I received your letter, they have been discussing the formation of an executive power, to be composed of new members, and to be guided by a new system, which was to be fixed upon previous to the members being nominated. But neither among the Commission appointed to expedite this business, of which I was a member, nor among the Cortes, where the new plan was to be discussed and approved, did any disposition exist to establish a government such as was wanted and according to your ideas, and which I had the satisfaction to find agreed with mine, and such as I have entertained ever since my arrival at this place, but which could not be expected to be harboured by persons actuated by very different principles, and who had, conformably to their maxims (already at my arrival), formed and resolved upon the Projet de Constitution.

The course of studies followed for a long time past, especially since the French Revolution, was not calculated to create any other ideas respecting the constitution of a government than those proclaimed throughout France in the course of the Revolution, and which are to be found in the productions of the authors who preceded that event, and certainly had a great influence in bringing it about. Without any communication but with France, almost without the knowledge of any foreign idiom but the French, and influenced by the books and writings of that nation, it was hardly to be

expected that their mode of thinking and their alluring maxims should not have been adopted by us, but particularly our wild and inexperienced youths. Thus the desire of innovating prevailed among the Commission, but on the principles of thorough reform. Being deeply imbued with these ideas, or to speak more truly, our ideas being identified with those of the French philosophers, we cannot understand that there is another species of government founded upon more solid rules, and capable of producing more substantial liberty and national prosperity. My Lord, people cannot conceive an idea of what they have never read, seen, or heard of; and creating and inventing geniuses are very scarce.

Upon my arrival in this city I composed a memorial (which I circulated among my friends who were members of the Congress and such individuals as took a lead in its transactions), in which I enlarged upon the dependence of the executive body as a creature of the Cortes—a creature which is annihilated and reestablished as suddenly as a gust of passion is created, and without there being any occasion for such a display of warmth; which was all clearly proved on the 8th of March. I did not omit to animadvert on the separation in which the two bodies were, and the disgust they had for one another, without having any clear idea of each other's sentiments, and united as they were by the ties of absolute dependence. My reflections indeed at that time carried some conviction with them, for these gentlemen consented that I should present my Projet, which was founded upon the same principles as those communicated in my letter; but as one of the articles provided that the Deputies of the Cortes could be appointed Secretaries of State, the ministers of the day, fearful of losing their places, began to intrigue. The ambition of the Deputies was the principal argument on which in appearance they grounded their opposition to the measure; but the fact is, they were only concerned in gratifying their own. The old device was then brought forward by Capmany, which provided that no member of the legislative body could form any part of the executive; and the ideas of absolute separation and ideal equilibrium, which were avowed by the most illustrious members of the Congress, were renewed. The alarm which was spread, and the pledges which many members had already given to support the Projet de Constitution, founded upon the above chimerical principles, induced those who had promised me their support to withdraw their promises, and I was at length obliged to desist from presenting it.

Since that period, my Lord, just when people were beginning to bestow their attention upon my plan, and when perhaps circumstances might have induced them to unite in my support, my ideas have been entirely forgotten, and no other maxims have been introduced in conversation or in public papers but those of the French philosophers. Some will not allow these maxims to be doubted; others (small indeed is their number) maintain that time will reform things; but many others, who have had a share in the building of our political fabric, are so well pleased with their work, that all constitutional propositions and minor laws must be regulated by them according to their principles.

Theories originate certainly in the Cortes only, and they are, in my opinion, labouring under a political fever, which will cling to them as long as the causes last which have produced it. My Lord, I do not hope, if I may be permitted to express what I feel, that the communication with the

interior of Spain, opened by the raising of the siege of Cadiz and other successful operations of your Lordship, will moderate the feverish disposition of these people. Two reasons induce me to abandon this flattering hope: firstly, the certainty that their communication with the interior must be confined to two ranks of people—either the old régime in its whole extension and complication of private interests, or the thorough innovators, impulsed either by the studies which have nourished their mind, or their hatred of the preceding despotism. Secondly, the conviction I entertain that the delirium of the fever has reached a degree that renders every remedy useless, and it is now not so much necessary to cure the patient as to prevent his doing any harm or spreading contagion around him.

In fact, my dear Lord, do not fancy that the advice of people in their senses, the lessons of other countries' experience, nor, as you very well observe, their own hard experience, will be able to mitigate the political frenzy which has reached its present degree. If perhaps they admit that the advantages of a solid and tempered liberty, the only kind of freedom which can be introduced without destroying social order, have been drawn from a constitution which has been gradually formed by the wisdom and the experience of centuries, still the whole of the work is censured on account of some faults, which every constitution framed by human intelligence must necessarily have. They do not balance the evil with the good, upon a comparison of which alone a decision can be made as to the merits of a constitution; and with the wish of substituting an edifice built after their own liking, they destroy another perfect one, which is known to possess so many advantages. Read in all this the answers of our legislators, and from all them you may be able to infer whether I would derive any advantage from the opinion you have favoured me with regarding the ills which my country is suffering, which your Lordship perceives and laments, and for which you propose a remedy, at the same time the most unpalatable, although the most proper.

Were any person to propose to these people, who are so well pleased with their work, to retrace one single step beyond the strict limits of absolute independence and liberty, if he were not called by them an enemy to his country, he would be contemptuously taxed with servility. It matters not whether he avoids equally the doctrines of servility and the wild theories of the friends of liberty. "He is tainted with Anglicism," has been often said in my hearing; carrying their folly and indecency so far as to attribute to the English every kind of attempt against our new Constitution, because, say they, it is so perfect, that it by far surpasses that of England. They will even not scruple to point out several essential defects which they have discovered in it. I now leave it to you, my Lord, to decide what hopes of improvement may be expected from people of that stamp.

My Lord, I have shown to your Lordship that these people are too well satisfied with their work to retrace one single step, and from the others, although the most numerous, no salutary reform can be expected; and I shall presently explain to your Lordship the reasons of this. They are to be found in the diversity of parties, their opinions, and the ends they have in view. I consider it important, therefore, to enter into detail concerning this subject, which it will not be quite useless to examine; and you will make whatever use you may think proper of these materials.

There are among the public two deeply-rooted parties who have distinguished one another by names indicative of their opinions, but not expressive of the real ends they have in view or the objects they wish to attain. You will perceive that I am speaking of the *Serviles* and the *Liberales*; but there is another, which, from the ends they have in view, serves as a counterpoise between the two former, and turns the scale towards the party with which they side. This is the American party. Neither of the two former is numerous enough to constitute a majority by its numbers alone; the third party must lend its assistance to either for that purpose; and as the latter is not steady in its inclinations, it forms in the revolutions of the Cortes an incoherence and contradiction of principles, varying in its politics according as circumstances direct. It is true enough that in neither of the two former is to be observed any connected plan of operations, nor even acknowledged talents for waging war with the other, because all will be champions. If they otherwise succeeded, or became skilled in the tactics of corporation wars, I believe that one of them must be constantly victorious, especially if the Americans could be bought by kindnesses and concessions; yet I am inclined to believe that, upon the whole, the Americans would prefer joining the *Liberales*.

In describing to you these personages, I cannot omit mentioning a few among the Cortes who think differently, but who, from their small number, cannot be said to form a party. They do not deliver their opinions and yield to the powerful storm which they cannot restrain; and although they give up all fruitless opposition, they still make use of circumstances to get some little advantage for the public cause.

The *Serviles* would have the Cortes resume the former arbitrary form of government, without any other law but the will of the sovereign, advised by councillors, but not controlled by laws, nor his authority disputed by any public body. They are generally ignorant of our ancient institutions, admirably suited indeed (though not perfect upon the whole) for those times of war and conquest, as indeed strangers will themselves admit; but they are now forgotten and their use has been discontinued. Despotism, when it made its appearance, succeeded so well, that people took up no other ideas of government but what they derived from the practice and abuse of authority. As this state of things was necessarily connected with the well-being of many whom the monarchs had carefully managed to draw on their side, and use them to the support of their cause, the *Serviles* are naturally sighing for the return of those times in which, sure of enjoying undisturbed all the fruits of that influence which is compatible with, or rather is the consequence of, the absolute will of a king, they therefore do not wish for the least restriction upon the royal will, nor do they allow or acknowledge any other privilege to belong to the Cortes but the power of pointing out abuses, and at most suggest the remedies and leave it to the sovereign to make whatever decision he pleases. Upon this principle many of them extend their hatred not only towards the thorough reformers, but also towards the temperate reformers of abuses.

The *Liberales*, imbued with the maxims of the French Revolution, and for the most part without having any other but French revolutionary principles, and dazzled by the speeches of those who have outdone themselves in France, and enraptured with the times of the Tribunes of Rome and the

harangues in the public places of Athens, adore a constitution which is more inclined to democracy than any other form of government. With this view they have established, until the return of the King, a government which is in reality similar to that of republican France; that would resemble the Directory, if the members of the Regency were deputies of the Cortes; that would resemble the Convention, were it not for the dependence and unsteadiness of our executive; which deserves no other name than that of Commission, subjected in all its operations to the party that preponderates in the Cortes, and exposed to be removed the moment they incur their displeasure.

All this was clearly demonstrated on the 8th of March, when the former Regents were displaced and others appointed in their stead in the course of a few minutes, and in consequence of a motion which had not been previously announced, and of which many Deputies had received no notice before their arrival at the hall of the Cortes, when they found everything done by means of a sudden coup de main, which, although a just measure in itself, was nevertheless too tumultuously executed. I say just in itself, because, my Lord, you know the former Regents did not possess the qualities necessary for the discharge of their office, and neither agreed with one another nor with their ministers, from which there resulted not only inaction, but also inconsistencies, meannesses, and blunders. This was, however, not the cause of their removal. As they did not act conformably to the instructions of the *Liberales*, they were accused of being anti-constitutional, and were held forth to the public as enemies of the liberty and independence of the nation, as will be seen from the harangues of that day. The measure needed but popular tumult in order to ensure the success of the motion without further examination, overwhelm its opposers, and ensure its execution without delay, under pretext of the urgency of the danger. I believe there may have been danger lurking; but there was none in the events that happened. Thus no hope of any useful reform being introduced may be entertained, nor has any been made in the new regulations since published.

The measure which you propose of establishing a permanent Regency, furnished with all the powers given by the Constitution to the King, in the person of a member of the Royal Family, or, in default thereof, in the person of some Spaniard fit to occupy the post by his authority, character, conduct, &c.: neither the one person nor the other would be acceptable, because the condition of the first and the qualities of the second (if such a person were to be found, which I very much doubt) would necessarily put an end to the subordination and dependence in which it is wished to keep the executive, that it may continue to execute strictly the will and commands of the Cortes, be removable at pleasure, and over which is constantly kept the wrath of the Congress, ready to be discharged with more or less violence, according to the degree of displeasure which the executive may have incurred.

It is certain that they will appoint President of the Regency the Cardinal of Bourbon, whose name alone is very gratifying to the Spanish people; but besides that this nobleman has by our laws no rights of blood, his father the Infant of Castille having married against the consent of his brother the then King of Spain, he is unfit, by the education he has received

and other causes not connected with the necessary qualifications, to make his authority respected. He has the best intentions, and he does not deserve to incur any suspicion from the Liberal party having established a Regency, distinguished by the title of reigning family, and materially agreeing with their principles.

The greater part of the American Deputies undoubtedly desire the independence of Spanish America, and I believe that they are principally aiming at this, keeping however in view the actual circumstances of those distant and extensive countries. Indeed, my Lord, I believe that America must, sooner or later, become independent of the Peninsula, and, in my opinion, that independence will promote the prosperity of both countries, certainly not at the present moment, nor by means of a revolution, nor by drenching with blood those vast and fertile regions, but in the course of time and according to the order of things, which must necessarily terminate in the separation of that vast continent from Europe. I do not know whether the attachment which is observed here towards America is calculated to preserve her attachment to the mother country; but I am certain that the Americans desire it so, and that it serves to regulate their actions.

There is, my dear Lord, still another party, composed of persons of all those abovementioned, and to be found more out of the Cortes. This is the French party. They wish for the Napoleon dominion, and that Joseph may reign in Spain. In revolutionary times opinions are divided, and unfortunately men adopt ways of thinking to the prejudice of justice and contrary to their best intentions. Many find their interest promoted by Joseph's reign; and if it is not their own, it is that of their old friends and relations, who hesitatingly followed the French cause in the beginning, and whom our Governors have forced to run into the usurper's arms without having endeavoured to draw them back, as they might have done, to the bosom of their country, to whom they might have been very useful. On the other side there are other people who, in hopes of pushing their fortunes during the revolution, or at least preserving their former influence and destiny, find their hopes blasted and their employments taken away from them. From all these materials is composed what I call the French party, which is certainly much more numerous than is generally believed, and in which so many individuals signalize themselves so conspicuously, that, whatever they may do to the contrary, their intentions cannot be mistaken.

They use various means to augment their numbers—all indirect means, indeed; and they clothe their language according to the persons whom they are addressing. On one point they certainly all agree, and thus they are making rapid progress. They know that our insurrection has been supported by England, and that if she had not afforded us assistance of every description, Spain would have been subjugated. They therefore endeavour to diminish the influence of the British government, and they leave nothing untried to indispose us against England, each of them making use for that purpose of the language that is most conformable to his ideas.

Among the *Serviles*, my Lord, they make converts under the pretence of religion and the English Constitution, which, as it limits, in their opinion, too much the authority of a king, they assure them is not compatible with the authority of a monarch, for whom this class of people are panting, but which they added is opposed by the English. The Liberales, on the con-

trary, they endeavour to persuade that the Constitution of your country is defective, and that it gives too much latitude to the regal authority; and that the English, sensible of the defects of which ours has been purged, will set about reforming theirs if they find that ours lasts any length of time, and that there is a large party formed in its favour; that this not being agreeable to the Cabinet of St. James, nor the different ranks of people that enjoy influence in the State and compose the Parliament, the British government is determined to prevent our Constitution from establishing itself solidly. All the actions of the English are consequently represented in this light. Those who merely wish for independence are told that you resist it because you do not assist and forward our expeditions to America, to encourage the European party in that country who desire the dependence of America and the monopoly of trade. You are represented as the fosterers and supporters of the ultramarine insurrection, because you do not unite your means with ours to extinguish these commotions by force of arms. And finally, they talk to the patriots their language by saying that in not reinforcing your armies you give a death-blow to the national independence; that this is done in order to prolong the struggle, which will terminate only with the extermination of ourselves and our nation's independence. If you send troops to us, it is for the purpose of subjugating us and depriving us of our freedom. If the opening of the campaign is delayed, as it should be, they say it is for the purpose of giving time to the French to lay waste the country. If successful actions are fought, it is for giving us the law. If you neglect our armies, it is for the purpose of exposing them to be beat by the enemy. If you discipline them and provide for them, it is to alienate their affections from the nation and making us dependent on England; and thus we shall have been fighting to change masters.

My Lord, it would take up much of my time were I to inform you of all the false colours which perfidy gives to the most disinterested and generous actions. It is sufficient to observe that all these insinuations to the unwary patriots who desire the independence of the nation are the more dangerous because they flatter and at the same time find encouragement in the national pride, which is very necessary, proper, and expedient to keep up the contest; but at the same time it would be the means of drawing us into slavery if these perturbators succeeded in leaving us alone to fight out the contest upon our own resources. I suppose, my dear Lord, that I am merely giving you here an account of facts and opinions, without either approving or censuring them. Some of the latter are so depraved and malignant, that they do not deserve refutation, they only merit indignation and contempt; but they certainly do exist, and unfortunately their foundation is adapted to mislead many who contribute to what they really in their hearts do detest. My Lord, consider of all this with your usual profound discrimination, and adopt what measures you may think proper with regard to us here. We must be silent and have patience, and time will correct these evils. The successful operations of the campaign, which I fervently pray for, will clear up matters and oblige the champions of this party to remain silent, and consequently present an opportunity to those who, either from ignorance or simplicity, are among their partisans, to learn that the British government sincerely desires the liberty and independence of Spain, and that a close alliance between the two nations is what can alone terrify

the colossal and oppressive power of France, and restrain it within such just bounds as will prevent her ambition and her resources from attempting and effecting the ruin of other powers. Nothing then will prevent Englishmen from being treated by the Spaniards as friends and allies with esteem and gratitude; but in the mean while malignity will find plenty of opportunities for her perfidious insinuations.

My Lord, I see in your Lordship's hands the means of accomplishing the above; and it is simply that you should follow that victorious career which has already immortalized your name and will render it ever dear to Spaniards. It is clear that the approaching campaign will silence a party who found all their hopes upon disturbing the friendly relations of the two countries; and as soon as these hopes shall have been destroyed by the great events of the North and the prosperous issue of the affairs of the Peninsula, there will be an end of their intrigues. My Lord, conquer the French, and you will silence these people; and though they will mourn over it in secret, they will finally applaud and respect the deliverer of Spain, and learn to appreciate the restorer of the liberty and independence of nations. That all this may happen is wished and prayed for by those few whom I mentioned to you before as belonging *here* to no ostensible party. I have added *here*, my Lord, because the nation in general is of that opinion; and there would not be the slightest difference or diversity of opinion were it not for that clashing of interests, or rather the misfortunes of the times. Disgusted as I am at the account I have been giving you of the manner of thinking of some persons in this city (which, although it has many honest men within its walls, may be said to contain the greater part of the bad men of the whole Peninsula), permit me notwithstanding, my Lord, to declare with a satisfaction which I cannot repress, that my country is sensible and grateful for the services it has received at the hands of their true friends, and that it knows to distinguish from the latter those who, under the mask of friendship, are brooding over dark and perfidious designs; and, in one word, that the Spanish nation entertains such a sense of the magnanimous conduct of Great Britain, since the opening of the revolution, as becomes a great, a generous, and a grateful people.

To return now to your letter, in order to apply the observations I have made: I find the reflections it contains just in the extreme; and the modifications which you propose should be introduced into our system of government are founded upon solid and practical wisdom. I will even say, in my own praise, that I have not only always avowed the same sentiments since my arrival in this city, but I have repeatedly declared even the Council of State to be useless and prejudicial. But as I have already observed, their Projet de Constitution was already drawn up and regulated according to the principles mentioned above, and which the agents of the executive body took good care to proclaim when they saw their authority about to escape from their hands.

And if at that time no remedy could be easily applied, how much more difficult will it be now, the Projet being reduced into a fundamental law, and political Constitution, which has been proclaimed with so much solemnity, received by some with so much enthusiasm, and cherished and defended by its promoters with so much tenderness and care! Firstly, glance over the picture I have been giving you, my dear Lord, of the different opinions and

designs of the parties, and compare it with the reform which you and I are desirous of introducing for the good of Spain. It will be easy to perceive that it would be chimerical and useless to undertake such a reform, and it was for the very purpose of demonstrating to you the impracticability of the thing, that I have given you a sketch of the characters that are connected with this subject, and from it would be idle to expect that they would contribute towards its introduction.

And finally, how could you expect these legislators to undo themselves, when by an express Article of their own making they have decreed their functions to be permanent, and not revocable at least for a period of fourteen years? This Article is contrary to their own principles of sovereign authority, which is never to be limited without prejudice to the State, but is quite conformable to their designs, from which nothing on earth will make them desist.

From what I have said, my Lord, you will be able to foresee what good it would produce were I to bring forward your letter and communicate my sentiments, which are in unison with yours, to my friends in the Cortes. The effect which the reading of it to them would produce would be (except in some few instances) quite contrary to our wishes.

I have spun out my letter to some length, and in it I have tendered to your Lordship my tribute of admiration at your Lordship's reflections, and I shall esteem myself highly honoured by your communicating to me your ideas in future.

Look upon me, my Lord, as one of those who appreciate and admire the qualities which so eminently adorn you, and who, grateful for the goodness which you have shown to me, esteem it an honour to call myself

Your devoted servant and affectionate friend,

A. A. DE LA VEGA.

[681.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD, Vera, 10th Aug., 1813.

I write to draw your attention to the situation of Sir Rowland Hill and Sir John Hope. They each of them command very large corps, and great expenses must be incurred by them; and I know that the former, and I believe the latter, has not the means of defraying those expenses.

The General officers of the British army are altogether very badly paid, and, adverting to the deductions from their pay, they receive less than they did fifty years ago, while their expenses are more than doubled; and their allowances of all kinds are smaller than those of corresponding ranks in other services, while, from the custom of the British army, they are all obliged to keep tables for their staff, and their expenses are greater. It would not probably be possible to increase the pay

of General officers generally; but I earnestly recommend that Sir John Hope and Sir Rowland Hill should have an allowance each equal to that of the second in command in Sicily, or to the commanding officer at Cadiz.

I would beg your Lordship to observe likewise that the expenses of an officer who must spend more than he receives here are vastly increased by the disadvantageous rate at which he is obliged to draw his money; and I believe that in this way even Sir Thomas Graham, who has a large private fortune, has been frequently in distress here.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Lesaca, 10th Aug., 1813. [682.]

1. The Commander of the Forces has desired the Commissary-General to direct the Commissaries with the several brigades of infantry and regiments of cavalry to make issues of bread, in the manner usual in all armies, for three days at a time. It will be necessary, however, that the commanding officers of regiments and of companies should particularly attend to their men on this subject, and should inspect the bread twice a day, and see that the soldiers do not consume in one day what is given them to last three. The Commander of the Forces requests the General officers commanding divisions and brigades to give orders on this subject.

2. The state of the ammunition of the soldiers likewise requires the constant attention of the officers, and the Commander of the Forces begs that the General Orders on this subject may be particularly attended to.

WELLINGTON.

To Earl Bathurst. [683.]

My Lord, Lesaca, 10th Aug., 1813.

I enclose a letter from the Minister at War of the Spanish Regency, in which he has informed me that the Cortes have been pleased to confer upon me the Royal possession in Granada called El Soto de Roma, to be held according to the laws and

constitution of Spain; and I beg your Lordship to lay this letter before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and to request his permission for me to accept this gift from the Cortes. In case His Royal Highness should consent to my acceptance of this possession, it is my intention to pay the rent of it into the Spanish treasury during the continuance of the contest for the independence of the country.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Decreto de 22 *de Julio de* 1813.

Las Córtes generales y extraordinarias, á nombre de la nacion Española, en testimonio de su mas sincera gratitud, decretan: Se adjudica al Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo para si, sus heredores y sucesores, el sitio y posesion Real, conocido en la vega de Granada, por *el Soto de Roma*, con inclusion del terreno llamado *de las Chanchinas*, que si halla situado dentro el mismo término del Soto para que si hayan y desfruten con aseglo á la Constitucion y á las leyes. Lo tendrá entendido la Regencia del Reino para su cumplimiento, y lo hara publicar. Dado en Cadiz á 22 de Julio de 1813. *Josef Antonio Sombiela*, Presidente; *Manuel Gorganes*, Deputado Secretario; *Fermin de Clementi*, Deputado Secretario. A la Regencia del Reino, Reg. lib. 2, fol. 222.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 13th Aug., 1813.

I found your Lordship's letter of this morning on my return from the front of La Peña d'Aya, which I wished Major Smith to see and take into his consideration, as before he had confined himself entirely to the plain on the left of St. Marçial.

But the security of any position in the valley depends entirely on its right being covered by the heights connected with the Peña d'Aya. As the Staff Corps have finished their work on the road, I mean to employ them in preparing palisades, which will be useful in any works that may be deemed necessary when your Lordship can examine the ground yourself.

As the wind is now, we have a right to look every day for the arrival of the division of transports from Falmouth. I fear these, however, will be the Cuxhaven equipment, and will have no quantity of shot to enable us to renew the attack. Everything is ready now, were the ordnance and shot arrived.

I send off your Lordship's letter and the newspapers to Marshal Beresford.

We shall probably be left as usual in the lurch by the Allies, to whom Buonaparte will make great concessions, in order to be left free to act against Spain.

It never seems to have been at all impressed on the minds of the Northern Powers that securing the independence of Spain was one of the severest blows to Buonaparte's overwhelming influence in Europe.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

G. O. Lesaca, 14th Aug., 1813. [684.]

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that with the morning state of the 20th instant the several regiments should send in a nominal list of the men returned in that state "Sick absent," specifying the letter of the company and the name of the Captain to which each man belongs, and the man's number; and as far as may be possible, the general or detachment hospital at which the men are supposed to be.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, War Department, London, 14th Aug., 1813.

General ——— has sent a memoir to the Foreign Office, with plans and schemes for the operations of your Lordship's army, with which I do not think it necessary to trouble you; but as his paper contains here and there some local information regarding places in the south of France, I have thought it worth while to have these passages extracted, and I enclose them herewith, though I have no means of ascertaining whether General ———'s information be correct or otherwise.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully yours,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

(Extracts.)

Ils marcheront sur Toulouse, dont on leur donnera le pillage. Cette place est ouverte. Après ce coup de main, dont le succès dépend de la célérité de la marche, et de la vivacité de l'attaque contre la Garde Nationale, plus aguerrie que celle de Béziers et de Narbonne, le centre et la gauche se rendront à Bordeaux à marches forcées. Buonaparte a fait construire à grand frais une route pavée, ce qui rendra cette opération très facile. Le cinquième jour l'armée alliée entrera dans Bordeaux, qui est sans défense, à moins que Joseph Buonaparte n'aye une armée suffisante pour couvrir cette place.

C'est alors qu'une expédition de chaloupes canonnières et bombardes devra remonter la Gironde pour canonner le pate ou fort de Blaye, qui est au milieu de la rivière, et accélérer la reddition du fort Medoc, en le bombardant pendant que du côté de terre on brusqueroit l'attaque de vive force. Ces deux forts

sont dans très mauvais état, mal-approvisionnés, et susceptibles d'être insultés avec succès si on les attaque avec intelligence et avec audace. Alors le cours de la Gironde devient libre depuis Bordeaux jusqu'à la Tour de Cordouan, et l'on sort de cette place des approvisionnemens et des richesses immenses.

C'est le nombre et les mouvemens de l'armée Française qui peuvent seulement déterminer les dispositions du Général Anglais. Il a cinq positions importantes qu'il peut occuper successivement sans pouvoir être forcé à lever le siége de Bayonne, en supposant que cette ville n'ait pas encore ouvert ses portes lorsque les Français seront en mesure pour prendre l'offensive. La première est l'Adour, qui prend sa source dans les Pyrénées, près de Bagnères en Bigorre, passe par Tarbes, Aire, Dax, et se jette dans la mer près de Bayonne. La seconde ligne est le Luy, qui prend sa source près de Pontac, à l'orient de Pau, et se réunit à l'Adour au sud de Dax, près de Saubusse. La troisième ligne est le Gave de Pau. La quatrième est le Gave d'Oleron, et la cinquième est la Bidouze, qui se jette dans l'Adour au-dessus de Guiche. Après avoir fait acheter chèrement ces succès à l'ennemi, le Général des Alliées peut présenter position derrière la Nive pour protéger la marche de son attirail de siége sur Fontarabie ou St. Sebastian, quoiqu'il paroisse plus naturel que le tout soit embarqué à bord des vaisseaux chargés d'agir de concert avec l'expédition de terre.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 14th Aug., 1813.

There is nothing new to report on this side. General Freyre told me this morning that, according to his intelligence, some thousand men had been marched by the enemy towards their left at St. Jean Pied de Port, and that he understood that 3000 conscripts had joined their army.

Sir R. Fletcher has sent Captain Stanway to Guetaria, but he is, from the report of the Spanish engineers, inclined to think the making of wells will be a tedious job. He has directed Captain Stanway, however, to make a particular report on that head, and on the necessary garrison, at the same time giving generally his opinion about the place. No ships in sight this forenoon.

Sir George Collier tells me the Spanish commandant at Pasages has given him information that there is a large assemblage of boats and gun-vessels or convoy at St. Jean de Luz. He meant to go up in his boat this morning to endeavour to ascertain the truth of this. He thinks an application to Lord Keith might induce him to try to stop the cabotage from the northward towards Bayonne, which he cannot spare anything for.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
Thomas Graham.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

My dear Sir Rowland, Lesaca, 14th Aug., 1813.

Your letter dated at 8 A.M. on the 11th inst. reached me only yesterday. It probably arrived in the forenoon of yesterday, although in consequence

of my having gone to the left of the army I did not get it till my return to Lesaca at night.

It is of course of great importance in the present situation of the army that our communications from all parts of the extended position we occupy should be arranged with a view to the greatest expedition as well as security of conveyance in cases of real emergency. I beg therefore that you will give such directions as appear most likely to be effectual for bringing this about, and that you will let me know what the arrangements are which have been adopted.

I beg you will also give orders to the officer commanding in the valley of Les Alduides to report direct to head-quarters in all extraordinary cases.

G. MURRAY.

I shall forward this through the cavalry at San Estevan and in the valley of Baztan to Les Alduides.

G. M.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 15th Aug., 1813.

As there are three roads which lead up from the position of Irun to that in front of this place, viz., the great road, the old road to Renteria on its left, and one on the right, following the narrow valley between the fall of the great hill connected with the Peña de Aya and some considerable heights which rise in the valley very near the great road, and which extend from the camp of the Guards almost to Irun, it occurs to me that some defensive works of consequence on these roads might be of great use as rallying points, should the forward position be forced, and that these might be constructed without any difficulty by the troops of the 1st division encamped near the material points. I have desired Major Smith to make a sketch of this ground and of such works as it might be essential to begin with on this idea. No doubt, to complete such a second line, others on the hills on each side of the valley would be requisite; but these would come into the general plan of defence, of which this would always be a very essential part.

As soon as there is anything fit to show, I shall transmit the sketch to your Lordship.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. Sir G. Collier has just sent me word that there is a large fleet of above sixty sail coming to Pasages.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 15th Aug., 1813.

As I foresee that my health will not enable me to continue my services long in a useful or creditable way, I think it my duty to give your Lord-

ship the earliest notice of my wish to retire, that there may be sufficient time to make such arrangements as may be expedient for replacing me in the very distinguished command your Lordship has confided to me.

I was anxious to make the trial of serving again under your Lordship's command, and I returned to the army in the hopes of being able to continue; but of late the great increase of stomach complaints to which I have been subject, and which require much attention, as well as the aggravation of the symptoms which affect my right eye, warn me that it is time to relinquish the duties of active service. In making this communication to your Lordship now, I would not wish to be understood to be desirous of withdrawing myself till my services can be dispensed with without inconvenience, which probably may be the case in six or eight weeks hence.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

[685.] *To Dom M. Forjaz.*

SENHOR, Lesaca, 16th Aug., 1813.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's communication of the 2nd instant, and, in respect to its contents, I feel it incumbent upon me to acquaint your Excellency that I experience great satisfaction in hearing that the conduct of Major-General Peacocke, in the discharge of the duties of his command at Lisbon, has been always regulated in a manner satisfactory to their Excellencies the Governors of the Kingdom, who have directed your Excellency to make it known to me.

Your Excellency may assure their Excellencies that I shall take the earliest opportunity to make known to the superiors of that officer the favourable opinion which their Excellencies manifest in his behalf, and, at the same time, I most decidedly concur in the desire expressed by their Excellencies of making known to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal his meritorious conduct.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 16th Aug., 1813.

I congratulate you on your distinguished success. You have not in your despatch stated the estimated loss of the enemy, and have not even men-

tioned the number of prisoners. In the bulletin which I have published I have supplied this deficiency, as it is that which is very material in estimating the extent of the success, and will be considered here as of *most importance*. Will you forgive my begging you to state these particulars on future occasions, for it does not come with so good an effect from me?

Five thousand stand of arms are ready shipped in case of emergency, and I have this morning ordered the vessel to drop down the river and proceed to Pasages. Shoes have been sent in some of the late convoys, but more shall be immediately forwarded to your Lordship.

I must beg of you to enforce the order for the transports to return as soon as they have landed the men or horses on board. All the transports which conveyed the greater part of the Swedish army to Stralsund from Sweden are detained in the Baltic by the earnest desire of the Crown Prince. This, with the number also detained in the Mediterranean, sadly cripples us.

I have heard of several transports having arrived at Pasages or Santander some time ago, and they do not seem to think of returning.

Ever yours, my dear Lord, most sincerely,

BATHURST.

P.S. Since writing the above I have had a return of the number of shoes sent out since the 29th of July, 83,000 pair, which I hope you will have received by this time.

The 7th Hussars begin embarking to-day. They were not ready to leave the London duty and march before.

The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, London, 16th Aug., 1813.

I avail myself of the opportunity of Baron Trip's going to the Peninsula to acquaint you with my arrival in town, which I reached only this morning at one o'clock, having had a passage of nine days, during three of which I was becalmed. The news of your late victories, of which you made me the bearer, has created the greatest sensation here; the *Sparrow* cutter having brought very alarming reports as to our loss before St. Sebastian and in the battle of the 28th. The Regent is quite delighted with the manner in which the troops behaved, and was particularly pleased with your account of the manner in which General Barnes's brigade drove the two French divisions from the Puerto de Echalar. Baron Trip calls for my letter: I however cannot finish without expressing again to your Lordship how very much obliged and thankful I feel for the many favours and marks of kindness I received from you during the course of the two years I spent in your family.

Your most obedient and obliged,

WILLIAM, Hereditary Prince of Orange.

There is a report of Austria having declared in favour of the good cause, and of the hostilities going to be renewed. I know not yet in how far this is to be believed.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 16th Aug., 1813.

I have received your letters of the 4th and 6th. Your battles in the Pyrenees seem to have surpassed all the other events of this extraordinary campaign. I wish I could say that they had made the impression which they ought to have made upon this government, but they have been almost passed over in silence, to the indignation of all the well meaning people in this place.

I enclose a copy of the note which I addressed to the government in consequence of the instructions which I received from Lord Castlereagh. You will see that I have avoided all mention of General Castaños, and have only remonstrated upon the breach of conditions with you. Lord Castlereagh's despatch and private letter left me no choice as to making a remonstrance, and indeed I am not surprised that the British government should take this matter up as likely to be of serious injury to the cause of the Allies. In that view of it the British government had a perfect right to interfere. In his private letter to me Lord Castlereagh says, "I have thought it advisable to lose no time in authorizing you to take up the late most perverse encroachment upon Lord Wellington's authority with decision. I have been desirous of making this interposition the exclusive act of the government, and you may show my despatch with its enclosure to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which will satisfy him that the displeasure occasioned by the conduct of the Spanish government has neither been excited by you nor Lord Wellington. I consider the present point as one on which the authority of the British government may be advantageously pressed, not merely with a view of arresting a great evil, but of checking the Anti-Anglican party in the government and Cortes."

I took upon myself, however, to alter the note, knowing the mischief which would have been produced by the mention of the removal of General Castaños, which in fact is not, as I have all along insisted, the cause of the difference between you and the Spanish government. But agreeing as I do entirely with Lord Castlereagh, that the British government has decidedly a right to interfere in a case involving the success of the war, I did not hesitate to send the note, of which the enclosed is a copy.

No answer has as yet been returned to it. I was anxious to get the answer before I wrote to you, but I will not any longer delay informing you of what has passed. I understand that the Minister of War is furious, and complains of the interference of the British government; but I think I can prove, beyond the power of contradiction, that we have a decided right to interfere.

I gave an extract of your letter of the 4th to the Minister of State, with a request that he would communicate it to the Regency, and that he would particularly call their attention to that part of it which relates to the feeding of the army. Everybody complains of the manner in which the business is conducted in the War Department; everything is in arrear. Indeed the Minister of War has such *rotten* health that I do not think it possible he can continue long in office.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

[Enclosure.]

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Don Antonio Cano Manuel.

Cadiz, 10th Aug., 1813.

The undersigned Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty has been commanded by the Prince Regent to represent to His Excellency the Minister of State that His Royal Highness has heard with the deepest regret and surprise that, in the midst of a campaign commenced under the most flattering auspices for the deliverance of the Peninsula, the Spanish government has, without any previous communication with Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, in a variety of instances broken the conditions which he considered to be necessary, and upon which alone he consented to hold the chief command of the Spanish army conferred upon him by a decree of the Cortes; and His Royal Highness loses not a moment in directing the undersigned to remonstrate in the most energetic manner against measures destructive of all confidence, and obviously subversive of the Marquess of Wellington's essential military authority.

His Royal Highness considers the fate of Spain to depend on the Allied army being permitted to act under the undivided command of one General, sustained by the avowed and unqualified support of the respective governments.

The high sense of honour with which the government of Spain is known to observe all its public engagements, and the evident impossibility of the Marquess of Wellington's fulfilling the important trust to which he has been expressly called by the government of Spain if his authority is not upheld, His Royal Highness doubts not, will at once determine that government to afford satisfaction to the Field Marshal with respect to the measures referred to, and an assurance that he will in future be left in the free exercise of his authority, according to the conditions stipulated, and under which the character of the national troops has so recently acquired the highest distinction.

The undersigned is commanded to signify His Royal Highness's confident persuasion that the Spanish government will not for a moment hesitate in rendering this act of justice as well to the Commander in Chief as to themselves; and His Royal Highness has no doubt that his representations will be received by the Spanish government in a manner consonant to those principles of friendship which so happily unite the feelings as well as the interests of the two nations.

The undersigned avails himself, &c.,

H. Wellesley.

Earl Bathurst to the Prince Regent.

Downing Street, 17th Aug., 1813.

Lord Bathurst most humbly submits to your Royal Highness that it would be gratifying to the army serving under the Marquess of Wellington if your Royal Highness were graciously pleased to distinguish some of the General Officers whose names have been mentioned with commendation by Lord Wellington in the late battles of Vitoria and the Pyrenees, by making them Extra Knights of the Bath.

Where so many are deserving, selection becomes invidious, unless some rule be adopted, by which, while some are admitted, others may be excluded without any disparagement of their military merits.

Lord Bathurst most humbly submits for your Royal Highness's consideration the rule which, on the present occasion, might be adopted, viz.:—

The Lieutenant-Generals serving in Lord Wellington's army in the battles of Vitoria and the Pyrenees.

The heads of Lord Wellington's Staff.

The persons who would be included by this rule are Lord Dalhousie and the Honourable W. Stewart, both Lieutenant-Generals; Major-General Murray, Quartermaster-General; Major-General Pakenham, Adjutant-General of Lord Wellington's army.

These four have been all mentioned by Lord Wellington with commendation, and are very deserving of your Royal Highness's favour.

Lord Bathurst hopes that your Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to enable Lord Bathurst to communicate your Royal Highness's pleasure on this subject to Lord Wellington by the next mail, which is fixed for Thursday next.

No other rule has occurred to Lord Bathurst which would not make the number of Extra Knights too great.

Approved,

G. P. R.

Brighton, Wednesday, P.M., 9 o'clock,
18th Aug., 1813.

[686.] *To Colonel Malcolm.*

My dear Malcolm, Lesaca, 18th Aug., 1813.

I have received your letter of the 25th July. I don't think I can be of much use to you in any way, and I should imagine of none in forwarding your views upon Constantinople. That Court is sometimes the seat of important diplomatic negotiations, and, at others, a sort of splendid retreat for ambassadors. You would be considered an interloper, by either the active or the declining diplomate. You had better adhere to your objects in India. Get into Parliament, if you can afford it; be nobody's man but your own, and you will soon be known, and get on.

Believe me, &c.,

Wellington.

P.S. I am afraid your brother-in-law will lose his leg, but he is in good health, and will get a pension in return. I have recommended him for promotion.

Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Hospitalet, 19th Aug., 1813.

I have the honour to inform you that the enemy blew up Tarragona last night, and have retired.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

W. C. Bentinck.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

My dear Sir Rowland, Lesaca, 19th Aug., 1813.

I received this morning your letter of the 17th inst. There is no artillery which can be at present specifically allotted to the works constructing by Mr. Wright. There is, however, no objection to your placing any part of the artillery attached to the troops under your orders into these works, should you deem it expedient, adverting of course to that artillery being withdrawn should the troops quit these positions.

I beg you will let me know whether any of the works constructed by Lieutenant Wright are constructed upon the plan of the second sort mentioned in my letter of the 8th inst., viz., that of being able to maintain themselves in the absence of the troops occupying the other parts of the position.

G. Murray.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Horse Guards, 19th Aug., 1813.

I have had the pleasure to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant, delivered to me by His Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and covering the copies of your reports to the Secretary of State of the operations of the army under your command.

I have frequently had occasion to convey to your Lordship, by command of the Prince Regent, the approbation and thanks of His Royal Highness for the great and important services you have rendered your country, and to accompany such communications not only by the expression of my concurrent approval, but by my congratulations personally upon the signal success which has so eminently crowned the exertion of your talents, your characteristic energy, and your professional knowledge.

Upon no occasion, however, have the gallantry and discipline of the troops and the display of those qualities which you so eminently apply to their successful guidance been more happily exercised for the honour of His Majesty's arms and those of his allies than in the arduous exertions which have marked your operations from the 24th of July to the 2nd instant. The success of these operations, and particularly as comprised in the total

defeat of the French army in the two battles of the 28th and 30th of July, is appreciated by the Prince Regent in a proportion commensurate with the ability and bravery with which the enemy conducted his attack under a boasted and declared expectation of success.

It is with such sentiments that I am authorised to desire that your Lordship will be pleased to accept, and to convey to the General officers and the whole army under your command, the thanks of His Royal Highness for the great and successful exertions by which your and their conduct have been distinguished; and in concurring with such approval, I request your acceptance of my warmest congratulations.

I am, my Lord, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 19th Aug., 1813.

I avail myself of the departure of the mail for the north of Spain to offer the sincere and heartfelt congratulations of an humble individual upon this fresh instance of your great success.

I never flattered created man, nor is there that being in existence, however great, whom I would compliment at the expense of my judgment. In saying, therefore, that you have proved yourself to be the first General of the present age, or that our history makes known to us in ages past, I am merely giving utterance to a truth which you have established beyond the detraction of envy, hatred, or malice. You really have had hard work of it; but it is nothing more than what I thought would occur in repelling the effort which Soult would make to regain the lost honour of the French arms. It would be a libel upon the merit of yourself and your army to disavow that he made the attempt with great ability; but the morale of the army opposed to you must now have received such a shock that little is to be apprehended from a similar attempt; and when you drive them from the Puerto de Vera, if you see fit to do so, their means of making an impression upon your position will be still more remote. The possession of St. Sebastian appears of great importance, and I trust your ordnance stores have long ere this arrived. Believe me, my dear Lord, that nothing connected with the executive government of the country requires reform more than this Ordnance Department. It is, as now constituted, the greatest clog about the State. It is a mélange of jealousy, intrigue, and stupid prejudice; and to nothing but the neglect of the *Board* is the failure in your supplies to be attributed. There are two powers in the Ordnance Department always acting in opposition and in contradiction to each other: the one is that of the Master-General himself and his secretary, and the other is the Board and their secretary. They are jealous of each other; and although the former is generally as efficient as the latter is the contrary, yet the Board, upon the subject of supply in particular, possess an independence at variance with the prompt control the chief *ought to exercise*. The constitution of the whole thing is radically bad.

I am a little proud of General Barnes, whom I selected for your Staff,

and who, with General Robinson, formed part of the batch of Generals that alarmed you so much.

I wish we had ample reinforcements for you: this would be the time to send them, and the militia of the country would volunteer in a body, officers and all, if government would but decide upon putting such a measure to them, and 20,000 men might be got in a few weeks. There is such a military spirit in the country just now, owing to your successes, that even a conscription would, I believe, be tolerated.

God bless you, my dear Lord, and believe me

Ever yours most faithfully and sincerely,

H. Torrens.

Your godson, who is one of the finest boys in England, fights your battles over with his painted soldiers.

H. T.

G. O. Lesaca, 20th Aug., 1813. [687.]

1. At a General Court Martial, held by virtue of a warrant and in pursuance of an order, &c. &c., Serjeant ——, of the 5th battalion — regiment, was arraigned upon the following charge:

* * * * * *

The Court having maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the evidence produced on the part of the prosecution, as well as what the prisoner has offered in defence, are of opinion that he, the prisoner, Serjeant ——, 5th battalion — regiment, is guilty of the charge preferred against him, viz.: "For deserting from his battalion towards the enemy, on or about the 17th November, 1812, near San Muñoz, and being dressed in the uniform of a French serjeant when taken prisoner at Vitoria after the battle," in breach of the Articles of War; and the Court do, by virtue of the said Articles, sentence him, the prisoner, Serjeant ——, of the 5th battalion — regiment, to be shot to death, at such time and place as his Excellency the Commander of the Forces may be pleased to direct.

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The sentence of the General Court Martial on the trial of Serjeant ——, of the 5th battalion — regiment, is to be carried into execution on the 22nd August in front of the lines of the 6th division of infantry, under the direction of the Assistant Provost Marshal attached to the 3rd division, in presence of

such troops of the 6th division, and the 5th battalion — regiment, as can be conveniently assembled, to be paraded for that purpose.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 20th Aug., 1813.

I have received your letter respecting the objection you feel to the Court Martial on Sir John Murray being held in your army. There would certainly be great inconvenience if the Court were fixed at a place far removed from the naval witnesses, who are stationed on the Eastern coast; but this inconvenience would be much greater if the Court Martial were to take place here.

The objection which you allude to, if the Court Martial were composed of the Eastern army, is, I think, conclusive. Upon the whole, therefore, I cannot help continuing to be of opinion that the Court Martial had better be composed of your army; but, in order to meet your objection as well as I can, I should propose it not assembling until the campaign be closed, and it may then meet in a more central place. This will be an additional argument for officers not having leave of absence in the winter. Your Lordship has always complained of this practice, and have yet felt great reluctance to refuse such applications. If you do not, therefore, object, I propose to relieve you from this difficulty by instructing you not to grant leave of absence except in cases of great emergency; and if there is to be this Court Martial held, it may furnish me with a fair occasion for giving that instruction.

The delaying of the trial so long may be objected to, but there are solid reasons for the delay, and I do not think Sir John Murray will have reason to complain.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 20th Aug., 1813.

I was upon the point of sending off a courier to you when I received your letter of the 9th, enclosing a copy of your letter to the Minister of War of the 7th. No answer has been returned to my note, yet I believe it has produced a good effect. I understand that the Regents and the Minister of War express great satisfaction at your letter, and that they propose to return an answer which will be satisfactory to you. You are to be told (as I am informed) that you have the full confidence of government, and that you are to consider yourself as exercising the powers of Generalissimo of the Spanish armies, although you are not invested with

the title. In short, they seem disposed to make atonement for what has passed, and not to interfere in future; but it is impossible for me to say whether this will be done in a manner which will satisfy you. The point of the greatest importance seems to me to be that you should retain the command at least until the campaign is over.

In addition to the extract in my last letter, Lord Castlereagh says, in his private letter to me, "I have not been insensible to the serious extent to which this pernicious temper has of late disclosed itself. I have been desirous, however, of postponing any ostensible demonstrations on the part of this government to repress such tendencies till the armies were in motion, and until some point occurred which might be laid hold of with effect. None can be more favourable than the present. The justice and policy of the case, the great name and popularity of Lord Wellington, and the triumphant progress of the allied arms exposed to hazard by this violation of all faith, will render our interference not only necessary, but popular."

We are going on here worse than ever. The Cortes have decided that the new Cortes shall assemble at Cadiz. I am assured that many of the deputies to the new Cortes have received instructions from their provinces not to assemble anywhere but at Madrid, where there are about fifty deputies already collected. We shall be in a pretty condition if the new Cortes should refuse to come here, and should assemble elsewhere of their own authority. Their first act would probably be the appointment of a new Regency. The enclosed extract of my despatch will show you what has passed upon this subject in the Cortes.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

If you can comply with the request contained in the enclosed paper, I shall be much obliged to you.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Cadiz, 19th Aug., 1813.

I have already communicated to your Lordship the correspondence which has passed between me and the Minister for Foreign Affairs relative to the removal of the government to the capital. The question has since been discussed in the Cortes, and it was decided by a large majority that the kingdom was not at present in such a state of security as would justify the removal of the public authorities from Cadiz. After notice had been given for a motion upon this subject, and before the day fixed for its discussion, every effort was made to intimidate the members who were known to be desirous of leaving Cadiz, until, upon a serious appeal from some of the deputies who were threatened by the populace, precautions were taken to secure the freedom of debate. There is no doubt, however, that the apprehension of the resentment of the populace induced many deputies to absent themselves from the Cortes on the day this question was discussed, and probably influenced several of them to vote with the majority.

The question has since been brought forward in a new shape, a motion having been made for immediately appointing the deputation which is to

meet the new Cortes, and that it should proceed to Madrid for that purpose. This was opposed by the Liberales and the Americans, and, upon a division taking place, the numbers for and against it were equal. Upon a second division, which, conformably to a rule of the Constitution, was postponed to the following day, the motion was lost by a majority of 4 : the number in its favour being 100, and against 104.

M. Mexia then moved that instructions should immediately be sent to the different provinces, requiring the deputies who were to compose the new Cortes to repair to Cadiz. This proposal was carried without a division, and the necessary instructions forwarded in the course of the day.

This is justly looked upon by the Liberales as a great triumph. Cadiz is the only place where they consider their persons to be in safety; and if the new Cortes should assemble here, it must necessarily delay the removal of the government to the capital. It is said to be the intention of Mr. Canga Arguelles, one of the deputies to the new Cortes, to take an early opportunity of moving for the repeal of the decree which precludes any deputy from holding a public employment for two years subsequent to the dissolution of the Cortes of which he was a member. The object of this motion would be to strengthen the present government by the accession of the talents of M. Arguelles and of others of the leading members of his party; and it is important to its success that it should be made previously to the removal of the Cortes from Cadiz, where the Liberales have more partisans than they are likely to meet with in any other part of Spain.

It is probable that the late resolutions will occasion great discontent in the provinces, many of which, I am informed, have instructed their deputies not to assemble anywhere but in the capital. There are already more than fifty deputies at Madrid who have expressed their determination not to proceed to Cadiz. The Ayuntamiento of that city have likewise made a strong representation to the government, insisting upon the privilege of the capital, and urging the immediate removal of the seat of the government.

There is no calculating the consequences if the new Cortes should decline assembling at Cadiz. It is certain that the greatest disgust has been excited in the interior by the proceedings of the authorities here, and perpetual complaints are received from the Gefes Politicos and other civil agents of the government of the difficulties which they meet with in the discharge of their duties, and of the impossibility of carrying into effect the regulations of the Constitution for the government of the provinces; and the late resolution to continue at Cadiz is not likely to improve the general sentiment prevailing in the provinces with respect to the administration of public affairs.

I have, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. Fletcher.

DEAR FLETCHER, Lesaca, 22nd Aug., 1813.

Lord Wellington wrote to you yesterday respecting the works to be undertaken for strengthening the position of Irun.

I had employed Captain Tod in making a sketch of the country in that direction, and he accompanied us when Lord Wellington rode over the ground. Captain Tod therefore knows the spots which Lord Wellington approved of and pointed out for works.

It seemed to be agreed that it would be desirable to keep all the ground

as far as the Bidasoa, including by that means the heights of St. Marçial and likewise the farthest slopes of the Peña de Aya, which lie on the right of the heights of St. Marçial.

It may not be in our power to maintain all this forward ground, however, except when we are in considerable force on the Irun part of our general defensive line upon the frontier; and on that account another position is also to be prepared, leaving out the heights of St. Marçial and the most forward slopes of the Peña de Aya. This second position has the same left with the first one (that is from Fuenterrabia to Irun), but at Irun it is thrown back in the direction of a rocky ravine, and it closes at a work proposed to be constructed upon a commanding part of the main branch of the Peña de Aya, before it divides and expands, which it does in approaching the river Bidasoa.

The worst part of this second position is after it leaves the protection of the rocky ravine I have above mentioned. It then falls along a tongue of land which is that, I think, on the extremity of which the redoubt X and flèche Z (immediately to the right of Irun) are placed in Major Smith's sketch. The lower part of the tongue of land is under the fire of the heights of St. Marçial, and is very much exposed to it. Our troops could, however, be covered from this fire; and by having a good work at a house situated upon this tongue of land where it is still considerably elevated, and not very near the St. Marçial heights, we might bring the lower part of the tongue under so heavy a fire from thence, and from the large work we should have on the height behind Irun, that the enemy could not possibly form or establish himself upon it.

In other respects I think this second position very strong, for on the right the approach to it is very narrow and well commanded; and as to Irun and all to the left of it, that part may be easily rendered very secure.

The town of Irun affords considerable facilities for establishing musketry defences, and we ought to have a strong permanent work, I think, upon the height which is about half a mile behind the town.

As to the position immediately in front of Oyarzun, I have not yet examined the ground sufficiently to form any opinion about it, but I propose going over to look at it to-morrow.

I fear you are not yet well enough to ride out, and by the time you are the siege will again occupy all your time; otherwise, if you are, I should be very glad if you could look over the ground of the positions I have mentioned, and exercise your judgment both as to the situation and the form of the works to be constructed.

Our first object by these works is present security, until we can get possession of San Sebastian and Pamplona.

But besides that, we should look forward to rendering a part of our force disposable for operations more to the eastward, if necessary; also to securing tranquillity in the winter, and even to something of permanent utility to the Spanish frontier. Our offensive operations this year have turned out very well, but we have yet not such firm hold of our conquests as we ought to have.

G. Murray.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 22nd Aug., 1813.

I found your Lordship's letter of this morning here on my return this afternoon from Ernani, the front of St. Sebastian, and the sand hills on the right. Sir Richard Fletcher seems desirous to have several large howitzers on the left attack in addition to the 13 guns. I much fear that battery will be found too distant. It is now calculated to be 760 yards from the face of the left bastion. Both Sir Richard Fletcher and Lieut.-Colonel Dickson wish much to know how far it would be right to use all the mortars that the additional equipments afford in bombarding the town. There is little doubt of that mode of attack facilitating the enterprise, which will always be an arduous one if the attack be confined to the left flank of the place. Indeed, there seems to be such a general opinion among all the officers of the 5th division that an attack in one column will always be made under such very disadvantageous circumstances, as to make its success at best extremely doubtful, and I much fear the effect of this general opinion may increase the risk of its failing. Meanwhile, however, the enemy has had time to countermine all the salient angles of the hornwork, which of course throws a great additional impediment in the way of any other attack.

By the *Zephyr* I received this evening three plans of the attacks made in 1719, which I shall send to-morrow to Sir Richard Fletcher.

I enclose a pencil tracing which will show your Lordship what was done and the means employed at that time. There were 40 guns, 12 mortars, and 4 pierriers; these last placed on the crest of the glacis. The innermost breach was chiefly made by the 6-gun battery on the right of the esplanade very near where our trench crosses the road, and the 10-gun battery was considerably in advance of the right of the burnt village of San Martin. What use was made of this 10-gun battery, or of what nature the guns were, is not stated. In one of the plans this battery is marked "10 pièces *qui n'ont pas tiré*." In another, the same is marked "*qui ne tirent plus*," which shows this battery was used, and certainly it is at half the distance of the redoubt 13-gun battery on the Convent Hill. The enemy are evidently working within the breach, as Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne has seen several explosions, and there was a great deal of dust rising there to-day. They have covered all the guns of the batteries of the Castle Hill with sod, and have converted all the communications up the hill into covered ways, as if determined to defend every inch of ground there.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

Thomas Graham.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 24th Aug., 1813.

I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of yesterday morning in the afternoon. I shall see Lieut.-Colonel Dickson to-day.

The chief use of the mortars, &c., was always meant to be reserved for the castle, against which no other kind of fire will be at all effectual, and its effect, whatever it is, greater in proportion to the numbers employed. Against the town too it would be chiefly to enfilade the lines of defence, and not generally to bombard the town, that any of that kind of fire might be found serviceable. Though, were it not for the devastation in the town, there might be considerable effects expected from that kind of fire against a garrison not protected by bomb-proofs. This was the case at Coni and Flushing, where bombardments alone reduced the places, though in the hands of the French.

Sir R. Fletcher has sent Major Smith back to mark out the works on the positions. Major-General Murray saw those points of this second line which we thought of, and which he seemed to think undoubtedly necessary, with some others. This position is not so well connected as could be wished, but it is the best the country will afford, and if strengthened in this manner, will be very formidable, and add much to the strength of the first line.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

To Earl Bathurst. [688.]

MY LORD, Lesaca, 25th Aug., 1813.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a list of the officers of the allied British and Portuguese army, who, according to the rule laid down in the Earl of Liverpool's despatch of the 3rd September, 1811, are entitled to a medal, or other badge of distinction, in commemoration of the battle of Vitoria.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 25th Aug., 1813.

I make no doubt you have judged right with respect to the instructions on General Castaños' recall, and General Lacy's appointment. At all events, our instruction arrived too late to have acted upon it with effect.

I feel all the delicacy of our interference in the internal government of Spain, the national jealousy on this subject, and the advantage which our enemies would take if we gave them any opportunity of working upon it.

On the other hand I think we may carry this forbearance too far, and we may lose our influence by not venturing to exert it. I do not mean this as a reflection upon what has passed, but as an introduction to a question on which I have for this month past intended to write to your Lordship.

Until the assembling of the new Cortes, the government of Spain must probably remain as it is; and their first act, it is to be hoped, will be the removal of their meetings to Madrid. After that, the formation of a new Regency will probably be discussed.

On questions of this nature we have varied in our policy; and there has always been a great difference of opinion whether we should or should not interfere.

Admitting for the present that it has been hitherto always advisable for us to be entirely neutral on these occasions, it by no means follows that it will be right for us to continue so, more particularly if the question should be whether the Princess of Brazil should or should not be the Regent.

Your brother Sir Henry has from time to time observed how much her party is gaining strength. In one of his despatches he says that in consequence of some misunderstanding between the South American party and the Liberales, her party was near gaining their object. There are, I think, many circumstances which must strengthen her party. If Spain shall be nearly, as I trust she will be, cleared of her invaders by October next, the revolutionary form of government which at present exists in the shape of a Regency ought to cease, in the opinion of all those who wish well to the monarchical government, and are capable of foreseeing the mischief which the present system, if continued, must produce. The enthusiasm of the country has saved Spain in spite of these Regencies; but when the French are gone, that spirit will die away, and they must look to a more regular form of government. These considerations will, I think, tend to strengthen the Princess of Brazil's party, unless there should be an immediate prospect of Ferdinand's release. If the Prince Regent of Portugal should return to Lisbon, which is in contemplation, this will also materially assist the Princess in her object. The question then which I wish to ask you is, if you advise us to assist her, to counteract her, or to be neutral.

If we decidedly counteract her, I do not think she will succeed; but shall we have a better government? If we are neutral, she may succeed, and we shall have her as much our enemy as if we had thwarted her. If by our interference she becomes Regent, we identify ourselves with her government. All who have been adverse to her, will become adverse to us; and many who might have been favourable to her, or at least indifferent, will, from a jealousy of our interference, become also adverse to her. On the other hand, it will be our fault if we do not make her feel that she owes her elevation to us. A Regent is a more efficient government than a Council of Regency; and no person, on general principles, so fit to be Regent as the heir apparent or presumptive to the Crown.

The bias of my mind is certainly rather for an interference, and one in favour of the Princess, but I feel all the difficulties; and I believe most of my colleagues feel them much stronger than I do: but we are all very anxious for your opinion.

Yours ever most sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 25th Aug., 1813, P.M.

The Austrian government have given us to understand that they will make to you an early communication if they go to war with France. This is only one of the possible issues of the present negotiations, and you may perhaps not be able to receive the intelligence which they propose to send. As it is of great importance to you to know the result of this Armistice, I shall send a messenger down to Plymouth this evening. He will wait there, ready to sail; and the Port Admiral will deliver to him for your Lordship's information a telegraphic communication (if the telegraph can work), containing one of these four messages:—

1. War.
2. Austrian war.
3. Armistice—week, fortnight, &c., &c.
4. Preliminaries—Continental.

By No. 1, "War," you will understand that it is a renewal of the war on the part of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden; *Austria neutral.*

By No. 2, "Austrian war," is to be understood the renewal of the war, including the co-operation of Austria.

No. 3, "Armistice," with the word "week," or fortnight, &c., implies the renewal of the Armistice and the period of that renewal.

No. 4, "Preliminaries," the signature of preliminaries by Austria. If Continental be added, the Allies are included; if Continental be omitted, the Allies are *left negotiating.*

By a *private communication* we have just heard that Austria, Russia, and Prussia have signed a treaty in favour of Murat, should the war with France commence. The condition of this treaty was, that no communication of it should be made to any other Power (including England) except with the consent of Austria. This treaty was signed as far back as June.

Hoping that your Lordship will receive No. 2 from the Port Admiral,

I remain yours ever sincerely,

Bathurst.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 25th Aug., 1813.

I enclose for your information a précis of the intelligence received by the last Gottenburg mail. Three more are now due; and as they must bring us some certain information as to a renewal of the Armistice, I shall despatch a vessel immediately upon their arrival to carry the earliest notice to your Lordship.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully yours,

Bathurst.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Foreign Office, 22nd Aug., 1813.

Mr. Thornton writes under date of the 7th August that the Prince Royal has instructed his minister at Reichenbach, in representing the importance to the interests of the Allies, and particularly Sweden and England, that the Armistice should be in fact denounced on the 10th August, nevertheless to assure Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart that his first wish on this subject is to conform his views entirely to those of Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart, which Mr. Thornton has accordingly notified to those ministers.

Mr. Thornton represents the expediency of entrusting to one individual the measures to be taken for furnishing the subsidies to be paid to Sweden and to Russia.

Caulaincourt arrived at Prague on the 20th as minister to the *Congress*, as the French call it. He has told Metternich that he cannot show his full powers unless he is to treat directly with the Russian and Prussian ministers, and that he is not furnished with any precise basis of a future pacification. On the other hand Metternich has declared formally and officially that if the preliminaries of peace on the basis proposed are not signed on the 10th, Austria will declare war on the 11th. All accounts agree that this will take place. It is strongly reported that Buonaparte is gone to Paris. The whole corps of Soult has been ordered from Germany to Spain, as well as considerable bodies of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine.

General Moreau arrived at Stralsund the 6th August; was received with the honours of General-in-Chief, and lodged in the Government House; was to leave Stralsund the 8th for Reichenbach.

General Gibbs also arrived with part of his troops on the 6th. Measures have been taken for the regular supply of the corps, and for conducting the service of the garrison with harmony and concert between the troops of the two nations.

Sir Charles Stewart writes from Strelitz on the 2nd of August that the Prince Royal has expressed himself extremely well satisfied with his inspection of the Russian and Prussian troops placed under his orders; speaks most highly of the division under General Count Woronzow, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, all in the highest order. Four thousand cavalry under Lieutenant-General Czernicheff not quite so good. He has been received throughout as a conqueror after his victories, and has between 80,000 and 100,000 men, highly disciplined and efficient. His head-quarters will be at Oranienberg or Potsdam about the 10th.

Sir Charles Stewart about to return to Reichenbach; has made arrangements with the Prince Royal for his return if he should be charged with any further military arrangements, and to reside with the Prince Royal if his operations are of the most active nature. He now goes to the head-quarters, to exchange the ratifications, arrange the payments of the subsidy, and see the Prussian ministers. He urges an early decision on the state of the troops to be taken into British pay. Though the language from the neighbourhood of the negotiations and armies is decidedly warlike, Sir Charles Stewart still feels that there exists in the mind of the Prince Royal and those about him a strong opinion that the negotiation will be protracted.

In Mr. Thornton's absence Sir Charles Stewart had made the Prince Royal acquainted with the substance of Lord Castlereagh's last despatches, and the Prince Royal had expressed his high sense of the wisdom, prudence, and

enlightened views with which they were framed for the general repose of Europe, if it could be obtained.

In an enclosed report from Mr. Jackson at Reichenbach, it appears that Count Metternich having in vain endeavoured to draw from Caulaincourt a disclosure of his full powers, proposed by an official note that the discussions should be carried *through* the mediator, in writing. Russia and Prussia consented: Caulaincourt refused, and insisted that he would only produce his full powers in a general meeting. The indignation of the Austrian cabinet is stated at its length, and a conviction that they will be forced to hostilities. The continued arrival of favourable intelligence from the Peninsula produces the best effect.

Mr. Addington writes on the 27th from Prague, on the authority of persons possessed of the best means of information, that Buonaparte had received at Dresden a letter from the Senate urging his immediate return to Paris, to quell tumults in the south of France, occasioned by the disasters in Spain, and that he had left Dresden for Mentz on the 26th. The tone of Count Metternich is very high and irritated at the conduct of France, and the warlike preparations of Austria increase daily.

Nothing received by the mail from Lord Cathcart.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 25th Aug., 1813.

We shall be much obliged to you if you would send us home some of King Joseph's papers: those which you may imagine to be the most curious. I promise you that you shall have them back again; as you may probably like to keep them yourself *as trophies*.

Yours very sincerely,

Bathurst.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 25th Aug., 1813.

Every thing will be ready to-morrow, I hope, to open again against St. Sebastian.

On the right attack there are—

In No. 1 (on the hill)	2	8-inch howitzers.
In No. 4	5	8-inch howitzers.
In No. 4	4	68 carronades.
In No. 4	6	24 pounders.
In No. 5	15	24 pounders.
In No. 6	4	10-inch mortars.

On the left attack:

In No. 5	4	18 pounders.
In No. 6	2	8-inch howitzers.
In No. 6	2	18 pounders.
In No. 6	7	24 pounders.

Abstract:—

28	24 pounders.
6	18 pounders.
9	8-inch howitzers.
4	68 pounder carronades.
4	10-inch mortars.
51	

More mortars will be brought in upon the right at No. 2 in order to take the line of the long curtain as much in reverse as may be, and they will be well placed there for the castle, for which chiefly the fire of all the mortars will be reserved. An enfilading fire of howitzers or carronades would be desirable, Colonel Dickson thinks, for the left line wall of the place.

The great fault of the left attack is the distance of the battery, which is now allowed to be 800 yards from the face of the left bastion, and which, therefore, cannot be expected to breach.

It is proposed to attack the island as soon as boats can be got round, for which purpose some of the pontoon carriages are ordered up; for though probably in very favourable weather the attack had best be made by boats from the sea, it is necessary to have some small boats at our command to remain on shore.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Sir C. Stuart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 26th Aug., 1813.

I am much obliged to you for the communications conveyed in your letter of the 15th, and the broad principle of policy you lay down is so very analogous to the conditions of the treaty of concert signed at Petersburgh in 1805, before the Austerlitz campaign, that I cannot but think an act expressly drawn up to check the evil to be dreaded in the present state of affairs would form a good basis for the intended negotiation.

The important consequences the enclosed letter shows must follow the early knowledge of your Lordship's victories in Germany, induces me to hope it may be possible to establish a communication for the conveyance of intelligence from the Spanish frontier, through France, by the agency of persons in the commercial houses at Lyons, Basle, and Augsburgh; and although the missions in Germany possess the best means of carrying it into effect, if some of the merchants established in Lisbon, who were formerly concerned in smuggling colonial produce and British goods into that country were committed, I believe they might be useful in attaining that object.

The Prince Regent of Portugal is very likely under the present circumstances to return to Lisbon, as I am assured that the King's government have at length sent instructions to Lord Strangford, in the sense of your

Lordship's suggestions to that effect; and the Conde de Funchal finding he has no other alternative to avoid the voyage to Rio Janeiro for the purpose of taking possession of the office to which he has been appointed, is now as anxious to promote the departure of the Court from that country as he was before desirous to prevent it.

As the part of the population of Portugal who chiefly profited by the presence of the army are the class upon whom the revenue was never exactly collected, I am justified in believing that notwithstanding the inconvenience they have experienced by the departure of the troops, the sums which flow into the coffers of the government will continue to increase.

The enclosed proclamation has been circulated to hasten the entrance of the income-tax, and I have obtained copies of the Acts of Parliament, and of all our English regulations respecting the mode of extracting the real fifth of their profits from the merchants, which I hope will enable the government to hit upon some plan founded on the proposition your Lordship brought forward several months since. The merchants of all Portugal last year only paid 71 contos on this account, of which Lisbon gave 34 contos, the Meza do Bem Commum 9, the Provinces 24 contos, from which latter 7 are to be deducted for the city of Porto.

A difference of opinion, however, prevails in the government between Dr. Nogueira, who is desirous that a fixed sum levied on account of this tax shall in future be deducted among the merchants in due proportion, and the Principal Sousa, whose plans are founded upon a principle more analogous to your recommendation.

The Spanish government have taken umbrage at the asylum granted by this country to the bishops who refused to publish the decree for the abolition of the Inquisition, and have requested that they may at least be compelled to reside in provinces south of the Douro.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

CHARLES STUART.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Near St. Sebastian, 26th Aug., 1813, 2 P.M.

The batteries opened this morning as was proposed. I have no doubt of the effect of those of the right attack; but I am very apprehensive the distance of the redoubt battery will disappoint the expectations of breaching the right face of the left bastion, and the curtain behind it. Sir R. Fletcher is confident that no benefit could be derived by carrying guns forward into the plain, as the scarp of the curtain would not be seen at all from the battery, if anywhere on the esplanade, on account of the face of the bastion. The arrangements are made with Sir G. Collier for the attack of the island about 2 A.M. to-morrow morning, and I hope they will succeed if no material change of weather takes place, so as to occasion a heavy swell. The wind has unluckily gone round to the westward this morning, but it is moderate hitherto.

Captain Cameron of the 9th regiment is to command the detachment, and he seems to be a very intelligent officer.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

[689.] *To the Duque del Infantado.*

MON CHER DUC DEL INFANTADO, Lesaca, ce 27 Août, 1813.

Je vous suis bien obligé de la lettre du 6me que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire, et pour vos expressions obligeantes sur nos succès de ce côté-ci.

Les papiers que vous m'envoyez me seront de la plus grande utilité, et je vous en remercie beaucoup. Le pays où nous sommes est un des plus difficiles pour la guerre que j'ai vu, surtout puisque Messieurs les Français veulent la faire avec des masses si énormes; mais j'espère que la leçon que nous leur avons donné dernièrement leur apprendra à ne pas s'y enfoncer une autre fois trop légèrement.

J'envois vos lettres aux Généraux Alava et Wimpffen.

Croyez moi, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 27th Aug., 1813.

As there is a doubt whether the telegraph can work, I send the enclosed intelligence by a messenger to Plymouth. He is to give it to the former messenger, should he be still at Plymouth. If he has sailed with the telegraphic message, the enclosed may go from Falmouth by the first opportunity.

I find that I had overstated the arrangement with respect to Murat by Austria, Russia, and Prussia. Nothing was fixed by a treaty. The letter from Nugent to Bunbury will show you that he has travelled rather fast in his promises of British co-operation.

Yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Downing Street, 27th Aug., 1813.

A messenger is arrived with despatches from Reichenbach, which he left on the 13th instant.

The Emperor of Austria declared war against France on the morning of the 11th instant. The Allies gave notice at the same time of the termination of the Armistice.

Ninety thousand Russians and Prussians entered Bohemia on the 6th by the routes of Landshut and Glatz, in order to unite with the Austrian army.

Blücher's corps d'armée and that under Langeron remain in Upper Silesia. The Russian reserves under Benningsen are approaching the Oder.

On the 13th the army under the Prince Royal of Sweden was stationed as follows:—The right at Plauen and Brandenburg, and left at Berlin; head-quarters near Potsdam. Right wing, Russians under Winzingerode; centre, Swedes; left wing, Prussians under Bülow. Total force exceeding 80,000 effectives. General Walmoden remains in the neighbourhood of Schwerin with a corps of Germans and Swedes to watch Davoust.

Marshal Hiller with an army of Austrians is at Gratz.

General Nugent is gone with 5000 light troops to raise the Croats, and the other provinces ceded by Austria at the last peace.

The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia are gone to Prague. General Moreau has proceeded thither, but it is understood that he declines taking an active command against the French unless the white cockade is hoisted.

The enthusiasm both of the Prussians and Austrians is described to be extreme. The news of the battle of Vitoria had produced the greatest effect, and appeared to have decided the Austrian cabinet.

Rear-Admiral T. W. Martin to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, *Salvador del Mundo*, Hamoaze, Plymouth, 27th Aug., 1813.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's government considering it of the highest importance that your Lordship should receive the earliest information of the result of the negotiation in the north of Europe, it has been so arranged by Lord Melville and Mr. Croker that I should have a particular number communicated by the telegraph, which would refer to one of the several messages which have been sent to me, applicable to whatever turn the negotiation might take, and which I am directed to transmit to your Lordship with the utmost despatch.

I have now the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the message received at 7 o'clock this evening states, "*the renewal of the war in Germany, in which Austria co-operates with the Allies.*"

I have directed the *Gleaner* to receive the King's messenger, charged with this and other despatches, to proceed to the nearest place of communication with your Lordship's head-quarters; and the officer commanding that vessel (Lieutenant Knight) is instructed to wait for such commands as your Lordship may think proper to forward to him, and then to return to Plymouth.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

T. W. MARTIN.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Oyarzun, 28th Aug., 1813, 7 A.M.

On returning here yesterday evening I found your Lordship's letter of 11 A.M. Considering that on a subject of such delicacy I ought not to answer it on my own opinion alone, I wrote confidentially to General Oswald, and have but just received his answer.

He assures me both in his own name and in Generals Hay's and Robertson's that the best spirit prevails in the division, and that the troops would feel great mortification if relieved by others, so as to have no share in the termination of their labours. He states them, however, to be greatly exhausted by the severity of the duties of the trenches and of the fatigue and working parties; and on that account, as well as from the nature of the service to be performed, he is anxious for the co-operation of reinforcements of British troops to take part in the attack. In this opinion I entirely concur with General Oswald, and think it would be most essential to have more British troops; for though in some respects the attack will be made under more favourable circumstances, still it will be made from one narrow debouchée, consequently in one column, which in its advance will meet with all the natural impediments of large slippery stones, partly covered by water, and almost certainly with an enfilading fire of guns as well as of musketry; besides which more serious consequences may be produced by the explosion of mines, which Sir R. Fletcher is satisfied the enemy has prepared, though he cannot precisely ascertain the objects. One he thinks very probable is blowing out the sea wall, under cover of which the column moves to the attack, and which serves to screen it from the fire of the hornwork. He is not at all certain that the left bastion is not mined: he thinks it probable that it is. Indeed, there is no part of the breaches in which from the town the enemy has not had full time to prepare this kind of defence; and it is quite certain, from the observation of the officers of engineers, that they have countermined all the salient angles of the hornwork. There is, therefore, reason to expect that there may occur some very discouraging circumstances, which would make it extremely desirable to have troops in reserve for a renewal of the attack without delay.

I am afraid there can be no very material diversion obtained without a naval attack on the back of the castle. This would require very favourable weather to make it at all practicable, as there is such a constant heavy surf breaking on the outside, except when the wind is steady from the south-east.

Even in this fine moderate weather, when the wind generally goes round the compass every twenty-four hours, the swell was so considerable as to increase the difficulty in landing on the island.

I do not suppose either that the naval means are equal to a serious attack on the outside of the castle, which would require men-of-war to cover the disembarkation by their fire, and flat boats for a large body of men. That such an attack would be most beneficial if practicable there can be no doubt. All, then, that could probably be done by sea to create any diversion would be to collect boats near the island to threaten an attack by the mole, towards which likewise troops might advance by the beach.

I do not imagine there is any other place where anything could be done in daylight. The river is fordable at low water for a short time at the mouth; but troops going that way by day would be opposed in any attempt to scramble up behind the mirador by very few men, and would probably be taken on the return of the tide. The enemy made a sortie three nights ago, by which an officer and twenty-five men were lost; last night another was made. Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron met and drove back the enemy by a charge before they reached the trenches.

In the attack of the island yesterday morning, Lieutenant Chadwick, of the 9th, assistant engineer, was killed, as also two or three sailors and an officer of marines, and sixteen seamen wounded. The Hon. Lieutenant Arbuthnot, R.N., led the boats to the attack in a very gallant manner, which occasioned the loss to fall chiefly on the navy.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—I should think Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson must have sent the return your Lordship wants about the last equipment, as I mentioned it to him immediately.

I shall return here this evening to be more in the way to receive any orders from your Lordship; but I think it will be necessary that I should go to remain near St. Sebastian to-morrow and till after the attack takes place, which I suppose will be on the 30th. Sir R. Fletcher did not expect it could be made sooner. I believe it will be low water between eleven and twelve on that day. On examining the effects of the 12-gun battery of the left from the sand hills yesterday, they did not appear to be so great as Sir R. Fletcher and everybody on the left thought. It is, therefore, to be regretted that more guns than four could not be placed in the new low battery. I wrote this yesterday from Pasages to Sir R. Fletcher. Colonel Dickson seemed to think that a battery nearer the end of the bridge on the right attack to move some guns into might see and breach the curtain above and behind the left bastion.

Colonel Bloomfield to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, 30th Aug., 1813.

I felt myself highly flattered at having been selected by your Lordship to execute a commission which could not fail to gratify the Prince Regent most exceedingly; and I am accordingly commanded by His Royal Highness to assure your Lordship how very sensibly he feels this mark of attention to him, and how much he prizes the gift. His Royal Highness receives the sword of Joseph Buonaparte at your Lordship's hands, not only as a trophy of the glorious victory achieved by you, but, at the same time, as a pledge of your attachment to him, and returns your Lordship his best thanks for the twofold gratification thus afforded him.

Allow an humble and insignificant soldier to offer his tribute of admiration at the brilliant career of your Lordship's arms, and his prayer for the

continuance of those successes on which the happiness of Europe so much depends.

With the greatest respect, I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful and obedient servant,

B. Bloomfield.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Casa Ayete, St. Sebastian's Road, 30th Aug., 1813, 6 A.M.

No explosion took place last night in consequence of the alarm given from the trenches. The enemy fired a good deal from the castle especially, and threw some hand-grenades, but soon seemed to be aware of its being a false attack. Had we had sufficient naval means (of gun-boats and flat boats), nothing would have been more likely to be attended with the best effects than an attack from the island on the mole; but the battery on the island would be material to assist such an operation, and the difficulties are such as to give little hopes of its being soon ready. I shall see Sir G. Collier again this morning, and we shall endeavour, at all events, to make all the arrangements in the best manner for the attack of the breach to-morrow.

I forgot yesterday to mention to your Lordship that Major Smith had stated to me, in answer to your Lordship's orders, that Captain Slade, of the Engineers, with a draughtsman, was busily employed in laying out the different works and making plans of each; that, if there were any that ought to have a preference, he would direct them to proceed accordingly as soon as he heard what your Lordship wished; that, with regard to profile and depth of ditch, for all cases where the soil would admit of it, the dimensions established by Sir R. Fletcher for the field-works made in the Peninsula would be followed.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

Thomas Graham.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Casa Ayete, St. Sebastian's Road, 30th Aug., 1813.

I avail myself of Lord March's return to Oyarzun to acquaint your Lordship that on Sir R. Fletcher's stating the difficulty of forming a lodgment on the greatest part of the breach, as it is only a narrow wall, all of masonry, without any earth, and, therefore, the cover could only be made by sand-bags, which will be very tedious, I have taken it upon myself so far to alter the plan of attack proposed, as to embrace, if possible, the half of the curtain and the cavalier. I say *if possible*, because, should so wide a cut be found in the rampart as to render it very imprudent to attempt it, the orders will be given accordingly; but it is so great an object that, if attainable, and without the risk of that confusion which would be so apt to arise in an attempt to carry the whole town, I hope your Lordship will not disapprove of this mode of attack having been determined on.

I have desired one of the regiments of Light Dragoons to be moved up; and there will be to-night in Lord Aylmer's camp the 9-pounder brigade of the 1st division and three troops of horse artillery.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 1st Sept., 1813, 6 P.M.

The state of the town,* notwithstanding every exertion of General Hay and the Staff officers, was such from the drunkenness of our soldiers and the plundering of all, especially the Portuguese, that I sent from the place an order for Lord Aylmer's brigade to come immediately to the town. I find, however, that the order was somehow received too late, and that the brigade could not arrive in time to be of use to-night. I have therefore suspended the order. Meanwhile I beg leave to state that from what General Hay said of the division, I do not think it can be adequate to the duties that will be required for want of officers. General Hay and the Staff officers of the division seem to be making every exertion to prevent excess, but for want of numbers of regimental officers, and of the necessary exertions of those who remain with their battalions, there seemed no prospect of their succeeding, and I could not help considering that there is very great risk of misfortune were the enemy to make a serious attempt against the town.

I thought it best to order out the detachments, as they were under the least control; many of their officers being wounded too. If I do not receive any order to the contrary by the return of the bearer, I shall send Lord Aylmer's brigade there in the morning, till some other arrangement is made at head-quarters. At all events, should it be necessary to continue the 5th division at St. Sebastian, some additional troops will be required, for the division has lost at least 1200 men.

I should think a Spanish brigade might be useful there.

I shall not be able to collect all the necessary materials for my report to your Lordship till to-morrow, and I would beg to recommend (since your Lordship was good enough to allow me) that Major Hare of the 12th foot, Assistant-Adjutant-General, attached to my Staff, should be the bearer of the despatch. I hope to send my report to Lesaca, so as to be there by 6 or 7 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sir G. Collier will detain the ketch.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's obedient servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. I add this slip of paper as a postscript, to mention to your Lordship that a principal inhabitant, who said he was much in Rey's confidence,

* The *town* of St. Sebastian was captured by assault on 31st August: the castle capitulated on 8th September. See letter from Sir T. Graham to Lord Wellington, 1st September, 1813, 1st edition of *Wellington Despatches*, vol. xi., p. 62.

told him yesterday that Rey had sent out his aide-de-camp the night we took the island, stating his wants, and that if not supplied in time he could not hold out longer than about this time, if the town were carried by storm. That Soult sent a small boat, which got in, urging him to hold out, and promising to make a diversion in his favour, as well as to send boats laden with supplies. These have not arrived, and this man said that Rey would surrender if summoned.

T. G.

Lieut.-Colonel A. Dickson to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Pasages de la Calzada, 1st Sept., 1813.

I have the honour to enclose your Lordship the requisition you desired me to prepare of additional battering ordnance and ammunition, that is to say, a fourth proportion complete with ammunition similar to each of the three first ones, and also two proportions of ammunition additional, the whole demand being one proportion of ordnance, and three of ammunition, as your Lordship directed.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

A. DICKSON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Pasages, 1st Sept., 1813.

Requisition for Battering Ordnance and Ammunition for the Peninsula.

Ordnance ..	With travelling carriages, and timbers with poles	24-pounders, 9 ft. long	14
		8-inch Howitzers	6
	With block-trail carriages	68-pounder Carronades	4
	With iron beds, 10-inch Mortars		4
Ammunition for	24-pounders	Round	16,800
		Case or Grape	700
		Spherical	3,500
	18-pounders	Round	7,200
		Case or Grape	300
	8-inch Howitzers ..	Common Shells	3,000
		Common Case	300
		Spherical Case	2,700
		Carcasses	300
	10-inch Mortars	Common Shells	1,800
		Carcasses	200
	Iron 1 lb. Round Shot		20,000
	Powder, W. B.'s, 90 lbs. each		3,084

In addition to the number of flannel cartridges requisite for the foregoing 24 and 18-pounder round, grape, and spherical, there must be a proportion of one-third of the whole quantity as a reserve.

The before-mentioned proportion is similar to the three proportions lately sent from England, with the addition of carcasses and extra cartridges, and it must be in every respect otherwise the same in its equipment.

Additional Ammunition for the use of the 2nd and 3rd proportions lately sent.

24-pounder	Round	33,600
	Case or Grape	1,400
	Spherical	7,000
8-inch Howitzers	Common Shells	6,000
	Common Case	600
	Spherical Case	5,400
10-inch Mortar Common Shells		3,600
Iron 1 lb. Round Shot		40,000
Powder, W. B.'s, 90 lbs. each		5,168

The above proportion to be complete with portfires, tubes, slow-match, and flannel cartridges, with the additional one-third cartridges in reserve for 24-pounders.

A. DICKSON.

Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Tarragona, 1st Sept., 1813.

I have taken the liberty of sending open for your perusal my public letter to Lord Bathurst, and my private letter to Lord Castlereagh. I shall be much obliged by your consent to my transfer to the Staff in Spain, if I am obliged to resign the command in the Mediterranean.

As it is important that I should be in Sicily as soon as possible, I hope you will not disapprove my going before I receive your answer. I shall leave the command with Lieutenant-General Clinton. I have just seen that officer, who begs me to request your Lordship to send a senior officer to him to command the army. This so unusual request proceeds from a diffidence of his own abilities. He thinks that this complicated machine would be better kept in order by an officer having more reputation and weight in Spain than himself. I have known General Clinton for many years, and a more honourable man cannot exist: but the diffidence which I have before stated makes him unfit for command; his fear of responsibility, and the anxiety and uneasiness he suffers under it, would, I am sure, in a very short time, ruin his constitution, and I cannot but therefore strongly recommend your Lordship's compliance with his request. I am convinced that you would, at the same time, be anxious to spare his feelings; and I should be much obliged to you to say to him that, in consequence of my desire to have the benefit of his services in Sicily, you had appointed another officer to the command of the army. Lieutenant-General Clinton could be relieved by Lieutenant-General Macfarlane, who would then be second in command. Lieutenant-General Macfarlane is anxious to go upon service; and as he has been detained in Sicily through my means, and indeed first brought there at my request, I should be very glad to be able to gratify his wishes upon this point.

I received your Lordship's letter of the 25th yesterday, and am very much obliged to you for the manner in which you have mentioned my retreat from Tarragona.

As I have every reason to feel quite confident that certainly 10,000 men

under De Caen, and possibly 15,000, have been detached by Suchet, I have not countermanded the march of the 3rd army. General Copons, who arrived here last night, completely confirms this intelligence. General Copons has done a very handsome act in giving 15,000 dollars, of 80,000 just received from Cadiz, to the division of Whittingham. I was certainly not satisfied with him at first, and I believe what I considered to be opposition proceeded from jealousy to Baron Eroles, whom I wished to have with his division on my left flank; but since my return to Tarragona he has certainly shown the utmost readiness to fulfil my wishes in everything, and to equip the two Spanish divisions now with the army, that cannot march for want both of provisions and transport.

I will attend closely to your instructions, and will, in a day or two, answer the other points contained in your letter.

I remain, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 2nd Sept., 1813, 2 P.M.

I received your Lordship's letter of 20 minutes before 7 this morning, but as the troops could not have reached St. Sebastian's in time this evening, and the reports from the town were more favourable as to the state of the troops there, and as those from the front corresponded with what your Lordship heard from General Freyre (on the authority of a deserter, as I hear), we thought it best for the present to wait at least till to-morrow, when I shall be guided according to circumstances.

The return of casualties not being yet come in, I have sent to Sir G. Collier to detain the vessel till to-morrow. I sent by Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and by Marshal Beresford some account of the difficulties started by Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne about the attack of the Castle.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. I have mentioned to Lord FitzRoy Somerset Lieutenant Gethin of the 10th foot, who was a volunteer with the Portuguese in the assault, and took down the flag from the cavalier, which he has brought here.

I hope your Lordship will allow his name to be mentioned in a postscript to my report, which I would not open.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Lesaca, 2nd Sept., 1813.

I have the honour to report that in compliance with orders to show ourselves towards the front, and threaten an attack on the 31st, I moved my

2nd and my Portuguese brigade to Zugarramurdi, from whence, at day-break, General Le Cor drove the piquets of the enemy, and followed them with great spirit as they drew back towards Ainhoué.

From their second camp, in front of Urdax, they supported their retiring piquets, and a sharp skirmish took place, in which, I regret to say, my Portuguese brigade lost several officers and about 70 men.

At 10 o'clock A.M. I received orders to move to Lesaca, but this I could not accomplish before 4 o'clock that afternoon, with my 2nd brigade, which I had held in support of General Le Cor.

I had, according to orders, detached my 1st brigade, under General Inglis, to the bridge of Lesaca on the 30th. This brigade moved on to the support of the 4th division on the morning of the 31st: for the detail of its operations I must beg to enclose to your Lordship General Inglis's own report, as it was not in my power to be present there.

I deeply regret the loss of these two brigades in officers and men. The 1st brigade had to sustain the attack of two divisions of the enemy on a strong and wooded hill; the loss there was unavoidable: that of Le Cor, I must confess, was owing in some degree to the too forward gallantry of the Portuguese troops. Notwithstanding this, my Lord, I cannot speak in too strong terms of the Generals Inglis and Le Cor, their officers and men. On every occasion of meeting the enemy I find additional reason to be proud of the conduct of the 7th division.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most faithful and most obedient,

DALHOUSIE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-Gen. W. Inglis to Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

MY LORD, Camp, near Lesaca, 2nd Sept., 1813.

I have the honour to report that my brigade being encamped on the 30th ultimo in the vicinity of Lesaca, agreeable to your Lordship's directions, I received on the following morning instructions from Major-General Murray, Quartermaster-General, to proceed to my left to support a Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, commanded by Colonel Miller, and to maintain a position which he pointed out. On my arrival, having taken the Portuguese brigade under my command, formed my own, and carefully examined the ground, I found it untenable against very superior force from its extent, and its nature only admitting of one mode of defence against very unequal numbers. The affair began on my left about 3 o'clock, the outposts of the 23rd Portuguese regiment being obliged to fall back; and towards 10 o'clock, on my right, the 11th regiment was attacked. At nearly 11 o'clock the enemy's strength had increased so much, and were, in consequence, gaining ground, that it became absolutely necessary to withdraw from the position to another in the rear which had been also pointed out; in doing which the affair became general, and every inch warmly contested, when I have the greatest happiness in assuring your Lordship that the 1st brigade maintained most strongly their character, and in no instance did troops show more steady discipline and determined gallantry. I much regret the very severe loss we have met with in valuable officers and men: it fell particularly severe on the 51st regiment, which, being a weak battalion, fully officered, was employed in covering the retreat of the other troops, with directions to maintain their post, both of which were executed by Colonel Mitchell in the most handsome manner.

I feel the most pleasing part of my duty is to acknowledge the active readiness which the officers commanding the different regiments showed in their different movements, and the friendly assistance I received from them. I am likewise much indebted to Brigade Major Chalmers, and to Lieutenant Elliot, 51st regiment, acting as my aide-de-camp. I beg leave to state that this is the third affair in which Captain Walmsley has commanded the 82nd, and that the command of the Chasseurs Britanniques devolved on Major Combremont, the two senior field officers being wounded.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,

W. INGLIS.

P.S. I have the honour to enclose a return of the killed and wounded.

I find I have neglected requesting your Lordship would be pleased to mention to the Field Marshal that the Portuguese brigade distinguished themselves, and that I am under obligations to Colonel Miller, commanding it; and to Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, commanding the 11th Portuguese regiment.

General Freyre to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MILORD, Irun, le 2 Sept., 1813.

Le défaut de santé qui me priva hier du plaisir de vous voir me prive aujourd'hui de parer à votre quartier-général, tant pour vous féliciter des avantages dont l'Espagne vous est redevable, et qui sans cesse augmentent votre gloire, que pour vous parler sur l'état de débilité où se trouve l'armée, qui réclame votre protection auprès de notre gouvernement pour vous prier de l'employer, puisque sans cela je vois s'anéantir cette armée, et ne puis espérer d'elle que des efforts infructueuses.

Vous m'avez observé l'énorme faute d'officiers, laquelle s'est augmenté considérablement avant-hier.

Me vous ne saurois pas, peut-être, que depuis que je suis à la tête de l'armée, et quelques jours auparavant, le soldat n'a mangé que la moitié ou les deux tiers de sa ration de pain et huit onzes de riz; que la disette ne diminue parce que les provinces de l'intérieur ne nous envoyent rien, et n'obéissent aux ordres du gouvernement; que les blessés ont été mal pansés, et il y a quelques-uns qui sont morts pour n'avoir un hôpital ambulant, faute de mulets ou chariots de transports; que le soldat ne peut, même dans un jour de bataille, boire de l'eau de vie, et jamais du vin, ni manger de la viande; qu'il n'a pas un sou, et que je ne sais comment faire pour le donner quelque auxile. Pour remédier à tant de maux, j'ai fait et je fais tout ce que je peus; mais crier, écrire, représenter, ce ne suffit pas.

Je vous prie donc, Milord, de vouloir bien prendre part à notre situation, y de employer votre crédit auprès du gouvernement pour qu'il remédie à tant des choses, ou pour mieux dire à une seule, qui est à avoir de l'argent, qui est l'origine de toutes les autres.

Je vous supplie, Milord, de vouloir bien m'excuser pour l'intérêt que je prends aux troupes que j'ai l'honneur de commander.

Je suis, Milord, avec autant de considération que de respect,

Votre très obéissant serviteur,

MANUEL FREYRE.

Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Admiralty, 3rd Sept., 1813.

I received two days ago your letter of the 21st ult., and I have also had to peruse other communications from you on the same subject, particularly your letter to Lord Bathurst of the 19th ult. and a letter to Sir Thomas Graham of the 20th, communicated by him to Captain Otway of the *Ajax*, and transmitted through the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet to the Board of Admiralty.

In the letter which I took the liberty of addressing to you on the 28th July, I stated for your confidential information the general difficulties with which we have to contend in the distribution of the naval force of the country. I did so, not with the view of accounting for any alleged deficiency of means at the disposal of the officer commanding on that part of the coast in the neighbourhood of your army, which I aver is not the case, but to demonstrate to you that unless we are apprised in due time of what is expected of us, there is no such superfluity of force at our disposal as to render it practicable for us to do more than to provide for the ordinary and foreseen contingencies of the service. At the opening of the Baltic season this year, the Admiralty made such provision as they considered necessary for the protection of our trade and the passage of convoys through the Sound or Belt; but on receiving an intimation from Lord Castlereagh that a large body of troops under the Prince Royal of Sweden were to act on the Danish or other territories on the south side of the Baltic, and that they relied on the co-operation of a British naval force, and on learning from Sir Alexander Hope the nature and extent of the service expected from us, an additional number of line of battle ships, with smaller vessels, bombs, flat boats, transports, and the whole naval accompaniment of an army employed in such a situation, were prepared with as little delay as possible, and sent off before even the Prince Royal was ready for them. Neither from you, nor from any other person at your suggestion, did we ever receive the least intimation that more was expected than the protection of your convoys along the coast, till the actual arrival of Sir Thomas Graham on the coast after the battle of Vitoria; and accordingly no provision was made for assistance in sieges or for any other service than what was connected with the transport of troops, stores, and supplies for the army. In order that there might be no mistake or misunderstanding on this point, I stated distinctly to Lord Bathurst, before you moved out of Portugal, that it was not in our contemplation, because we did not conceive you to expect us, to give the assistance of line of battle ships, troop ships, marine corps, or anything but the security of your transports. I took this precaution in case you should have wished for similar attempts on the North coast of Spain as had been made last year under Sir Home Popham. Do not suppose from what I have formerly stated to you that there would have been any hesitation in affording you whatever naval assistance you might require. If it could have been provided by no other means, which I have no doubt it could, it might have been a question with government to determine what other object, the Baltic for instance, or a portion of the American squadron, &c., should have been given up; but *you* would have been secured in what you wanted in the first instance.

I do not think it necessary at present to trouble you with any remarks

on the several charges against the Board of Admiralty which are contained in your letters above mentioned. Our replies to them will be sent to the Secretary of State; and if he shall transmit them to you, I confidently anticipate from your plain dealing that you will consider them as satisfactory. If you shall think that we have spoken our minds freely, you will do us the justice to recollect that you have compelled us to do so, as well as shown us the example.

I must confess, however, that I feel no predilection for this paper warfare. You and I have the same object in view, viz., the furtherance of the public service, and neither of us have any time to spare for such controversial discussions; but being very desirous that all your wishes in regard to naval co-operation shall be gratified as far as may be physically practicable, I have determined on adopting the proceeding which you will find detailed in the enclosed copy of instructions to Rear-Admiral Thomas B. Martin, now second in command at Plymouth. He is sent to you with the view of learning from you, and of reporting to us, the nature and extent of the co-operation which you may require from the navy, as far as you may think it prudent or may be able to explain to him; and also for the purpose of satisfying you professionally as to what may be practicable, and what is impossible to be accomplished by the navy, either generally, or on particular points of the coast to which your inquiries may be directed. He is a very zealous, active, and intelligent officer, and was usefully employed last year in assisting the Russians at Riga and in other places on that coast. I wish his health would permit him to remain with you and to assume the command of whatever force it may be necessary to attach to your army, if you should desire such an arrangement to be made; but as we cannot conceive that large ships can continue in the neighbourhood of your present position, and as Sir George Collier is of sufficient standing to command almost all the frigate captains in the service, and is well acquainted with the coast and with the business on which he is employed, I should doubt the propriety of superseding him.

I have already stated that I do not wish in this letter to discuss all the points adverted to in the catalogue of your complaints against the Admiralty, though I am glad that I now know the full extent of them. There are some matters, however, which depend merely on naval opinions, and on which it is indispensably necessary that you should be apprised of our sentiments and intentions. I will take your opinion in preference to any other person's as to the most effectual mode of beating a French army, but I have no confidence in your seamanship or nautical skill. Neither will I defer to the opinions on such matters of the gentlemen under your command who are employed in the siege of St. Sebastian, and which happen to be at variance with those of every naval officer in His Majesty's service.

In the first place, then, you are not to expect any effectual assistance in that operation from line of battle ships, because from the situation of the place, and the nature of the coast, they cannot anchor without extreme risk, and are exposed to almost certain destruction in a gale of wind when from the direction in which it blows they can neither haul off nor run for shelter into any port. If you will ensure them a continuance of easterly wind, they may remain with you, but not otherwise. In the next place

all the small craft in the British navy could not prevent the occasional entrance of small boats at night into St. Sebastian's, though it may be rendered difficult and very uncertain. The same observation applies to the communication along the coast between Bordeaux and Bayonne, where also the nature of that coast renders a perfect and complete interruption to the communication at all times and in all weathers scarcely practicable. In the third place, without at all entering into the question of whether your convoys have been as frequent and as securely protected as the nature of the service would admit, I wish you distinctly to be apprised that we will not be responsible for ships sailing singly or without convoy between this country and Spain or Portugal, or for any considerable distance along the coasts of those countries. No amount of cruisers on those stations could secure such ships from occasional capture; and though I enter fully into all you say as to the delays and inconvenience to which you may be exposed in receiving your supplies, I assert confidently on the best (and indeed I believe unanimous) opinions of naval men that the attempt would produce its own discomfiture from the inducement which the system, if adopted, would hold out to enemy's privateers of running in upon the lines of communication, and with a very good chance of escaping, especially at a more advanced period of the year. Considering the immense extent of our trade, and the occasional dispersion of convoys in gales of wind, we have hitherto been comparatively little annoyed by American privateers, and certainly less than we expected. I cannot pretend to say how long we may continue to be equally fortunate, and can only repeat that the nature of naval service will nowhere admit of perfect and complete security. There must always be some risk, and our duty is to render it as little as possible. With regard to the alleged want of naval means on the north coast of Spain to afford sufficiently frequent convoys, which you say "no one will deny," I can only state that it is positively denied by Sir G. Collier, the person most competent to judge on such a subject, and certainly much more so than your Commissary-General whom you quote. There may have been delays from the weather or other causes over which Sir G. Collier had no control, but not from the cause which you suppose.

There is only one other point on which I feel it necessary to trouble you at present, and I do it with regret, though I feel confident that you will ascribe my noticing it to the real motive, a sense of duty and a due regard for the public service. I advert to your communications to Captains Otway and Sir George Collier, not merely on points relating to the service in which they were more immediately engaged, but containing strong censures on the Board of Admiralty on matters with which those officers had no concern whatever. I certainly think that you have formed erroneous opinions on some points, and have been misinformed on others; but I do not complain of your making those representations to the Secretary of State or to Lord Keith or to myself, because I know you would not have made them if you had not felt yourself called upon to do so. Appeals to subordinate officers against their superiors are not customary in either branch of the service, and they can not only produce no good, but must be injurious to the public interest. The communications to which I particularly allude are your letter to Sir Thomas Graham, transmitted by him (with your knowledge, I presume) to Captain Otway, and your letter to

Lord Bathurst, of which you sent a copy to Sir G. Collier. There is an assertion in the former letter which surprised me a good deal, because I had not heard the same account from any naval officer, and am still at a loss how to account for it, viz. that the enemy's naval force on the coast in the Bay of Biscay is superior, and can drive off Sir George Collier whenever they please. I should be much astonished if Lord Keith or Sir George were of that opinion.

I have now disburthened myself of all I had to state to you, and shall only add that as far as the naval means of this country can supply, every practicable aid and support shall be afforded to your operations; but though the British navy can do much, there are many adverse contingencies to which that service is peculiarly exposed, and which no human power can control, and in all your calculations you must make a large allowance for the possibility of such occurrences.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever yours sincerely,

MELVILLE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Secretary of the Admiralty to Admiral Lord Keith.

MY LORD, Admiralty Office, 3rd Sept., 1813.

I have received and communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letters covering representations made by Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington to Captains Otway and Sir George Collier, adverting generally to the inadequacy of the naval force on the coasts of the Peninsula, and more particularly alleging the want of adequate co-operation in the siege of St. Sebastian.

Your Lordship must be well aware, from your own professional experience and from the observations of Sir George Collier, that the several topics of Lord Wellington's representations may be fully and satisfactorily explained by a reference to circumstances of seasons, weather, and localities, which in so considerable a degree affect all naval operations, but which, in the consideration of services to be performed in so hazardous a situation as the bight of the Bay of Biscay, are most peculiarly important.

I enclose to your Lordship copies of two letters connected with this subject, which by their Lordships' commands were addressed to the Secretary of State on receiving from that department a communication of a nature similar to those which your Lordship has transmitted. These letters, my Lords understand, have been transmitted to Lord Wellington, and will, they confidently trust, have been perfectly satisfactory to his Lordship.

But as Lord Wellington, in his communication to Captain Sir G. Collier, expresses his desire of knowing what degree of naval assistance he is to depend upon for the future, and as neither the particulars of his Lordship's demands, nor the detail of any obstacles to their execution arising out of mere naval circumstances, can be with sufficient celerity or accuracy conveyed on paper, my Lords think it absolutely necessary that a personal communication should be opened with Lord Wellington, for the purpose of ascertaining all the wants and wishes of his Lordship as connected with this department, in order that if his Lordship should be found to entertain any expectation to the accomplishment of which any obstacles arising out of naval circumstances may exist, these obstacles may be fully explained to his Lordship, and that where no such obstacles may present themselves every facility and assistance that the British

navy can give may be liberally, cordially, and with the least possible delay afforded to his Lordship's operations.

With these objects, my Lords having the fullest confidence in the professional judgment of Rear-Admiral Martin, second in command at Plymouth, have been pleased to direct him to hoist his flag in His Majesty's ship *La Creole*, and to put himself under your Lordship's orders, for the purpose of being employed on a mission to the Marquess of Wellington on the subject above stated.

Your Lordship will, therefore, lose no time in furnishing the Rear-Admiral with copies of the several papers herewith sent, and of such others as your Lordship may think likely to be of use to him, giving him such further directions and advice as your Lordship's long professional experience may suggest to you. You will direct him to proceed immediately to assume the temporary command and direction of His Majesty's naval force at present on the north coast of Spain, and of any other ships or vessels that may proceed to that quarter while he is engaged on this service.

He is, immediately on his arrival, to proceed to Lord Wellington's headquarters, and to confer with his Lordship on the general nature of his wants and expectations from naval assistance in the whole line of operations which he may have in view.

He will explain to his Lordship how far the execution of these wishes and the fulfilment of these expectations are, in his professional opinion, practicable by naval means, and where they are impracticable; and he will endeavour to show to his Lordship to what extent that which is practicable may be reckoned upon as *certain*, and in what cases it must be considered as *contingent* upon those circumstances of season and weather that control in so great a degree all naval operations, and which, in a situation so dangerous as the bight of the Bay of Biscay, should be most particularly attended to.

Having fully possessed himself of all his Lordship's views on this subject, and having given such explanations as he shall have judged necessary, he is to issue on the spot immediate orders for the execution of such services as may be required, in the manner most consistent with his Lordship's wishes; and in order to enable him to make the most perfect arrangements and dispositions to this effect, your Lordship will authorize him to communicate with Sir Harry Neale, or Commodore Malcolm, in case any aid within their power should be required so immediately as to render the delay of a reference to your Lordship at Plymouth hazardous to the service.

Having thus provided for all urgent parts of the service, and having given to the senior officer any additional temporary instructions which Lord Wellington's suggestions or demands may appear to render immediately necessary, he is to lose no time in returning to Plymouth, to state to your Lordship the whole of Lord Wellington's views, the particulars of his own proceedings, and the observations with which his personal inspection of local circumstances may have furnished him, in order that your Lordship may be fully enabled to make your arrangements for giving to the Field Marshal all the assistance which His Majesty's ships may be capable of affording; and your Lordship will be so good as to acquaint me, for their Lordships' information, with the result of the Rear-Admiral's proceedings, and of your own intended arrangements, in order that, if it should appear necessary, an adequate increase of force should be placed at your Lordship's disposal.

I have, &c.,

J. W. CROKER.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton.

MY DEAR SIR STAPLETON, Lesaca, 3rd Sept., 1813.

I enclose a letter from Sir Rowland Hill about the 4th Portuguese Cavalry. The answer I have given to Sir Rowland is, that Colonel Campbell will receive his orders direct from you.

When the army was so situated that the troops under the immediate command of Sir Rowland were in some measure detached from the body of the army, it was found expedient that the senior officer of the cavalry with Sir Rowland should take a general superintendence of the regiments of cavalry acting with that part of the army; but under the present distribution of the cavalry that arrangement is not thought necessary.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 3rd Sept., 1813, 6 A.M.

Lieutenant-Colonel Berkeley came up from General Hay this morning to tell me that the fire has spread so much that he did not think the communication could be preserved with the front line occupied at present by our troops. I have ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne to turn all his means to that object in preference to everything else. At all events if the fire does not spread across the great street on this side to the great buildings we hold at the foot of the Castle Hill, they may still be held by opening the line wall at the barracks of St. Elmo, and so having the communication at low water outside. This will likewise give the men means of having a supply of water from the river, there being no wells in that part of the town. The enemy hold the convent of Sta. Teresa, as well as the garden. The works which the engineers had begun against this post have been given up on account of the progress of the fire. Meanwhile we have lost several men there, and a most valuable young officer, Captain Stewart, of the Royals, General Hay's aide-de-camp. As General Hay informs me the men of the 5th division are getting into good order, I have desired General Howard to send one battalion to St. Sebastian, and General Wilson one from the right.

A young man, Secretary to Santuario, came here yesterday, having hid himself in the town. He says there were 1700 bayonets in the town and 300 in the Castle the morning of the assault; but, not knowing the loss, he cannot judge of the strength in the Castle.

Some deserters came out last night, and say they have not more than 700 or 800 men left.

I would certainly do nothing about summoning the garrison till this fire in the town has subsided.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. I should think for the night time that relays of foot guides of the country soldiers would be the quickest way of keeping up the communication.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 3rd Sept., 1813, ½ past 6 P.M.

I send your Lordship Rey's letters with my answers.

Colonel De Lancey followed into St. Sebastian's, and had a conversation in terms of the memorandum I gave him. This produced nothing but a demand of a suspension of hostilities till an answer could come from Soult. De Lancey told the officer that it was needless to take the letter for Soult, as hostilities could not be suspended; and then he threatened my sending back the wounded prisoners to the gate of the convent, which the French officer said would force them to expose our wounded without any care whatever. De Lancey then gave a summons which I had written (but of which I kept no copy), in order that there should not be wanting that pretext if he had any disposition to surrender. I have desired Dickson to disturb their rest to-night two or three times with a salvo of the shells, and I should not be much surprised if I should hear from him again. Five deserters came out last night from behind and under the mirador, and they all say the garrison wishes to surrender. It consisted before the siege began of 2900 men, and they all say that now there are not 1000 in the castle. There are, including wounded, between 600 and 700 prisoners, I am told. The town will, I fear, be entirely destroyed. Hitherto the large buildings next the hill are safe, and the communication will be made through the ruins of the burnt houses. The batteries are preparing in the hornwork, which the engineers and Colonel Dickson think the best place. In the line next the great curtain there will be 18 guns. Still Burgoyne seems to despair of making much of any thing but the mirador.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Memorandum, 3rd September, 1813.

Colonel De Lancey will propose that the British and Portuguese prisoners in the Castle should be sent out under charge of a French officer, to be still considered prisoners till the Castle surrenders. Should it be relieved, they shall all be sent back to General Rey. Should this proposal be accepted, the wounded French will be sent to our hospitals in the rear.

In case the first proposition is rejected, Colonel De Lancey may propose an exchange of an equal number as that of the prisoners of the Allies in the Castle. Should that too be rejected, he will say that I should be justified by the rules of war to send all the worst cases to the convent gate, that General Rey might take care of them himself in the Castle.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General Rey.

SIR, Ernani, 3rd Sept., 1813.

The Major-General commanding in St. Sebastian has sent me your letter of last night's date. I have the honour to assure you that, meanwhile, all means have been employed to prevent your wounded from perishing in the

flames, but under the peculiar circumstances of the present case I should hope that some arrangement, such as both humanity and mutual honour would dictate, relative to the wounded prisoners on both sides, might be made.

I beg leave, therefore, to propose to you to send an officer of rank to meet and converse with Colonel De Lancey, Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Allied army, on this interesting subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

III.

General Rey to Marshal Soult.

MONSEIGNEUR, Le 3 Sept., 1813.

Monsieur le Général de division Graham, commandant les troupes Anglaises devant St. Sébastian, avec lequel j'ai eu l'honneur de communiquer, fait demander l'échange des prisonniers, Anglais et Portugais, que j'ai au fort, contre pareil nombre d'hommes de chaque grade. J'ai l'honneur de demander à votre Excellence vos ordres pour la conduite que j'ai à tenir. Je prie Monsieur le Lieutenant-Général Graham de vous faire parvenir ma lettre.

Je prie votre Excellence d'agréer l'hommage de mon profond respect.

REY.

IV.

General Rey to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham,

M. LE GÉNÉRAL, Au Fort de San Sebastian, le 3 Sept., 1813.

Ce n'est pas tout d'avoir satisfait à l'honneur en défendant la ville, mais la position militaire du fort, sa force, et ses moyens tacheraient de lâcheté celui qui serait assez coupable pour ne point y apporter la défense la plus opiniâtre. Les braves troupes que j'ai l'honneur de commander ont jurées de s'y maintenir jusqu'à la dernière extrémité; aussi est-ce pour ménager autant que l'honneur le permet l'éffusion du sang de tant de braves des deux armées, que je vous propose une suspension d'armes de quinze jours délai, après lequel le fort sera rémis à vos troupes, si ma garnison n'est pas secourue; sous la condition expresse qu'elle rentrera en France avec armes et bagages, sans être prisonnière de guerre.

Voilà, Monsieur le Général, ce que la valeur de mes troupes, ma position, et mes moyens de défense me permettent d'accepter.

J'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Général, d'être

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

REY.

V.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General Rey.

SIR, St. Sebastian's Road, 3rd Sept., 1813.

I lose no time in acknowledging the receipt of your answer to the summons I had the honour of transmitting to you this morning.

I am sorry to find by it that I have no alternative left but to push the operations entrusted to me as vigorously as I can, for I know that at no period would the Commander-in-chief of the Allied army, the Marquess of Wellington, have permitted me to treat with you on any other terms than that the garrison should be prisoners of war. The usual honours of war your garrison has certainly merited, and the private property of officers and soldiers would be respected.

Further than that I cannot offer, and I shall, therefore, order the hostilities to recommence at 7 this evening.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

VI.

General Rey to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

M. LE GÉNÉRAL, Au Fort, le 3 Sept., au soir.

Je vous prie d'avoir la bonté de me faire remettre l'état nominatif de Messieurs les officiers et numérique des sous-officiers et soldats Français fait prisonniers par vos troupes dans l'après-midi du 31. J'ai lieu d'espérer, Monsieur le Général, que vous adhérerez à ma demande, ayant eu l'avantage de vous faire remettre, le 27, sur votre demande, un pareil état.

J'aurai l'honneur de saisir cette occasion, Monsieur le Général, pour vous dire que Messieurs les officiers Anglais prisonniers de guerre ont réclamés près de nous pour faire mettre ailleurs les prisonniers qui, placés sans blindage dans le pourtour de l'hôpital, ont eu ces jours derniers plusieurs hommes tués ou blessés.

En plaçant, Monsieur le Général, les prisonniers près des hôpitaux, sur lesquels il flotte un drapeau noir, j'ai cru les placer dans un lieu d'autant plus sûr, que l'hôpital est établi sur le bord de la mer, totalement éloigné de toute opération militaire, même des magasins. Dans tous les temps les bâtimens isolés des hôpitaux ont été respectés.

J'ai donc, Monsieur le Général, l'honneur de vous demander d'avoir la bonté d'ordonner qu'il ne soit pas tiré sur les bâtimens de l'hôpital; l'humanité le demande, l'intérêt de vos prisonniers l'exige, puis qu'ils éprouvent encore plus de mal de ce tir que les Français.

Je joins ici la lettre qui m'ont écrit Messieurs les officiers prisonniers de guerre.

Je ne doute pas, Monsieur le Général, que les malheureux blessés que j'ai été obligé de laisser en ville n'ayent reçu de vos troupes le même traitement que nous avons prodigué aux vôtres. La situation dans laquelle vous les avez trouvé, et leur aveu, vous auront prouvés qu'ils ont été constamment soignés et traités comme les soldats Français.

J'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Général, de vous le réitérer, je vous demande toute votre bienveillance pour les blessés Français. L'embrasement où se trouve la ville le réclame impérieusement.

J'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Général, d'être

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

REY.

VII.

Lieut. Harry D. Jones to General Rey.*

Le 3 Sept., 1813.

Tous les officiers y prisonniers, Anglais y Portugais, sont bien convaincu que V.E. a fait tout ce que vous pouvez pour leur confort tout le temps qu'ils ont été avec les Français; mais malheureusement pour eux la direction du feu ces deux jours passés a été dirigé contre le magasin, et comme les prisonniers sont dans la cour sans blindages, il y en a beaucoup tués et blessés par les bombes.

Si V.E. aura la bonté de faire quelque chose pour les délivrer de cette situation affreuse, ils seront remplis de gratitude.

J'ai l'honneur d'être votre très humble serviteur,

HARRY D. JONES.

* Now General Sir Harry D. Jones.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 5th Sept., 1813.

I observed that Jones made use of the word "*magasin*," but that Rey expressly calls the building *the hospital*, denoted by a black flag. I shall, however, write to him to protest against his treatment of the prisoners in placing them there, and in employing them to work under fire. I immediately communicated your Lordship's instructions to Major-General Oswald relative to the disposition of the troops in the town. I am afraid, however, the almost total destruction of the town by fire will make it very difficult, if not impossible, to follow them literally, at least for some days; for much the greatest part of the town is exposed to the enemy's musketry from the different terraces of the hill which overlook it, and at present the burning beams and the dangerous state of the walls of many of the houses, rent and falling from time to time, prevent working parties being employed to make covered communications and posts where it would be very desirable to have them. Last night, during the high wind, there was such risk of the fire extending to the front line, that the men could scarcely be kept in it.

There are several such strong buildings in that line, that with tolerable vigilance it would be impossible for the enemy to force them; there are two churches, the arsenal, and barracks of St. Elmo of this description. While these are held, I should scarcely think the enemy would venture to push forward towards the south rampart, where there is a considerable reserve. I shall examine it attentively to-morrow, and make the engineers consider of any additional precautions that may be taken for the security of the troops on duty within the place. Several people have been wounded by musket-shots to-day.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S. Colonel Dickson will open against the Castle twenty 24-pounders and three 18-pounders on the 8th.

[690.] G. O. Lesaca, 6th Sept., 1813.

1. At a General Court Martial held by virtue of a warrant, and in pursuance of an order from, &c. &c., private ——, of the — regiment, was arraigned upon the following charge, viz.: "For leaving his post before he was regularly relieved when sentinel, on the night of the 21st July, 1813, and attempting to desert towards the enemy."

The Court having deliberately and maturely weighed and considered the evidence for the prosecution, together with what the prisoner has offered in his defence, and the evidence produced in support of it, is of opinion he is guilty of the crime of

which he is charged, being in breach of the Articles of War, and does therefore sentence him, the said ——, to be shot to death, at such time and place as his Excellency the Commander of the Forces may be pleased to direct.

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The sentence of the General Court Martial on the trial of private ——, of the — regiment, is to be carried into execution on Thursday, the 9th September, 1813, under the direction of the Assistant Provost Marshal attached to the 2nd division of infantry, in front of the lines of that division, and in presence of the — regiment, and such other troops as can be conveniently assembled, to be paraded for that purpose.

WELLINGTON.

The Princess of Brazil to the Duke of Vitoria and Ciudad Rodrigo.

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Palais du Rio de Janeiro, le 6 Sept., 1813.

Depuis longtemps j'auroi dû vous écrire pour vous féliciter des victoires que vous avez obtenu en Espagne et en Portugal, et au même temps de toutes les honneurs qu'y ont été rendus à votre mérite; mais le mauvais état de ma santé m'en a jusqu'à présent empêché. Je profite donc du premier moment pour vous faire parvenir mes félicitations, et aussi ma reconnaissance pour tous les importants sérvices que vous avez rendu aux Portugais et Espagnols; et il paroit que le succès ait confirmé l'opinion que je m'avais fait de votre courage et intelligence, et que vous ne cesseriez vos brillants exploits avant la destruction du tyran, et avant que d'avoir rendus aux fidèles Espagnols et Portugais leurs légitimes Souverains.

Par un hasard j'ai eu connaissance de l'opinion, où vous êtes, que je suis contre votre nation. Je vous déclare donc formellement que je n'ai jamais été contre elle; au contraire, je professe les sentiments de la plus grande reconnaissance pour la manière dont elle a aidé et aide actuellement les deux nations; et tous mes efforts seront dirigés toujours à lier le plus étroitement possible l'union et l'amitié des trois nations. Mes plaintes n'ont jamais eu pour but la nation Britannique, mais quelques individus de cette nation, qui ont agi et agissent de manière à compromettre l'honneur même de la nation Britannique.

Je prie Dieu, Monsieur le Duc, qu'il vous aide à triomfer du commun ennemi, et à accomplir la gloire des trois nations Espagnolle, Britannique, et Portugaise.

Recevez, Monsieur le Duc, l'assurance de la considération et de l'estime avec laquelle je suis

Votre affectionnée,

CHARLOTTE,

Infante d'Espagne et Princesse du Brésil.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 6th Sept., 1813.

I have examined the town attentively with the engineer, and settled what additional work will be necessary for the security of the front line, as well as the second, on the rampart and under it, for at present it is quite impossible to get an intermediate one; but the posts in the front line are such as never can be forced, and the communication from the right of the south rampart will be very good up to the barracks of St. Elmo and to the arsenal next to it. An intrenchment will be formed so as to throw a great fire on the only passage by which the enemy could attempt to come from the convent of Sta. Teresa. So that, on the whole, I think it impossible any impression could be made; or if made, that it would turn out to our ultimate advantage by giving an opportunity of cutting off great part of the assailants.

I send your Lordship my correspondence with Rey to-day. I am told he has almost a halter about his neck for having blown up the Castle of Burgos, so defends this to save himself from Buonaparte's resentment. Five deserters came in last night, who repeat that the garrison is much discontented, and anxious to surrender.

I have the honour to remain
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to General Rey.

SIR, Ernani, 6th Sept., 1813.

The Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies, the Marquess of Wellington, having observed in Lieutenant Jones's letter to you that he states the prisoners to be in "*la cour du magasin sans blindages*," and considering that a building appropriated to the use of a garrison as a *magasin* can never claim any protection by another part of it being used as an hospital, and marked as such by a black flag, has ordered me to demand a positive declaration from you of the fact; and at the same time to protest in the strongest terms, as I hereby do, against the prisoners being detained in "*la cour du magasin sans blindages*," if any part of the building be ever applied to any other purpose than that of an hospital for the sick and wounded.

I am likewise ordered to protest against the practice, which has been repeatedly noticed, of the prisoners being employed to work *under the fire of our batteries*.

It would seem to be unnecessary to call your attention to the severe responsibility which a conduct, in these particulars, so contrary to the rules of war, would expose you and your garrison to; for you cannot be ignorant of the repeated defeats Marshal Soult has already experienced in his attempts to relieve you, and therefore must know that the Castle of St. Sebastian will soon be in our possession.

I have the honour to remain, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

II.

General Rey to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham.

M. LE GÉNÉRAL, Au Fort, le 6 Sept., 1813.

J'ai reçu la lettre que vous me faites l'honneur de m'écrire pour me faire connaître ce que vous mande Son Excellence Monsieur le Marquis de Wellington rélativement à vos prisonniers de guerre détenus au fort.

Vous avez dû vous convaincre, Monsieur le Général, en entrant dans San Sébastian, par le bon état de vos blessés, de la manière dont ils ont été traités, soit dans nos hôpitaux, soit dans la ville ; dans le fort Messieurs les officiers et soldats prisonniers sont au milieu des officiers et soldats Français blessés ou malades.

J'ai eu l'honneur de vous mander que dans les bâtimens de l'hôpital il n'existait pas de magasin, et je vous l'assure de nouveau ; et lorsque j'y ai placé vos prisonniers, ce n'était que pour les mettre à l'abri du tir de vos projectiles. Je proteste donc, Monsieur le Général, contre ce que vous me dites rélativement aux magasins que vous supposez à tort dans ces bâtimens. Cette erreur ne peut dériver que du défaut d'expression Française dans la lettre de Messieurs les officiers.

Quant à votre protestation rélativement aux travaux que vos prisonniers auraient exécuté sous le feu de vos batteries, j'ai l'honneur de vous répondre, Monsieur le Général, qu'aucun d'eux n'a jamais été employé de cette manière, et encore moins blessé ; s'ils ont éprouvé des pertes, elles n'ont eu lieu que dans les cours des trois bâtimens réunis et destinés aux hôpitaux des officiers, sous-officiers, et soldats des deux nations.

Vous réitérant ce dernière analyse, qu'il n'y a point et jamais eu aucun magasin ni caserne.

Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Général, que je ne puis entrer en aucun manière dans les tentatives ou défaits de Son Excellence Monsieur le Maréchal Soult, l'honneur et mon devoir devant régler ma défense.

Veuillez, je vous prie, Monsieur le Général, faire connaître ces faits à Son Excellence Monsieur le Général en Chef, Marquis de Wellington.

N'ayant qu'un mauvais interprète Anglais, je vous prie, si vous étiez dans le cas de m'écrire, de le faire en Français.

J'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Général, d'être

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

REY.

G. O. Lesaca, 7th Sept., 1813. [691.]

2. The balances due to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers on the face of their several accounts, closed to the 24th March, are to be paid to them according to the mode pointed out in the General Order of the 3rd August, 1813 ; that is to say, the sum due to each man is to be divided by 30, and the soldiers are to receive on every day the 30th.

3. It is to be understood that the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Life Guards, Horse Guards, the Dragoons, Artillery, and Foot Guards, are to receive the full amount of their daily subsistence as fixed by the regulations, if the balances

due should be sufficient to cover the daily issue to that amount for the month.

4. At a General Court Martial held by virtue of a warrant and in pursuance of an order, &c., Lieutenant ——, of the ——, was arraigned upon the following charge:

* * * * * *

The Court having maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the evidence produced in support of the prosecution, together with what the prisoner, Lieutenant ——, of the ——, has offered in his defence, are of opinion that he is not guilty of the first part of the charge preferred against him, viz.: "For highly unofficerlike conduct," and do therefore acquit him, Lieutenant ——, thereof; but the Court find the prisoner guilty of the second part of the said charge, viz.: "In ill-treating and repeatedly striking private ——, of the same corps, with the flat part of his sword on the back, on or about the evening of the 11th August, 1813, in his, Lieutenant ——'s tent," and do therefore sentence him, the prisoner, Lieutenant ——, of the ——, to be reprimanded in such manner and at such time and place as his Excellency the Commander of the Forces may be pleased to direct.

The Court has been induced to pass a sentence thus lenient, it appearing to it that the custom which did exist in the regiment of punishing with the flat part of the sword had not, to the period of the commission of the act, been formally forbidden.

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

5. The practice of striking soldiers with the flat of the sword must be discontinued entirely in the ——, and the Commander of the Forces trusts that Lieutenant —— will take warning from the lenient sentence which has been passed, and not be guilty of such an act in future.

He is hereby reprimanded, and is to be released from his arrest and to return to his duty.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 7th Sept., 1813.

I have submitted to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent your Lordship's despatch No. 71; and I am commanded to express to you the satisfaction His Royal Highness has felt at learning the intention of the

Spanish government to confer an estate upon your Lordship, as a fresh mark of the gratitude with which your great services are regarded in Spain. I am at the same time to convey the full approbation of the Prince Regent that your Lordship should accept the grant which has been thus honourably tendered by the Spanish government.

I am your Lordship's most obedient servant,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 7th Sept., 1813.

I have given immediate attention to the subject of your Lordship's despatch No. 76, and I have to acquaint you that I fully concur in the propriety of bringing Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray to trial before a general court-martial upon the three first charges which have been transmitted by your Lordship. I have also to express my acquiescence in your opinion that it will be, upon the whole, advisable to omit the fourth charge, founded upon General Copons' narrative, as being of too general and indistinct a nature.

It appears desirable that the court-martial should be held at some commodious station on or near the eastern coast of Spain; but that it should not be assembled till the circumstances of the campaign shall allow of the members and of the witnesses being collected without prejudice to His Majesty's service.

According to your Lordship's desire I return herewith the original Journal of Events which was transmitted by General Copons.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

Colonel Bunbury to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 7th Sept., 1813.

On the 1st instant I had the honour of sending your Lordship such papers relative to the Austrian negotiation and to the affairs in Germany as had been then received from the Foreign Office. I now enclose the remainder, together with a schedule of the whole, and a note from Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst expressing a wish that your Lordship should return all the papers relating to Austria, as being of a very secret nature.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient and most faithful servant,

H. E. BUNBURY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Prince Metternich to the Comte de Narbonne.

Prague, le 11 Août, 1813.

Le soussigné, Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrangères, est chargé par un ordre exprès de son auguste maître de faire la déclaration suivante à S.E. le Comte de Narbonne, Ambassadeur de l'Empereur des Français, Roi d'Italie.

D'après la dernière paix signée avec la France en Octobre, 1809, S.M.I. et R.A. a voué toute la sollicitude non seulement à établir avec cette puissance des relations d'amitié et de confiance dont elle avait fait la base de son système politique, mais à faire servir ces relations au maintien de la paix et de l'ordre en Europe. Elle s'était flattée par une alliance de famille contractée avec l'Empereur Français contribuerait à lui donner sur sa marche politique la seule influence qu'elle soit jalouse d'acquérir, cette qui tend à communiquer aux cabinets de l'Europe l'esprit de modération, le respect pour les droits et les possessions des Etats indépendans qui l'animent elle-même.

S.M.I. n'a pû se livrer longtems à de si belles espérances. Un an était à peine écoulé depuis l'époque qui semblait mettre le comble à la gloire militaire du souverain de la France, et rien ne paraissait plus manquer à sa prospérité pour autant qu'elle dépendait de son attitude et de son influence au dehors, quand de nouvelles réunions au territoire Français d'Etats jusqu'alors indépendans, de nouveaux mouvemens et déchiremens de l'Allemagne vinrent reveiller les inquiétudes des puissances, et préparer, par leur funeste réaction sur le nord de l'Europe, la guerre qui devoit s'allumer en 1812 entre la France et la Russie.

Le Cabinet Français sait mieux qu'aucun autre combien S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche a eu à cœur d'en prévenir l'éclat par toutes les voyes de conciliation qui lui dictait son intérêt pour les deux puissances, et pour celles qui devoient se trouver entraînées dans la grande lutte qui se préparait. Ce n'est pas elle qui l'Europe accusera jamais des maux incalculables qui en ont été la suite.

Dans cet état des choses S.M. l'Empereur ne pouvant conserver à ses peuples le bienfait de la paix et maintenir une heureuse neutralité au milieu du vaste champ de bataille qui de tous côtés environnait ses états, ne consulta dans le parti qu'elle adopta que sa fidélité à des relations si récemment établies et l'espoir qu'elle aimait à nourrir encore que son alliance avec la France, en lui offrant les conseils de la sagesse, mettrait des bornes à des maux inévitables et serait la cause du retour de la paix en Europe.

Il n'en a malheureusement pas été ainsi : ni les succès brillans de la campagne de 1812, ni les désastres sans exemple qui en ont marqué la fin, n'ont pu ramener dans les conseils du gouvernement Français l'esprit de modération qui aurait mis à profit les uns et diminué l'effet des autres.

S.M. n'en saisit pas moins le moment où l'épuisement réciproque avait ralenti les opérations actives de la guerre pour porter aux puissances belligérantes des paroles de paix qu'elle espéroit encore voir accueillir de part et d'autre, avec la sincérité qui les lui avoit dictées.

Persuadée toutefois qu'elle ne pourroit les faire écouter qu'en les soutenant des forces qui promettroient au parti avec lequel elle s'accorderoit de vues et de principes l'appui de sa co-opération active pour terminer la grande lutte, en offrant sa médiation aux puissances, elle se décida à l'effort penible pour son cœur d'un appel au courage et au patriotisme de ses peuples. Le Congrès proposé par elle et accepté par les deux parties s'assembla au milieu des préparatifs militaires, que le succès des négociations devoit rendre inutile, si les vœux de l'Empereur se réalisoient, mais qui devoient dans le cas contraire conduire par de nouveaux efforts au résultat pacifique que S.M. eut préféré d'atteindre sans effusion de sang. En obtenant de la confiance qu'elles avoient vouës à S.M.I. le consentement des puissances à la prolongation de l'Armistice que la France jugeoit nécessaire pour les négociations, l'Empereur acquiescat : avec cette preuve de leurs principes et de leurs intentions il y reconnut les siens ; et se persuada de ce moment que ce seroit de leur côté qu'il rencontreroit des dispositions sincères à concourir au rétablissement d'une paix solide et durable. La France, loin de manifester des intentions analogues, n'avoit donné que des

assurances générales, trop souvent démenties par des déclarations publiques, qui ne fondoient aucunement l'espoir qu'elle porterait à la paix les sacrifices qui pouvoient la ramener en Europe.

La marche du Congrès ne pouvoit laisser de doute à cet égard. Le retard de l'arrivée des plénipotentiaires François sous des prétextes que le grand but de sa réunion auroit dû faire écarter, l'insuffisance de leurs instructions sur les objets de forme qui faisoient perdre un tems irréparable, lorsqu'il ne restoit plus que peu de jours pour la plus importante des négociations, toutes ces circonstances réunis ne démontroient que trop que la paix telle que la vouloient l'Autriche et les souverains alliés étoit étrangère aux vœux de la France, et pour ne pas s'exposer à la reproche de la prolongation arbitraire de la guerre, la proposition d'une négociation, elle vouloit en éluder l'effet ou s'en prévaloir peut-être uniquement pour séparer l'Autriche des puissances qui s'étoient déjà réunis à elle de principe avant même que les traités n'eussent consacré leur union pour la cause de la paix et du bonheur du monde.

L'Autriche sort de cette négociation, dont le résultat a trompé ses vœux les plus chers, avec la conscience de la bonne foi qu'elle y a portée. Plus zélée que jamais pour le noble but qu'elle s'étoit proposée, elle ne prend les armes que pour l'atteindre, de concert avec les puissances animées des mêmes sentimens. Toujours également disposée à prêter les mains au rétablissement d'un ordre de choses qui, par une sage répartition des forces, place la garantie de la paix sous l'égide d'une association d'états indépendans, elle ne négligera aucune occasion de parvenir à ce résultat désirable; et la connoissance qu'elle a acquise des dispositions des cours devenues désormais ses alliées, lui donne la certitude qu'elles co-opéreront avec sincérité à un but aussi salutaire.

En déclarant, d'ordre de l'Empereur, au Comte de Narbonne que ses fonctions d'Ambassadeur viennent de cesser de ce moment, le soussigné met à la disposition de S.E., ainsi de S.E. le Duc de Vicence, les passeports dont elles auront besoin pour elles et leur suite.

Les mêmes passeports seront remis à M. de la Blanche, chargé d'affaires de France à Vienne, ainsi qu'aux autres individus de l'ambassade.

Le soussigné est également chargé de prévenir S.E. le Comte de Narbonne que S.M. l'Empereur, fidèle à l'engagement éventuel verbalement arrêté entre S.M. l'Empereur Napoléon et le soussigné lors de son séjour à Dresde, est décidé à ne faire commencer les hostilités qu'après le terme de six jours révolus.

Il a l'honneur, etc.,

METTERNICH.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir Charles Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Landeck, Silesia, 15th Aug., 1813.

I have the honour to inform you that, by intelligence received, the French have positively crossed the line of demarcation on the roads to Landshut, Jauer, and Neumarck. General Blücher has taken up his position at Schweidnitz. General Sacken has orders to occupy Breslau.

The French General Girard has asserted at Löwenbourg that a very large army is to move on Berlin. Davoust is advancing with a corps assembled at Magdebourg. The troops at Leipsig, Dessau, and throughout Lusatia are in motion.

Private accounts state the French army is divided into thirteen corps. The 4th, which has been in cantonments near Sproltau, marched from thence, on the 12th August, towards Grunebourg. It is supposed that this corps will pass the Oder, and proceed upon the right bank of that river towards Custrin.

The corps of Ney, Lauriston, and Bertrand are in the neighbourhood of Leignitz. The 5th corps has been encamped hitherto near Goldberg; it has also marched on Leignitz. The 6th corps left Buntzlau on the 12th for the same destination: the strength was 16,800 infantry and 4000 cavalry.

The 11th corps marched from Löwenbourg towards Leignitz upon the same day, and this place has been strongly fortified. Another corps, encamped at Gueffenbourg, has not yet moved.

The French park of artillery at Buntzlau has been sent to Leignitz. Sebastiani has reviewed at Haynau the 2nd corps, consisting chiefly of cavalry. It is composed of 19 regiments, which are, however, weak, not more than 300 or 400 each regiment. It is believed the French troops assembled upon the Katzbach, on the line of Leignitz, are not intended to act offensively against Silesia, but are to enter into Bohemia, through the Riesengebirge, in concert with another French corps d'armée penetrating from Zittau; thus cutting in upon the line of march of the Russians and Prussians on Prague, and turning the positions of the Austrians on the banks of the Elbe and near Hunerswassen.

General Moreau passed through Glatz last night upon his way to Prague. Report states that the Emperor of Russia is disposed to place the whole of the army of Barclay de Tolly under Prince Schwarzenberg, and Moreau will be requested by both Emperors to assist the Austrian Field Marshal.

The intelligence I have above detailed may not be in all parts authentic, but I have endeavoured at this interesting period to give your Lordship the best accounts I can procure.

I enclose for your Lordship's information the location and a very exact return of the Prussian army, and I am sure it will afford your Lordship satisfaction to perceive so numerous a force under arms.

I understand the allied troops enter a position selected by the Austrians about the 20th.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

P.S. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland arrived here this day, having learnt that His Russian Majesty was here upon his way to Prague.

III.

SCHEDULE of PAPERS sent to Earl Bathurst for the Marquess of Wellington.*

1st Sept., 1813.

No. 1. Despatch to Lord Cathcart, 5th July, 1813.
„ 2. Despatch to ditto, 13th July; 1 enclosure.
„ 3. Despatch to ditto, 13th July.
„ 4. Despatch from Lord Cathcart, 12th August.
„ 5. Despatch from Sir Charles Stewart, 11th August; 7 enclosures.
„ 6. Extract of despatch from ditto, 30th July.
„ 7. Count Nesselrode to Count Lieven, 14th June (enclosed in No. 2).

3rd Sept., 1813.

No. 8. Baron Witterstett to M. de Rehausen, 5th August.
„ 9. Eventual Treaty between Austria, Russia, and Prussia.
„ 10. Despatch from Lord Cathcart, 6th August (3 enclosures, *not sent*).
„ 11. Count Nesselrode to Count Lieven, 28th July (9th August).
„ 12. Despatch from Lord Cathcart, 25th May; 8 enclosures.

* These Papers appear to have been returned to Lord Bathurst.—ED.

The Quartermaster-General to Colonel De Lancey.

MY DEAR DE LANCEY, Lesaca, 7th Sept., 1813.

I have just received your letter of this day's date about the works in the position of Irun. I am very glad to find they are to be begun upon so soon. The work immediately behind Irun should be a good, substantial one.

I had some conversation this evening with General Wimpffen upon the subject of these works, and we agreed that he should write a letter to the Chief of the Staff of the Galician army (copy of which I enclose), and I told him that I should take care that a communication took place on our part with the principal Spanish engineer employed, in order to concert matters for carrying on the work in concert, and with a common understanding, both of what is to be done generally and of the part to be undertaken by each. I wish you would be so good as see the Chief of the Staff of the Galician army or the principal Spanish engineer, and take care that the latter and Captain Slade are put in communication and upon a good footing of understanding with each other. I consider that as very essential towards making things go on well, and in the way we should always endeavour to go on with the Allies.

As Lord Wellington is desirous that a good deal should be done upon the heights of San Marçial, that will be the best place for the Spaniards to employ themselves; but Captain Slade should go over the ground with the Spanish engineer, to consider what works it will be best to construct in that quarter.

I am not sure whether, by custom or existing regulations, the soldiers are to be paid when employed in works of the description above alluded to, but I will ascertain that point and let you know.

G. MURRAY.

Vice-Adm. Sir E. Pellew to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Caledonia, at anchor off the Mouths of the
MY DEAR LORD, Rhone, 7th Sept., 1813.

I am delighted Mr. Croker has acquired for me permission to pass any important papers through your Lordship's protection, as it affords me the opportunity of offering my congratulations, in common with my country and the whole world, on the glorious success of the armies under your Lordship's command. I shall only say the importance of your Lordship's signal victories will be held in admiration by the latest posterity, and acknowledged as they are at present to have saved the expiring freedom of Europe. I beg once more to repeat to your Lordship my best thanks for your obliging communication. I need not, I trust, repeat my earnest desire of rendering all the aid of my fleet to the wise plans of your consideration, and I shall confine myself to saying we are all ready and cheerfully willing to shed our blood in the good cause, as those noble officers and soldiers who have so nobly and liberally shed theirs under your Lordship's auspices.

In this part of France there is not a soldier. Maassén is wonderfully active

in increasing his fleet; twenty-two sail of the line are afloat, of which five are first-rates and twelve frigates. I count upon sixteen fit for sea-service, and I have fourteen here snug at anchor. Pray God preserve your Lordship's life for the honour and benefit of mankind and the world.

I deeply deplore the necessity which forces Lord William Bentinck away at this crisis, and I am sure the affairs of Sicily are exaggerated.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
With perfect respect and esteem,
Your Lordship's faithfully devoted servant,
ED. PELLEW.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY in the Peninsula, under the Command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Lesaca, 8th Sept., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Field Officers	26	10	36
Captains	80	20	100
Subalterns	155	53	208
Staff	86	50	136
Quartermasters of Cavalry	22	4	26
Serjeants :—			
Present	453	67	520
Sick :—			
Present	19	3	22
Absent	7	..	7
Command	87	19	106
Prisoners of War and Missing	3	..	3
Trumpeters :—			
Present	88	39	127
Sick :—			
Present	2	..	2
Absent	1	6	7
Command	5	2	7
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File :—			
Present	5746	1254	7000
Sick :—			
Present	349	25	374
Absent	288	127	415
Command	1031	375	1406
Prisoners of War and Missing	152	2	154
Horses :—			
Present	5776	1142	6918
Sick	290	106	396
Command	701	280	981
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	1	..	1
Horses :—			
Dead	4	..	4

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula, under the Command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Lesaca, 8th Sept., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers:—			
Colonels	3	11	14
Lieutenant-Colonels	66	21	87
Majors	68	31	99
Captains	425	161	586
Lieutenants	857	183	1040
Cornets or Ensigns	293	357	650
Staff	367	456	823
Quartermasters of Cavalry	22	4	26
Serjeants:—			
Present	2520	1270	3790
Sick:—			
Present	121	70	191
Absent	511	185	696
Command	411	232	643
Prisoners of War and Missing	47	4	51
Trumpeters or Drummers:—			
Present	989	506	1495
Sick:—			
Present	29	7	36
Absent	113	41	154
Command	28	47	75
Prisoners of War and Missing	34	11	45
Rank and File:—			
Present	35,401	20,990	56,391
Sick:—			
Present	2228	979	3207
Absent	11,852	6205	18.057
Command	3232	1913	5145
Prisoners of War and Missing	2448	451	2899
Horses:—			
Present	5776	1142	6918
Sick	290	106	396
Command	701	280	981
Alterations:—			
Men:—			
Joined	2	3	5
Dead	10	7	17
Discharged	1	3	4
Deserted	2	3	5
Transferred	1	..	1
Promoted	2	1	3
Reduced	5	..	5
Horses:—			
Dead	4	..	4

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Ernani, 8th Sept., 1813, half-past 7 P.M.

I most sincerely congratulate your Lordship on the surrender of the Castle of St. Sebastian: another great result of the glorious combinations of the campaign.

Your Lordship will see that by my answer to the 10th Article * it is referred entirely to your Lordship. Songeon (who is not the Burgos officer we imagined) was more anxious about this Article than any other, wishing to get back to France himself, and I promised to solicit your Lordship on this point. I see Rey has added an article of reservation to his own choice (should your Lordship agree to an officer being sent), and very probably he does not mean to send Songeon, who rather took pains to describe himself.

Rey sent me a very urgent message about the Commissary mentioned in the 5th Article, as the women of the family depend entirely on him for subsistence, and must go to England too if he is sent there. Perhaps Soult would send back Mr. Larpent in exchange for him. I wrote a note immediately to Sir G. Collier, for the not being marched through Spain or any way exposed to the Spaniards seemed a point of the utmost anxiety. I hope he will keep the *Freya*, being a troop-ship, to assist in the embarkation. But probably your Lordship will write to urge him to use every means to get rid of all these prisoners as soon as possible.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

Thomas Graham.

P.S. I have just got the enclosed note from Sir G. Collier. I really did not think of him, and could not have waited, as it was sunset before we exchanged the copies of the capitulation; but I should think if Captain Bloye of the *Lyra* were to carry your Lordship's despatch, it would please him. I know he is anxious about his promotion, and he might be invited to accede and to sign the capitulation, as he wishes it. I send the state of the garrison.

[Enclosure.]

Commodore Sir G. R. Collier to Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham.

My dear Sir, ¼ to 5 P.M., 8th Sept.

I have just heard, through Colonel Hill, that troublesome enemy has at last thought fit to surrender. I should be anxious to know this, if not thought troublesome. The *President* cannot weigh, and I am sorry to say the boat with the bag of letters swamped, but everything is safe. The messenger went off, and I gave my own boat to General Picton, or the letters would have been safely on board. Some of the ships have parted in the gale, which was very sudden.

I am anxious to send Captain Bloye home, if anything occurs. Will it be considered intrusive my asking, in case the garrison capitulates, whether I

* For Articles of Capitulation, see letter from Sir T. Graham to Lord Wellington, dated 8th September, 1813, 1st edition *Wellington Despatches*, vol. xi., p. 100.

sign to the capitulation? It might be serviceable to me hereafter. But you will be the best judge of its propriety.

I am very sincerely and gratefully yours,

G. R. COLLIER.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 9th Sept., 1813.

The Duke of Berri's application to your Lordship was a secret to this government until you enclosed his letter and your comments upon it. The substance of these comments, so far as was necessary, was communicated to the Duke of Berri by Lord Castlereagh, who endeavoured to find out upon what grounds the Duke calculated the 20,000 French who he had stated were regimented and ready to appear in favour of the House of Bourbon.

It appears by his answers that this is founded on general assurances of good-will received by two channels, on neither of which much dependence can be placed, and that the Duke has received no details, nor is capable of giving any general sketch of what he expects, or the particular quarter from whence this rising is to proceed.

The policy of your advancing into France, except for the purpose of dislodging Soult and taking Bayonne, has, I confess, always appeared to me to be very questionable. The occupation of Bayonne is fairly to be considered as a Spanish object, as the establishment of an outwork for the security of the Spanish frontier. If you advance farther you must expect general opposition, unless you are acting with a party in the country. If the party with whom you act be not the prevailing party, the attempt to impose a government upon France would arm the country against you, and the cause here would soon become unpopular. Are we, then, sufficiently sure (or can we be so) that the Bourbon party is the prevailing party? The Duke of Marlborough advanced into France without intending to dethrone Louis XIV. Why should you act differently? On the other hand, if you decline the offer of co-operation with the Royalists, you turn them against you; and if they be the prevailing party, you build up a wall against yourself. I entirely agree with you in thinking that there can be no security for Europe as long as Buonaparte is on the throne of France. But it is a great question whether his downfall should not grow out of defeat, rather than be attempted by a formal attack. It is very necessary before we decide the question to do what you suggest, ascertain the sentiments of our Northern Allies, more particularly those of Austria. Connected as she is with the present French dynasty, she may be reluctant to embark in a deliberate engagement, or in open attempt to overthrow it. She might be jealous even of any operation which should have that appearance. We have instructed Lord Aberdeen to sound the Austrian cabinet on this important subject, and your Lordship may be assured that you shall be put in full possession of the sentiments of this government as soon as we shall be able by answers from Lord Aberdeen and from other sources to form any. The more we are assisted by your communications, the more satisfied we shall be with our decision.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 9th Sept., 1813.

Sir Thomas Graham's return makes it necessary to send some other General out; because it is very desirable to consider on whom the command would fall, if your Lordship were by any accident to be deprived of the personal exercise of the command. With that view, and also for the purpose of giving you the assistance of as efficient an officer as we could in so extensive a command as you now have, it was the Duke of York's opinion, and it seems to be, indeed, the general opinion, that General Hope should be selected, and a letter has been written to him in Ireland to that effect.

In concurring with this opinion, I will tell you fairly that I have made a sacrifice of my own feelings, knowing how anxious the Duke of Richmond is to serve under you. If I could insure your health and continuance in command, I am not sure that I should not have pressed for him, as you know his straightforward good sense, which in subordinate commands is of great advantage. In this selection, however, we were to consider not only who would act under you to your satisfaction, but who would be able to discharge your duties if circumstances should unfortunately prevent your being able to discharge them yourself. In this view of the subject, I did not think that I should be warranted in pressing for the Duke of Richmond, who, with every disposition to see service, has unfortunately not had any experience.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Ernani, 9th Sept., 1813.

I shall have the honour of sending your Lordship answers to most of the inquiries in your last letter of this morning to-morrow, having already anticipated most of the directions it contains relative to the engineer and artillery officers making out the states of stores, guns, and the necessary repairs of the place. Indeed I know from Colonel Dickson already that there are not more than 10 or 12 pieces of ordnance of any kind in a serviceable state in the works of St. Sebastian and castle. He intended to propose to put in meanwhile some of the damaged iron 24-pounders, till ordnance could be brought from Coruña. The chief objection to this, in his mind, is the loss of the carriages, which are good and valuable, should the spare guns not be sent. As to the guns themselves, he considers them as of no value.

Sir George Collier will be able to find transports immediately, provided they can be victualled at Pasages from the Commissariat ships there, which is the only means that he can think of to prepare them quickly. There may be some difficulty too about water-casks, the victuallers and horse transports having a very small proportion of casks. If the *Freya* comes in, it would be a great relief, as she could carry 500 or 600. The men described as non-combattans are mostly wounded soldiers. Those that are

much estropié, so as to be unfit for service, and some worn out old men of different descriptions, had better be sent at once to Bayonne.

There is an elderly man, the Surgeon-Major of the place, who behaved with the utmost humanity and attention to the wounded; and there is an officer who showed much gallantry in going twice down the breach to assist up our wounded officers on the first assault. Mr. Jones and the other officers are very anxious to have some favour shown to these two. Your Lordship will be so good as to let me know if any exception can be made about them.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 10th Sept., 1813.

I have submitted to the Commander in Chief your proposition to keep on after the close of the campaign the provisional battalions.

He had so constantly expressed himself strongly against this system, that I entertained little hopes of being enabled to give you a favourable answer; and I certainly did not find His Royal Highness less impressed on this occasion with the expediency of getting back these detachments of different regiments to their depôts.

Your Lordship is so fully in possession of His Royal Highness's arguments on this subject, that I will not trouble you with a repetition of them. His Royal Highness has, however, at length consented (but with very great reluctance) to permitting the privates of these regiments volunteering into any one regiment serving with your Lordship; and would not object to your fixing on one of the regiments belonging to these provisional battalions. I did not understand that he intends to confine you to any particular time when you are to make the men this offer; you may therefore choose the moment when the offer is most likely to be generally accepted.

Your Lordship will have received my letter proposing that you should take the 37th from Gibraltar, and sending the 29th to Gibraltar, as, upon inquiry, it appeared that the 29th were as yet unfit for campaigning. As you propose the 29th to garrison St. Sebastian, there seems no great objection to relieve the 37th by the 77th from Lisbon; I am afraid, however, that this will reduce the garrison at Gibraltar much below its usual complement.

We shall be able to send you soon another regiment from Ireland; and there is *some hope* that we may contrive another cavalry regiment from Great Britain.

I am, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Deputy Judge Advocate to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Châteauneuf, Bayonne, 10th Sept., 1813.

For the unexpected and unmerited proofs of regard expressed towards me in your Excellency's letter of the 4th instant,* whatever may be the result, I shall ever feel most grateful; and I can with great truth assure your Excellency that the kindness manifested towards me and drawn forth by my late misfortune (which I fear will end in ruining all my prospects through life) will go no small way in making me support that misfortune with patience, and even with cheerfulness. I am also encouraged by the contents of that letter to address you, through the favour of General Count Gazan, Chef de l'Etat-major, &c., in the French army here, and to state for your consideration the situation in which I am now placed. In consequence of your letter, I wrote to the Marshal the Duke of Dalmatia, and had leave to remain here until the answer arrived. Last night I received a letter in answer from General Gazan, expressing his good wishes and favourable views towards me, but at the same time informing me that no proposition had been made on your part for my exchange (the letter to *me* I conceive not being in any respect considered as such); but that if any such had been made, or should now be made, it would be accepted; again repeating "If any proposition is made for the exchange by your General in Chief, you shall be sent back immediately to the English army." General Gazan then added, that orders had been given for my not being sent beyond the Garonne *at present* (in which direction I set out forthwith), to enable me to avail myself of any proposition made by you to the Duke of Dalmatia. I merely state these facts, being assured your Excellency will give them all due consideration consistent with the general interests of our army; and begging that you will give orders for the security of my baggage and money until all chance of exchange is over.

I have now the honour to subscribe myself, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and very humble servant,

FRANCIS SEYMOUR LARPENT.

P.S.—I understand the Secretary of the Governor of San Sebastian is a man of very low rank. I have just heard that we are to set out immediately, and are to remain for the present at Mont de Marsan.

The Quartermaster-General to Sir R. H. Kennedy.

DEAR KENNEDY, Lesaca, 10th Sept., 1813.

Lord Wellington has frequently remarked the serious embarrassment that would be occasioned in case of any sudden move by the great number of cattle near the divisions of the army. It would be very desirable that a large portion of the cattle should be kept in the valleys farther back, towards Goyzueta for instance, and the range of mountains which extend from the neighbourhood of Lanz towards Lecumberri and Tolosa. By that means they would be out of the way of the troops in their first movements, which is very essential in positions such as the army at present occupies.

G. MURRAY.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 78.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 11th Sept., 1813.

As we propose that Parliament should meet on the 2nd of November for the purpose of passing some Bill to increase the disposable force of the country, I shall state to you the different measures which are in contemplation, for the purpose of obtaining your opinion upon them.

Our decision must to a certain extent be regulated by the state of the war on the Continent, and by the temper of the country, which will in a great degree be influenced by the fate of the Continental campaign.

The first plan is the raising 20,000 men additional for the militia, and allowing at the same time an additional number to volunteer from the militia into the line. This measure has the recommendation of having been twice tried, and with success. But allowing the Bill to pass before Christmas, we cannot look to its effect on the line before the end of April or beginning of May; and even then doubts may be entertained whether the men so recently enlisted would be immediately fit for foreign service if the regiments consisted of a large proportion of these men, who would be wholly unacquainted with their officers, and a large portion of them without much previous drill.

Another plan is to allow militiamen to retain the provisions for their wives and families when they volunteer into the line to which they are now entitled as militiamen. It is thought that many of the Irish and Scotch, neither of whose militia, and particularly the Scotch, do now volunteer equal to the number allowed by law, would on this encouragement enlist readily, and that we might then increase the number now allowed to enlist with a prospect of success.

The third measure is to allow under certain restrictions the militia regiments with their officers to enlist. I enclose to you the scheme of this measure, to which I beg to call your attention. This measure could not be adopted without having also recourse to the first in order to re-establish our home defence. We might also add to it the second, for individual volunteering. This measure should not be tried unless we have reason to believe it would take, and this must depend upon the spirit of the country at the time it is proposed. It would also, for a time, so break up our home defence that we could not hope to pass it without serious opposition (which of itself would damp the spirit of the country), unless we could hold out the expectation of this long contest being likely by one great effort to be brought to a conclusion.

If our Allies should be beat by the time we meet, even if no armistice should be made, we must look to a long continuance of the war, or at least have no immediate hope of seeing it terminated. In that case I do not think this measure should be hazarded.

I shall be very happy to receive your comments on all these plans, and still more to receive one of your own.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Major-Gen. the Hon. Charles Colville to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Mayo, 11th Sept., 1813.

Whilst I am happy enough to retain that share of your Lordship's good opinion which your letter of yesterday does me more than ever before the honour to inform me of, I can never think my services, such as they may have been, without reward; a sentiment in which the small remains of my immediate family will I am sure accord, a family whose greatest happiness has for these last years consisted in your Lordship's reports of me, and to which their gratitude has been equal.

I therefore most cordially and thankfully accept your Lordship's proposal of receiving back my letters of the 23rd July and 9th instant. I had indeed originally to fear that they were not such as would benefit my cause elsewhere, and only hoped that your Lordship would in your kind consideration extract from them such facts as you thought likely to attract the notice and reward of government.

Permit me, my Lord, to say that the reasons you have taken the trouble to give me for your declining to do so are perfectly satisfactory; and that should even further disappointment follow up the course I trust I shall never deviate from, I shall not be unmindful of, or without consolation from, your Lordship's words, "that there is no person of whose good opinion I should be solicitous, who will think the worse of me on that account."

I have the honour to be with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES COLVILLE.

[692.] *To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Lesaca, 12th Sept., 1813.

I send a courier, with the account of the surrender by capitulation of the castle of St. Sebastian.

There is nothing new on this side, excepting a French report of a victory gained on the 26th near Dresden. I have seen the 'Moniteur' of the 6th September, from which it appears that the Allies either attacked or made a strong reconnoissance on their intrenched camp near Dresden on the evening of the 26th of August, which the French appear to have repulsed; but the force stated to have been used by them was so small, viz. three divisions of the Guards, that I think the affair of no consequence, and that it was only a reconnoissance.

I am waiting here till the animals of the pontoon train will be relieved from the work consequent on the siege, when I shall cross the Bidasoa. We have carried on the whole siege with

our own equipments, which consequently have suffered materially, not having been able, as usual, to obtain any assistance from the country.

I enclose a letter for the Duque del Infantado,* which I request you to send him by a person who will certainly deliver it to him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 13th Sept., 1813.

The Prince of Orange will deliver to you the despatches. It would be doing him great injustice if I did not tell you how much he is attached to you, and sensible of the advantages he derives from being under your protection. He had his choice either to go to Germany and have the command of a brigade in our pay there, or to return back to his present situation under your Lordship; and he chose the last. The Duke of York intends to give him a regiment, and we hope he will be able to give him one serving in Spain. He may there serve at the head of his regiment for a little while; and when your Lordship shall think fit, he may have the rank of Major-General, with a brigade under you.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

I was in hopes to have sent by the *Prince* a Marshal's staff, which is making for you, but it is not yet ready.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Murray to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Palermo, 13th Sept., 1813.

On the 10th I had the honour of receiving your letter with that from Lord Bathurst of the 14th of July. The duplicate reached me at the same moment. I shall as soon as I can get a vessel set off for Valencia, and I feel myself extremely obliged to your Lordship for this change in my destination. I hope to get there before the officers arrive from England, but I am obliged to apply to Sir E. Pellew for a ship.

Your Lordship is no doubt long ago apprised of the late events at Tarragona, and I think they prove, without the power of contradiction, the accuracy of my statements respecting Suchet's force. To me it has been mentioned as amounting to 26,000 men, the three columns marching against Lord William; and in all 30,000. It may be difficult to say what

* See p. 212, letter of 27th August, 1813.

his numbers exactly are, but Lord William had 33,000 men actually with him, without including the Catalonian army and Villa Campa in his rear, and Suchet was strong enough to force him to retire; and it is to be observed that Suchet has left in the garrisons behind him fully as large a force as he left in Valencia when he marched against me. In any way it can be reckoned, his whole force will be found to amount to 46,000 or 47,000 men; and if the great body of them were not opposed to me, I should be glad to know where they were. After Suchet marched, the main body of the enemy crossed the Xucar, Requeña was taken, Villa Campa got almost to the walls of Valencia. The Freyle was unopposed, and at Gerona and Barcelona there did not remain from all accounts a relief for the guards. Where then were all the men, unless in the great masses with Suchet and Maurice Mathieu? I was, I assure you, overpowered; and I still insist that had I acted otherwise than I did, the Sicilian army would not at this moment have existed.

It is quite needless to trouble your Lordship with any observations on the Admiral's conduct. If he knew of no more than 5000 men being near, his judgment and opinion are of no value when it is proved there were 22,000: if he did know, his letter does not fairly represent the case; and that he did know, even his own letter, I think, proves.

Allow me, my dear Lord Wellington, to congratulate you on your successes, and to assure you that there is nobody rejoices in them more heartily on your account than I do.

I have the honour to be yours most sincerely,

J. MURRAY.

[693.] G. O. Lesaca, 14th Sept., 1813.

3. The following extract of a letter from the Regency of Portugal to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces is published for general information:

"We beg your Excellency will be pleased, in the name of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to accept and communicate to the General officers, officers, and soldiers under your Excellency's command, His Royal Highness's sincere and grateful acknowledgment for the late brilliant victories which they have obtained in the field of honour, by the most heroic sacrifices in contending for the independence of his crown, the salvation of the Peninsula, and the liberty of the world."

4. The commanding officers of regiments are informed that tin camp kettles cost 600 *reis* each, and the bags 200 *reis* each, and these articles are to be charged at these rates to those men who may lose them.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 15th Sept., 1813.

Major Hare did not arrive with your despatches of the 2nd instant until yesterday, two hours after they had announced by telegraph the surrender of the *Castle* of St. Sebastian on the 9th. The account of the last business is not yet arrived, but probably will before I close the despatches.

With respect to the omission of Sir William Beresford, it arose from an oversight of mine, in not adverting to your having named him in the despatch of the 1st of August. Your suggestion respecting a pension is a good one. If any Peers for military services should be made on the close of the campaign, I certainly think that Sir William's name ought not to be omitted; but I am giving my own individual opinion, and confidentially to your Lordship. With a Peerage he would be entitled to a pension.

By the bye you call the affairs near Pamplona the *battle* of Sorauren. I observe I have called them the *battles* of the Pyrenees. By which name shall they be distinguished in the medals?

I have directed inquiries to be made in order to ascertain when the depôt will be completed, and will let you know by the next mail.

Many thanks for the letter which you have sent me, and which I return. I promise you to return as exactly King Joseph's papers. I have sent by the Prince of Orange a book, which ought to have been sent sooner to you if the contents had been known.

I congratulate you on St. Sebastian having fallen; and hope Pamplona will not be able to hold out much longer.

I am, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 15th Sept., 1813, 6 P.M.

I have but a moment to say that I have just received your despatches by the messenger who left you on the 7th. The report by the telegraph of the surrender of the Castle rests, I find, upon what he heard. The Port Admiral should not send up a telegraph upon such light authority.

This Eastern army has been a most unlucky one. I feel, I can assure you, the force of what you say, and will converse with Lord Castlereagh on the subject, in order to come to some final arrangement.

Ever yours, my dear Lord,

BATHURST.

MEMORANDUM ON THE RIVER BIDASOA, IN FRONT OF THE HEIGHT OF SAN MARÇIAL.

15th Sept., 1813.

The river Bidasoa offers but two good situations for throwing bridges across it opposite the height of San Marçial, one above and the other below the ruins of the permanent bridge. A little below the ruined bridge is a narrow island, and about 150 or 200 yards below this the river forms a slight re-entering angle, and is its narrowest part, being about 100 yards wide. The pontoons would be brought by the great road from Irun, which forms the left bank.

About 1500 yards above the ruined bridge, and a little above the place where the enemy lately threw a bridge over the river, is a sudden bend towards the right of the Marçial height, which affords a favourable situation for placing a bridge. A road branches from the great road, near the ruined bridge, and runs at some distance from the river till it meets it at this point, by which the pontoons could be brought; or a road might be made on the right extremity of the Marçial height down to the river.

Between the height of Marçial and the Bidasoa runs a ridge nearly parallel to it, but much lower. This ridge affords the best position for guns to protect the lower bridge and cover the passage.

It is, however, considerably commanded by the heights on the opposite side, but they are distant.

The height of San Marçial, although considerably elevated above everything on the right of the Bidasoa, is much retired from it; the distance from its summit to the points that would chiefly annoy the lower bridge is 1800 or 2000 yards. Its extreme right and the falls from it to the river are its best situations for annoying the distant fire on the lower bridge. By its proximity in this part it protects the upper bridge and commands the ascent on the opposite side.

The ground on the right bank in front of the lower situation proposed for a bridge is a low plain, intersected by narrow creeks, but a communication is open to the main road at the head of the ruined bridge.

From the ruined bridge to where the enemy last passed, a steep hill runs close to the river, and then terminates in a ravine, up which is a road; a lesser ridge then continues on in front of the upper proposed situation; at its foot is a low flat closed on three sides by the river in its abrupt bend, and from which is a narrow road to the one up the ravine above-mentioned. The river then resumes its former direction.

There are very good roads, and practicable for heavy artillery, leading from Irun up the Marçial hill and along the position, and also to and along the lower ridge in its front.

F. STANWAY.

G. O. Lesaca, 16th Sept., 1813. [694.]

2. General officers commanding brigades must not give leave to any officer or soldier to be absent from his corps or station for more than one night. General officers commanding divisions must not give leave of absence for a greater length of time than eight days.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 16th Sept., 1813.

In my letter last night I had just time to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 7th instant.

My instruction of the* instant and your letter have crossed each other. My instruction desired you to appoint a fit person to take the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army if Lord William should have left Spain. Your Lordship tells me that you can spare no General officer from your army. At the time that you wrote this, however, you were not aware of Sir John Hope being about to join your army. In consequence of this additional strength in General officers (although he be not actually arrived), you may have detached somebody in consequence of my instruction, and then any officer appointed from hence might be placed in an awkward situation. Until I receive an answer to the instruction, I am for these reasons unwilling to send anybody from hence.

I despatch this by a messenger to beg that if you wish for more General officers in order to enable you to send one or more to the Anglo-Sicilian army, you may let me know it. You will also let me know whether you would prefer any person not now serving with you to be sent out to take the command of this detached part of your army.

There can be no more fighting this campaign for Lord William, and so I shall tell him that he had better remain in Sicily for the present. He is so anxious to serve, that I hope you will have no objection to his serving under you next campaign; but I shall explain to him that he must consider his separate command at an end.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

From motives of delicacy to Sir Thomas Graham, not being willing to supersede him, I have not hastened Sir John Hope's departure from Ireland, which, however, I shall now do, especially as the fall of St. Sebastian makes it easier.

Let me know if there are any particular General officers now in England whom you would wish to have.

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* Blank in manuscript.

Vice-Admiral T. W. Martin to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, H.M.S. *Creole*, off Pasages, 16th Sept., 1813.

On my return from your Lordship's head-quarters yesterday afternoon, I sent the *Magicienne* off Cape Finisterre in quest of the privateer which had been represented to your Lordship as cruising so successfully in that quarter; and Captain Gordon, who commands that ship, is directed to continue between Cape Finisterre and Cape Ortegal for three months, to protect the navigation along that coast.

I at the same time directed the *Lyra* and *Arrow* to proceed off Santoña and blockade that place as rigorously as possible, and not to permit the fishing-boats to contribute in any degree, by their supplies, to the maintenance of the garrison.

The Captain of the *Lyra* is to apprise the Spanish officer commanding before Santoña of the purport of his orders, and to give him every assistance which may be necessary for the annoyance and distress of the enemy.

On the arrival of the *Cydnus*, now hourly expected, I intend to join her in the blockade of Santoña; after which there will remain, applicable to other duties, the ships named in the margin;* so that to complete the number of vessels to meet your Lordship's wishes there remain to be sent to the coast two brigs and additional vessels for coast convoys; but in the mean time this part of the arrangement will not experience any delay, as the *Challenger* is already at Lisbon, and the *Sylvia* at Oporto, waiting for convoy.

I beg to state to your Lordship that I have this day been to the mouth of the Bidasoa, and I find it capable of giving better security to small vessels than I had been led to expect, though certainly not such as can be deemed altogether a safe anchorage in the winter season: it is, however, highly important to find that sort of refuge for the small cruisers which is so necessary to encourage a perseverance in the hazardous duty assigned to them, and in which I confess, my Lord, that I do not think their best exertions will tend in any material degree to obstruct the communication of the enemy between the Gironde and St. Jean de Luz; and the enemy, aware of the impossibility of our sending any ships of war into this corner of the bay, will presently bring forward a force that will almost dare the approach of these small vessels.

That nothing, however, may be left undone to forward your Lordship's wishes, I have given the plan of a light, easy to be constructed, at the point of Higuera, that will be necessary for the guidance of the vessels, and I apprehend it will be found expedient to place a few guns there for their protection.

Under the sanction of your Lordship's opinion respecting the perfect security of Pasages against any attempt from the enemy, I shall direct the *Surveillante* to come into the harbour during the period of the equinox.

Before I leave Pasages, it will be satisfactory to me to know that I have

* *Surveillante*, *Sparrow*, *Constant*, *Nimble*, *Holly*, *Fancy*, *Juniper*, and *Challenger* (gone to Lisbon, from whence she will bring a convoy).

in no instance misunderstood your Lordship's wishes, which it is my duty, and I can truly say my desire, to promote by every possible means.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's very obedient and humble servant,

T. W. MARTIN.

P.S. I beg to transmit a paper describing the naval force which I understood your Lordship would wish to have on this coast.

T. W. M.

[ENCLOSURE.]

A frigate, four brigs, and four cutters to be constantly on the coast for any service Field Marshal Lord Wellington may require of them.

Four vessels of war to be exclusively employed in the protection of the transports between Coruña and Pasages.

The Admiral commanding at Lisbon to give the same or a sufficient number of vessels of war to escort the transports to and fro from Lisbon, the Mondego, Oporto, and Coruña.

This will make the permanent force for the north coast of Spain as follows:—

Frigate	1
Brigs	6
For convoy	4
Cutters or small vessels	4
Flat boats	6
Bomb-ship	1
	22

A line-of-battle ship occasionally to show off Coruña.

But if at any time the supplies coastways from Portugal should be so diminished as not to require this number of vessels, it should be notified to the senior naval officer, that a part of the vessels may be released from this service.

And, in the event of Santoña falling, reference will be made to Lord Wellington respecting his wish of the further services of the vessels employed in that blockade.

T. W. MARTIN.

A Son Excellence Monseigneur Lord Wellington, Général en Chef des Armées Combinées en Espagne, etc., etc., etc.

Les Officiers de Santé Français employés pendant le Siége dans les Hôpitaux Militaires de la Place de St. Sébastien.

MONSEIGNEUR,

Appelés par leur ministère à des fonctions essentiellement pacifiques, les officiers de santé n'ont pu voir sans douleur que l'exception demandée en leur faveur n'avait pas été accordée: les vertus qui honorent votre Excellence les encouragent à lui adresser leurs réclamations.

Au moment du siége la place de St. Sébastien était dépourvue de tout;

nous n'avions ni emplacement, ni fournitures, ni médicamens pour les hôpitaux. Cependant, malgré le grand nombre de blessés Français, le zèle des officiers de santé a supplée au peu de ressources qui étaient en leur pouvoir; les secours de toute espèce ont été prodigués aux militaires de votre nation; soldats, officiers, tous ont trouvé dans nos personnes des amis et des consolateurs; et nous ne craignons point d'invoquer le témoignage de chacun d'eux, bien sûrs que tous nous rendront la justice que nous croyons mériter.

Tels sont, Monseigneur, les titres que nous osons faire valoir auprès de votre Excellence pour être renvoyés dans notre patrie; titres bien puissans puisque nous les présentons à un Général qui aux talens et à la valeur des héros joint les vertus des philosophes et des amis de l'humanité.

Nous avons l'honneur d'être, avec le plus profond respect,

De votre Excellence, Monseigneur,

Les très humbles et très obéissants serviteurs.

(*Here follow the Signatures.*)

P.S.—Dans le cas où Son Excellence ne prononceroit pas notre renvoi pur et simple en France, nous le supplions de nous faire jouir du même avantage qu'elle a bien voulu accorder au commissaire des guerres, celui de rester sur la frontière jusqu'à ce que Monsieur le Maréchal Soult ait répondu sur l'échange que votre Excellence voudrait bien nous permettre de lui demander.

16th Sept., 1813.

[Tell them that I am very much gratified by their care of the British wounded who were taken prisoners in the late siege of San Sebastian; and I hope they will find that the numerous French wounded in our hands are invariably well taken care of.

That I am much concerned that the conduct of the French government must prevent me from considering them otherwise than as prisoners of war.

WELLINGTON.]

[695.] G. O. Lesaca, 17th Sept., 1813.

1. At a General Court Martial, held by virtue of a warrant and in pursuance of an order, &c. &c., Sub-Lieutenant and Adjutant ——, of the — Life Guards, was arraigned upon the following charges, viz.:

1st. "For refusing to obey the orders of Lieutenant —— of the same regiment, his superior officer, on a point of duty on the watering parade, on the evening of the 4th August, 1813.

"For unofficerlike conduct and disobedience of orders the

same evening on parade, in peremptorily refusing twice, in presence of the piquet, to give over the same to Lieutenant ——, who ordered him so to do, and who was his senior officer, and appointed to that command;" the whole being to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.

The Court having duly weighed and considered the evidence in support of the first charge, viz.: "For refusing to obey the orders of Lieutenant ——, of the same regiment, his superior officer, on a point of duty on the watering parade, on the evening of the 4th August, 1813," together with what the prisoner, Sub-Lieutenant and Acting Adjutant ——, has offered in his defence, with the evidence thereon, is of opinion that the prisoner, Sub-Lieutenant and Acting Adjutant ——, is not guilty of the first charge preferred against him, and does therefore fully acquit him of the same; and the Court is further of opinion that the charge is frivolous and vexatious.

The Court having duly weighed and considered the evidence in support of the second charge, viz., "For unofficerlike conduct and disobedience of orders the same evening on parade, in peremptorily refusing twice, in presence of the piquet, to give over the same to Lieutenant ——, who ordered him so to do, and who was his senior officer, and appointed to that command," together with what the prisoner, Sub-Lieutenant and Adjutant ——, has offered in his defence, with the evidence thereon, is of opinion that he is not guilty of the second charge preferred against him, and does therefore fully acquit him of the same; and the Court is further of opinion that the charge is frivolous and vexatious.

The Court cannot conclude the investigation of the above charges preferred by Lieutenant —— against Sub-Lieutenant and Adjutant —— without remarking that the conduct of Lieutenant ——, during the circumstances upon which the charges are founded, is highly unmilitary and reprehensible, and that he has not been actuated by motives for the good of the service, and that he has acted contrary to the advice of his commanding officer, previously asked for by him.

Which opinion has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. Lieutenant and Adjutant —— is to be released from his arrest, and to join his regiment.

3. The Commander of the Forces cannot avoid observing,

upon the perusal of the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of Lieutenant and Adjutant ——, that Captain —— having been present on the parade on the night of the 4th August when the transactions occurred which form the subject of the second charge against Lieutenant and Adjutant ——, ought to have interfered as a superior officer of the regiment to protect Lieutenant and Adjutant —— in the performance of his duty of Adjutant, as prescribed by the Regulations of His Majesty's service, and the standing orders of the regiment; and that it must be understood in the Life Guards, as well as in the army in general, that the possession of rank in the service is attended by the necessity for the performance of duty, and for attention to the maintenance of good order and discipline, and that it is not in the power of an officer to lay aside or assume his rank in the service at his pleasure, but most particularly not when he is on a parade on which troops are formed for duty.

WELLINGTON.

The Military Secretary to Colonel Torrens.

MY DEAR COLONEL, Lesaca, 17th Sept., 1813.

When Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. J. Stewart, of the 7th West India regiment, succeeded to the Lieutenant-Colonelcy of that corps, he gave up his situation in this army and obtained leave to return to England under the idea that he should be obliged to join the regiment to which he had been appointed. Lord Wellington has however since understood, that as Colonel Stewart was very usefully employed here, the Commander in Chief might be inclined, at his solicitation, to allow of his returning to the Peninsula. His Lordship has, therefore, desired me to mention to you that he has a very favourable opinion of Colonel Stewart's abilities, and will be very glad to have him back, if His Royal Highness should think proper to allow him to do so, without going to the West Indies.

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Marshal Soult to the Governor of Santoña.

M. LE GÉNÉRAL, St. Jean de Luz, le 17 Sept., 1813.

Les événements qui se sont passés à St. Sébastien, dont sans doute vous avez connoissance, n'ont pas permis au Commandant de la Marine de vous expédier aucun bâtiment; la mer était couverte de ceux de l'ennemi. Nous espérons que l'avenir cela sera plus facile. Ainsi vous pourrez recevoir des nouvelles, même des secours, et vous pourrez aussi m'instruire

de votre situation, que je suis impatient de connaître avec détails. Il n'est absolument rien parvenu de vous depuis que vous êtes livrés à vos propres forces.

La place de Santoña est considérée comme inexpugnable tant qu'elle aura des vivres, et d'après les rapports qui m'ont été faits il parait qu'elle était abondamment pourvue. Je ne doute pas qu'elle ne soit ravitaillée avant que ces approvisionnements soient consommés. Je compte même qu'elle sera entièrement dégagée ; vous devez avoir cette confiance, et l'inspirer à votre garnison ; vous devez surtout être pénétré que l'Empereur compte sur la conservation de cette place importante. Les braves qui ont défendu St. Sébastien se sont immortalisés ; ils ont fait éprouver des pertes considérables aux ennemis en retardant leurs opérations. Je suis bien convaincu que si l'occasion s'en présente, les Français qui sont sous vos ordres à Santoña montreront la même valeur ; et que vous mettrez à profit tous les moyens quelconque qui peuvent prolonger votre défense à l'infini, comptant toujours sur les secours et sur les ravitaillements successifs que je vous annonce.

Faites moi parvenir par le retour des patrons qui vous remettent ma lettre un aperçu de vos approvisionnements, et de la force des divers corps et détachements qui composent la garnison. Instruisez moi si vous avez fait perfectionner les ouvrages de défense, et quelle est leur situation. Dites-moi quelles troupes vous sont opposées, et faites-moi part des nouvelles qui vous sont parvenues sur ce qui se passe dans les armées ennemies, et dans l'intérieur de l'Espagne. S'il vous était possible de vous procurer les Gazettes étrangères, je vous serais obligé de me les envoyer.

Il est probable que pendant la mauvaise saison les ennemis ne tiendront pas la mer, car alors il y aurait trop de danger pour leurs bâtiments. A cette époque vous pourrez peut-être armer en courses et faire en sorte d'introduire quelque prise dans votre port. Quand on est dans la situation où vous êtes, le moindre secours devient important, de quelque manière que l'on puisse l'obtenir.

J'attendrai avec une grande impatience de vos nouvelles.

LE DUC DE DALMATIE.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Colonel Thornton.

SIR, Lesaca, 18th Sept., 1813.

I have received your letter of the 16th inst., enclosing returns of clothing and other stores belonging to the 40th Regiment which you wish to have conveyed round by sea from Lisbon to Santander. There is no objection to the 40th Regiment having the same facilities afforded it which it has been the custom to grant in similar cases, but it is right I should apprise you beforehand that it is not the intention of the Commander of the Forces that the whole of the stores of the regiments now at Lisbon should be transferred to Santander, but that such part only of the articles placed in depôt there should be from time to time brought round as Commanding officers foresee will be absolutely necessary.

I think it proper also to take this opportunity of explaining to you that the Commander of the Forces has always considered it as a matter of special

indulgence when the public means of transport are allowed to be employed for the conveyance of regimental clothing, or of other articles, the private property of colonels of regiments; and that no responsibility whatever on account of any losses or damage incurred in such cases is thereby imposed upon the public.

I have, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 19th Sept., 1813.

A most curious scene has been passing here lately. The permanent deputation having been appointed, the Cortes closed their sessions on the 14th. There had been for some days reports of the prevalence of the yellow fever, which had excited alarm. On the 16th, in the evening, I received an official note from the Minister of State, apprising me of the intention of the government to proceed to Madrid on the following day, but without expressing any reason for so sudden a resolution. At night I went to the Regency, thinking that this was an occasion when it would be right to offer them some pecuniary assistance. I found Agar and Ciscar together, the Cardinal being ill of the gout. They told me that the prevalence of the disorder was the sole cause of their determination to leave Cadiz, and Ciscar particularly dwelt upon the necessity of removing, saying that he had twice seen the fatal consequences of delay at Carthagena. They then told me that there were disturbances in the town, in consequence of which they had determined upon summoning the General and Extraordinary Cortes; and indeed, if they had consulted the Constitution, they would have found that as the ordinary Cortes were not sitting, they could not have adopted the measure of leaving Cadiz without consulting the Extraordinary Cortes. I went from the Regency to the Cortes. A motion was made for summoning the ministers to account for the proceedings of the Regency. Never was I witness to so disgraceful a scene of lying and prevarication. The ministers insisted upon it that it was the intention of the Regency not to leave Cadiz until the Cortes had been consulted, although I had in my pocket the official note announcing that intention, and had been told by Ciscar that the Extraordinary Cortes were assembled for no other reason than because there were disturbances in the town. The Cortes ended this session by appointing a Commission, consisting of Arguelles, Torreno, Garcia Herreras, Antillon, and Pascual, to examine the Junta of Sanidad and to report upon the state of the public health. Upon the report the next morning it appeared that twenty-nine physicians declared that in their practice they had not met with any case of yellow fever, but in the hospitals it appeared that there were some cases; and the Committee, I conclude with a view of serving the Regency, stated their opinion that the government ought to remove to Port St. Mary's. Villanueva, the priest, however, made a motion that the physicians should be directed to state whether more deaths had occurred this year than in the last at the same period, and whether the disorder was more contagious than in the last year; and Mexia

added a resolution that it should likewise be ascertained whether it were possible to place the sick in an isolated situation, so as to lessen the danger of contagion. Villanueva and Mexia were added to the old Committee, which was directed to report upon these points. The result of their report was adopted by the Cortes, viz. that there was no necessity for the removal of the government until the installation of the new Cortes on the 25th, when they would decide upon the propriety of departing from Cadiz. A letter from the Regency was then read, in which they vindicated their conduct, upon which Antillon got up and said that the fault was evidently somewhere, and he moved that a Committee should be appointed to examine into the whole affair, when Vasquez Canga, the Conde de Torreno, Morales, Galliego, Don, and Sombrela were appointed and directed to report on Monday; and it is supposed that the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Grace and Justice will be the victims.

In this affair the Liberales have lost much of their popularity, particularly Arguelles, Garcia Herreras, Torreno, &c. Arguelles's speech, after the report of the Committee had been read, was absolutely hooted by the galleries. The Serviles have behaved with great judgment: not one of them has opened his lips, thinking, as the Irishman says, "that it was a mighty pretty quarrel between the government and its supporters, without their interference." We shall see the result of the debate on Monday. There certainly was no reason for so precipitate a measure, which has alarmed the whole country; but I think the Liberales will now see the necessity of leaving Cadiz, where they are completely the slaves of the people.

I have received your letters of the 3rd, 5th, and 12th; the last to-day. I am delighted that you have got St. Sebastian. The Spaniards are highly delighted at your account of the battle of St. Marçial, and think that you have done ample justice to their troops.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I return your paper to the Minister of War, which I think excellent. I do not propose to interfere any more upon the subject, unless you should think it advisable.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 21st Sept., 1813.

Finding it generally asserted that Sir John Hope was going out under the special appointment of your *second in command*, and it appearing that I had not been in the first instance sufficiently explicit with him on this subject, I lately wrote to Sir John a letter of explanation, in which I stated that no such term was applied to his appointment upon your staff, but that he would be next in seniority, with the command of a division, or more troops, as circumstances might render necessary; and I expressed my expectation that he would prefer such an arrangement to the undefined situation in which a mere second in command, acting as such, is placed. I enclose you the copy of his answer, which I trust will be satisfactory to

you. I thought it was better to let this matter be clearly understood, not only from my knowledge of what were your wishes upon the subject and recent practice, but in recollection of the embarrassments attending such an appointment in the person of Spencer when I was with you.

Though the staff of your army is full, and that the Commander in Chief has for a long time refrained from making any minor appointments to it, yet His Royal Highness has been induced to permit Sir John Hope to take with him an assistant in each of the departments of the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General. His Royal Highness has thought this due to Sir John Hope's rank, the habit he has been in of having certain people about him, and in consideration of the command from which he is taken.

I was on the point of writing to request you would give employment to my cousin Major Torrens, whom you may recollect in the 19th Dragoons in India; but I have received a letter from Sir John Hope, offering to take him upon his staff. I still, however, request the favour of your attention and protection to Major Torrens. You will do me the justice to allow that I have not often been troublesome to you respecting my personal friends, never having asked you to appoint one to the staff except my relative Captain Blackall, of the 53rd, who was killed with his regiment at Salamanca.

About 2000 more infantry detachments are in progress of preparation to go out to you, and the additional or fourth squadron to the three Hussar regiments will also soon be ready for embarkation.

I wish we could send you 20,000 men. As I told you before, it might be done; and I trust that an efficient provision for your reinforcement will be made upon the meeting of Parliament.

I congratulate you upon the success of the Allies in Germany. Poor Moreau's loss is very great. His presence with the Allies would have had a moral effect upon the French army, and in France of the first importance.

Ever, my dear Lord,

Most faithfully and sincerely yours,

H. TORRENS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Colonel Torrens.

MY DEAR SIR, Dublin, 17th Sept., 1813.

Yours of the 14th has removed the only feeling of a doubtful nature which I had in regard to my appointment to the army in the Peninsula, as I should have very sincerely deprecated any such vague appointment as that of second in command without the charge of troops. Your former intimations did not lead me to expect such an appointment, and therefore I was silent on the subject; but it is very satisfactory to have it confirmed that it is not to be so arranged.

The letter you mention having written on the 13th has not yet reached me.

I most sincerely congratulate you on the fall of St. Sebastian.

Yours, &c.,

JOHN HOPE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Tarragona, 23rd Sept., 1813.

I have the honour to apprise you that Lord W. Bentinck embarked yesterday evening on board His Majesty's ship *Swiftsure*, and sailed immediately for Sicily: previous to his departure, his Lordship directed me to take the temporary command of the troops here, which since the 15th of this month have been hutted near to this place.

I do not find that Lord William had any intimation that your Lordship had received his letter of the 1st instant, in which I believe he noticed his being obliged to go to Sicily.

The army has been busily employed since its return here in working at the breaches lately made by the French, so as if possible to render the place tenable, and much has been done, but it has been found I believe by the engineers, that at best this is but a poor place as a fortress; and though as a position for an army it may perhaps be considered respectable, it cannot, without going to a great expense of money and labour, be rendered secure for many hours against an enemy attacking it in form.

According to reports received this morning from Villafranca and the neighbourhood, the enemy occupied nearly his old position on the Llobregat: this afternoon, however, a report has been received from General Copons from Igualada of yesterday, stating that he understands the enemy were in movement, in what number not stated, but that it was said he was directing his march towards Lerida.

Should this be ascertained to be the case, it is my intention to move towards Villafranca with such force as I can get together, from thence to watch his movements, and to endeavour, as opportunity may offer, to act in co-operation with General Copons; but as the Spanish infantry of Major-General Whittingham's division is unable (from want of provisions or the means of carrying them, had it the articles) to move with us, I am apprehensive I cannot look for any greater addition to the British and Sicilian force I can take with me than about 3000 of Major-General Sarsfield's division, which I have reason to believe are now at Villafranca; so that should the enemy turn his column on this side, I shall be under the necessity of retiring to this place, and here await his attack, should he be disposed to follow up his movement.

I hope before long to know the decision your Lordship may have been pleased to make relative to the command of this army; having to express an earnest wish that your Lordship may have found it convenient to send some one more worthy than myself to replace Lord William Bentinck, and more likely than I can possibly expect to be to possess the confidence so conspicuously shown to his Lordship by this army.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

W. H. Clinton.

Vice-Adm. Sir W. S. Smith to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, *Hibernia*, at anchor off the Rhone, 23rd Sept., 1813.

I venture to send you some confidential papers in aid of your calculations as to what great blow you will strike next. You are too much in the habit of a great scale of reasoning on military affairs not to feel and know that in your line of operation, extended as it is over upwards of 200 miles of mountainous country, you may by an advance give your hand to a naval force on each flank, viz., in Basque Roads and the coast from whence I date this letter, and where the fleet may still be for a short time till the winter gales make it less practicable at all times during the season. You are too much in the habit of reasoning on the great scale of Indian alliances not to feel the value of the willing good office of a military chief like the King of Sardinia for operations in a mountainous country, where artillery and tactics are not so much wanted or so applicable as wolf hunters and zealous enthusiasm: should you therefore wish to extend your right in your mind's eye, and wish to cause a powerful diversion in the rear of your enemy's left, on the great scale of the south of this part of the European continent, it may be done with due combination in Downing Street with my friends Lord Bathurst and Lord Castlereagh. I, of course, have kept them informed. I have asked myself the question more than once whether I might venture to communicate confidentially on such a subject with your Lordship, and have made my mind up that I should be wrong to withhold such information from you, and to omit to assure you of my own knowledge that my gallant, enterprising "clairvoyant" chief is equal to meeting your wishes if you will express them to him, although, from the nature of our responsibility, he cannot make a proposition to your Lordship.

For my own part I feel every day lost that we do not clip the wings and the claws of the arch fiend.

I crave your pardon for the intrusion, and remain,

My dear Lord,

Your devoted humble servant,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Account of the Attack on Port de Cette by the English Fleet and Catalonian Army in 1710.

The town and harbour of Cette became famous by the attack the English made upon it in the year 1710, which was one of the best concerted schemes of the whole war, though, by reason of unforeseen accidents and mistakes in the execution, it did not succeed. The inhabitants of the Cévennes, rendered desperate by persecution and oppression, having given the French King a great deal of disturbance, and considerable bodies of them being still in arms, it was proposed to the British Ministry that, notwithstanding former disappointments, something should be again undertaken in their favour. It was

further observed, that the main body of that people were within fifteen leagues of Montpellier; that a body of English troops might be easily landed at Port de Cette to support them; and, in short, that an expedition of this kind might disconcert the enemy's designs in Spain, and at least facilitate King Charles's enterprises in Catalonia. Upon this a gentleman, thoroughly instructed in the whole affair, was despatched to Spain, with orders to propose the project to General Stanhope and Sir John Norris, upon whose approbation, and the consent of the King of Spain, it was to be immediately put in execution by the fleet then cruising on the coast of Catalonia. It cannot be denied that the project was exceeding well formed; for, had the English troops fixed themselves but for three days at Cette, they might, with the assistance of the Duke of Savoy, have given the French King more trouble than he had met with from any of their projects during the war. His own subjects, then in arms against him, were a bold, daring, and hardy people, and, with very little encouragement from England, would have formed an army of 20,000 or 30,000 men, to which the French exiles from every part of Europe would have resorted; and as among them there were many experienced officers, it is not easy to conceive what consequences the affair might have had, or to what extent the flame might have reached. As soon as the plan of this expedition was communicated to General Stanhope, who was an enterprising officer, he eagerly embraced the scheme, and prevailed upon King Charles to permit a small body of troops to embark on board the fleet. This resolution being intimated to Sir John Norris, he called a great council of war on the 6th of July, in which it was resolved to send an express to the Duke of Savoy, and embark the forces immediately, that an affair of so great moment might not suffer by delay. These troops, consisting of Colonel Stanhope's regiment and 300 men from Port Mahon, in all not exceeding 700, were commanded by Major-General Seissan, a native of Languedoc, and a very good officer. The fleet sailed from Barcelona on the 9th, and on their arrival before Cette the troops, having landed without opposition, next morning by break of day marched directly towards the town. Sir John Norris, at the same time, appointed some ships to batter the fort at the mole head, upon which the inhabitants retired to the church, and, soon after, both town and fort surrendered, as did also the town of Agde next day, so that now the English seemed to have firm footing in the enemy's country, and the expedition had a very promising appearance: the only misfortune was, that the troops were too few to be sent upon an affair of so great moment. On the 17th Major-General Seissan received advice that the Duke of Roquelaure, with 400 dragoons and 4000 militia, was advancing to ford the lake and repossess Cette, upon which the Major-General thought proper to leave 140 men to secure the bridge of Agde, and marched with the rest of the forces to oppose the enemy, giving notice at the same time to the Admirals Norris and Sommelsdyke to send all the boats of the fleet, with as many men as they could spare, into the lake, to attack the enemy in his passage through it, which was accordingly done. The Duke of Roquelaure, seeing his design prevented by these measures, returned to Mèze, and the Admirals and General detached a Major with 150 men to reinforce the detachment left to secure the bridge of Agde; but, at the same time, advice was brought that this important post had been abandoned upon a false alarm; nevertheless it was resolved to prevent the enemy, and to return to Agde with shallops by sea, in order to regain that post, but the very moment this was to be executed a contrary wind sprang up, which obliged them to abandon the design and direct all their care to secure Cette. In short, the Duke de Noailles arrived at Agde the same day

they were to return thither. They then began to think of defending the mountain of Cette, and posted the few troops they had in the vineyards there, surrounded with a slight wall, with orders to retire, but not before the arrival of the enemy. An officer, who commanded fifty men, did not rightly apprehend this order, or else he was surprised; for, upon the first appearance of a few dragoons who fired upon his men, he surrendered at discretion: the other troops, upon this discouragement, retired in disorder, though the necessary dispositions had been made to support them in their retreat, and the several officers did all that could be expected from men of courage and experience to rally them. While these were re-embarking, on the 17th a captain was left in the fort with fifty men to guard it: it was not accessible but on the side of the mole, and the passage leading to it on that side was defended by two pieces of cannon; besides, the enemy had no boats. The shallops were still by the fort the whole morning: Admiral Norris, however, had no sooner put off to go aboard his ship, but the enemy sent notice to the captain that, unless he immediately surrendered the fort, he must expect no quarter: whereupon the officer let down the bridge and surrendered at discretion, even before the troops were re-embarked. The Duke de Roquelaure sent on board the captain who had so ill defended the fort in exchange for a burgher who had been released before; but the captain was ordered on shore again, and told that since he had been so complaisant to M. de Roquelaure as to deliver up the fort to him, it was but reasonable he should be near the Duke's person, and treated according to his merit.

II.

Account of the construction of the Canal of Languedoc, and description of the same.

We have already taken notice of the great importance of Port de Cette to the province of Languedoc and the whole of the southern coast of France, as it is the only tolerable harbour they have in the Gulf of Lyons, but it is of no less consequence as it affords a communication between the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean; and this seems to be what Louis XIV. had particularly in view when he ordered it to be constructed at a vast expense. Port de Cette communicates with the Lake of Thou by a canal of 900 French fathoms in length and 20 in breadth, and this lake extends in length 12,000 fathoms from the Canal of Port de Cette to the mouth of the Royal Canal of Languedoc.

In taking the level of the places through which the canal was to be drawn, it was found that the ridge of Naurouze, near Castelnaudary, is more than 100 French fathoms higher than the Western Ocean, and as much elevated above the surface of the Mediterranean Sea. It was therefore thought proper to introduce at this place the supplies of water necessary to support the navigation of the canal; that, this being the highest point, it might from thence flow downward to both these seas. And, to lessen as much as possible the labour and expense of digging, it was judged expedient to take all possible advantage of the course of the Garonne by making the canal communicate with that river about a quarter of a league below Toulouse, which is above 68 French fathoms higher than the level of the Western Ocean, and about 55 leagues distant from the Tower of Cordouan; that small vessels loaded with goods for any part of Languedoc or the coast of the Mediterranean, having sailed up the Garonne to the mouth of the canal, might, by help of the sluices, proceed up the canal to the Naurouze (which is 32 fathoms French

higher than the Garonne, and 28,279 fathoms distant from it), and from the Naurouze be conveyed, by the help of a great many sluices, down the same canal to Port de Cette, which is more than 100 French fathoms lower than the level of the Naurouze, and at the distance of 113,987 from it. So that the whole length of the canal, from the Garonne to Port de Cette, is 142,266 fathoms, which amounts to more than 70 French leagues, and above 180 English statute miles.

The principal difficulties which occurred in the construction of this grand canal were those that follow. There being only a small fountain at the Naurouze, it was necessary to find between 5000 and 6000 cubical inches of running water, and fall upon means to get it conveyed to the Naurouze. It was also a matter of great difficulty to carry the canal from the Naurouze to Toulouse, and from the Naurouze to the Mediterranean, as, in doing this, it was necessary to find a remedy for the inequality of the grounds through which it was to pass by a great many sluices, to level some rocks and mountains and cut a passage for the canal through others; to avoid rivers and torrents, and where this could not be done, to carry the canal over them upon bridges or admit them into it, with such precautions as to prevent their filling it up with sand and mud. And to conclude, it was necessary to make a harbour in the Mediterranean at the mouth of the canal, at a very great expense. Upon the whole, they found it necessary to dig up more than 2,000,000 of cubical fathoms of earth, and above 500,000 of solid rock; to build 104 sluices,* 16 causeways, 24 drains, and a great many bridges, which required a prodigious quantity of stones and wood, especially if we take into the reckoning more than 40,000 cubical fathoms of mason work, exclusive of the works, moles, and quays of Port de Cette, which, considered by themselves, are of a very large extent. It was further necessary to have at all times in the canal above 1,000,000 of cubical fathoms of water and more than 600,000 ready in the reservoir at St. Feriol, to serve in dry weather and keep the highest part of the canal constantly full. The expense of this prodigious work amounted to 13,000,000 of livres, whereof the King advanced 6,920,818, and the province contributed 6,079,182, including the 2,000,000 they advanced for defraying the charge of Port de Cette.

A part of this expense might have been saved, especially with regard to some of the rocks they were obliged to cut, and the passage that was dug under the hill of Malpas,† if they had united the Royal Canal with that of Narbonne, already mentioned, which is not above the distance of a league from it; but Riquet, the principal director, was a native of Béziers, and therefore, it is said, preferred the interest of the place of his birth to that of the whole province, particularly of Narbonne, Toulouse, and Carcassonne, which by this means lost a great part of the advantages they might otherwise have had by this canal.

* About a quarter of a league from Béziers, where the canal runs down the side of a hill, eight of these sluices are employed to make this descent navigable, each of them being 38 paces long between the gates, and 8 broad. The gates are of an oval shape, and, when they are all open, expose to the sight a beautiful cascade of nine falls of water, each about 9 feet high.

† This hill lies about a league and a half from Béziers; the canal runs under it through a passage 200 paces long, 140 of which are covered with an arch of stone, and the other 60 with naked rock. The arch is 24 feet in diameter, and 4 in thickness, and the depth of earth or the height of the hill above the arch 40 feet. On one side of the canal, under the arch, there is a footpath 3 feet odd inches wide, by which foot passengers may walk through this extraordinary passage.

III.

The King of Sardinia to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Sidney Smith.

M. L'AMIRAL, Cagliari, le 29 Juin, 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre avec les pièces incluses, et le Lieutenant de la frégate m'ayant obligeamment offert, de la part du capitaine, qui est malade, d'attendre deux jours mes lettres, j'ai profité de ce retard pour pouvoir unir à mes réponses au contenu des votres plusieurs pièces, qui nous sont parvenues avec des nouvelles très fraiches des armées (accommodées cependant à la manière de Buonaparte, savoir à son avantage), où il parle de victoires sans aucun détail sur les mêmes, et qui ont tout l'air d'avoir été au moins en partie à l'avantage des Russes et des Prussiens, puisque bien que les Français soient à Breslau, ceux qui marchoient sur Berlin n'ont pu y arriver.

Ce qui m'afflige cependant c'est la nouvelle de l'Armistice, qui a dû commencer le 1 Juin, et doit durer deux mois. Avant cette conclusion, l'Empereur d'Autriche avoit expédié différents courriers aux puissances belligérantes, et bien qu'il rassemble de fortes armées dans la Bohême, l'Hongrie, et la Carintie, et que Buonaparte ait ordonné le rassemblement d'un camp à Verone, on ne peut prévoir l'issue de tout cela. Il se peut que les Russes veuillent laisser le temps à 150,000 hommes, qui sont encore en arrière, de les rejoindre; mais Buonaparte ne manquera pas aussi de son côté de tirer parti du temps. Je le crains beaucoup plus comme négociateur en égard qu'il n'a rien pour suspect, et que les mensonges et les parjures ne lui content rien, ce en quoi il n'est pas égal aux autres; que comme Général les événements des guerres passées ayant fait voir qu'il peut très bien être battu (ce que vous avez très bien su lui faire voir vous-même d'une manière très claire à St. Jean d'Acre), et que s'il se sauve lui-même il n'en perd pas moins les armées, qu'il commande comme personne avant lui n'avoit fait.

J'avois déjà fait imprimer et publier avec beaucoup de détails la persécution des prêtres, et leur déportation en Corse maintenant. Monseigneur d'Avezo, qui arrive dans l'instant sur le chébec *l'Ienusa de la Madaleine* avec d'autres de ces braves ecclésiastiques, qui ont pu gagner notre littoral, pouvont nous donner bien des détails de plus, que je m'empresserai de faire aussi imprimer, et que je vous envoyerai.

J'ai donné, touchant la note confidentielle que vous m'avez remise, et que vous me renvoyez plus corrigée pour l'orthographe, par la frégate, les dispositions analogues à ce que nous avons arrangé pour éviter tous les inconvénients et désagréments qui pouvoient survenir entre deux puissances qui combattent contre le même ennemi et contre les mêmes principes destructeurs de tous les droits et possessions légitimes. Pour ce qui est de l'affaire du jeune officier dont vous me parlez, je vous prie de l'assurer que j'ai très bien compris que cela n'avoit été que l'effet d'un transport de zèle de sa part, et que cela ne m'a certainement pas fait concevoir la plus petite mauvaise idée d'un jeune officier qui d'ailleurs me paroit très accompli.

Par rapport à l'entreprise qui pouvoit avoir lieu sur l'île voisine (Corsica), j'ai fait écrire par le Comte Roburent au Chevalier de Genei, lequel, outre que c'est un militaire de terre et de mer très capable, est très hardi, a beaucoup de liaisons et de moyens dans le pays en question, afin qu'il me fit toutes les réflexions nécessaires sur les possibilités, les utilités, les moyens, et le temps, et par un autre occasion je vous envoyerai ses réflexions et les miennes. Cette maudite suspension d'armes nous mettant pour le moment dans la nécessité de suspendre tous nos projets offensifs, savoir, jusqu'à ce que nous puissions nous horizonter sur le mode et les moyens, sans perdre de vue les préparatifs à faire pour la promptitude de l'exécution lorsque nous aurons les données nécessaires pour l'entreprendre. Pour ce qui regarde l'affaire majeure dont vous me

parlez, du Continent, j'y ai beaucoup de moyens, du crédit, et de la confiance; mais pour ne pas perdre tout cela il faut que je ne débute pas sans les moyens absolument indispensables pour réussir, et pour me promettre à moi-même de ne pas compromettre mes bons et fidèles amis, comme ils ont déjà été compromis deux fois par les Autrichiens, qui ont parlé en mon nom sans que je l'eusse porté, et même lorsque pour aider les affaires je me suis porté sur le lieu, et j'aurois réussi, parceque tous étoient dans l'intention de se rallier à moi. On m'a empêché de prendre le commandement de mes propres troupes; on a voulu les organiser à l'Autrichienne, donner des drapeaux avec nos armes, mais avec celles d'Autriche, ce qui a fait que personne n'a plus voulu s'engager, et ceux qui se sont trouvés incorporés dans les Autrichiennes sont presque tous désertés, se protestant qu'ils étoient Piémontais et pas Autrichiennes, malgré tous les efforts que j'ai fait pour les retenir unis aux Autrichiennes, parmi lesquels ils se trouvoient, ou comme je ne pouvois répéter cette scène sans me faire du tort à moi-même dans l'esprit de mes bons Piémontais. Je ne puis l'entreprendre sans avoir huit ou dix mille hommes de mes troupes pour servir de noyaux aux autres, qui n'aient plus à craindre de se voir incorporés dans une armée étrangère, et pour prendre pied dans le continent. L'endroit le meilleur seroit Gênes, car avec la mer aux flottes Anglaises 8000 hommes des miens,* avec le corps de troupes que l'Angleterre voudroit employer pour s'en rendre maîtresse de la ville et s'y maintenir, nous aurions bientôt 30,000 ou 40,000, et plus de mille hommes rassemblés dans Gênes, à pouvoir entreprendre de barrer les Alpes depuis la Suisse à la mer, nous unir aux Suisses et aux Tyroliens, et coupant l'entrée et la sortie de l'Italie aux Français, y excitant l'insurrection, qui ne seroit pas moindre de 200,000 à 300,000 hommes des masses armées, l'Italie se trouveroit peut-être délivrée du joug infame qui l'opprime en une seule campagne. L'Autriche n'auroit plus rien à craindre des Français, puisque en tant des siècles ils n'ont jamais pénétrés à Vienne que depuis que nous avons été délogés de l'Italie, qu'ils y vont toutes les fois que Buonaparte le veut. Il ne seroit pas même nécessaire pour cela que l'Autriche co-opérat pourvu qu'elle ne s'opposat pas. Mais pour cela il y faut les moyens de mettre ces 6000 hommes au moins sur pied de mes troupes, il y faut des fusils et de l'artillerie de campagne surtout dont je manque. Il n'y a pas de doute que l'occupation préventive de la Corse faciliteroit infiniment l'expédition sur le Continent. Les gentilhommes dont vous me parlez sont à terre, et on leur facilitera leur passage.

Le code des signaux m'a été remis, et nous nous donnerons tous le mouvement pour le mettre en exécution. Avec certains alcaidi il faudra pourtant pour le commencement se borner aux signaux les plus simples et plus importants, afin de ne pas les confondre avant qu'ils aient bien appris la leçon. Je vous suis très obligé pour les bons offices que vous avez bien voulu faire pour l'échange de nos esclaves avec ceux de Tunis. Bien que cette lettre soit confidentielle pour vous, vous pouvez cependant en faire l'usage que vous jugerez avec l'Amiral, que je n'ai pas le plaisir de connoître personnellement, mais dont je connois un fils qui est un jeune homme très estimable. Je vous prie de faire bien des compliments de ma part à Monsieur l'Amiral. Je me suis acquitté de vôs commissions envers ma femme et les Archiducs, qui y ont été très sensibles, et vous assurant des sentiments que je vous ai voués,

Je suis, Monsieur l'Amiral,

Votre bon ami,

V. EMANUEL.

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* On peut valer les Piémontais au moins 6000.

IV.

The King of Sardinia to Vice-Admiral Sir W. Sidney Smith.

(Extract.)

"Cagliari, 29 Juillet, 1813.

"Buonaparte, ensuite du vif intérêt que la Russie et l'Autriche viennent de lui témoigner à mon égard pour mon rétablissement dans mes états du Continent, espérant de les tromper et leur faire accroire que je négociasse avec lui une paix séparée, a fait publier que la paix étoit comme fait avec moi, et a nommé un Consul-Général en Sardaigne, lequel est arrivé, se disant négociant, par surprise sur un bateau à Longou Sardou. Ayant été tenu en observation et interrogé, il a confessé avoir été autorisé ici comme Consul-Général, et a même dit que Buonaparte avoit décidé la paix avec la Sardaigne, comme s'il appartenoit à lui de donner la paix à un rival qui ne la veut point séparément des autres puissances belligérantes. J'ai en conséquence envoyé d'abord l'ordre qu'on intimat à Monsieur le Consul-Général de s'en retourner comme il étoit venu, lui déclarant que jamais je n'aurois accepté de Buonaparte aucune paix particulière et séparée de ceux qui ont bien voulu se charger de la défense de mes intérêts, et que jamais je n'aurais renoncé au Piémont comme je n'ai jamais voulu y renoncer depuis que nous en avons été malheureusement chassés, malgré le monument qu'il a fait projeter sur le Mont Cenis pour perpétuer l'union du Piémont et de l'Italie à la France."

[696.] *To Earl Bathurst.*

MY LORD, Lesaca, 24th Sept., 1813.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 6th September, enclosing one of the 2nd from the Secretary of the Admiralty; and I had hoped that one of the consequences of the interview which I had had with Admiral Martin, and the arrangement which the Admiral promised me should be made, would have been to enable me to refrain from troubling your Lordship again upon the subject of the naval service on the coasts of Spain and Portugal. But it is quite impossible that I can allow either that my letter of the 19th August* to your Lordship contained the first statement of my wishes and opinions upon this subject, or that all the facts upon which I have grounded my complaints to your Lordship, are false. Indeed, the letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty proves the truth of what I had stated, which was not that we had no naval assistance in attacking St. Sebastian, or in the other services required; not that the assistance in Sir George Collier's power was not zealously afforded and ably directed; but that it was not sufficient: and this I repeat, and am ready to prove. It is no answer to my reports on this

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 17.

subject, referable to operations carried on between the 10th and 26th of July, to say that ten different convoys sailed from Plymouth to the coast of Spain between the 29th July and 9th August;* and, in fact, when, after the siege was concluded, Admiral Martin came to fix the force to remain upon the coast for the naval purposes of the army, which was, in the whole, to consist of as per margin,† there was a deficiency of six vessels, even including two vessels, the *Challenger* and the *Sylvia*, sailed to the coast of Portugal. Not a day passes now that I don't receive an account of some capture at sea. Only yesterday, notwithstanding Admiral Martin's arrangement, a Portuguese vessel, laden with 20,000 pairs of shoes and other supplies, was run on shore by a French privateer, between Passages and Fuenterrabia; and this morning a report has arrived of the capture of two Portuguese vessels off Viana. Your Lordship is also aware that the 77th regiment and 1200 Portuguese drafts are detained at Lisbon, and the 37th regiment are detained at Gibraltar, for want of transports to remove them or ships of war to give them convoy; Admiral George Martin's flag then flying in the *Wellington* tender.

I have before heard the opinions contained in Mr. Croker's letter about the value of the island of Santa Clara to aid the maritime blockade, which island, known to have on it only twenty-five men, would have been taken possession of at a very early period of the siege of St. Sebastian, had we had the maritime means either to attack it or to keep a communication with it after it should be in our possession. The fact is, however, that, although useful in other respects, it was of no use in preventing the enemy's communication by sea. On the very night it was taken the enemy received considerable supplies by sea, and the communication, not for "eggs and fowls alone," but for everything that was wanted, was open and made every night till the 31st August. Notwithstanding the preference naturally given by the Secretary of the Admiralty to the reports of Sir George Collier, which, however, as quoted by the Secretary of the Admiralty, are not exactly consistent on every subject with his opinions delivered in conversation or in his private letters to

* It must be observed that whatever convoys were despatched, none arrived till after the date of the despatch of the 19th August.

† 1 frigate, 6 brigs, 4 for convoys, 4 cutters or small vessels (6 flat boats and 1 bomb ship), not included in the number of vessels stated to be deficient.

me and to Sir Thomas Graham, I here assert a fact which I know and can prove.

It is likewise fact that the garrison of Guetaria entered the place by sea after it was blockaded, and that all the provisions and ammunition in the place were introduced into it on the 4th of July; and there was a communication every night, by which ordnance, ammunition, provisions, and reinforcements were introduced at pleasure.

In regard to the opinion of Admiral Lord Keith of the expediency of aiding the operations at St. Sebastian with ships of the line, I conclude that no doubt is entertained that Lord Keith did make Sir Thomas Graham acquainted with his intentions upon that subject, as stated in my despatch to your Lordship of the 19th August; and he did send Captain Otway* first with the *Ajax* alone, and lastly with the *Ajax* and *Bellona*, on the 3rd of September, without any requisition from me, notwithstanding that the directions of the Admiralty were that he should wait for such requisition. I may fairly conclude, then, both from what his Lordship stated to Sir Thomas Graham, and from his actions, that, if he had not been prevented, he would have sent this assistance at an earlier period, viz. in the end of June, when unquestionably it would have been more safe.

Notwithstanding my ignorance of naval affairs in preferring the boats of the fleet to the harbour boats of Passages, navigated by women, for performing the services of landing the ordnance and stores, as manifested in my complaints to your Lordship of the want of this assistance in the first part of the siege, I am happy to have to report that it was found practicable to give us this assistance in the second part of the siege, by which the service was much facilitated, and that none of the difficulties referred to by the Secretary of the Admiralty were experienced.

I cannot admit that there was anything improper in my communication to Sir George Collier, adverted to by the Secretary of the Admiralty, or in that made to Captain Otway of the *Ajax*, by Sir Thomas Graham, of my opinion regarding the want of naval assistance upon the coasts of Spain and Portugal. Sir George Collier referred to me a letter from Lord Keith on naval services, upon which certainly I might have declined to give

* Captain Ottway arrived on the 9th.

any opinion, as I shall decline to give any opinion upon all future occasions. But in order to bring the subject entirely and distinctly under the view of Sir George Collier and of Lord Keith, I sent the former an extract of the letter which I had addressed your Lordship on the 19th; and in order to enable Sir Thomas Graham to explain my wishes distinctly to Captain Otway, I wrote him a note to the same purport, which he sent to Captain Otway.

In future, however, I am convinced that the best mode of proceeding is to confine myself strictly to the line of my own duty, which is to report to your Lordship any deficiency that may be felt by the service for want of naval assistance as it may occur, leaving it to His Majesty's government to take such measures as they may think proper to apply a remedy.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Echalar, 24th Sept., 1813.

I shall do myself the honour of waiting upon your Lordship on the 27th, and beg you will permit me to say that I do consider the honour conferred upon me by the Prince Regent as enhanced in the highest degree in being received at your Lordship's hands.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful,

DALHOUSIE.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 25th Sept., 1813.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 5th* instant, in answer to mine of the 25th ultimo marked D.

You may be assured that if you can strike a blow at the democracy in Spain, your conduct will be much approved here.

On the question respecting the Princess of Brazils, I will confess fairly to you that I (individually) am not quite a convert to your opinions on the subject.

You say that the best thing would be to select some person for Regent

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 88.

who would unite the strongest claim from birth with the best capacity. Now I am inclined to think that it is best for the monarchy that the person who is the heir apparent or presumptive should be the Regent, without requiring the additional qualification of the best capacity.

I think so, not only because the heir is more likely to have an immediate interest in upholding the monarchy, but also because by so doing you approach nearer to the principle of hereditary monarchy, which excludes all idea of selection.

I am by no means prepared to say that in revolutionary times or times of great danger this principle might not be advantageously departed from. If there were now in Spain any eminent man possessing or likely to obtain an ascendency there, it would, I think, be desirable that a person of that description should be preferred, although it might even endanger the succession. But the misfortune is that there is no person of eminence in Spain, and none acknowledged generally to be so; and what little you would gain in character and ability by your preferring some other to the Princess of Brazils, you would lose in principle and stability.

I think our having little or no influence in the Cortes is owing to having acted in a manner to discourage all approaches to us from the different parties which divide that assembly. When questions of such moment are agitated, it cannot be expected that persons will keep aloof, and not connect themselves with some one of the political leaders; and though many may respect us, and be grateful for what we have done for the country, and would have preferred to belong to our party, if we had formed one, yet, that not having been the case, and they having made their choice, they must abide by their political attachments.

The system which we at first adopted, that of not forming a party, was, I believe, very right under all the circumstances of the case. It may be doubtful whether we should persist in that system, advanced as matters are now.

Can we for example strike a blow at the democracy without connecting ourselves with those who feel the same inclination? Your Lordship, with the influence of public opinion in your favour, and with the opinion of strength which a military commander always possesses, although he may not intend to exercise it, may do much if a fair opportunity presents itself, and I heartily hope one will. Otherwise we must sit by, and see the mischief done, without being able to prevent it, but not without the reproach of having permitted it.

You will, I hope, my dear Lord, understand that I am writing my own individual doubts. The conduct of government had much better be what you suggest, neutrality on the great question of the Regency.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 25th Sept., 1813.

Before the arrival of Lord William Bentinck in Spain, complaints were made of the misconduct of the two Italian regiments belonging to the Anglo-Sicilian army; and it was represented that little or no dependence could be placed upon them. Lord William in a letter to me states that they would fight well in a national cause; but seems to admit that where they are, they may not act as well as his representations in Sicily respecting them induced us to expect. I therefore suggest to your Lordship that you might send them at once to Sicily; and I have this day given an instruction to the Commander-in-Chief in Sicily to send two battalions of the King's German Legion to Spain, on the arrival of the two regiments in question. I have thrown this suggestion in the form of a private letter, that you may do just as you like about it. You will probably find it expedient to make other changes in the regiments in that army, by ordering some to join you, and sending some of your own to that army, as I hear there is much party in it.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 25th Sept., 1813.

You may make your orders on the depôt as soon as you receive this letter. It would be a great convenience if your Lordship would order home any spare transports equal to the tonnage required for the orders you may give from time to time.

I have, however, given directions to the Transport Board to have some always ready. The depôt has been finally fixed at Plymouth, in consequence of a representation from the Admiralty, who have stated that Plymouth will be more convenient for their arrangements. I am sorry for this, as it may make delay in the passage out.

Colonel Torrens has taken the arrangement respecting the officers' baggage in hand, and has promised to write to you on the subject.

Your Lordship will receive 150,000*l.* by the vessel which is to sail tomorrow, together with the additional ammunition ordered in consequence of your letter of the 3rd September.

The additional 50,000*l.* I got for your *fighting* Spaniards.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Portsmouth, 25th Sept., 1813.

I have received to-day your letter of the 16th from Lesaca,* together with a long report from Rear-Admiral Martin on what may be required in the way of naval arrangements. I have not had time to peruse the latter, and as the *Niger* frigate is now under weigh at Spithead with a considerable sum of money on board and some transports under her charge for St. Sebastian's, I am unwilling to detain her till I had perused it. I am glad to find, however, by a few lines from Mr. Croker to-day that the Admiralty Board in London have anticipated the directions I should probably have given to carry into immediate effect all the suggestions transmitted by the Admiral. The latter has also written to me a private letter, in which he adverts to some points of a more confidential nature as necessary to be attended to in carrying on the service with a view to the most effectual co-operation, and which I shall not lose sight of, though I may not give any official or formal directions respecting them.

I have many thanks to return for your letter of the 16th, and the explanations contained in it. The only reply I shall make to it is by endeavouring to anticipate your wishes on every occasion in which it may appear to me practicable for the naval service to assist in the objects you may have in view.

I have a few lines from Sir John Hope to-day, by which I find he accepts my offer of the *President* frigate, which I had sent to Cork to convey him from thence to your head-quarters, instead of coming through England.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

I have promoted Captain Bloye of the *Lyra* and Lieutenant O'Reilly of the *Surveillante*, and mean to do more at no distant period.

[697.] G. O. Lesaca, 27th Sept., 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces publishes to the army a letter received from Earl Bathurst:

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 14th Sept., 1813.

I have received the honour of your Lordship's letter, No. 80, of 2nd September, and lost no time in communicating its contents to H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

While His Royal Highness deeply laments the loss of such valuable officers as Sir R. Fletcher and Lieutenant-Colonel Craufurd, and of the other brave officers and men who have fallen on this occasion, His Royal Highness congratulates your Lordship on the achievement of this important operation.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 115.

Your Lordship will not fail to convey to Sir T. Graham in the first instance, to Lieutenant-General Sir J. Leith, and Major-General Oswald, as well as to Major-Generals Hay and Robinson, the high sense which His Royal Highness entertains of their meritorious services in their respective commands; and he has been graciously pleased to direct me to beg your Lordship to express his admiration of the splendid example of persevering ardour and dauntless intrepidity given by the officers in the assault, and the alacrity with which it was followed by the non-commissioned officers and men, in a manner truly characteristic of the British soldier.

Your Lordship will also have the goodness to assure Major-General Spry that His Royal Highness has had much pleasure in receiving the very favourable representation which has been made of his services, and of the officers and men in the Portuguese brigade under his command.

I am further commanded by His Royal Highness to beg your Lordship to take the earliest opportunity of assuring General Don M. Freyre that it was with peculiar satisfaction that His Royal Highness has observed the firm and resolute manner in which the Spanish troops under his command repulsed alone the repeated attacks made upon the position which they occupied on the 31st ult.*

This action cannot fail to reflect lasting honour on the General and the officers under his command, and extend the military glory of their country.

I have, &c.,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 29th Sept., 1813.

The Prince of Orange has just called upon me. He seems to think that the Dutch regiments (two, I think, in number) would be inclined to come over from the French army opposed to you, if properly encouraged. I have given him to understand that if they came over in a body they would be taken into our pay; but that I could not undertake that they should serve in your army, as you might possibly see great inconvenience in having such a body with you, for they would be placed under the disagreeable situation of having no quarter given them if they were to be taken prisoners. But you may send them over by the first opportunity, and they may be sent to Germany, or used elsewhere. It will be a diminution, also, of the force opposed to you. I think H. S. H. seemed to doubt whether one of the regiments might not be in Catalonia. In that case there is not much chance of having both.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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* The heights of San Marçial, and the town of Irun, covering the approach to San Sebastian.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 30th Sept., 1813.

An equipment of heavy shells and carcase rockets, with a detachment of Royal Artillery drivers and horses, is preparing for embarkation. In the event of your Lordship's wishing to have them, they will be ready to sail by the time that I receive your Lordship's answer to this letter.

Your Lordship's very faithful and obedient servant,

Bathurst.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Tarragona, 3rd Oct., 1813.

Your Lordship will have ere this been apprised of Lord William Bentinck's departure from hence, and that he had directed me to take the temporary command of the army. In case Captain Milne, to whom I entrusted the despatch with this information to your Lordship, should not have arrived, I send a duplicate. Since sending off that despatch I have received on the 29th September that which your Lordship addressed to Lord William Bentinck, from Lesaca, on the 23rd, to the contents of which I shall now have the honour to advert, premising only what I shall have to say by stating shortly to your Lordship in reference to my letter of the 23rd ultimo, that notwithstanding the demonstration made by the enemy, he has not to this moment, that I am aware, made any decided movement, but continues pretty much in the same force on the Llobregat, where he has been making a *show* of fortifying himself, giving out sometimes that he is about to march to Lerida, at others to Vich, and sometimes to this part of the province.

In compliance with your Lordship's desire I now transmit an accurate return of the loss in the action at the pass of Ordal, and in the subsequent retreat to Vendrels on the 13th ultimo; and I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of acquainting your Lordship, that from all the accounts that have been received, the enemy's loss must have been infinitely beyond that sustained by our army, while the imposing manner in which the retreat was made has not gone unremarked or unfelt by the enemy, and by the inhabitants of the country was witnessed with perfect admiration of the steadiness of our troops.

I observe what your Lordship says relative to the march of the 3rd army, and the remark with which you close that paragraph, in reference to which I beg here to subjoin such information relative to the Ebro and the province of Valencia as I was fortunately enabled to collect from General Elio himself, who had come here for a few hours on the 29th ultimo. Before entering upon the view I am induced to take of our situation here, I shall proceed to state the information received from General Elio on the various points to which your Lordship calls Lord William Bentinck's attention. And first, then, as to whether the blockades of the different posts in Valencia be real and effectual blockades: to which General Elio replies, that the garrisons of the forts of Denia, Sagunto, Peñiscola,

Morella, and Tortosa are kept within their walls, and are compelled to exist on the provisions collected in those places; that guns have been brought against Denia and Morella, and that there is reason to hope neither can hold out long; that Peñiscola is prevented from making sorties; that Sagunto has indeed the ground immediately about the fortress, but that as General Roche's division will now be stronger than it has been, General Elio thinks the enemy will be kept more closely to his works, and that General Roche has begun to annoy him with shells. That in respect to Tortosa, that place having a large garrison, and taking advantage of its situation on a great river, can sally forth occasionally, but can nevertheless obtain no other advantage in that exhausted neighbourhood than that of collecting a little fuel. General Elio, however, added that he hoped soon to be able to curb the enemy in their excursions by the measures he should take.

To your Lordship's query, whether the blockading troops have intrenched themselves, the General replied that none of the blockading divisions have intrenched themselves, except General Roche partially at *Puzol*. He added, that it had been avoided generally near Murviedro, on account of the rich cultivated ground in the vicinity of that place; and that with respect to Tortosa and Peñiscola, closely to blockade either of these places at this season would risk the throwing the force so employed into the hospital. With respect to Peñiscola, however, General Elio observed that it is well watched from advantageous ground in the neighbourhood; and referring generally to these two places, he added that their vicinity is particularly unhealthy, and that it would ruin the troops if encamped or hutted thereabouts, observing that at this moment, owing to the unwholesome air in the low grounds near Peñiscola and Tortosa, he has 2000 of his army down with the ague.

Referring then to your Lordship's query as to what periods respectively it is understood that Tortosa and the other places are supplied with provisions, General Elio acquainted me that from all the information he had been able to obtain on this subject, all these forts have provisions for *eight* months.

Having now replied to the several queries in your Lordship's letter, I proceed to answer, as far as I am able, the other points to which your letter refers, in doing which I feel myself called on to take a general view of the situation of things here, and in what manner it may appear expedient this army be now employed.

On taking the command of it, I have found it, after having advanced towards the enemy, to be now occupied in putting in a state of defence this nearly ruined place. Upon inquiry as to the means of moving the Spanish division of Major-General Whittingham acting with, and immediately attached to this army, I find that the division has not any depôt of provisions, and that were a forward move to be deemed expedient, and that I might think myself justified (conformably to the concluding paragraph of your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd ultimo) in handing over a magazine of provisions for the use of these troops, there are not means for carrying such provisions; and were I upon emergency to suffer such to be carried by our Commissariat, such a measure would so diminish our own means of transport (at least one-third) as would thus in a prolonged movement

very much cripple us. In like manner no dependence in the long run could be had on the movement of the division of Major-General Sarsfield, who, though at present tolerably supplied with provisions by General Elio's arrangements, would nevertheless have to look to our Commissariat for the *transport* of its provisions, and consequently at once, if permitted, would preclude any forward movement of this army, except for a very short distance from its depôt. In respect too to the provisioning of the division of Major-General Whittingham, even in the fixed, stationary way in which that body of troops has generally been, it seems to be now becoming a question whether it may be possible to ration these troops for any length of time in the province. I have not failed to call the Captain-General's attention to this, and it is a subject which has been latterly very much dwelt upon in the several communications had with him.

With respect to the 1st Spanish army, I apprehend much might be expected from the general good spirit that prevails in it, and from the activity, zeal, enterprise, and intelligence of its chief; but I do not see how it can, under any circumstances, be brought to act immediately in conjunction with the army here: indeed the consideration of the difficulty of procuring subsistence for such a force assembled in one corps seems alone to militate against the measure. In deciding then upon the plan to be pursued, supposing it to be practicable to take the Allied force immediately under my command in this province up to the enemy, or if assembled here or elsewhere to meet him on his advance on us, I apprehend I must calculate only upon the two Spanish divisions of Whittingham and Sarsfield, and on the British and Sicilian troops; and with this view of things I have no hesitation in saying that, in my humble opinion, the siege of Tortosa (independent of the grand consideration of the risk of at once crippling this army by the effects of the unhealthiness of the spot) cannot be undertaken.

I now submit with deference to your Lordship the opinion I am induced to form of our situation here. It is this. Marshal Suchet will either retire behind the Fluvio, where I am informed there is a very strong position (detaching largely to France), or he will be prepared to act *offensively*, and endeavour to force this army to go beyond the Ebro. If the French retire as supposed, I think then that, in *co-operation* with General Copons' force, we should pass the Llobregat, and if the force left in Barcelona, &c., be not too considerable, should mask that place, and endeavour to force the position of the enemy, weak as I am supposing him to be, and at once oblige him to abandon the province. Should he leave 5000 or 6000 men in Barcelona, then that we should endeavour closely to blockade and distress the garrison, the Catalan army and General Sarsfield's corps going as far forward as circumstances might make it convenient for the purpose of harassing the enemy's remaining force in the field, and straitening his resources in the province. On the other hand, should Marshal Suchet remain where he is, and be then induced to act offensively (as I apprehend we could not, with the force he would have, venture to encounter him in the field with his great superiority, especially in cavalry), I would submit to your Lordship that there are but the alternatives, either of at once retiring and passing the Ebro, or that of placing the army in position before this place, and there waiting the event.

One great difficulty would attend the former of these projects, viz., the feeding of the army while on the other side the Llobregat, which, with the means of transport we have, would, I am informed, not be possible (independent of the consideration of the probable necessity of subsisting the Spanish troops of General Whittingham's division from our magazines) without forming an intermediate depôt, or unless our provision train were very much increased, there being no convenient place on the coast at which our provision ships could at this season of the year safely lie.

In the other supposition, and that Marshal Suchet acted offensively, I apprehend that unless his army be considerably augmented, he could not venture to push on to the Ebro, should this army occupy this place and the positions in its vicinity; but then in the adoption of such a measure there would arise this inconvenience, namely, that if the enemy came up to us it would be necessary to feed from our magazines the two Spanish divisions, and that in the meanwhile, as long as the enemy should be able to remain near us, he would be living on this already half-exhausted country; and when I mention to your Lordship that our own resources of provisions, with every attention to economy in the consumption of the article of *salt* meat, are extremely low, and that it is not practicable in these parts to secure a regular supply of *fresh* meat (supposing our pecuniary resources to be such as to enable such purchases to be made, which is by no means the case), I need not say that the adoption of this plan, if it entailed the having the enemy any length of time in our presence, might become extremely pressing and *inconvenient*. On the other hand, the abandonment of this place on the advance of the enemy's army would seem to be giving up all the advantages which had been reaped from the effect of your Lordship's successes in Navarre, &c. So that, taking all circumstances into consideration, I am inclined to be of opinion that the adoption of the plan of holding this place, with part at least of the Spanish force attached to this army, might be the most advantageous; in this case (as a diminution of the objection to such a measure as pressing upon our resources) keeping the corps of General Sarsfield as a flying corps on the flank, or in advance of the enemy, with orders, if pressed, to pass the Ebro and to join General Elio.

It now becomes proper to speak of the state of the communication over the river, and to acquaint your Lordship that very soon after I took the command of this army I wrote to General Elio to suggest to him to secure a ready communication over the Ebro, and that such communication should be covered by a good *tête de pont* on either side; and on asking the General, when here a few days since, what was the actual state of the communication across the river, and how protected, he acquainted me that there were then a large pontoon or flat boat, and two smaller ones; that on the 29th or 30th ultimo there would be another pontoon, and two more in eight days; that four of these pontoons would be large enough to contain 600 infantry each, the two smaller 40 each; that he proposed to construct a light bridge for cavalry and infantry, with a redoubt to cover it; and that he had it in contemplation to establish a bridge likewise some time hence *above* the town of Tortosa, and to cover it by redoubts; that at that moment nothing but one large pontoon and two flat boats existed as means of passing troops. Looking therefore to the

chance of it being possible circumstances might make me wish to send a large force across, and in a hurry, I pressed General Elio to look without loss of time to the establishing of at least one bridge, and that this should be covered by a strong redoubt.

In respect to the observations your Lordship makes of there being with this army a sufficient quantity of ordnance for attacking Tortosa, in the event such a measure were adopted, I beg to state that on arriving here lately a considerable number of our guns were ordered to be landed as a defence to this place, there not being at the time one serviceable piece of heavy ordnance in the place; and though, since our arrival here, several guns have been drilled and rendered serviceable, there will not be in all more than twenty-two of every description fit for use, and the greater part of these are of small calibre: I have therefore left Lord William Bentinck's order for the landing of part of our ordnance to take effect as I found it given; and at this moment we have on shore fourteen 24-pounders, four of 18, fourteen of 12. These I apprehend it will be necessary, for the most part at least, to keep on shore for the present, and until the Spanish government shall have taken some measures for reinforcing the place with ordnance. I should add, that an application has been made by Admiral Hallowell that some heavy ordnance of the Spanish ships may be forthwith sent from Minorca, and when that arrives no time will be lost in embarking our ordnance.

Although probably my command of the army be but a temporary thing, as I sincerely wish may be the case, I have still thought it my duty to go much into detail on my assuming such command, and have submitted my opinions for your Lordship's consideration. I can hardly flatter myself those opinions will be approved by you, but I trust your Lordship will be pleased to do me the honour to point out the correction you may think should be made on the possible false view I may have taken of the plan of operations, offensive or defensive, which circumstances may, at no distant period, render necessary to be adopted.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your obedient humble servant,

W. H. CLINTON.

[698.] G. O. Lesaca, 4th Oct., 1813.

2. * * * * *

3. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to have observed the number of soldiers who have lately attempted to desert to the enemy, which he cannot but attribute to the arts and misrepresentations of the enemy to induce them to quit their colours.

4. An extract of the Order of the 10th Nov., 1810, is to be published again and read with this Order, at the head of every regiment, at three different parades, and the Description Roll

therein called for of all deserters may be forthwith sent to the Adjutant-General's office.

5. It is impossible that the soldiers of the army can have forgotten the miserable state in which those of their comrades who had before been guilty of the crime of deserting to the enemies of their country have been found by them when they have fallen into their hands again.

6. It is well known that nobody can trust men guilty of so base a crime; and, notwithstanding the enemy's promises, those who have been guilty of it are employed only in services of the lowest and most laborious description, they are despised and shunned by all, even by those who profit by their crime, and that the soldiers who are prisoners of war will hold no communication with them.

7. It is known to the Commander of the Forces that some soldiers who, in an unguarded moment, have been induced to quit their colours, have found themselves in so miserable and degraded a state as to be desirous of being considered prisoners of war, and have preferred remaining in confinement to incurring the risk of the punishment which awaits them if ever they should come under the power of any British authority.

8. The Commander of the Forces hopes that this warning will prevent the commission of a crime become but too common, and which till lately was unknown in the British army.

WELLINGTON.

ARRANGEMENTS CONNECTED WITH A FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE LEFT OF THE ARMY, TO TAKE PLACE ON THE 7TH INSTANT. [699.]

Lesaca, 5th Oct., 1813.

Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill will direct the Portuguese division in the valley of Les Alduides to move at daybreak on the 7th instant by the most direct road to Errazu, to take up the positions now occupied by the 3rd division in the valley of Maya.

Sir Rowland Hill will make such arrangements as he thinks most expedient for replacing the Portuguese division by part of the other troops under his command.

If Sir Rowland thinks proper, he may call upon the troops of

Major-General Mina in his neighbourhood to strengthen his right flank.

One brigade of the 3rd division will move at daybreak on the 7th instant by the mountains, and will proceed to occupy the heights which overlook the village of Zugarramurdi. The other two brigades will follow to the same destination on the approach of the Portuguese division into the valley of Maya.

The Earl of Dalhousie will be so good as send an officer acquainted with the country to the 3rd division, to guide it in the direction above pointed out.

Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie will move the two rear brigades of the 7th division at daybreak on the 7th instant to the Spanish encampment in the Puerto de Echalar. These two brigades will leave their camps standing till seven A.M.

The brigade which is in advance towards Zugarramurdi will continue there until the approach of the 3rd division enables it to move off and join the other two brigades in the Puerto de Echalar.

Attack of the Position of Vera.

The attack on the left of the enemy's position is to be made by the Spanish troops under the orders of Major-General Giron. These troops will move to the attack in two columns, directing their march towards the two extremities of a wooded bank, which extends from the great mountain of La Rhune to the rocks on the left flank of the enemy's encampment in the Puerto de Vera.

The right column is to be guided so as to ascend this bank by roads which appear of a red earthy colour, and which go up the wooded bank near where it is connected with the mountain of La Rhune.

The left column is to be guided so as to pass through a ravine which is at the extremity of a sharp ridge, on which the enemy has an outpost stationed, and which is particularly marked by a zigzag path a little to our left hand of the ravine alluded to. After entering this ravine, the column will ascend the wooded bank by some roads of a whitish colour which lead up by that extremity of the bank which is next the rocks on the left of the enemy's encampment in the Puerto de Vera.

Major-General Giron will be so good as make the following arrangements in aid of the operations of the two columns already mentioned :—

One battalion to be detached as early as possible on the right to move up through the woods upon the slopes of the mountain of La Rhune, concealing its force and the direction of its march, as far as circumstances will admit, by the trees and the hollows of the mountain. This battalion will occupy, by a detachment, the top of the mountain of La Rhune, observing from thence the paths which lead up the mountain from the village of Ascain, or from the neighbourhood of Sarré. The battalion will also gain possession of a height, shaped like a saddle, less elevated than the mountain of La Rhune, but which appears to command the left flank and in some degree the rear of the enemy's position in the Puerto de Vera.

Major-General Giron will leave one battalion in reserve during the attack, on a considerable height which intervenes between the lines of march pointed out for the two columns, before they approach the wooded bank mentioned above; and one brigade is to be left in reserve towards the entrance to the valley of Vera from the side of Sarré, to cover the right and rear of the troops engaged in the attack from any attempt that the enemy's force at Sarré might make in that direction.

The Major-General will, of course, throw out a sufficient number of tirailleurs to clear the way for the heads of the columns, as also to keep up their connection with each other and with the battalion detached up the mountain of La Rhune. The tirailleurs on the left will also communicate with those of the Light division.

Major-General Giron will be pleased to commence his arrangements for the above operations immediately on the break of day on the 7th instant, and will move forward the troops exactly at seven o'clock.

The Spanish posts in the Puerto de Echalar will remain until relieved by the 7th division.

The attack upon the centre and right of the enemy's position above Vera is to be made by the Light division and the division of Brigadier-General Longa.

One part of the Light division will operate directly against the encampment which the enemy has in the Puerto de Vera. This attack should extend sufficiently on its right to point to the rocks which are on the left flank of the enemy's encampment, and should communicate in that quarter with the left column of General Giron's troops.

The remainder of the Light division will gain the heights above the church of Vera, and will direct its attack against the right encampment of the enemy.

Major-General Alten will leave such reserves as he may deem necessary during the attack upon the narrow rocky ridge to our right hand of the road leading to the Puerto de Vera, and on the heights above the church of Vera. Major-General Alten will make his arrangements so as that the troops may move forward half an hour after the troops under Major-General Giron have been put in motion.

One-half of Brigadier-General's Longa's troops will pass the Bidasoa by the bridge of Vera, and will move forward into the great wooded ravine which lies between the right and centre encampments of the enemy. These troops will connect the two attacks of the Light division, and will operate in aid of both by throwing forward a great number of tirailleurs through the woods to act against the flanks and rear of the enemy on both sides of the ravine.

The other half of Brigadier-General Longa's troops will pass the Bidasoa by the fords near Salain, and will act against the right encampment of the enemy, in cooperation with the left column of the Light division. These troops will throw out as many tirailleurs as possible to turn the right of the enemy in all the positions he takes up.

Brigadier-General Longa will also detach a few companies to pass the Bidasoa near Endalaza, and from thence ascend the hill on which the French telegraph is situated, and towards which a path leads along one of the rocky ridges of the mountain.

Brigadier-General Longa will be so good as communicate with Major-General Alten and form all his arrangements for the operations above mentioned in concert with that officer, who will have the general superintendence of both divisions during the attack.

The 4th division will move from its present camps soon after daybreak, and will be in reserve in the position of Santa Barbara during the attack.

After the attack has made some progress, Sir Lowry Cole will be so good as push forward part of his troops to the lower heights of the position of Vera, in order that Major-General Alten may be enabled to draw forward the reserve which he will have left in the first instance in these situations.

The 6th division will continue to occupy its positions in the Puerto de Maya during the above operations; but Major-General Colville will be so good as make some demonstrations to keep the enemy in uncertainty and prevent his weakening his force very considerably in the positions near Ainhoué.

Movement of the Left of the Army.

The 5th division will pass the Bidasoa by the fords near Fuenterrabia: it will be accompanied by one squadron of the 12th Light Dragoons and by the brigade of artillery attached to the division. A brigade of reserve artillery will also move with it to Fuenterrabia, which will act as may be necessary in the neighbourhood of that place during the passage of the troops, and afterwards remain there in reserve.

All these corps are to be moved to Fuenterrabia, so as to arrive there and be stationed in the ditch of the place and in other situations where they cannot be seen by the enemy, before break of day on the morning of the 7th instant. They are to move forward and begin passing the fords as soon as the tide has fallen sufficiently to admit of their doing so, which will probably be about a quarter past seven A.M.

As these troops arrive on the opposite side of the Bidasoa, they will occupy the high grounds in their front and will afterwards move to their right in such manner as to threaten the right flank of the enemy's force opposed to the troops which pass the Bidasoa near the ruined bridge, and will put themselves in connection with these troops as soon as possible.

Major Todd, of the Royal Staff Corps, will please to accompany this column.

The 1st division and Brigadier Wilson's brigade will pass the Bidasoa by the ford at the ruined bridge and by two fords a little lower down the river; the lower of which is called the Vado de las Nasas de Abaxo, and is near the point where the chaussée from Irun first comes near the edge of the river. A part of this force will also pass at a ford a small distance above the ruined bridge, called El Vado de las Nasas de Arriba.

These troops will begin to advance towards the fords at the same time that the troops at Fuenterrabia begin to move forward. A signal, to be made from Fuenterrabia, announcing the movement of the troops there, will therefore be previously concerted.

The remainder of the 12th Light Dragoons will pass the

Bidasoa with this column, which will be accompanied also by the brigade of artillery attached to the 1st division, and by one brigade of reserve artillery. The Royal Staff Corps will also be attached to this column.

The first object of the troops composing this column, after crossing the river, will be to establish themselves strongly upon the height called La Montagne de Louis XIV. and upon the other most advantageous points, and they will communicate on the left as soon as possible with the 5th division.

The troops composing this column are to be assembled before break of day near Irun, and in such other situations as may be deemed most advantageous, and are to be kept concealed as much as possible until they are put in motion towards the fords.

A bridge of pontoons is to be established as soon as it can be effected near the ruined bridge. To cover this operation as well as to aid the passage of the troops, the 18-pounder brigade and two other brigades of artillery are to be disposed upon the heights of San Marçial, and in such other situations as the commanding officer of artillery may deem most expedient.

This artillery is to be moved in the night of the 6th instant to the vicinity of the points where it is to be used. The pontoons are also to be moved forward on the 6th, so as to arrive at Irun after dusk, and be placed where they will not be seen by the enemy, till ordered forward towards the river.

The tents of the troops of this column and also those of the 5th division are to be left standing, and the baggage is to remain in the camps until the whole of the troops are fully established on the right bank of the Bidasoa.

The Spanish troops under the orders of Major-General Freyre will pass the Bidasoa by the several fords above the ford of Las Nasas de Arriba in the following manner:—

The left column of the whole will pass at the ford marked No. 8 on the Spanish plan, near where the enemy established their bridge on the 31st of August. The troops which pass here will immediately occupy the height above the ford upon which there is a large tiled building with a camp of huts near it, and they will put themselves in communication on the left with the troops that pass at the ford of Las Nasas de Arriba.

The next column will pass at the fords marked Nos. 9 and 10. The left of these troops will put themselves in communication with the column that passes at ford No. 8, and will assist it in

occupying the height upon which the large tiled building and the camp of huts already mentioned are situated. The centre will push forward and occupy the hill called La Montagne Verte, and the right will occupy the ravine between the Montagne Verte and the Montagne de Mandale. A reserve for the support of the centre should be left at the village of Biriatu.

The remainder of General Freyre's troops will pass the river at the fords marked 11, 12, and 13. The object of these troops will be to gain the summit of the mountain of Mandale and establish themselves firmly there, forming by that means an appui on the right to the whole of the operations of the left of the army. The troops most to the right in this quarter will move up the ravine which is to the right of the hill of Mandale, and separates it from the narrow rocky hill next it.

The passage of the troops under Major-General Freyre will be supported by the Spanish artillery, and also by two brigades of British artillery. This ordnance is to be moved on the night of the 6th to the vicinity of the points where it is to be used.

A pontoon bridge will also be established as early as it can be effected on the morning of the 7th, at a point which has been determined upon at a little distance below the ford No. 9. The pontoons for this purpose are to be moved forward during the night of the 6th to such situation as the officer in charge of the pontoon train may deem most advantageous.

Major-General Freyre will be so good as agree with Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham upon the signal to be made from Irun to apprise him when the troops there are going to advance, and he will be so good as put the whole of his columns in motion at the same time.

Major-General Bradford's Portuguese brigade will move from its present encampment exactly at daybreak on the morning of the 7th, and will station itself upon the right of the position of San Marçial as a reserve.

Major-General Lord Aylmer's brigade will move so as to be before daylight in the valley behind the position of San Marçial. It will form the reserve to the column of the 1st division, and will station itself to the left of the position of San Marçial near the chaussée between Irun and the ruined bridge, when the above column moves to the fords.

Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham will be so good as give orders for such detachments of troops being furnished as

may be required to assist the officers of the pontoon train, as also to aid the artillery in moving to the positions it is to act in.

It is requested that Sir Thomas Graham will also communicate the necessary orders relative to the above arrangement to all the corps concerned. A separate copy of the instruction has been transmitted to Major-General Freyre for his guidance in regard to the operations of the Spanish troops under his command.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 5th Oct., 1813.

The calumnies against the British troops for their conduct at St. Sebastian had reached such a height, that upon talking over the subject with Major Smith, I requested him to make out a plain statement of what had occurred, which has been published in the 'Conciso,' and has produced a good effect. If you should disapprove this, I can only say that I am to blame, and not Major Smith. In fact, if the object of these calumnies were not to injure you in the public estimation, I should not think them of so much importance; but as a proof that this is the object, the 'Duende de los Cafées,' the editor of which holds an employment under the Minister of War, and receives his instructions from him, yesterday more than insinuated that you had issued the order for the sacking of St. Sebastian. You may bear such calumnies and consider yourself, as you certainly are, beyond their reach; but I cannot submit to them with patience, particularly when I know that their sole end is to deprive you of the command.

The Cortes have at last decided upon leaving Cadiz; but as Spaniards can do nothing like other people, they are to go in the first instance to the Isla, and are to wait there until a place can be prepared for them at Madrid, with a full intention, however, of going there.

All the correspondence relative to your command has been laid before the Cortes, and yesterday in a Secret Session a Committee, of which Mexia is one, was appointed to take it into consideration. Before I close this letter I will endeavour to learn the names of the other members of the Committee. The government sent only a part of the correspondence, but the Cortes demanded the whole, which has annoyed the Minister of War considerably.

The fever certainly prevails here, but not to any great extent, and it is of a milder kind than usual.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I have received your letters up to the 23rd, and will forward the clothing immediately.

Two of the Committee are Mendiola and Capaz. The latter is a friend of Villa Vicencio. I have not heard who are the rest.

G. O. Lesaca, 8th Oct., 1813. [700.]

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be under the necessity of publishing over again his orders of the 9th July last,* as they have been unattended to by the officers and troops which entered France yesterday.

2. According to all the information which the Commander of the Forces has received, outrages of all descriptions were committed by the troops in presence even of their officers, who took no pains whatever to prevent them.

3. The Commander of the Forces has already determined that some officers, so grossly negligent of their duty, shall be sent to England, that their names may be brought under the attention of the Prince Regent, and that His Royal Highness may give such directions respecting them as he may think proper; as the Commander of the Forces is determined not to command officers who will not obey his orders.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 8th Oct., 1813.

We have this day received the missing numbers, Nos. 86, 87, and 88, and your two private letters of the 19th ult.†

With regard to that which is written on the subject of your future operations, the misfortune in Catalonia, with which you were not then acquainted, although you apprehended it, may have thrown some additional difficulties in the way of your advancing. The successes of the Allies will have removed others, which you seemed to entertain, under the impression of their having experienced reverses. The failure before Dresden would have been attended with much greater loss if it had not been for the self-possession of the King of Prussia, who seemed to have been the only man in any authority who knew what to do. Vandamme's defeat recovered the credit of the Allies, and put them again in decent good humour with each other; but the grand army in Bohemia has no commander whom they all will obey, and apparently no plan on which they will all act. Blücher's victories have been important: that of the Crown Prince on the 8th as much so. We might expect every thing now if there were not many heads against one; and that one, Buonaparte's. I send you the copies of several despatches which Lord Castlereagh has sent here for you. I have also sent you the copies of two or three private letters which arrived yesterday, as they will put you a little in possession of the feelings of eye-witnesses. It is impossible to say that a peace, or at least an

* See p. 67. † See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 123.

armistice, may not be suddenly made; but I think things are too complicated to admit of any such event as will at once put Buonaparte at liberty to turn himself against you.

I enter fully into all you feel about the idle expectations in this country. I assure you I am no party in raising them, and I am sometimes afraid lest you should be told that I depreciate your successes by not falling in with all that it is said will be the consequences.

I am, my dear Lord, yours ever most sincerely,

Bathurst.

[Enclosures.]

I.

Le Comte de Balmaine au Comte de Lieven.

Du Camp de Schweinitz, 9 Sept., 1813.

Je fais mes excuses d'avance à V.E. du désordre qu'elle trouvera dans cette lettre, et de la mauvaise qualité du papier sur lequel je me permets de lui écrire. Nous sommes au camp, et devant l'ennemi; il ne m'est guère possible de faire mieux. Je suppose que les bulletins de la grande armée que vous recevez, ainsi que ceux de la nôtre, n'auront pas manqués de vous donner les plus grandes espérances sur les suites de cette guerre. Souffrez que je me réjouisse avec vous de nos succès, et que je fasse les vœux les plus sincères pour leur continuité. L'armée Française aux ordres du Maréchal Ney, que nous avons en tête, vient d'être chassée de la rive droite de l'Elbe; elle se retire vers Leipsic, et ses pertes depuis la reprise des hostilités peuvent monter en tout à 100 canons, 20,000 prisonniers, 450 voitures de munition et d'autres ambulances qu'on n'a pas encore eu le tems d'examiner. Il n'y a eu que deux engagemens assez considérables, où les Prussiens ont tout fait. Le Maréchal Oudinot commandoit les Français dans le premier. Napoléon, furieux de ce qu'il avoit été battu, et obligé de se retirer sur Wittenberg, envoya Ney, qui vouloit faire le même, risqua une seconde affaire, et fut non seulement rossé, mais mis en telle déroute que l'on ne peut comparer sa retraite de Jutterbock jusqu'à Torgau qu'à celle de Russie. Vous ne croirez jamais que les Français jetoient armes et bagages, fuyoient à la débandade: un seul Cosaque en prit cent dans un village, s'empara de leur argent, et donna leurs hardes à quelques paysans Prussiens qui se trouvoient là. La grande nation n'est plus à reconnaître. Je peux vous en citer des traits qui vous surprendront, et qui je vous garantis sur ma parole d'honneur. D'abord c'est que lorsqu'ils se retirent la cavalerie s'en va la première, et l'artillerie, mêlée à un peu d'infanterie, couvre la retraite. On fait partir chez eux les chevaux comme les gros équipages; quand ils prennent un camp c'est toujours dans un bois, un village, un lieu inabordable aux troupes légères; ils ont soin de cacher leurs tirailleurs, et mettent sous la protection de cette arme des videttes de cavalerie. Dernièrement, lorsque nous étions en ordre de bataille près de Nimeck, l'envoi nous prit à moi, à mon beau-frère Carischin et au Lieutenant-Colonel Donnaeff de visiter leur chaîne d'avant-postes: à la distance où se trouvoit notre armée, il n'y avoit pas moyen de rien voir; une forêt immense les dérobait à notre vue; nous nous en approchâmes donc à une demi-porté de fusil, et nous découvrîmes une chaine serrée de postes de cavalerie; nous les examinâmes chacun séparément, et dans tous les sens il n'en sortit pas un pour nous chasser; ils avoient, au contraire, une si grande peur de trois hommes à cheval que du moment que nous fesions un mouvement vers l'un ou vers l'autre, il étoit tout de suite en-

touré de deux ou trois tirailleurs, qui sortoient du bois pour le défendre. Cette mauvaise plaisanterie pensa nous coûter la vie, car la dernière vidette dont nous nous approchâmes eut l'art, en paroissant nous défier, de nous attirer plus avant vers le bois, où un bataillon d'infanterie, que nous ne voyons pas, se tenait caché ; de l'autre côté un poste de Baschkiers, qui nous prit pour des Français, se lança sur nous la pique en avant. Un officier de Cosaques, qui se trouvait là par hasard, nous tira de ce danger, en fesant entendre aux Baschkiers, et en nous avertissant que ce matin même il y avait eu des gens blessés en cet endroit. Mais rien ne faire honte aux Français, comme l'affaire que nous avons eu ces jours derniers à leur camp retranché de Wittenberg ; le Comte Woronzow commandoit l'avant-garde Russe, et nous étions vers leur aîle gauche pour les observer seulement. Ney ayant pris le commandement, quitta d'abord ce camp et marcha sur Jutterbock pour livrer la bataille qu'il vient de perdre. Le Comte Woronzow, instruit de ce mouvement, se mit de suite à cheval avec nous tous et une vingtaine de Cosaques, fit brûler les retranchemens ennemis, et en avançant rencontrant son arrière-garde. Nous n'avions pas de troupes, mais voyant l'extrême timidité des Français, toute la suite du Comte se mit à faire les flanqueurs, nous nous éparpillâmes à droite et à gauche, nous coupions et prenions leurs traîneurs, nous leurs enlevions leurs guides, la plupart des officiers fit quelques prisonniers en présence même de leurs colonnes, nous nous en approcheons à une portée de pistolet, sans qu'il en arrive rien à personne. Enfin, après avoir fait ainsi une mille, nous nous trouvâmes sans le savoir, sans le vouloir, en face d'une batterie qui se mit à jouer sur nous ; c'est alors que finit cette affaire qui coûta cependant aux Français près de 200 hommes. Je pourrois citer à V.E. mille traits pareils du mépris que nous avons conçu d'un ennemi autrefois redoutable, mais sujet maintenant aux terreurs paniques.

Nous nous trouvons à présent à Schweinitz, près de Torgau. Ney est bien loin de nous. On ne sait pas encore ce que le Prince Royal fera ; il a sauvé Berlin et toute la Prusse qui est de nos côtés, et cela sans compromettre ses forces. Notre armée est encore toute fraiche. Les Russes et les Suédois n'ont pas 500 hommes hors de combat : il n'y a ni canons ni équipages de perdus ; les gens, les chevaux, sont bien nourris et bien conservés. La perte des Prussiens, que le Prince (et parcequ'ils défendent leur propre pays et parcequ'ils ont plus de moyens de se refaire) a toujours mis en avant, monte à huit mille en tout, sans prisonniers. Il est vrai que jusqu'à présent nous n'avons rien risqué ; nous avons agi en conséquence des mouvemens de l'ennémi, sans rien entreprendre.

Il y a des personnes qui disent que l'on pouvoit et devoit en faire davantage ; que nous sommes en général trop lents ; mais il y en a d'autres, et je suis du nombre, qui admire cette prudence, cette sage économie de ses forces, justifiée par les résultats les plus brillants ; car enfin, que peut on faire de plus en si peu de temps que de battre deux fois une armée de 80,000 hommes, commandés par deux bons Maréchaux ; dé la chasser du pays que l'on doit défendre ; de lui enlever ses canons, sa poudre, ses vivres, et cela non seulement sans s'affoiblir, mais presque même sans se fatiguer ; car le Prince avoit l'art de nous faire reposer dans les cas extrêmes et pressants ? Cent fois nous paroissions éparpiller, on se demandoit où est ce corps, et autre ? et lorsqu'il le falloit, en deux heures l'armée étoit ensemble. Nous sommes parfaitement bien menés, et cela donne à l'officier, au soldat, une confiance qui se rend invincible. Quand le Prince vient dans notre camp c'est un plaisir, une joie ; tout vole au devant de lui. Il est extrêmement aimé.

Le Comte de Balmaine.

II.

Colonel Hammerstein to Count Munster.

(Translation.)

Jutterbock, 10th Sept., 1813.

Your Excellency will be surprised on receiving a report from me from the Crown Prince's head-quarters. The circumstances of Count Walmoden's corps brought me here. The two armies acting at a considerable distance from each other, many points arise which must be cleared up: besides, Mr. Thornton had expressly desired that I should come here. I have fortunately succeeded in all respects. I arrived at head-quarters shortly after the battle. The Prussians fought with a bravery seldom equalled. I believe their loss in killed and wounded exceeds 7000. The whole French army would probably have been destroyed had the Russians and Swedes arrived sooner, or had they briskly pursued when they did arrive; nevertheless, the result is very brilliant; 10,000 prisoners have been made, and many pieces of artillery are taken, and the enemy was cut off from Wittenberg and obliged to retreat to Torgau. It is asserted that they saved but five cannons; all the rest of their artillery was captured, destroyed, or concealed. Our outposts are at Muhlberg.* The Crown Prince will perhaps make an attempt upon Wittenberg; and should it not surrender, as is probable, he will then perhaps leave some troops before it and cross the Elbe with the remainder. But this great movement is not yet definitively resolved upon, nor have they fixed upon the spot where to cross the Elbe. The great Austro-Russian army has resumed the offensive after the victory over Vandamme, and is at Pirna. It is thought that Napoleon will leave the Elbe and retreat either in the direction of Erfurth or Leipzig. His heavy artillery and baggage are already on the left bank. I do not think it improbable that before he retreats he will try to engage one of the Allied armies in a general action; but the Crown Prince is of a different opinion. This General has displayed great talents in the mode of drawing up his army and making one column support another. His army is extremely fine, composed of 22,000 Swedes, 20,000 Russians, and about 45,000 Prussians. Besides, to him are due the increase of the corps of Tauenzien, the formation of Wobeser's corps, the application of the Landsturm; and in all these respects he has discovered the genius of a first-rate general. The Swedes are angry because they took not their proper share in the battle, and they say that by more actively employing men the victory would have been complete. The Crown Prince has saved the good cause, which after the defeat of the Austrians looked by no means promising. The confusion in the Austrian army was incredible, and the consequences of this would have been frightful, but for the determined resistance of Osterman and the subsequent defeat of Vandamme.

I left Walmoden at Domitz; he was going to regulate his motions by those of Davoust.

I request your Excellency's pardon for not having written to you more frequently of late. During the last eight days I have had scarcely a moment's leisure, being constantly on the march or travelling, and not having sometimes either pen or ink. Should we cross the Elbe, Baron Bremer will, I hope, regulate everything which relates to the Civil Department, the Crown Prince reserving to himself what concerns military affairs. I shall return to Count Walmoden to-morrow or the day after, or as soon as the Crown Prince has decided about our corps. I wish extremely that our Hanoverians were now reinforced, and that the Russian Legion was declared to be part of our

troops. This would remove many inconveniences, and enable us to act with decision. I dined yesterday with the Crown Prince quite alone, and had an opportunity of representing to him our true situation. One half of the rockets are ordered to join this army: they will be here in four days, and may perhaps be employed against Wittenberg. The Hanoverian cavalry is in great want of horses. With the Swedes under Vegesack there are but 34 pieces of artillery fit for service; Davoust with the Danes has about 100 pieces. Walmoden is a General of the first talents. Those I have met here are inferior to him. The Crown Prince asks the opinion of Pozzo, Suchtelen, Vincent, &c., but acts according to his own views. Wetterstedt's influence over the Crown Prince is very great; he is certainly a favourite. Adlercreutz is very brave, but the Crown Prince, I think, does not very well admire his violent, stubborn disposition. He was very loud about the Swedes not having acted: however, he is a man that may be depended upon. The Crown Prince has ordered me to inform your Excellency that he is raising a Saxon Legion to act as far as the Rhine and not to serve beyond the sea. He has applied 100,000 rix dollars from his private purse for its equipment. It should seem His Serene Highness expects to be supported by England in this respect.

The extraordinary exertion and bravery of the Prussians have laid the basis for the future greatness of that power. History will perhaps one day trace for future admiration all that your Excellency has done for the great cause of the civilised world. Your most difficult task is perhaps to come yet, that of giving existence to our native country. Without country, without army, forgotten amidst the powerful Allies, and envied by all, we Hanoverians have yet great obstacles to surmount. Our hopes are fixed in His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

11th Sept.

P.S.—The head-quarters will this day be removed to Seyda, and I hope I shall return to Walmoden this evening.

Tauenzien was absent from his corps the day before the battle. His corps had lost its outposts, and when he returned in the night he fell in with the French and was surrounded by them. Fortunately for him they spoke the German language, and he pretending to be a French officer, they sent for orders to their commander whether they should suffer him to pass. There was no time to be lost, and finding that Cossacks were near, he contrived to escape. It is incredible how close those Cossacks keep to the enemy: they advance till they actually fall in with their opponents.

The Emperor of Russia, in the confusion before Dresden, could not make use of his baggage, and was for two days with scarcely anything to eat. Sir Charles Stewart's wound is said not to be dangerous; but if one of the sinews in the thigh should be touched, it may lead to lameness. Lauenbourg was plundered by the French on their entrance.

Our troops want pay. The Deputy Commissary is dead; a most unfavourable circumstance for our commissariat. Indeed, a good commissariat is much wanted, particularly so should we go into Hanover. In Mecklenburg we have no want of forage and provisions. In this neighbourhood we must fear a want of both, for the armies occupy but a small district, which has been plundered by French and Cossacks.

HAMMERSTEIN.

III.

Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

Dear Lord B., Dover Castle, 2nd Oct., 1813.

I have not yet deemed it expedient to make any official communication to either missions in the Peninsula of the accompanying papers; but as it may be desirable to keep Lord Wellington precisely informed of the sentiments of His Majesty's ministers and of their intercourse with the Allies, I have made a selection for his perusal, which will explain the measures lately taken to strengthen the alliance against France, also the reception given to the Duke of Bassano's recent overture. I shall be obliged to you to request Lord Wellington will return these papers when read.

It may be right to mention that it appears, by letters from head-quarters received since the instructions relative to the treaty were despatched, that the Allied Courts were then engaged in negotiating a treaty of alliance somewhat upon the same principle, which was to be communicated when signed.

Believe me, my dear Lord B., yours very sincerely,

Castlereagh.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Castagnoz's House, near Andaya, 8th Oct., 1813,
¼ past 9 A.M.

My Lord,

I have just now the honour of your letter of this morning by Major Fremantle, and I am extremely glad to find that you approve of our not contesting the point at the extremity of the centre tongue. It certainly is a convenient post for the enemy to hold, but on looking again at it this morning, it does not appear to me that their occupation of it can be of any serious detriment to us; and if we were to hold it, the whole of the troops near that part of the position would be kept in perpetual alarm, besides the other inconveniences that have occurred to your Lordship.

At that part of the advance last night the sentinels were several times attacked, and the enemy at last succeeded in surrounding and carrying off one of Halkett's light battalion men, after which every thing remained quiet. They probably wished to carry off a prisoner with a view to their information. Since daybreak every thing here has remained perfectly quiet.

Captain Wells of the Engineers has had an order given for such working parties as he required, and I hope the works proposed in the position and on the advanced ridges will be set about immediately, and I shall take care that your Lordship's wish in regard to covering the guns in position shall be attended to.

I very much wish that Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne would look at the ground which should be occupied for the purpose of covering the bridge on the Bidasoa, as I think it probable that several considerable works may be necessary for that purpose.

Our left is not quite what it should be, as the heights, generally speaking, run out into a valley which inclines towards the front and runs to the

sea. However, a more compact and shorter line, tolerably strong, will, I imagine, be found thrown back to the sea in front of Andaya, to which if necessary the left of this column could retire.

It does not seem probable that an enemy could promise himself any great advantage in attacking the left, since success in the centre or towards the right of this part of the position would be much more advantageous to him, and at these points I think we are strong.

I very much lament the disorders committed yesterday in front, and spoke to Colonel Halkett on the subject. I shall endeavour to find out the Cavalry Staff Corps and employ them. I shall be towards the centre or right of the 1st division in the afternoon, in the hope of seeing you as you return from General Giron.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, your faithful humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

P.S. Much plunder has been carried on by the Spaniards in this quarter. They cross the river from Fuenterrabia and Irun in great numbers. I shall have some patrols to look after them. It is, however, desirable that they should be encouraged to come over with supplies.

MEMORANDUM. [701.]

9th Oct., 1813.

1. Besides the measures proposed in the memorandum of the Quartermaster-General, the following must be adopted by other parts of the army:—

2. The 4th division must move to the valley of Oyarzun on the day preceding the attack.

3. The 5th division and General Wilson's brigade must be relieved at St. Sebastian by the troops to form the garrison of that place, and General Freyre must replace the Spanish troops now at Fuenterrabia.

4. The bridge and all the artillery in the neighbourhood of Oyarzun should be moved in the preceding night to Irun to be there concealed.

5. The troops to cross at the lower fords to be assembled before daylight at Fuenterrabia, leaving their tents standing; those to cross at the fords nearer the bridge to assemble at the same time at Irun.

WELLINGTON.

[702.] ATTACK OF THE POSITION OF VERA.

9th Oct., 1813.

The attack upon the right and centre of the positions of the enemy in the Puerto de Vera will be made by the troops under Brigadier-General Longa and by the Light division.

Two companies of General Longa's troops will pass the Bidasoa by the fords near Endalaza, and will ascend the rocky ridge leading to the top of the hill upon which the French telegraph is situated.

Half of General Longa's division will pass the Bidasoa by the fords near Salain, and will move against the right encampment of the enemy, extending to the left wherever the ground admits of it, and endeavouring always to turn the right flank of the enemy's posts or of the skirmishers thrown out by him on his right flank to impede the progress of our troops.

The other half of Brigadier-General Longa's troops will cross the Bidasoa by the bridge of Vera, and will cooperate with that part of the Light division which acts against the centre camp of the enemy in the Puerto de Vera.

The left brigade of the Light division will move from the village of Vera and direct its attack against the right encampment of the enemy by the tongue of land which leads to that encampment. This brigade will leave one battalion in reserve in the first instance upon the heights immediately above Vera.

The right and centre brigades of the Light division will operate against the encampment which the enemy has in the Puerto de Vera.

This attack is to be extended upon the right so as to point towards the rocks which lie to the left of the enemy's encampment above mentioned, and it is to be extended on the left so as to gain possession of a house situated above a large green field, and which is upon the tongue of land that originates from the heights immediately to the right of the enemy's camp in the Puerto de Vera, and which heights are to be gained by that movement. By this means the attack of these two brigades will threaten and ultimately turn both flanks of the enemy's camp in the Puerto de Vera, at the same time that it is directed also by the main road from Vera against the centre of the same encampment.

That half of Brigadier-General Longa's division which has

passed at the bridge of Vera, and which is to cooperate with those two brigades, is to push forward in the large wooded ravine which separates the enemy's two encampments. It will by that means connect the attack of the left brigade of the Light division with that of the other two brigades, and the tirailleurs pushed forward from it will penetrate through the woods on both sides of the ravine and get as much as possible upon the flanks and into the rear of both the enemy's encampments.

Major-General Alten will place a reserve in the first instance upon the narrow rocky ridge to which a road ascends from the upper extremity of the village of Vera, and which is now occupied by some of the enemy's advanced posts.

These operations will be supported by the 4th division, which will have moved at daybreak and placed itself in reserve in the position of Santa Barbara for that purpose.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, London, 9th Oct., 1813.

I most sincerely congratulate you on the great event of obtaining Pamplona undamaged, and with the garrison prisoners of war; and I feel most grateful for the communication your Lordship has been so good as to send me of an event which I felt so deeply interested in. I was at all events going to trouble your Lordship with a few lines to mention that Lord Bathurst had applied to me about a letter, translated from one of the Cadiz papers into ours, about pretended atrocities committed by the troops at St. Sebastian. Your Lordship may probably have had the letter in question sent to you from Cadiz. It bears evident proofs of being written by one of the *Afrancesados*, and meant to do the Allies all the harm possible in the minds of the Spaniards. I denied as absolutely false the burning of the town by us, or the possibility of carrying the castle the day of the assault of the town, as also the alleged sacrilege; and I assured Lord Bathurst that though there were undoubtedly excesses, yet it was impossible that the cruelties attributed to the soldiers could be true, as no complaint of personal violence had ever been made either to me or to General Hay, who had with the other officers made every exertion to maintain discipline, protect the inhabitants, and arrest the progress of the flames.

It would require a different military code from ours to stop men from being disorderly on such an occasion. I am quite sure that if Dover were in the hands of the French, and were to be taken by storm by a British army, the cellars and shops of the inhabitants would suffer as those of St. Sebastian did.

Every body here is in the greatest joy on account of the success of the Allies in the North. Mr. Wickham assured me, in my way up from

Plymouth, that he knew the Austrian declaration was decided by the news of the battle of Vitoria. People seem inclined, however, to expect too much, as usual, and fancy Buonaparte never can make another stand. Wishing your Lordship all possible success,

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST, Walmer Castle, 10th Oct., 1813.

I return Lord Wellington's letters with many thanks. I had an opportunity yesterday of showing them to Castlereagh. He asked whether Wellington would be sufficiently on his guard, on entering France, against committing us too deeply with the Bourbons. I told him that I believed you had written to him on the occasion of his letter respecting the Duke of Berri's application, to apprise him of our views and sentiments on this question.

Castlereagh suggested (and I confess I agree with him) that it might be very material that Wellington, if he entered France, should publish some declaration disclaiming all idea of dismembering France: this would be entirely conformable to all that the Allies have been saying, and would certainly take away the only pretence for reviving national enthusiasm in France.

My mind has been much relieved by the last accounts from North America. I shall be in town on Wednesday.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Near Andaya, 10th Oct., 1813.

Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham having with your Lordship's permission quitted the left column of the army for the purpose of embarking for England before the reports of the operations of the 7th could be made out, I have now the honour to lay before you the report of the proceedings of the 5th division, commanded by Major-General Hay, which that officer has just sent me.

I cannot entertain a doubt that if this duty had been performed by Sir Thomas Graham himself, he would have taken occasion to bestow every commendation upon the arrangements made by Major-General Hay, as well as on the manner in which they were executed.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your obedient and faithful humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Major-Gen. A. Hay to Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hope.

SIR, Camp, 5th Division, in France, 8th Oct., 1813.

I have the honour to report that in consequence of the orders I received from Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, I yesterday crossed the river Bidasoa with the 5th division in three columns, about ½ past 7 in the morning, the tide not serving sooner: the right column, consisting of the 1st brigade, under the command of Colonel the Hon. Charles Greville, at ford No. 3; the centre column, consisting of the 3rd brigade, except 300 of the 3rd Portuguese detached under Colonel M'Creagh, at ford No. 2. Colonel M'Creagh and a part of his regiment I placed in support of the 2nd brigade to flank its movements towards the sea, and to cover the guns and cavalry, which formed the left column, and crossed at ford No. 1, under the command of Major-General Robinson. I placed myself by the Lieutenant-General's directions with the left column.

It is with great satisfaction I have to report the very determined manner in which the columns passed the river, particularly as the water and mud were deep in several places: but on gaining the right bank the columns moved forward in so gallant a style that they soon overcame every difficulty opposed to them, notwithstanding the nature of the ground was well calculated for defence; and also their different strong positions, from which the enemy were successively driven.

After passing the river I could only see the movements of the right and centre columns occasionally and at a distance, the country being much intersected with hedges and hollow ways; but I beg leave to mention the good conduct of those columns from the reports made to me by their commanders, Colonel Luiz de Regoa and Colonel the Hon. C. Greville.

Being myself with the left column, I cannot express how much I feel obliged to Major-General Robinson for his able assistance in turning the enemy's right flank several times; in one of which movements a detachment of the 47th regiment, and a grenadier company of the 3rd Portuguese, under that active officer Captain Smith, charged the enemy posted in and behind a battery on our left near the sea, and took possession of it with four 24-pounders, and a considerable quantity of ammunition which they had not time to destroy. The column still continued turning and driving the enemy till we got to the flank and nearly to the top of their position, where they were strongly posted behind some field works and strong hedges, which were carried by a charge of the 47th regiment, supported by the 59th regiment and a part of the 3rd Portuguese. At this time my left flank was attacked, and the flankers driven in, by a very superior body of the enemy, but who were most gallantly repulsed (whilst I was with the 47th) by Major-General Robinson and the 4th regiment, and driven, till I had orders to halt, to the ground where our advanced piquets now are. He reports in the strongest terms the good conduct and support he received upon this and former occasions from Major Anwell and Captain Wood, his aides-de-camp, both of the 4th regiment; and I also bear testimony to the zeal and intelligence of those officers.

I beg also to mention the judicious and exemplary conduct which I witnessed, at the beginning and end of the affair, of Colonel Luiz de Regoa and of Colonel the Hon. C. Greville, which I believe came under the eye of Lieutenant-General Sir T. Graham.

As the 1st brigade was considerably to my right, I have the honour to

enclose Colonel Greville's report of their conduct, which I understand was everything I had reason from my former knowledge of this brigade to expect. Colonel de Regoa reports the very brilliant conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Forjas, of the 3rd Portuguese Infantry; of Captain Joaquim de Warte, commanding the 8th Caçadores; of that very meritorious officer Major Campbell, commanding the 15th Portuguese infantry; and of Captain Antonio Coreo Grudes, of the same regiment, who, though not recovered of his wounds got at San Sebastian, volunteered his services yesterday and distinguished himself greatly at the head of the Grenadiers; also of the exemplary conduct of Captain Brackenbury, aide-de-camp to General Sprye; Major of Brigade Fitzgerald; and Ensign Antonio Peito, 15th Portuguese regiment.

I feel myself under the greatest obligations on this as on many former occasions to Lieutenant-Colonels Berkeley and Gomm, of the Divisional Staff, for their able assistance. Of the zeal, intelligence, and information afforded me by Major Todd, of the Royal Staff Corps, I bear a grateful remembrance. Captain Mann and Lieutenant Longmore, of the Royal Staff Corps, rendered every assistance to the 1st and 3rd brigades.

I am under very great obligation to Lieutenant Jones, of the Royal Engineers; Lieutenant Sinclair, Royal Artillery, my aide-de-camp; whom, with Captain Willshire, 38th regiment, and Captain Wood, 4th regiment, I request you to recommend to the favourable consideration of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Captain Stewell, of the 12th Light Dragoons, brought up his squadron in the best style. I regret that the nature of the ground prevented my employing him against the enemy. Lieutenant Johnston, Royal Artillery (Captain Moss being detached), brought up three of his guns, notwithstanding the difficulties of the road, in time to assist in accelerating the retreat of the enemy from the left of our position.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

With great respect, your obedient Servant,

ANDREW HAY.

P.S.—I had forgot to mention that Captain Willshire, 38th regiment, commanded the light companies of the 1st brigade; and I am happy to add that the loss of the division has been comparatively small, considering the numbers of the enemy, and the strength of his position. Lieutenant-Colonel Berkeley, A.A.G., has forwarded a return of the casualties.

II.

Colonel the Hon. C. Greville to Major-Gen. A. Hay.

SIR, Camp, 7th Oct., 1813.

I have great pleasure in reporting to you the excellent conduct of the corps composing the 1st brigade in the affair with the enemy of this day. The gallant manner in which this column was led to the fords on the river Bidasoa by Captain Mann of the Royal Staff Corps, and the gallantry of Captain Willshire, who covered this movement with the light companies of the brigade and Brunswick company detached, in presence of a piquet of the enemy, merit my highest praise; and the spirited advance of the Royal Scots and 38th regiment, under the command of the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Deane and Lieutenant-Colonel Barns, on a corps of the enemy who for a considerable time defended their encampment on the right of their advanced position, does much credit to these officers.

I was here enabled to communicate with the brigade of Guards on my right, and deemed it best to gain the height yet occupied by the enemy and forming his second and main position, by ascending the extreme right of the hill, and gaining a communication with the Portuguese brigade under command of Colonel L. de Regoa on my left. With this intention I directed an advance from my left in échelon of wings of battalions: the column was led in a most conspicuous manner by Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron of the 9th regiment, who drove in the advanced parties of the enemy; and though a powerful resistance was made on reaching the intrenchment which covered the right of the encampment, the rapid advance of the whole of the corps as soon as formed obliged the enemy to retire with precipitation, leaving one gun in our possession in their battery, and three in the intrenched encampment. My thanks are particularly due to Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. J. Deane, commanding the 38th regiment, to Lieutenant-Colonel Barns of the Royal Scots, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, who severally distinguished themselves; also to Captain Mann of the Royal Staff Corps for his assistance throughout the day, and to Captain Willshire of the 38th regiment, who conducted the troops under his charge with much credit to himself.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,

CHARLES GREVILLE.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-General Colville.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Vera, 11th Oct., 1813.

In answer to the latter part of your letter of yesterday's date, suggesting a co-operation on the part of Brigadier-General Campbell, and also by the 3rd division, to enable you to occupy a part of the high grounds farther towards Espelette, I have to acquaint you that for the present it is not Lord Wellington's intention to push forward the centre of the general line any farther. I will be much obliged to you, however, if you will cause as much information to be obtained as possible respecting the communications leading to any part of the river Nive, between Itsassu and the villages of San Martin and Horça, which two last places are upon opposite sides of the Nive, a little above Bidarry.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-General C. Alten.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Vera, 11th Oct., 1813.

I will be much obliged to you if you will let me know what has been observed in regard to the position and force of the enemy's troops seen from any of the most commanding situations from which you have had observations made; and I will thank you to let me know when any alterations of consequence are reported to you. As your outposts command a good view of all the country towards the coast, you will of course be immediately made aware of any appearance indicating an advance of the enemy in that quarter against the left of the army.

G. MURRAY.

[703.] G. O. Vera, 12th Oct., 1813.

3. Officers commanding regiments and corps will take care that in future in all returns of officers who are killed, wounded, or missing, and of those who die, the Christian as well as the surname may be inserted at full length; and the Assistant Adjutant-Generals of divisions are required to give particular attention to this point.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 14th Oct., 1813.

The enclosed copies of my despatches home will show you what is passing here, and I have thought it right to send you a courier in order that you may receive the earliest intimation of the government having actually quitted Cadiz. They went to the Isla yesterday, and little or no notice was taken of them by the mob. The Cortes are to hold their first sittings at the Isla this evening.

You will see that the question relative to your command has been referred back to the government and to the Council of State. I am assured that the Council of State are likely to give such an opinion as will be satisfactory to us, and that Garay in particular has declared that, as the English have now really come forward in support of Spain, everything should be conceded to you which you can possibly require. I am disappointed at the report of the committee, which I believe would have been in very different terms if it had been made without examining the Minister of War, whom I strongly suspect of having misrepresented some facts upon which he was questioned. This gentleman is appointed acting Minister of State in the room of Cano Manuel, who has been dismissed from all his offices for an infraction of the Constitution during the late Regency. As General O'Donoju and I have by his own desire had no communication since the letter I addressed to him, a copy of which I sent you, I have been obliged to state the whole case to one of the Regents, telling him that, although I would conduct the ordinary business with the new Minister of State, yet that it was quite impossible for me to have any confidential communication with him either verbally or by letter, and that in any such cases I must request permission to communicate with one of the Regents. Agar, to whom I spoke, agreed with me entirely, and seemed to condemn the conduct of the Minister of War.

But the manner in which things are going on would really be quite ludicrous, if the subject were not too serious for ridicule. Conceive General O'Donoju, the Prime Minister of Spain, with the whole of the War Department in his hands, and the British Ambassador scarcely upon speaking terms with him! Besides this, I have ascertained positively, through the Swedish Consul, that neither Sweden, nor Russia, nor any of

the Allies upon the Continent, will send Ministers here until things are upon a different footing, and that they are sure that their Ministers will be treated with proper consideration. With regard to the press, it is absolutely necessary that the Cortes should be made to revise their regulations for it, in order that there may be some law by which their allies may be protected.

I am told that there are intrigues going on at Madrid against the government, and that there is likely soon to be a motion in the Cortes for its removal. They talk of bringing forward Castaños as one of the new Regents. I doubt whether much benefit would be derived from any but a radical change such as you suggested in your letter to La Vega, excepting indeed that by a change we should get rid of a government absolutely hostile to the alliance. I am much disposed to think that we should give all our support to the Princess of Brazil, as being the best chance of shutting out Jacobinism, and having a government which would be respected.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

I have received your letter of the 29th. I do not think it clear that the Regency will proceed very soon to Madrid, unless they are frightened out of the Isla by the fever which I hear has reached that place. They have, however, so contrived, that almost all the towns on the road to Madrid have a cordon round them. The fever still continues here, and many people are ill of it, but the deaths are not in proportion to the numbers taken ill. Lord and Lady Hinchingbrook are at my house at Chiclana, but they have got another, and I shall go there in a day or two. He seems to be in a very precarious state of health.

I send the copy of the Minister of War's letter which you forwarded to me.

[Enclosures.]

I.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.

My Lord, Cadiz, 11th Oct., 1813.

The ordinary Cortes commenced their sessions on the 1st instant.

On the 3rd instant a motion was made by Mr. Quartero, Deputy for Cuenca, for the immediate removal of the government and the Cortes to Madrid, which being referred to a committee, it reported that the political circumstances of Europe and of the nation required the immediate removal of the government into the interior. After much discussion, it was at length determined, by a majority of 72 votes to 49, that the removal should be in the first instance to the Isla de Leon, but that the government and the Cortes should repair to Madrid as soon as the necessary preparations for their reception should be completed, unless in the mean time the political circumstances of Europe and of Spain should have materially changed.

This determination has been received with fewer symptoms of public discontent than could have been expected after the disposition which was manifested to resist the resolution announced by the Regency on the 26th ultimo of proceeding to Madrid.

It is probable that the transfer of the public authorities to the Isla de Leon

will take place in the course of a few days, and that their removal to the capital will not be delayed beyond the time necessary for preparing for their reception. Nothing material has since occurred in the Cortes, excepting the dismissal from office of Mr. Cano Manuel, late Minister of Grace and Justice, and charged with the temporary administration of the Department for Foreign Affairs, for an infraction of the Constitution during the administration of the late Regency. Mr. Cano Manuel's successor has not yet been announced to me.

I have the honour, &c.,

H. Wellesley.

II.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.

My Lord, Cadiz, 11th Oct., 1813.

The whole of Lord Wellington's correspondence with the Regency having been laid before the Cortes, has since been referred to a committee. Lord Wellington's last letter to the Regency relative to his command, in reply to that from the Minister of War of the 20th August, copies of which are enclosed, is dated the 30th August, and was received here on the 11th September; and your Lordship will observe that he requests the Regency to accept his resignation unless they are prepared to abide strictly by the conditions agreed upon with the late government. He desires, however, that a copy of his letter may be transmitted to the Cortes, meaning, no doubt, that the whole question should be referred to the decision of that assembly.

The following circumstances were communicated to me by M. Mexia, one of the members of the committee, with whom I have had an interview.

Upon the receipt of Lord Wellington's letter of the 30th August, the Minister of War gave out that the whole correspondence would be submitted to the Cortes for their decision. But he replied to Lord Wellington on the 23rd September, and from his reply it would appear that the Regency have thought proper to consider his Lordship as having resigned the command. The letter, however, concludes by announcing to him that the correspondence is to be submitted to the Cortes.

M. Mexia informed me that the Committee was outrageous at the proceedings of the Regency throughout this affair; that the whole tenor of this correspondence showed it to be their intention to get rid of Lord Wellington, while on the other hand it was perfectly evident that his Lordship had determined that his resignation should depend upon the decision of the Cortes. He added that the Report of the Committee would, he hoped, be such as would induce the Cortes to adopt measures which would be satisfactory to Lord Wellington, and enable him to continue in the exercise of the command with advantage to the public service.

I apprised M. Mexia of another fact connected with the proceedings of the Regency, which is indeed scarcely to be credited, viz., that the whole of the correspondence with Lord Wellington upon this subject has been conducted by the government without their being apprised of the conditions, the departure from which was the point in dispute; for the Minister of War requested a friend of his to ask me for a copy of the conditions, observing that, however extraordinary it might appear, he had never seen them, and that no copy of them was to be found in his office. I could have no objection to transmitting him the copy in my possession; but his last letter to Lord Wellington, dated the 23rd September, was written before he received this document, which was not forwarded to him until the 24th.

The correspondence was not laid before the Cortes until the 5th instant, and it was delayed under the expectation evidently that the Cortes in their first session would decide upon immediately removing to Madrid, which would have left the Regency with uncontrolled power for a period of nearly six weeks, in which case Lord Wellington must necessarily have given up the command.

The Committee are fully apprised of all these circumstances, but I regret that their Report has not been such as I expected. It states that, as the Regency have declared that they do not feel themselves authorized either to accept Lord Wellington's resignation or to grant the powers he requires, they recommend that the Cortes should send back the correspondence to the Regency, requesting them to explain what in their opinion ought to be done, first consulting the Council of State. If this recommendation should be adopted by the Cortes, the decision upon this affair will necessarily be suspended for some time longer.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

G. O. Vera, 15th Oct., 1813. [704.]

5. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers and commanding officers of regiments will give directions that neither officers nor soldiers may be allowed to pass the advanced piquets either for forage or other purposes.

6. Any non-commissioned officers or soldiers who do pass the advanced posts, and may fall into the enemy's hands, are to be considered as deserters in every respect, will forfeit all back pay, if ever they should be released, and their length of service will not be counted.

WELLINGTON.

Major-General A. Hay to Major-General the Hon. Sir E. Pakenham.

SIR, 5th Division Camp, 18th Oct., 1813.

I had the honour to receive your letter of the 16th this morning, and I beg leave to state to you, for the information of the Field Marshal, the means that I took to repress outrage and to protect the inhabitants of San Sebastian after that place was taken by assault.

When I entered the town by the curtain with the storming party on the 31st of August, the town was on fire in several places, and a great deal of musketry and some firing from cannon in the streets. As soon as the enemy were driven out of the town, the first thing I had to attend to was to secure the avenues leading to the castle from the barrack of St. Elmo on the right to a large white house overlooking the harbour on the left, to endeavour to secure the powder, and send patrols through the streets. On this occasion there were not (from the severe loss) officers sufficient left for

the number of men, and no doubt upon this as on similar occasions certain men absented themselves in search of plunder through the narrow streets and barricades, where only one man could pass at a time.

It is, however, but justice to all the officers present, several of whom were wounded, to declare that they did their utmost to prevent outrage and to prevent the spreading of the flames by every exertion in their power; but the wind being very changeable and generally high, their laborious exertions were of little avail, as the alcalde and inhabitants, when applied to for engines, buckets, and other necessary implements, told them the enemy had removed them into the castle, and the men that were employed on the roofs of the houses were obliged to desist by the fire of the enemy. They also found empty tar-barrels and other combustibles in the houses, evidently placed for the purpose of conflagration, and the houses invariably took fire at the top and burned downwards; and General Rey, in his despatch so early as the 27th or 28th of July, mentions the town being then half on fire. I can affirm, as well as every officer who was present, that on the night of the 23rd of July the houses were so much on fire near the breach that it could not be attacked; and on the night of the 24th that the conflagration was such that the enemy could distinctly see the 1st brigade marching down the road towards the convent of St. Bartholomew, so as to cannonade it with precision on our way to the trenches.

Lieutenant Jones, Royal Engineers, wounded and taken on the 25th of July, informs me that the French soldiers, previous to our last attack, set fire to many houses with long torches for the purpose of plundering, which statement was also made me by some of the inhabitants. Doubtless on the day of the assault, from the quantity of loose powder and spare ammunition at the barricades and other places, set fire to by the firing in the streets, other houses were set on fire. I think I have clearly proved that the enemy set fire to the town, which it was impossible for us, under the existing circumstances, to extinguish, though great personal exertions were made by all.

I am perfectly certain also that all the Commanding officers exerted themselves to the utmost not only to prevent outrages to the inhabitants, but to give them every assistance to secure and transport out of the town whatever property could be saved from the flames, notwithstanding in so doing they were fired on by the enemy. I myself sat with a court martial in the Plaza Vieja, near the gate, to listen to all complaints, with a gallows there erected and a Deputy Provost-Marshal (Williams), now, I believe, at head quarters, who can, I should suppose, report the exact number (I know there were a good many) of severe punishments inflicted by my orders on soldiers and sailors found with plunder: the plunder was put in a heap for the inhabitants to claim, which they did, and were escorted out of the place with it, and every assistance given to secure their effects. I can with confidence appeal to every inhabitant then in San Sebastian to state whether they were not furnished with safeguards and escorts whenever they applied for them to me or the other Commanding officers, and whether any men they complained of were not examined and generally punished on the spot. The old guard-room in the Plaza Vieja, near the gate, where I was driven to at last by the flames, was generally full of the property brought by the inhabitants till it could be successively carried out for them; and, except when

going round the streets and posts, I or some of the divisional staff were at the gate for six days and nights, till I was relieved.

Previous to the attack on the 25th of July and subsequently, I and the other officers commanding regiments and companies endeavoured to impress in the strongest manner on the minds of the men the absolute necessity there was for strict discipline and to abstain from plunder, more perhaps than at any former assault, "as only one part of the object was attained by taking the town, the castle still remaining, which we must be prepared to attack at the shortest notice." This, with the places being taken in daylight, was attended with the best effects, as, with the exception of a few, I never witnessed men behave more orderly. I am also certain that, from the precautions at the gate, there never was a place taken by storm where so little plunder was carried away by the troops, as they were there stopped to lay down the plunder and punished on the spot. I am told that for the two or three first days the inhabitants, whilst carrying off their effects on the roads leading from San Sebastian, were plundered by many Spanish straggling soldiers and some of ours, and peasants, who I believe mutually plundered and ill-treated each other. But the fact is, the great destruction of property was owing to the burning of the town, which it was visible to the world (laying aside General Rey's report) was in flames, more or less, for five weeks previous to the 31st of August; and I am convinced that none that were present in San Sebastian and witnessed our exertions, and who are not badly disposed and friends to the enemy, dare assert but that every possible protection was given to them by me and the officers I had the honour to command, and this at the risk of their lives, from the falling of the houses and exposure to the enemy's sharp-shooters and grape.

Though I cannot assert from my own knowledge, yet from the reports of others I do believe, that 700 men, inhabitants, were rationed by the enemy, and believe that some of them did fire at the troops advancing through the streets from the windows. Officers of the greatest respectability are ready to swear to this fact, whilst others certainly seemed friendly to us by pointing out the best passages. Major-General Oswald, who was present in the assault and visited me different times, can corroborate my statement, as (if necessary) can Lieutenant-Colonels Berkeley and Gomm, who were one or other continually with me from the time Lieutenant-General Sir James Leith was carried off the field. I have not been able even to suppose who the author of the letter to Vitoria is; but the person who saw it there might be able to give such information as will enable me to know if it came from the division which I then commanded.

I herewith send some documents, particularly one from the French officers, which confirm the account of the ardour and devotion with which the inhabitants assisted to prolong the defence. I hope his Excellency th Field Marshal will believe that I and the other officers did our utmost to prevent outrage and disorder, and punished such as occurred.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

Andrew Hay.

[Enclosures.]

I.

Colonel the Hon. C. Greville to Major-General A. Hay.

Sir, Camp, 18th Oct., 1813.

In compliance with your desire that I should enter into a statement of the circumstances touching the injury sustained from the troops in the assault of San Sebastian, which appears with much injustice to have been attributed to motives of intentional malice and a premeditated revenge of the troops on the inhabitants, I think it necessary to assure you that the sentiment is as unfounded as illiberal; and while calling to your recollection that the posts occupied by the 1st brigade, and extending from the church of St. Elmo on the left to the artillery arsenal, did not allow me to contribute considerably to the arrangements of police, it is with justice I can bear most ample testimony that every possible exertion was made by the officers to the discouragement of violence in the vicinity of their posts, and for the protection of property when called for; that several houses found in flames in the Calle de Trinidad were extinguished by the exertion of the troops during the evening of the assault, and that these had been set fire to by the retiring enemy I can have no reason to doubt, nor had the inhabitants to assert; and it cannot, Sir, have escaped your recollection that the town was considerably in flames in various other directions previous to our entering into it, and it is notorious to all that the commanding situation of the enemy rendered abortive every exertion to extinguish it. That the occupation of the troops was necessarily called to the security of the posts we had to maintain against the enemy beyond what is necessary after most sieges, can only be attributed to the situation and circumstances which made the precautions absolutely necessary, and not to any reluctance in the troops to give every assistance possible; and I can further assert, that aided by the 4th and 8th Caçadores, which your permission granted me for the express purpose of extinguishing the fire wherever practicable, I found the means remaining in the possession of the civil magistrates totally inadequate. The engines were unserviceable, and every other description of implement was in possession of the enemy; the unwearied exertions of the officers and men continued nearly half the day, when the galling fire of grape from the enemy in the castle, and the obvious inefficacy of the means, induced us to relinquish the undertaking.

I cannot, Sir, conclude this without recurring once again to the exertions of the brigade I had the honour to command, harassed with the constant duties of the line of posts and patrols for the three previous nights and days. It was on the fourth night that the flames reached the Calle de Trinidad. From the violence of the wind the one side of the street was in flames in several places at once, and only by the exertion of every individual, both officers and men, the two great churches and the street were preserved: a proof, I trust, that every effort was made for the protection of what came within their charge.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

C. Greville.

II.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Barns to Major-General A. Hay.

Sir, Camp, near Andaye, 18th Oct., 1813.

I have the honour to report to you that I used my best exertions to prevent the soldiers from plundering after the assault of San Sebastian, and gave all

the assistance in my power to the inhabitants. I also aided the people of the town as much as possible in carrying off their property, and gave them safeguards for that purpose, as far as the strength of my battalion would admit. The officers of the Royals declare, upon honour, that they neither wrote the letter to Vitoria which is mentioned by the Adjutant-General of the Forces, nor know who was the author of it.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Stevenson Barns.

III.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Cameron to Colonel the Hon. C. Greville.

Sir, Camp, 18th Oct., 1813.

In obedience to Major-General Hay's directions, I have the honour to reply to the statement contained in the Adjutant-General's letter relative to the plunder of the town of San Sebastian, as far as the 9th regiment is concerned; and in so doing I have to assure you, in the first instance, that the communication said to be from an individual of the 5th division to a correspondent at Vitoria, rejoicing at the sufferings of the inhabitants, was not from an officer or any other individual belonging to the 9th regiment; and with regard to the plunder of San Sebastian, the battalion under my command being constantly on duty until relieved and marched out of town, it was next to impossible that they could find time to commit depredations. Many Spaniards came to me for assistance to escort their property out of the town, which was never refused. At the same time it is very possible that many of them were not the right owners of such property.

To the exertions of the troops in the town to prevent the fire from communicating, you can bear testimony, and certainly in a more arduous and fatiguing duty I never remember to have been concerned.

That the town was set on fire by the enemy there cannot be a doubt, from the preparations found in some of the houses; and as a further proof of it I beg to add that an inhabitant, who had the appearance of respectability, assured me that the French had either destroyed or took with them to the castle every means for extinguishing the fire.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Cameron.

IV.

Major J. L. Hoysted to Major-General A. Hay.

Sir, Camp, 5th Division, 18th Oct., 1813.

Having perused the Adjutant-General's letter on the subject of irregularities stated to have been committed by the military at San Sebastian, I have the honour to inform you that on my arrival at six o'clock on the morning of the 1st September, I assumed the command of the 59th regiment in the town, at which period the town was on fire in several places, and which fire, from the length of time it must have been burning, was most certainly purposely done by the enemy, as I observed several houses myself in flames, and all the fire proceeded from the upper stories, and the lower parts were not on fire. Had it been done by the soldiers, no doubt but the fire would have proceeded from below.

As to plundering having been permitted, I can assure you that every exertion was made by me and the officers of the regiment to prevent anything of the kind, and that I sent frequent patrols, by your order, to take up any man that was found in town, as also to afford assistance to any inhabitant that might call upon them; and I am assured by Captain Fuller, who commanded on my joining, that there was no plundering the night before. Some few men were in liquor.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. L. Hoysted.

V.

Statement of Assistant Provost Marshal Edward Williams.

I was ordered into San Sebastian the morning after the capture of the town, and by General Hay's orders, who was also in the town, flogged every man I found plundering or committing excesses. I flogged about thirty men a-day for the two first days; on the third I had not many occasions to punish. During this time Assistant Provost Johnstone, of the 5th division, was constantly stationed either at the breaches or at the gate of the town, to prevent persons bringing out plunder, and was also very active in punishing irregularities. General Hay had given most particular orders to me to endeavour to discover any rising fires, that they might be instantly extinguished. I apprehended on the third day after the capitulation a French sergeant hid in a house, and from circumstances and the appearance of the sergeant I conceived this sergeant had been employed in setting fire to the houses. Under this impression I took the sergeant to General Hay, who, in the first instance, ordered him to be hanged, but, after a few questions with him, countermanded this order. I did not quit the town for the three first days after its capture, and did not observe in a single instance violence offered to the person of an inhabitant.

From the circumstance of a chair having been found on fire in a house close to the magazine in the town, the impression was always strong in my mind that there were French in different parts of the place who had orders or felt disposed to destroy every house in their power. Of the number of houses from which I drove the soldiers during the first day after the capture of the place, I did not observe anything which had the least appearance of their having had fire in any of them.

Edward Williams.

VI.

Extrait d'une Adresse des Officiers Français faits Prisonniers de Guerre à San Sebastian à Monsieur le Chevalier de Songeon, Chef d'Etat-Major, et l'Adjudant Commandant, en témoin de sa bonne conduite.

"Enfin cet officier non seulement a mérité l'estime et l'admiration de la garnison, mais il a encore forcé par sa conduite celle des malheureux habitans en coopérant avec autant d'ardeur et de dévouement à croître et prolonger une défense tellement opiniâtre, qu'elle a eue pour eux un résultat de destruction totale de leur ville."

Signé par les officiers composant la garnison.

A. Hay.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Leith.

My dear Leith, Vera, 18th Oct., 1813.

I have received your letter of the 14th, on the subject of your bât and forage allowances.

It was formerly the case in regard to the allowances that a latitude was left to the General officer commanding in regard to the application of the rules which the custom of the service had established; and perhaps it was the fairest footing upon which the matter could be placed, for it is impossible, I believe, to frame any general regulations which will do justice to individuals in all the cases which arise.

There is no doubt, however, but that the latitude formerly allowed was very much abused; and out of that the present regulations originated. There is no latitude now left for a General officer in command to deviate from these regulations. If there is any exception to be made in favour of wounded officers, or in any other case, the regulations must be altered or modified at home.

No General officer in command abroad ought voluntarily to deviate from a regulation established for the guidance of the service; and I am sure that if any General officer does so in regard to bât and forage concerns, especially if he has a large force under his orders, he will involve himself in a maze of the most disagreeable and perplexing business that a man can possibly be embarrassed with.

I confess to you candidly that I am an advocate, as Quartermaster-General, for adhering closely to the regulations. I have not the smallest objection to any change that may be made in them at home, and think they should always lean to the side of the officer; but what I deprecate, of all things, is a latitude being allowed to our decisions here.

I see no reason against a memorial or representation at home, but I do not think it will ever be admitted here that we can take it upon ourselves to deviate from the letter of the regulations.

I am sorry to hear that your wound is still so troublesome. I had understood latterly that it was doing well, and that you would not be obliged to go to England.

Believe me, my dear Leith,

Very faithfully yours,

G. Murray.

Earl Bathurst to the Earl of Liverpool.

My dear Liverpool, Brighton, 19th Oct., 1813.

The question respecting the command on the Eastern coast stands in a very awkward way.

Before Lord William had signified his intention to leave Spain, a formal instruction was sent out to Lord Wellington to appoint a successor, in contemplation of that event. On hearing of Lord William's decision, I wrote a private letter to Lord Wellington, saying that a successor would have been immediately appointed from hence, if I had not imagined he would

have already sent one. In that letter also I proposed sending out more General officers, if he wished for more, either for his own or the Anglo-Sicilian army. In his answer he has told me who would not accept and who he thought ought not to have this command; but he neither expressed a wish that we should appoint from hence, nor desired any more General officers should go out. I certainly understood from his letter that he would send some General officer from his own army, as soon as he knew that Lord William was actually gone (and I am yet not clear that he does not intend to do so). I also guessed that Lord Dalhousie would be the man, as Lord Wellington did not name him either as having had the offer or as being unfit to have it. My reply to this letter of his was to say that if I did not believe he had sent somebody, I should have suggested Lieutenant-General Auchmuty, and begged his opinion if it remained still undecided.

Lord Wellington's private letters take no notice of Lord William's departure. One of them I enclose to you, as it relates to allowances to be made to General officers. It will, I am afraid, require consideration, although there cannot be a doubt that the case is a hard one. The other letter regards provisional battalions, which I shall send to Torrens.

I am yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field-Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 19th Oct., 1813.

I have received your letters of the 6th, the 9th, and the 11th. That of the 6th came the last. I was very happy to learn that you had established your line within the French frontier, and am anxious to hear of your next movements.

I required of the government to prosecute the 'Duende,' and the Junta de Censura have declared, as you will see by the enclosed (although their opinion has not yet been announced to me by the government), that there is nothing censurable in the papers submitted to their consideration. I shall apply to the government to prosecute the editor of this infamous publication for a calumny, which can still be done. Nor do I think that the prosecution of this affair ought to be relinquished until this libeller has been punished, or until it has been proved that the laws of Spain are insufficient for the protection of the Allies from the most atrocious and malignant calumnies. In the latter case I should make a new representation to the government, desiring that the whole question might be submitted to the Cortes, in the hope that they would perceive the necessity of revising the laws, with a view of imposing some restraint upon the licentiousness of the press, or at least of adopting some regulations for protecting the allies of Spain. The question would then come to be one between the two nations, and in my mind a very important one; for it is necessary that Great Britain should look a little to her relations with Spain hereafter, and to consider whether she is likely to maintain a good understanding here, if, every time the Spanish government is out of humour with the English,

they are to be libelled and calumniated without the least power of redress. Conceive the impression that such publications must produce in other parts of Europe if they are suffered to pass unnoticed! In my opinion the British government ought to take up the question very seriously, and even to alter its diplomatic relations with the government of Spain unless some regulations are established to protect us in future from the licentiousness of the press.

My letters will have apprised you of what has passed with respect to your command. I do not believe that the subject has yet been submitted to the Council of State. There is something very unaccountable in the conduct of the Committee of the Cortes upon this subject. I never saw anybody more determined than Mexia to bring the question to a satisfactory issue, but something certainly passed at the examination of the Minister of War to induce them to pause. It is strongly reported that there is an intrigue at Madrid against the present government, and it is not impossible (although I have not heard it) that those of the Committee who support the present government may suppose you to have some knowledge of this intrigue, and to be disposed to countenance it. The delay in submitting the question to the Council of State may arise from the knowledge that they are desirous that you should continue in the command under any conditions, and I am assured that this is the general feeling among them.

It is impossible to imagine the contempt in which the government are held. They were very ill received at the Isla, so much so that the Regents could with difficulty obtain lodgings, and the Ministers were wandering about the streets, being refused everywhere. The Council of State is at Chiclana, the Council of War at Port St. Mary's, and the Corps Diplomatique at Cadiz. The functions of the Ministers of War, of State, and of Foreign Affairs, which are united in the person of Don Juan O'Donoju, are suspended in consequence of his illness. The Minister of the Interior is likewise ill. Half the Cortes are at Cadiz, and not more than sixty members attend. Such a government I suppose never was heard of before. Agar, after having with considerable difficulty obtained admittance into a house at the Isla, was refused the use of the kitchen, and had a wrangling bout with the proprietor, an old widow, who seems not to have been impressed with too much respect for the Executive power. All the towns in the interior are shut against us, and here we must continue until the fever is over, of which there are still many people ill.

These Cortes set out by declaring that they would attend to nothing but war and finance, yet not a recruit has been raised, nor is there a dollar in the Treasury.

I have sent your official letter to me on the subject of the excesses imputed to the British troops at San Sebastian to the government, and I have stated in a note from myself that I suppose they will not leave the Gefe Politico who has dared thus to calumniate the British officers and the army in a situation where he must necessarily be in constant intercourse with those whom he has falsely aspersed. I have also required of the government to undeceive the public. As soon as I receive their answer I will write to you officially.

Ever most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, London, 20th Oct., 1813.

Your letter respecting Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher was forwarded to me at Walmer Castle, where I have been passing a fortnight. I will pay immediate attention to it, and recommend such a pension for Colonel Fletcher's family as may be conformable to former precedents and due to his memory for his distinguished services.

I congratulate you most sincerely on your late successes. Whatever may be the result of these operations, the establishment of the British army in France, after the expulsion of the French armies from Spain, will be a proud event in our military history, and forms a new epoch in the transactions of this most extraordinary war.

We received last night letters from the head-quarters of the Allied armies of the 29th of September: they bring the important intelligence of an arrangement having been concluded between the Austrians and Bavarians, by which the latter are to take part in the war against France. If this arrangement shall really be carried into effect (and there can be no doubt of it, if some unforeseen misfortune does not happen to the Allied forces), it will completely secure the deliverance of Germany, and probably of a large part of Italy. The situation of Buonaparte at Dresden is most critical, and the fate of his army might be considered as certain if there were *one head* that directed the operations of the Allies, and that *a head* in which all had confidence. In amount of force, in quality of force, in zeal and spirit, military and national, the Allies are greatly superior. Buonaparte's advantage consists in a single command, opposed to a divided command. With this advantage, however, on his side, I think we need not now be apprehensive of the result; but the difference will nevertheless be great between his retiring to the Rhine with his present force nearly entire, or that force being completely defeated in its present position. I reckon not a little on his obstinacy in endeavouring to maintain that position longer than prudence would warrant. By a return which I have seen, the French armies have lost in the field and by sickness not less than 150,000 men since the recommencement of hostilities. The French force now in Germany may amount to about 200,000 men.

Parliament meets on the 4th of November. We intend to raise as much money as we can before Christmas, and likewise adopt the measure which may be judged upon the whole most advisable for keeping up our army to its present amount. Nothing is yet finally decided upon this point. The subject is under consideration. When these measures are passed, together with the usual annual votes, we have some idea of adjourning till the month of March, but of this intention we think it more prudent to say nothing at present.

I was happy to hear from March so good an account of your health.

Believe me to be with sincere regard, my dear Lord,

Yours very faithfully,

Liverpool.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, War Department, 20th Oct., 1813.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch No. 98, and no time was lost in laying it before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

His Royal Highness commands me to congratulate your Lordship on the brilliant success which has attended your important movement into France.

By making this advance your Lordship has brought us back after the lapse of a century to the time when, under the auspices of the Duke of Marlborough, the military glory of this country was raised to a height at which, until lately, it was imagined it would never again arrive. If this were all that this movement produced, it would be far from being without its solid advantage. But this advance has materially improved your own position, and it has proportionally injured that of the enemy. By occupying the frontiers and threatening the interior of France, it will probably oblige the enemy to weaken if not to withdraw the army under Marshal Suchet in Catalonia, and it will animate and act as a powerful diversion substantially as well as in impression in favour of our Allies in the North.

Your Lordship will convey to Major-General Hay, and the officers and privates lately under the command of Sir Thomas Graham, His Royal Highness's most gracious acceptance of their meritorious services; and your Lordship will express the satisfaction which His Royal Highness feels that Sir Thomas Graham has concluded his command by an action so worthy of the splendid manner by which he has repeatedly distinguished himself, and more particularly in the course of this campaign.

Your Lordship will also convey to Major-General Charles Alten and the officers and privates under his command the favourable sense which His Royal Highness entertains of their highly creditable exertions.

I am directed to beg your Lordship to communicate to Lieutenant-General Don Manuel Freyre, Brigadier-General Longa, and Mariscal de Campo Don Pedro Giron, His Royal Highness's sincere congratulations on this additional instance which the troops under their command have afforded of that gallant spirit and heroic valour which has heretofore distinguished the Spanish nation.

While His Royal Highness deeply regrets the great proportionate loss which the Portuguese troops suffered on this and other recent occasions, His Royal Highness cannot but consider it as a proof that the zeal and ardour which have from the outset distinguished them are unabated, and will continue to exalt the military glory of their country.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

G. O. Vera, 22nd Oct., 1813. [705.]

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that attention may be paid to the General Orders of the army regarding the taking of quarters.

2. Houses must not be taken under the authority of individuals, whether for the purposes of hospitals, or for quartering officers or soldiers; in every case in which it is possible, an

officer of the Quartermaster-General's department must distribute and allot the quarters; and wherever there is a magistrate he must apply to the magistrate, and either obtain billets, or make the allotment in common with him.

WELLINGTON.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Vera, 22nd Oct., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers:—			
Field-Officers	32	11	43
Captains	97	20	117
Subalterns	188	68	256
Staff	83	49	132
Quartermasters of Cavalry	21	4	25
Serjeants:—			
Present	529	72	601
Sick:—			
Present	15	2	17
Absent	4	..	4
Command	76	16	92
Prisoners of War and Missing	3	..	3
Trumpeters:—			
Present	102	42	144
Sick:—			
Present	2	..	2
Absent	1	5	6
Command	3	2	5
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File:—			
Present	6949	1218	8167
Sick:—			
Present	365	48	413
Absent	218	52	270
Command	754	400	1154
Prisoners of War and Missing	151	2	153
Horses:—			
Present	6992	1162	8154
Sick	280	83	363
Command	570	279	849
Alterations:—			
Men:—			
Joined	4	..	4
Horses:			
Recruited	7	..	7
Dead	5	..	5
Cast	12	..	12

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula, under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Vera, 22nd Oct., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	18	12	30
Lieutenant-Colonels	54	26	80
Majors	81	37	118
Captains	477	176	653
Lieutenants	917	195	1112
Cornets or Ensigns	302	354	656
Staff	371	463	834
Quartermasters of Cavalry	21	4	25
Serjeants :—			
Present	2720	1363	4083
Sick :—			
Present	89	57	146
Absent	474	154	628
Command	399	214	613
Prisoners of War and Missing	43	2	45
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1024	516	1540
Sick :—			
Present	17	6	23
Absent	112	36	148
Command	23	45	68
Prisoners of War and Missing	34	4	38
Rank and File :—			
Present	38,141	21,591	59,732
Sick :—			
Present	1712	771	2483
Absent	11,216	5636	16,852
Command	3074	1801	4875
Prisoners of War and Missing	2311	258	2569
Horses :—			
Present	6992	1162	8154
Sick	280	83	363
Command	570	279	849
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	4	..	4
Dead	22	1	23
Discharged	8	15	23
Deserted	8	1	9
Transferred	3	..	3
Reduced	1	..	1
Horses :—			
Recruited	7	..	7
Dead	5	..	5
Cast	12	..	12

EDWARD PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

My dear Sir Rowland, Vera, 23rd Oct., 1813.

Lord Wellington does not attach much importance to the information communicated to you from St. Jean Pied de Port, and which you enclosed to me on the 21st instant. The division at Bidarry is so situated that it may be applicable either to the centre or to the left of the enemy's line, as circumstances require.

I beg, however, that you will be so good as give me the earliest intimation of any further intelligence, or any appearances which seem to indicate an increase of the enemy's force upon the left of his line, or any intention of his acting in that quarter.

It may be advisable also that you should communicate with Marshal Beresford upon the subject, as he has gone to establish himself in the valley of Maya, and to have under his immediate direction the 3rd and the 6th divisions.

Believe me, &c.,

G. Murray.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

My dear Sir Rowland, Vera, 25th Oct., 1813.

Enclosed I transmit you an instruction respecting movements to be carried into effect immediately on the surrender of Pamplona.

You may dispose of those battalions of General Mina's which are in your immediate neighbourhood, in the first instance, in such manner as will most facilitate the commencement of your own movement.

As to the Portuguese artillery, I believe there is no doubt of its being practicable to move it by the route mentioned. It may be advisable, however, to move it before the troops march, in order to insure its being up in time to act with them, and that the animals may have, if possible, half a day's rest in the valley of Maya.

Don Carlos de España has been directed to give you immediate notice of the surrender of Pamplona, as also to apprise General Mina of it, that he may put his troops in motion towards Roncesvalles.

I beg you will communicate to the 13th Light Dragoons that part of the enclosed arrangement which concerns them; and apprise them also of the surrender of Pamplona, that they may move as directed.

I request that you will report your intended movements (by the most direct channel) the moment they are determined upon, as other arrangements to be ordered will depend upon the date of the arrival of the troops from the right at their destination.

Believe me, &c.,

G. Murray.

[The arrangement enclosed for Sir R. Hill contained also that for Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry, and that for the 4th Regiment of Portuguese cavalry.]

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton.

MY DEAR COTTON, Vera, 26th Oct., 1813.

It is intended to make a forward movement as soon as Pamplona falls. The arrangements that regard the cavalry are as follows:—

The 16th Light Dragoons will be ordered forward to join the 12th. Major-General Bock's brigade will also be moved a little more in advance towards Irun.

Major-General Alten has been instructed to move his brigade to San Estevan and Lesaca when Pamplona surrenders, that it may act with the centre of the army.

Colonel Grant has been instructed in like manner to move his brigade into the valley of Baztan, on the fall of Pamplona, that it may act with the right of the army.

The 4th regiment of Portuguese cavalry has been ordered to move at the same time into the valley of Baztan.

Lord Edward Somerset has been likewise directed to bring forward the Hussar brigade to the cantonments occupied by General V. Alten's regiments, when these latter regiments leave them.

No further movements of the cavalry are at present intended.

G. MURRAY.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 27th Oct., 1813.

I have not as yet done any thing on the subject of your proposition contained in your letter of the 9th instant. As it in fact is the same proposition as was last year so warmly combated by the Duke of York, except that it proceeds on the principle of making that a system which was then only suggested as an expedient for the year, I do not see much probability of success, especially as I know (from what has already passed) that His Royal Highness is as tenacious as ever on this point.

Before I mention it to him, I should wish to know how many regiments there are which are likely to be reduced to the number you mention, 350; and which, therefore, will come under your proposed regulation this year. It would be desirable also to know what the individual regiments are.

You will have received before this the power to volunteer from the provisional battalions. This I hope will at all events be of service to you. I will let you know by next mail what measures government are likely to adopt for recruiting the army.

I am, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir Stapleton Cotton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Tafalla, 27th Oct., 1813.

I inspected the Household Brigade on Monday last, and am sorry to say that the Life Guards are still in bad order. Nothing can be better than the Blues in every respect. That regiment turned out twenty-three files a squadron stronger than the Life Guards. The regiments are all more healthy than they were; but there are in the two regiments of Life Guards a great many men who ought to be sent home, being much too old for this country, or indeed for active service in any country. The remounts which arrived in June last for the Life Guards should be transferred to the light dragoons, but there are not many strong enough for that service.

I have ordered the whole brigade into Logroño, where the three will be well put up in three convents, which were fitted up as stables by the French.

General O'Loghlin had rather too many field-days, but I have desired him to have the brigade out occasionally in marching order and to discontinue his field-days for the present. I have directed his attention to the interior, which he seems to understand; and I was very well satisfied with their messing, particularly the breakfast messes, which he has established in all the regiments.

There are many of the officers of the Life Guards who wish to resign, and the service would be benefited thereby; but until officers are sent from England to replace them, I have desired the General will not forward their resignations.

I have ordered the carbines of the three regiments of Household cavalry to be collected (except six per troop) and put into regimental store. These troops never can be called upon to skirmish, and the horses have already a sufficient load to carry. If you approve of it, I shall be much obliged to you if you will allow me to order them to be sent to one of the Ordnance depôts.

I am, my dear Lord,

Yours very faithfully and sincerely,

Stapleton Cotton.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Errazu, 27th Oct., 1813.

I have received this morning your letter of yesterday, and I am ready at a moment to move more to the centre. I conclude Zugarramurdi will be the most eligible place, as soon as I hear of Hill's moving this way, which, from what I hear from Pamplona, will be immediately, as it appears a person came out (Baron Maucune) on the 25th to treat. I wrote to you in my former letter to say that the force estimated to be on the great height above Ainhoué was 4000; but having desired a more particular examination of the force, I enclose you the report of General Lambert.

The enemy is extending his breastwork more down the hill to his right. The distance from the point where you saw a small advance of ours to the left of one point where you were sitting, and on the ridge which runs towards but does not extend to the enemy's hill, is estimated by the engineer at 600 yards from the lower works of the enemy's hill, and takes them in flank.

I am going to Urdax, and will send this from there or Zugarramurdi to add any report I may receive.

Urdax, half-past 1 P.M.

I do not find any change in the position of the enemy. It appears that two battalions are withdrawn from the camps in front of Ainhoué, but it is probable they are in the town. I send you two papers I have picked up on my way here; there is little interesting in them, the most the philippic against Bernadotte, who is here brought forward for the first time.

Yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

ARRANGEMENT FOR A FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY, ON THE SURRENDER OF PAMPLONA.*

Vera, 27th Oct., 1813.

The object of this movement is to place the centre of the army in the first instance upon the heights which lie between the villages of Sarré and Ascain, and those which form the left bank of the Nivelle river, in the neighbourhood of the village of St. Pé.

ATTACK OF THE CENTRE.

The Light Division will assemble, before daybreak, near the ground occupied by its outposts, below and to the left of the Hermitage of La Rhune. From thence they will attack the enemy's posts on the Petite La Rhune, and establish themselves firmly there.

Three mountain guns will be attached to the Light Division for this operation. The division will continue to hold its position on the Petite La Rhune till General Alten perceives that the other divisions on his right, which are to move through Sarré, have made sufficient progress to be prepared to attack the heathy hills beyond that village, and he will then put his troops in motion to co-operate in that attack.

Part of Brigadier-General Longa's troops should be pushed down to the left, upon the branch of the mountain which points towards St. Jean de Luz. These troops will oppose the ascent of any force the enemy may send up the mountain from Ascain, and they will also put themselves in communication with the right column of Major-General Freyre's corps, which will be ordered to move along the foot of the mountain towards Ascain.

* The garrison of Pamplona made proposals to surrender on the 26th, and capitulated on the 31st of October; but continued rain and snow prevented this Movement until the 10th November, when it took place with the result that history records.—ED.

Major-General Giron will put the troops under his orders in motion exactly at daybreak. Those corps which are stationed upon the right branch of the mountain of La Rhune will descend by the ravines in their front towards the village of Sarré, and will possess themselves of the lower slopes of the mountain in that direction, as also of the woods and of the gardens. These troops will take care not to descend too much into the village, and will keep good reserves ready to support their skirmishers.

The main body of General Giron's corps will move forward by the ravine which is on the left of their present encampment. As soon as General Giron has made sufficient progress to enable him to do so, he will send three battalions of his left up the ravine which separates the mountain of La Rhune from the Petite La Rhune. These battalions will ascend the slope of the ridge near its centre, where there is a rocky projection half-way up the bank, and from thence they will gain the top of the ridge in the middle part of it between the two rocky extremities. These battalions will there put themselves in communication and co-operate with the Light Division in driving the enemy down the back of the rocky ridge.

The remainder of General Giron's troops will continue to move forward by the lower slopes of the Petite La Rhune, and by that part of the village of Sarré which is situated between the church and the mountain.

In proportion as the column gains ground, General Giron will throw his left up the valley which separates the Petite La Rhune from the heights that lie behind Sarré, between that village and Ascain. This operation will serve to turn the enemy's troops if they remain on the rocky ridge (Petite La Rhune).

The centre and right of General Giron's corps will advance towards the heathy heights behind Sarré. The right will direct itself in such a manner as to act in the first instance against the right flank of a camp of huts which the enemy has upon a brown bank immediately behind Sarré, and from which the enemy must be driven before the troops move on to ascend the heathy hills beyond.

General Giron's column will be attended by three mountain guns.

The 4th Division will be, at daybreak, at the encampment of General Giron's corps. It will move forward from thence to the attack of the right redoubt of the enemy which covers the village of Sarré. After carrying that redoubt, the division will advance through the village in the direction of the church. It will thence continue its progress so as to leave upon its left the enemy's camp of huts upon the brown bank behind Sarré, and, advancing against the hills beyond the village, it will ascend them so as that its left may co-operate with General Giron in the attack of the large heathy height; whilst the right and centre of the division ascend a little more to the right hand, where the enemy's position recedes a little, and where the slopes begin to be enclosed and wooded to the top.

The 4th Division will be accompanied by a brigade or troop of artillery, to be employed, in the first instance, against the right redoubt of the enemy.

The 7th Division will descend from the Puerto de Echalar, and will afterwards move along by the ravine which is on the right of the tongue of land on which General Giron's troops are encamped. The division must be in this ravine before daybreak. This division will attack the left-hand redoubt of the enemy, which covers the village of Sarré. Having carried this redoubt, it will direct its march in such a manner as to keep at some distance on the right flank of and nearly parallel to the 4th Division; and passing by the lower end of Sarré, it will ascend the hills beyond it by that part of the

enemy's position which projects farthest towards us, where the ground is a good deal intersected by woods and enclosures, and where the slope appears to be longer and more gradual than in the other parts of this range of heights. This division will be aided by a brigade or troop of artillery, to be employed, in the first instance, against the left redoubt of the enemy.

3RD DIVISION.

The 3rd Division will move forward by the road which leads from Urdax towards St. Pé. It will be the business of this division to co-operate with the 7th Division by covering its right flank and by aiding its progress as may be necessary. As the attack advances, the 3rd Division will push forward some troops into the ravine by which the Nivelle river passes through the hills and breaks the connection between the heights beyond Sarré and the long ridge which the enemy occupies behind Ainhoué. There is a bridge upon the Nivelle, where it passes through these hills, of which bridge the 3rd Division will endeavour to get possession, both for the purpose of preventing the enemy from using that communication between the camps behind Sarré and those behind Ainhoué, and for the purpose of securing the use of the bridge for our own troops in their further operations.

It is probable that the brigade of artillery which is to act with the 7th Division may be employed against the enemy's left work with most advantage from situations between the direction of march given above to the 7th and the 3rd Divisions, in which case it will be the business of both divisions to attend to the protection of these guns.

The 3rd Division should be formed behind its own outposts before daylight, so as to move forward from thence when the day breaks. It will keep up a constant communication at all times with the 6th Division, which will be upon its right, on the other side of the Nivelle.

When the heights beyond the village of Sarré have been gained, the corps employed against them, viz. the Light Division and Longa's troops, General Giron's corps, the 4th Division, the 7th Division, and the 3rd Division, will establish themselves firmly upon the heights, pushing forward detachments only in pursuit of the enemy.

In that situation these troops will receive fresh instructions respecting their further operations.

General Alten's brigade of cavalry will act with this part of the army, and a squadron of Colonel Grant's brigade will be attached to the 3rd Division in its first movements.

CO-OPERATION OF THE TROOPS FROM THE VALLEY OF MAYA, AND OF THOSE FORMING AT PRESENT THE RIGHT OF THE ARMY.

The 6th Division will move from its positions in the night, so as to be prepared to advance from the neighbourhood of the outposts of the Portuguese brigade at daybreak.

This division will move against the right of the enemy's position behind Ainhoué, and it will keep up a communication from its left flank with the 3rd Division.

The attack in this quarter is to be made in échelon from the left, the 6th Division leading and directing itself against the right of the position which the enemy occupies upon the hill behind Ainhoué. The other troops under Sir R. Hill will support the 6th Division, refusing their right, but at the same time threatening the enemy in that direction in such a manner as to make him apprehend an attack, and prevent him by that means from throwing his whole force to his right flank.

Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry will act with the troops employed against the enemy's positions on the right of the Nivelle.

When the troops under Sir R. Hill have made themselves masters of the ground forming the right of the enemy's positions behind Ainhoué, they will establish themselves securely there, and wait for fresh instructions in regard to their further movements.

Sir R. Hill will, in the mean time, secure his right by occupying the large square redoubt near the centre of the enemy's position if it has been abandoned, and he will send a part of the cavalry to ascertain the direction of the enemy's retreat, and push patrols, if possible, to the villages of Souraide and Espelette.

It is intended that that part of General Morillo's corps which moves up to the Pass of Maya should act upon the hills to the right of the Pass. This will alarm the enemy for the left of his position near Ainhoué; and should he withdraw from these hills, the occupation of them by Morillo's troops will give security to the operations of the other troops under Sir R. Hill.

CO-OPERATION OF THE (SPANISH) TROOPS FORMING THE LEFT OF THE ARMY.

One division of the troops under General Freyre will move towards Ascain. This division will assemble, before daylight, behind the small detached hill called Arrequico Borda, upon which hill an advanced post of General Longa's troops is now stationed. From thence it will advance at daybreak in such a manner as to keep close to the lower slopes of that branch of the mountain of La Rhune which stretches towards the village of Ascain. The road which it will take passes by a small house called Paragien Borda, and proceeds from thence to Ascain. The division will detach some troops up the slopes of the mountain on its right, in the direction of a house called Mendionda Borda, and will seek to put itself in connection with the troops of Brigadier Longa on that part of the mountain.

The remaining part of General Freyre's corps will assemble in front of the height called the Arrequico Borda, and will put itself in motion from thence at daybreak.

This column will place itself in such a manner as to be able to advance by a road which lies a little to our left of the house of Jolimont, and which leads towards the farm called Choucoutem Borda.

This column should be accompanied by artillery, to act against that which the enemy may have in his works. This part of General Freyre's corps is meant less as a column of attack than as a reserve, in retired échelon, to the right division, which marches towards Ascain.

Its situation near Jolimont will enable it to give support to the right column, with which it will communicate by throwing strong detachments into the ravine which separates them, and in the direction of a house which has a good many poplar trees about it. At the same time, by threatening an attack upon the enemy's works in the direction of Choucoutem Borda, the left column will hinder him from detaching any troops from that quarter to the support of any other point.

One battalion should be stationed in reserve near the house called the Escola, which is surrounded by the ditch of an old French redoubt, and where there is at present a Spanish piquet.

One battalion should also be stationed in reserve upon the hills called Arrequico Borda.

THE TROOPS UNDER LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JOHN HOPE WILL ACT IN THREE COLUMNS AS FOLLOWS.

The centre column will attack the heights which lie to our left of the village of Urrugne; and, having gained these heights, a part of the troops are to be pushed forward a little, so as to occupy the most advantageous points upon the left bank of the rivulet which runs between the heights of Urrugne and those of Siboure, and enters the sea near Socoa. The troops of this column, when halted, will front towards Siboure and St. Jean de Luz, and Sir John Hope will be so good as have them placed so as not to be exposed to the range of the artillery in the works which cover Siboure and the convent of Bordagain.

The left column will act between the heights of Urrugne and the sea-coast, and, when halted, will front towards Socoa.

The right column will move in such a manner as to keep up the communication with the troops under General Freyre, and it will, at the same time, threaten the front of the encampment which the enemy has on the right bank of the rivulet of Urrugne, and to our right of the great road leading from that village to St. Jean de Luz.

It is not intended that the operations in this quarter should be pushed forward as a real attack; it is meant only to fix the attention of the enemy, and prevent his detaching troops to the support of other points of his line.

Should it happen, however, that the success of the other attacks against the enemy induces him to abandon any of the works which he holds on the left bank of the Nivelle between Ascain and Socoa, General Freyre and Sir J. Hope will consider themselves authorized to occupy the ground which the enemy abandons; and they will, in that case, advance the troops towards the line of the Nivelle rivulet, without committing the troops in an attack against any point strongly occupied, or immediately under the protection of the enemy's works.

Sir J. Hope will place an officer's detachment of cavalry in the neighbourhood of Jolimont, near the bottom of the hill by which the road goes through General Longa's present encampment to the village of Vera. This detachment is intended to keep up the communication with the centre of the army, in the first instance, through Vera, and afterwards by Ascain, should that communication become open.

WELLINGTON.

To Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hope.

[706.]

MY DEAR SIR, Vera, 28th Oct., 1813, 1 P.M.

After I had written to you yesterday I received accounts from Pamplona, stating that at half-past two on the 26th the enemy had broken off the negotiation for the surrender of the place, having insisted upon being allowed to march to France under an engagement not to serve for a year and a day, and declaring that the garrison preferred death to being prisoners of war.

I have heard no more since; but I'll keep this letter open till the post will come this day.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—2 P.M. The Pamplona post has arrived, and has only brought a letter for the Director of the Posts. By this it appears that the enemy had not, at noon yesterday, renewed their propositions. The officer who writes the letter says he had conversed with some French officers, who told him they were at the last extremity, and would not undergo any further suffering.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Horse Guards, 30th Oct., 1813.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 10th instant, transmitting an account of the passage of the Bidasoa by the troops under your command and of the operations connected therewith; and, having laid its contents before the Prince Regent, I have much satisfaction in conveying to your Lordship the high sense entertained by His Royal Highness of the gallantry which has been so conspicuously displayed by the officers and men engaged upon this occasion, and in expressing His Royal Highness's approbation of the very able arrangements made by your Lordship to ensure a successful result to the attack upon the enemy's positions.

I have to request your Lordship will accept my congratulations upon this event, and that you will convey to the General and other officers and to the men employed in the late operations my thanks for the bravery and skill which they have shown in carrying into effect your Lordship's orders.

I am, my Lord, yours, &c.,

FREDERICK.

[707.] *To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.*

MY DEAR HENRY, Vera, 31st Oct., 1813.

I have a letter from Lord Liverpool of the 20th, in which he tells me that he had heard from Töplitz, on the 30th of September, that the King of Bavaria had concluded a treaty with the Emperor of Austria, by which he had engaged to join the

Allies against France. It is impossible for Napoleon to hold his ground, and the Confederation of the Rhine is gone.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

G. O. Vera, 1st Nov., 1813. [708.]

1. The Commander of the Forces has great pleasure in communicating to the army H.R.H. the Prince Regent's approbation of the conduct of the troops employed in the late attack on the enemy's position, as conveyed to his Lordship in a letter from Earl Bathurst, an extract of which is subjoined:

"Your Lordship will convey to Major-General Hay, and the officers and privates lately under the command of Sir T. Graham, His Royal Highness's most gracious acceptance of their meritorious services; and your Lordship will express the satisfaction which His Royal Highness feels that Sir T. Graham has concluded his command by an action so worthy of the splendid manner in which he has repeatedly distinguished himself, and more particularly in the course of this campaign.

"Your Lordship will also convey to Major-General C. Alten, and the officers and privates under his command, the favourable sense which His Royal Highness entertains of their highly creditable exertions.

"While His Royal Highness deeply regrets the great proportionate loss which the Portuguese troops suffered on this and other recent occasions, His Royal Highness cannot but consider it as a proof that the zeal and ardour which have from the outset distinguished them are unabated, and will continue to exalt the military glory of their country."

WELLINGTON.

PROCLAMATION, No. 1, [709.]

*Par le Maréchal Marquis de Wellington, Général en Chef des Armées Alliées.**

AUX FRANÇAIS! Vera, ce 1 Nov., 1813.

Malgré que le pays qui se trouve vis-à-vis l'armée soit ennemi, le Général en Chef désire particulièrement que les

* Proclamations to the French issued in the department of the Lower Pyrenees were accompanied by a translation in the Basque language.

habitans soient bien traités, et que les propriétés soient respectées, comme elles l'ont été jusqu'ici.

Les officiers et soldats de l'armée doivent se rappeler que leurs nations sont en guerre avec la France uniquement parceque celui qui se trouve à la tête du gouvernement de la nation Française ne leur permet point d'être en paix, et veut les forcer à se soumettre à son joug; ils ne doivent pas oublier que le plus grand des maux que souffrit l'ennemi, dans sa honteuse invasion de l'Espagne et du Portugal, fut causé par les désordres des soldats, et les cruautés qu'ils exercèrent envers les malheureux et paisibles habitans du pays, avec l'autorisation, et même l'encouragement, de leurs chefs.

Il serait inhumain et indigne des nations auxquelles le Général en Chef s'adresse, de venger cette conduite sur les paisibles habitans de la France; et cette vengeance, dans tous les cas, causerait à l'armée des maux semblables et même plus grands que ceux que l'ennemi a soufferts dans la Péninsule, et deviendrait infiniment contraire à l'intérêt public.

On doit, donc, observer dans les villes et villages de la frontière de la France les mêmes règles qui ont été mises en pratique jusqu'ici, dans les réquisitions et reçus pour les vivres que l'on tire du pays; et les Commissaires de chacune des armées des différentes nations recevront des ordres du Général en Chef de leur armée respective relativement au mode de payer ces provisions et au terme auquel les paiements devront avoir lieu.

WELLINGTON.

[*Here follows a translation of the* G.O. *of 9th July*, 1813. *See* p. 67.]

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Andaye, 1st Nov., 1813, 11 A.M.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of yours of yesterday.

The accession of Bavaria would seem a very important fact. I have just sent Murray an extract of a letter from my brother, by which it appears that the desertion from the French army is great, and that Benningsen's army of reserve was to join the troops in Bohemia, and another effort was expected to be made from that quarter to dislodge the French from the Elbe.

I have already experienced so much of your Lordship's indulgence in regard to my Staff that I am ashamed to trouble you further on that subject; but at the earnest entreaty of Captain Kinloch, of the 2nd

battalion of the 52nd Regiment, a young man who was very severely wounded at the battle of Salamanca, and whom I had just got appointed as my aide-de-camp in Ireland, a situation he lost on my coming out here, I am induced to ask your permission to desire him to come out to join me, if he can obtain leave from his corps, which is in England, with a view to his serving with me as an extra aide-de-camp.

We have had torrents of rain last night, and it has just been reported to me that the upper bridge, constructed, I believe, by the Portuguese, has been carried away, and that they are in some apprehension the coming down of the materials and other matters carried by the river may injure the Spanish bridge.

Burgoyne and Tod are, however, doing what they can to secure it, as well as our pontoon bridge.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your faithful humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, Vera, 1st Nov., 1813.

Lord Wellington conceives that in the present state of the weather it would not be practicable for you to make the movement pointed out to you by the instruction forwarded to you upon the 25th ultimo, and that even if it were, the further operations connected with that movement could not be carried into effect.

Notwithstanding, therefore, the former instructions having directed you to put the troops in motion immediately on your being informed of the surrender of Pamplona, Lord Wellington desires that you will defer the march until you receive fresh orders to carry it into effect. I am, however, to request that you will make all the necessary previous arrangements to facilitate the movement as soon as the weather improves, and that you will be so good as report from time to time the state of the communications by which the troops would have to march.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

MY DEAR MARSHAL, Vera, 1st Nov., 1813.

Lord Wellington bids me tell you he understands Pamplona has surrendered, although the official details have not yet arrived.

I send a letter which it is requested you will have forwarded by an officer, without delay, to Sir Rowland Hill. It is to direct him to suspend the movements he was ordered to make on the fall of Pamplona until further orders, on account of the present state of the weather rendering it impracticable to carry into effect the further operations with which these movements were to be connected, even although it should be possible for the troops on the right to effect their march.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Andaye, 2nd Nov., 1813, half-past 4 A.M.

I have this moment received your letter of yesterday, dated 4 P.M., and most sincerely congratulate you on the surrender of Pamplona.

Every precaution shall be used to prevent your intentions being communicated to the enemy; the frequent desertions from the light battalions of the Legion, however, may contribute to put them on their guard.

After I wrote your Lordship yesterday, I found that a premature report had been made respecting the trestle bridge above Biriatou, which, though in danger, was not carried away, and I saw it, then pretty well secured, at 3 in the afternoon. None of the others had suffered last night, although the river had risen much.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your faithful humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Chiclana, 2nd Nov., 1813.

I have received your letter of the 16th. As soon as I had received your official letter relative to the excesses imputed to the British and Portuguese troops at San Sebastian I transmitted a copy of it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a few days afterwards the enclosed Gazette was published. I, however, informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I could not consider the reparation to you, to your officers, and to the British and Portuguese armies as complete and satisfactory unless the Gefe Politico of Guipuzcoa was removed from a situation where he is necessarily in constant communication with the authorities he has aspersed. I am well aware that he will not be removed, but I am sure it is right to push the government as much as we can upon this occasion. For this reason I have insisted upon satisfaction for the libel in the 'Duende' upon the British government. I shall not obtain any satisfaction; but I mean to bring the matter to this point: that the British government shall decide whether they choose to continue their diplomatic relations upon the present footing, under the certainty that no redress is to be obtained through the Regency for the most gross attacks upon our honour and good faith. The line I have adopted has, for the present, put an end to the attacks in the 'Duende,' and I think it a great point gained to have got the Regency to publish what they have done. I hope and believe that the publicists will be more shy in future of attacking us. The 'Conciso,' you will have observed, has taken quite a different line, and is generally disposed to insert anything that is sent to him which does not reflect upon the present Regency.

You are perfectly right in your conjecture that all the attacks in the 'Duende' originate in the office of the Minister of War. Their object was certainly to reconcile the people and the army to depriving you of the

command. The question relative to your command is still before the Council of State, but I have strong reason to believe that the business will terminate by confirming all the conditions under which you now hold the command, and probably by the removal of the Minister of War.

You will be grieved to hear that the fever has carried off poor Vega and Mexia. Vega is an irreparable loss, and I now know not where to look for a confidential friend among the Spaniards. Mexia is likewise a great loss, and particularly at this moment, while the question relative to your command is pending. This fever has been particularly destructive among the higher classes; several members of the late and of the present Cortes have died of it. Luckily, it did not get into my house, and I am now removed from Cadiz. Capel has had it, but not very severely, and is getting well. I think it better not to say anything at present with respect to the risk of removing to Madrid. Six weeks will probably elapse before the cordons placed on account of the sickness will be taken off from the different towns, so as to enable the government to move, and I think it would be advisable to wait the events of that period. If I were to mention what you have stated in your letter, it is not at all improbable that the Regency would avail themselves of it as a pretext for returning to Cadiz whenever the sickness, which is now diminishing, would admit of their doing so; and rather than this, I should prefer the risk of their being surprised at Madrid.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Liberales in the new Cortes complain that they have not the same support from the people at the Isla as at Cadiz. In general, the Cortes seem to be held in great contempt, and I doubt whether, according to the regulations of the Constitution, there is a sufficient number of deputies at the Isla to pass a law. The greater part of the deputies have remained in the interior, not choosing to trust themselves in these parts during the prevalence of the sickness.

MEMORANDUM OF ORDERS TO BE SENT FOR THE MOVEMENT ON THE 8TH NOVEMBER UPON SARRÉ. [710.]

4th Nov., 1813.

Supposing Sir Rowland Hill to put his troops in movement on the 6th November, the attack should take place on the 8th.

Colonel Grant to be apprised that Sir Rowland Hill is directed to order the 13th Light Dragoons into the valley of Baztan, and to be instructed to close up his brigade upon the 7th division towards Maya, that it may be at hand to act with the troops under Sir Rowland Hill on the morning of the 8th.

The artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh to be ordered to move forward so as to be upon the top of the pass of Maya

(but concealed from the enemy) on the 7th instant, that it may be prepared to act on the 8th.

The three mountain guns at Elizondo to be ordered to move forward likewise to the pass of Maya, that they may accompany the 6th division when it descends from thence to the station whence it is to move forward at daybreak on the morning of the 8th.

Orders to be sent through Sir Stapleton Cotton for the 4th regiment of Portuguese cavalry to move forward so as to arrive in the valley of Baztan on the 7th instant, or the morning of the 8th.

Major-General V. Alten to be instructed to move the 18th Hussars into the valley of the Bidasoa on the 6th instant, and to canton the brigade on the 7th in Yanci, Echalar, and Lesaca.

Lord Edward Somerset to be directed to occupy the cantonments quitted on the 6th instant by the 18th Hussars, together with such other cantonments as may place the brigade most à portée to pass into the valley of the Bidasoa, should it be ordered. One squadron of the brigade is to be established at San Estevan on the 7th, from which letter parties are to be sent to Vera and to Echalar, as also to an intermediate point between these places and San Estevan. These letter parties should be at their stations as early as possible on the morning of the 8th. Major Gardiner's troop of artillery to be ordered to canton in the neighbourhood of Lecumberri.

Sir John Hope to be instructed to order forward Captain Greene's and Captain Cairnes's brigades of artillery in sufficient time to enable them to act with the troops under his orders on the morning of the 8th; as also to direct Major-General Vandeleur to order up the 16th Light Dragoons in sufficient time for the same object.

Orders to be given for the movement of Major-General Bradford's brigade to the vicinity of Vera on the 7th instant, that it may take the station allotted to it at daybreak the following morning.

The reserve of small-arm ammunition carried on mules to move forward so as to be at Vera early on the morning of the 8th.

Three mountain guns to join the Light division on the 7th instant.

Three ditto to join General Giron's troops on the 7th instant, but to be placed in a situation concealed from the enemy.

The three brigades of artillery at Vera to move forward on the 7th instant to the most convenient situation upon the newly-re paired road in front of the 4th division.

The several divisions to be apprised of the date when they are to move.

The detachment of the Royal Staff Corps upon the left to be placed at Sir John Hope's disposal. The detachment at Endalaza to move upon Sarré and act with the centre of the army.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 5th Nov., 1813.

The charge against the conduct of the British troops in St. Sebastian, as published in the Spanish newspapers, had made a sensation here. I have had a correspondence with Sir Thomas Graham on the subject, and am happy to find that we can make a good statement, which I think I shall do on Monday next on the Vote of Thanks. I do not know that I shall have a better opportunity.

We are all so delighted with the news from Leipsig that this charge is for the present almost forgotten; but I do not think it should pass unanswered, as we have a good case by Sir Thomas's account. There are letters from the army which speak much of these disorders; but there are many there who like to complain, or who like to write flourishing letters of what is going on. I am therefore inclined to believe Sir Thomas's report to be the true one.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 5th Nov., 1813.

I send you a copy of the despatch in which Lord Aberdeen has given the substance of a conversation with the Austrian Minister on the proposition of the Duc de Berri. By this you will see that we may take what part we please on this subject. I believe the Austrian Minister may be right in thinking that there is no strong attachment to the House of Bourbon in France, or perhaps rather, that there is no attachment in France to any family or form of government strong enough to induce any large party to involve themselves in the risks of a revolution. The people have suffered so severely by revolutions that they prefer an established government, even with conscriptions, to the possible consequences of a change. If this be the common feeling, I do not imagine you will find

much disposition to rise in favour of the House of Bourbon, nor, on the other hand, much enthusiasm in defence of the territory of France. If you advance, it is evident that it is but the natural progress of your march, the consequence of your former successes, not a new undertaking, which requires an explanation to prevent the inhabitants from thinking that you intend the dismemberment of France, or an interference with its government, or to lead the world to believe that it requires an apology from you before you presume to enter that country. I have therefore always felt a strong disinclination to advising you to issue a declaration on advancing (except so far as may relate strictly to the discipline of the army); and it has been found so difficult to express anything which would be satisfactory, that there is no intention of suggesting any such measure. The declaration might repress any disposition which might otherwise be shown in favour of the House of Bourbon, which would probably assist you in your military operations, or, by its ambiguity in that particular, raise suspicions which will not otherwise exist. I have sent you a copy of the King's speech, however, in a public despatch, which you may have translated and disseminated in France, if you imagine that the sentiments it contains will have the effect of counteracting any attempts on the part of Buonaparte to raise a spirit of resistance against us as the invaders of France and the friends of the House of Bourbon.

I am, my dear Lord, yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Earl of Aberdeen to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Töplitz, 22nd Sept., 1813.

With reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 8, I have to inform your Lordship that an opportunity having arisen, in one of my conversations with Count Metternich, to mention the proposal of the Duc de Berri relative to his junction with Lord Wellington, and the French force which he hoped to be able by his presence to bring under his Lordship's standard, I fully ascertained the feelings and views of the Austrian government on this subject, as they were frankly communicated by Count Metternich.

He entreated that in the prosecution of the war against France, Great Britain would entirely lay aside all reference to an Austrian interest in the question, as connected with the person of the French Emperor. He felt convinced that the views of Austria were perfectly conformable to those of Great Britain, the attainment of a solid peace by the speedy and effectual diminution or destruction of the preponderating power of Buonaparte. He was quite content to leave the matter to the discretion of Lord Wellington and to the British government. If they should be of opinion that the services of the Duc de Berri were likely to promote the success of the common cause, he wished them to be accepted in any manner which should be thought most expedient. At the same time he observed that he knew the interior of France well, and that he was decidedly of opinion little would be gained by the presence and active co-operation of His Highness, and was very incredulous as to the amount and value of the force likely to join him.

I am inclined to believe that the Austrian Minister himself is not deficient in hostility to the government or person of Buonaparte. The difficulty is with the Emperor. From a weakness which cannot be considered as altogether

unnatural, he hesitates between the welfare of his people and the safety of his child. I would not have your Lordship imagine that I entertain the least apprehension of this weakness influencing the views and conduct of His Imperial Majesty in the prosecution of the war; on the contrary, I am persuaded that the object which His Majesty has proposed to himself is most wise and just, and that there is not the least reason to doubt his perseverance and zeal in the pursuit. Indeed I have the best reason for knowing that it is only as connected with the security of his daughter that he takes any interest in the fate of Buonaparte, and that if she were safely restored to him at Vienna, he would be well contented to remain without a son-in-law. I wish particularly, however, to convey to your Lordship my impression that Count Metternich, individually, still less partakes of any lingering sentiment of respect for the person of the French Emperor.

In corroboration of this opinion I may quote some remarkable expressions which he recently used, connected with the subject. He said the alliance had not been understood in England or in the rest of the world. He added, "no country in Europe has made greater efforts, or suffered more in the good cause, of which we have never lost sight. We have acted the part of the oak when we had strength and means, and have bent like the reed under the pressure of imperious circumstances; but yielding or resisting we have always kept in view the good cause of Europe. We have at all times looked forward to a state of repose, founded on a due equilibrium of the great powers of Christendom."

Reverting to the immediate object of this despatch, I think that so far as Austria is concerned the British government is entirely free to avail itself of the services of the Duc de Berri in any manner in which they may be deemed most efficient. The question started by Count Metternich of how far, in any shape, they may prove conducive to the ultimate success of our cause, it is for your Lordship and the advisers of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to consider.

I have the honour, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 5th Nov., 1813.

I have the honour of enclosing a copy of the speech delivered yesterday by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent from the throne.

If it should appear to your Lordship advisable to make any declaration of the principles on which the British government have resolved to carry on the war against France, they are so fully explained in the speech of His Royal Highness that it will be hardly necessary for your Lordship to do more than publish a translation of it.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Speech of the Prince Regent to both Houses of Parliament, 4th Nov., 1813.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

It is with the deepest regret that I am again obliged to announce to you the continuance of His Majesty's lamented indisposition.

The great and splendid success with which it has pleased Divine Providence to bless His Majesty's arms, and those of his allies, in the course of the present campaign, has been productive of the most important consequences to Europe.

In Spain the glorious and decisive victory obtained near Vitoria has been followed by the advance of the allied forces to the Pyrenees, by the repulse of the enemy in every attempt to regain the ground he had been compelled to abandon, by the reduction of the fortress of St. Sebastian, and finally by the establishment of the allied army on the frontier of France.

In this series of brilliant operations, you will have observed, with the highest satisfaction, the consummate skill and ability of the great commander Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, and the steadiness and unconquerable spirit which have been equally displayed by the troops of the three nations united under his command.

The termination of the Armistice in the north of Europe, and the declaration of war by the Emperor of Austria against France, have been most happily accompanied by a system of cordial union and concert amongst the allied powers.

The effects of this union have even surpassed those expectations which it was calculated to excite.

By the signal victories obtained over the French armies in Silesia, at Culm, and at Denevitz, the efforts of the enemy to penetrate into the heart of the Austrian and Prussian territories were completely frustrated.

These successes have been followed by a course of operations, combined with so much judgment, and executed with such consummate prudence, vigour, and ability, as to have led in their result not only to the discomfiture of all those projects which the ruler of France had so presumptuously announced on the renewal of the contest, but to the capture and destruction of the greater part of the army under his immediate command.

The annals of Europe afford no example of victories more splendid and decisive than those which have been recently achieved in Saxony.

Whilst the perseverance and gallantry displayed by the allied forces of every description engaged in this conflict have exalted to the highest pitch of glory their military character, you will, I am persuaded, agree with me in rendering the full tribute of applause to those sovereigns and princes who, in this sacred cause of national independence, have so eminently distinguished themselves as the leaders of the armies of their respective nations.

With such a prospect before you, I am satisfied that I may rely with the fullest confidence on your disposition to enable me to afford the necessary assistance in support of a system of alliance, which, originating chiefly in the magnanimous and disinterested views of the Emperor of Russia, and followed up as it has been with corresponding energy by the other allied powers, has produced a change the most momentous in the affairs of the continent.

I shall direct copies of the several conventions which I have concluded with the Northern powers to be laid before you as soon as the ratifications of them shall have been duly exchanged.

I have further to acquaint you that I have concluded a treaty of alliance

and concert with the Emperor of Austria, and that the powerful league already formed has received an important addition of force by the declaration of Bavaria against France.

I am confident you will view with particular satisfaction the renewal of the ancient connection with the Austrian government; and that, justly appreciating all the value of the accession of that great power to the common cause, you will be prepared, as far as circumstances may permit, to enable me to support His Imperial Majesty in the vigorous prosecution of the contest.

The war between this country and the United States of America still continues; but I have the satisfaction to inform you that the measures adopted by the government of the United States for the conquest of Canada have been frustrated by the valour of His Majesty's troops, and by the zeal and loyalty of his American subjects.

Whilst Great Britain, in conjunction with her allies, is exerting her utmost strength against the common enemy of independent nations, it must be matter of deep regret to find an additional enemy in the government of a country whose real interest in the issue of this great contest must be the same as our own.

It is known to the world that this country was not the aggressor in this war.

I have nothitherto seen any disposition on the part of the government of the United States to close it, of which I could avail myself consistently with a due attention to the interests of His Majesty's subjects.

I am at all times ready to enter into discussion with that government for a conciliatory adjustment of the differences between the two countries upon principles of perfect reciprocity not inconsistent with the established maxims of public law and with the maritime rights of the British Empire.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I have directed the estimates for the Services of the ensuing year to be laid before you.

I regret the necessity of so large an expenditure, which I am confident, however, you will judge to be unavoidable, when the extent and nature of our military exertions are considered.

I entertain no doubt of your readiness to furnish such supplies as the public service may require.

I congratulate you on the improved and flourishing state of our commerce; and I trust that the abundant harvest which we have received from the bountiful hand of Providence during the present year will afford material relief to His Majesty's people, and produce a considerable augmentation in many branches of the revenue.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

I congratulate you on the decided conviction which now happily prevails throughout so large a portion of Europe, that the war in which the allied powers are engaged against the ruler of France is a war of necessity; and that his views of universal dominion can only be defeated by combined and determined resistance.

The public spirit and national enthusiasm which have successively accomplished the deliverance of the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, and of the Russian Empire, now equally animate the German people; and we may justly entertain the fullest confidence that the same perseverance on their part will ultimately lead to the same glorious result.

I cannot but deplore most deeply the continuance of this extended warfare,

and of all those miseries which the insatiable ambition of the ruler of France has so long inflicted upon Europe.

No disposition to require from France sacrifices of any description inconsistent with her honour or just pretensions as a nation will ever be on my part, or on that of His Majesty's allies, an obstacle to peace.

The restoration of that great blessing upon principles of justice and equality has never ceased to be my anxious wish; but I am fully convinced that it can only be obtained by a continuance of those efforts which have already delivered so large a part of Europe from the power of the enemy.

To the firmness and perseverance of this country these advantages may in a great degree be ascribed. Let this consideration animate us to new exertions, and we shall thus, I trust, be enabled to bring this long and arduous contest to a conclusion which will be consistent with the independence of all the nations engaged in it, and with the general security of Europe.

Baron L. de Maucune to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR, Pampelune, *le 5 Nov.*, 1813.

J'ose espérer de la bonté de votre Excellence qu'elle voudra bien ne pas trouver mauvais que j'ai l'honneur de lui observer qu'au moment où j'allois rentrer en France pour y rétablir ma santé, qui est depuis longtems des plus mauvaises et entièrement délabrée, comme le prouve le certificat des officiers de santé en chef, que j'ai l'honneur de lui envoyer, j'ai été retenu en étant subitement bloqué dans la place de Pampelune; ne devant plus dès lors consulter que mes devoirs, je m'efforcai souvent à oublier tous mes maux physiques pour terminer une fin que mes souffrances m'ont parfois fait désirer de trouver au champ d'honneur; mais mes espérances s'étant trouvées vaines, et la place ayant été obligée de capituler au moment où je me trouvois encore bien plus malade, et absolument dans l'impossibilité de pouvoir faire la route et suivre la destination de mes camarades, j'ai été forcé de rester à Pampelune, d'où ces considérations, Monseigneur, m'autorisent d'avoir recours aux munificences et à la générósité bien reconnue de votre Excellence pour la supplier instamment de vouloir bien m'autoriser à rentrer en France avec ma suite comme prisonnier de guerre sur parole d'honneur, ou jusqu'à mon échange, pour me rendre auprès de la faculté de médecine, soit à Paris ou à Montpellier, afin de tâcher d'y rétablir entièrement ma santé. J'ose supplier instamment votre Excellence, en qualité d'ancien gentilhomme, de compter sur ma parole, et de vouloir bien me faire la grâce d'accueillir le plutôt possible favorablement ma demande, et en même temps de me permettre de ne pas lui laisser ignorer que mon nom ne doit pas être inconnu à Monsieur le Lieutenant-Général Paget, attendu que mon frère le Général de Division Baron de Maucune, commandant dans les temps l'avant-garde de l'armée de Portugal, a été assez heureux pour pouvoir lui offrir sa bourse et lui être de quelque utilité lorsqu'il fut fait prisonnier l'année dernière.

Je présente à votre Excellence l'hommage de mon plus profond respect,

L. DE MAUCUNE.

[Return the enclosure, and tell him that I am obliged to act towards him and other French officers in the manner the

French government act towards our officers; and that notwithstanding that many French officers have, to my knowledge, been allowed to go to France on their parole, not one has been permitted to return; and not one English officer has yet been allowed to go to England or to return to the army on his parole.

Tell him that I should be happy to have it in my power to show any civility to General Maucune's brother, but that it is impossible.

WELLINGTON.]

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Vera, 5th Nov., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers:—			
Field-Officers	32	11	43
Captains	100	21	121
Subalterns	211	68	279
Staff	90	48	138
Quartermasters of Cavalry	22	4	26
Serjeants:—			
Present	549	74	623
Sick:—			
Present	19	1	20
Absent	1	..	1
Command	55	18	73
Prisoners of War and Missing	4	..	4
Trumpeters:—			
Present	102	42	144
Sick:—			
Present	3	..	3
Absent	1	5	6
Command	2	2	4
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File:—			
Present	7353	1200	8553
Sick:—			
Present	311	46	357
Absent	192	51	243
Command	528	423	951
Prisoners of War and Missing	152	2	154
Horses:—			
Present	7330	1143	8473
Sick	257	82	339
Command	327	294	621

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula, under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Vera, 5th Nov., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	19	11	30
Lieutenant-Colonels	55	24	79
Majors	83	38	121
Captains	495	176	671
Lieutenants	957	203	1160
Cornets or Ensigns	316	357	673
Staff	392	470	862
Quartermasters of Cavalry	22	4	26
Serjeants :—			
Present	2776	1388	4164
Sick :—			
Present	109	58	167
Absent	459	129	588
Command	379	213	592
Prisoners of War and Missing	44	1	45
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1041	524	1565
Sick :—			
Present	22	5	27
Absent	104	33	137
Command	22	43	65
Prisoners of War and Missing	35	4	39
Rank and File :—			
Present	38,951	22,168	61,119
Sick :—			
Present	2164	794	2958
Absent	10,658	4959	15,617
Command	2805	1820	4625
Prisoners of War and Missing	2306	255	2561
Horses :—			
Present	7330	1143	8473
Sick	257	82	339
Command	327	294	621
Alterations :—			
Joined	42	4	46
Dead	8	5	13
Discharged	..	1	1
Deserted	6	4	10
Promoted	2	1	3

EDWARD PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

MEMORANDA OF AN ARRANGEMENT FOR WITHDRAWING THE ARMY FROM ITS PRESENT POSITIONS WITH THE VIEW OF PLACING IT IN CANTONMENTS. [711.]

6th Nov., 1813.

Major-General Giron will order all the baggage of his corps to be loaded so as to move off one hour before daybreak.

One half of the baggage will move by the roads which lead direct to Echalar, by the passes which the 7th division occupies; and the other half will move by the roads leading to Vera, through the camp of the 4th division.

The troops are to be under arms half an hour before daybreak, and at daybreak they are to move off. One-half of the corps is to move by the two roads which lead to Echalar through the encampments of the 7th division, and the other half is to move by the roads which lead through the camp of the 4th division towards Vera.

General Giron will allot one battalion as a rear-guard upon each of the two lines of march above pointed out. The piquets will fall back upon these two battalions and will cover the rear of the whole.

The troops on the mountain of La Rhune are to put themselves in march half an hour after daybreak, and are to move by the zigzag road which leads down the mountain behind the left of the 4th division.

The whole corps will continue its march to the bridge of Yanci, and will there encamp.

The 7th division will be prepared to cover the movement of that part of General Giron's corps which passes through the Puerto de Echalar, and Major-General Le Cor will push forward some troops for that purpose to commanding situations on both sides of the roads which lead up the pass.

Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole will order the baggage of the 4th division to be parked at daybreak. The division will be in readiness to protect (if it should be requisite) the movements of that part of General Giron's corps which marches through its encampment towards Vera; and Sir L. Cole will be so good as take care that the roads are kept clear by which the Spanish column is to march.

WELLINGTON.

Commodore Sir G. R. Collier to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Pasages, 6th Nov., 1813, 7 P.M.

As I learn the *Dragoon* returns, I do myself the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of this day's date, and, in reply, beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that the *Vesuvius* shall weigh to-morrow with secret instructions not to run down towards the point marked out by your Lordship till the approach of daylight on the 8th. I shall order the *Sparrow* and *Challenger*, and any small craft in a good state, to rendezvous at the time specified on the same point, and to comply with your Lordship's desires by every possible endeavour. If circumstances permit, I shall do my best to run down the coast for a day in a gun-boat or pinnace, but not if the weather looks threatening. All the Spanish small craft possible should be procured by the Commissariat, to assist in carrying down supplies of provisions or ammunition to Socoa, which would much relieve land-carriage.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful and obedient humble servant,

George R. Collier.

Vote of Thanks by the House of Lords.

Die Lunæ, 8° Novembris, 1813.

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, That the Thanks of this House be given to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, for the consummate ability, indefatigable exertion, and admirable judgment displayed by him in the operations which succeeded the battle of Vitoria, by which the enemy have been compelled to abandon the Western Provinces of Spain, and the Allied Army finally established on the frontier of France.

George Rose, Cler. Parliamentor.

Sir C. Stuart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Lisbon, 8th Nov., 1813.

I think it right to transmit your Lordship the accompanying copy of a despatch I have just received from Lord Castlereagh upon the subject of the feelings which have been expressed by the Portuguese government, and reported to your Lordship in former communications.

Ever, my dear Lord, very truly yours,

Charles Stuart.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Viscount Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart.

SIR, Foreign Office, 19th Oct., 1813.

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed by command of the Prince Regent to Viscount Strangford, expressive of His Royal Highness's admiration of the distinguished conduct and eminent services of the Portuguese troops in the brilliant achievements of the present campaign in the Peninsula, and I am to desire that you will take an early opportunity of communicating the same to the Regency at Lisbon in such manner as may appear to you most advisable.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

II.

Viscount Castlereagh to Viscount Strangford.

MY LORD, Foreign Office, 11th Oct., 1813.

The important and distinguished share which the troops of Portugal have uniformly borne in the brilliant achievements of the present campaign have never failed on each succeeding triumph to attract the particular attention of the Prince Regent, and to call forth His Royal Highness's warmest and most unqualified admiration.

I have now to signify to your Lordship the Prince Regent's express commands that you do, in a special audience solicited for that purpose, forthwith offer to the Prince Regent of Portugal His Royal Highness's sincere and affectionate congratulations on the eminent services of his troops, whose military reputation has been established by a succession of exploits to an extent which commands the respect and confidence of the whole army.

You may assure the Prince Regent of Portugal that His Royal Highness confides to your Lordship the expression of his sentiments upon this interesting occasion with a pleasure not less sincere than he has experienced in applauding those British troops who, with their Portuguese and Spanish brother soldiers, have shared the glory of nearly expelling the enemy from the Peninsula, to the completion of which great work His Royal Highness trusts nothing is wanting but perseverance on the part of the Allies, indissoluble union, and an uninterrupted application of the same courage and discipline in the day of battle which have hitherto so eminently marked their conduct.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Chiclana, 8th Nov., 1813.

I have received your letters of the 23rd, 25th, and 26th. That of the 25th, relative to the complaints alleged against the British army, I have forwarded to the government, with copies of the enclosures.

I should be very much disposed to do what you recommend in your letter of the 23rd, and if you recollect I suggested it to you some time ago. I doubt whether I ought to leave the seat of the government without permission from home, and indeed it would be impossible just now, because there is a cordon all round us. I really think that the government ought not to continue its diplomatic relations with Spain upon their present footing unless some material change takes place here, and I have hinted this often enough of late in my letters home. I do not think that things can continue long in their present state, and I hear from all quarters that some material change will certainly take place immediately after the arrival of the government at Madrid, and I know that both the government and the Cortes are desirous of moving from hence without loss of time. Antillon, one of the leaders of the Jacobins, was waylaid in the street the other night and severely beaten, for something he said in the Cortes, and this has alarmed them all considerably, and increased their dislike of their present residence.

The question relative to your command remains undecided, but I continue to receive assurances that it will be decided satisfactorily. I will make a proper use of the enclosures in your letter of the 26th, which I received yesterday.

Two hundred thousand dollars have been sent to the 1st and 2nd armies, as you desired. As I was uncertain where the 3rd was to be met with, I have preferred sending the money intended for that army with the money for the army of reserve. It is all ready, and will be embarked either for Lisbon or Pasages as soon as the vessel for its conveyance, which has been written for, arrives.

I know not to what it is to be attributed that I never receive your letters by the post at the same time that others are received of the same date. They are always a post behindhand. I suspect that this is some trick of the government, and that orders have been sent to some of the places upon the road to keep them back, and perhaps to open them. I do not believe that they are detained here.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

Lord and Lady Hinchingbrook desire me to thank you for the offer of your place, and beg to be kindly remembered to you. He is much better, but seems to be quite undecided as to his future motions.

Lord Burghersh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord Wellington, Frankfort, 9th Nov., 1813.

I received your letter at Berlin, and should have answered it immediately, but I had nothing more to communicate than the printed paper I sent you in Priscilla's letter. Since that time I have reached this place, following the French retreat. The road is covered with a good many dead men, and a greater number of dead horses; and, upon the whole, the French seem to have suffered great losses. Buonaparte has carried about 80,000 over the

Rhine: faults were committed, or he would not have saved so many. Peace is at this moment the order of the day; it is to be offered by the Allies, but exertions for carrying on the war are not to be relaxed. The passage of the Rhine is meditated, and great advantages expected from it. The force of the Austrians at this place is about 80,000: the other powers, without the army which the Crown Prince has carried into Hanover, will amount to about 80,000 more. The army of Italy has been given to Bellgrade, and has been increased to a nominal 100,000 men. Great things are expected from it. I have been here but two days, have got no horses, and have not yet seen the Emperor, so that I am merely giving you the best information I have been able to obtain. I hope soon to give you something more detailed, but, in the mean time, you must put up with what I can give you. I saw the King of Prussia at Berlin: he asked if I was not connected with you, and then took an opportunity of saying more good of you than you would have patience to hear; he said that the world would owe its independence to you; that he was proud of acknowledging it. You cannot conceive the admiration which is felt here at the brilliant exploits you have achieved. General Meerfeldt, who has a great reputation among the Austrians, told me that of all the wars which had been conducted since the revolution, none could be compared for science or for splendid military results to that of the Peninsula. God knows it is true enough. In this part of the world Providence has ordained what has happened, for, *au reste*, conceive a head-quarters where Emperors, Kings, Field Marshals, Wilson and his followers, have all not only their words but their coequal commands to give. One man is up to-day, another gives his advice to-morrow. After the battle of Leipsig the Emperor Alexander required the command of the army: the thing was refused; but judge how a plan of operations can be formed or followed in the midst of such arrangements. Buonaparte certainly is too proud to be a good general in difficulties, or one cannot explain his conduct at Leipsig. Blücher and the Crown Prince passed the Elbe on the 4th and 6th, the Bohemian army from the other side did not reach the neighbourhood of Leipsig till the 15th, and Benningsen till the 18th; yet Buonaparte remained about that town with rivers behind him, &c., till all the corps fell upon him at the same time. I do not understand it. The French soldiers and their Generals seem still to be frozen, or to have not the courage and talents they used to display. In the battles which preceded that of Leipsig, the French were beaten by half their numbers. At Gros Beren, near Berlin, the Prussians alone fired a shot; they carried the village with great gallantry, and their cavalry had a brilliant affair; but the next morning, when the battle was expected, the enemy was gone, a great many guns abandoned, and the army in *déroute*, though neither Swedes nor Russians had been engaged. At the battle of Jutterbock the Prussian corps of only 15,000 men was attacked by Ney's whole force of at least 50,000; the Prussians resisted till the rest of the Crown Prince's army came up, when Ney set off in *déroute*, and suffered considerably. In the action at Leipsig, during the three days it lasted, Buonaparte never acted upon the offensive but once, when his cavalry nearly succeeded in destroying the centre of the Bohemian army; but throughout the rest of the battle he remained on the defensive on all points, till he was driven from all the villages he occupied, and was almost enclosed in Leipsig.

He began his retreat on the night of the 18th; left a corps under Regnier to defend the town; placed no cannon, however, at the assailable points; deceived his Generals about his retreat, left them to be taken, and escaped himself from the town at eleven in the morning of the 19th. You will understand this better than I can do: circumstances may have prescribed a conduct which puzzles me, but it seems as if the whole had been ordained. Every state in Germany has now declared against Buonaparte. Italy is believed to be ready to do the same, though as yet I doubt it. The Austrian army is said to have arrived at Verona, in rear of the Viceroy, who is supposed here to be cut off, yet this I cannot yet believe. But certainly what with the movements we have heard of on your side, and those in this part of the world, the French are in a bad way.

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

BURGHERSH.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 10th Nov., 1813.

The fall of Pamplona must have relieved you from some anxiety, considering the state of the season. Your advance into France will also come at a very seasonable time, although Buonaparte has effected his escape to Mayence. It is impossible to judge by the French papers with what force he has been able to retreat. There cannot be any doubt of Blücher having defeated part of the army on the 21st.

I regret that there appears no decided spirit of insurrection in Holland. Until lately it was not desirable; but if they do not soon take up arms for themselves, the Allies will enter as into an enemy's country, and treat them as a conquered one. It is very desirable for the young Prince of Orange that he should prosecute his intention of going to his connections in Berlin soon. He may create by that means, if he succeeds in his *object* there, an interest which his father has not, and it might much facilitate the re-establishment of the family. I have written to him by this mail to this effect, begging him, however, to do nothing without your advice. Politically speaking it would, I think, be very desirable to have Holland set up as an independent state, instead of being parcelled out, which may be the case; and there is something so amiable in the Hereditary Prince that it is impossible not to wish him success.

I am, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

BATHURST.

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT FOR THE FURTHER MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY AFTER ITS FIRST ADVANCE UPON SARRÉ.

10th Nov., 1813.

Should it be found expedient, after having gained the heights beyond Sarré, and the position of the enemy behind Ainhoué, to make a further movement forward, the troops will advance as follows:

The troops under Sir Rowland Hill will in the first instance secure their right by placing it advantageously upon the heights behind the village of Ainhoué, and by having the command of the road which leads under the extremity of these heights from Ainhoué to Souraide, and also to Espelette.

The centre and left of this part of the army will then move up in such a manner as that the general line of front of the whole shall look towards the village of Souraide, having before it the ravines which fall towards that village, and occupying in advance the village of Souraide, or the most favourable points near it; as also those in the direction of Espelette. The left of the troops under Sir Rowland Hill will place themselves in connexion with the right of the centre of the army (formed probably by the 3rd division); and if the country is open on his left flank, Sir Rowland Hill will place some cavalry in that quarter.

Sir Rowland Hill will observe the enemy particularly in the direction of the village of Cambo, where there is a bridge over the river Nive; and it will be desirable to ascertain as soon as possible the nature of the works which the enemy is understood to have thrown up to cover that bridge; as also to learn the amount of his force in that quarter. Sir Rowland Hill will also send patrols towards the village of Ustaritz, where there is likewise a bridge over the Nive, and upon which village it is probable that a part of the enemy's force will retire.

When the centre of the army receives orders to move forward, the right division (the 3rd) will cross the Nivelle by the bridge of Amots, and after following a little way the road which leads down the right bank of the Nivelle, it will slant up to its right, and will take a direction pointing towards the village of Ustaritz. This division will keep itself in such a situation as to be able either to connect itself with the left of the troops under Sir Rowland Hill, or to manœuvre to assist the advance of the columns to its left, as circumstances may require.

Some artillery will be attached to this division.

The 7th and the 4th divisions will cross the Nivelle by the bridges of St. Pé next below the bridge of Amots. Having crossed the river, these two divisions will move in the direction of the road which goes from the village of St. Pé to Bayonne. It will probably be desirable that the divisions should move parallel to this road (one of them upon each side of it), leaving the road itself for the artillery.

The troops under Major-General Giron will pass the Nivelle by the bridges immediately below those crossed by the 7th and 4th divisions. General Giron will form his troops in two columns, and having passed the river he will direct the columns towards the wood of St. Pé, keeping them nearly parallel to the British divisions on his right, and leaning a little towards that flank, if necessary, to keep up his connexion with them.

It will be necessary that the left column of General Giron's troops should throw out detachments upon its outward flank, and take precautions against the enemy in case he should approach upon that side from the camps which he has near Serres.

The Light division and Brigadier Longa's troops will in the first instance be placed in a situation to protect the left flank of the centre of the army, by observing the enemy on the side of Ascain and Serres, whilst the other

divisions of the centre are moving down to pass the Nivelle as above mentioned.

When the enemy retires from the neighbourhood of Serres the Light division and Brigadier Longa's troops will pass the Nivelle by the bridge of Ascain, or by a ford about a mile higher up the river. They will push forward detachments to harass the enemy in his retreat, and Major-General Alten will direct his column so as to incline gradually towards the right, until he finds himself in connexion with the troops of Major-General Giron.

The troops under Major-General Freyre will also pass the Nivelle, the right column crossing at Ascain or in its neighbourhood, and the left column following in the same direction, unless a passage is found to enable it to cross the river a little lower down.

After passing the river, the right of General Freyre's corps will move forward so as to support the troops under Major-General Alten; and the left will extend towards St. Jean de Luz sufficiently to make itself master of the right bank of the Nivelle as far as the *Tuilerie*.

General Freyre will keep one brigade in reserve upon the heights above the village of Serres.

Sir John Hope will in the mean time throw forward the right of the troops under his command to the banks of the Nivelle, and establish a bridge of pontoons as soon as possible in the most advantageous situation above the *Tuilerie*.

If the above operations take place so as that the troops of the left of the army can arrive upon the Nivelle at low water, they may probably be able to pass the river by the fords, which are at that time practicable. One or if possible two pontoon bridges are however to be thrown across the river with as little delay as possible.

Sir John Hope will judge by what is observed of the movements of the enemy what portion of the force under his command it may be necessary to keep in reserve opposite to Siboure whilst the enemy continues to hold his positions in that quarter. When it is perceived that the enemy is evacuating the posts near Siboure, this reserve will advance to occupy them, and it will be of essential importance if the rear of the enemy can be pressed so closely as to prevent his destroying the bridges of St. Jean de Luz. With this view some artillery should be brought forward quickly into situations which command the bridges, in order to drive the enemy's troops back from them. And in case this operation proved successful, it would be expedient that Sir John Hope should support the attack through St. Jean de Luz with all the force that can be applied in that direction.

If circumstances admit of the above movements being carried into effect, the army will be placed as follows at the close of the operations:

The centre will be in position in the *Bois de St. Pé*.

The left will be between St. Jean de Luz and the village of Guethary.

And the troops under Sir R. Hill on the right will be *en potence* towards Souraide, and will observe the enemy on the side of Cambo and Ustaritz.

G. MURRAY.

Memoranda respecting the Baggage of Head-Quarters.

10th Nov., 1813.

The baggage of head-quarters is to be packed early to-morrow morning, and in a state of preparation to load and move on the shortest notice. The baggage is not to quit Vera, however, until ordered.

Mr. Hooke will be so good as remain at Vera to receive and act upon such instructions as may be transmitted to him.

Lieutenant-Colonel Scovell will be so good as give orders for a detachment of the Mounted Staff Corps to keep the roads which lead through the valley of Vera towards Sarré clear of all obstructions, and to allow no baggage or anything else to stop in these roads so as to interrupt the passage.

Lieutenant-Colonel Scovell will also place a small party of his corps at Vera to convey to the Commander of the Forces (in the direction of Sarré) any reports that may come to Vera from the corps on the left of the army under Sir John Hope and General Freyre.

G. MURRAY.

Instructions for the Officers stationed in Observation upon the Mountain of La Rhune.

10th Nov., 1813.

1. To be upon the top of the mountain at daybreak to-morrow.

2. To observe and note down as exactly as they can the position of the enemy's force when it can be first observed, specifying the situations in which their troops are stationed, and the numbers which they estimate to be in each place, mentioning either the number of men, or the number of battalions, companies, or other separate bodies observed in each place; also what artillery is observed, and what cavalry, if any is seen.

3. To note the several movements which are made by any part of the enemy's force in the course of the day, and to express in the most distinct manner the seeming amount of the force moved, the time of the movement, specifying whether the movement is towards the *enemy's* right or his left, towards his front or his rear. Also to state (if they are known) the name of the place whence the movement is made, and that towards which it appears to be directed.

4. The line of direction of the enemy's present positions seen from the mountain of La Rhune is: the works which cover Socoa and Siboure; the camp overlooking Urrugne; the detached works on the enemy's left of the camp overlooking Urrugne; a camp on the left of the Nivelle river, a little below Ascain, and which covers a pontoon bridge on that part of the river; the village of Ascain and its stone bridge; the village of Serres (opposite Ascain) and the camps and works in its vicinity, on the right bank of the Nivelle; a white house on the right bank of the Nivelle, about an English mile above the bridge of Ascain, below which there is a ford, and near which a work has been constructed on the right bank of the river; the Petite La Rhune, against which the first attack of the Light division is to be directed; the heathy heights behind it, between the village of Ascain and the village of Sarré; the village of Sarré and the position behind it, and two

works in front of it; the village of St. Pé; the position occupied by the enemy on the long hill behind Ainhoué; the village of Ainhoué; the village of Espelette; Cambo; Ustaritz; Bayonne.

5. Observations respecting the most important movements which the enemy may make are: Movements to his right or left to reinforce any point of his line; movements which might indicate his acting offensively against any part of our line; appearances which might indicate his retiring to a new position; or his withdrawing altogether either towards Bayonne, or beyond the river Nive, which runs by Cambo and by Ustaritz towards Bayonne.

6. The observations made are to be sent down from time to time, addressed to Lord Wellington. Each report is to be numbered, and the hour at which it is despatched is to be noted upon it.

Major-General Alten will be directed to leave a non-commissioned officer and party from the Light division at the chapel on the mountain, to be at the disposal of the officers in observation; and Lieutenant-General Lowry Cole will be directed to station a few small parties in such a manner as to convey the reports expeditiously in the direction of General Giron's present encampment, where a party of the Mounted Staff Corps will be stationed to receive them.

7. Copy of a memorandum given to Mr. Hooke is enclosed, that the officers in observation may act upon it should circumstances occur to render it necessary.

Memorandum for Mr. Hooke.

Should any circumstance occur in the course of to-morrow to render it expedient for the baggage of head-quarters to move farther to the rear, Mr. Hooke will order it to proceed to Lesaca. Mr. Hooke will be apprised of the necessity of such an order either from the Staff with the Commander of the Forces, or from the officer stationed in observation upon the mountain of La Rhune, who will apprise Mr. Hooke *in writing* should anything occur upon the left of the army to render it expedient to remove the baggage of head-quarters from Vera.

G. MURRAY.

[712.] G. O. St. Pé, 11th Nov., 1813.

The General officers and commanding officers of regiments are requested to save the dry forage as much as possible, and to use the green, while the state of the weather will admit of the use of it; they will find the necessity of attending to this caution in the course of the winter, and, if it be not attended to, the Commander of the Forces declares his intention not to allow any claims for animals lost for want of food to go before the Board.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 11th Nov., 1813.

In consequence of your Lordship's private letters to me of the 24th ultimo I have given orders that the *Marshal Wellington* transport, having on board the equipment of rockets alluded to, should sail for Pasages without delay. Since the date of my letter of the 30th September the Ordnance Department have made strong objections to sending out the horses and drivers requisite to complete this equipment, stating that the so doing would interfere materially with the regular supply of artillery horses for your Lordship's army. As many horses as can be collected will be sent out. At any rate the rockets will be forwarded, and your Lordship can apply any of the artillery horses now with your army to the service of the rockets, if you should consider it advisable.

Ever, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Chiclana, 11th Nov., 1813.

I received last night your letter of the 2nd instant, in which you desire me "not to keep secret what you wrote in your last letter, which you will certainly put in execution, be the consequences what they may."

I have not received any letter from you between the dates of the 26th October and the 2nd of November, and, if you have written to me between those dates, your letter should have reached me by the post of to-day.

I enclose you the correspondence which has passed between me and the Secretary of State on the subject of the libels in the 'Duende.' You will have seen the statement published in the Regency Gazette upon the receipt of your letter, in reply to the complaints of the Gefe Politico of Guipuzcoa. If, after reading the enclosed correspondence, you think it advisable that I should prosecute the 'Duende' for a calumny in the manner pointed out by the Junta de Censura, I will certainly do so; and, indeed, I should have done so before, had I not been deterred by a letter which I received some months ago from Lord Castlereagh, in which he made light of publications of this description, and seemed rather disinclined to believe that so bad a spirit prevailed at the seat of the government. You will observe that the Regency assert that they have not the power of taking up the question for their allies by a prosecution, but that it must be instituted by me. I shall employ the time until I receive your answer to this letter in consulting the best legal authorities on this point, and I do not think that much time will be lost by this reference to you.

I am happy to tell you that the Council of State have given a most satisfactory opinion upon the question relative to your command. They have declared that nothing could be more injurious to the cause than your relinquishment of the command, which must not be admitted on any

account, and that whatever conditions were agreed upon with you should be strictly and scrupulously adhered to. Two of them (Juan Navarro and General Requeña) entered a separate protest against the conduct of the Minister of War. This is the least exaggerated report I have received. One person told me that he had read the report, which not only stated that the conditions agreed upon with you should be adhered to, but that more extensive powers should be granted to you if you required them, and that the protest of the two members above-mentioned went so far as to urge the necessity of the removal of the Minister of War; observing, likewise, that there must be some agent of Buonaparte in his office. Old Don, the President of the Committee, says that he has no doubt that the business will terminate satisfactorily in the Cortes. The opinion of the Council of State was sent in to the government on the 8th, at night. I have a strong suspicion that they will delay sending it to the Cortes as long as they can, and that they have some design of evading a decision by commencing their journey to Madrid sooner than they proposed, as there are parties of cavalry already stationed upon the road to escort them, and it is reported that they mean to enter the towns which may oppose their passage by force. However, I can hardly believe that they will venture upon such a measure.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

I have just received your letter of the 31st of October, containing the news you had received from Lord Liverpool, but no other letter has reached me. Pray send back the enclosed papers.

The sickness at Cadiz is diminishing.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Souraide, 11th Nov., 1813.

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that, in pursuance of the instructions conveyed to me by Major-General Sir George Murray, Quarter-master-General, I collected before daylight yesterday morning the different columns of the right of the army which your Lordship had been pleased to place under my command at the points most eligible for their advance to the different attacks upon the enemy's fortified position in front and rear of Ainhoué.

During the subsequent operations of the day, I observed, as much as the circumstances of ground allowed, the plan of attack laid down by your Lordship, and I have infinite satisfaction in enclosing the accompanying reports from Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton, commanding the 6th division; Lieutenant-General Sir W. Stewart, commanding the 2nd division; and Major-General Morillo, commanding the Spanish division. I have as yet received no report from Lieutenant-General Sir J. Hamilton, commanding the Portuguese division; but I have every reason to be satisfied with the manner in which that division (composed of the brigades of

Major-General Campbell and Brigadier-General Buchan) directed its line of attack and its steady conduct throughout the day.

Your Lordship will perceive by the accompanying reports that the most brilliant part of the operations of the day fell to the lot of the 6th division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton, and the 2nd division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir W. Stewart, particularly the brigade commanded by Major-General Lambert, who led the assault made by the 6th division, and that of Major-General Byng, who particularly mentions his light companies, commanded by Major Ackland, 57th Regiment, and the Provisional battalion, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Leith.

I perfectly coincide with Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton and Lieutenant-General Sir W. Stewart in the deserved praise they have bestowed upon the troops under their command, and the conspicuous conduct of those officers whom they have named as having distinguished themselves.

I was greatly assisted in the operations of the day by the personal exertions of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton and Lieutenant-General Sir W. Stewart; and am also indebted to Lieutenant-General Sir J. Hamilton and Major-General Morillo for the great precision with which they directed their several columns.

I am much indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh, commanding the Royal Artillery under my orders, for his exertions in bringing his guns into action and drawing off the fire from our columns of infantry as they advanced to the assault.

I have also to mention the exertions of Major Cairncross, Royal Artillery, who succeeded in turning the enemy's guns as soon as they were taken upon his retiring columns.

I feel myself much indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Rooke, Assistant Adjutant-General, for his exertions; and I regret to say he received two wounds, the consequences of which, I fear, will deprive me for some time of the valuable assistance of that meritorious officer.

I am also much obliged to Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson, Assistant Quartermaster-General; to Lord Charles FitzRoy, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General (on whom the duties of the department devolved when Lieutenant-Colonel Rooke received his wound); to Lieutenant Wright, of the Royal Engineers; to Major Hill, Captain Churchill, and the other officers of my personal staff.

I have herewith the honour to enclose the returns of the killed and wounded, as also of the guns, ammunition, &c., taken in the different redoubts. The enemy's loss must have been considerable; but I have not as yet got any return of the prisoners.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
R. Hill.

P.S.—I beg leave to forward also the report of Lieutenant-General Sir J. Hamilton, which I have just received.

[ENCLOSURES.]

"1.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Clinton to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

SIR, St. Pé, 11th Nov., 1813.

The 6th division having been collected behind the hill upon which was posted our left piquet before daylight yesterday morning, and Lieutenant-Colonel Brown of the 9th regiment of Caçadores, with that regiment and the light companies of Major-General Lambert's brigade, having been pushed forward by the valley to turn the right of the enemy's post upon the left of the Nivelle rivulet, the whole moved forward by the left at half past six o'clock. The column proceeded as you had directed towards the rivulet in the nearest line with the right of the enemy's position behind Ainhoué. The enemy having abandoned the post called "the fortified house," retired with very little opposition before Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, whom I then directed to discover a convenient place for passing the rivulet; and having discovered two fords, concealed by the wood from the view of the enemy, the passage was effected in two columns. The active intelligence of Lieutenant-Colonel Brown of the 9th Caçadores enabled me to place the troops destined to make the attack upon the right of the enemy at the very foot of the hill. As I observed, however, that the extreme difficulties of the country prevented Lieutenant-General Hamilton's division from making the same progress, and that the enemy was still in possession of the strong ground commanding that part of the river where he intended to pass, I sent two companies of Major-General Lambert's brigade supported by a battalion of the 12th Portuguese regiment to menace the right of the enemy. As soon as the object of this move was attained, the disposition for the principal attack was made. Major-General Lambert's brigade, with the 12th Portuguese regiment, covered only by the fire of its marksmen, was destined to assail the face of the hill upon which the enemy's right rested. Major-General Pack's brigade with the 8th Portuguese regiment were formed in a second line, and ordered to follow at the distance of 200 paces as a support. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown having gained, under cover of the wood which skirts the foot of the hill, the right of the enemy, was to advance by the rocky ridge and dislodge the enemy's skirmishers from their positions, in which they would have been able to increase the difficulties of the attack. Two companies of General Lambert's brigade were ordered to ascend the hill by the woody gorge on the right of the enemy's work to cover the right of the attack. As soon as Lieutenant-General Hamilton's division had by considerable exertions arrived at that point which would constitute the attack in échelon, I ordered the 6th division to advance, and I do not think that the parts allotted to the several corps could possibly have been better performed. Major-General Lambert's brigade and the 12th Portuguese regiment began the ascent of the hill with the same regular step with which it was continued without the least check to the very summit. The natural difficulties of ascending in line an extremely steep hill of 400 or 500 yards were increased by the cross-fire which the enemy was enabled to produce from several breastworks formed on the face of the hill. Notwithstanding the loss, which I am concerned to say has been heavy in the first line, the troops had no sooner ascended the hill than they rushed forward to the assault of the redoubt, which is a square work with ditches of a considerable depth. The enemy did not wait the assault, but, intimidated by the heroic conduct of this gallant brigade, he retreated rapidly along the height. The Highland brigade under Major-General Pack supported this attack with the

utmost steadiness, and proceeded to the top of the hill in as good order as if he had met with no other impediment than the steepness of the hill. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown having completely performed the part allotted to him pursued the enemy to some distance down the reverse of the heights, and obliged him to abandon several pieces of cannon and their tumbrils. When you ordered the 6th division together with that under Lieutenant-General Sir John Hamilton to attack the redoubt to our right on the same ridge, I directed Major-General Pack to advance against it with one battalion of his brigade and the 8th Portuguese regiment. This post, though of a more formidable nature, was abandoned by the enemy with less resistance than the former; and having left his guns unspiked, by the exertion of Captain Brandreth of the Royal Artillery one of them was soon brought into action against him.

It is superfluous, I am sure, for me to notice to you the gallantry and judicious conduct displayed by Major-Generals Pack and Lambert, as well as by Colonel Douglass commanding the Portuguese brigade attached to the 6th division: indeed I cannot single one of the commanding officers of battalions for more praiseworthy conduct than another; but I must beg you will make favourable mention to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces of Lieutenant-Colonel Brown of the 9th Caçadores, an officer of the greatest zeal and much professional experience and ability; and I must not omit to mention the good conduct of Lieutenant Robe of the Royal Artillery, who had been attached to the 6th division in the command of the brigade of mountain guns: this officer by great exertion succeeded in getting his guns up the height, and rendered himself useful in cannonading the enemy as the 2nd division drove him along his position. I have received every assistance from Lieutenant-Colonel Woodford, the Assistant Quartermaster-General, and have great reason to express my approbation of the manner in which that officer and Lieutenant-Colonel Hare, the Assistant-Adjutant-General, performed their several duties, and to thank them for their zealous services. Captain Boteler of the Royal Engineers has been most assiduous, and rendered himself of considerable utility by the knowledge which he had been able to acquire of the country. To my personal staff I owe every obligation which a most zealous performance of their duty can lay me under.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

H. CLINTON.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir W. Stewart to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

SIR, Heights above Espelette, 11th Nov., 1813.

I have the honour of reporting that, in conformity with your orders, having assembled the 2nd division before daybreak yesterday morning to the left of the village of Llandebar, and having received your instructions to act in successive advance upon the enemy from the 6th and Portuguese divisions, his piquets on the left bank of the Nivelle, and in front of Ainhoué, were driven across that river by the 2nd brigade under Major-General Pringle.

When the preceding named divisions possessed themselves of the right bank of the Nivelle, and pushed for the heights and redoubts in front of the 6th division, I followed with the 2nd division, as directed, in support of the Portuguese division, until full possession was gained of the heights in their respective front by those divisions: I then deemed it expedient to direct the march of my Portuguese brigade (Brigadier-General Ashworth's) and of my

3rd brigade (Major-General Byng's) against the enemy's main position on the heights above Espelette. I supported Brigadier-General Ashworth's column by the light infantry of the 2nd brigade, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce of the 39th regiment.

The two brigades under Brigadier-General Ashworth and Major-General Byng advanced against the position in very good style, and, as you were witness, carried it and the two redoubts, which are on it, in as spirited a manner as could be desired.

The principal attack having fallen to the duty of Major-General Byng's brigade, I have the honour of enclosing the report of that officer, and cannot in too warm terms express my praise of the Major-General's exertions and animated example upon the occasion; the conduct of his aide-de-camp and of his Brigade Major, Captains Clitherow and Cotton, were equally observed by me with admiration. The Major-General received a contusion, and had two horses wounded under him.

I take this opportunity of particularly reporting the gallant conduct of Major Ackland, who fell at the head of Major-General Byng's light infantry, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Leith, who first led his battalion against the redoubt in his front, and who *first* entered it. I was under obligation to Major-General Pringle and to Brigadier-General Ashworth for the good order in which they led their respective brigades. The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce at the head of Major-General Pringle's, and Lieutenant-Colonel Fearon at that of Brigadier-General Ashworth's light troops, was very good.

I was likewise under obligation to the officers of my departmental and personal staff, and take this opportunity of again recalling your attention to the merit of Captain Thorn, whose good services during this and three preceding campaigns in the Peninsula are already known to you, and do certainly merit promotion.

My 1st brigade, under Major-General Walker's command, having been directed by you to remain in reserve to Major-General Morillo's division, the conduct of that brigade will, I conjecture, be reported to you by the senior Major-General. I have the honour to enclose the names of certain officers of the 2nd division who on the present or on the last occasion have particularly distinguished themselves when the corps was engaged with the enemy, and whose services I request you to submit to the Commander of the Forces, with my hope of his Excellency's protection.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your very faithful Servant,

WILLIAM STEWART.

P.S.—I feel it due to Major Heise, the Assistant Adjutant-General of the 2nd division, and to my aide-de-camp, Captain Le Marchant, especially to report their conspicuous conduct and gallantry in leading on the troops to the attack of the redoubts during the action of yesterday.

III.

Major-Gen. J. Byng to Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir W. Stewart.

SIR, Camp near Espelette, 10th Nov., 1813.

I have the honour to report for the information of yourself and of Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill, that during the operations of this day, when it fell to the lot of my brigade to carry the height and redoubts near this place, the light companies 57th regiment, and provisional battalion, were those engaged, and conducted themselves admirably. I have to regret the

death of Major Ackland, who fell, gallantly leading on the light companies which he commanded: the four captains of those companies, viz., Captain Cameron, Buffs; Captain M'Lean, 57th; Captain Girlestone, 31st; and Captain Pyne, 66th regiment, each leading on his company in a most handsome style, received severe wounds; and Lieutenant Levicke, commanding the 60th company acting with them, conducted himself in a manner deserving of my notice. Colonel Macdonald was severely wounded in the command of the 57th regiment. Brevet Major Burrowes, who succeeded him in that command, received two wounds; and the conduct of both merits my approbation. Lieutenant-Colonel Leith led on the provisional battalion in the most gallant manner, and was the first who entered the redoubt I ordered him to attack. Lieutenant-Colonel Nicol of the 66th, and Captain Nicols, 31st regiment, acting as Major, were very forward, and contributed towards the success and good conduct of their battalion.

I trust that I shall not be trespassing too much on your time in expressing the gratitude I feel for the services afforded me by my aide-de-camp Captain Clitherow, and Brigade-Major Cotton. No two officers could behave better. I am sorry to add the latter was severely if not dangerously wounded, and had a horse shot under him.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very obedient humble servant,

JOHN BYNG.

IV.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hamilton to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

SIR, Camp in front of Ainhoué, 11th Nov., 1813.

In obedience to the orders I received from you, I yesterday marched an hour after daybreak from our encampment in front of Urdax with the Portuguese division of infantry, and part of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh's brigades of artillery. About two miles from Urdax we turned off the road to the right and advanced against the French foundry, in which the enemy had a small force, but who retired on the advance of the 10th Caçadores, commanded by Major Pampeluna, and part of the grenadiers of the 4th brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Neil of the 10th regiment. I continued marching parallel to the 6th division, moving on our left. We crossed the river at different fords, the 10th Caçadores and part of the grenadiers of the 4th brigade protecting our right from the light troops of the enemy, who had advanced in considerable force. We then assembled and crossed the ridge of mountains, where we sustained some loss from the artillery of the enemy, until Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh opened a well directed fire on them from a commanding situation. We crossed a deep ravine, ascended, and gained the fortified height at the enemy's huts between the two forts at the same period that that on our left was carried in a very gallant manner by the 6th division.

The enemy on our gaining the summit of the hill retired to the fort on our right, setting fire to their huts, which burned with such force that for a short time it retarded our following them: the grenadiers, however, of the 2nd brigade and the Caçadores under Lieutenant-Colonel Gomersal being on our right, and to the windward of the fire of the hut, were enabled to follow the enemy to the fort on our right, near which they made a short stand, but being pressed by this force drove them from the hill and carried the fort.

I feel in every respect perfectly satisfied with the conduct of the division, and have received from Brigadier Campbell and Brigadier Buchan, com-

manding brigades, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh, commanding the artillery, the most flattering reports of the good conduct of the officers, &c., under their command, who respectively have recommended the undermentioned officers: Lieutenant-Colonel Gomersal, commanding 2nd regiment; Major Jacintha, 14th regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, 4th regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel José Maria, 10th regiment; and Major Pampeluna, 10th Caçadores.

To the staff of my division, Major Pinto, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Watson, Royal Dragoons, Assistant Quartermaster-General, as also my personal staff, Don Gastão de Camera, I feel much obliged for their assistance whenever opportunities have offered. I have had the honour on former occasions to recommend Captain Watson to your notice, who has served with me nearly four years, and who, as the only British officer attached to me, I beg most strongly again to call to your recollection.

JOHN HAMILTON.

Major-General C. Alten to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Camp, 11th Nov., 1813.

In obedience to your Lordship's instructions, communicated to me by the Quartermaster-General, I have the honour to report to your Lordship that the Light Division directed its attack at daylight yesterday morning against the enemy's position on La Petite Rhune. I directed Major-General Kempt, with the 1st brigade, to drive the enemy from the rocky ridge, whilst the 2nd brigade turned the starwork upon the left. The 43rd regiment, under Major Napier, led the attack of the 1st brigade; and I am persuaded that nothing but the persevering gallantry of this regiment could have ensured such complete success. I am sorry to say it was not obtained without the loss of many brave officers and men, which, however, could not, from the strength of the ground and works, be expected otherwise. Receiving afterwards the order to commence the attack against the intrenched position upon the heights above Sarré, I caused Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, with the 2nd brigade, to advance for this object, covered by the 1st brigade, of which the 1st battalion 95th regiment covered the attack of the 2nd brigade. The intrenchments were successively carried, but not without a severe loss. The conduct of the 52nd regiment was most particularly conspicuous. I am extremely sorry to add that Colonel Barnard was very severely wounded on this occasion. The fort upon the highest hill could not possibly be taken by assault; upon the 4th division coming round its flank it surrendered by capitulation to Colonel Colborne, the garrison consisting of the 1st battalion 88th regiment, between 500 and 600 strong.

I directed Brigadier Longa, while these operations were going on, to obtain possession of the height immediately above Ascain, but the enemy had evacuated it before his division reached it.

No conduct could be more distinguished than that of Major-General Kempt and Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, commanding the brigades. The former was wounded in the arm in the first attack, but I am happy to say it did not deprive the division of his services.

I beg also to mention to your Lordship the very zealous assistance

which I met with from Major-General Bradford, acting as support to the Light Division.

I am particularly indebted to all the officers of the Staff belonging to the division for the zeal with which they did their duty and the assistance I derived from them; but I must particularly remark the unremitting activity with which Captain Beckwith, Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, performed all the duties of his department, as well before as during the operation.

The division took upon La Petite Rhune two guns, all the tents of the enemy, and about 48 prisoners.

The loss of the division has been, in killed and wounded, 34 officers and 469 men.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES ALTEN.

Commodore Sir G. R. Collier to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Passages, 12th Nov., 1813.

Yesterday evening the *Juniper* arrived from Santander, bringing with her five transports, having about 5000 bags of bread and some corn on board, which was all that remained at that place. There were two transports, with recovered men on board, from Santander: one, the *Retreat*, missed the port yesterday in a squall of wind, and has not since beat up again. Boats have gone out to her.

The *Vesuvius*, *Sparrow*, *Challenger*, and *Racer* were ordered off the port of Socoa, agreeably to your Lordship's wishes, but the swell was too great for them to act otherwise than by making a demonstration. His Majesty's sloop *Sparrow*, Captain Lock, received some damage in the hull and sails, and had one man wounded, from the tower of Socoa, the guns of which, five in number, were, I observed, left by the enemy primed. These can be easily transported by sea at any time your Lordship may wish.

On visiting the ports of Socoa and St. Jean de Luz, I was sorry to find neither of them capable of receiving vessels drawing more than 9 or 10 feet, and then only at spring-tides; so that I have impressed upon the mind of Mr. Commissary-General Dalrymple the necessity of employing Spanish coasters immediately; and I propose, with your Lordship's permission, arming the two best trincadores left at St. Jean de Luz to act as convoy.

I am selecting three of the smallest British transports to try the port of St. Jean de Luz.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and very humble servant,

GEORGE R. COLLIER.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Guethary, 12th Nov., 1813, half-past 8 A.M.

I have the honour to report to you that the enemy, who during the last night occupied the heights of Bidart, in the front of this village, and whose piquets were standing this morning as placed yesterday evening, has retired from Bidart, and appears to continue his march by the great road.

A small patrol of cavalry, supported by a few infantry, has been pushed on to the heights of Bidart; and as soon as I can get up a few of General Bock's cavalry, I shall cause a stronger patrol to be pushed forward to observe the enemy's motions.

I have desired Major-General Vandeleur to send out a reconnoitring party along the ends of the ridges which run down to the stream which skirts the heights of Bidart, and from whence the great road appears to be seen for a considerable way, but the haziness of the morning prevents objects from being seen.

I beg to add that Major Tod is working on the principal bridge at St. Jean de Luz. At present it is only passable for infantry or animals singly. The second bridge was also so much injured as to be impassable yesterday, but it may also be re-established: the access to it is, however, very bad, and from its construction it is doubtful whether it will bear artillery or heavy carriages of any kind.

The inhabitants of St. Jean de Luz manifested considerable satisfaction on our arrival, and many of them exerted themselves to save the bridge.

I have the satisfaction to report to your Lordship that the conduct of the troops yesterday, in passing through St. Jean de Luz, was very orderly, and that I am under obligation to Major-General Lord Aylmer, whose brigade first reached the town, for the arrangements which insured this conduct. In proof of what I have stated I enclose a copy of a letter which has been put into my hands by Lord Aylmer.

I have for the present left five companies of the 76th regiment at St. Jean de Luz and the heights of Siboure; a small detachment of Portuguese troops is in Socoa.

The latter is a mere earthen work, I understand from Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne, surrounding a strong tower. The old work of the printed plans appears to have been long since destroyed. Some ordnance was left in the works of Siboure, but I have as yet got no account of it.

Yesterday I saw Sir George Collier, who was looking at the port of Socoa, but at that time he did not seem to like it. We are endeavouring to re-establish a bridge over the stream between this and Bidart, which the enemy burnt yesterday. The stream appears not to be fordable at the great road for two hours before or after high water.

I ought to add that the fords of St. Jean de Luz, which appear to be two, seem to be passable for infantry for not more than two hours at a time.

The inhabitants are pretty generally returning to their houses. It would be of use if I had some more copies of the proclamation to distribute.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your obedient humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

P.S. An inhabitant has just been sent in by the patrol, who says the enemy's rear-guard is at Anglet.

J. H.

Although I think your Lordship probably may have later papers than that I enclose, yet I have sent it lest it should not be so. It contains an ample confirmation of the gratifying intelligence from Germany.

J. H.

[ENCLOSURE.]

M. LE SOUS-PRÉFET, St. Jean de Luz, le 11 Nov., 1813.

Depuis ce matin, nos troupes ayant évacué le pays, l'armée combinée d'Espagne est venu en prendre possession avec des forces imposantes. Les habitans ont été traités avec bonté, contre toute espérance, et la générosité de cet ennemi que nous avions tant de raison à craindre est si forte qu'il permet la rentrée des habitans que la peur a éloigné de leurs foyers. Vous, Monsieur le Sous-Préfet, qui vous intéressez tant au sort de vos concitoyens, faites leur connaître ces dispositions, afin qu'ils ne puissent languir dans les besoins. C'est un surcroît d'obligation que le pays vous portera, et dont nous ne perdrons jamais le souvenir.

Agréez, Monsieur le Sous-Préfet, les nouvelles assurances de mon respect.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Guethary, 13th Nov., 1813, half past 11 A.M.

I beg leave to acquaint you that a pontoon bridge has been established across the stream of Bidart, and that I have directed the brigade under the orders of Major-General Robinson to be advanced to the heights of that village, as also a brigade of artillery, in conformity to the instructions your Lordship gave me yesterday.

Upon this arrangement taking place, I propose to move the two light battalions of the Legion more to the right, along the valley of the stream of Bidart and in rear of Arbonne; that part of our ground being the most defective of any.

I also propose to establish some cavalry posts in that direction, but am just going with De Lancey to look at the ground.

With the understanding I have of your intentions for future proceedings, I think you may possibly wish the bridge over the Bidart stream *not* to be *permanently* re-established, and I shall be glad to know your pleasure in that respect. In the mean time, however, materials are collecting for that purpose at St. Jean de Luz.

I am happy to be enabled to report to you that the principal bridge at St. Jean de Luz was last night rendered passable for artillery.

The enemy keeps his post on the great road as yesterday, and ours are also where they were.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your faithful humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

[713.] G. O. St. Pé, 14th Nov., 1813.

1. * * * * *

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The Commander of the Forces cannot sufficiently express his disapprobation of the conduct of Lieutenant ——. The duties required from the junior ranks of the officers in the army, however easy of execution, are highly important to the welfare of the soldier, and are essential to the public interests, and they cannot be neglected without injury to both.

3. The Commander of the Forces trusts that what has happened to Lieutenant —— will be a warning to others to consider their professional duty their first object, and not to allow any idle pursuit to induce them to stay away from their regiment and neglect their duty.

WELLINGTON.

[714.] G. O. St. Pé, 15th Nov., 1813.

1. The great abuses and waste which are the consequences of the existing mode of foraging for the army, and the inconvenience resulting therefrom, have induced the Commander of the Forces to issue the following orders:

2. Under the orders of the late Commander of the Forces, Lieutenant-General Sir J. Moore, a horse or mule was allowed to each Captain of a company of infantry, and a horse or a mule among the subalterns of the company; and under the orders of the late Commander of the Forces, Lieutenant-General Sir J. Cradock, which have been the rule with this army, the subalterns of a company of infantry were allowed a horse or mule between two.

3. The Commander of the Forces now desires that the Captain of a company may be allowed to keep two horses or mules,

besides one horse or mule to carry the tents of the company, and that every subaltern of infantry may be allowed to keep one horse or mule; but it is to be clearly understood that no more bâtmen servants are to be taken from the ranks than there were under the former orders.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires also that throughout the army the officers commanding regiments, heads of departments, &c., will take measures to prevent horses, mules, or other animals from being kept in the regiments, &c., which are not allowed by the General Orders.

5. All foraging parties from regiments of cavalry or infantry, or brigades of artillery when it is necessary to send any, are to go out regularly under the charge of an officer; the officer of the Quartermaster-General's department of the division, in concert with the officer of the Commissariat, pointing out where the foraging is to be made, and the orders of the 25th August, 1809, and of the 20th March, 1811, regarding the attendance of the officer of the Commissariat, being attended to.

6. The Staff of the brigade or division will forage with one of the regiments of the brigade or division, according to the selection of the General officer commanding, and no persons are to be allowed to go separately in search of forage.

7. The officer in charge of a foraging party is to take care that a regular receipt is given to the owner for what is taken, and a list of the officers sent out with foraging parties is to be kept in each regiment of cavalry or infantry, brigade of artillery, and department, specifying the name, and place where sent to, in order that in case of complaint it may be discovered who has neglected to attend to this order.

8. When the forage will be brought in, it is to be taken to the Commissary attached to the brigade or division, and is to be delivered out in regular rations to the several persons entitled to it under the General Orders of the army.

9. If the forage in any district can be collected in magazine, the foraging by the troops is to cease entirely, and all are to draw from the magazine.

10. Notwithstanding these orders, the Commander of the Forces requests that the green forage may be used as long as may be possible, and that the dry may be saved.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, St. Pé, 15th Nov., 1813.

In acknowledging the receipt of two Clasps which have been sent to me (through the Military Secretary) by command of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, I take the opportunity of humbly submitting to your Lordship my claims to a Cross, which honour has been conferred upon officers who have not served so long with this army, or been so frequently personally engaged with the enemy.

At the battle of Busaco the cavalry could not be brought into action; but I trust your Lordship will take into consideration the services rendered by that arm in covering the retreat of the infantry to the position of Busaco, and from thence to the lines near Sobral; for which services your Lordship, in a letter to me from head-quarters near Sobral, was pleased to say that the army was much indebted to the cavalry for having made so good a retreat.

During the siege of Badajoz (1812) the cavalry were actively employed with the covering army; and, a few days after the fall of that place, I had the good fortune to attack and defeat with considerable loss a very superior body of the enemy's cavalry near Llerena, in presence of the corps commanded by the Count d'Erlon.

In the same year your Lordship was pleased to express your approbation of my conduct before the enemy at Castrejon, and in covering the retreat of the army from the Guareña to the position near Salamanca.

The cavalry which served a short campaign under the late Sir John Moore, in 1808, not having been in the battle of Coruña, medals were granted to General officers and Commanding officers of regiments for "Cavalry Service; Spain, 1808."

I trust, therefore, your Lordship will be pleased to take my claims and those of other cavalry officers concerned into your favourable consideration; and that your Lordship will be pleased to recommend that additional marks of distinction may be granted to us for our services upon the occasions I have stated.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient and very humble servant,
Stapleton Cotton.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Ibarren de St. Pé, 15th Nov., 1813.

I transmit to you extracts from the reports of the General officers commanding the 3rd, 4th, and 7th divisions on the 10th instant. The whole of the operations of those divisions having been immediately under your own view, renders it unnecessary to give from the Generals or myself the details of them, and I therefore only send the extracts comprising their reports on the officers whose conduct merited their approbation. The mode and result of executing your instructions speak sufficiently for the Generals

themselves; and to which I shall only beg to add my acknowledgments for the assistance I received from Brigadier-General D'Urban and the officers of his department with him, as well as from Lieutenant-Colonel Hope, Assistant-Adjutant-General, and from Colonel Arbuthnot and the officers of my personal Staff.

I remain, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Extract of a Report from Major-General the Honourable C. Colville to his Excellency Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford of the Operations of the 3rd Division in the Action with the Enemy on the 10th instant.

"It is hardly enough to say that in Major-General Power and Colonel Keane I met with everything that my previous long acquaintance with them or my utmost wishes could lead me to expect. In Lieutenant-Colonels Stovin and Thomas Arbuthnot, the Assistant-Adjutant and Quartermaster-Generals, I had all the assistance that professional talent and the most energetic example to those about them could afford; and I am equally indebted to Major Henderson of the Royal Engineers, to Captain Jackson, my aide-de-camp, and to Lieutenant Power of the Engineers, acting with me for the day (but who was unfortunately killed within the last half hour of our operations), for the zealous manner in which they forwarded my wishes in execution of the service we were employed upon.

"Colonel Keane speaks in the highest terms of all under his command; viz., the 5th, 83rd, 87th, and 94th regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonels Pratt, Carr, Gough, and Lloyd, going into action; the two latter under that of Major Desbarres and Captain Laing, after the fall of Lieutenant-Colonels Gough and Lloyd; to which I am happy from my own observation to add that of Major Griffiths of the 60th, and who commanded the advance of the division. Of the junior officers, Colonel Keane mentions Lieutenant Barry, commanding the light company of the 87th, as having distinguished himself."

II.

Extract of a Report from Major-General Power to the Honourable Major-General Colville.

"Although the conduct of the whole of the officers of that battalion (11th Caçadores) was extremely gallant, I cannot but particularly notice Lieutenant-Colonel Duersback and Major Kilsha, the latter in particular, who, when the enemy made a show of advancing against them, and before the 21st regiment could be got through the several abattis which opposed their progress, animated his men by his exertions to keep their ground. At the same time I have equal reason to applaud similar and as effectual exertions on the part of Lieutenant-Colonel Paty, who commanded the grenadier companies of the 9th regiment; and I trust that these officers, being very old captains in the British service, may be deemed worthy of recommendation for the Brevet rank of Major in the British army.

"Colonel Sutton of the 9th regiment, whose exertions I have at all times

particular reason to be satisfied with, has spoken in very high terms of Captain Peacock. I must not conclude without also noticing the exertions and gallantry of my aide-de-camp, Major Johnston, who has upon every occasion afforded me opportunities of reporting his conduct in very favourable terms."

III.

Extract of a Report from Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Lowry Cole to Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford of the Operations of the 4th Division on the 10th instant.

"The conduct of the division was such as I could desire. To Major-Generals Anson and Ross and Colonel Vasconcellos I feel much indebted; and my thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer of the Royal Artillery, and the three brigades of guns under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, Major Symphe, and Captain Douglas, for their conduct in the attack against the enemy's first redoubt. The conduct of the 40th and 48th regiments, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton and Brigade-Major Bell, was conspicuous. I likewise feel much indebted to Colonel Bingham of the provisional battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Maclean of the 27th regiment, and Brigade-Major Thomas in command of the light company. The Portuguese brigade as usual conducted itself to my satisfaction, particularly the Caçadores in the attack of the village of Sarré.

"To my divisional and personal staff I am at all times indebted for their zeal and gallantry, and on no occasion more than on the present."

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Villafranca, 18th Nov., 1813.

I have delayed the departure of the usual courier a few days, imagining I might be able to acquaint your Lordship of some decided movement made by the enemy. Everything for the last week had the appearance of retiring; nevertheless, although certainly his line of posts on the Llobregat have been considerably diminished, he still remains in the vicinity of Barcelona with a considerable force, nor can I ascertain that to this hour a detachment of any magnitude has as yet proceeded to the French frontier.

In the meanwhile this army has maintained the same position as when I last had the honour to address your Lordship. The repairs of the works of Tarragona, favoured by the good weather, have been considerably advanced; and I trust if there be ten days more of such weather, the place may then be considered to be secure, and I may be enabled to withdraw the four battalions still employed in the repair of the fortifications.

I have not failed to communicate to General Copons extracts from your Lordship's letter of the 26th October which related to his Excellency and to the view your Lordship had taken of the mutual support that might be looked for from the co-operation of the first Spanish army and that at

present under my command. In reply the General has sent me some suggestions, the substance of which is, 1st, that this army may act offensively in conjunction with his in endeavouring to force Suchet to retire; 2ndly, that if there be reasons why the whole of this force should not be pushed forward, then that 5000 men be detached to act in immediate co-operation with the first army; and, 3rdly, if it be judged inexpedient to pursue this last measure, then that a plan be determined on for giving mutual assistance in case of the enemy attacking either army.

With the view of clearly explaining to General Copons my opinion of the suggestions he has offered, I propose to send an officer to his head-quarters immediately.

With respect to his first proposition, I apprehend that as long as Marshal Suchet maintains himself in force within a few days' march of Barcelona, no move with the force I can take into the field, joined to that which is disposable of the first army, would avail any thing; for that whenever the Marshal should move against us in earnest, we must either fall back or risk a general action, which, with an army composed as this is, would, I presume, not be advisable, while on the other hand a retreat would have a bad appearance, and probably might materially affect the public feeling in this province.

Should Suchet retire to a distance, leaving a force of 10,000 or 15,000 men only in the vicinity of Barcelona, then indeed it might be well to make every possible exertion to straiten the resources of that force, and this measure I mean to propose to General Copons in lieu of his first suggestion.

In respect to his second, should Suchet remain (as at present is not improbable) in position within a few days' march of Barcelona, I do not see any objection to detaching General Sarsfield's division of Spanish troops to act closely in co-operation with General Copons, provided, however, that it be clearly understood that the Captain-General will answer for the subsistence of these troops so long as they may be acting with him, for I know it will be out of General Elio's power to feed the division at such a distance from the depôt.

The last proposition of General Copons is self-evident, and I think a plan may be determined on between us to render the assistance to be mutually given, in case of attack on either force, most efficacious.

Since writing to your Lordship I have received a letter from General Elio, dated the 12th instant, in reply to mine relative to the expediency of ensuring a supply of one month's provisions in Tarragona for the division of General Sarsfield, respecting which General Elio promises me to give immediate directions; but I am sorry to observe that the General, in speaking of the communication across the Ebro, says that the tête de pont had not been begun, nor would be commenced until the bridge should be completed, which he expected it would be in eight days. I shall now urge General Elio to lose no time in completing the work intended to cover the bridge, the plan of which we agreed upon soon after I saw him in September at Tarragona, and at his particular request I spared him some intrenching tools to enable him, as I understood, forthwith to proceed with the work. Referring to General Elio's letter, I beg to represent to your

Lordship that he has urged me to furnish him from the British stores four hundredweight of gunpowder, and a supply of shot for the four 12-pounders lent him for the siege of Morella, and which he now proposes to employ against Peñiscola. I am not yet aware whether the powder can be spared; the shot I know cannot: but as General Elio tells me that the powder shall be repaid to us from the depôt at Carthagena, I shall not hesitate to give the General this supply, provided it can be done without risk of our wanting it immediately. General Elio, however, at the same time remarks that the issue of the powder from the magazines at Carthagena depends on your Lordship. I submit then that the General may have authority to receive at least the quantity necessary to replenish our store, and that sanction be likewise given for the issuing from the depôt at Carthagena such number of intrenching tools as the chief engineer of this army may require, it being understood that at that place there is a considerable quantity of such stores.

I conclude General Elio will report specially to your Lordship his intention of firing against Peñiscola.

I herewith transmit to your Lordship the heads of intelligence received of the enemy's movements from the 9th to the 17th instant, as likewise a statement of General De Caen's supposed force. I request likewise to observe to your Lordship that by a letter from Mr. Zehnpfenning, an English military agent, dated Igualada, the 12th instant, I am informed that intelligence has been received from Perpignan that Soult with the greater part of his army had been ordered to this province, and that he was already on the march. I do not mention the report as believing it, but merely that your Lordship, who is best able to judge of the truth of such information, may be aware of what is given out in this quarter.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your obedient humble servant,
W. H. CLINTON.

J. W. Croker, Esq., to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Admiralty, 20th Nov., 1813, 4 P.M.

The Yarmouth telegraph announces "a complete revolt in Holland, the Texel fleet in mutiny, a Dutch Baron on his way to the Prince of Orange."

Yours faithfully,
J. W. CROKER.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY in the Peninsula, under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 19th Nov., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Field Officers	32	12	44
Captains	101	21	122
Subalterns	207	68	275
Staff	85	50	135
Quartermasters of Cavalry	23	4	27
Serjeants :—			
Present	538	73	611
Sick :—			
Present	10	1	11
Absent	7	..	7
Command	62	19	81
Prisoners of War and Missing	5	..	5
Trumpeters :—			
Present	101	41	142
Sick :—			
Present	2	..	2
Absent	2	4	6
Command	2	4	6
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File :—			
Present	7239	1206	8445
Sick :—			
Present	186	31	217
Absent	262	48	310
Command	674	443	1117
Prisoners of War and Missing	156	1	157
Horses :—			
Present	7265	1159	8424
Sick	285	89	374
Command	305	263	568
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Dead	5	..	5
Transferred	2	..	2
Horses :—			
Dead	16	..	16
Cast	16	..	16

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula, under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 19th Nov., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers:—			
Colonels	14	12	26
Lieutenant-Colonels	54	28	82
Majors	78	35	113
Captains	464	174	638
Lieutenants	921	195	1116
Cornets or Ensigns	298	348	646
Staff	378	449	827
Quartermasters of Cavalry	22	4	26
Serjeants:—			
Present	2666	1367	4033
Sick:—			
Present	74	56	130
Absent	562	149	711
Command	403	216	619
Prisoners of War and Missing	46	1	47
Trumpeters or Drummers:—			
Present	1010	522	1532
Sick:—			
Present	20	5	25
Absent	124	31	155
Command	27	45	72
Prisoners of War and Missing	35	4	39
Rank and File:—			
Present	37,922	21,666	59,588
Sick:—			
Present	1576	809	2385
Absent	12,294	5107	17,401
Command	3114	1971	5085
Prisoners of War and Missing	2326	261	2587
Horses:—			
Present	7265	1159	8424
Sick	285	89	374
Command	305	263	568
Alterations:—			
Men:—			
Joined	2	2	4
Dead	20	14	34
Discharged	..	3	3
Transferred	2	5	7
Promoted	6	..	6
Reduced	3	1	4
Horses:—			
Dead	16	..	16
Cast	16	..	16

E. PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Ustaritz, 21st Nov., 1813.

I have the honour to transmit Major-General the Honourable C. Colville's report of the particulars of the skirmish which took place on the 18th instant, in consequence of our attempt to place a better and more natural barrier between the enemy and the left of our cantonments, and which your Lordship will see was effected and maintained, though the enemy made an effort during the night to regain it or to destroy the bridge, in both of which efforts he was unsuccessful.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
W. C. Beresford.

[Enclosures.]

I.

Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

Sir, Ustaritz, 19th Nov., 1813.

I have the honour to report, that on receiving your permission to advance the posts of the 3rd division to the extremity of the wood in front of their cantonments at Arrauntz and on the great Bayonne road, I directed Major-General Power to advance with such part of his Portuguese brigade as he should think necessary against the posts we knew the enemy to have in that neighbourhood. He accordingly, with such part of the 11th Caçadores as were off other duty and one battalion of the 9th regiment in immediate support, with the other following, came nearly by surprise upon the enemy's advanced post at the Pont d'Ardanche, and which is over a small canal running into the Nive from about Arcangues.

The voltigeurs, who seem to have occupied the strength of the post, formed en tirailleur on the opposite bank and kept up a smart fire upon our troops, supported by two battalions in column, the 32nd and 43rd, as appears by the information of a prisoner, while they had a third a little more to their right, the 58th, most probably in front of Bassussarry.

Encouraged by the small number which the nature of the ground made it prudent for General Power to show, the enemy made a dashing attempt to recover the post, but were driven back in good style and left several dead on our side of the bridge, among them an officer of the rank of Major.

Perceiving soon after that we had no intention of further aggression, they left off firing, and posting their sentries, we did the same, and commenced strengthening our post. This I think will be sufficient in a day or two against any attack of infantry, at least while the floods continue, and I have requested Major Henderson, of the Royal Engineers, to give our piquet-defences solidity enough to resist the field-pieces which it is not unlikely may be brought against them. There is sufficient accommodation in good houses on the spot and adjoining to it for the troops required for the defence of the post.

The enclosed, from Major-General Power, will inform your Excellency of an attack made upon the posts this morning early, but in which they were received with such coolness and gallantry by Lieutenant-Colonel Duersback and the 11th Caçadores under his command, that they were not only forced to relinquish their forward movement, but failed in their secondary object,

that of destroying the bridge. A barrel of gunpowder was exploded upon it, but not being allowed time to cover it, the effect was incomplete, only throwing down the parapet-walls and shaking the side. The very good conduct of the 11th Caçadores upon these two occasions, under Colonel Duersback, and of the 9th regiment under Colonel Sutton, though no more than we had a right to expect from their previously established character, will still, I am convinced, be estimated by you with sentiments correspondent to my own, and which I have to request you will do me the honour to make known to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,
CHARLES COLVILLE.

II.

Major-Gen. J. M. Power to Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

MY DEAR GENERAL, 19th Nov., 1813.

I sent you the report by my aide-de-camp this morning, as I received it from Colonel Sutton; at the same time I confess I fully disbelieved it, having the fullest confidence in the vigilance of Lieutenant-Colonel Duersback, who repulsed very gallantly an attempt which the enemy made to surprise his post. Between three and four o'clock they came on with a huzza à pas de charge close up to the breastwork, where, being well received, they immediately retreated.

I cannot sufficiently commend the steadiness of the Caçadores on this occasion. I do not think they will trouble us again, seeing we are so well prepared; but I should not be surprised were they to bring a piece or two of artillery to bear upon the road and to dislodge us from the house. However, in that case we can find sufficient shelter in the turn of the road a little to the rear.

Believe me, &c.,
J. M. POWER.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD, 5, George Street, Monday morning, 22nd Nov., 1813.

I was just preparing to leave Brighton yesterday evening when I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter by the messenger. Having an engagement on business of consequence at 1 o'clock this morning, I shall go down to your office between 11 and 12.

I must confess, my Lord, that the proposition in your Lordship's letter was so unexpected, that independent of all the circumstances which you refer to as natural objects of inquiry, I feel the greatest difficulty to bring my mind to think of the possibility of accepting this command, unless I am to consider it to be *an order;* for, having requested to be relieved in the distinguished situation I held in the army in the Peninsula on account of the state of my health, which I considered was such as to make it advisable that I should give up service altogether, I feel that, though now much better, I should be thought very inconsistent, and might even be

suspected of having left the army rather on *pretence* of bad health than from its really being so.

I am well aware, however, that after the signal marks of favour I have received, it is my duty, as it has ever been my wish, to devote myself to the King's service whenever an opportunity of being of use occurred. I cannot help troubling your Lordship with this note for your consideration till I have the honour of seeing you.

I remain, my Lord, faithfully and obediently yours,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, London, 22nd Nov., 1813.

Your Lordship will be surprised to hear that I am going with some troops to Holland. You cannot be more so than I am myself to find that this is to be the case.

I certainly considered that it was quite understood that in leaving your army and the distinguished command I held in it, I was relinquishing service for ever, as I thought necessary from the state of my health. But having got better, and being on the eve of going into Norfolk to shoot, I have been pressed into this service in a way that precluded refusal. All I could do was to bargain for a trial only; and now I sincerely regret having left the army before the conclusion of the campaign, as I should thereby have escaped this corvée, for I cannot look forward to it otherwise than an irksome service, with scarce a chance of any material success. I shall indeed be well pleased if we avoid disgrace.

But as Lord Bathurst told me he was writing to your Lordship on the subject, I will not detain your Lordship longer. With sincere wishes for your continued success and good health,

I have the honour, my Lord, to remain

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—Stanhope, who has just been here, begs to offer your Lordship his best respects. His wound is closed for the present, but more bone has to come away. He is anxious, however, to go with me, though certainly not fit to bear fatigue.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Chiclana, 22nd Nov., 1813.

In my last letter I informed you of the decision of the Council of State relative to your command. Upon its being sent to the Regency they kept it for several days until General O'Donoju had prepared a note, in which

he calls the Council of State "bad Spaniards," and endeavours to show fresh cause why the conditions agreed upon with you should not be adhered to. While this was going on, the Minister of State applied to me for pecuniary assistance to enable the government to proceed to the capital as soon as the cordons round the different towns should be removed. Seeing, however, their perseverance in the measure of dispossessing you of the command of which the British government had expressed its disapprobation in so marked a manner, I determined not to afford them the assistance they required until this question should be decided in the Cortes, and I told M. de la Serna privately that I should defer answering his note until I could form some judgment of the impression likely to be made by the fresh attempt of the government to indispose the Cortes towards you. I should observe to you that M. de la Serna thinks exactly with us upon this as well as upon all subjects relative to the present government.

Things were in this state when M. Peleguri, one of the new Deputies and a very respectable man, called upon me to say that although he and all those of his way of thinking were pretty certain of carrying the question in the Cortes as far as a confirmation of the conditions in dispute and a censure upon the conduct of the Minister of War, yet as they were desirous of giving you a signal proof of their disapprobation of the proceedings of the government, they thought it advisable to defer the discussion until the arrival of the government at Madrid, and that he was deputed by his friends to ask my opinion. I had no hesitation in giving it as my decided opinion that the question should be settled without loss of time, and I succeeded in bringing him to my way of thinking.

The same evening I received a note from M. de la Serna desiring to see me. I found him with M. Avella, who is in the Foreign department, and lately appointed a Deputy for Arragon. They told me that several Deputies had been with them to say that if I insisted upon it they would endeavour to decide the question now; but at the same time entreating and imploring that I would suffer it to be deferred until the arrival of the Cortes at Madrid, because that they would then be enabled to give you the most ample satisfaction, and even to increase your powers. To this they said they would pledge themselves under their signatures, if I desired it. I repeated all that I had said to M. Peleguri, adding that things were come to such a pass that some prompt and decisive act of the Cortes was requisite in order to prove to the British government that they did not concur in the measures of the Regency. They would recollect likewise that by the delay they exposed you to a repetition of the insolence of the Minister of War; that a confirmation of the conditions under which you consented to accept the command and a censure upon the manner in which you had been treated would, I was persuaded, be considered by you as affording ample satisfaction; and that I could not perceive that the settling this question would in any way prevent the accomplishment of the other objects which they had in view upon their arrival at Madrid, provided they were sure of their strength. They begged me, however, to consider the question, and to give them an answer on the following day.

The more I reflect upon this question the more decided I am in my opinion that it ought to be determined here; but we must likewise take into consideration the characters of the persons we have to deal with; and

as I have no means of compelling them to act according to my opinion, I have thought it better to repeat it in writing, but at the same time to say that if the Deputies are of a different way of thinking, I must necessarily acquiesce in their judgment. I was the more disposed to this mode of proceeding, as certainly some advantages will be gained by putting off the question until our arrival at Madrid. All the Jacobins and friends of the government are here, and we certainly should not have so decided a majority here as at Madrid, for I am assured and believe it to be certain that when all the Deputies are assembled at Madrid, four-fifths will be with us.

I saw M. Peleguri again yesterday evening, and he continued to be of opinion that the question should be decided here, and meant to speak to his friends about it to-day. The Council of State are furious at the idea of its being put off.

Upon the whole, I am very well satisfied with the disposition manifested by the Cortes upon this occasion. They think that the best proof they can give you of their indignation at the proceedings of the Regency will be by kicking them out the instant they arrive at Madrid; a measure upon which they dare not venture here, and which indeed would be attended with inconvenience, from the difficulty of finding persons to succeed them. I have, however, maintained that these are questions which are and ought to be entirely unconnected, and that it would be much better to proceed in the manner I have suggested, which, as I said before, need not prevent their pursuing the other objects which they have in view, provided their strength is sufficient.

I am convinced that we shall have a much larger party in the present Cortes than we had in the last. M. Avella told me that the Deputies were not only desirous of being guided by your opinions upon military subjects, but upon others likewise, such as finance, &c.; and both he and M. de la Serna said that any ideas you wished to have communicated to the Cortes might easily be conveyed through me.

I know not how this business will end, but I rather suppose it will be deferred until our arrival at Madrid; and indeed the Committee have not yet given in their report upon the opinion of the Council of State and the last note from the government. M. de la Serna and M. Avella told me that the Sessions here was immediately to be closed, and that the opening of the new Cortes at Madrid would be fixed for the 27th of December. Perhaps I may hear something further before closing this letter.

I have seen some of the Deputies, and they still continue to be of opinion that it will be better to defer this question until the meeting at Madrid. It appears that the Minister of War is doing everything in his power to gain friends by bribery and misrepresentation. Among other things, I am told that he has given out that the English mean to take Santoña for themselves.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Since my last letter to you I have received yours of the 30th October. It is probable that the government saw it before it reached me, as it was open at the sides. I, however, read the last part of it to M. de la Serna and to some of the Deputies in Cortes.

I enclose the confidential note which I gave to M. de la Serna.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to M. de la Serna.

Chiclana, 20th Nov., 1813.

After the fullest and most attentive consideration of the subject referred to me this morning, I continue to be of opinion that the question relative to Lord Wellington's command of the Spanish armies should be decided previously to the removal of the Cortes from the Isla de Leon. The respectable persons with whom I have communicated are sufficiently apprised of my reasons for this opinion, and it does not appear to me that the other objects which they have in view (and which are and ought to be entirely unconnected with the subject immediately before us) can in any way be influenced by the measures which they may adopt previously to their removal to Madrid.

This is my unalterable opinion. But if the individuals who have done me the honour to consult me upon this occasion and their friends in the Cortes should continue to think that it will be advisable to defer the further agitation of this question until the Cortes shall be assembled at Madrid, I am disposed to acquiesce in their judgment, fully confiding in their assurances that, as soon as may be practicable after their assembling at Madrid, the Cortes will come to such a decision upon this subject as shall be satisfactory to Lord Wellington, to the British government, and to the Spanish nation.

The whole conduct of the Spanish government from the 8th of March to the present period, their conduct in particular with respect to the command conferred upon Lord Wellington by a decree of the Cortes, the countenance which they have afforded to periodical writers employed to calumniate our government and our armies, have created an impression in Great Britain which can only be removed by some prompt, signal, and decisive act of the Cortes, which shall prove that they are free from distrust and suspicion of their allies, and continue to be actuated by those principles upon which the alliance was originally formed. It appears by the communication which was made to me to-day, that if the question relative to Lord Wellington's command were to be decided here, the decision would be such as would satisfy Lord Wellington and the British government; and it is incumbent upon those who wish well to the alliance to be well assured that the deferring the discussion until the arrival of the government at Madrid will be attended with all the advantages which they promise to themselves.

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Chiclana, 22nd Nov., 1813.

I have not the least doubt that the government will be changed immediately after our arrival at Madrid. The prevailing opinion here seems to be that a royal personage should be placed at the head of it, and the King of Sardinia has been mentioned to me by two or three persons. This appears to me to be very absurd, but it is not a new idea, for I remember its being mentioned to me by M. de Bardaxi when he was in office, and I think that somebody wrote a pamphlet recommending it.

The Princess of Brazils is likewise talked of, and I should imagine would unite more voices in her favour.

The plan seems to be to have a royal personage at the head, with a Council of Regency to assist him. I conclude that General Castaños would be one of this Council, under an idea that he is liked by the English. I wish you would tell me what you think about him, because, although it is not my intention to interfere, yet if my opinion is asked it will not be easy to avoid giving it. I have no kind of objection to General Castaños, excepting that I have no great opinion of his talents. I have reason to believe, however, that he thinks I am not friendly to him, and I could wish he were undeceived upon this point if possible.

I have mentioned to M. de la Serna and to some of the deputies the plan of having two Legislative Assemblies instead of one, and the great difficulty seems to be the oath to abide by the present Constitution for eight years. They all said, however, that the provinces might absolve them from this oath, but that it was a subject upon which no opinion could be given with certainty until the Cortes had assembled at Madrid.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I think that we must have patience, and that everything will end well. We shall probably have more influence than we have ever yet had in Spain; but whether any change will produce a good government is with me a matter of considerable doubt. The main point in my mind is to settle the question relative to your command, not only with a view to the improvement of the army, but to the impression which your resignation would make in Europe.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 23rd Nov., 1813.

In answer to your letter of the 8th instant, I have only to say that if you think it will have a good political effect to withdraw our garrison from Cadiz, I see no objection. I take it for granted you mean to leave the detachment at Ceuta.

I am much obliged to you for sending me M. de Forjaz's letter, which is much to his credit, particularly as it seems that of late Sir Charles Stuart has not kept his usual good temper in his correspondence with that minister.

The Regent's speech, and the vote of thanks, have been fortunately very much in conformity with your wishes; and I hope everything will go on well again. The Minister Souza, who is still here, has expressed himself much gratified with what has passed.

As the Regency at Lisbon has invited the Prince from the Brazils, it has been thought expedient for the Regent to write a letter to the same effect. If the Prince wishes to come, he will not wait for this letter, and it having been written will prevent all jealousy on the subject.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 23rd Nov., 1813.

I enclose to you the copy of a letter written by Colonel Lowe,* detailing the particulars of the battles near Leipsic. You will, I think, be pleased with the account, particularly if you have not received any other.

Colonel Lowe appears to me in all his correspondence to be a very intelligent officer, and very capable of receiving instruction from the situation in which he has accidentally found himself. I believe he has never served under you.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Colonel Lowe to Colonel Bunbury.

MY DEAR COLONEL, Leipsic, 20th Oct., 1813.

I addressed a line to you yesterday by Captain James, who took Sir Charles Stewart's despatches to England, acquainting you of the important event of Napoleon's defeat; and I profit by the first leisure moment to give you some relation of the events that led to it, begging you to excuse my inaccuracies in speaking of operations on so very extended a scale. The grand combined army under the chief command of Prince Schwarzenberg had remained for a considerable time inactive in the vicinity of Töplitz and Dresden, waiting probably the arrival of the reserves under General Benningsen, whilst the army of the Prince Royal of Sweden continued in its positions behind the Elbe, without undertaking any other material operation than the blockade and bombardment of Wittenberg.

General Blücher, by his passage across the Elbe at the head of the Silesian army (the remotest from the scene of general action at the commencement of the campaign, and now, after a series of the most splendid victories, the first in advance), and by abandoning the bridge which had served for his passage, gave a new vigour to the councils of the Allied Generals, and rendered their direct operations against the enemy's grand army indispensable.

On the 15th of October it was ascertained that the enemy, who had made a series of counter movements to oppose the designs of the Allies in the advance towards Leipsic, was finally concentrating his force on that point. The grand combined army was on this day at or in the vicinity of Pegau and Borna; that of General Blücher at Halle and Merseburg. The army of the Prince Royal of Sweden was still in the rear at Cothen, and the reserves, under Generals Benningsen and Klenau, at Röchlitz.

According to a disposition made by Prince Schwarzenberg, the army of the Prince Royal of Sweden should have moved on the 15th towards Leipsic by Trubie, but only one corps was sent there, the main body of his army having followed the course of the Saale, towards Halle. His participation in a general combat which was fixed for the following day became thus impossible.

General Blücher's army moved on the evening of the 15th to Gross Kugel.

On the morning of the 16th, at about seven o'clock, a general action commenced between the grand combined army and the enemy's main body, which occupied Liebertwolkwitz, the villages and heights in its vicinity, and all the

* Afterwards Lieut.-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe.

roads that diverge from the town of Leipsic on the south side between the Elster and the Partha. The corps of Count Giulay and of Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, which formed the left wing of the grand combined army, became also engaged with the enemy beyond the left bank of the Elster.

Skirmishing and a heavy cannonading, the ordinary prelude upon such occasions, were soon visible along the whole line; but a disadvantageous turn was nearly given to affairs by a bold and sudden movement of the enemy with the main body of his cavalry, commanded by Murat, who came round from a concealed position behind the main body of the army, against the centre of the grand combined army. Its reserves of cavalry had been placed too far in the rear, but orders were immediately sent to them to move forward. In the mean time the centre had been to a certain extent broke through, and the army of General Wittgenstein separated from that of the Austrians. The advance of the cavalry reserves re-established matters, and the allied forces were enabled to act together in one connected line during the remainder of the day, during which various attacks were made, and charges given and received, without any material advantage being gained on either side. At night both armies rested in their positions, the loss of each in the hot contests that ensued being not much less than 25,000 men. Such, as I have been informed, was the general outline of the operations on that side: of the detailed movements of each corps I cannot presume to give you any relation, having been attached during the day to the army of General Blücher, from whence the cannonading and general line of fire were all that were visible to me. Early in the day General Count Giulay and Prince Lichtenstein obtained some advantages over the enemy, and pushed their advances so far as to be enabled to communicate with the Silesian army across the Elster.

It was at six o'clock in the morning General Blücher left his bivouac at Gross Kugel, and advanced at the head of a corps of 12,000 cavalry on the high road to Leipsic, by the way of Schweditz. His infantry he left in position, with orders to cook, and then hold itself in instant readiness for marching. On approaching the villages of Freyroda and Radefeld it was observed the enemy had established his advance there, and large bodies of his troops were observed to be stationed between these villages and Lindenthal. The general attack was now visible along the whole line of the grand combined army. At this moment only information arrived of the change that had been made in the march of the Prince Royal's army on the preceding day, which, instead of having moved on Trebig, where it would have been at hand to have advanced to the support of the army of Silesia, had taken the direction of Grapsig and Wettin towards Halle. This affected not in any respect the resolution of General Blücher, who, seeing the grand army engaged, lost not an instant's time in making his dispositions for attack. It happened opportunely that Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Stewart arrived on the ground at this moment, and according in all respects with General Blücher's views, and those of General Gneisenau, chief of the Staff, wrote instantly to the Prince Royal to urge his immediate march from Halle on Delizch, and foregoing the gratification of being personally present at the outset of General Blücher's attack, went himself, at the General's request, to urge the Prince's compliance.

The disposition of General Blücher's attack was as follows:—

The infantry to immediately commence its march. The corps d'armée of General Count Langeron to attack Freyroda and Radefeld. The corps of General Baron Sacken to follow as reserve.

The corps of General d'Yorck to follow the Leipsic road, and, turning to the left near Litschina, attack the village of Lindenthal.

The infantry of the Grand Guards of the Prussians to remain on the high

road to Leipsic. The corps of General St. Priest to follow up the movement of Count Langeron, and the grand reserve of cavalry to remain in the centre to repel any attack on that point, and to be in other respects at General Blücher's own disposition.

The villages of Radefeld and Lindenthal were abandoned after an insignificant resistance. Count Langeron pursued the enemy to Gross and Klein Wetteritz, where a stand was made, but here again the enemy was soon compelled to retreat. Count Langeron pursued his advantages nearly as far as the Partha river, which he was making preparations to pass, when a large corps of the enemy was observed to be approaching on his left flank; and on making his arrangements to receive it, it was observed that the enemy had again pushed forward from the Leipsic road to the village of Gross Wetteritz, and regained possession of it. To expel him became now Count Langeron's object, and after a very sharp and obstinate contest this was accomplished. The wood of Klein Podowitz became then the scene of an obstinate and sanguinary conflict. A heavy cannonading and volleys of musketry finally compelled the enemy to retire, when the cavalry, pursuing him across the plain, made a most successful charge, took 600 prisoners and twenty-two pieces of cannon, and threw the enemy into complete discomfiture. He retreated until he approached near Rozucheyden, where he took up his position for the night.

On the right, General d'Yorck, after expelling the enemy from Lindenthal, pursued him till he arrived at the village of Möckern, where and in the grounds adjoining he remained posted in defiance and in great force. Here the contest became one of the most furious and bloody kind. Five times was the village taken and retaken. The Prussian troops, however, were animated with much too noble a spirit to be repulsed. The fifth time success crowned their valour. The enemy fled in disorder, leaving the ground covered with his killed and wounded, with arms, guns, and ammunition waggons, and his infantry exposed to the sabres of the Prussian cavalry, who followed them until they found refuge among the gardens and suburbs of Leipsic. Seven pieces of artillery, an eagle (taken by the Hussars of Mecklenburg-Strelitz), and about 1500 prisoners were the trophies won. To count the killed and wounded became impossible. The loss of the enemy must have been most severe. The victory was not gained without a great sacrifice, for the Prussian corps lost in killed and wounded at least one-third of its numbers, rated perhaps at 5000 men. The greater proportion were wounded with musketry, and their recovery expected.

General Count Langeron's loss was not so severe: 2000 killed and wounded are the numbers generally stated.

Thus was General Blücher victorious on every point, and by the operations of this day, unassisted by any other corps, and with a large body of the enemy coming in an unexpected direction on his flank, obtained possession of all the villages on the north side of Leipsic, and of all the roads which diverge from the town on that side, confining the enemy to Leipsic and its suburbs alone.

The army bivouacked on the field of battle during the night. At the time when success began to crown General Blücher's operations Sir Charles Stewart arrived on the ground, and communicated the Prince Royal's acquiescence in all that General Blücher had desired, and his intention of marching his army that night.

General Blücher had besides the satisfaction to learn of his operations having exacted such disquietude as to have called Napoleon himself to the field, where he arrived about five o'clock in the afternoon, and came in time to witness the retreat of his troops and the capture of his artillery.

On the morning of the 17th the grand combined army and the enemy's grand army remained in position, their batteries almost within musket shot of

each other. No movement took place on either side. But propositions were made through General Meerveldt, who in an attempt to force the passage across the Pleisse by Connowitz on the preceding day was wounded and taken prisoner, and who was shortly after liberated on his parole, for an armistice, to obtain which Buonaparte offered to give up all the Prussian fortresses on the Elbe, and to retire himself beyond the Saale. This insidious proposal, however, was of course rejected, and a disposition made for a general attack on the following day.

General Blücher lost not an opportunity of doing the enemy as much injury as possible even on this day.

In the morning it was observed that he had pushed forward some parties to the village of Gohles, and occupied on different points the outskirts of the suburbs. A fire of artillery and skirmishers immediately ensued, and the enemy brought out some guns to reply. The cavalry were ordered to charge, took 200 prisoners, and three pieces of artillery. This occurred about ten o'clock in the morning. The enemy retired altogether to the suburbs, and no further movement took place during the day.

The 18th October was the day fixed for the general attack of the whole of the allied armies on the grand army of Napoleon. History scarcely furnishes an example of so immense an army being brought into the field to act upon one point. The collective numbers may be estimated nearly as follows, though deduction should be made for the losses suffered in the battles of the preceding days. Napoleon himself, in making his proposition for an armistice, stated his force to be 230,000 men. There is, however, better reason to believe it did not surpass 160,000, if it even reached that number. A detail of his force a short time preceding mentioned 177,000 men, and a large garrison had been left in Dresden and reinforcements sent to Torgau.

The Austrians are said to have had about 80,000 men in the field, and with the corps of Wittgenstein and Kleist, under General Barclay de Tolly, consisting of about 60,000, formed a total for the grand combined army, under the chief command of Prince Schwarzenberg, of 140,000 men. Generals Benningsen and Klenau's corps of reserve consisted of 30,000 men; the army of the Prince Royal of Sweden, 60,000; and that of General Blücher, 60,000. The grand total of the Allies would be then 290,000, and of the combatants on both sides 450,000.

The superiority of numbers was evidently on the side of the Allies, but the enemy had advantages of position and his force concentrated. It required, therefore, a perfect combination on the part of the allied Generals to bring such a mass of force to act together, and to produce by one simultaneous effort the grand results that occurred. Soon after daylight in the morning the attack of the grand combined army commenced. The disposition ordered for the attack was as follows:—

The column of the right wing, consisting of the army of General Benningsen and of General Klenau, to attack the enemy in his position of Liebertwolkwitz on its left flank at Holshausen.

The 2nd, or centre column, consisting of the corps of Wittgenstein and Kleist, to attack on the right of the position of Liebertwolkwitz; the Russians and Prussian Guards forming the reserve to this attack.

The 3rd or left column, consisting of the divisions Bianchi, Lichtenstein, Weisenwolf, and Nastitz, under the command of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, to attack on the right bank of the Pleisse, along the road to Leipsic. Count Colloredo's corps formed the reserve to this attack.

The corps of General Giulay was to attack the enemy, or make demonstration if he could not force him.

In a conference held on the morning of the 18th, between the Prince Royal of Sweden and General Blücher, it was agreed upon that the corps of General Count Langeron should cross the Partha, and act in concert with the army of the Prince Royal, whose attack, however, by the subsequent operations of the several armies of Benningsen and Wittgenstein, became linked with others.

The enemy was driven from his position at Liebertwolkwitz, and pushed back as far as the villages of Stötteritz and Connowitz, which, in spite of every effort made by the allied armies, and of his being several times expelled from them, he still was enabled to retain with strong reserves, recover his ground, and maintain possession. The security of his retreat depended entirely on the obstinacy with which he could preserve these points.

Though the army of the Prince Royal of Sweden made a forced march during the night, yet it did not arrive on the ground time enough to commence its attack at the same moment as the grand army.

General Blücher had repaired to a plain which extends on the right bank of the Partha, in front of the suburbs of Leipsic, when he observed the attack of the grand army had commenced, and the enemy, who had been posted in great force on the opposite side of the river, retiring as if to the support of the troops already engaged.

The disposition of attack agreed upon between the Prince Royal and the General was that the Prince's army should cross the Partha river, direct itself on the high grounds of Taucha, and take the enemy in flank, whilst General Blücher was at the same time to make an attack on the town of Leipsic.

General Blücher, seeing the grand army engaged, and that the Prince Royal's had not yet arrived, while the enemy appeared to be drawing off his troops from the point on which the Prince was to advance, gave immediate orders for the march of Count Langeron's corps across the Partha, directed his cavalry to form in the plain to the right of it, and whilst awaiting the arrival of the troops at the appointed spots, disposed the Cossacks and light troops along the banks of the river, to watch the first favourable instant of crossing it, and brought up several batteries of artillery, with which he immediately opened a fire against the troops on the opposite side. This was replied to, but not long continued. The enemy left the bank, and the Cossacks, taking the infantry soldiers on their cruppers, were soon on the other side. The Prince Royal's army was now observed to be fast approaching, and the advanced guard of General Winzingerode's corps was already observed on the enemy's flank. The enemy's lines were observed to be then forming in very considerable numbers, with their left to the Partha, in front of the village of Schönfeld, and extending on the right by Paunsdorf towards Engeldorf. It was at this moment the preparations for the grand contest that was to ensue may be said to have become general. The ground was in general open and naked. The troops appeared ranged in lines or scattered in black columns to an extent all around farther than the eye could reach, and in numbers that surpassed all calculation. The cannonading and firing became general in all directions, and the villages, which always formed the scenes of the most obstinate conflicts, were soon enveloped in flames. The detail of the operations of each corps can only be given by those who personally witnessed them. General Blücher's operations were always such as to command the most marked attention. He no sooner observed the Prince Royal in movement than he directed the attack on the town of Leipsic; General Baron Sacken's corps was to undertake it, supported by that of General d'Yorck. The attack was conducted with such vigour that the suburbs were soon in our possession, and the troops approached the gates of the town. These, however, were barricaded, but the

obstacle that this presented would not have been regarded had not General Baron Sacken observed the enemy to be drawing in very powerful reserves to his support, not merely sufficient for defence, but such as might enable him to regain possession of the ground he had lost. His designs do not appear to have extended beyond the recovery of the suburb, which, after a considerable opposition, General Sacken abandoned again, about two o'clock, and retired to the houses and gardens which skirt it, from whence he maintained a constant hot fire of artillery and musketry during the remainder of the day, and kept the enemy in complete check, without calling in the aid of General d'Yorck's corps, whose exertions and whose losses in the battle of the 10th had rendered him unwilling to apply for its support.

At three o'clock in the afternoon the Swedish division of the Prince Royal's army arrived at the village of Lindenthal, and on asking General Blücher's directions for its guidance in crossing the Partha to join the Prince Royal, received an intimation of its being advisable to rest in a *third* line behind that of General d'Yorck, to aid, should the enemy make any attempt to escape from his critical position at Leipsic in that direction, and replace to a certain degree the corps of General Count Langeron, which was now hotly engaged on the other side of the river. In the afternoon, however, the Swedish division also passed.

Whilst General Sacken's corps was so warmly engaged in the suburbs of Leipsic, the Cossacks of General Blücher's army and the corps of Count Langeron had their full share also of honour. The Cossacks advanced against two regiments of hussars of the enemy, who on their approach made signs for a parley. It was to pass over to their side. They were Saxon corps, in the highest order. Several brigades and corps of Saxons and Wirtemberg troops came over to the grand combined army and to the Prince Royal's in similar manner.

Count Langeron had the charge of driving the enemy before him along the left bank of the river, in which he was perfectly successful and victorious, until he reached the village of Schönfeld, where the enemy made a most obstinate and determined resistance, which cost him great efforts to overcome; but after gaining possession of the village, the approach of large reserves and superior numbers again compelled him to abandon it. Of this event General Blücher, who was near the village, but on the opposite side of the Partha, received information about sunset. He gave instant orders for General Count Langeron to again attack it, and carry it at the point of the bayonet. Such orders, with the Russian infantry, are sure of compliance. The village was retaken, and remained in our possession for the night. In the contest for its occupation General Langeron lost about 3000 killed and wounded, at the lowest calculation. The enemy, by leaving his wounded, suffered in much greater proportion. Nearly at the same moment as this successful operation was closing the day, an aide-de-camp of the King of Prussia arrived, and brought General Blücher information of the success which had crowned the efforts of the allied forces on the other side, that the French army was in retreat, and desiring he would detach what cavalry and light artillery he could spare to harass them. General Blücher immediately detached General Waseletchoff, with a corps of cavalry, to Skeuditz, to pass the Elster where he could, and strive to molest the enemy, whilst he directed General d'Yorck to march to Halle, and move from thence over the Saale to Merseburg, or in such direction as circumstances might best point out.

Thus terminated the events of this day on the side of General Blücher's army, which may be considered as having been victorious on every point; for though General Sacken had been compelled to abandon the suburbs of

Leipsic, yet the vivacity of his first attack, and the vigour with which he continued during the whole of the day to molest the enemy and menace a repetition of it, compelled the enemy to withdraw a large force into the town, which became useless for any other object, whilst the operation of Count Langeron was crowned with complete success.

The Prince Royal's army had pushed the enemy before them on every point; and though the resistance made by the enemy at the villages of Stötteritz and Connowitz had enabled him to keep them at the close of the day, they were abandoned during the night, and the Allies remained complete masters of the field, with the certainty that the enemy's retreat from all points had already commenced. To cover this retreat the town of Leipsic and its suburbs were preserved, and became the scene of another obstinate contest on the following day.

At daylight in the morning of the 19th the enemy had retired altogether within the town and suburbs, with the exception of a few advanced posts on the south and east sides, which were soon driven in, and a general assault determined on.

General Bülow's corps attacked under the Prince Royal's command, and the corps of General Baron Sacken and of General Count Langeron under General Blücher's. The Prussians under General Bülow were observed to be making very rapid progress, while twenty battalions of Russian infantry of the two latter corps were collected nearly opposite the entrances on the north side, and under cover of a most formidable fire from about fifty pieces of artillery made their attack, the foremost battalions dispersing in small parties and pushing the enemy at every point where the ground best admitted, whilst the other battalions remained in reserve to supply the losses which this destructive mode of attack necessarily occasioned, the enemy firing from the houses and streets, which had been barricaded, and filled with obstructions of every kind, and making at every corner and every house a most obstinate resistance. After about three hours' firing, the musketry had penetrated from the suburbs into the principal streets of the town, and the victory became completely ours. The Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia entered the town on one side, the Prince Royal of Sweden at another, and General Blücher at a third. The acclamations with which all were received surpass all expression, and there was none of them whose appearance seemed to excite more enthusiastic feelings of joy and gratitude than the veteran warrior whose splendid and heroic achievements had so transcendently contributed to the success of the day. Scenes presented themselves which humanity would wish to have concealed. The dead and the dying absolutely obstructed the passage in the gates and streets, and it was difficult to restrain the numerous parties of cavalry that entered from riding over their mangled and distorted frames.

The King of Saxony, with all his court, were taken prisoners in the town, and his guards, his Generals, and a variety of German troops hastened to offer their services to the Allied Powers.

The absolute loss sustained by the enemy has not been nor cannot be as yet exactly ascertained. The following, however, is known:—Thirty Generals killed, wounded, prisoners, or abandoned the enemy's service. Among the French Generals are the names of Regnier, Charpentier, Bertrand, Lauriston, Delney, Aubry, taken; Latour Maubourg killed; as also the chief of the Polish army and insurrection, Poniatowsky. Eighteen battalions of Saxons surrendered themselves, and the Polish troops are following their example; 33,000 prisoners and wounded, 260 pieces of artillery, and 870 ammunition waggons; but artillery and ammunition it is certain has been left to a much

greater extent. The number thus given is what has been correctly ascertained to exist in possession of the Allies. The killed of the enemy must have been enormous, and it is supposed, on the whole, he did not carry off more than 60,000 men. Such is the general outline of the military results of the victory.

The loss of the Allies has been also severe. The collective numbers of killed and wounded cannot be much less in all the days than 50,000 men, but the wounded are taken good care of, and their services will be soon restored.

It is a singularity in the battle of Leipsic that it should have been the first one in which a British corps should have been engaged in active hostility against Buonaparte, the commander of which has sealed with his blood the victory that has been gained.

Amongst the persons who contributed to the success of the day may be fairly ranked Sir C. Stewart. The vigour of his counsels and the activity of his mind and body were obvious and powerful incentives to the resolutions of the Prince Royal of Sweden, not only on the days immediately preceding the actions, but in the precedent operations.

On the 16th he rode 100 English miles, and after accomplishing his great object of obtaining the Prince Royal's immediate co-operation, returned to the field in time to witness the completion of the battle, and to see victory declare on our side.

I have thus, my dear Colonel, given you the best relation I can of the important events that have been passing; and trusting in your indulgence to excuse all the inaccuracies it may contain,

I remain, &c.,

H. Lowe.

P.S.—I set off this morning to follow General Blücher, of whose further operations I hope to be enabled to give you some account.

I have picked up some maps of Leipsic and the neighbourhood, which I enclose.

Lieut.-Col. J. T. Jones to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Colchester, 23rd Nov., 1813.

I have the honour most respectfully to state to your Lordship that, during the time I have been incapable of service, I have drawn up from my notes a professional account of the sieges undertaken by your Lordship in the years 1811 and 1812.

As I think such an account could not fail to be of service to the army generally, by extending to all officers the information to be derived from those operations, I am desirous of publishing it; but previous to taking such a step, I deem it a duty to solicit your Lordship's permission.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and humble servant,

John T. Jones.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 24th Nov., 1813.

You will have heard of the counter-revolution in Holland by a letter which I understand Mr. Croker sent to you last Saturday. This will in all probability have decided the Hereditary Prince to return; but I shall comply with the Prince of Orange's wishes in writing him a letter to that effect. I had hopes of having been able to have sent off this letter two days ago, but the Admiralty could not spare a vessel on board of which the Prince might return.

I enclose the amount of the force we have scraped together to meet this emergency. Sir Thomas Graham will explain in his letter the delicacy he had in accepting the command. We have heard nothing more precise from Holland for the last two days. The wind is now unfavourable for anything to go out, which is unfortunate, as the arms which had been ordered out, and of which the Dutch stand in the greatest need, are still at the Nore, instead of being where they would have been by this time, on the coast of Holland.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Prince of Orange will sail on Friday for Holland.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Memorandum of Troops preparing to embark for the Coast of Holland.

24th Nov., 1813.

	R. & F.
Major-General COOKE.	
1st Foot Guards (Det.)	800
Coldstream (do.)	400
3rd Regiment (do.)	400
Major-General HERBERT TAYLOR.*	
35th Regt., 2nd bat.	600
37th Regt., 2nd bat.	500
44th Regt.	500
52nd Regt.	300
Major-General SKERRETT.	
55th Regt.	400
56th Regt., 3rd bat.	400
69th Regt., 2nd bat.	500
95th Regt., 3rd bat.	250
1 Veteran bat.	500
	5550

* He has declined in consequence of Her Majesty not liking to lose the benefit of his services at Windsor.

Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

My Lord, Frankfort on the Maine, 24th Nov., 1813.

Your Lordship is already aware of the general plan of the campaign, which had been in some measure laid down by the supreme power at the grand head-quarters; you are also informed by me of the Prince Royal of Sweden's objections to the operations that were fixed on, as also of his representations to His Imperial Majesty.

Since my arrival at Frankfort I have not learnt if any definitive resolution has been taken, and I am apt to believe that, although the army is in march, much change may still occur before the plan develops itself.

A deviation of no trifling nature has already occurred in the original intentions, and it is now said that the grand army, instead of going into Switzerland and Italy, shall pass the Rhine near Basle and Huninguen, and march direct on Befort, occupying the country in its neighbourhood. At the same time a strong corps traverses Switzerland, and by Milan comes into communication with Marshal Bellegarde's army, advancing from Vicenza. When the Italian army is nearer united with that acting from the Rhine, the operations will be combined, and they can mutually support each other. On the other hand the proposal for Marshal Blücher is to remain here, in the centre of the very extended line opposite all the fortresses, thirteen in number, which stare us in the face.

When we pass the Rhine at Mayence, the army of Silesia will probably be directed to play the same game they have hitherto pursued, retiring if the enemy advances upon them, while they will pass the Rhine and make demonstrations if the enemy moves all his forces against the grand army.

The army of the north enters Holland as already projected, and carries on its operations independent. The same idea pervades this plan as that we have already acted upon: Switzerland is to become another Bohemia; Blücher acts in the centre, and the Prince Royal in the north; the difference of execution, however, is the immense extent we shall act upon, and the want of communication between our armies. It is certain that Switzerland must be possessed; it is an appui essential to our flank in any operation; and it may be argued that, having the line of the Danube behind the grand army, the great resources in Bavaria, and the means we might form for supply, ammunition, &c., on the line of this river, afford facilities. Many declare also that, in all operations forward, Napoleon constantly, and every General of eminence, was ever partial to this line of operation.

All these reasons seem to have determined the great movement in this quarter, though when it will actually take place, and to what extent, is as yet doubtful. The head of the grand army will arrive at Freyberg about the 25th. About the 5th of December it is supposed a corps might get to Befort. In the mean time I do not hear that there are any orders here for movement of head-quarters, and I augur that discussions still prevail.

The general idea of the above I know to be General Knesebeck's, and adopted by the Emperor and Prince Schwarzenberg against General Radetzski's opinion.

General Gneisenau, with his usual activity, is much hurt at the present delay; seeing things protracted from day to day, he formed and submitted

a new plan to the Emperor, of which I send your Lordship a copy herewith. It is interesting from the very exact, unexaggerated state that it gives of the allied forces. I accompany this document with a copy of General Gneisenau's reasons against the plan adopted. These arguments lean to carry Marshal Blücher's army forward into Holland, instead of the Prince Royal's. Your Lordship, with all the accounts you receive, will be able to give these papers their due weight, and it would be superfluous in me to add any comments.

Indeed I am little tempted to be presuming enough to offer an opinion further than I think the first plan (which has been since modified) very objectionable. *Au reste* there are so many experienced officers here, that have over and over fought this ground, and who know every position in it; every fortress, its relative strength and importance, the real means of the Allies, their difficulties or advantages, that, in comparison with them, I am neither informed nor competent to give an opinion; and I deem it wisest to put your Lordship in possession of the information I get, leaving to far more experienced hands and better judgment the task of detailing the merits of the different plans.

I am of opinion that no great progress will be made in the organisation of the German forces before the allied armies pass the Rhine. While they remain nearly concentrated here, the different interests, the various authorities, the confusion that exists, and the means they swallow up, preclude the carrying into effect those detailed arrangements necessary for collecting, consolidating, and arming the German States. It is therefore much to be wished that such a disposition should be made of the great armies as would not impede the formation of those that would be so powerfully auxiliary, and that are coming forward. It is reported that Marshal Bellegarde's arrival here is anxiously waited for, in order to consult his opinions, and combine the movements of the army of Italy with that of the Rhine: on this ground delay is excused.

With respect to the army of the north of Germany, they seem to have come to the resolution here that in the event of the necessity of operations against the Danes continuing, and the Prince Royal still manifesting a disposition to engage in this warfare in preference to that of Holland, that they will, in such case, leave to the Prince Royal 50,000 men, including his Swedes, and consider him quite independent of all other operations, placing the army to enter Holland under the orders of another General. It is, however, to be presumed, from the accounts received yesterday, that the Prince Royal will direct his own march from Bremen to Holland, the Prussian troops having already entered it at various points, and I understand General Baron Adlercreutz will have the direction of the forces against Davoust and the Danes. This will be acceptable news here, if it turns out to be correct; and if the Prince Royal of Sweden is desirous of cordially connecting his movements with the allied armies, and shows a real disposition to that effect, it may allay those prejudices which have arisen against him, in many instances, I am sorry to say, from his own misconduct.

The affair of Dresden creates great discussion, and awakens the most lively interest here. Had the capitulation been ratified, Napoleon would have received 1700 officers who are there, which would have been no small

aid (in addition to the whole of St. Cyr's garrison) as a *noyau* to the new armies he is forming.

Prince Schwarzenberg's decision appears to me to have been quite right. Some differ on this point, and talk of honour, faith, and agreement; but, to my conception, none have been violated. The last report I hear on this subject is that St. Cyr and his corps have commenced their march to re-enter Dresden.

I have the honour to enclose what may be a very interesting document, an exact account of the garrison of the place.

The Chancellor Hardenberg has informed me that Modellin has surrendered. I believe there is no reason to doubt the certainty of its being in our possession in a few days.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Nombre, Disposition, et Emploi des Forces des Puissances Alliées.

Forces disponibles dans le moment actuel :—

A.

	Hommes.
Gardes Russes et réserves de Grenadiers ..	30,000
Corps d'armée de Wittgenstein	10,000
Armée Autrichienne	120,000
Armée de Silésie	52,000
Armée Bavaroise	30,000
	242,000

Troupes disponibles dans quelques semaines :—

B.

Corps d'armée de Kleist	15,000
Troupes des Princes de la ci-devant Confédération Rhénane (de la première formation)	20,000
	35,000

Renforts déjà en marche :—

C.

Pour le corps de Wittgenstein	15,000
Pour les corps de Langeron et Sacken ..	15,000
Pour les corps de Yorck et Kleist	12,000
	42,000

Troupes disponibles plus tard :—

D.

Toutes les troupes devenant disponibles après la reddition des places fortes sur l'Elbe :—	Hommes.	
Kleinau	18,000	
Chasteler	9,000	
Tolstoy	25,000	Hommes.
		52,000
Formations ultérieures des Princes de la Confédération Rhénane		150,000
Troupes que la Bavière a offert de fournir outre celle déjà mises en campagne		40,000
		242,000

De ces 242,000 hommes on ne mettra ici en ligne de compte que 121,000.

1. Les 30,000 Bavarois, ou un pareil nombre d'Autrichiens, restera sur la rive droite du Rhin pour observer Mayence. Ils ne s'en approcheront de trop près, mais ils prendront une position forte à quelques lieues de cette place, et se borneront à faire évacuer les villages dans le voisinage de Mayence de tout ce qui pourroit être utile à la garnison.

2. 212,000 combattans passeront le Rhin sur différents points, laisseront des corps d'observation devant Landau et Strasbourg, et prendront la direction sur Metz et Nancy.

3. Après la reddition d'Erfurt, ou après celle de Dresde, le corps de Kleist, et tout ce qui alors sera disponible de troupes de la ci-devant Confédération Rhénane, se mettra en marche vers le haut Rhin, pour, selon les circonstances, ou relever les corps d'observation en Alsace ou faire l'invasion de la Franche Comté du côté de la Suisse. Dans le premier cas les corps relevés formeront une réserve pour la grande armée.

4. Tout ce qui deviendra disponible de troupes des Princes Germaniques dans un tems subséquent se formera en une grande réserve, et prendra position là où le cours des opérations l'exigera.

5. Le corps de Walmoden, une partie du corps de Winzingerode, celui de Bülow se dirigeront sur le Bas Rhin, passeront ce fleuve, et tâcheront de percer par Liège et Givet.

6. Le corps de Thielmann se dirigera sur Ehrenbreitstein, y passera le Rhin, prendra la forte position de la Chartreuse, près de Coblence, et soutiendra, selon les circonstances, les opérations des corps qui se dirigent vers Givet ou celles de la grande armée.

7. Le corps d'armée Suédoise, une partie de celui de Winzingerode, et toutes les troupes qui deviendront disponibles après la reddition des places de l'Elbe, seront opposés à Davoust et aux Danois.

8. Supposé que la grande armée, en se dirigeant sur Metz et Nancy, laisse derrière elle 35,000 hommes pour l'observation des places de l'Alsace, il lui reste alors 182,000 combattans. Que l'on en déduit encore 7,000 en malades, etc., etc., reste 175,000 combattans. Ces 175,000 combattans seront alors joints par les 42,000 hommes de troupes de renforts (v. B.), et formeront une

armée de 217,000 combattans, qui auront une réserve de 100,000* combattans, et encore une autre réserve de 121,000 combattans.†

Rien n'empêche que les opérations proposées ne se commencent aussitôt; elles sont indépendantes de celles de l'armée d'Italie et de l'armée du Lord Wellington; et tous les succès que celles-ci pourroient remporter sont à l'avantage des armées du Rhin, et contribueront à leurs succès, sans en être la condition.

Par cette opération l'ennemi est forcé de mettre dans Mayence, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Metz, Thionville, Landau, Brisach, Sarre Louis, et dans les petites places des Vosges et du Rhin de fortes garnisons, des munitions, de l'artillerie, des provisions de toute espèce. Il ne lui restera par conséquent que très peu de troupes et de moyens pour en former une armée capable à nous résister, et de les doter en artillerie et munitions.

Si, après la formation complète des troupes de la Confédération Germanique, on ne seroit pas parvenu à dicter la paix à la France, nos grandes masses de troupes nous donnent alors la possibilité de menacer la capitale même, et de la soumettre en lui ôtant ses subsistances.

Disposition des forces quand la grande armée sera arrivée près de Metz et de Nancy.

	Hommes.
Près de Metz	212,000
En Alsace	35,000
Près de Mayence	30,000
Près de Coblence	15,000
En Alsace ou en Suisse	35,000
Près de Liège	50,000
Grande Réserve	121,000
	498,000
Devant Torgau	5,000
Devant Wittenberg	20,000
Devant Magdebourg	28,000
	53,000

II.

General Gneisenau's Observations on the Plan of Campaign.

Le plan de campagne discuté hier en présence de S.M. l'Empereur de Russie, et adopté, paroit défectueux en ce qu'il y est mis trop peu de poids sur l'invasion de la Hollande et du Brabant.

1. Tant que la Hollande reste au pouvoir de l'ennemi, il n'y a pas de sûreté pour le nord de l'Allemagne; et l'armée qui sera destinée ou de garder le Rhin ou de le transgresser sera rejetée dans l'intérieur de l'Allemagne du moment que l'ennemi, par des succès qu'il pourra obtenir ailleurs, sera en état d'envoyer une armée en Hollande, et de faire, basé sur les places fortes de ce pays-

	Hommes.
* Pris de Mayence	30,000
En Alsace	35,000
Troupes mentionnées sous B. ..	35,000
	100,000

† Troupes mentionnées sous D.

là, une invasion en Westphalie. Le sera-t-on, au contraire, une fois emparé de la Hollande, toute invasion contre le nord de l'Allemagne sera flanquée par notre armée en Hollande, et cette armée pourra être secourue à tout moment, la mer étant à nous.

2. La Belgique et la Hollande sont les pays les plus riches du continent. Si on ne tâche pas d'arracher ces provinces à l'ennemi, il en tirera de puissans secours en hommes, en numéraire, et en moyens de guerre de toute espèce. Ces moyens seront à nous si nous ne différons pas de nous en emparer.

3. La France est entourée de 130 à 140 places fortes. Ces places, autrefois les Boulevards de l'Empire, lui sont devenues dans les circonstances actuelles un fardeau immense. Doter dans son état d'épuisement toutes ces places en hommes, munitions, provisions de toute espèce, etc., c'est pour la France une impossibilité absolue. Au lieu donc de craindre ces places fortes et de les éviter, il faut, au contraire, se placer au milieu d'elles, et les menacer toutes. Alors on mette l'ennemi dans la cruelle nécessité ou de s'épuiser en ravitaillant toutes ces places, et y jetant tout ce qu'il peut ramasser de nouvelles levées, et par conséquent de n'avoir pas d'armée en campagne à nous opposer, ou pour former des armées disponibles en campagne de nous abandonner une partie de ses places fortes, qui alors nous formeront une base solide d'opérations.

4. Remettre la conquête de la Hollande à la bonne volonté du Prince Royal de Suède pourroit devenir dangereux. Il trouvera à coup-sûr des argumens à n'en rien faire. Si d'après le plan de campagne qui chargeoit l'armée de Silésie de l'invasion du Brabant, celle-ci auroit devancée l'armée du Prince Royal, et tournée la Hollande, on pouvoit alors se persuader que le Prince Royal s'est laissé entraîner par des motifs de vanité à entreprendre une conquête facile et peu dangereuse. Maintenant, où il ne verra pas une armée s'avancer pour porter les premiers coups, il trouvera l'entreprise trop périlleuse, et les moyens qu'on lui destine pour effectuer cette conquête sont, on ne sçauroit le nier, peu proportionnés à la tâche qu'on veut lui imposer. Cette fois-ci le Prince Royal aura de puissans motifs à se soustraire au rôle qu'on lui destine.

5. Ces négociations avec le Prince Royal, supposé même qu'elles prissent l'issue désirée, ameneront une perte de tems irréparable. L'ennemi, plus actif que nous à développer ses moyens de défense, et guidé par une longue expérience, employera ce tems à former de nouvelles levées et à exploiter des moyens de toute espèce.

6. Si, enfin, la négociation avec le Prince Royal n'aura point de résultat, et si on devra renoncer à l'invasion du Brabant et à la conquête de la Hollande, on aura alors le désavantage d'avoir laissé à l'ennemi la faculté de ne pas mettre des garnisons dans les places fortes de ces pays-là, et de former des troupes qu'il devroit y destiner, si nous dirigions nos opérations de ce côté-là, une armée puissante qui pourra nous gêner fortement dans nos opérations.

7. Faire l'invasion de la France du côté de la Suisse est une entreprise brillante mais dangereuse. On ne doit pas se dissimuler qu'elle contribuera à donner une force morale au gouvernement Français et de lui fournir le prétexte d'appeler aux armes toute la population du pays: la vanité nationale en sera blessé. Au lieu que se bornant à la conquête des provinces subjuguées par la France, et faisant connoître par des proclamations que c'est là le seul et l'unique but des puissances alliées, on laissera calme et passif le peuple Français, qui alors ne prendra part à la lutte qu'en tant qu'il y sera poussé par son gouvernement.

8. Pour porter la grande armée dans le voisinage du lac de Genève, il nous faudra un terme de tems de plus de cinq semaines. C'est un tems perdu pour nous. Pendant la marche de cette armée, celle du Maréchal Blücher sera paralysée. L'ennemi pourra se promener où bon lui semble.

9. La longue ligne de communication de la grande armée de l'intérieur de l'Allemagne avec un grand détour sur la Suisse à Paris avec de places fortes et de bonnes positions à sa droite doit nous inspirer de l'inquiétude, l'ennemi étant à même et de former des nouvelles levées et d'assembler beaucoup de troupes contre elle, y ayant le tems nécessaire et n'étant pas occupé ailleurs. L'armée de Silésie est à la vérité destinée à lui couvrir le flanc droit, mais la plus grande partie des troupes dont cette armée doit se composer n'est encore qu'à se former, et les 20,000 hommes de nouvelles levées en Westphalie auront en partie une autre destination, S.M. le Roi de Prusse ayant ordonné que de ces nouvelles levées on formât des bataillons de marche, pour en compléter les bataillons de tous les corps d'armée Prussiens. L'armée d'Italie ne pourra pas passer le Var que lorsque ou le sort de la France ou celui de cette armée sera décidé. Cette opération rassemble un peu à celle de Napoléon sur Moscou.

III.

List of the French force in Dresden at the time of the Capitulation.

Etat nominatif des officiers généraux qui se trouvoient à Dresde lors de la capitulation :—

Gouvion St. Cyr, Maréchal de l'Empire.

Généraux de Division.

C. Lobau.	C. Lapaude.	Dumoneau.
C. Durosnel.	Duvernet.	Gérard.
C. Dumas.	Berthezène.	Cassaghe.
C. Bonnet.	Razout.	Teste-freyre.

Généraux de Brigade.

Borilly.	Schram.	Paroletti.
Couture.	Bertrand.	Godart.
Goguet.	Letteleser.	Ed. d'Escleirn.
Hedmann.	Jacquet.	Ferensar.
Doucet.	Chartraud.	Gobrecht.
Weissenhoff.	Palkovsky.	Baltus.
Omeara.	Bernard (Westphalien).	

Etat numérique des officiers, sous-officiers, et soldats qui se trouvoient à Dresde lors de la capitulation :—

Corps d'armée.		
1er.	452 officiers.	6,507 soldats, compris les hommes malades.
14ème.	947 ,,	17,129 à la chambre.
Garnison	360 ,,	4,078, compris les hommes isolés.
	1,759	27,714
	Aux hôpitaux ..	6,031

Etat des bouches à feu laissées dans la Place de Dresde :—

	Mortiers.	Obusiers.	Canons.	Total.
Artillerie des corps d'armée ..	..	25	69	94
Artillerie de place	8	26	117	151
Totaux	8	51	186	245

Le Général chef de l'Etat-Major du 14ème Corps,

BARON DE BORELLI.

Lord Burghersh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Frankfort, 24th Nov., 1813.

I wish I could tell you that we had broken up from this place, but quite the contrary, we are losing time. The corps of Prince Schwarzenberg, 170,000 men, has, however, marched to the southward: it is now placed between the Neckar and Basle. Its first operation will be to occupy Switzerland with a considerable corps: the rest of the army will protect that movement, and be ready to march upon the French army wherever it may be assembling. The corps of Blücher, 60,000 men, is in front of this place, and will assist the movement of Prince Schwarzenberg. The corps of Bülow (part of the Crown Prince's army) is upon the Yssel. The whole of that force (saving a corps to watch Davoust in Hamburgh) is expected to march into Holland. Buonaparte is assembling near Metz. I confess I fear we are extending over too great a space. Holland and Switzerland are distant points for our flanks, particularly when the number of fortresses in possession of the enemy and between them is considered. But our sanguine people talk of having 600,000 men to oppose to him. God knows what may be the event of the campaign. Numbers are not wanting, but pour le reste, I don't think we have much to boast of. We talk of communicating with you. Dijon is looked to with great anxiety. I hope we may arrive there in safety. If we do, you shall hear from me.

Ever yours, my dear Lord Wellington, most sincerely,

BURGHERSH.

Captain F. Stanway to Lieut.-Col. Elphinstone.

SIR, San Sebastian, 24th Nov., 1813.

I am sorry to be obliged to report to you the conduct of the Spanish troops composing this garrison in regard to their stealing palisades, gates, all wooden buildings, and, in short, every article appertaining to the defences of the fortress that is made of wood. The palisading of the covert way has been several times completed, and as often destroyed by the soldiers again; the gates about the castle, the wooden store-houses, &c., left by the French, are nearly all burnt; and in another month, unless a stop is put to this practice, there will not be left any article of wood on the works. The traverses of casks on the grand curtain are entirely destroyed, as also several gates, &c.

I have made repeated remonstrances both by letter and personally to the governor on this subject, but without the least effect; he tells me he cannot make these troops obey his orders.

I was particularly directed, on my taking this duty, by Colonel Burgoyne, to secure the breaches from a coup-de-main by sinking the terre-plein behind them, or building dry walls, &c., which I have repeatedly done; and they are as repeatedly destroyed by the troops quartered in St. Elmo, who find by descending the breach a shorter road out than through the proper gateway.

I have had timber for firewood collected for the use of the garrison under the grand curtain, so that if any regularity were observed in fetching timber for use of the cooks, there would be no occasion to destroy the works.

I should, perhaps, have been justified in making these complaints sooner but that I did not wish to be premature in finding fault, and I had hopes the orders given by the governor would have put an end to such irregularities; but I find it has not, and I can assure you that unless steps are taken, it is quite useless endeavouring to put this place in a state of defence.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

F. STANWAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Major-General Sir E. Pakenham.

MY DEAR PAKENHAM, St. Jean de Luz, 24th Nov., 1813.

I return you Bouverie's letter. I should think that there being but one officer of the Mounted Staff Corps with the troops on the right of the army, he will have work enough without taking up the quarters of the Staff, and that it would be very desirable that Sir Rowland Hill could allot that duty to some other individual.

It has never appeared to me that this was, properly speaking, a duty of the Quartermaster-General's department. It used to be the custom to have a person called a *Fourier de la Cour* at the head-quarters of an army, to allot the quarters of the General Staff, which is now done at this head-quarters by Mr. Hooke, under Scovell's superintendence. And although the Assistant-Quartermaster-Generals can manage the business well enough with single divisions when they have the aid of the personal Staff of the General officers, I think that in the case of a more extensive command, such as Sir Rowland Hill's, it ought to be made a separate duty, on the same principle as at the general head-quarters of the army.

G. MURRAY.

The Marquess Wellesley to Earl Bathurst.

East Cliff Lodge, 25th Nov., 1813,
Thursday, 1 P.M.

MY DEAR BATHURST,

I return you many thanks for your kind attention. My brother Arthur's success at this crisis is most important. He has done much in driving the French from their strong position. In his letter to me (dated St. Pé, 14th inst.) he complains of the weather, the roads, and the Spaniards, and expresses an apprehension that he shall not be able to do more this winter. Rumour, however, has brought him to Bordeaux, and I shall not be surprised to hear that he is there soon.

I sincerely congratulate you on this and all the happy prospects before us. I trust that Italy and Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the states

on the Rhine (swallowed up by France since 1792) will settle the boundaries of the French empire for themselves, for us, and the world. If France be wise, she will call for the Bourbons, who (as I know) have learnt discretion and moderation in the best of all schools, the *long mornings* of adversity. This call would save much trouble, although even in that case much would remain before the elements of civilized society could be recomposed in a state of settled order. I am not surprised, although deeply grieved, at the spirit of jealousy which has betrayed itself in Spain. I always expected this difficulty to accompany our success; nor should I be astonished if we found the government and nobility of Spain, at a general peace, better inclined to France than to us.

Yours always sincerely,

WELLESLEY.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 25th Nov., 1813.

I had yesterday evening the honour of receiving by the Marquess of Worcester your Lordship's despatches of the 13th instant,* announcing another victory † obtained by the troops under your Lordship's command, and I lost no time in communicating to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent such welcome intelligence.

His Royal Highness commands me to say that it was most gratifying to him that the very day on which he had heard that the hereditary Electoral dominions of his sovereign and father had been restored, after having been for ten years groaning under the weight of foreign usurpation, should be also marked by his receiving an account of so glorious an achievement of the British arms, in which France herself will have witnessed the unrivalled courage of the British soldier, the exemplary exertions of the officers, and the pre-eminent abilities of the commander to whose former victories the events which have led to the restoration of the Electoral dominions may be to a considerable degree attributed.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has commanded me again to express that satisfaction which the conspicuous good conduct of Marshal Sir William Beresford and Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill has called forth on so many preceding occasions; and although the most brilliant part of the service did not fall to the lot of Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope and Don Manuel Freyre, yet His Royal Highness has equal reason to be satisfied with the execution of that which was under their direction.

You will also communicate to Lieutenant-General Sir Lowry Cole, Sir William Stewart, Sir John Hamilton, and Sir H. Clinton, and to Major-Generals the Honourable C. Colville, Charles Baron Alten, Mariscales de Campo Don Frederico Le Cor and Don Pablo Murillo, His Royal Highness's gracious acknowledgment and approbation of their distinguished services. I have had great pleasure in calling the peculiar attention of

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 279.

† Battle of the Nivelle.

His Royal Highness to the good conduct of Major-Generals Byng, Lambert, and Anson, in command of brigades.

You will not fail to communicate to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the several divisions, His Royal Highness's thanks for their valour and exertions on this occasion.

To Major-General Power, commanding the 8th Portuguese brigade in the 3rd division, and to the Portuguese officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, you will convey that sense of their distinguished exertions which His Royal Highness has had occasion so often to express in the previous operations of the preceding campaigns.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 25th Nov., 1813.

I forgot to ask Lord Worcester how you name the last battle. You will see I have called it the battle of the Nivelle. However, I will change it very readily to any other name, as I am by no means partial to it; on the contrary, I think it sounds ill. Be so good as let me know your wish upon it.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,
BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 25th Nov., 1813.

I very cordially congratulate you on the successful issue of your attack on the French lines, the intelligence of which was brought by Lord Worcester a very short time after I had closed my despatches yesterday to your Lordship.

Lord Worcester has told me that you had desired him to intimate to me that you purposed soon to close the campaign, unless there was anything in the operations of the Allies which made a continuation of it desirable.

At that time you were not aware of the details of the important victory at Leipsig, and of the consequent retreat of the French across the Rhine with little more than 60,000 men of their immense army. By the mail of yesterday you will also see that the Allies have no intention of stopping at the Rhine, and that the counter-revolution in Holland is calculated to add very much to the increasing embarrassments of the enemy. Under these circumstances you will probably have determined to continue the war on your side, if it be practicable, otherwise it will release a considerable part at least of the army now opposed to you.

Of the military expediency of continuing, your Lordship must be the best judge; but politically speaking, I must say we are here all most anxious that it should not be understood you have concluded your operations, knowing the prejudicial effect it will have upon our Allies. If it were to induce them to close the campaign, it is much to be apprehended that we should not be able to persuade them again to open it next year.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

I enclose another Gazette Extra of this day, by which you will see the progress of the allied arms.

Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir C. W. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Frankfort-on-the-Maine, 28th Nov., 1813.

I transmit to your Lordship a general outline of the arrangement for the army of Germany, as given to me by the Chancellor Hardenberg. By the next courier I shall send your Lordship the whole of this concern more in detail, with explanations.

Your Lordship will perceive that when the force is raised, and I see no reason to doubt its completion if vigorous and proper measures are adopted, we may arrive at an army of the following magnitude, arrayed for the cause of Europe and the Allies, which I think may bid defiance to all the efforts of Buonaparte:—

	Men.
German Army	291,120
Russian army, by treaty	150,000
Austrian army, by treaty ..	150,000
Prussian army, by treaty ..	150,000
Swedes	30,000
Total	771,120

besides what we may hope from Holland.

I do not think there is any event of much military importance to communicate to your Lordship, except that notwithstanding the report received when I last wrote that Marshal St. Cyr would re-enter Dresden, it has turned out that he refuses, and consequently the whole of his army will be treated as prisoners of war.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

[ENCLOSURE.]

ETAT de l'ARMÉE de l'ALLEMAGNE qu'on propose à organiser.

	Hommes.	Hommes.	Commandants.	
1er corps.				
La Bavière	..	36,000	Wrede	Avec les Autrichiens.
2ème corps.				
*Hanovre	20,000			
*Bronsvic	6,000			
Oldenburg	1,500			
Villes Anséatiques	3,500			
Mecklenburg-Schwerin ..	1,900			
		32,900	Walmoden ..	Dans le Nord.
3ème corps.				
Saxe-Royaume ..	20,000			
Saxe-Weimar ..	800			
Saxe-Gotha ..	1,100			
Schwartzburg ..	650			
Anhalt	800			
		23,350	Duc de Weimar	Dans le Nord.
4ème corps.				
Hesse Cassel ..	..	12,000	Prince Electorale de Hesse.	Avec Blücher.
5ème corps.				
Berg	5,000			
Waldeck	400			
Lippe	650			
Nassau	1,680			
Coburg	400			
Meiningen	300			
Hildburghausen .	200			
†Mecklenburg-Strelitz	600			
		9,230	Duc de Coburg	Avec Blücher.
6ème corps.				
Wurtzburg	2,000			
Darmstadt	4,000			
Frankfort and Isenberg	2,800			
Les Reuss	450			
		9,250	Prince Ph. de Homburg.	Avec les Autrichiens.
7ème corps.				
Wurtemberg ..	..	12,000	P. R. de Waldeck	Avec les Autrichiens.
8ème corps.				
‡Bade	10,000			
Hohenzollern ..	290			
Lichtenstein ..	40			
		10,330	Prince Eugène de Wurtemberg.	Avec les Russes à la grande armée.
		145,560		
Landwehr ..	..	145,560		
		291,120		

* On abandonne au Prince Régent d'Angleterre de fixer les contingens d'Hanovre et de Bronsvic, et de nommer le commandant en chef.

† Les Houssards de Strelitz sont déjà à l'armée de Blücher.

‡ Les Badois seront commandés par le Général Schaffer.

[715.] G. O. St. Jean de Luz, 29th Nov., 1813.

1. * * * * * * *

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The Commander of the Forces fully concurs in the sentence of the General Court Martial on the trial of Lieutenant ——, and he conceives that Lieutenant —— acted very improperly in refusing to take charge of the detachment at Toro when ordered to do so by the Commandant, and in quitting Toro without leave. He is at the same time convinced, from the perusal of the proceedings of the General Court Martial, that Lieutenant —— was really unable, from recent sickness, to take such a charge, and that his conduct is to be attributed wholly to that ignorance of his duty, and of the regulations of the service, and of the orders of the army, of which too many are guilty.

3. If Lieutenant —— had made himself acquainted with the orders of the army, he would have known that all officers at an hospital station are liable to do duty with the depôt, and under the orders of the Commandant, and consequently cannot quit the hospital station without his leave or order: he would likewise have known that if his health was not in a state to allow of his undertaking the charge of a detachment of convalescents on the march, he ought to have appeared before a Board of medical officers, who would have decided upon his case. Being ignorant of these orders, an attention to which it is obvious is necessary for carrying on the service, Lieutenant —— has got himself into this difficulty and disgrace; and the Commander of the Forces trusts that he has not mistaken the character of Lieutenant —— in believing that the fault was involuntary, that he was really so unwell as to be unable to take charge of the detachment, although desirous of joining his regiment, and that this reprimand will be sufficient to induce him and others to read with attention, and attend more strictly to the duties and conduct required from them by the standing regulations of the service, and the orders of the army.

4. With this hope the Commander of the Forces is induced to remit the sentence on Lieutenant ——, and he desires that he may be released from his arrest, and may join his regiment.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 1st Dec., 1813.

I received your letter of the 11th ult.,* relating to the army on the eastern coast, after the messenger was gone. If you can possibly do without that army, it will be most desirable for you to break it up; and you may therefore consider yourself fully authorised to make such arrangements as are most advantageous.

The contrary winds have prevented all succour from sailing to Holland, and their situation is critical.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Chiclana, 1st Dec., 1813.

The enclosed copy of my despatch home will show you what has passed in the Cortes on the subject of your command. I have no doubt that the question will be revived at Madrid for the purpose of turning out the government and the Minister of War. I understand that Agar and Ciscar have declared their intention of resigning in consequence of the decision of the 29th, and that the Minister of War and his agents are furious. They expected a victory, and had spared neither bribes nor promises to procure it. I am not surprised at their numbers. They have displayed nearly their whole strength in the Cortes, and had made this completely a government question.

One of my motives for wishing it to be brought forward here was the mischievous reports industriously circulated about Santoña; but I was not aware of the extent to which they had been carried until yesterday. Some secret information was sent to the Cortes from Biscay, stating it to be your intention to take possession of Santoña for the British government. The Cortes, as a matter of course, sent this to the Regency, who have thought proper to make a formal business of it, and, besides numberless insinuations promulgated by their agents, have sent it to the Council of State for an opinion! I have no doubt that the opinion of the Council of State will be what it ought to be, for they are fully aware of the objects of this government, and as much disgusted by them as we are.

I understand that the Committee of the Cortes agreed unanimously that there was nothing in the conditions made with you which was not perfectly consistent with the national decorum and with the rules of the Ordenanza. This, however, was not stated in their report; but Mendiola, in his speech, called upon them to declare whether it was not so.

The Cortes closed their sessions at the Isla on the 29th ultimo, and

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 275.

have fixed the 15th of January for their meeting at Madrid. I believe the Regency will set out about the middle of this month.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I sent 200,000 dollars to the eastern coast for the 1st and 2nd armies more than three weeks ago. The other 200,000 dollars, for the 3rd army and army of reserve, are waiting for a ship; and I suppose, as the sickness is said to be at an end at Cadiz, that one will soon arrive. I shall in future put a piece of ribbon round my private letters to prevent their being opened.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Chiclana, 30th Nov., 1813.

In my despatch, No.* , I informed your Lordship of what had passed upon the subject of Lord Wellington's command up to the 27th instant. The objections, however, which I had stated to delay, and some fresh intrigues of the Minister of War to procure partisans in the Cortes, determined our friends in that assembly to bring the question to such a point as should compel the Regency to maintain the engagements entered into with Lord Wellington until the extent of his powers could be finally settled at Madrid.

The Report of the Committee of the Cortes, to which this question was referred, and which was composed principally of supporters of the present government, recommended that the engagements made with Lord Wellington by the late Regency should be adhered to, but that his command should be confined to the provinces immediately upon the frontier.

The President of the Committee, Señor Don, refused to sign this Report, and gave a separate opinion that, whatever might be the decision of the Cortes, the Regency should be informed of the dissatisfaction of the assembly at the conduct of the Minister of War throughout this affair.

Señor Espiga proposed that, as some time must elapse before this delicate and important question could be finally settled, the Regency should be directed to manifest to Lord Wellington the great satisfaction which his conduct had afforded to the Cortes, and that they relied upon his acknowledged patriotism and love for the just cause for his continuance in the same line of conduct, the Cortes being determined to adhere scrupulously to the conditions under which he held the command.

This gave rise to a warm discussion, which would certainly have terminated in favour of the last proposition, had not the President, who is a supporter of the Regency, adjourned the debate to the following day.

After much discussion on the next day, the 29th, the following questions were put: First, Whether Lord Wellington should continue in the command of the Spanish armies; and, Secondly, Whether he should continue to exercise the command conformably to the conditions under which he now held it.

The first of these questions was carried unanimously in the affirmative. The numbers in favour of the second were 49 to 44.

The message sent to the Regency states that the Cortes have determined

* Blank in manuscript.

that for the present Lord Wellington should continue to exercise the command according to the conditions stipulated with the late Regency, and that the question will be finally settled at Madrid. The deputies, therefore, who wish to bring this forward as a charge against the Regency and Minister at War upon their arrival at Madrid have completely gained their object. It will not appear surprising that the numbers which voted in the minority upon the second proposition should be so considerable, when it is known that they compose nearly the whole support of the government in the new Cortes. The sentiments of the nation with respect to Lord Wellington may be gathered from the unanimity which prevailed upon the first proposition submitted to the Cortes. If so many deputies supported the Regents upon the second proposition, it is because they wished the question which it embraced to be considered as one upon the decision of which their continuance in office must depend, and that they put forth their whole strength and influence in order to carry it.

It may perhaps be said that as the numbers on both sides were so nearly balanced, it would have been better to have deferred the discussion of the question until the arrival of the government at Madrid; but it should be recollected that six weeks must elapse before the Cortes can assemble at the capital, during which period the Regency will be left with uncontrolled power, which might, and probably would, be exercised over Lord Wellington in a manner which would compel him to resign the command.

I trust, therefore, that your Lordship will be of opinion that, upon the whole, there is every reason to be satisfied with what has passed. It is a great triumph to our friends in the Cortes to have defeated nearly the whole strength of their opponents with less than half their own numbers. It is believed that one of the first measures of the Cortes after their meeting at Madrid will be the removal of the present Regency, and I think we may reasonably look forward to an improvement in our relations with the government of Spain.

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Chiclana, 1st Dec., 1813.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 6th ultimo.

The statement published in the supplement to the Regency Gazette of the 20th of October was taken from the translation of your Lordship's letter to me, which translation I forwarded to the government. Upon reading it, it occurred to me likewise that the word *saqueo* had a more extensive meaning than was intended to be conveyed by the word plunder; but upon my stating my objections to the person whom I employed to translate your Lordship's letter, he assured me that *saqueo* had exactly the same meaning in Spanish as the word plunder in English; and I received the same assurances the other day at the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In any case, as the statement was taken from the translation which was forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by me, I cannot well call upon the government to publish the explanation which you have suggested;

but I do not believe that any other meaning has been given to the passage in question than that which was intended by your Lordship.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and regard,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

H. Wellesley.

Lord Burghersh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord Wellington, Frankfort, 3rd Dec., 1813.

We have received the news of your success in the capture of Pamplona, and we have rumours through France of your having obtained advantages over Soult. I hope it will be confirmed. Everybody here is looking at you with admiration and with hope: you are considered the champion of the good cause. I wish things were going on here with as much energy as where you are commanding. Such as they are, however, I will detail them to you. Buonaparte was beaten at Leipsic with the whole force he could collect in France. The garrisons of his empire on this side had been marched to the grand army, so that the fortresses were without defence, either as to men or other necessaries. The French army that passed the Rhine at Mayence amounted to 90,000 men, most of them in a most wretched state. The Allies arrived at Frankfort with about 160,000 men. Blücher had 50,000 more upon Coblentz, Cologne, &c. A little rest might be necessary to these troops, but I cannot but feel a strong opinion that we should have taken advantage of the destruction of the French armies to have crossed the Rhine, and to have operated towards Metz and Luxembourg, Blücher upon the Maas, and the Crown Prince upon Holland. The time is, however, now gone by. A new system is decided upon, and co-operation on your part is called for. First, as to politics: the King of Naples is already looked upon as an ally; Schwarzenberg even looks to him for assistance with a considerable army for the attack of France. Next, en militaire, I am directed to tell you that it is resolved to carry the whole of Prince Schwarzenberg's army, 200,000 men, into Switzerland, and from thence, on the latter days of January next, to make a formal entry into France. The first results of this movement are expected to be the total conquest of Italy. The Austrian army from that country is then to enter France to the southward of the one from Switzerland; the King of Naples to the southward of that, who, it is hoped, will communicate with you.

4th Dec.

New plans are to-day in agitation. Schwarzenberg desires me to tell you that his whole army will be assembled near Basle in the beginning of January, and that he will immediately enter France; first directing himself upon Befort, next upon Langres and Dijon. The army of Italy is to be commanded by Bellegarde, who insists upon having 100,000 men; that force will be given to him, and be assembled towards the end of this month. I don't think, however, it will be effective above 80,000, if so much. The occupation of Switzerland is decided upon, but the troops will

not be ready to move till the 15th or 20th of this month. That operation will assist Bellegarde in Italy, and it is hoped the French will be forced in a very short time to evacuate Italy north of the Po. Propositions are gone to Murat to place his army in English transports, and under the orders of Lord W. Bentinck, who is to land, with an addition of his own troops, at Antibes.

5th Dec.

Don't think me mad for writing you such a letter, but I have seen Schwarzenberg, who tells me that he is in the greatest troubles; that the Emperor of Russia has opposed the entry of troops into Switzerland. For the moment, therefore, all plans are at a standstill. The army, which has marched nearly to Basle, may have to come back again; in short, all is confusion. Schwarzenberg will write to you as soon as the plans are settled. God knows when that may be. His army is still moving, and in a very short time will be placed in échelon between Stockach and Basle. It is impossible for him, however, to enter France from thence, threading the needle between the fortresses of Hunningen, New Brisach, and Strasburg on one side, and the doubtful neutrality of Switzerland on the other. I cannot write more at this moment; you shall hear from me by the first opportunity. You may guess how things are here by the contradictions in this letter. The Emperor Alexander three weeks ago was the most anxious for the occupation of Switzerland. The plan was formed upon that basis; the army was moved. He has now tacked about, and God knows what will be undertaken. Hopes are still entertained of persuading him for Switzerland.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord Wellington,

Yours most sincerely,

BURGHERSH.

The Quartermaster-General to Colonel Campbell.

MY DEAR SIR, St. Jean de Luz, 6th Dec., 1813.

Lord Wellington has kept your letter of the 4th inst., in order that some steps may be taken in regard to the measures which you state have been adopted by the Spanish military authorities to prevent you being supplied with forage in the country where your regiment is now cantoned; and I am to request that you will apprise me as soon as possible of the nature of the interference alluded to, and of the proofs of it which can be brought forward; in particular what evidence there is in regard to the seizing of the alcalde whom you mention to have been carried off by an order from General Morillo, in consequence of his having shown a willingness to supply your commissary with corn.

G. MURRAY.

ARRANGEMENT FOR OCCUPYING THE COUNTRY ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE RIVER NIVE.

7th Dec., 1813.

Sir Rowland Hill will put the troops under his orders in motion during the night between the 8th and 9th instant, so as to pass the river in force by the fords in the neighbourhood of Cambo at daybreak on the 9th.

Sir Rowland Hill will cause the bridge of Cambo to be established immediately on gaining the command of the right bank of the river.

When the passage of the troops has been completed, Sir R. Hill will move into the great road which communicates between St. Jean Pied de Port and Bayonne, and will advance by that road towards Bayonne, putting himself in communication on the left with the 3rd and 6th divisions; and ultimately Sir R. Hill will take up a position in the neighbourhood of Villefranque and Petit Mouguerre, occupying these villages as outposts merely, or in more considerable force, according to circumstances.

It will be necessary, during the above operation, that Sir R. Hill should send strong patrols towards St. Jean Pied de Port, as also to Hasparren and towards Louhossoa; and a body of infantry should be posted by Sir R. Hill near the village of Urcaray, which situation will enable it both to cover the bridge of Cambo and to serve as a support to the cavalry employed in observing the country towards St. Jean Pied de Port.

The troops to cross the river Nive, under the orders of Sir Rowland Hill, are:

The 2nd division of infantry.
The Portuguese division.
The brigade of cavalry under Colonel Vivian.
Major-General Alten's brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ross's troop of horse artillery.

Major-General Alten will detach one squadron to act with the 3rd and 6th divisions.

The troops under General Morillo are intended to guard against any attempt the enemy may make by the valley of the Nive to disturb the above operations; and Sir R. Hill will either leave that division at Itsassu or dispose of it in such other way as may appear best calculated for effecting that object.

With a view to the co-operation of the 3rd and 6th divisions in the operations of the troops under Sir R. Hill, Marshal Beresford will cause bridges to be established on the river Nive, in the neighbourhood of Ustaritz, during the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th.

Marshal Beresford will pass over a sufficient force, in the first instance, to the right bank of the river to protect these bridges, and will afterwards cooperate in aid of the movements of Sir R. Hill in such manner as may be requisite to enable Sir Rowland to occupy the position pointed out in his instructions.

A brigade of 9-pounders and a squadron of Major-General Alten's brigade will join the two divisions under Marshal Beresford on the 8th instant.

The 7th division will move on the 8th instant to the neighbourhood of the hill of Ste. Barbe and there encamp. One of the brigades of that division will relieve the outposts of the 3rd division, in order that the whole of the latter may be disposable to act on the morning of the 9th as occasion may require.

The 4th division will move forward from Ascain on the 8th instant, and will encamp in such a situation as will enable it either to give immediate support to the right of the Light division in the neighbourhood of Arcangues,

or to make a movement by its right towards Arrauntz, according to circumstances.

Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope will make such demonstrations on the 9th instant as may fix the enemy's attention in the quarter opposite the left of the army by the appearance of an attack being intended in that direction.

Major-General Charles Alten will make similar demonstrations on that part of the line which is occupied by the Light division, and he will communicate with Sir John Hope on the subject of these arrangements.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 7th Dec., 1813.

Lest the Regency should attempt to cavil upon the late vote of the Cortes respecting your command, I send you a copy of the resolution which was transmitted to the government, and you may rely upon its being a correct copy.

Ever yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Que interin las Cortes determinan el expediente del Duque de Ciudad-Rodrigo á su llegada á Madrid se prevenga á la Regencia que no haya novedad alguna en el mando que deve continuar como hasta aqui.*

Louis (afterwards Louis XVIII.) to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Hartwell, Comté de Buckingham, le 8 Déc., 1813.

Le Portugal conservé à ses souverains, l'Espagne rendue à Ferdinand VII., vous placent, Mylord, à côté du grand Marlborough; la gloire de le surpasser doit être le but d'une âme comme la votre. Vous y parviendrez; vous briserez le joug qui accable les Français; et c'est avec une entière confiance que leur Roi, que leur Père, vous voit sur le territoire de France. Le Chevalier de la Fitte et le Baron de la Barthe, qui vous remettront cette lettre, vous feront connoître les missions dont je les ai chargés, et je vous prie de vouloir bien les aider à s'en acquitter.

Recevez, Mylord, l'assurance de ma haute estime, de mon admiration, et de tous mes sentimens pour vous.

LOUIS.

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* *Translation.*—That while the Cortes are determining as to the course [to be adopted] with regard to the Duke of Ciudad-Rodrigo on his arrival at Madrid, it is notified to the Regency that there is to be no alteration in the command, which is to continue as heretofore.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope.

MY DEAR GENERAL, St. Jean de Luz, 8th Dec., 1813.

It is Lord Wellington's wish that you should avail yourself of the opportunity which the operations ordered to take place to-morrow may afford, to ascertain as accurately as possible the actual position of the force with which the enemy covers the town of Bayonne upon this side, and the nature and situation of the works that have been constructed to defend the approaches to it.

It has been understood that the position by which the enemy intended to cover Bayonne on this side would have its left on the river Nive, a little in advance of the Château de Mamac; that from thence the centre would follow the right bank of the little rivulet which, in the upper part of its course, separates the outposts of the Light division from those of the enemy; and that the right would be behind the same rivulet, at its junction with the Adour, a little below Bayonne.

It appears to Lord Wellington that by pushing back the enemy's advanced posts beyond the village of Anglet, it might be ascertained whether or not the enemy has taken his position in the manner above described, and in what state of defence it is; and possibly the same operation may afford an opportunity for reconnoitring the country on the left of the great road, towards the mouth of the Adour, with a view to the practicability of a bridge being eventually thrown over there in some future operation of the army.

I am to request you will understand, however, that it is not Lord Wellington's intention that the objects above mentioned should be pressed against any very serious opposition which the enemy may make, in case his force in front of Anglet should prove greater than it is supposed to be. His Lordship desires, therefore, that you will be so good as use your own discretion in regard to the advance to be made towards the enemy's position, as also in regard to the withdrawing of the troops after the objects of the movement have been effected. It may possibly be found expedient to delay this latter operation until night, in case there is an appearance of the enemy being prepared to follow in considerable force.

You will be so good as make use of the co-operation of the Light division in such manner as you may deem expedient, without uncovering that part of the general line of defence which it occupies.

Believe me, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

In case of your not understanding that Lord Aylmer's brigade, or the 12th Light Dragoons, are subject to act to-morrow under your orders, I think it right to make you aware that both Sir Stapleton Cotton and Lord Aylmer have been apprised that these corps are liable to act under such instructions as you may think proper to send them.

Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir C. Stewart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, St. James's Square, 9th Dec., 1813.

On my arrival in London, on my way to resume my situation with your army, I have been offered by Lord Bathurst and the Duke of York the command of the three regiments of hussars now under orders for service.

I am so feelingly alive to the marked kindness and distinction you have shown me by keeping open the appointment of Adjutant-General for me for so long a period, that I had not a moment's hesitation in stating both to Lord Bathurst and the Horse Guards that I could not accept of any command which was not sanctioned by your complete concurrence, and, in fact, arising from your disposition with regard to your army. I consider myself, from your late uncommon attention towards me, more than ever bound to be disposable as you may think fit. If it should fall within your arrangements to place me in the command of a division of cavalry of which the hussars might form a part, it would be uncandid not to confess that I should accept such a trust with the most ardent satisfaction and humble hope I might acquit myself so as to gain your confidence and approbation. If, on the other hand, from late arrangements and other circumstances in your army, you should find it most expedient to retain me where I am, be assured I shall do my utmost, with renewed zeal, to retain that affectionate regard you have lately so amply manifested towards me, and, putting all personal inclination aside, buckle cordially to whatever you point out. I think they will not appoint another General officer to these regiments until they hear from you; and as I see no immediate probability of your moving, I should be anxious, if possible, to receive your answer to this before I start from hence, as it would be of moment to my little concerns, whichever line of service I am to look to, to know it here. I have also some business which will detain me long enough to receive your answer, which will regulate mine to the War Department and the Horse Guards. I have only once more to assure you that I have quite determined to be happy in any decision you may make for me, for that I am, more than ever,

Yours, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 10th Dec., 1813.

The Russian ambassador has pressed me very frequently on the subject of your Lordship's advance into France at the time when the Allies propose advancing thither also.

I have represented to him the hazard of that measure unless you were

fully aware of the plan and progress of the allied arms, and were not fully assured that no armistice would take place. I have also endeavoured to explain to him how necessary it was for you to economise your force, as we had not the same resources the Russian empire had; that if I pressed you, you might ask me, If by advancing now I lose half my army, will you promise me to replace it?

The result of these conversations has been his proposing you to be put into direct communication with the Emperor, at least with his Secretary of State, Count Nesselrode. I have the more willingly agreed to this because you may make your advance the effect of the Emperor's solicitation and in confidence of his assurances of support. Part of his court and army are beginning to be tired of a war in the succeeding events of which they are not interested; and it will be desirable to have his personal engagements with you to confirm him in his resolution to proceed.

I shall send you a cypher, with which you will carry on your correspondence, as the Russian Minister will be also provided with it. It will be, however, proper that you should have communication at the same time as to movements with the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, Prince Schwarzenberg; and the same cypher will answer.

It will be fit that you should be in possession of the state of our transactions with the two Courts of Russia and Austria. I have therefore desired the Foreign Office to send me copies of the late overtures to France, and our comments upon it. I shall also desire copies to be sent of the plans of campaign. I confess I think that the Prussian General's note against the Swiss plan is most worthy of attention, and I regret that his representation is not likely to be followed.

It would be very desirable for me if you would enable me to form an opinion as to your future operations. I will tell you very fairly my doubts on all the points which present themselves.

The small force which we have sent to Holland (or rather, I am sorry to say, mean to send, for the easterly winds still detain them) is avowedly to support the Dutch in the infancy of their exertions; and although we now consider ourselves as much bound to support the cause of Holland as we have done the cause of the Peninsula, we are not equally compromised as to the means by which we are to support it.

Looking at the question generally, as to the best means of forcing the French to a secure peace, it appears to me that if we had our option, it would be better for us to throw our whole force as much as possible to cooperate with the Allies in the Netherlands, than in the divided manner we are all likely to act. In addition to the reasons given for operations from Mayence down to the Netherlands by the Prussian General, there would be this advantage in commencing a negotiation for peace: that having occupied the country up to the frontiers of old France, we might set off on the principle of *uti possidetis*, which is always a simple basis; and France would not like a negotiation to be broken off which proposed the surrender of that in which she was not interested, when the consequence of breaking it off would be the invasion of her own immediate territory. To this plan, however, there are two great objections: first, that the Allies will probably not act in this direction in any considerable force,

unless indeed the Dutch counter-revolution should alter the plan; and secondly, an army or even a considerable part of an army cannot be readily transported from the frontiers of the south of France to the Scheldt. Add to this that I doubt very much whether the Spanish army would be equal to defend their own frontiers, with all the advantage to be derived from the fortresses of Pamplona and St. Sebastian; and the jealousy and pride of Spain would not trust a Portuguese army with the possession of either of them.

The British army must therefore, I conclude, continue acting in its present destination. The Portuguese force will continue with you, but from what I hear of Spanish discipline you must not expect much assistance from them. Will you be able to advance before the spring? Can you hope the operations of the Allies will be such, if this plan of theirs is to be acted upon, as to enable you to derive any support from them? I confess I doubt very much whether you will derive any, except what must have arisen on march, when the Allies were acting on Dresden. If you advance (the capture of Bayonne will probably be your first operation), what object do you propose in advancing? What effect is to be produced? What means present themselves to secure yourself as you go on? You will probably find yourself master only of the ground you occupy.

By keeping the sea close upon your left, you may maintain your communications. But unless we can hope that the country will rise in your favour, it appears to me that we cannot foresee the point on the arrival at which you could commence a negotiation of peace with advantage. We could not offer to give up the country you had passed over in return for what would improve the Dutch frontier, for it might be truly answered that it had ceased to be under our control the moment we had left it.

These objections do not apply to your proceeding from Holland into the Low Countries, but then we could transport you, but not your army.

The packet having been taken which brought probably despatches from you, I am left much in ignorance of your present position and plans, as I have not heard from you for the last month almost. I am afraid I have written on so blotted a paper that you may have some difficulty in reading it, but I did not discover the blot until I had come upon the side of the paper on which it was.

I am, my dear Lord, yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

I doubt whether all the papers I have named will be sent in time; for the most material paper, the plan of the campaign, has, I have just heard, not been returned from Carlton House. Your communications must be through Switzerland.

Be so good as to send back the papers at your leisure.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Alphabet.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I or J	K	L	M	
A.B.	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	w	x	y	z	A.B.
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i or j*	*k*	*l*	*m*	
C.D.	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	w	x	y	z	n	C.D.
E.F.	p	q	r	s	t	u	w	x	y	z	n	o	E.F.
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i or j*	*k*	*l*	*m*	
G.H.	q	r	s	t	u	w	x	y	z	n	o	p	G.H.
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i or j*	*k*	*l*	*m*	
I.K.	r	s	t	u	w	x	y	z	u	o	p	q	I.K.
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i or j*	*k*	*l*	*m*	
L.M.	s	t	u	w	x	y	z	n	o	p	q	r	L.M.
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i or j*	*k*	*l*	*m*	
N.O.	t	u	w	x	y	z	n	o	p	q	r	s	N.O.
P.Q.	u	w	x	y	z	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	P.Q.
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i or j*	*k*	*l*	*m*	
R.S.	w	x	y	z	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	R.S.
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i or j*	*k*	*l*	*m*	
T.U.	x	y	z	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	w	T.U.
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i or j*	*k*	*l*	*m*	
W.X.	y	z	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	w	x	W.X.
Y.Z.	z	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	w	x	y	Y.Z.
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I or J	K	L	M	

En se servant de ce chiffre il faut que celui qui écrit désigne la *ligne* (dont il s'sert en substituant les lettres fausses pour les véritables) par une des 24 lettres capitales mises à côté du tableau ; et en observant cette précaution on peut changer les lignes des lettres substituées à son gré. Par ex. : J'ai à écrire *L'Empereur Alexandre et l'Empereur François.* La combinaison de lettres sera ce qui suit :—Je me plais de me servir d'abord de la ligne *N* et ensuite de la ligne *Z*.

N *r y s i y l y b l* t r y d t g x l y Z q h *x q y d q f q i f* r f z b o c u g,

dans laquelle chacune des deux combinaisons sous-lignées veut dire *l'Empereur*, et de cette façon le même mot pourra être rendu par douze combinaisons différentes.

La ligne N pourra être également désignée par *N* ou *O*.

Voici les substituans des numérales : 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0.

Ecrivez : 7, 3, 1, 9, 8, 2, 4, 5, 6, x.

Pour faciliter le travail on pourra répéter la première moitié de l'alphabet en sus de chaque ligne, et en encre rouge.

On fera bien d'insérer de temps en temps quelques mots en clair, seulement pour déguiser le chiffre.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 10th Dec., 1813.

Your Lordship will receive a letter addressed to you by Mr. Goulburn, my Under Secretary, recommending le Chevalier Lieutenant-Colonel de la Fitte and le Baron de Barthe to your Lordship's protection. You will understand that the object of these gentlemen is to proceed to France on the part of the French Princes.

I am, my dear Lord, yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Cadiz, 10th Dec., 1813.

A few days previous to the removal of the Regency from Cadiz to the Isla de Leon, I received a private letter from your Lordship in which you stated your intention of moving the British troops from Cadiz as soon as you could dispose of the numerous stores belonging to the British government at that place; and you left me at liberty to communicate your intention to the government in the manner I should think fit.

I did not think it necessary at that time to do more than apprise one of the members of the Regency (Mr. Agar) of your Lordship's intention; and all I could gather from his answer was, that the number of British troops at Cadiz was so inconsiderable as to make the time of their removal a matter of indifference to the government.

On the 23rd of November two members of the Cortes (Messrs. Antillon and Capaz) rose to call the attention of the Assembly to the danger to which the country was exposed, which, in their judgment, became more formidable in proportion as the Allies were successful; and they noticed the continuance of the British troops at Cadiz, declaring it to be their opinion that they should immediately be sent away. These gentlemen took occasion to deliver their sentiments in the manner I have stated, immediately after the Minister of War had communicated to the Cortes the glorious intelligence of the successes of the Allies in the north, and of your Lordship having attacked and carried the French lines.

Although these speeches were not followed up by any resolution, yet I thought it advisable to communicate officially to the Minister for Foreign Affairs what I had before stated verbally to one of the Regents relative to your Lordship's intention of removing the British troops from Cadiz, and I enclose a copy of my letter to the Minister with his reply.

I have since, however, received another letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which a copy is likewise enclosed, and which I shall notice in no other way than by saying that I have forwarded it for your Lordship's consideration.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

H. WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to his Excellency Don Fernando de la Serna.

SIR, Chiclana, 25th Nov., 1813.

I think it necessary to state to your Excellency, for the information of the Regency, that some weeks ago I received a letter from Lord Wellington apprising me of his resolution to remove the British troops from Cadiz as soon as he could dispose of the numerous stores in that place, which require a certain number of troops to take care of them. His Lordship likewise informed me that I was at liberty to communicate his intention to the Regency whenever I should judge it advisable; and I accordingly apprised

one of the members of the Regency of it previously to the removal of the government from Cadiz.

I request your Excellency to accept, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 10th Dec., 1813.

I have received your letter of the 19th November.* I have likewise received all those which you have noted in the margin.

You will see by my official letter of this date what has passed on the subject of the British troops at Cadiz. I have no doubt that the last letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs was a piece of revenge of the Minister of War on account of his defeat in the Cortes.

I propose to set out for Madrid in a few days.

Ever yours most affectionately,

H. WELLESLEY.

Capel says that there are stores here to the amount of more than a million sterling.

As my papers are packed up, I cannot refer to the date of your letter in which you state your intention of removing the British troops from Cadiz.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Cadiz, 10th Dec., 1813.

I have received your letter of the 24th ultimo.†

You are so much better a judge than I am of the manner in which the subsidy should be distributed, that I have only to acquiesce in whatever you may think right. If you mean, however, to make any formal proposal to the Spanish government, I would suggest whether it might not be better to wait their arrival at Madrid, in order to see whether any change is likely to take place. My reason for suggesting this arises from a conviction that anything you propose, under existing circumstances, will be misrepresented in such a manner as to indispose all that part of the army which is not to have a share of the subsidy. This will not be the case if the change which I expect upon our arrival at Madrid should take place; or even if this government should be continued (which I think almost impossible), there will be less danger of their misrepresenting what you propose at Madrid than at this place.

The expense of the depôt at the Isla, including General Doyle's allowances, is not more than from 4000 to 5000 dollars a month. It is fair that I should state, however, that it has not lately produced any

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 300.

† See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 315.

men, because the recruits that were intended for it have all been sent to America. Three thousand recruits have been promised by the Captain-General, and are expected immediately; and I should think that it might be fairly calculated that it would produce from 8000 to 10,000 men annually in such a state of discipline as those which have fought under you in the Pyrenees. The question is whether it is worth while to give 50,000 or 55,000 dollars annually in order to keep up this establishment: if not, it must fall to the ground, for it may be relied upon that if we abandon it, the Spaniards will not pay a farthing towards its maintenance.

I should be sorry to see General Doyle turned adrift, but I really state this for your consideration without any reference to him.

I think that both Whittingham and Roche will wish to give up their corps unless they are paid from the subsidy, or unless there is some certain provision for their payment. Under the present government there is a decided objection to the employment of foreigners in the service, and I apprehend that the corps commanded by foreigners would be the last to be paid.

The main point, however, is that the corps opposed to the enemy should be in a good state, and with this view I think the plan proposed by you is the best that could be devised. When you propose it to the British government, I shall be obliged to you if you will say that you have apprised me of your intention, because I have once or twice received letters from Lord Castlereagh written as if I had shown a disposition to oppose some of the arrangements for the subsidy; whereas my only wish is to promote whatever arrangements you may think right.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Guethary, 10th Dec., 1813.

I have the honour to report to you that, in obedience to your orders, conveyed by the Quartermaster-General's letter addressed to me on the 8th instant, the troops under my command advanced yesterday in three columns in the direction of Bayonne, for the purpose of forcing back the advanced posts of the enemy, and of affording an opportunity of reconnoitring the position which he occupies in front of that town.

The left column, under the orders of Major-General Hay, was pressed somewhat forward, being destined to turn the right of that portion of the enemy's force which was in front of the village of Anglet, and moved by the heights of Biaritz. The centre column, commanded by Major-General Howard, advanced by the great road direct upon the village of Anglet. The right column, under the command of Colonel Halket, having passed the valley which lies in front of our piquets and of those of the Light division near the head of the morass, was a little held back, and, passing under the heights of Anglet, gained the summit of that ground.

The nature of the ground was extremely favourable to the enemy, and he opposed a considerable resistance to our advance, particularly on both sides of the great road and upon the heights of Anglet.

The effect of the movement was, however, to turn the right of his advanced posts and of the successive positions taken for their support by the force which he had in front of the village of Anglet, and he was ultimately forced back and driven through that village with precipitation into his intrenched position.

The troops under my orders were then placed in position in rear of the village of Anglet, with their advanced posts close to the enemy's works, and remained in that situation during the day. This afforded the opportunity desired of reconnoitring the enemy's position, as well as the nature of the river; and as Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne as well as the officers of the Staff Corps were employed in that way, I hope I shall be able to transmit to the Quartermaster-General, for your Lordship's information, their more detailed reports upon the objects of our movement.

During the whole of the day I had the most perfect reason to be satisfied with the manner in which the officers commanding the three columns conducted their advance, and particularly with the manner in which the connection was kept up between the columns.

Captain Ramsay's troop of horse artillery moved with the left and centre columns, and I had much reason to be pleased with the active and judicious manner in which he and his officers conducted themselves, and with the effect of the fire of the troop. Captain Ramsay was slightly wounded. Three squadrons of the 16th Light Dragoons, under the direction of Major-General Vandeleur, accompanied the movement of the troops. Our loss, I am happy to have reason to think, was not so considerable as might have been expected; that of the enemy, judging from their dead which were left, must have been considerable.

I had requested Major-General C. Alten to move forward a portion of his division to give security to the right of our movement, which the General immediately complied with, and which had the desired effect.

The vicinity of our position to the enemy made me deem it expedient not to withdraw the troops till after dark, when they returned to their cantonments.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your obedient humble servant,
JOHN HOPE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Guethary, 11th Dec., 1813.

I have the honour to report that yesterday the enemy, having previously driven in the advanced posts of the Light division, which connected with the right of the troops under my orders, proceeded about 9 A.M. to force back the advanced posts of the left column stationed on the right of the great road leading to Bayonne.

The Caçadore battalion of Brigadier-General Campbell's brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, which formed these advanced posts, conducted itself with the greatest gallantry; and being supported, as soon as it was possible, by Brigadier-General Campbell, with the remainder

of his brigade, effectually contributed to check the advance of the enemy until support could be brought from the cantonments more in rear.

Major-General Bradford's Portuguese brigade, and the 5th division commanded by Major-General Hay, were, on the first alarm, moved forward from their cantonments; and the ground on the right of the great road, immediately in front of what is called the Mayor's house, was strongly occupied by Major-General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, and the Portuguese brigade of Brigadier-General Campbell, and the 5th Caçadores, and 24th regiment of Major-General Bradford's brigade, the remainder of that brigade as well as the rest of the 5th division being kept in reserve, or occasionally brought forward to support the troops which were engaged during the day.

The two brigades of Guards and Lord Aylmer's brigade were also moved from their cantonments, and arrived in the afternoon near the point attacked.

In the course of the day the enemy made three powerful efforts with a large portion of his force to obtain possession of the ground on which the troops were posted, but was repulsed in each with considerable loss.

It is with peculiar pleasure that I report to your Lordship that nothing could exceed the good conduct of the whole of the troops engaged.

The brunt of the action fell upon the 5th division, and more particularly upon Major-General Robinson's brigade. The Major-General, I am sorry to say, while gallantly exerting himself in the command of his brigade, received a severe wound.

I have the honour to enclose a report, received from Major-General Hay, who commanded the 5th division, which is so full that it may be unnecessary for me to enter into more detail.

To the Major-General, as well as to Major-General Robinson, to Major-General Bradford and Brigadier-General Campbell, as well as to Colonel Do Regoa, and their staff, I am particularly indebted.

The conduct of the Portuguese troops on this occasion is particularly deserving of commendation in common with the British troops, they having maintained their ground under disadvantageous circumstances; and when hard pressed or forced to retire before superior numbers, they rallied with great readiness, and in spite of all opposition re-occupied their ground.

I was most essentially assisted by Colonel De Lancey, Deputy Quarter-master-General, and Captain Herries of that department; by Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald of the Adjutant-General's department attached to me, and by my personal staff, Captains Napier and Wedderburn, and Lieutenant Moore.

The action ceased with the close of the day, and the enemy, who suffered severely, occupied the ground immediately in our front.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

P.S. I observe that I have omitted to mention to your Lordship the good conduct of Colonel the Honourable C. Greville, commanding the 2nd brigade of the 5th division, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd of the 84th, Lieutenant-Colonel Piper of the 4th, and Brevet-Major Tonson of the

84th regiment, who successively took the command of Major-General Robinson's brigade when the Major-General was wounded. I regret to say that Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd was killed.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Arrauntz, 11th Dec., 1813, 7 A.M.

I received here on my way to the front your letter of last night. I have already sent the information you desired to Sir Rowland Hill, and Sir H. Clinton has his orders.

I will in every particular conform to your instructions. I am not sure the bridge of river boats can be removed to-day, as the upper bridge was not finished last night; and if the river increases much, the part of the lower bridge that leads from this side to the pontoons will be impassable; thus taking up the bridge of river boats, we might be left at a critical period without a passage. But as soon as a passage is secured by the upper bridge, or that we can ascertain the lower one will give us a passage whilst the operation of removing the bridge of river boats is going on, this latter will be immediately begun upon. I did not see Lord FitzRoy yesterday after parting with you, but you expressed yourself the wish to have the bridge of boats removed, and every effort has been making to comply with it. I give you joy on the success of yesterday.

Yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[716.] *To Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL, 12th Dec., 1813, ½ past 12 at noon.

The enemy have a considerable force assembled in front of Sir John Hope, and are keeping up a tiraillade; but there is no immediate appearance of attack.

I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether you have established any post on the Adour. It is very desirable that you should do so, as I understand that we should thereby render the remaining of the army at Bayonne nearly impossible.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Guethary, 12th Dec., 1813.

I have the honour to inform you that yesterday morning, as soon as it was light, it was perceived that the enemy had retired from the immediate front of the advanced position held by the left column in front of Bidart, leaving only piquets of observation on that ground. He continued, however, to hold the ridge which extends from that ground in the direction of Bassussarry.

The piquets which the enemy had left in front of the advanced position were forced to retire by some troops which were moved forward for that purpose, and some posts of observation were again replaced upon it.

The enemy, however, again began to assemble on the ridge which extends towards Bassussarry, and at 3 in the afternoon again attacked the advanced position in great force.

I am happy to have to report to your Lordship that, on this occasion, the gallantry of the troops was not less conspicuous than on the 10th, and every attempt of the enemy to force the advanced position was thereby completely foiled.

On this occasion, as on the 10th, the 5th division, commanded by Major-General Hay, was chiefly engaged, and particularly distinguished itself. The report made to me by Major-General Hay, and transmitted with my letter of yesterday's date, will convey to your Lordship further particulars relative to that division.

In justice to that division, however, I ought particularly to report to your Lordship that both on the 10th and 11th the good conduct of the Royals, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Barns; of the 4th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Piper, afterwards by Captain Kipping; of the 9th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron; of the 59th regiment, commanded by Major Hoysted; of the 84th regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd, and (after the Lieutenant-Colonel was killed) by Captain Jenkins, who, though twice wounded, did not quit the field; and of the 3rd Portuguese regiment, commanded by Colonel MacCreagh, as well as that of Lieutenant-Colonels Berkeley and Gomm of the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General's departments attached to the 5th, as well as to the personal Staff of Major-Generals Hay and Robinson, was particularly deserving of commendation.

A small portion of Major-General Lord Aylmer's brigade was engaged on the 11th, and the light companies of that brigade, under the command of Major Deshon of the 85th regiment, were particularly engaged with the 5th division in repelling the attack of the enemy.

On this occasion, as on the 10th, I have to express my thanks to the Deputy Quartermaster-General, Colonel De Lancey; Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, Assistant-Adjutant-General; Captain Herries, Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General; and my personal Staff.

Captain Napier of the Chasseurs Britanniques, my aide-de-camp, has been severely wounded.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Ustaritz, 3 o'clock P.M., 12th Dec., 1813.

I have received your letter of this mid-day.* You do not say whether or not, since the move of the 7th division to Arbonne, I am to call it to this place in case Sir Rowland Hill calls for the 6th division. I conclude, however, that to be your intention; as if Hill wants force on his side, there will be no probability of the 7th division being wanted where it is.

The enemy opposite us is as nearly as possible as he was yesterday. He has three masses along the flank that runs from opposite the house of Arcangues to the point in front of the bridge of Urdanche, which is now Colville's right, and I consider each mass as a brigade. He has a considerable number of guns along there. He has this day brought out another division from Bayonne, but which did not come far out of town, and piled arms. It had not left that at 12 o'clock. I do not see anything towards Hill. The bridge was down last evening: it is not so conveniently placed as I could wish. But we are much in want of many materials that we cannot procure here. I hope, however, by degrees to get it where I wish. I propose getting the pontoons out of the water as soon as possible, but I would wish to repair the standing bridge where they are first, as by the upper bridge is a very great round to Ville Franque. The anchors of these pontoons are with the bridge of boats, nor have we enough, and it would be well if some anchors could be sent to us from the sea-side, and their proportionate cables: we might then be enabled to put a bridge across where we pleased. At present the pontoons must move without their anchors.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. Beresford.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Guethary, 13th Dec., 1813.

I have the honour to report to you that this morning the situation of the enemy's posts was the same as last night, and he occupied the ridge of Bassussarry in considerable force.

It does not appear to me that he intended to attack our advanced position, but a firing of musketry was brought on between our posts and his; and he having reinforced his advanced people, the firing continued with little intermission till towards the afternoon. The 1st brigade of Guards, and one battalion of the 2nd brigade, Lord Aylmer's brigade, and Major-General Bradford's, were chiefly engaged, and conducted themselves extremely well; and I have on this occasion to express my thanks to Major-General Howard, commanding the 1st division; the Honourable Major-General Stopford, commanding the 2nd brigade of Guards; Colonel Maitland, commanding the 1st brigade of Guards; Major-General Lord Aylmer, and Major-General Bradford.

In my former reports I ought to have reported that the troop of horse artillery commanded by Captain Ramsay, and the brigades of artillery

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 359.

commanded by Captains Carmichael and Moss, as well as piquets of the 16th Dragoons, have been employed with the advanced troops on the 10th and 11th, and that they conducted themselves to my satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

J. HOPE.

Major-Gen. V. Alten to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Unkura, 13th Dec., 4 P.M., 1813, on the high road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied du Port.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report to your Excellency that I joined this morning, at 8 o'clock, Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry. I sent immediately my patrols towards Mendiondo, who met with the enemy about half a league from this.

The enemy's strength consisted of about two battalions of infantry and three squadrons of cavalry, upon which I sent two squadrons of cavalry and General Morillo's infantry forward, and the enemy retired again.

At 2 P.M. they came on a second time and drove in our piquets; the skirmishing continued until 4 P.M., after which the enemy retired, and our piquets occupied their former ground again. From all the information which I have been able to collect of the enemy, his force consists of about 2000 infantry and 1600 cavalry.

Every necessary precaution for the night has been taken.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,

VICTOR ALTEN.

To Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill. [717.]

MY DEAR HILL, Heraurity, 14th Dec., 1813.

Everything appearing quiet, I am going to the left, and shall sleep to-night at St. Jean de Luz.

It is very desirable that you should strengthen your position as soon as possible, and Beresford will do the same towards Villefranche and the left.

I shall be obliged to you if you will tell Morillo that I am very much displeased with the conduct of his troops. They have behaved as ill at Ainhoué as elsewhere; and I must make the officers pay for the damage their troops do, if they don't prevent it. I have ordered an account to be sent from thence as well as at Hasparren. They will do the cause more harm than good if this conduct is not prevented.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Arthur, Cadiz, 14th Dec., 1813.

Within these few days General Ballesteros has arrived at the Isla, having been permitted to proceed to Fregenal, in Estremadura, until his cause is decided. No one, however, ever dreamt of his presenting himself at the seat of the government, and it is supposed that he was invited there by the government under the expectation that they would have a majority in the Cortes upon the question relative to your command, and that in that case they meant to have put Ballesteros at the head of the army, or at least to have given him a distinguished command. He had an interview with the Minister of War, which, considering that he is under his trial, is not very decent. I know not how long he is to remain at the Isla, but there is a rumour that he is to be made governor of Cadiz, and that General Valdes is to go somewhere else. I know not, however, that there is any foundation for this report.

I have received from Madrid the strongest assurances of the good disposition of the deputies there. The Jacobins, however, are making great efforts to maintain themselves and the present government, and I believe there will be no want of money to assist their exertions. I have desired my correspondent to put his friends upon their guard; and if you have any correspondents at Madrid, you would do well to desire them to keep a vigilant watch over the Jacobins, otherwise they will be surprised and frightened into any measures the others choose to propose. Much will depend upon the first proceedings at Madrid; that is, they will decide whether Spain is to be revolutionized *à la Française* or not. It seems to me that we shall be obliged to acquiesce in the appointment of the Princess of Brazil, whose party increases daily.

No day is as yet fixed for the departure of the Regency. I mean to set out very soon, and expect to reach Madrid by the end of the month.

General Alvear, of the Marine, requested me to forward the enclosed to you. It is a petition for some clothing for the marines, which I declined giving without a reference to you. I likewise enclose a return of stores remaining in the Cadiz depôt.

The Duke and Duchess of Bedford are arrived in the *Volontaire*, which ship is to convey the 200,000 dollars for the 3rd army and the army of reserve.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. Wellesley.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 14th Dec., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Field Officers	30	15	45
Captains	100	20	120
Subalterns	199	67	266
Staff	88	50	138
Quartermasters of Cavalry	24	4	28
Serjeants :—			
Present	538	75	613
Sick :—			
Present	16	1	17
Absent	3	..	3
Command	60	17	77
Prisoners of War and Missing	5	..	5
Trumpeters :—			
Present	103	42	145
Sick :—			
Present	2	2	4
Absent	2	2	4
Command	2	4	6
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File :—			
Present	7347	1206	8553
Sick :—			
Present	225	48	273
Absent	238	43	281
Command	561	425	986
Prisoners of War and Missing	158	..	158
Horses :—			
Present	7212	1159	8371
Sick	350	62	412
Command	258	281	539
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	40	..	40
Dead	1	1	2
Horses :—			
Recruited	77	..	77
Dead	2	1	3

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula, under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 14th Dec., 1813.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	14	12	26
Lieutenant-Colonels	54	27	81
Majors	81	35	116
Captains	474	163	637
Lieutenants	965	200	1165
Cornets or Ensigns	314	338	652
Staff	382	451	833
Quartermasters of Cavalry	24	4	28
Serjeants :—			
Present	2759	1385	4144
Sick :—			
Present	91	50	141
Absent	513	141	654
Command	406	213	619
Prisoners of War and Missing	48	2	50
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1028	526	1554
Sick :—			
Present	25	8	33
Absent	104	24	128
Command	33	44	77
Prisoners of War and Missing	35	5	40
Rank and File :—			
Present	39,065	21,233	60,298
Sick :—			
Present	2039	890	2929
Absent	11,330	4973	16,303
Command	3105	1884	4989
Prisoners of War and Missing	2420	328	2748
Horses :—			
Present	7212	1159	8371
Sick	350	62	412
Command	258	281	539
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	40	1	41
Dead	44	3	47
Deserted	7	..	7
Transferred	11	..	11
Promoted	..	1	1
Reduced	1	..	1
Horses :—			
Recruited	77	..	77
Dead	2	1	3

E. PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

G. O. St. Jean de Luz, 15th Dec., 1813. [718.]

1. The Commander of the Forces has great satisfaction in publishing the following extract of a letter from the Secretary of State:

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

"War Department, 25th Nov., 1813.

"His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has commanded me again to express that satisfaction which the conspicuous good conduct of Marshal Sir W. Beresford and Lieutenant-General Sir R. Hill has called forth on so many preceding occasions; and although the most brilliant part of the service did not fall to the lot of Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope and Don Manuel Freyre, yet His Royal Highness has equal reason to be satisfied with the execution of that which was under their direction.

"You will also communicate to Lieutenant-Generals Sir L. Cole, Sir W. Stewart, Sir J. Hamilton, Sir H. Clinton, and General Giron, and to Major-Generals the Honourable C. Colville, Baron C. Alten, Mariscal de Campo Don P. Morillo, His Royal Highness's gracious acknowledgment and approbation of their distinguished services. I have had great pleasure in calling the peculiar attention of His Royal Highness to the good conduct of Major-Generals Byng, Lambert, and Anson, in command of brigades.

"You will not fail to communicate to the officers, the non-commissioned officers, and privates of the several divisions, His Royal Highness's thanks for their valour and exertions on this occasion.

"To Mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, and Major-General Power, commanding the 8th Portuguese brigade in the 3rd division, and to the Portuguese officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, you will convey that sense of their distinguished exertions which His Royal Highness has had occasion so often to express in the previous operations of this and the preceding campaign."

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 15th Dec., 1813.

I received this day your Lordship's letter of the 24th ult.* on the subject of ————.

The state of the case is simply this:—I had understood that you had offered the command of the Eastern army to ———— previous to his returning home, and that he had declined it on the plea of ill-health. On his recovery I spoke to him on the subject. He seemed much disinclined to accept the command, especially as I could not hold out any expectation of being able to improve the description of that force. He at length said he should obey your orders, and go if you desired it. At my last interview I apprised him that very probably the Sicilian army would be broken up. You will, I trust, therefore have experienced no difficulty by what has passed here.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 316.

I had the less hesitation in having this communication with ———, because in your last letters on the subject of a commander you told me you did not know who to appoint, and had not mentioned the name of ——— among those who, in your correspondence, you had stated not to be qualified for the situation.

I am, my dear Lord, yours ever most sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 15th Dec., 1813.

I have given orders for the arms. It has come at rather an unfortunate moment, as we are pressed to send every thing which is ready to Holland, besides the large demands from the Foreign Office for a supply of arms to Austria, taking the direction of Italy. I will, however, hasten those for you.

You inform me that there are no transports at Lisbon to convey the arms which are there. Either you or I must be misled, and I shall be much obliged to you if you would make inquiries and let me know the result. The Transport Board (as you will have seen by a report made by them and transmitted to your Lordship) assert that there are plenty of transports at Lisbon. I have put the question distinctly to them again on receiving your letter, and they are positive as to the fact.

I have also received your letter on the subject of our relations with the Spanish government yesterday. It is a subject of too grave a nature to be immediately answered. I shall communicate it to my colleagues, and indeed I should like to receive your answer to my letter on the subject of military operations before we come to a final decision. I am very clear we ought not to make the threat if we are not prepared immediately to act upon it.

Lord Liverpool will write to you on a very interesting subject, and I will not, therefore, trouble you with any observations upon it. You are much too quick-sighted not to see how it may operate when known.

I am, my dear Lord, yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Guethary, 15th Dec., 1813.

Since I had the honour of making my reports to you respecting the different affairs in which the left column has lately been engaged, I have received the accompanying report from Major-General Hay, covering one from Major-General Robinson, which I beg leave to lay before your Lordship.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your obedient humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

[ENCLOSURES.]

1.

Major-Gen. A. Hay to Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope.

SIR, Bidart, 12th Dec., 1813.

I have the honour to report the conduct of the 5th division in the affairs with the enemy on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant, viz., on the 9th, the 1st brigade, under Colonel the Honourable C. Greville, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves in several attacks on the enemy. The 38th regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable S. Deane, dislodged the enemy from a height which he obstinately defended; and Major Willshire of the same regiment, commanding the light companies of the brigade, assisted in the attack.

I am under great obligations to Major-General Robinson for the zealous assistance he rendered me on that day: the 2nd brigade, under his orders, behaved well. Major Hoysted, with the 59th regiment, charged the enemy, supported by the 84th regiment. The conduct of Captain Wood, aide-de-camp to Major-General Robinson, was conspicuous.

My best thanks are due to Captain Cator, Royal Horse Artillery, for his ability and intrepidity: his guns were of use in dislodging the enemy on various occasions.

On the 10th the whole of the 1st brigade was engaged. Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, commanding the 9th regiment, charged the enemy; and Lieutenant-Colonel Barns, commanding the Royal Scots, finding himself very critically situated, faced about and took a good number of prisoners. Major-General Robinson and the 2nd brigade were, from local circumstances, warmly engaged before the remainder of the division could come up: each regiment in it distinguished itself. The Major-General being unfortunately severely wounded, the command devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd, 84th regiment, who was soon after killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Piper, 4th regiment, then took the command, until night put an end to the action. I beg leave to observe that when Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd was killed, Captain Jenkins took the command of the 84th regiment, and, though twice wounded, did not quit the field; and when Lieutenant-Colonel Piper assumed the command of the brigade, Captain Kipping commanded the 4th regiment to my entire satisfaction.

It is but justice to mention the exemplary conduct of Major Jones, 4th regiment, who commanded the supports of the piquets until he was obliged to leave the field wounded. When that old and deserving officer, Major Hoysted, was carried off the field, Major Halford took the command of the 59th regiment.

Colonel do Regoa, with the 3rd Portuguese, under Colonel M'Creagh, made a fine charge on the Bayonne road, assisted by the 47th British regiment.

On the 11th the 9th regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, of Colonel Greville's brigade, distinguished themselves, and were engaged nearly the whole of the day. Nothing could exceed the good conduct of the 2nd brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Piper, and when he was obliged to leave the field the command fell upon an old officer, Brevet Major Tonson, 84th regiment.

Colonel do Regoa, though wounded, continued in the field; and the 15th Portuguese regiment, under that meritorious officer Major Campbell, had an opportunity of behaving well, along with the 9th British regiment, in covering the last movement of the division.

I have on this, as on many former occasions, to report the very able assistance I had from Lieutenant-Colonels Berkeley and Gomm of the Divisional

Staff, the latter of whom was wounded on the 9th instant, but continued to do his duty for the last three days.

I must also mention the zealous conduct of Brigade-Major Howard, who, though wounded on the 9th, continued to do his duty, and from the frequent change of commanding officers of the 2nd brigade his presence was particularly useful.

Lieutenant Fitzgerald, Brigade-Major to the 3rd brigade, gave me every assistance in his power on this occasion.

I beg leave to recommend Lieutenant Sinclair, my aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Jones, Royal Engineers, to your consideration, and I hope you will be good enough to ask his Excellency the Commander of the Forces protection for these two officers.

I am sorry to say the loss of the division has been severe.

I have the honour to be

Your obedient humble servant,

ANDREW HAY.

II.

Major-Gen. A. Hay to Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. Hope.

SIR, Bidart, 14th Dec., 1813.

I beg leave to submit to you the enclosed I have received from Major-General Robinson, particularly on account of the paragraph respecting Captain Wood of the 4th regiment, whom I also know to be a most meritorious, intelligent officer, and I have several times had occasion to observe his good conduct before the enemy.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ANDREW HAY.

III.

Major-Gen. F. P. Robinson to Major-Gen. A. Hay.

SIR, St. Jean de Luz, 13th Dec., 1813.

The rapid succession of interesting events has prevented my addressing you as I otherwise would have done.

As you were a spectator of the conduct of the brigade on the 9th instant, I will confine myself to the mention of those individuals who require my particular notice.

Major Hoysted, of the 59th regiment, who led the attack of the village of Anglet, claims precedence, since the death of that gallant and excellent officer Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd, of the 84th regiment. Major Hoysted made himself even more conspicuous on the 10th by driving back the enemy with the bayonet, in repeated attempts to break through the position. This officer is, I believe, the senior in this army, yet his activity in action is equal to that of his former years.

Brevet Major Anwyll, my Brigade-Major, though wounded on the 9th, has not quitted the brigade for an instant. His merit, though great on every trying occasion, was never more conspicuous.

Captain Wood, of the 4th foot, my aide-de-camp, deserves my notice for his conduct throughout the whole affair of the 9th, at the close of which he received so violent a contusion by the fall of his horse from a shot, that I fear I shall be for some time deprived of his services.

I wish I could do justice to the brigade from the morning of the 9th until I

was compelled to quit the field in the evening of the 10th, but their merits, I feel, are in abler hands, which occasions me the highest satisfaction. All the officers distinguished themselves, and the men seemed determined to outdo their former exploits.

With sincere wishes for your safety, and that success may attend you and the division,

I remain, Sir, your faithful servant,

F. P. ROBINSON.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-General Sir G. L. Cole.

MY DEAR COLE, St. Jean de Luz, 15th Dec., 1813.

I think it would be desirable that something should be done as soon as possible to strengthen that part of our line of defence which by the arrangement I transmitted to you yesterday evening is allotted to the 4th division.

It appears to me that the rivulet which runs by the Pont d'Urdains should be dammed in two or three places between the Pont d'Urdains and the Nive, and that it should also be dammed at the Pont d'Urdains itself, and at one or two places above it. That precaution, together with some musketry defences prepared at the butcher's house, at the height on the right of it towards the Nive, and in some of the hedgerows along the meadows, would give a good line of outposts.

The defence of the bridge of Urdains might be secured by improving the musketry breastworks which overlook it from the wooded point, and a battery of a couple of guns might be constructed to bear upon the bridge from that part of the wooded bank which is upon the right of the road going from Garat's House to the Pont d'Urdains.

The bridge itself should not be destroyed, as it may be a useful débouche for ourselves hereafter.

The principal work, however, in your front of the position should be, I think, at Garat's House. A strong redoubt there, with artillery, would effectually check the enemy if he were to succeed in forcing the bridge of Urdains; and it would also range to the left into the bottom towards Bassussary, and cross its fire there with that of a work which it is proposed to construct near a small house on the open heights to the right of Arcangues.

The only other work which I recollect to be very essential in your part of the position is that of improving the communication at the mill-dam, between Arrauntz and Arcangues.

I fear your means are not considerable at present for carrying on works, as the company of Sappers and Miners that was with the division is required for the bridges, &c., upon the Nive. However, I hope you will be able to do something.

I shall endeavour to have your brigade of artillery sent to join you as soon as possible; in the mean time that of the 3rd division has been ordered to Arrauntz.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Colonel Jackson.

DEAR JACKSON, St. Jean de Luz, 15th Dec., 1813.

I should wish an officer to be employed as soon as possible in sketching the country between Hasparren and the Adour.

The boundary of the sketch may be the little rivulet which runs between Hasparren and La Bastide, and falls into the Adour near Urt. This rivulet is called in the map the *Gambouri*, between Hasparren and La Bastide; near La Bastide it is called *La Joyeuse*, and lower down towards Urt it is called *L'Arran*.

It will be necessary that the officer employed should have the protection of the cavalry, and he must be careful not to go beyond where that protection can give him security.

I will send Major Bainbrigge * to sketch the country between Hasparren and the Nive.

G. MURRAY.

The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Harwich, 16th Dec., 1813.

You may conceive my astonishment and surprise when on my landing at Plymouth I was informed of the deliverance of Holland, and of my father being declared Prince Souverain of the Netherlands. I am now on the point of embarking here for that country; and having received the rank of Major-General, and placed on the staff of the British army under Sir T. Graham, I shall have the command of a British brigade and of Dutch troops. I hope not to prove myself unworthy of the good reputation your Lordship has given me; and if I can be instrumental in the deliverance of my own country, I feel that I entirely owe it to your great kindness towards me. I shall always be most proud of having been your Lordship's Aide-de-Camp, and hope you will always consider me as such, and not withhold your advice from me, which I am sure I shall feel a great want of, being perfectly aware how very different and more difficult my present situation is from the past. I therefore beg your Lordship's leave to write for the future in a most open manner towards you.

I think it now my duty to tell your Lordship, still considering myself in the old situation towards you, that the Regent expressed himself in the strongest terms as to his wish of seeing you again advance, saying that at present he had nothing so much at heart, and would be perfectly happy if you did. I then thought it my duty to tell him that I supposed your Lordship would, by what I had seen and heard before I left the army, as soon as you would have been informed of the successes in the North, but that much ought not to be expected this time of year.

May I beg you, Sir, to remember me to Alava and FitzRoy Somerset, assuring them that I would likewise have written to them if I had been able to find time for it.

Your Lordship's most affectionate and obedient,

WILLIAM, HERED. PRINCE OF ORANGE.

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* Now Lieut.-General Sir P. Bainbrigge.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 16th Dec., 1813.

The mail having been detained a day, has enabled me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, with your despatch of the 5th.*

I answered your letter respecting the evacuation of Cadiz on the 2nd ultimo, and you ought to have received it by the 5th instant. I am very glad the affairs in the interior of Spain are beginning to have a more favourable complexion; and I think that the comment with which you propose to accompany the order for withdrawing the troops from Cadiz will have its advantage.

I have not received the letter which the Hereditary Prince told me you had written to me on the subject of his return. Probably it was only to announce it; but I mention it, in case it contained any opinion of yours on the Dutch business, which indeed you did not then know had broken out, but might have expected.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

General Dumouriez to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MON CHER LORD, Le 16 Décembre, 1813.

Vous vous donnez la peine dans votre lettre du 22 Novembre † de m'expliquer vos motifs pour avoir préféré entrer sans délai en France, à vous occuper de la Catalogne. Vous avez eu parfaitement raison sous les deux points de vue politique et militaire. Vous verrez par ma lettre du 29 Novembre que nous nous entendions avant de nous parler, et que les circonstances que votre sagacité a prévues m'ont rangé entièrement de votre avis.

Je vois devant, dès que les pluies auront cessé et que les chemins seront praticables, deux opérations dont vous avez le choix. La première est de pousser devant vous, d'attaquer et forcer le camp de Bayonne, et vous emparer de cette ville; vous n'y trouverez pas grande ressource militaire, mais vous aurez détruit une armée. A la vérité, à la suite de ce succès, dont je ne doute pas si vous vous y déterminez, vous trouverez à la droite de l'Adour la citadelle à assiéger dans les formes, et ensuite 30 lieues de landes à traverser, qui vous exigeront cinq à six jours de marche, en y mettant la plus grande rapidité, dans un pays aride, désert, sans ressources, obligé de porter tout avec vous.

La seconde est de masquer ce camp avec une force à peu près égale, de passer la Nive et le Gave de Pau, en vous portant par votre droite jusqu'à Dax, près du confluent de l'Adour et de la Garonne, ce qui vous rendrait maître du Béarn et du pays de Soule, où vous trouveriez des subsistances, et même des magasins, que Soult n'aura eu ni le tems ni les moyens d'évacuer, et plusieurs bonnes villes, comme Pau, Oléron, etc. Une fois sur la Garonne, vous rassembleriez tous les bateaux de ce fleuve et des

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., pp. 338, 348.

† See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 308.

rivières confluentes pour vous en servir pour porter à Bordeaux la plus grande partie de vos vivres, artillerie, et bagages, et même une partie de votre infanterie, pendant que l'escadre de Sir G. Collier entrerait dans la rivière. Vous auriez peut-être sur cette route à combattre le Général Harispe, peut-être même Suchet, mais ils ne tiendraient pas contre votre supériorité. D'ailleurs je compte beaucoup sur la disposition des habitans, dont le mécontentement augmentera de mois en mois, d'après ce qui se passe sur la Meuse, sur le Rhin, et en Italie.

Mais laisser derrière soi Soult avec 50,000 hommes. 1. Vous le masquerez avec un corps à peu près égal, soutenu en arrière par l'armée Espagnole en seconde ligne sur les Pyrénées. 2. Il ne cherchera pas à vous attaquer; il sortira certainement de son camp dès qu'il connaîtra votre mouvement par votre droite, mais ce sera pour l'abandonner, ne laisser qu'une forte garnison dans la citadelle, passer l'Adour et le remonter, vous observer, et couvrir Bordeaux et la Garonne. S'il était assez fort pour vous combattre, étant batailleur de son naturel, il marcherait à vous; mais dans la position où est la France, il doit ménager la seule armée qui reste dans le Sud, éviter de se compromettre, et surtout de rester enfermé entre Bayonne et les Pyrénées.

Voilà les deux seules opérations que je prévois. Vous êtes sur les lieux, vous êtes à la fois prudent et hardi; choisissez.

Je vous écrirai encore ces jours-ci pour vous mander ce que je pense de la campagne qui va s'ouvrir sur la Meuse et sur le Rhin dès que les Alliés l'auront passé. Les affaires vont aussi très bien en Italie. Les coups qui se porteront au Midi hâteront ceux du Nord, et *vice versâ*. Je ne crois point aux négociations. J'espère que d'ici à six mois les Français, revenus de leur illusion sur leur tyran Corse, le puniront eux-mêmes, et que nous aurons une longue paix, grâces à votre nation et à vous. Tels sont les vœux sincères de votre fidèle serviteur,

DUMOURIEZ.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Vieux Mouguerre, 16th Dec., 1813.

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that during the night of the 12th instant the enemy collected in great force in front of his intrenched camp of Bayonne, and at daybreak of the 13th his columns were seen advancing to attack the position, which your Lordship had instructed me to take up, between the rivers Nive and Adour.

On the right, Major-General Byng with his brigade occupied the ridge and village of Vieux Mouguerre; Brigadier-General Ashworth, with his brigade and two Portuguese guns, was in the centre, near the village of St. Pierre; Major-General Pringle was on the left, with his brigade on the ridge of Villefranque, in front of the village of that name. The remainder of the troops were in reserve.

The troops stationed in front were under the immediate directions of Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir W. Stewart.

The point of attack appearing to be the centre, Major-General Barnes, with his brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross's horse artillery, and Lieutenant-

Colonel Tulloh's Portuguese artillery (excepting two guns of each), moved to the village of St. Pierre, and on the ridge on which it stands.

As the attack became more decided against the centre, the whole of Major-General Le Cor's Portuguese division moved to the support of that point; and Major-General Byng's brigade (with the exception of the Buffs and the light companies) was also drawn from the right to resist the determined efforts of the enemy on our centre. The contest now became general and severe, and I never witnessed more gallantry than was shown by all the troops repulsing the enemy in the heavy and repeated attacks he made, and finally driving him back to his original position, and from a strong height he occupied to cover his retreat.

I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship the reports of Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir W. Stewart and of Major-General Le Cor; and, in justice to the officers and troops of their several divisions, I cannot omit drawing your Lordship's attention to the very distinguished conduct of Major-General Barnes and Brigadier-General Ashworth, who, with their two brigades, successfully maintained their position, and eventually repulsed the enemy in all his attacks upon our centre; to that of Major-General Le Cor, for the very seasonable support he gave the centre of our position, by bringing up his left brigade (under Major-General Da Costa) at the most critical moment of the struggle, which, by a timely and most gallant charge with the bayonet, determined the fate of the day at that point; and to that of Major-General Byng, who assaulted the strong height occupied in force by the enemy in front of our right: he ascended the hill first, and himself planted the colours of the 31st regiment on the summit.

Brigadier-General Buchan with his brigade gave very effective support in the early part of the day to the left, and subsequently was moved to the support of Major-General Byng's brigade, and contributed much to the success on that side.

Major-General Pringle was equally successful in repulsing the enemy's attack upon our left.

The two brigades of artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ross and Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh, were most judiciously posted to command the road, and caused considerable loss to the enemy in his advance, and during the contest upon our centre. The zeal and activity of these officers were most conspicuous throughout the day.

I am much indebted to Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton for the support he gave my troops by moving up the 6th division, and for the assistance I received from the 9th Caçadores, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne.

From observation and concurring reports, it appears that the enemy had collected nearly the whole of his force, under Marshal Soult, for this operation. From the fire of our artillery and the gallant resistance the enemy met with at all points, his loss is immense.

During the contest we took from the enemy two guns, several officers and prisoners.

I cannot use expressions sufficiently strong to convey my sense of the services rendered me by Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir W. Stewart: his able and gallant conduct contributed most essentially to the brilliant success of the day. I was witness to the activity of Captain Le Marchant and

Lieutenant Lord C. Spencer (aides-de-camp to the Lieutenant-General), and of Captain Thorn, his Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

I feel myself particularly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson, Assistant Quartermaster-General, for his able arrangements previous to, and active conduct during the attack; as also to Lieutenant-Colonel Bouverie, Assistant Adjutant-General; to Lieutenant-Colonel Goldfinch, of the Royal Engineers; and to Major Cairncross, of the Royal Artillery; with the officers of their respective departments. I received great assistance from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Robert Hill (of the Royal Horse Guards), who attended me during the day; and from the exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Currie, Major Churchill, and the officers of my personal Staff.

My first aide-de-camp (Major Hill) will have the honour of delivering this despatch to your Lordship. I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's protection.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
R. HILL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir W. Stewart to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill.

SIR, Petite Mouguerre, 14th Dec., 1813.

The enemy was perceived at daylight yesterday to have his columns collected on the Bayonne road, in front of the suburb of St. Pierre. At 8 o'clock he advanced with much animation against our advanced posts on that road. The centre position, which that road intersected, had been entrusted to Brigadier-General Ashworth's Portuguese brigade. The enemy immediately commenced a most determined attack on and by both sides of the road, and at the same time detached a very large force by his right to that part of the centre position which rested on a mill stream and on a valley that separated the centre from the left position, occupied by Major-General Pringle's brigade. The enemy's movement in that direction was rapid, and, if successful, would have separated that brigade from the rest of the 2nd division. He at the same time, or shortly after, moved Dalmagnac's division against the right position, occupied by Major-General Byng's brigade, on the height and in the village of Vieux Mouguerre. The extreme right of this position rested on the Adour, while the left of Major-General Pringle's extended to the Nive. The extent of front thus occupied by the 2nd division was nearly four miles, the flanks extended on heights, and giving to the centre a semicircular, and thus far, for defence, a favourable character. The whole of the country thus occupied is much intersected, interspersed with cottages, and unfit for cavalry movements.

The object of the enemy was to force our centre, to menace the left, and to gain more firm possession of our right position. That object gained in either the first or last instance (the height of Vieux Mouguerre connecting with that of Petite Mouguerre in rear of the centre), a retreat from the whole advanced line would necessarily have followed. Against Major-General Pringle's brigade the attack was comparatively feeble, and chiefly conducted by light troops. As soon as the attack was made on the advanced posts in the centre, the light companies of Major-General Barnes's brigade moved to their support, and that brigade shortly after arrived.

The enemy's columns in the centre, although much checked by the piquets,

succeeded in driving them in, and in establishing themselves on an intermediate ridge between the high road and the left of the centre position.

At this point, and in some neighbouring houses on either side of the road, the contest lasted for some hours, and with dubious success. The 18th Portuguese regiment and Major-General Barnes's brigade repeatedly drove the enemy to his original position, and he, in turn, from superior numbers, as frequently compelled our troops to retire. Several brilliant charges were made by the Portuguese and British, more particularly by the 92nd Highlanders and 18th Portuguese regiment, gallantly directed by Major-General Barnes. *Four* guns of Lieutenant-Colonel Ross's horse artillery and *six* of Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloh's Portuguese artillery were chiefly employed in defence of the centre, and were most ably conducted by those zealous officers. While the defence of houses and main road was under the charge of Major-General Barnes, I found it expedient to give my attention to the left of the centre, and to preserving the communication with Major-General Pringle's position. The 6th Portuguese regiment and 6th Caçadores defended the left centre, and greatly distinguished themselves. The enemy increased, however, so rapidly in numbers and assurance, that it became necessary to withdraw the 71st regiment and two guns of the horse artillery from the centre, and afterwards two companies of the 92nd regiment in support of the Portuguese. Success continued various. The superior number of the enemy enabled him, about midday, to gain from us the summit of the elevated ground, with the neighbouring hedges and cottages. The arrival of Major-General Le Cor's left brigade, under Major-General Da Costa's command, was opportune, I directed the 2nd regiment to move round the right of the enemy's columns, and the 14th regiment, shortly after, to recover the important ground that we had lost in front. Both of these movements, like all others by our gallant ally in yesterday's action, were conducted with high spirit. The charge which was made by the 14th regiment in column, over a broken hedge and a wooded road, was led by Major Jacintho Travassos, and had my highest admiration. It effectually turned the fortune of the day at that point. It is my duty to recommend to your notice, and to that of Marshal Sir William Beresford, that gallant field officer, who was, I understand, severely wounded.

While the contest was, as above stated, on the centre position, the enemy repulsed, and as often propelling fresh troops to the attack, Major-General Byng arrived, by your order, from the right, with the 57th regiment and provisional battalion, leaving the Buffs and light troops of his brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bunbury's orders, to defend the height of Vieux Mouguerre. Although that officer appears to have been compelled by Dalmagnac's division to retire to the rear of the position, on receiving your commands to recover the village the assault was made on it with spirit, and the enemy driven from the height, principally by Captain Cameron's (of the Buffs) exertions: he commanded the light troops, much distinguished himself, as he does on all occasions, and captured a Lieutenant-Colonel and some of the enemy's chasseurs.

Until as late an hour as *one* o'clock the enemy's commanders were seen endeavouring to force fresh columns to the attack of the centre, and these columns refusing to advance. It then appeared opportune to push forward our right, in front of Major-General Byng's original position, and dispossess the enemy of a ridge on which he had much force and some guns with which he was incommoding our centre. I directed Major-General Byng to unite his brigade from the centre and from the Vieux Mouguerre height, and attack the ridge. The combined movement was executed with marked judgment and gallantry under a galling fire from the enemy. The Major-General was the

first on the summit of the hill, with the colours of the provisional battalion in his hand: the enemy was driven down the ridge to the suburb of St. Pierre, and abandoned an 8-pounder. The Major-General reports warmly in praise of Lieutenant-Colonel Leith and of the provisional battalion on this service. The enemy made an ill-planned effort to retake the position under a heavy cannonade, but was foiled in his attempt, Brigadier-General Buchan's Portuguese brigade having arrived to the support of the post.

On the left Major-General Pringle was, at first, attacked by skirmishers, but afterwards more solidly. He maintained his position well, and by advancing his brigade to his outposts, within gunshot of the enemy's intrenched camp, tended greatly by this forward movement, and by a flank fire from the 28th regiment, to repel the attack which was conducted against our left centre. The Major-General reports very favourably the conduct of Colonel Belson, and of that regiment. Major-General Barnes having been compelled to leave the field from two wounds, Brigadier-General Ashworth resumed the charge of the centre position, and with equal judgment as spirit re-established his advanced posts on the ground which had been held by those of the enemy previous to the action, and who, at this point, abandoned a small gun.

The advanced line thus acquired along our front confirmed the victory of the day.

Towards sunset the enemy withdrew to the suburb of St. Pierre, and the firing ceased on both sides.

The loss which has been sustained by the division under my immediate command, in a contest so unequal in point of numbers opposed, has been severe. The division had to do its duty well in order to maintain its original ground: under the timely and active support which you were pleased to send to it, it was neither due nor expedient to retire from that ground; nor should I have done justice to your dispositions of yesterday and the preceding, had a less firm resistance been made than was made. The enemy must have suffered severely from the perseverance of his attack, and from our commanding position. He is reported to have opposed to us his whole army, with the exception of two divisions on the left bank of the Nive, and one detained in our front, in reserve. Marshal Soult commanded, I believe, in person.

The arrival of the 6th, and subsequently of the 3rd division, gave to the corps under my command that valuable support, towards the close of the action, which tended much to our success. I was particularly indebted to the Caçadores of the former division for their co-operation with Major-General Byng in the attack of the advanced ridge.

I cannot in too warm terms express my approbation of the General and commanding officers under my orders. Of the former, Major-Generals Barnes and Byng, and Brigadier-General Ashworth, were particularly distinguished. Of the latter, Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, 92nd Highlanders, and Major Gordon, 50th regiment, who commanded Major-General Barnes's light troops, were most marked in my 1st brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Leith, 31st regiment, and Captain Cameron of the Buffs, in the 3rd brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, 6th Portuguese regiment, who commanded first that regiment and afterwards the brigade, although severely wounded, to the close of the action; Lieutenant-Colonel Fearon, 6th Caçadores, and Captain Borges, who commanded the 18th regiment after the death of Major José, in the Portuguese brigade. The merit of Major Travassos, of the 14th Portuguese regiment, has been already reported by me. To Major-Generals Pringle and Le Cor, to Lieutenant-Colonels Tulloh and Ross, and to Major Jenkinson, of the Royal British Artillery, to Major Cunha Preto of the Portuguese Artillery, and to Captain Lumley of the 18th Portuguese regiment, I was indebted, in their respective commands, for important support.

From my own Staff, who were all wounded, I received great assistance while they were in the field: for the fourth time during this campaign I take an opportunity of calling your kind attention and that of the Commander of the Forces to the merit of Captain Thorn, Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-master-General.

I have the honour of enclosing the names of some officers in favour of whose promotion for their services in yesterday's action I request your recommendation to the Marquess of Wellington.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your very faithful servant,
W. STEWART.

PROCLAMATION, No. 4. [719.]

Au Quartier Général, ce 17 Déc., 1813.

Les personnes ci-dessous nommés rempliront les charges contre leurs noms respectifs provisoirement dans l'administration civile du pays jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Pour le Canton de St. Jean de Luz.—Justice de Paix, M. Jean Pagez, habitant et propriétaire d'Ascain.—Juge de Paix, M. Jean Baptiste Galharret, propriétaire de St. Jean de Luz, Greffier.

Pour la Ville de St. Jean de Luz.—Police, M. Jean Latour, habitant et propriétaire de St. Jean de Luz, Officier de Police.

Magistrature.—*Pour Urrugne*, ayant sous sa dépendance Soubernoa, Olhete, Helbarren, et Herboure, M. Duhalt, habitant d'Urrugne, pour Maire; M. Hiriart, habitant du dit lieu, pour Adjoint. *Pour Hendaye*, M. Jean Ansoborlo, habitant du dit lieu, pour Maire; M. Saubat Harisboure, habitant du dit lieu, pour Adjoint. *Pour Biriatou*, M. Dibildotz, propriétaire et habitant du dit lieu, ci-devant Maire, et qui s'est trouvé hors de sa commune, pour affaire, lors de l'invasion. *Pour Ascain et Serres*, M. Monsegur, propriétaire et habitant, pour Maire; M. Feillary, propriétaire et habitant, pour Adjoint. *Pour Bidart*, M. Dom. Salambehere, habitant et propriétaire du dit lieu, pour Maire; M. Bnd. Landaboure, habitant et propriétaire du dit lieu, pour Adjoint.

WELLINGTON.

G. O. St. Jean de Luz, 17th Dec., 1813. [720.]

3. Lieutenant ——, — regiment, having apologised to Mr. Assistant-Commissary-General —— for his conduct towards him

on the 28th October at Pasages, and Mr. —— having declared himself satisfied, Lieutenant —— is to be released from his arrest.

4. The Commander of the Forces begs to observe, however, that he is not satisfied with the excuse made for his conduct by Lieutenant ——, that he imagined that Mr. —— was an inferior person in the department: whatever might be his rank or situation, he ought to have been treated with mildness and civility.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Burghersh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Fribourg, 17th Dec., 1813.

Schwarzenberg's head-quarters have been established at this place since the 13th. The whole of his army is assembled between Basle and Stockach. The occupation of Switzerland is decided upon: the troops decidedly march the 20th. The French have no troops à portée to resist this movement: the Swiss are in general desirous it should take place. The canton of Berne has already taken steps to reinstate their ancient government, and are ready to join the common cause against France. You may rest assured, therefore, that the Austrians will establish themselves quickly in Switzerland. The Austrian-Italian army has not yet moved from the Adige. Bellegarde will assume the command of it in a day or two, and will then advance. The Viceroy is weak, and his positions will be turned by the occupation of Switzerland by Schwarzenberg.

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

BURGHERSH.

[721.] G. O. St. Jean de Luz, 18th Dec., 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the standing rules of the service, and the General Orders of the army, in regard to the cleanliness of the troops in their cantonments, may be attended to as far as may be possible.

2. Every house or other building inhabited by the troops should be visited constantly by the officers of the company to which they belong, and care should be taken that all wet straw and other dirt be removed; that the fern or other materials which the soldiers have collected to lie upon be rolled up, and the floor swept; and that whenever the weather is fine, the blankets, &c., are put out to dry.

3. The officers should also see that the men do not cut down

or otherwise injure the floors or staircases, the doors or windows of the houses, or the gates of the farms, and should particularly inquire from the inhabitants of the houses whether they have any complaints.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that the mules and other animals belonging to the army may not be turned to graze in the vineyards, or in the grounds which were last year under cultivation: these grounds can now afford no sustenance to the animals, and their being turned into them is very injurious to the proprietors, and will prevent their cultivation.

5. The Commander of the Forces requests the General and Commanding officers of regiments will each in their cantonments give every encouragement and assistance to the inhabitants to continue their peaceable occupations, and will attend to and redress all their complaints.

WELLINGTON.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, St. Jean de Luz, 18th Dec., 1813.

The signal of three flags mentioned in the paper respecting signals transmitted to you this morning is intended to refer to the operations which may occur in rear of the right of the army.

In the event of the enemy undertaking any operations of importance in that direction, you will be so good as order the above signal to be made upon the church of Vieux Mouguerre; and I am to request that you will transmit a written report at the same time, through Arrauntz to Arcangues, *there to remain*, in order that Lord Wellington may be more fully informed, at that point, of the purport of the signal, in the event of his proceeding towards the right of the army upon its being repeated.

Believe me very faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

Major J. Hughes to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Urcuray, 21st Dec., 1813.

I have the honour to send you with this letter two golden ornaments, which evidently belong to the bâton du maréchal of Marshal Jourdan, which your Lordship presented to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

They were brought to me this day by a corporal of the 18th Hussars, and whose story is as follows. He says that in the pursuit after the battle of Vitoria he overtook, amongst others, a French infantry soldier, who immediately broke his musket and surrendered; that he passed him, but

suddenly turning round perceived him conceal something under his coat, upon which he pulled up, and ordered him to draw it forth, when he produced something in a morocco case, which in his ignorance he believed to be some symbol or appendage of masonry: that he drew off the ornaments at each end, which were of gold, and put them in his pocket, and placed the rest in his holster. On coming into camp at night he says he fell into the company of a drummer of the 87th, whom he suspects of having stolen the bâton; and having accidentally seen a newspaper in which mention is made of the bâton of Marshal Jourdan, he began to suspect the truth, which induced him to bring these ornaments to me.

I know not how much of the above story is true; but as the trophy is incomplete without these ornaments and the legend engraved on them, I have taken the liberty to present them to your Lordship, and

Have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
J. HUGHES.

[Tell him I am much obliged to him, and beg him to give the man two sovereigns for the ornaments in question.
WELLINGTON.]

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 23rd Dec., 1813.

I enclose, by General Dumouriez's desire, his answer to your Lordship's letter of the 22nd ultimo,* of which he was so good as to give us a perusal. Had I known your decision sooner, I would have spared you the trouble of reading a very long letter on the subject of your future operations.

The Allies have decided to pass their main army over the Rhine near Huningen. General Blücher is to pass with a separate corps at Mannheim. The army of the North, about 85,000, were to have directed their march on Holland. The Crown Prince has hitherto occupied the whole of the Elbe. Had he sent half the force down to the Netherlands, the good dispositions of the whole of the provinces and the extreme weakness of the enemy would have secured the possession of the whole country.

General Pozzo di Borgo is come over here on a mission from the three allies, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. He is authorised to give the strongest assurances of a vigorous prosecution of the war, although a negotiation should take place. Indeed, if the Allies intend to enforce their interpretation of the basis proposed, they must obtain further advantages over the enemy.

In order to give greater unity in our negotiations with the three Allies than can be attained by the separate missions to the respective Powers, Lord Castlereagh is about to proceed to head-quarters with full powers, and enabled still to act as Secretary of State. I shall desire him to com-

* See p. 435.

municate with your Lordship in the cypher I lately sent you: if it should become necessary, I will also furnish him with the cypher you have had some time ago, in case he should prefer that to the other.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

G. O. St. Jean de Luz, 26th Dec., 1813. [722.]

1. At a General Court Martial, held by virtue of a warrant and in pursuance of an order, &c. &c.

* * * *

The Court having maturely and deliberately considered the evidence against the prisoner, with that which he has said and brought forward in his defence, is of opinion that he is guilty of neglect of duty, highly insubordinate conduct, and disobedience of the express orders of his superior officer, Dr. ——, as set forth in the 1st and 2nd parts of the charge preferred against him; and it does therefore sentence him, the prisoner, Assistant-Surgeon ——, to be suspended from rank and pay for the space of three calendar months.

In referring to the reparation endeavoured to be made by the prisoner in atoning for his fault on the discovery of his error, by having sent an apology which proved perfectly satisfactory to the prosecutor, and from the wish expressed by General —— of his having received Mr. ——'s letter in sufficient time to have prevented his making a report on the subject, the Court is induced strongly to recommend him to the favourable consideration of the Commander of the Forces.

The Court is the more induced thus to recommend the prisoner, as it appears in evidence that he was given to understand that a sufficient apology from him would lead to his liberation from arrest.

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. In consequence of the recommendation of the General Court Martial, of which Lieutenant-Colonel —— is President, and of the circumstances stated, that Mr. Assistant-Surgeon —— had made an apology for his conduct, which had been approved of and accepted by his superior officer, the Commander of the Forces is induced to remit the sentence, hoping that what has happened will be a warning to Mr. —— in future.

3. He is to be released from his arrest, and to return to his duty.

WELLINGTON.

Vice-Adm. Sir E. Pellew to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, *Caledonia*, Port Mahon, 26th Dec., 1813.

I this day forward a despatch for England containing a statement by His Sardinian Majesty of his views and offers of activity in obtaining possession of Genoa, aided by my marine troops and fleet, by coup-de-main, by sending one of his Generals and his few companies of chasseurs d'élite. I have thought it right His Majesty's Ministers at home should know it, and that your Lordship should also be made acquainted with its general outline. His Sardinian Majesty calculates on 8000 troops, which in detail are to be produced as follows: 3000 Italians and Piedmontese, now in the French service in Corsica, who are to desert; 3000 more said to be well-inclined, and ready to rise in the neighbourhood of Genoa on the appearance of his Royal standard.

Money, arms, clothing, and provisions to be found by us.

I have carefully watched Genoa by two sail of the line and a frigate, and a similar detachment sailed on relief two days ago. I believe Genoa to be in a disturbed state, but unable to stand forth. A division of my ships are just returned from Leghorn, having landed Colonel Catinelli with 1000 Italian troops and our few marines. They have done handsomely, and got possession of the suburbs of Leghorn, and routed the troops sent from Pisa to attack them, taking, killing, and wounding about 300. But the Livornese said precisely, "We wish to rise and join against our oppressors, but you are not in sufficient force to give us security." Such, I conceive, will be the case at Genoa until the Austrians can approach, when the thing will be done without risking His Majesty's few companies of chasseurs. I am not without hope of intercepting the ships of war at Genoa, and the troops which I know are to be sent over from Corsica. I have forwarded an officer to Lord William Bentinck, who came off from Calvi to propose two regiments ready to join on assurances of service in our pay. My attention will be alive to these points.

Conscripts are arriving in Cataluña. They are part of 10,000 ordered last year to be raised in the southern provinces for service in Spain, and under promise not to go to the northern army.

I beg to congratulate your Lordship on your late brilliant affair and the glorious prospect before you, and am,

My Lord, with sincere admiration and great respect,

Your Lordship's most faithful and devoted servant,

E. PELLEW.

Lord Burghersh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, La Roche, 28th Dec., 1813.

Since I last wrote to you, the army of Prince Schwarzenberg (at least the Austrian part of it, 90,000 men) have entered Switzerland. It has been unopposed by the people, so that up to the present moment it has met with no resistance. The whole of Prince Schwarzenberg's force, amounting to 214,000 men, is to be placed, the right, at the fort of Hall, opposite Strasburg, commanded by Wittgenstein, 30,000 men; the left, commanded by Bubna, 15,000 men, at Geneva. The centre, commanded by General Wrede, 57,000 men, is in France, having passed the Rhine at Basle: a part of his corps is occupied in the siege of Huningen; the batteries will open to-morrow; the rest of it has its right, commanded by Frimont, at Mulhausen, on the road to Colmar, and its left blockading Befort. From intelligence that has been received, Buonaparte has ordered his troops from Metz to Colmar. The advanced cavalry from that place have already the day before yesterday attacked the advance of the Austrians under Frimont, and a more serious attack is daily expected. Buonaparte will most likely make his attack upon the corps of Wrede, will try to raise the siege of Huningen, and occupy the important central point of Basle. Barclay de Tolly with the reserves, amounting to 35,000 men, is marching to support the corps of Wrede. He will not, however, arrive till the 3rd of next month. The Austrians that have entered Switzerland will be assembled (with the exception of Bubna at Geneva) in échelon from Pierre Pertuis to Zurich, the corps de bataille of Arberg. Such will be the general position of the army on the 5th of January. It is then intended (after sending some detached parties towards Italy and the south of France, and a corps to communicate with you) to debouch with the left from Pierre Pertuis and Pontalier, and to take a position with the greater part of the army from Besançon by Montbelliard to Befort. Huningen, it is hoped, will by that time belong to the Allies, and form the appui of the right of this position. Blücher with 60,000 men will pass the Rhine below Frankfort, will march upon Treves and Thionville, and threaten the left of Buonaparte along the Meuse and Moselle, while this army menaces his right.

Such is the general plan of campaign about to be adopted. You will calculate upon numberless delays, &c., but I hope no reverses.

The forts of Lonserona and Blomont have already fallen to the Allies. The French do not appear to have been prepared for the invasion of this part of their country. Befort is ill-provided; Besançon in the same state. We know little of Buonaparte's preparations: they are believed to be formidable, but as yet they cannot be considerably advanced.

I am just come from Prince Schwarzenberg, who tells me that the French are defiling from Strasburg towards Neu Brisach; that they are also collecting at Colmar. He is therefore determined to attack them in three or four days with the corps of Wrede. In the mean time he has directed the troops in Switzerland to debouch. One column will arrive to-morrow at Porentrui, another at Pontalier. They will continue their march, without stopping, upon Besançon and Montbelliard. They will have arrived at those places in the early days of next month, and will push from thence on Langres and Vesoul. On the 5th of January there will be 92,000 men

assembled in the neighbourhood of Basle, 30,000 men at Hall, and 70,000 marching from Besançon and Montbelliard to the front. I cannot help thinking that by this operation we shall be extending too much to the left. From every account it appears Buonaparte will make his great effort concentrated along the Rhine and upon the point of Basle. The corps at Vesoul and Langres would then be out of reach, and if the centre in these environs were beat, would be placed in an awkward predicament. I hope therefore they will be kept in échelon upon Befort to support the left of the centre. It is hoped that General Bubna will have reached Lausanne without opposition from the Pays de Vaud; but it is much feared he will not get farther towards Geneva without hostility from the people of that canton. It has a militia of 18,000 men, which might soon be got together; and I fear they will be employed to defend the country. I have no more news, and no time; so

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

BURGHERSH.

Lieut.-Col. Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Major-Gen. the Hon. W. Ponsonby.

MY DEAR GENERAL, St. Jean de Luz, 28th Dec., 1813.

I have received and communicated to Lord Wellington your letter of the 24th instant. His Lordship begged you to consider your absence from this army as your own act, because we had been desired to prevent officers from going home as much as possible; but knowing your anxiety to have a short leave of absence, he directed me to inform you that he thought this the most favourable moment to go, at the same time that he thought it right to apprise you that he could not give his sanction to your going, as he has been ordered by government to keep officers with the army during the winter. His Lordship, however, is sorry that you should consider his meaning so seriously, and now desires me to mention that he really thinks your brigade will remain in cantonments for the present, and therefore that the present opportunity is the most favourable for your visit to England.

Yours truly,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Horse Guards, 30th Dec., 1813.

It was with very great satisfaction that I yesterday received your letter of the 14th instant, transmitting a copy of the report, made by your Lordship to the Secretary of State, of the operations of the army under your command on the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th December.*

The very able dispositions made by your Lordship to attack the enemy's position in front of their intrenchments near Bayonne, and upon the left bank of the Adour, appear to have been seconded in the most conspicuous manner by the gallantry of the troops, and to have been crowned with a

* See letter to Earl Bathurst of 14th Dec., 1813, *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 365.

success which materially adds to the fame of your Lordship and of the forces under your command.

The resistance which the enemy met with, in their repeated attempts to dislodge the right and left wings from their advanced positions, sufficiently evinces the discipline of the troops, and the skill and bravery of the officers and men; and I request that your Lordship will convey to the General and other officers and to the men engaged in these arduous operations my perfect approbation of their conduct, and my high sense of the spirit which animated them to behave in a manner so creditable to themselves and acceptable to their country; and it will afford me much gratification to bring under the gracious consideration of the Prince Regent their very meritorious services upon this occasion.

I derive most sincere pleasure from again having an opportunity of requesting your Lordship to accept my personal thanks and congratulations for the distinguished advantages you have gained over the enemy's army, which I have no doubt will lead at the present conjuncture to the most important results.

I am, my Lord, yours,

FREDERICK.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 30th Dec., 1813.

Your letter of the 4th instant* only reached me yesterday; and I lose no time in assuring you that I cannot see any objection to your forwarding my letter to ——— ———. Indeed, all things considered, I am convinced it is better that he should be definitively acquainted with the obstacles which will prevent his hopes and expectations from being realised. Lest, however, I should have misconceived the Duke's commands in the tenor of the letter I wrote to you, I have this day shown the copy of it to His Royal Highness, and have ascertained that it is a correct communication of his sentiments.

As well as I can recollect the conversations I have had with ——— ———, they have been in a tone similar to that conveyed by my letter; and upon the grounds of the intimacy and friendly footing which have always subsisted between the General and myself, I should have acquainted him with the nature of my communication to you, had I not been unwilling to anticipate the course which you would probably wish to pursue on the subject; and indeed it is on many accounts better that you should make the communication.

I am quite aware of ——— ———'s malady, though I was not equally so of its being to any extent that could endanger the service. It is quite right, however, that he should be removed in the manner you propose. He is brave and zealous; and I believe the Duke is well disposed towards his claim to a better regiment.

Allow me to take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the recent additional instance of your glorious success. Exclusive of public considerations, no one from personal motives can hail your glory with greater

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 345.

exultation than myself. If the Allies pressed the French upon their "sacred territory" in the manner which you are doing, the power of the enemy would soon be humbled to the extent of our utmost wishes.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully and sincerely yours,

H. Torrens.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My dear Lord, Downing Street, 31st Dec., 1813.

If I had received, as I ought to have done, your private letter of the 21st Nov., I should not have written mine of the 10th inst. Having heard nothing of your Lordship's views and objects for some time, I thought it desirable to *provoke* some discussion. You mistake me if you think I preferred operations in Holland to operations in the south of France. I was aware of the objections to withdrawing your army from where it is, and had no materials before me to judge of the facilities and difficulties to be expected in your advance.

You say very justly, that if we extend our assistance, we can only do so either by increased means or by stinting other services. We have extended our assistance to Germany, but the opening of the German markets has given us means we had not before. The insurrection in Holland has given us pecuniary facilities there also. We have had a good return for the money and equipments sent out to Germany. I hope we shall have the same in Holland; but we were called upon by every consideration to make the utmost exertions there. It was desirable, politically speaking, that our arms should appear to contribute towards this revolution. I believe that our appearance there will serve to protect it until more essential assistance can be brought. Had the wind favoured us, I really believe we might have not only occupied Bergen-op-Zoom, but have even destroyed the ships at Antwerp, in so defenceless a state was everything left there. Had the Prince Royal marched down upon the Low Countries, as he engaged to do at Leipsic, when the Allies increased the force under his command, he would have before this time carried everything before him up to the frontier of France. Either from a secret reluctance to bear hard upon France, or from an ill-judged impatience to secure his own objects, he marched to the north. He afterwards promised our minister to detach Winzingerode with a considerable force to Holland on hearing of the counter-revolution in favour of the House of Orange; and we have within this week discovered that he countermanded these orders, apparently without the knowledge of our minister there. I mention this for the purpose of coming better to the next question: Shall we continue our force in Holland for offensive operations when Holland itself shall be secure? And here your Lordship's observation does, I am aware, apply with great force. We cannot, I am afraid, maintain an army there without diminishing the force you might otherwise have. It would be in vain to deny that this must be the effect, although it must be remembered that the maintenance of an army in Holland (to a limited extent) will not touch upon the pecuniary means which we furnish for your army: its vicinity to this country, and the bills arising from commercial communications, will cover the

expenditure, so as not to require the exportation of money to Holland. It must be also observed, that all which is employed in Holland could not be sent to your Lordship in France. Still, however, I admit that it will become a question of much consideration, whether we should break up that army to reinforce you, whenever we can withdraw it with security to Holland. The advantages in doing so are evident. I will state to you the reasons which may be urged against it. Our great object is Antwerp. We cannot make a secure peace if that place be left in the hands of France. When I tell you, *most confidentially*, that Lord Castlereagh is authorised to state that we will not give up any *one of our conquests* unless Antwerp be so disposed of as not to be under the influence of France, you may consider it almost as our *sine quâ non* as far as peace with us is concerned.

In this the Allies feel no common interest with us. Some, absurdly jealous of our maritime power, may even wish Antwerp to remain with France. The Prince Royal certainly is too French to wish Antwerp to be wrested from France; and unless the Allies come to an open quarrel with him, he will continue to have the command of the Allied forces in the Netherlands. If then we have not a British force, we can have no hopeful prospect of the operations being directed against Antwerp. We must also recollect that, as the operations of the Allies in Holland will be for the purpose of obtaining a strong barrier for Holland, it is an object in which we are largely interested, and may be expected to assist by a British force. Nothing, however, has passed which can in any way whatever embarrass us whenever the time shall come for our decision.

I propose to confine this army to 10,000 effectives, not including a brigade of militia of 1600 men. Of this 10,000 I am sure, if we break up the army, I shall not be able to send to you more than 6000, if so many, such is the composition of this force.

I will acquaint you next week with the reinforcements you may expect from hence.

With respect to the clothing, which you tell me has not been sent, I am assured by the Foreign-Office that it is gone to the depôt at Plymouth. I can assure you that in all the orders I have given with respect to equipments for foreign service, I have uniformly reminded the departments that they must not interfere with your demands.

With respect to the Naval department, you say very justly that a service which offers no encouragement, either of glory or profit, will not be well executed if it be not attentively watched. The Naval Lords here, however, speak of the service in the Bay at this time of the year as that which cannot be with safety undertaken, the ships of war having no safe place to run to. On reading the *Moniteurs*, which prepared us for severer losses than you have experienced in the late actions, I had a conversation with one of their Lordships on the expediency of sending some troop-ships, ready in the Downs, to Pasages with such reinforcements as we could collect in a short time for you; but he protested against it at present, unless the case should be very urgent indeed. As to the blockade of ports, we have always seen how ineffectual they are to reduce a garrison by famine. We have blockaded Corfu for three years, and the garrison has never suffered for want of provisions. I am afraid, therefore, that you can never place much reliance on the co-operation of the navy for purposes of this kind.

I send you a copy of a letter from Lord Burghersh. It is the most gratifying from head-quarters which we have had for some time.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

With respect to the assistance to be given to the Spanish troops, for the purpose of enabling them to co-operate with you, I will write by the next mail.

Fifty thousand pounds, in addition to the 100,000*l.* already announced, is ready to be put on board at Portsmouth. I mean this for the Anglo-Sicilian army, if not broken up, and you have no immediate want for it.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lord Burghersh to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Freibourg, 16th Dec., 1813.

I have the honour of reporting to your Lordship my arrival at this place on the 14th instant. Prince Schwarzenberg had already established his head-quarters here, and his army was assembled between Freibourg, Basle, and Stockach.

The Emperor of Austria arrived here yesterday. It has been a cause of the greatest satisfaction to me to have been a witness of the enthusiastic manner in which the inhabitants of this town received their ancient master.

The country of the Brisgau (of which this town forms a part) had for many centuries belonged to the House of Austria. The people were firmly attached to it, and had never ceased to lament their separation from a government whose mild and paternal rule had for so many ages protected them and made them happy. The return of their ancient Sovereign, crowned with so many triumphs over an enemy detested in this country, afforded an opportunity of showing their attachment to him too tempting to resist. The people met him at a distance from the town, accompanied him with acclamations to his quarters, and through the whole night assembling in crowds at his doors, proclaimed their joy at his return amongst them, and their attachment to his person.

I never witnessed more enthusiasm or a more decided expression of those feelings which alike do honour to those who gave way to them and to the Sovereign who received them.

I have already informed your Lordship of the objection which had been taken by the Emperor of Russia to the movement of the Allied army into Switzerland. I have also stated to you the total impossibility which was felt by Prince Schwarzenberg of attempting the invasion of France from the positions in which his army was assembled, unless the neutrality of Switzerland was rendered secure, or its occupation by a corps of the Allies consented to.

In consequence of the decree of the Diet of Switzerland announcing a system of neutrality for that country, a corps of 12,000 men was placed under M. de Watteville, to protect the frontiers and to secure them against invasion. This body of troops was placed in positions along the left bank of the Rhine, between Basle and Schaffhausen. It is singular that the whole of this force should be cantoned on the frontiers towards Germany, whilst it does not appear that a single soldier has been directed to those on the side of France. The preparations on the part of the Allies were perhaps more formidable, but the

French have assembled troops in positions which should at least have required some attention on the part of the Swiss government.

A body of 300 conscripts have lately been sent from Switzerland to join the French armies. Palisades have been furnished from Basle for the fortress of Huningen; and an Austrian officer who had escaped from France was again delivered over a prisoner to the French by the authorities of Switzerland. So far the neutrality does not appear to have been maintained with impartiality between the contending parties.

The town of Berne, proud of the distinguished part it formerly held in the Swiss Republic, has first taken a decided step towards the recovery of its ancient rights. The provincial Diet has blamed the conduct of its deputies in the General Assembly, in having consented to the maintenance of the government as at present established, and in having agreed to a system of neutrality to which they were unauthorized. The Diet has refused to publish the decree of neutrality within the canton, and thus has separated itself from the general Confederation.

The Avoyer Frendenreich, the present head of the government of Berne, has declared his readiness to abdicate in favour of the Avoyer Steiger, and the commission of ten persons established in 1802, if the Allied Powers will guarantee the re-establishment of the former limits and government of the canton; and several deputies have been sent to this place to obtain that object. Two persons return this day to Berne with a favourable answer from the Austrian government. It is expected that upon their arrival a change of government will immediately take place, and that the Avoyer Steiger will be placed at the head of the authorities of that canton. The feeling of the people is most decidedly in favour of this change; they are alone anxious to recover their former rights and government, and for that object look with anxiety for assistance from the Austrian troops.

The entry of the Allied Army into Switzerland has therefore been determined upon; but the Austrian government is anxious that the new government of Berne should, upon its establishment, invite that movement, and the deputies who now return are charged with instructions on that head.

Negotiations have been established with Monsieur de Watteville, seeking to induce him to take part with the Allies, and with the anxious wishes of his own countrymen; as yet they have been brought to no decided termination. The troops under his orders are generally desirous of rescuing their country from the pernicious domination of France, and particularly the contingents of the canton of Berne are looked for to support the system about to be adopted by their country.

The troops of the Pays de Vaud are alone suspected of any disposition hostile to the re-establishment of the ancient Constitution of their country. The militia of that canton amounts to near 18,000 men, in a tolerable state of organization. Its government has a depôt of 150 pieces of cannon at Morges; and from its other military resources considerable apprehension of its hostility is entertained at Berne, unless the advance of the Austrian troops should immediately follow the change of government meditated in that canton.

In the canton of Zurich, the Grisons, and the little cantons, the most favourable dispositions have been manifested by the people. No doubt is entertained of their immediate declaration in favour of their ancient laws and government, and of their active assistance in the cause of the Allies.

Although the time is not irrevocably fixed, yet I have every reason to believe that the 20th of December will be the day on which the Austrian troops will pass the frontiers of Switzerland. The answer from the government of Berne may be expected before that time; but I hope that even should it be delayed, the march of the troops will not be put off.

The French are collecting troops in the vicinity of Basle: their amount as yet is trifling. Depôts are also forming at Besançon, Befort, and Dijon. It is reported that Marshal Ney is appointed to the command at Besançon.

These preparations on the part of the enemy make it most essential that as little time as possible should be lost in the occupation of a country so easily to be defended and of such vital importance to the operations of the Allied armies, from their present positions, as Switzerland.

The Austrian troops will pass the Rhine in several columns between Basle and Schaffhausen: they will amount to about 60,000 men, and will be directed, the right upon Berne, thence in part upon Pontalier, the rest upon Morges and Geneva; the centre upon Freidberg, thence round the left and to the southward of the lake, and also to Geneva; the left upon Zurich, thence upon the Valais.

Your Lordship will already have been apprised of an anxiety on the part of the persons about to re-establish the former government in the canton of Berne, to receive some supplies of money from the funds formerly placed by that government in the Bank of England. I merely mention that subject as it was stated to me by the deputies from Switzerland, who requested me (in the absence of Lord Aberdeen) to report their wishes.

One of those persons, Monsieur Louis Gatchet, formerly Major in the regiment of Ravena, in the service of Great Britain, and now in receipt of a pension from our government, is anxious to retain that pension, although he is about to enter the service of his native country.

I can give your Lordship but little detailed information of the state of the French armies.

The army of the Viceroy is at Villafranca. He has detached a corps of 10,000 men from Mantua towards Ferrara, against General Nugent. His advanced posts are upon the Adige as far as Rovigo. His army is weak in proportion to the one opposed to him, of which Marshal Bellegarde is about to assume the command, and whose early advance is expected. Murat is believed to have advanced towards Rome, but no hostility is expected from him. Marshal Masséna has arrived at Genoa, some persons report, with a corps of 20,000 men; others, with a much less considerable number. The reserve, which is to be formed at Turin, is not as yet composed of any troops fit for the service of a campaign. At Huningen there is as yet but an inconsiderable garrison.

By the reports of deserters from France there appears to be a very considerable deficiency of means for the formation of the new levies assembling at the depôts in that country. The maladies which were brought into France by the troops returning from the German campaign still continue to rage amongst them, and have been communicated to the conscripts who have been incorporated with them at the different points of their assembly.

I have, &c.,

BURGHERSH.

II.

17th Dec.

I have the honour of enclosing for your Lordship's information a copy of a letter from Count Salis to the Avoyer Steiger at Berne.

I had omitted yesterday to mention to you the appointment of Monsieur le Comte de Serft Pilsach on an extraordinary mission from the Court of Austria to Berne. The Comte will leave this place to-day, will pass by the headquarters of Monsieur de Watteville at Arau, and will endeavour to bring to a favourable close the negotiations which have been commenced with that officer. He will afterwards proceed to Berne, from whence it is hoped he will

transmit the invitation from the new government of the canton for the advance of the Austrian troops.

I have great satisfaction in reporting to your Lordship the favourable state of affairs in this quarter. The entry of the Allied troops into Switzerland at the call of the inhabitants gives the world another proof of the detestation in which the domination of France is held, even in countries where its sway was thought to be the least oppressive. The accession of that republic to the cause of the Allies must in every point of view be considered as a most important and favourable occurrence.

I have, &c.,

BURGHERSH.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 31st Dec., 1813.

I had the honour of receiving, on the 29th instant, your Lordship's despatch of the 14th,* dated St. Jean de Luz, and I lost no time in laying it before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

I am commanded by His Royal Highness to assure you that he has received the intelligence conveyed by your despatch with peculiar satisfaction, not only as forming a splendid instance of that uniform success which has distinguished your Lordship's operations, but as being well calculated to encourage the Allies, now on the Rhine, to renew the campaign, and press upon that part of the French territory which is immediately opposed to them.

The difficulties with which your Lordship has had to contend, in consequence of the bad state of the weather and roads, must have operated much in favour of the enemy; and it is highly to the credit of the troops under your command that these difficulties have been so happily overcome.

Your Lordship will convey to Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope His Royal Highness's congratulations on the opportunity which has been afforded him of displaying the gallantry, coolness, and judgment which have always distinguished him in service.

The repeated instances which Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill has given of his eminent abilities are most gratifying to His Royal Highness; and your Lordship will be pleased to express to the Lieutenant-General the sense entertained by the Prince Regent of his services.

Your Lordship will have the goodness to convey to Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart, and to the General officers and other officers engaged in these memorable actions, His Royal Highness's most gracious thanks for their distinguished conduct.

You will be pleased likewise to express to Marshal Sir William Beresford, and to the General officers and other officers of the Portuguese army, the high sense entertained by the Prince Regent of their distinguished gallantry and good conduct on this and indeed on every occasion throughout this brilliant and eventful campaign.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 365.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 31st Dec., 1813.

Your way of legislating by proclamation is very good; and your opening the port of St. Jean de Luz politic in many views. If the trade becomes any way considerable, it will give some facility in the negotiation of bills. I beg, however, to call your attention to some points which may be worthy of consideration. Buonaparte has for some time been anxious to encourage an import trade: colonial produce, as furnishing him with revenue; hides, &c., for military equipments. It will be very necessary to watch whether the port of St. Jean de Luz being thus open may not give to vessels carrying either colonial produce or the raw materials for military equipments means of eluding our cruisers, by appearing to be bound to a friendly port. This perhaps comes more immediately under the observation of the cruisers; but the same object may be effected by importing the goods, in the first instance, into St. Jean de Luz, and then reexporting them to the French ports in small craft. Your Lordship will be able to judge whether this is practised. I will look at the wording of the original order for blockading the ports of France to see if any instructions to cruisers are necessary to secure the trade you have permitted.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

I send you what Lord Melville has just written on the interruption of the money from Lisbon and Cadiz. You will have the official communications by next mail.

[ENCLOSURE.]

"Admiral Martin ought not to have made any difficulty about sending the frigate with the money from Cadiz direct to Santander or Pasages, if practicable from the weather. I presume that he considered himself as restrained by the arrangements agreed to between Lord Wellington and Rear-Admiral Martin as to convoys meeting at Coruña; but measures shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of the inconvenience in the case of money being conveyed from Cadiz or Lisbon. I think it probable also that he may have demurred to sending any of his squadron into Cadiz during the prevalence of the fever. The orders from hence against any communication with Gibraltar were peremptory to all ships going into or out of the Mediterranean."

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 31st Dec., 1813.

I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatches from No. 128 to No. 136, inclusive, and likewise the duplicates of your despatches 116, 117, and 118, of which the originals had not been received.

Upon the subject of the No. 132, I hasten to convey to your Lordship the entire approbation of His Majesty's government with regard to the steps your Lordship has adopted for encouraging trade in the port of St.

Jean de Luz, and for levying a duty upon certain imports in order to defray the civil expenses of the country occupied by your Lordship's army.

I have particularly to express the approbation with which your Lordship's decision to grant no licences whatsoever for the purpose of trading with the enemy's ports has been received; and I recommend earnestly that no intercourse should be permitted by which the present French government might derive an accession of revenue.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS, AND THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE PURSUED.

31st Dec., 1813.

It is needless to expatiate upon the importance of the present crisis, or to dwell upon the necessity of acting instantly, and profiting by an opportunity which certainly presents itself with the fairest aspect at this moment, but which may be very soon gone by. One of two things must happen: either Buonaparte will endeavour to negotiate with the view of gaining time and renewing his strength, or he will at once make the most strenuous exertions to reassemble such forces as may baffle the Allies. In the former case it is our game to anticipate him, and to bring matters to such a state that Napoleon may not negotiate with the enormous advantage of holding Germany and Italy in passive subjection; and, in the second case, it must undoubtedly be our policy to follow up our actual advantages with the utmost vigour, to crush his rising armies in their growth, and to deprive the enemy of his most essential resources.

Germany is a more important and necessary possession to Buonaparte than Spain can be esteemed under the present circumstances. I conceive that in this moment of distress he will sacrifice the lesser rather than abandon the greater object, and that he will immediately draw a large body of troops from Spain in order to make head against the Russians, and repress commotions in Germany. But I do not imagine that Napoleon will withdraw the whole of his force from Spain, because he would by so doing render the Allied armies in the Peninsula disposable for offensive operations. According to my calculation, there are about 140,000 French remaining in Spain; and my conjecture is, that 50,000 or 60,000 of these (including a large proportion of cavalry) will be withdrawn immediately, and will be sent by forced marches to the Rhine, where conscripts, and contingents, and gleanings from every quarter, will be mixed with these old troops, so that Napoleon will appear early in the spring with a very powerful army of reserve upon the Elbe or the Oder. If 80,000 men are left in Spain, this number will be sufficient (with the advantage of holding many and very strong places*) to keep the Allies in play for some months, and give their master time to reestablish his affairs in Germany.

* Pamplona, Mequinenza, Tortosa, Barcelona, Figueras, Murviedro, &c.

England must of necessity make her efforts in the south of Europe. Her whole army is in Spain and the Mediterranean; and to attempt to transport our forces, with all the incumbrance of horses, artillery, stores, &c., from the Peninsula to the Elbe or the Weser, would be to sacrifice the time which is so peculiarly precious at the present conjuncture.

We can only give therefore an indirect help towards the operations in Germany. The German troops assembling in Finland are rated at 15,000 or 20,000 men. These may be taken into our service; and if placed under able and respected officers (such as Linsingen, Walmoden, &c.), will form a valuable corps d'armée, particularly as such an accession of strength might enable Bernadotte to operate with effect upon the side of Pomerania and Mecklenburg. And if they once get into communication with Hanover and the adjoining countries, this body of Germans may become the noyau of an army of four times their present numbers. 30,000 Swedes and 20,000 Germans, acting from Lubeck or Stralsund, would make it extremely difficult for the French to hold the line of the Oder; and if the latter should be forced to throw themselves back upon the Upper Elbe, it is not unreasonable to expect that the Prussians would join the Allies, and connect the operations of Bernadotte's army and that of the Russians.

This speculation is founded upon the presumption that Austria will take no very active part in the war either one way or the other. I shall endeavour to show presently that we possess an engine by which Austria might be drawn to the side of the Allies, or at least be neutralised.

There are some matters of detail to be attended to in this country with the view of giving thorough effect to the above operations. Naval means of all sorts (including bomb-vessels, gun and mortar-boats, &c.) should be ready to enter the Baltic the first moment that the ice will permit it. A large proportion of mortars, some battering-guns, ammunition, rockets, and a number of spare field-pieces, with harness and equipments, should be embarked without loss of time. Clothing and arms should be sent to Gottenburg for the German troops; and considerable quantities of spare arms and clothing should be prepared for the additional forces we may expect to levy. A supply of valuable officers might be obtained by turning over the men and horses of two of the regiments of German cavalry, now in Spain, to the other two;* and in like manner transferring the men of some of the infantry battalions of the Legion, and sending the officers and serjeants to Gottenburg to receive German recruits, and form fresh corps with the greatest expedition.

I have supposed 80,000 French to be left in Spain. Of this number there might be available for service in the field near 60,000 men, after garrisons have been furnished to the strong fortresses. One part of this force would probably act in the mountainous country of Navarre, having Pamplona as their pivot and point of support, while the rest would endeavour to prolong the war in Catalonia. In neither of these countries

* Men and horses of the 2nd Hussars to 1st Hussars; men and horses of 2nd Dragoons to 1st Dragoons; men of 5th Battalion of the Line to 1st and 2nd Battalions; Men of 2nd Light Battalion to 1st Light Battalion; men of 7th Battalion Line (in Sicily) to 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th. Compress the men of Brunswick Legion into 6 companies, and send home the officers, &c. of the other companies.

is there much scope for the operations of cavalry; and it is to be hoped that when one comes to a war of chicane in mountains and defiles, much use may be derived from the better description of guerrillas. The British and Portuguese army will be very powerful by the end of February; and we may fairly expect to see some service rendered by the Spanish troops now that they are placed under Lord Wellington's control and guidance. Their gross numbers must be considerable when the Gallician army, and those under Del Parque, Elio, Carlos de España, Lacy, &c., are brought to act under one system, and upon a contracted theatre. Considering the means and advantages which the Allies will possess, we may flatter ourselves that the most the enemy would be able to effect would be to *chicaner* and protract the resistance of the several fortresses, but that these must fall in succession a little sooner or a little later. Barcelona is the most important to us; and if this place were wrested from the French, they would have little chance of success in a second invasion of Spain.

You will observe that, in enumerating the force of the Allies in the Peninsula, I have made no mention of Lord William Bentinck's troops; and I have omitted them because I am fully convinced, after the most intent consideration, that they ought to quit Spain immediately. The assistance they could give in a campaign of sieges and skirmishes beyond the Ebro would be of no value when compared with what they might effect elsewhere: and if any attempts are to be made to liberate Italy, or to detach Austria from the French alliance, they must be made *without the least delay;* otherwise Napoleon will negotiate with the one as his subject and the other as his friend; or he will arm for a new conflict with the resources of both countries at his disposal.

The emancipation of Italy must be a point of vital importance to the British. That rich and populous country, if once rescued and united in one state, would become the best counterpoise and surest rival to France in the south of Europe. The Italians are an intelligent and rising people, unanimous in their detestation of the French, and ardently desirous of being delivered from their dominion. But the Italians have felt too often and too severely the force of the French arms to commit themselves by premature and unconsolidated insurrections. Neither would they engage in a conflict with their present masters unless they were satisfied that the old governments of Italy were not to be reestablished, but that they should be enabled to frame for themselves one free and powerful state.

But even if there were no other object to be attained than the immediate advantage of depriving Buonaparte of the vast resources he derives from Italy, and of obliging him to divide his forces at this critical period, these alone seem to me sufficient reasons for carrying the war into the northern parts of Italy. From local considerations, Lord William Bentinck has not been able to bring to Spain more than 11,000 men; but he could employ with safety at least 18,000 in Italy: and if the Spanish government would allow of his carrying to that country the auxiliary divisions under Whittingham and Roche, Lord William might land at Leghorn or Genoa with 25,000 men. My own conviction (and that founded upon a pretty long and intimate acquaintance with the affairs of Italy) is, that the people would flock in thousands to receive the arms and directions of the English General, and that a very few weeks would be sufficient to shut up

the French in the principal garrison towns. But even supposing that the effect of our debarkation be less rapid and decisive than I am inclined to suppose, and that only partial disturbances are at first excited, let me ask what troops the enemy can assemble in the field to oppose with success such an army as Bentinck would command? It is notorious that Italy has been drained of troops in order to feed the ruinous wars in Spain and Russia. The alarm and agitation which must attend the invasion would oblige the enemy to keep as large a force as they could command in every considerable town, as well as in the numerous fortresses of this extensive and populous country; and the Allies would be able to establish themselves securely, ensure their resources, and open communications upon every side; by which means the disposition of the Italians would be fairly tried, and the fullest opportunity afforded to them of shaking off their yoke. Leghorn would probably be the best point for our attack, as it is a large town, tolerably well fortified, of which we could easily make ourselves masters. The port would afford good shelter to our transports; and (when the works should be armed) Leghorn would be a secure place of retreat and reembarkation in the case of ultimate failure. The situation of Leghorn is also particularly favourable, because the people of Tuscany, the Roman State, Parma, and Placentia are the most ardent in their hatred to the French; and because the possession of the Tuscan coast would cut off the supplies of the Isle of Elba, and perhaps throw that valuable spot, with its fine harbours and strong citadel, into our hands.

But in order to give a greater stimulus to the Italians, and to render our diversion more effectual, I would at the same time (or even sooner) raise Dalmatia, Carniola, Carinthia, and the Tyrol against their new masters. The antipathy borne to them by the people of these countries cannot be doubted; and the forces by which they are at present held in subjection are contemptible. In Dalmatia, Istria, &c., there are no other troops than Croats and Sclavonians. These might be easily *bought*; and a couple of thousand men detached from Sicily and the Ionian Islands, with a good squadron, and the flotilla from Messina, and carrying arms, &c., for the insurgents, would be sufficient to kindle the flame, which would blaze from the Bocche di Cattaro to the frontiers of Switzerland. A word from the Emperor of Russia, and a few thousand dollars from England, would make the Montenegrins join in the first blows to be struck at the French garrisons; and the insurrection of these warlike countries and that of Italy would mutually assist and secure each other.

But it is not only for the sake of aiding our operations in Italy that I would use every effort to raise the people of the Tyrol and Dalmatia. Their taking arms would, I conceive, afford the surest and speediest means of detaching Austria from her alliance with France. Let these people, when they rise against the French, display the Austrian flag, and send deputies to Vienna to offer homage, and demand to be again received under the Imperial dominion. In such a crisis as the present a petition of this nature could not be lightly rejected, particularly if the Emperor were given to understand at the same time, that in the event of his refusal the Allies would vigorously support these nations, and guarantee their accession to the states of Italy.

Let us now take a general view of the state of affairs as they might

stand in the ensuing spring. If Buonaparte succeeds by great efforts in reassembling a numerous army in the north, he may bring the Russians to a check upon the Vistula; but it is much more probable that the latter will have reached the Oder; and in this case the resources of Poland and of the greater part of Prussia will have been cut off from the enemy. 50,000 Swedes and Germans will menace the north of Germany, and at least oblige Napoleon to keep a strong army of observation in Lower Saxony. In Spain Lord Wellington will take the field with 60,000 effective troops of the finest description, exclusive of the Spanish regulars and guerrillas. Under such a pressure, and after the tremendous losses which Buonaparte has recently sustained, how can he send a fresh army to Italy to oppose the English, and to repress the insurrections which will have burst forth? At the same time these insurrections and our invasion will at once have deprived him of the resources in men and warlike means, of which he has such pressing need. Buonaparte has not reduced Europe to the state we have lately beheld with the troops and resources of France alone, but with those of France, Italy, Germany, and Poland. Leave him these and the advantages of his position, and he will again defeat us, and resume his superiority; but if we profit by the opportunity, and by the good will of the Germans and Italians, to reduce Napoleon to the impaired resources of France alone, we cannot but prevail in the struggle.

Powerful as the means of Russia and England may be (eked out with those of Sweden, Spain, and Portugal), yet when I consider the concentrated mass and vigorous spirit of Napoleon's power, I cannot help doubting the ability of the Allies to reduce him to a state of harmlessness unless the resources of Germany and Italy be wrested from him, and converted into the instruments of his overthrow. It appears to me therefore of the most essential and urgent importance to adopt such a policy, and pursue such a line of operations, as may afford the people of those countries the best opportunity of revolting, and may support them most effectually in their endeavours to expel their oppressors.

Before I conclude, it is necessary to advert to two other cases which may arise. Instead of recalling a portion of the French troops from Spain, and leaving a strong body to occupy the Allies in that quarter, Napoleon may either determine upon continuing his efforts to hold his footing in that country, and may leave the whole of the present force to oppose the British and Spaniards, or he may possibly withdraw all his disposable troops after throwing garrisons into the most important fortresses. Under the first of these suppositions I see no reason for deviating from the system of operations which I have suggested in the former part of this paper. The Allies would be strong enough at least to confine the enemy to the northern provinces of the Peninsula; while the most important of all possible diversions would be effected in favour of the proposed operations in Italy and Germany. If, on the contrary, the whole of the French troops should retire from Spain, I conceive that the siege of Barcelona should be our first object. While that was going on, the Hanoverian troops now serving under Lord Wellington might be brought without difficulty to join the Allied army in the north of Germany; and at the same time two or three regiments of British cavalry might be sent forward to reinforce Lord William Bentinck's army in Italy; and as soon as Barcelona should be

reduced, I should wish to see Lord Wellington cross the Gulf of Lyons (a short and easy passage), and establish himself in Genoa and Piedmont. The forces under Lord William would be united with those of Lord Wellington, and his Lordship would be at the head of 70,000 men, covering and commanding the inexhaustible resources of Italy.

There appear to me the most serious objections to an invasion of the south of France from the side of Spain. The French may be discontented with the government of Buonaparte, and the increasing pressure, arising from the unfavourable turn of the war, may heighten this discontent; but I cannot believe that they would join or give assistance to foreign invaders. Our invasion would probably make them forget their grievances by exciting their national pride, and the apprehension of partition and political changes to which there is no reason to believe that they can be well inclined. The British forces under Lord Wellington are not sufficiently numerous to make any effectual impression by themselves. If Spanish troops were to accompany us, their vengeance, their want of discipline, and their poverty would lead them into acts of pillage and oppression, which must stimulate the French more strongly to resistance. And it may be doubted if the Portuguese would engage with that zeal which must be necessary to produce success in a course of operations so distant from their own country, and in which they might not feel a direct interest. It is to be recollected also that upon entering France we should find the mass of national guards and gendarmerie united with the regular troops, and adding very materially to their means of resisting us, while those forces cannot be made use of in Italy or Germany; so that an invasion of the French territory would serve in effect to augment and concentrate the military means of the enemy.

H. E. B.*

Hohenzollern Hechingen, 31 Décembre, 1813.

MON RESPECTABLE PROTECTEUR,

Il paroît que tous les démons se sont conjurés pour m'empêcher de vous écrire. Deux longues lettres, dans lesquelles je vous contois, mon Général, les aventures de l'an 1813, sont disparus dessous mes mains au moment où j'allois les cacheter. Mais pourvu que vous ne blâmez pas mon empressement à me rappeler à votre souvenir, je ne perdrai pas patience à recommencer mon récit, si non savant et étudié, du moins sincère.

Les événements les plus extraordinaires, les plus opposés dans leurs résultats, et les plus décisifs pour le sort de la race humaine, se sont brusquement succédés depuis notre dernière conversation à Little Ealing.

Il y a peut-être des cours et des individus qui aimeroient s'attribuer l'issue de cette mémorable campagne, qui dans leurs conjectures et combinaisons voudroient trouver la source du changement heureux, opéré dans le monde militaire, politique, et moral. Qu'il me soit permis d'en douter, et de rappeler la devise du modeste Alexandre sur la médaille de 1812:—"Non nobis—non nobis—sed nomine tuo."

* This document appears to have been drawn up by Lieut.-Colonel Henry Edward Bunbury, Under Secretary-at-War.—ED.

Personne des deux parties n'a eu un plan fixé, personne n'a rien prévu de ce qui est arrivé; tout a été l'effet des passions aveugles, et rien d'un calcul raisonné.

"Dieu a voulu, Alexandre a désiré, et la nation Prussienne étoit déterminée;" voilà tout le panégyrique de cette année.

Après des longues et fatigantes angoisses d'irrésolution, l'Autriche s'étoit enfin déclarée, plutôt par poltronnerie que par honneur. François le maigre craignoit une révolution en Hongrie, Metternich les polissons de Vienne, et Schwarzenberg les reproches de sa femme, qui est une patriote très prononcée. Vous sentez bien, mon Général, qu'avec de pareils ingrédiens on ne produit pas de l'enthousiasme; aussi toute la nation se vit compromise dans cette lutte avec un espèce d'abattement qui contrastoit bien l'exultation des Prussiens.

L'armée Autrichienne, qui pleure son Archiduc, avoit toujours connu Schwarzenberg pour bon diable, mais jamais pour grande tête; le public se défioit du ministère, et les deux champions eux-mêmes, qui venoient de briller comme les organes du Napoléonisme, n'avoient pas le courage de se croire faits pour en être les destructeurs.

La marche de l'armée Russe-Prussienne de Reichenbach, en Silésie, jusqu'à Töplitz réussit, malgré le peu de rapidité qu'on y mit, parceque Napoléon manquait d'espions.

Moreau, qui accompagnoit l'Empereur Alexandre, voulut déjà alors qu'on marchoit sur Leipsig, en abandonnant les défilés de Töplitz à Wittgenstein: mais malgré les sages conseils qu'il donnoit, et les distinctions dont on l'étouffoit, on faisoit toujours le contraire de ce qu'il proposait; les uns par jalousie, les autres par bêtise ou foiblesse.

Quant au Sieur Jomini, déraisonnant à qui mieux, il se réjouissoit de la tournure qu'il donneroit aux affaires, dans son cinquième volume.

Wittgenstein, faisant donc l'avant-garde de la grande armée combinée, entra le premier en Saxe et délogea le Maréchal Gouvion St. Cyr de la position de Pyrna. St. Cyr, inférieur en nombre et surpris, se retira, mais avec une contenance et un ordre admirable. Il fit la faute de prendre une position devant la ville de Pyrna, au lieu de ne point la toucher, et de marcher de Peterswalden droit sur Dohna. Si Monsieur de Wittgenstein avoit profité de cette circonstance, il auroit pu s'emparer le même jour de Dresde, qui n'étoit occupé que d'un seul bataillon. Nous nous contentions d'avoir balayé les débouchés.

La grande armée, au lieu de suivre le Comte Wittgenstein de près sur la chaussée, fit sans rime et sans raison un grand détour par de mauvais chemins, et perdit trois jours.

Mais enfin nous voilà arrivés avec 225,000 hommes devant Dresde, qui, légèrement fortifié, n'étoit défendu que par le brave Gouvion.

Toute cette expédition de Dresde est un tissu d'absurdités qui surpasse tout ce que j'ai vu dans ce genre; et je crois en avoir vu beaucoup.

N'exigez pas, mon Général, que je vous rende compte de la raison et du but de ce mouvement: suffit qu'on vous ait ennuyé de mauvais manœuvres; pourquoi vous faire enrager par une mauvaise logique?

En occupant même alors la ville de Dresde qu'avions nous gagné? On se flattoit de faire de l'Elbe une Bérézina, en oubliant que Napoléon avoit à droit et à gauche d'autres têtes-de-pont qui valoient mieux, et qu'en nous

plaçant devant un grand fleuve, dont l'ennemi tenait les deux bords à volonté (tandis que nous, très loins d'avoir un seul passage assuré, n'avions pas même un point d'appui), je dis qu'en nous plaçant de sorte, nous assurâmes toutes les chances contre nous, et toutes pour l'ennemi. Mais supposé même qu'il nous fallait indispensablement le pavé de Dresde, nous nous primes à l'attaque de cette ville très gauchement.

Après une longue délibération sur ce qu'on vouloit faire, on résolut de donner l'assaut lendemain, sachant bien que Napoléon marchoit à toutes jambes.

Le lendemain donc on exécuta ce projet par une *démonstration générale*, c'est-à-dire, "on prit une position en colonnes serrées à bout, portant des retranchements et palissades ennemis, et les fit attaquer par des tirailleurs," sans rien effectuer par une mesure aussi savante, comme de raison. Le vaillant Collorédo seul chargea une rédoute à la bayonnette et l'emporta, sans cependant être soutenu. Bianchi fit aussi une attaque hardie qui échut par la même raison. Schwarzenberg regarda Dresde comme dans sa poche, empêcha les Alliés de donner l'assaut, pour en avoir l'honneur à lui seul, et au lieu de risquer à la fois 10,000 hommes, avec le sacrifice desquels il auroit certainement pris la ville, il ne vouloit rien risquer, n'entreprit que des attaques partielles, qui lui coûtèrent 20,000 hommes et n'effectuèrent rien.

Nous eûmes quantité de canons démontés et un très grand nombre de braves gens fusillés, car j'appelle *tirailler* avec un adversaire *couvert* se faire fusiller. La nuit tombante nous apprîmes enfin que Napoléon étoit arrivé à Dresde déjà depuis les neuf heures du matin, et nous étions charmés que c'étoit du moins *lui* qui nous avoit frotté.

Nous primes en conséquence de cette douce persuasion une position défensive autour de Dresde, pour *bloquer* Napoléon dans cette ville, position assez bonne par l'avantage du niveau contre l'ennemi, mais entrecoupée par son front par plusieurs ravins profonds et impraticables. Toute mauvaise qu'étoit cette nouvelle détermination vu la proximité de Königstein, où les François avoient un pont, et l'appui et le replis que l'ennemi trouvoit en Dresde, moyennant de quoi il pouvoit tomber avec ses forces réunies inopinément et impunément sur une telle partie des nôtres que bon lui sembloit. Malgré ces circonstances, le quasi blocus de Dresde auroit pu cependant être soutenu, puisque nous étions deux fois plus forts, mais il sembloit que le déluge qui métamorphosoit les sommets des montagnes les plus élevées en marais courbeux, avoit submergé en même temps les organes dont le quartier-général avoit besoin, selon le système du Docteur Gall, pour ses opérations intellectuelles.

Le 27 d'Août est le jour le plus brillant dans la vie célèbre de Napoléon. La victoire de Lutzen étoit très belle et décisive, mais il y eut le grand avantage du nombre. A Dresde il défit pour la première fois un ennemi absolument supérieur en forces. Au fond il n'y eut point de combat, mais Napoléon en cueillit des lauriers néanmoins.

L'armée Russe-Prussienne, commandée par Monsieur Barclay de Tolly, ayant un corps d'observation vis-à-vis de Königstein, et refusant son extrême droite, formoit la droite de notre position. Le chemin de Pyrna et Töplitz n'étoit occupé que par des troupes légères, ce qui nous fit perdre ensuite notre ligne d'opérations et de retraite naturelles. Les Autrichiens

tenoient la gauche; sur ceux-ci Napoléon tournoit tous ses efforts, ne faisant contre Barclay que des démonstrations et des attaques partielles, mal combinées, et repoussées avec dédain.

En effet même sur notre droite le combat consistoit beaucoup moins en charges d'infanterie et de cavalerie qu'en une simple canonnade, qui fit perdre les deux jambes au pauvre Moreau, et le petit reste de son bon sens au pauvre quartier-général. Arrive Murat, avec sa misérable cavalerie, qui pour la première fois dans cette campagne osait se montrer, et tombe sur les Autrichiens, qui, mouillés de corps et d'âme, jette les armes par bataillons, régiments, et par brigades entières, tandis que notre superbe cavalerie, supérieure en nombre et qualité, étoit employée "à faire démonstration contre l'artillerie Française." Voilà le signal d'une fuite générale sans que l'ennemi nous poussât!

Si Schwarzenberg ne vouloit pas risquer de se retirer alors sur Leipzig ou derrière la Saale, et d'abandonner le sort de la Bohême à ses bonnes forteresses, à ses défilés qu'on auroit pu soutenir par quelques corps d'armée, et aux diversions de Blücher et de Bernadotte (pour rester fidèle à son premier plan, qui étoit celui d'enfermer Buonaparte), il auroit dû détacher du moins une bonne partie de ses troupes, en corps volants, sur cette direction, ce qui n'auroit pas laissé de donner beaucoup d'inquiétude à Napoléon, d'en couper la communication avec la France, et de faciliter le mouvement rétrograde de l'armée alliée.

Au lieu de manœuvrer avec sang-froid, puisqu'on ne se trouvoit guère en extrémité après la journée du 27, tout se précipita d'une manière honteuse et ridicule sur les chemins les premiers venus de la Bohême.

Toute l'armée Autrichienne et le corps de Wittgenstein, avec leur artillerie et train, s'encombrèrent sur la malheureuse route de Dippoldswalde, Landsberg, et Zinnwalde, qui est si mauvaise qu'on y passe à cheval avec danger, et que tous nos chevaux s'y estropièrent.

Toute l'armée de Schwarzenberg auroit été prise et dissoute si Buonaparte, après sa brillante victoire, eût montré un peu plus de sens commun, ou le Stoïque Comte Ostermann Tolstoy, le Caton des Russes, un peu moins de valeur.

C'est à cet homme bizarre et manquant de génie, mais vertueux, inébranlable, et indifférent à tout caprice du monde extérieur,—c'est à cet homme que l'Europe doit le tribut de l'estime et de la reconnoissance les plus pures.

Abandonné depuis le 26 Août avec 5,000 hommes en observation de Königstein, il se vit attaquer le 27 de tous les côtés par des forces très supérieures, sans céder du terrain. Il auroit succombé néanmoins si les Gardes Russes, commandés par l'intelligent Yermoloff, ne fussent pas venus à son secours. L'ordre de la retraite en Bohême les suivit de près. Ostermann trouva la chaussée derrière lui déjà occupé par l'ennemi, mais sans s'arrêter longtemps il franchit le chemin à la bayonnette, ce qu'il était obligé de faire trois fois. Enfin, ayant gagné les devants sur Töplitz, il fit volte-face, et soutenant continuellement les charges du furibond Vandamme, tint bon dans les gorges de Culm jusqu'au 30 Août, midi, où la tête de la grande armée commençoit à défiler de l'Erzgebirge par le chemin de Dur.

Le Général Barclay de Tolly se mit alors en personne à la tête de nos

Gardes (Ostermann, qui à la bataille de Bautzen, le 20 Juin, avoit eu un coup de feu à travers de la poitrine, venoit de perdre le bras par un boulet le 30 Août à Culm), et dirigeant le brave Général Kleist, avec ses Prussiens (qui de Dresde s'étoient retirés par un chemin entre celui de Dur et de Culm), sur Nollendorff, décide la victoire.

Dès que Vandamme vit les masses accroître devant lui, car le vaillant Collorédo arrivoit aussi, il s'arrêta ; et dès que Kleist fut descendu dans le défilé de Nollendorff derrière lui, il ne put plus empêcher une déroute générale. Des 35,000 hommes qu'il avoit, il n'en échappèrent peut-être pas 5,000, qui, la plupart cavalerie, se firent jour l'épée à la main, et culbutèrent tout le corps de Kleist, fort de 25,000 hommes, en colonne de marche, qui ne s'attendoit pas à cette charge, et s'éparpilla dans les montagnes ; de sorte que Kleist, qui avoit décidé de la défaite et de la prise de 35,000 hommes, fut totalement battu dans le même moment par une poignée de fuyards. Cet exemple prouve que quelques escadrons déterminés peuvent décider quelquefois plus dans les montagnes qu'en plaine. La journée de Rivoli nous apprend la même chose.

La bataille de Culm est pour la campagne de 1813 ce que l'affaire de Tarontine étoit pour celle de 1812. Elle ranima d'une manière extraordinaire l'esprit abattu des armées alliées, dont le triomphe accrut encore davantage par la victoire signalée de Blücher à la Katzbach, et par la victoire également brillante de Bülow à Yuterbock.

Les militaires sévères blâmeront le long séjour inactif de la grande armée combinée à Töplitz ; mais comme il était nécessaire que les trois Souverains fussent présents à leurs armées, il est très certain que le séjour de Töplitz doit être envisagé comme la garantie de la délivrance prochaine de l'Europe.

Ce n'est qu'à Töplitz que les puissances réalisées conçurent un plan ferme de cette guerre ; qu'elles examinèrent sans partialité les sages conseils de Moreau,* qui dans le principe étoient les mêmes que le respectable Dumouriez avoit recommandés depuis si longtemps à l'Empereur Alexandre, qui les admira chaque fois, sans cependant les suivre. Les idées et les hommes profonds gênent ceux qui ne sont pas profonds eux-mêmes.

Ce n'est qu'à Töplitz que les Alliés s'assurèrent les uns des autres par des traités, et ce n'est surtout qu'alors que l'Angleterre obtint d'eux la promesse solennelle et publique de ne point négocier séparément avec l'ennemi général de quelque façon que ce soit ; selon moi, objet de la plus grande importance, impardonnablement négligé jusqu'alors. Ce traité sera rangé par la postérité à côté de celui que Oxenstierna fit conclure dans la guerre de 30 ans à Heilbronn, qui dans le moment ne paroissoit qu'une pure formalité, mais que le historien-philosophe envisage comme le *base* de la paix de Westphalie. Les mortels *pensent* bien des révolutions hardies, mais pour les faire *agir* il est nécessaire de les faire prononcer ces pensées à haute voix. La parole réciproque de trois pauvres montagnards coûtoit à l'Autriche la Suisse ; et la ligue des gueux (Gensen Bund), dont tout Madrid se moquoit, fit perdre à l'Espagne la belle et riche Hollande. Pourquoi chercher si loin ? N'est-ce pas la Junta qui a donné la première secousse irréparable à l'Empire de Napoléon ?

* Napoléon avoit raison de dire à la bataille de Leipzig, "Moreau se remue dans son tombeau."

Les Alliés s'arrangèrent de même avec les Princes de la Confédération du Rhin, et bien que les traités qu'on a fait avec eux ne font pas un chef-d'œuvre de politique, ils avoient néanmoins leur avantage dans le moment.

Depuis le 26 et 27 Août la conduite de Napoléon est une galerie d'inconséquences et de fautes étonnantes. Il avoit l'air de ne s'être pourvu d'esprit, de jugement, et de hardiesse que jusqu'à Dresde. Si, en nous voyant fuir honteusement le 28 Août vers Dippoldswalde et Landsberg, il s'étoit posté en force sur Töplitz, ce qu'Ostermann n'aura pu empêcher, il nous auroit tous fait mettre bas les armes dans les gorges impraticables et stériles de l'Erzgebirge; mais en détachant Vandamme avec 35,000 hommes contre près de 200,000 hommes, sans le soutenir, il fallut bien qu'il fut pris.

Si, en voyant si distinctement notre mal-adresse et impuissance, à force d'avoir plus de matières que nous n'avions d'esprit en proportion, et plus de voix que d'accord, il s'étoit contenté de nous avoir chassé en Bohême, dont il pouvoit fermer les débouchés avec peu de monde; s'il avoit rapidement repassé l'Elbe pour courser Blücher et Bernadotte, pour entrer à Berlin, ce qui auroit totalement découragé les Prussiens, et pour débloquer les forteresses de l'Oder, d'où il auroit pu pousser facilement la guerre dans la Pologne, prête à revolter—s'il avoit fait quelque chose dans ce genre, il auroit pu donner beaucoup de tournure à son affaire: mais il ne fit rien du tout.

Il s'amusoit avec des entrées triomphales à Dresde, y prenoit des bains, et sans rien entreprendre d'énergique il se fit frotter tour à tour par Schwarzenberg, Blücher, et Bernadotte.

Quant aux Alliés, on remarque depuis la journée de Culm dans leurs résolutions de la lenteur, et de la foiblesse dans l'exécution, mais leurs fautes ne sont plus grossières.

On conçut depuis les premiers jours de Septembre l'idée très juste que si on ne vouloit pas s'engager dans des batailles générales, qu'il falloit néanmoins harceler et fatiguer l'ennemi par la petite guerre, et par des partisans sur ses derrières; en conséquence de quoi on détacha avec de la cavalerie légère le Comte Mensdorff, le Général Thielmann, et le Prince Kondacheff, avec Platoff, par Carlsbad en Saxe, et Thuringue. Cette mesure étoit trop foible pour avoir des résultats décisifs, mais elle ne laissa pas de faire beaucoup de tort à l'armée Française.

Si, au lieu d'une poignée de Cosaques et de Hussards, nous eussions envoyé en Thuringue un corps d'armée solide de 50,000 hommes, ce que personne ne nous empêchoit de faire, nous aurions forcé Buonaparte de quitter l'Allemagne six semaines plus tôt. Mais cette grande timidité que vous nous voyez à détacher de l'infanterie hors de portée du camp provient essentiellement de notre ignorance honteuse de fortifier les places et les positions. Napoléon fait dans un couple de jours d'une cabane, d'un village, d'un bois, d'un marais, d'une montagne, ou d'un défilé, *un fort*, où une compagnie d'infanterie résiste aux attaques des plus grandes masses; tandis que nous, demeurant des mois entières dans des places fortes, ne nous doutons guère qu'un officier intelligent peut s'y défendre aisément contre un nombre très supérieur.

Quand faut-il avoir plus de recours à la fortification que lorsqu'on se met sur la défensive? Nous avions passé l'Elbe sans posséder un seul

double tête-de-pont sur l'Oder, dont toutes les forteresses étoient occupées par l'ennemi.

Après les essais manqués de Buonaparte de pénétrer en Bohême, de prendre Berlin, et de repousser Blücher, et voyant nos partisans si peu incommodés en Thuringue, nous sentîmes que nous n'avions pas besoin de craindre avec nos 150,000 à 200,000 hommes l'aspect de l'armée Française ruinée par le manque de vivres et de fourrages. On résolut donc d'aller à Leipzig, suivant le conseil du défunt Moreau, auquel on rendoit pleine justice depuis qu'il ne vivoit plus, et depuis que la promenade de Dresde, que nous avions faite contre son opinion, avoit coûté aux Autrichiens au delà de 40,000 hommes, et aux Russes et Prussiens ensemble près de 10,000 hommes.

Un bon général auroit craint à notre place une seule chose, c'est de laisser échapper la bonne occasion pour attraper le grand homme; mais quant à nous, nous complimentions des semaines entières avec le très prudent Bernadotte, qui passeroit dernier, lui l'Elbe, ou nous l'Erzgebirge. Cette délicatesse cérémonielle réciproque n'auroit jamais cessé si le brave héroïque Blücher, avec son excellent chef d'état-major Gneisenau, ne fussent pas venus pour mettre fin à la farce.

La campagne de Blücher en Silésie et en Saxe, mais surtout son passage de l'Elbe, est une suite d'opérations sublimes, qui mérite la plus grande admiration. Beningsen, s'étant chargé avec 80,000 hommes de la position de Culm, ne laissa plus de prétexte à Schwarzenberg de rester inactif.

Les Français firent une diversion sur Dessau et la rive droite de l'Elbe, qui fit d'abord rebrousser chemin à Bernadotte, lequel employa tout son possible pour ramener aussi Blücher; mais celui-ci avoit pris sa position intéressante derrière la Saale, et lui répondit par des gros mots.

Buonaparte avoit encore le temps de faire mille choses qui valoient infiniment mieux que de prendre cette position défensive circulaire de Leipzig, ville isolée dans une immense plaine. Il avoit perdu la tête. La bataille commença le 14 Octobre, anniversaire de celle d'Auerstadt, et finit le 19 avec la défaite totale de l'armée Française. Le combat étoit décidé dès la première attaque; malgré toute l'opiniâtreté des troupes Françaises, on étrangloit leur armée peu à peu. Murat fit, le 16, avec l'excellente cavalerie arrivée d'Espagne, une belle charge contre les Russes, mais elle ne pouvoit décider de rien.

Il est remarquable que Napoléon avoit pris la seconde fois une grande ville pour centre de sa position, ce qui en lui-même a des avantages importants, pourvu que le dos soit assuré et la ville approvisionnée.

Le Général Autrichien Giulay, avec 20,000 hommes, avoit été chargé de barrer à Napoléon le chemin d'Erfurth, ce qui étoit très simple; mais il s'y prit si gauchement et si ridiculement que les manœuvres de l'Amiral Tchitchagoff à la Bérézina sont un chef-d'œuvre en comparaison des siens. Giulay est brave, mais Giulay est court d'esprit; et si Giulay ne s'avisoit pas d'avoir de l'esprit, Giulay seroit un bon soldat.

L'Europe doit l'importante et mémorable victoire de Leipzig particulièrement aux Généraux Blücher et Beningsen; son projet au Lieutenant-Général, digne élève de feu le Prince Maréchal (et sa main droite dans la campagne de 1812); et la protection de ce projet à l'Empereur Alexandre, qui le soutint contre les remontrances timides de Schwarzenberg. Les troupes Autrichiennes rétablirent à Leipzig leur réputation, fortement

ébranlée à Dresde; mais leurs généraux, tous personnellement braves, restoient comme ils ont toujours été, et comme ils seront toujours avec très peu d'exceptions, très méthodiques, très lents, et très maladroits. La cavalerie Autrichienne et leurs Chasseurs Tyroliens sont de superbes troupes, sous tous les rapports; mais manquant de généraux habiles, ils sont sacrifiés souvent sans utilité, et n'effectuent presque jamais ce qu'elles devroient effectuer aussitôt qu'elles fussent bien employées. Leur Etat-Major aux Plumes Vertes est une collection de pédans enflés, dénués de génie et de bon sens. L'Autriche possède dans le Général Meyer, ci-devant chef d'état-major de l'Archiduc Charles, un homme d'un génie éminent, et de beaucoup d'énergie, raison suffisante pour ne pas l'employer!

Napoléon doit son heureuse retraite à la conduite inexcusable de Giulay et à la lenteur de la grande armée. Il est cependant naturel que celui qui doit sauver sa propre vie court plus vite et plus loin que tel qui veut l'ôter à un autre. En pareil cas la peur est plus forte que la vengeance.

Napoléon eut le mérite d'avoir formé deux avant-gardes, dont la dernière trompa le vieux Blücher, qui le poursuivoit, en le faisant prendre la route de Coblence, tandis que l'armée Française filoit sur Hanau et Francfort.

Le brave général Bavarois Wrede, ayant en vue les fautes de Tchitchagoff et de Giulay, résolut de refuser à Napoléon le passage de Hanau. Wrede s'est battu comme un Léonidas, ayant justement acquis l'estime de toutes les armées. Il a développé cependant moins de prévoyance que de courage. Il a fait, selon moi, trois fautes:—

1. N'ayant en tout que 30,000 ou 40,000 hommes, et s'attendant à un ennemi supérieur et désespéré, il avoit tort de détacher une division entière à Francfort; il falloit tenir ses forces réunies d'autant plus que l'intention de l'ennemi étoit prononcée.

2. Il n'auroit pas dû prendre position à Hanau, où le terrain est ouvert, mais il auroit dû marcher de Wurtzburg ou Aschaffenburg, droite sur Geinhausen, qui est le débouché de la forêt de Thuringue.

3. Il n'auroit pas dû se placer perpendiculairement des deux côtés de la route, mais parallèlement, ce qui étoit beaucoup moins risqué, lui rassuroit toutes les chances, et lui donnoit le moyen de prendre l'ennemi en flanc, dans un terrain où il lui étoit impossible de développer ses forces.

Le Lieutenant-Général Comte Orloff Denizoff, à la tête de 800 hommes de cavalerie légère, suivit cette méthode près de Geinhausen, et dans le terrain le plus désavantageux pour la cavalerie, sans perdre 50 hommes il arrêta plusieurs fois la marche de l'ennemi, sur lequel il fit 4,000 prisonniers. Avec une seule division d'infanterie il auroit pu disperser toute l'armée Française, tant le terrain étoit favorable pour l'infanterie.

Le passage de Hanau a néanmoins coûté à Napoléon près de 20,000 hommes, de sorte qu'il arriva à Mayence tout au plus avec 60,000 hommes, le beau reste des 300,000 hommes avec lesquels il étoit entré en campagne.

L'occupation de la Hollande, la reddition de St. Cyr à Dresde, la prise des places fortes sur la Vistule et l'Oder suivoient de là, ainsi que les succès de Bernadotte contre les Danois et Davoust.

Nous venons d'entrer en Suisse et de la remettre sur son ancien pied, ce qu'il auroit fallu faire depuis longtemps.

Nos masses sont immenses, et le sort de la campagne de 1814 est aussi sûr que celui de la bataille de Leipzig l'étoit depuis son premier engagement.

Mêmes causes, mêmes effets. Cela ne me prouve pas encore que nous puissions faire des fautes impunément. Nous en faisons déjà; nous en ferons de bien grosses, surtout à notre grande armée; et nous en serons châtiés. Je serois cependant fort étonné si, le 1 Janvier, 1815, on comptoit le grand Napoléon encore parmi les vivants.

J'aimerois bien voir le Duc d'Orléans, votre élève, à quelqu'armée des Alliés. Je suis fâché qu'on ne s'occupe pas d'une expédition sérieuse pour la Vendée, qui pourroit avoir dans ce moment des résultats absolument décisifs.

Mais à quoi bon toutes ces conjectures et réflexions? Je suis intimément convaincu, sans plaisanter, que c'est la Providence Divine qui guide, et qui veut guider la lutte de l'honneur et de la justice contre l'infamie et la tyrannie. Point de calcul humaine qui tienne; le sort indéfinissable se mêle de tout. Qui auroit pu prévoir que Moreau mort seroit plus funeste à Napoléon que Moreau vivant, et que la bataille de Dresde seroit le signal d'une longue suite de belles victoires des Alliés?

Je ne puis finir ma relation sans rendre hommage à ceux que je regarde comme les principaux auteurs de la délivrance de l'Europe, qui est le poids décisif dans la balance du Continent.

Je ne me crois pas assez vile pour flatter même mon propre souverain, mais je me réjouis de voir en Alexandre le Libérateur de l'Europe, titre que la postérité la plus sévère ne pourra lui refuser. Il a commis dans cette année mémorable de grandes fautes militaires et politiques, mais ses intentions étoient toujours les plus pures et les plus nobles; et si on peut lui reprocher les batailles de Lutzen et de Bautzen, ainsi que la retraite de Dresde (car si Schwarzenberg agissoit jamais contre la volonté de l'Empereur, c'étoit encore faute d'énergie), on ne peut non plus lui refuser celle de Leipzig. L'Empereur Alexandre a partagé tous les dangers et toutes les privations de ses soldats avec la plus belle fermeté. C'est lui qui a rapproché les nations pour le soutien de la bonne cause; c'est lui qui a créé et qui seul nourrit la bonne harmonie entre elles, et qui, pour donner l'exemple de désintéressement, a dissout son armée de 1812 en corps auxiliaire. Sacrifice énorme, mais indispensable pour lui donner l'influence qu'il a. L'Empereur étoit sur le point de perdre son immortel laurier par une paix déshonorante en Silésie, mais Monsieur d'Anstedt, son Secrétaire d'Etat, sauva sa gloire et décida l'Autriche; il mérite en cela la reconnoissance de l'Europe entière. Le Comte de Nesselrode, autre Secrétaire d'Etat, en fonction de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a également beaucoup contribué.

Le Roi de Prusse s'est immortalisé par sa bravoure, son zèle, et son noble confiance dans le cœur d'Alexandre.

Quant à la nation et l'armée Prussienne, il n'y a pas d'éloge assez grand pour leur rendre justice. Les Russes ont fait l'incroyable dans l'an 1812, mais les Prussiens leur disputent le prix en 1813. J'admire et vénère cette nation.

Le vieux Général Blücher, guidé par son pénétrant Gneisenau et par le raisonnable Müffling, a surpassé de beaucoup tous les généraux alliés. La moitié de l'armée de Blücher sont Russes; le vieillard en raffole et en est appellé le second Suwarrow.

Les noms de Kleist, de Yorck, Bülow, Tauenzien, Hirschfeld, etc., sont bien respectables à tout bon militaire et patriote.

L'Empereur François est le meilleur homme du monde, mais il n'a pas de volonté a lui.

Metternich est l'âme de tout ce qui se fait en Autriche; et si c'est aussi un homme à deux faces, on ne peut guère lui refuser de la tournure, de l'esprit, et de l'adresse.

Schwarzenberg, que nous appellons le gros Télémaque, n'est qu'un mannequin de Metternich et de l'Empereur Alexandre. Le premier le protège pour tenir à l'écart l'Archiduc Charles, son ennemi juré; et l'autre le favorise pour ne pas être gêné dans le commandement de l'armée. Schwarzenberg est néanmoins bon, brave, et tranquille partout.

Le Comte Radetzki, son chef d'état-major, courtisan insinuant, ne manque ni d'esprit ni de courage; les bonnes idées dans cette campagne ne sont cependant guère parties de lui. Il étoit l'antipode prononcé de Moreau: cela suffit.

Les généraux Autrichiens Collorédo, Bianchi, les Princes de Hesse Hombourg, Aloys Lichtenstein, se sont distingués; mais quelle différence des généraux Prussiens!

L'armée Autrichienne est comme la monarchie Autrichienne, une compote de cent nations différentes, et contraires les unes aux autres par mœurs, langage, religion, et constitution. Elle ne peut avoir de l'ensemble, et par conséquent point de sentiment national. L'Archiduc Charles savoit réunir toutes ces parcelles par un attachement général et égal à sa personne, mais l'armée n'est plus ce qu'elle étoit sous lui.

Parmi les généraux Russes, Toll, Diebitsch, Quartiers-maîtres Ostermann, Beningsen, Barclay,* Wittgenstein, Sacken, Rayewski, Yermoloff, Pierre Pahlen, Woronzoff, et Rondzévitsch se sont particulièrement distingués. Comme partisans, il faut admirer Czernicheff, le défunt Prince Kondacheff, gendre de feu le Prince Maréchal, Seslavin, Fieguer, Tettenborn, et Madatoff, avec plusieurs autres. Platoff est trop vieux pour son métier.

Bernadotte a beaucoup déclamé et très peu fait. Les Suédois ont perdu tout au plus 200 hommes dans cette campagne.

Quant au Bavarois, Wrede a établi leur réputation. Mongelas est du côté du plus fort; son cœur n'est certainement pas du côté de Vienne.

L'Angleterre a beaucoup contribué à cette campagne par la prodigieuse quantité d'armes et de munitions qu'elle a si promptement fourni à la Prusse, par les progrès importants de Wellington, mais plus que tout par le traité de Töplitz, qui a donné de la solidité à la coalition.

L'ex-Ministre Stein n'a pas paru officiellement en scène. Son influence invisible a été d'autant plus grande. L'Empereur Alexandre a beaucoup de confiance en lui, et il ne s'y trompe pas. Je regarde Stein comme le meilleur diplomate et l'homme le plus prononcé à toutes les cours alliées ensemble.

Vous soupirez, mon digne et respectable protecteur, de voir tomber avec la réputation du Corse celle de vos compatriotes! Mais ne soupirez pas. Le François n'a jamais développé tant de courage que dans la campagne de 1813, et jamais plus qu'à la bataille de Leipzig. Vainqueur ou vaincu le soldat François a acquis dans cette année l'estime de tout militaire réfléchissant et impartial. Combattant si bien pour une mauvaise cause, combien vaillant doit il être dans la défense d'une juste!

Il est remarquable que la cavalerie Française a deux fois dans cette campagne ébranlé nos lignes tandis que la grande armée alliée ne peut se vanter

* Et le jeune Prince Eugène de Wirtemberg.

d'une seule charge dans ce genre. Mais c'est la faute des généraux. Le vieux hussard Blücher a bien prouvé ce que vaut la cavalerie Russe et Prussienne.

Nous passons déjà le Rhin. Durant l'armistice Monsieur de Wittgenstein me demanda, tout-à-coup, le quatrième acte. "Le troisième vient de finir," lui répondis-je, "et la quatrième va commencer." A cette heure, je lui dirois, "nous voilà au dernier!"

Avouez, mon Général, que vous n'avez jamais reçu une lettre plus longue que celle-ci; qu'à Dieu plaise que le nombre de ses pages ne se trouve en proportion contraire avec votre patience de les lire!

Avez-vous reçu, mon Général, une lettre de la part du Comte de Wittgenstein (s'entend de manu propriâ)? Il y a un siècle que je ne l'ai vu, et j'avoue que je m'inquiète un peu pour cette lettre. Le sabre est plutôt l'affaire du Comte que la plume; on lui a pris son Diebitsch, et je ne sais trop qui de la suite voudroit parler et raisonner devant le général de Champagne et de Jemappes; car depuis vos prophécies sur la campagne de 1812, que tout le monde connoit, les Russes vous regardent comme un sorcier, dont le sang circule autrement et dont la cervelle est faite tout-à-fait particulièrement.

Je suis dans ce moment attaché au Comte Barclay de Tolly, qui a lu vos lettres passées à l'Empereur, et qui vous nomme bien souvent.

Je me demande bien des fois la raison pourquoi dans cette époque intéressante un Dumouriez, un Archiduc Charles, qui est du moins le meilleur en Autriche, et un vieux Comte de Pahlen, au grand caractère, sont inactifs? et je me dis ce que je pensois à la mort de Moreau—Le bon Dieu ne veut point faire au tigre l'honneur de le faire déchirer par des lions; il a résolu de le faire assommer à force de ruades!

J'intrigue pour être envoyé chez Wellington, accompagné de quelques lances. Il faut se dépêcher de faire quelque chose, et de jouer son rôle, grand ou petit, car le théâtre va être bientôt fermé.

Ne me regardez pas, mon Général, comme un jeune Aristippe qui déclame devant le grand Socrate, mais comme un bonne enfant qui jase avec son bon papa.

Je suis, mon Général, etc.

Memoranda about a Forward Movement of the Right of the Army.

During the Winter 1813—1814.

Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill will move forward towards St. Jean Pied de Port, with the 2nd division, Major-General Morillo's division, and the 13th regiment of light dragoons.

Sir Rowland Hill will endeavour to move these troops in such a manner as to keep his columns out of the range of the artillery of St. Jean Pied de Port, and of the works constructed by the enemy in its immediate vicinity. Having passed St. Jean Pied de Port, Sir Rowland Hill will take up the most advantageous position that can be found beyond that place, upon the road leading to Bayonne. Sir Rowland will also observe, with his right, the road leading from St. Jean Pied de Port towards Oleron and Pau.

Besides the artillery of the 2nd division, and of Lieutenant-General Hamilton's division, the brigades attached to the 3rd, 6th, and 7th divisions will also move with the troops under Sir Rowland Hill.

A part of the corps of Major-General Mina will follow the column under Sir Rowland Hill, and will act in support of that column in such manner as Sir Rowland may direct.

The Portuguese division under Lieutenant-General Hamilton will move at the same time upon St. Etienne de Baygorry, and thence in the direction of the village of Anhaux, or of Irruleguy, to the banks of the river Nive, a little below St. Jean Pied de Port.

Lieutenant-General Hamilton will ascertain what passes there are over the river Nive in that part of its course, and will make himself master of them. He will put himself in communication as soon as possible with the column under Sir Rowland Hill, and will act in support of the left of that column in such manner as Sir Rowland Hill may direct.

The 3rd division will move at the same time to St. Etienne de Baygorry, and thence down the valley of Baygorry to the neighbourhood of the villages of St. Martin d'Arossa and Horça. The General officer commanding the division will occupy these two villages, and will secure the passages over the river Nive in the neighbourhood of the division. He will also cause the roads to be observed which lead down the river Nive towards Bidarry, as likewise those which lead from the neighbourhood of the division to the villages of Irissarri or Suhescun, or any part of the great road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Bayonne, on which road the two villages last mentioned are situated.

Two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons will move with the 3rd division. The remaining squadron of that regiment will place itself in the villages of Ariscun and Erratsou till further orders.

The 6th division will follow the route of the 3rd division by St. Etienne de Baygorry, and will close up to the 3rd division, if the march is not too long.

The 3rd and 6th divisions, and the Portuguese division under Lieutenant-General Hamilton, will establish posts upon the Nive so as to communicate with each other; the 3rd and 6th divisions extending their posts up the river, and the posts of the Portuguese division extending down the river, until they meet each other about half-way between St. Jean Pied de Port and the junction of the Nive and the Baygorry rivulet near St. Martin d'Arossa.

A brigade, or troop, of artillery will be ordered into the valley of Baygorry for the purpose of acting with the 3rd and 6th divisions, if the roads admit of it; and if this is not found practicable, a part of the artillery which moves with Sir Rowland Hill's column will join these divisions as soon as circumstances permit.

The 7th division will move to its right, and will place two brigades in the Puerto de Maya, and one brigade at the village of Maya. The two former brigades will occupy the village of Urdax, and such other of the outposts in front of the Puerto de Maya as it may appear necessary to hold. The brigade at the village of Maya will observe the passes which lead out of the valley of Maya towards Bidarry.

WELLINGTON.

RETURN of the Number of Deaths that have occurred in General and Regimental Hospitals in the Peninsula, of the undernamed Regiments and Corps, between the 21st December, 1812, and 20th December, 1813.

St. Jean de Luz, Jan. 1814.

Bat.	Regiment.	Number of Deaths.	Bat.	Regiment.	Number of Deaths.
..	Royal Artillery	295		Brought forward ..	4548
..	Royal Horse Guards ..	6	1	52nd Foot	55
..	1st Life Guards	11	1	57th do.	34
..	2nd do.	16	2	59th do.	83
..	3rd Dragoon Guards ..	24	5	60th do.	35
..	4th do. ..	21	1	61st do.	43
..	5th do. ..	24	2	62nd do.	30
..	1st Dragoons	19	..	68th do.	64
..	3rd do.	30	1	71st do.	93
..	4th do.	17	1	74th do.	47
..	7th Hussars	3	..	76th do.	4
..	9th Light Dragoons ..	9	..	77th do.	13
..	10th Hussars	19	1	79th do.	58
..	11th Light Dragoons ..	47	1	82nd do.	200
..	12th do. ..	29	1	83rd do.	70
..	13th do. ..	7	2	84th do.	33
..	14th do. ..	20	..	85th do.	13
..	15th Hussars	22	2	87th do.	120
..	16th Light Dragoons ..	14	1	88th do.	64
..	18th Hussars	8	1	91st do.	111
..	Royal Waggon Train ..	47	1	92nd do.	64
1	1st Foot Guards	484	1	94th do.	44
3	1st do.	184	1	95th do.	37
1	2nd do.	172	2	95th do.	78
1	3rd do.	123	3	95th do.	49
3	1st Foot	191	..	1st Dragoons, K.G.L. ..	22
1	3rd do.	62	..	2nd do. do. ..	19
1	4th do.	224	..	1st Hussars, do. ..	7
1	5th do.	218	..	2nd do. do. ..	9
1	6th do.	107	1	Light do. ..	36
1	7th do.	115	2	Do. do. ..	27
1	9th do.	117	1	Line do. ..	17
1	11th do.	90	2	Do. do. ..	23
1	20th do.	90	5	Do. do. ..	47
1	23rd do.	94	..	Duke of Brunswick Oels	38
3	27th do.	133	..	Chasseurs Britanniques	59
1	28th do.	58	..	Royal Staff Corps	13
1	32nd do.	94	1	Provisional Battalion ..	49
2	34th do.	63	2	Do. do. ..	71
1	36th do.	103	3	Do. do. ..	101
..	37th do.	1	4	Do. do. ..	77
1	38th do.	169	..	Garrison Fort, St. Julian	7
1	39th do.	174	..	Cavalry detach., Lisbon	13
1	40th do.	89	..	Infantry do. ..	93
1	42nd do.	141	..	Lisbon Castle	2
1	43rd do.	88	13	Royal Veteran Battalion	7
1	45th do.	87			
2	47th do.	115		Total in hospitals	6727
1	48th do.	112		Died in conveyance from one hospital to another, regiments unknown ..	64
1	50th do.	69			
..	51st do.	93			
	Carried forward ..	4548		Total deaths	6791

G. O. St. Jean de Luz, 1st Jan., 1814. [723.]

Lieutenant-General the Honourable W. Stewart is requested to put Mr. Assistant-Surgeon —— in arrest for having sent out a bâtman to forage contrary to orders, giving into his possession an irregular receipt, the consequence of which conduct on the part of the officers of the army is great irregularity in the country, and inconvenience to the public service.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Hanover, 2nd Jan., 1814.

The advices your Lordship will receive from head-quarters will be so much more recent and so much more satisfactory than any reports I can send you from hence, which reach me by letter, that I only write a few lines on what is going on there for the sake of regularity.

The passage of the Rhine was effected, on the 21st ultimo, at Schaffhausen, Rheinfeld, Lauffenburg, and near Basle. The Austrian army is planted in échelon from Pierre Pertuis to Bern: it is called 175,000 men, independent of Russians or Prussians. A corps under General Bubna is to be detached to Geneva. The head-quarters of this corps were, on the 25th, near Biel.

Huningen is blockaded by General Wrede and the Bavarians, supported by a division of the Wurtembergers and a division of Austrians.

Béfort is surrounded. Count Wittgenstein's corps is before Kehl, in the intrenched camp with the troops of Baden, &c. He communicates on his right with the Silesian army.

General Barclay de Tolly, with all the reserves, is in the neighbourhood of Basle and Doorlach.

I hope the movement on Switzerland will encourage the party favourable to the Allies, and awe those in the French interest; but the government continues ill disposed, and I hear it is in contemplation to purify it.

The next object to be obtained by this movement is to cut off all communication between France and Italy. Reports state that Eugène Beauharnais would be glad to follow the example of Murat, who is arrived on the Po. If both these chiefs should join in the deliverance of Europe, it is to be hoped the kingdom of Italy may be annihilated, and the states of Piedmont and Savoy restored to their lawful sovereign, as well as that part of Switzerland usurped by Buonaparte.

With regard to the preparations of the enemy, the French army of 1814 may be expected to be as much inferior to that of 1813 as this latter was to the one of the preceding year, especially in generals, officers, artillery, and cavalry.

I hope to give your Lordship better accounts from the scene of action shortly, as I proceed on my journey this night to head-quarters.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 2nd Jan., 1814.

I arrived at this place on the 31st.

I understand that there are about eighty deputies here, and they are unanimous for turning out the government. It does not appear, however, that they have come to any resolution with respect to the persons who are to compose the new government. Castaños, Labrador, Villamil, Lardizabal, Villa Vicencio, are mentioned. I think it not unlikely that the two first will succeed. The Princess of Brazil is likewise talked of, and has certainly a considerable party. Everybody abuses O'Donoju, and some have found out that he is an agent of Buonaparte. The Conde de Torreno has been insulted in the streets.

It appears, however, that the party is resolved to make every effort to support itself and the government. For this purpose General Villa Campa has been appointed governor of the place, which is to be garrisoned, it is said, by the regiment he commanded. He is the intimate friend of Antillon. I own I am not without apprehension that the superior activity of this party may triumph at last.

Before I left Cadiz I received your letters of the 3rd and the 17th ultimo. I certainly am of opinion that unless we can place ourselves upon a better footing with the Spanish government, we ought to chance our diplomatic relations with them, and I am very glad that you wrote to Lord Bathurst as you did.

Your letter to me on the subject of the British troops at Cadiz and Carthagena has been published, and has produced the best possible effect.

The Regency are to arrive on the 5th. I shall write again whenever anything occurs worth communicating.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

[724.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL, Ustaritz, 3rd Jan., 1814, 20 minutes before 5 P.M.

I propose to stay here this night, and shall be glad to hear from you what is the real state of affairs at night-fall. The last I heard was, that the enemy had passed the Adour with about 6000 men above La Bastide, and were apparently marching upon Briscous.

The 7th division have marched one brigade to Basse Cambo, one brigade to the inn on the high road, and the other in the centre between the two.

Two brigades of the 6th division are ordered to encamp to-night on the high road where their right was; and two brigades

of the 4th division at Heraurity. So that we are pretty well prepared to assemble in any quarter.

The enemy have not shown many men on our right, on the great road, so that it is probable that the whole business is a reconnaissance, possibly to cover the attack I expected to be made on Mina; but I have not yet heard from that quarter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 4th Jan., 1814.

I have the honour of transmitting to your Lordship the enclosed copies of a letter and its enclosures, which have been received from the Office for Foreign Affairs, by which your Lordship will perceive that the Emperor of Austria has been pleased to confer upon you the Grand Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresa, in acknowledgment of the eminent services which your Lordship has rendered to the great cause of Europe.

I am at the same time to convey to your Lordship the full consent and approbation of the Prince Regent to your accepting the Order of Maria Theresa, although His Royal Highness has not thought fit to allow the Earl of Aberdeen to accept the Austrian Order of St. Stephen, as it has been determined by His Royal Highness that British subjects shall receive and bear foreign orders of distinction only when conferred for conspicuous military merit in the face of an enemy.

I have the honour of enclosing also a sealed letter addressed to your Lordship by the Austrian Minister in this country.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

W. Hamilton, Esq., to Colonel Bunbury.

SIR, Foreign Office, 3rd Jan., 1814.

I am directed by the Secretary of State to transmit to you the copy of a letter from Baron Wessenberg, dated 31st December, 1813, covering the copy of a letter from the Emperor of Austria to the Prince Regent, and one from the Baron to the Marquess of Wellington, copy and original of which are enclosed, by which you will perceive that His Imperial Majesty has conferred upon the Field Marshal the Grand Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresa; and I am to request you will lay these papers before Earl Bathurst, and move his Lordship to take the pleasure of His Royal Highness thereupon, and make such further communication to the Field Marshal as he may judge expedient.

I am, &c.,

W. HAMILTON.

Baron de Wessenberg to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MILORD, Londres, le 31 Décembre, 1813.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon maître, ayant désiré depuis longtems de témoigner à Votre Excellence la haute estime qu'elle lui porte, et de lui prouver d'une manière éclatante combien elle sait apprécier les services immenses que sa Seigneurie a rendus à la cause de l'Europe, m'ordonne de lui transmettre la lettre autographe ci-jointe de sa part, et de lui annoncer qu'elle l'a nommé Grand'Croix de son Ordre Militaire de Marie-Thérèse.

Je m'estime heureux d'être chargé de cette commission, et prie Votre Excellence d'agréer à cette occasion l'hommage des sentimens de respect et d'admiration avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Milord,

De Son Excellence le très humble et le très obéissant serviteur,

WESSENBERG.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Emperor of Austria to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Francfort, le 10 Decembre, 1813.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, MARQUIS DE WELLINGTON,

Les services éminens que vous rendez depuis tant d'années à la cause de l'Europe, dont vos glorieuses victoires ont préparé et accéléré le triomphe, m'ont engagé à vous conférer la Grande Croix de mon Ordre Militaire de Marie-Thérèse, comme une preuve de mon estime et de ma bienveillance particulière.

J'écris à Son Altesse Royale le Prince-Régent pour demander son agrément à cet égard, et j'aurai une véritable satisfaction à voir décoré d'un ordre que la valeur et le mérite militaire ont seuls le droit d'obtenir, l'un des hommes du siècle qui y ont acquis les titres les plus incontestables.

Je saisirai avec plaisir toutes les occasions de vous témoigner, Monsieur le Maréchal, Marquis de Wellington, les sentimens distingués avec lesquels je suis

Votre affectionné,

FRANÇOIS.

II.

Baron de Wessenberg to the Earl of Aberdeen.

MILORD, Londres, ce 31 Décembre, 1813.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon maître, m'ordonne d'informer Votre Excellence que les services éminens rendus à la cause de l'Europe par le Maréchal Marquis de Wellington l'ont engagé à lui conférer la Grande Croix de son Ordre Militaire de Marie-Thérèse, et qu'elle a nommé le Comte d'Aberdeen Grand' Croix de son Ordre de St. Etienne.

Sa Majesté me charge de faire parvenir sans délai à S.A.R. Monseigneur le Prince Régent la lettre autographe ci-jointe (dont j'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à Votre Excellence la copie), dans laquelle elle demande à S.A.R. son autorisation pour que le Marquis de Wellington et le Comte d'Aberdeen puissent se décorer de ces ordres.

Je m'adresse à cet effet à V.E. en le priant de vouloir bien me faire con-

naître les gracieuses intentions de S.A.R., afin de pouvoir transmettre à sa Seigneurie les décorations pour Lord Wellington, pour lequel se trouve ci-jointe également une lettre autographe de la part de mon Souverain.

Je suis, etc.,
WESSENBERG.

III.

The Emperor of Austria to the Prince Regent.

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE ET COUSIN, Francfort, le 10 Décembre, 1813.

Les services éminens rendus à la cause de l'Europe par le Maréchal Marquis de Wellington m'ont engagé à lui conférer la Grande Croix de mon Ordre Militaire de Marie-Thérèse, comme une marque de mon estime et de ma bienveillance.

Ayant eu également à cœur de témoigner au Comte d'Aberdeen, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de V.A.R. auprès de moi, la satisfaction que j'éprouve de la manière distinguée dont il s'acquitte de ses fonctions, je l'ai nommé Grand' Croix de mon Ordre de St. Etienne.

En demandant à V.A.R. son autorisation pour que le Marquis de Wellington et le Comte d'Aberdeen puissent se décorer de ces ordres, je me flatte, Monsieur mon frère et cousin, que vous y verrez une nouvelle preuve du prix que j'attache aux rapports d'alliance et d'amitié qui m'unissent à V.A.R., et de la bienveillance que j'accorde à ceux qui par leurs services en différens genres contribuent à maintenir ces relations.

Recevez, mon frère et cousin, les assurances du sincère attachement et de la considération très distinguée avec lesquels

Je suis, etc.

Sir C. W. Flint to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Irish Office, 5th Jan., 1814.

The enclosed copy of a letter from the Avoyer May (at the head of the government of Berne) contains so concise and correct a picture of the state of Switzerland while under the influence of Buonaparte, that I am induced to send it to you for your Lordship's information.

Monsieur May is one of the most respectable men in Switzerland, and you will readily believe that the sentiments expressed by him are those of every true Swiss.

His letter fortunately reached me before Lord Castlereagh set off on his mission, but I have reason to think that the Allied Powers had already felt the importance of adopting a liberal line of policy with regard to Switzerland, and had begun to act upon it at the very moment that his Lordship was leaving this country.

I send also for your Lordship's information a copy of the answer which I was instructed to return to the Avoyer.

The Allies were to cross the Rhine on the 20th December, and I understand that accounts have been received announcing that event. The operation was to be effected partly through the Canton of Basle and partly by Brisach.

Besançon and Béfort are the only places that can at all arrest their progress.

Besançon (even the citadel) is so completely commanded that it is hardly possible that it can occupy more than 15 or 16 days open trenches. Béfort, which is not very strong, cannot take up more time, so that by this time one may hope the Allies are fairly in France.

The disposition of Franche-Comté has been at all times good. The people of that province have resisted the new conscription, and I have no doubt, if properly aided and treated, will lend their best assistance in delivering their country from the horrible yoke under which it has been so long groaning.

Ever, my dear Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged and faithful,

C. W. FLINT.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Sir C. W. Flint to the Avoyer of Berne.

MONSIEUR L'AVOYER, Le 3 Janvier, 1814.

La lettre dont Votre Excellence m'a honoré, en date du 20 Novembre, m'a été remise dans la nuit du 23 du mois passé.

Pénétré de l'importance du contenu et toujours animé du zèle le plus ardent pour tout ce qui a rapport à votre pays, je n'ai eu rien de plus empressé que d'en faire part à mon gouvernement, et heureusement avant le départ de Lord Castlereagh pour le Continent.

Aujourd'hui je suis autorisé à envoyer à V.E. la réponse suivante :—

"On a reçu avec reconnoissance la communication de Monsieur l'Avoyer May, dont les renseignements importans et utiles ont été justement appréciés.

"Les sentiments exprimés par M. l'Avoyer ne pouvoient être qu'agréables au gouvernement Anglois, et on a lieu de croire que déjà l'objet que S.E. a tant à cœur est commencé et même effectué."

Sachant le vrai plaisir que V.E. ressentira de cette assurance, je m'empresse d'expédier la présente.

Je ne m'arrête que pour exprimer à V.E. combien j'ai été flatté de la marque de confiance non équivoque qu'elle m'a donnée en cette occasion, et dont je conserverai la plus vive reconnoissance toute ma vie ; et combien je m'estimerai heureux de trouver de fréquentes occasions pour prouver à V.E. l'étendue de mon attachement personnel, et de mon zèle pour les intérêts de la Suisse.

C. W. FLINT.

II.

The Avoyer May to Sir C. W. Flint.

Berne, ce 20 de Nov., 1813.

Je ne puis me dispenser, Monsieur et cher ami, de vous écrire quelques lignes sur la situation de ma patrie, dans un moment aussi décisif pour son existence future.

Je ne vous parlerai pas des horreurs de notre révolution en 1798 produite par les armées Françaises ; vous les connoissez ; mais pour vous donner une idée juste de notre état actuel il faut que je vous retrace ce qui c'est passé en 1802. A cette époque on crut le moment favorable pour chasser un gouvernement qui s'étoit rendu odieux à toute la Suisse. On prit les armes, on le força d'abandonner Berne, après avoir battu ses troupes à Morat on le poursuivit jusqu'à deux lieues de Lausanne, où nos succès furent arrêtés par l'arrivée du Général Rapp, envoyé par l'Empereur, et suivi d'une armée Française. Voyant alors que toute résistance à cette volonté impérieuse serait inutile, on fut obligé

avec la douleur dans l'âme de retourner dans les foyers. Bientôt après, l'Empereur invita les divers districts de la Suisse d'envoyer des députés à Paris pour les consulter sur les nouvelles constitutions à faire, mais en réalité c'étoit pour recevoir ses ordres. Il en dicta en effet, à laquelle il donna (je ne sais à quel titre) le nom d'Acte de Médiation. Par cette acte les 13 cantons furent mis au nombre de 19. On arracha à celui de Berne ses deux plus belles provinces, le Pays de Vaud et l'Argovie; on annula tous les priviléges des villes; on rendit les élections populaires; on mit la direction générale des intérêts de la Suisse entre les mains d'un Landamman, amovible d'une année à l'autre. En un mot, une constitution qui ouvre la porte à toutes les intrigues, et renferme tous les vices que l'esprit révolutionnaire d'alors cherchoit à introduire dans les gouvernements qui étoient sous leur influence.

Depuis lors nous avons constamment vu la Réunion suspendu sur nos têtes. L'exemple de Genève, du Valais, de toute l'Italie nous faisoit trembler, et nous forçoit de consentir à tout ce que l'on exigeoit. Le canton de Tessin fut occupé par les troupes Françaises jusqu'en dernier lieu. On lança un décret foudroyant contre les militaires au service des puissances en guerre avec la France, par lequel ils sont rappellés sous peine de perdre leur bien et leur droit de bourgeoisie. On fit une capitulation pour quatre régiments, d'abord par enrôlement libre, mais changé ensuite en enrôlement forcé, qui nous oblige de fournir 3000 hommes annuellement, ce qui a déjà introduit la conscription dans divers districts. Enfin, nous payons un impôt indirect à la France sur les marchandises coloniales, que nous ne pouvons tirer que de ses magasins.

Vous voyez, Monsieur et cher ami, que nous ne sommes guères mieux traités qu'une province Française, et je ne puis imaginer, vu l'esprit de justice et de générosité que les puissances coalisées manifestent partout, qu'elles veuillent abandonner la Suisse à son triste sort. Il me paroit même que leur propre intérêt exige que ce pays, comme point intermédiaire entre la France, l'Allemagne, et l'Italie, soit tiré de la dépendance Française, et recouvre une liberté qui pendant des siècles faisoit son bonheur. Vous me demanderez peut-être par quel moyen on peut atteindre ce but. Il ne faut pour cela qu'un mot de la part des puissances, prononcé avec fermeté. Ce mot est, Que tout rentre dans l'ancien ordre en Suisse, tel qu'il étoit en 1798, avant l'invasion des Français, sous peine de nous envisager comme province Française, et de nous traiter en conséquence. Vous pouvez être convaincu que c'est ici l'opinion et le vœu de tous ceux qui aiment leur patrie.

Je suis entré dans tous ces détails persuadé que votre attachement pour nous, et dont nous avons eu tant de preuves, vous fournira des moyens pour faire connoître à votre gouvernement notre malheureuse situation, et l'engager de donner à son ambassadeur auprès des armées une instruction conforme à la haute bienveillance qu'il a toujours témoigné à la Suisse. Je me rappellerai toute ma vie de celle que M. Wickham a eu en 1800. Une pareille combleroit tous nos vœux. Je n'écris pas à ce dernier par discrétion, sachant qu'il vit à la campagne, éloigné des affaires. C'est à vous seul que je recommande nos intérêts; si vous pouvez faire quelque chose en notre faveur dans ces circonstances, non seulement moi mais toute la Suisse vous devra une reconnoissance éternelle.

J'ai hasardé de vous faire parvenir cette lettre par la voye de Milord Cathcart, que je suppose actuellement à Frankfort, et auquel je la fais remettre avec la prière de l'ouvrir, de la lire, et de ne vous la faire parvenir qu'autant qu'il la trouveroit convenable. J'espère que par ce moyen vous la recevrez sûrement, et que vous pourrez me donner un mot de réponse, ce que je vous demande instamment.

Adieu, Monsieur et cher ami; soyez assuré que quel que soit notre sort, je

conserverai toujours l'attachement que je vous ai voué, ainsi que les sentiments les plus distingués avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

C. MAY.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 5th Jan., 1814.

Since I wrote to you last I have received your letter of the 15th ultimo.

I am heartily glad to find that the experience you have had of Sir John Hope since he joined the army has confirmed the high opinion you had previously entertained of him. He is certainly a man of peculiar acquirement, and under the prospect of his assistance being useful to you in the execution of your most arduous trust, I derived a great deal of satisfaction in his appointment to the Staff of the Peninsula. It is much to be regretted, however, that such a man should expose himself unnecessarily; and I concur with you in thinking that, unless he can be induced to use more caution, he will be infallibly lost to the country and his friends.

From what I have heard, I have reason to believe that the judicious and kind manner in which you spoke to MacDonald on the subject has made the desired impression upon Sir John. Except from yourself, the subject cannot well be urged by any but his immediate relatives: I have therefore put his brother Sir Alexander Hope in possession of the circumstances, and he tells me that he has written strongly to Sir John upon the subject.

It is gratifying to find that, notwithstanding all the hard service your army has undergone, and the several actions in which it has been engaged, it is nearly as efficient now as it was many months ago. I wish, however, the source for your reinforcement were more ample. You will hear from various quarters of the extent to which the militia volunteering, under the last Act, has failed! Instead of getting 30,000 men, we have only 8000 for the line, and I don't expect that the numbers of militia who have extended their services as such will form *three* provisional battalions! One of these battalions is to be commanded by Lord Buckingham. His Lordship will cut a figure at your outposts! Scanty as the fruits of the volunteering have been, however, it will enable us to send you above 4000 good detachments in less than a month. The remainder of the 53rd will be sent out, so as to render it unnecessary to send home that portion of one of your *provisional battalions.*

Between ourselves I am heartily sorry that our friend Sir Thomas Graham went to Holland. He had terminated his active services under your commendation so honourably, that, at his time of life, I think it was a pity to place him in a situation of difficulty and responsibility; under which he certainly is not so easy as he might have been a few years ago!

His force is unavoidably ill composed; and he can do little with them. Upon the policy of offering him the command I cannot presume to give an

opinion; but I decidedly think it would have been wise in our excellent old friend to have refused it.

Forgive this long letter, and believe me, my dear Lord, to be

Yours ever most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing-street, 5th Jan., 1814.

Your Lordship has judged right in not making any regulations respecting the export trade from St. Jean de Luz at the time you permitted the import trade. Your Lordship will have always time to make any regulations on that subject, should you find that the exports are calculated to raise the price of the articles necessary for the consumption of your army.

There is one point, however, to which I wish to call your attention. On all principles of trade their exports ought not to be discouraged, because without them our exports would not thrive, if there were no way of paying for them. But as it is very desirable for you to increase by every means the demand of your bills on our Treasury, if the return cargo does not pay for the cargo imported into St. Jean de Luz, the remainder will be paid by our bills. On this principle I should suggest that the export trader from St. Jean de Luz, at least to Great Britain, should not receive any peculiar encouragement.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing-street, 6th Jan., 1814.

It will not be in my power to furnish you until to-morrow with a statement of the communication which took place between Lord Liverpool and Monsieur on the subject of the Memorandum, nor with copies of the notes which have been written on the same subject. I am, however, unwilling to detain the Comte de Grammont any longer in town; and I shall entrust these papers to Colonel Abercrombie, who will follow the Comte de Grammont to-morrow.

I do not see that we could have acted differently at present; but I feel all the hardship of the case, and can well understand the French Princes being unwilling to wait for the result of any communication with the Allies.

Our policy is certainly not to break up an alliance which it will be difficult ever again to form.

I hope to be able in the course of a week to give you some statement by which you may be enabled to judge how far we can assist you with means from hence to support and pay Spanish troops. Politically as well as militarily, it will be of great consequence to get some under your more immediate protection.

I shall by that time also, I hope, be able to let you know the extent of the reinforcements we shall be able to send you, cavalry, horses, and infantry, from hence; also what is the amount of the serviceable troops from Holland, should we be able to break up that army by the course of events there.

I shall by that time also be better able to explain to you the disposition of the Cabinet here as to the line to be adopted if partial insurrections in favour of the House of Bourbon should appear.

But as all this will lead to details, and require many explanations, I think it will be more satisfactory for your Lordship as well as for myself to send my Under-Secretary of State, Colonel Bunbury, at once to you. He will have my entire confidence, and also that of Lord Liverpool. I propose sending him in about a week's time.

I am, my dear Lord, yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 6th Jan., 1814.

I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 21st ultimo, enclosing a copy of a memorandum which the Comte de Grammont* was instructed by your Lordship to deliver, together with a letter from Monsieur de Mailhos to Louis XVIII.; and your Lordship has requested to receive instructions in what manner you are to conduct yourself if a Prince of the House of Bourbon should present himself at your head-quarters.

Previous to the reception of this memorandum, Monsieur had requested that two of the French Princes might be permitted by the British government to proceed to your head-quarters, and this application has been now renewed with increased solicitude.

As the receiving at your head-quarters in France a Prince of the House of Bourbon would directly or indirectly change the character of the war, the confidential servants of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent are of opinion that, under existing circumstances, the concurrence of the coalesced Powers is essential before such an instruction can be given to your Lordship; and Viscount Castlereagh will forthwith be put in possession of this memorandum, for the purpose of its being communicated at the head-quarters of the Allies in Germany.

Every argument will be used to persuade the French Princes at least to wait the result of this communication. If, however, contrary to the remonstrances of the British government and against their consent, the French Princes shall arrive within your Lordship's command, I am under the necessity of instructing you not to receive them at your head-quarters, and they will be fully apprised of this instruction.

Nevertheless your Lordship will continue to exercise your discretion in availing yourself of those facilities which any indisposition of the people

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 381, "Memorandum for the Comte de Grammont;" and letter to Lord Bathurst of 22nd Dec., 1813, p. 390.

against the actual government of France may from time to time afford to your operations in the field against the enemy.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Note particulière.

Jan. 4, 1814.

Les négotiations entamées sur le continent pouvant, malgré la vraisemblance de leur prochaine rupture, faire appréhender aux Ministres que le départ des Princes de la maison de France n'acquière une publicité contraire aux vues du gouvernement Britannique, le Roi est prêt à se conformer aux précautions qui lui seront indiquées.

Sa Majesté n'est pas moins empressée d'aller au devant de tous les désirs que formerait à cet égard le Marquis de Wellington ; et d'après cette double considération, le projet exposé dans la note remise aujourd'hui par Monsieur au Comte de Liverpool doit être considéré comme susceptible de se concilier avec tous les mesures que la prudence et la nécessité du secret doivent suggérer. S'il arrivait enfin qu'une partie de ce projet ne pût recevoir l'approbation des Ministres, le Roi se flatte que leurs objections, restreintes aux seuls points qui les auraient motivées, lui laisseront encore la possibilité de le leur faire agréer en applanissant les difficultés.

M. le Duc d'Angoulême et M. le Duc de Berri pourroient partir secrètement pour le lieu de leur embarquement, munis des passeports qui leur seraient donnés sous des noms supposés. Il en serait de même de Monsieur, qui se rendrait séparément au port, où l'attendrait un bâtiment frêté pour une destination inconnue, et où le joindraient les Royalistes qu'il désirerait emmener avec lui. Ceux-ci ignoreraient son départ jusqu'au dernier moment. Le capitaine du vaisseau n'en serait pas même informé, et les armes que Monsieur porterait en France seraient embarquées comme faisant partie de ses équipages. En un mot, il serait facile, si le gouvernement le désirait, de tenir le voyage des Princes absolument secret, et d'empêcher surtout qu'il pût être envisagé autrement que comme une détermination prise exclusivement par eux sans la participation du gouvernement ; Lord Liverpool n'ayant besoin que de remettre à Monsieur les passeports et la licence, qui sont les seules choses indispensables à l'accomplissement du plan dont il s'agit.

Quelques fonds avancés par les Ministres seraient d'un grand secours pour la conduite d'une semblable entreprise, et cette assistance secrète ne s'écarterait point des vues opposées à un concours ostensible.

II.

Official Note presented by Monsieur to the Earl of Liverpool.

Hartwell, Comté de Buckingham, ce 2 Jan., 1814.

Le gouvernement Britannique connait les dispositions de la France. Il sait qu'elle appelle, qu'elle attend avec impatience son Souverain légitime. Ce n'est plus la voix d'un parti ; c'est celle de la nation toute entière! Les Souverains armés contre Buonaparte ne peuvent l'ignorer. Le chef victorieux de l'armée Anglaise, qui occupe aujourd'hui une portion du territoire Français, est le premier de l'attester. Peut-il, dans ces circonstances, exister un doute

sur la conduite que le devoir le plus cher et le plus impérieux prescrit au frère de Louis XVI. et aux Princes de sa maison? Privés d'un appui qu'ils n'ont cessé de solliciter à toutes les époques, l'occasion présente ne leur permet plus d'être arrêtés par un semblable obstacle. Ils rempliront l'attente d'un peuple opprimé; ils satisferont à l'obligation sacrée, que leur imposent les droits de leur naissance, ainsi que la gloire de leurs ayeux, et rien ne sera capable de leur fermer la carrière que l'honneur vient de leur ouvrir.

Guidé par ces pressans motifs, le Roi demande au gouvernement Britannique un bâtiment de guerre pour conduire LL.AA.RR. M. le Duc d'Angoulême et M. le Duc de Berri au port de Pasages, tandis qu'une frégate transportera Monsieur, accompagné d'un petit nombre de Royalistes, sur quelque point de la côte de l'Ouest, pour s'y joindre aux Français qui dans cette partie n'attendent qu'un chef et des armes pour arborer l'étendard royal.

Comme il est toutefois possible que l'Angleterre ne crût pouvoir concourir à une semblable mesure qu'après avoir consulte ses Alliés, le Roi, qui est loin de songer à commettre le gouvernement Britannique avec les autres puissances belligérantes, et qui d'un autre côté ne peut risquer de perdre le tems le plus précieux, ne demanderait dans cette supposition que des passeports, pour que les Princes, ses neveux, puissent s'embarquer à Falmouth sur le paquebot, et une licence pour qu'un vaisseau frêté et armé aux frais du Roi conduise Monsieur au lieu de sa destination.

LOUIS.

III.

The Earl of Liverpool to

4th Jan., 1814.

I have seen this morning His Royal Highness Monsieur, who returned from Hartwell yesterday, after a communication with his brother Louis XVIII. and his two sons, the Duc d'Angoulême and the Duc de Berri, on the subject of the memorandum delivered by Lord Wellington to the Comte de Grammont, for the purpose of being shown to Louis XVIII.

Before we entered upon the subject which had given rise to the appointment, I stated to Monsieur that I was desirous of informing him that by letters received from the head-quarters of the Allies at Freyberg, dated the 19th ultimo, it appeared that a counter revolution had taken place in the canton of Berne; that the Allies had in consequence been invited to pass the Rhine and to march into Switzerland; that General de Watteville, who commanded the Swiss troops, had consented to their advance; and that Prince Schwarzenberg intended to begin the passage of the Rhine on the 20th with an army of 150,000 men, issuing at the same time a proclamation that the Allies, in passing into France through Switzerland, acknowledged the independence of that country, and engaged not to lay down their arms till its ancient independence and its ancient limits were secured. I added that I was particularly anxious this important event might be known to him before we began our conversation upon other matters, as it must tend in a great measure to alter the opinion, which I knew he entertained, that Austria was not really faithful to the alliance, but was at this time ready (provided she could obtain her own conditions) to make a separate peace; that I could assure him that this operation was in a considerable degree to be ascribed to the Austrian councils; and I would leave it to his judgment to decide whether, if Austria had been pursuing her own personal objects, she would not rather have looked to operations

* In the handwriting of Mr. Brooksbank, private secretary to the Earl of Liverpool.

in Italy upon a more extensive scale than to a direct operation in the interior of France. He admitted the truth of this observation, and received the communication with strong marks of satisfaction.

Monsieur then entered upon the subject on which we had met. He said he had had a full conversation with his brother and two sons, in consequence of Lord Wellington's memorandum and the Count de Grammont's mission; that all that had passed, however, on this subject was confined to themselves, and had not been made known to any individual attached to them.

He said that he considered Lord Wellington's memorandum as furnishing additional proof from the highest authority of that of which they had had indisputable evidence before, that the dispositions of the people in France were in favour of the re-establishment of the House of Bourbon, and that they desired only the appearance of a Prince of that House to induce them to declare in his favour; that I was already apprised of his sentiments as to what they considered as their duty, under present circumstances, previous to the arrival of the Count de Grammont; and that even if a doubt could have existed of what they owed to their own honour and to France previous to this event, they could have now no hesitation in declaring that it was their indispensable duty to comply with the wishes which had been expressed from so many quarters, and to embark with as little delay as possible for some port of France; that the arrangements which had been approved by Louis XVIII. were as follows:

That the Duc d'Angoulême and the Duc de Berri should embark on board a ship of war, or in case that could not be granted, on board the packet-boat, for Pasages, and that upon arriving there they should put themselves in communication with Lord Wellington; that it was Monsieur's intention to embark on board a frigate, or if that could not be granted, a vessel which he had the means of hiring, and to sail directly for the Garonne; that he knew there was a party in Bordeaux ready to support him, and that he had not the least doubt of being received and supported by them as soon as he landed in the neighbourhood; that if our engagements with our Allies prevented our giving them that active assistance in this business which they were so desirous of obtaining, they limited their application to a demand for passports for the Duc d'Angoulême and the Duc de Berri, either under their own names or under fictitious names, to embark on board the packet-boat for Pasages, and a licence for the ship in which Monsieur intended to go to Bordeaux.

As soon as Monsieur had concluded, I began by reminding him that when I last saw him (which was only two hours after the copy of the memorandum from Lord Wellington to the Count de Grammont had been put into my hands), I had explicitly stated to him my personal opinion that the British government could not, under present circumstances, further or assist the proposition which I was aware would be grounded on that memorandum; that we were so circumstanced with respect to our Allies that we should not be justified in taking such a step without their previous consent, or without such a manifestation of public opinion by an actual rising in France as might warrant us, from what we previously knew of their sentiments and opinions, in acting without the delay which would unavoidably arise from a reference to them; that I could now state it as the opinion of my colleagues (in which I included that of Lord Castlereagh, for I had received his opinion in writing) that neither our engagements nor our honour would permit our adopting at this moment the proposal which he had made; that the connection which subsisted between us and our Allies necessarily required previous communication with them on a measure of such importance, but that this communication was rendered still more indispensable from the negotiations to which we were jointly parties. That if he

asked my opinion as to the result of those negotiations, I did not believe they would end in peace. That the Allies would certainly not have made peace at Frankfort upon the same terms as they would have made it at Prague, nor would they, in my judgment, make it at Besançon or Dijon upon the same terms as they would have concluded it at Frankfort; but that, as they had admitted the principle of treating with Buonaparte, it was in his power to have peace by accepting their conditions, though, from what we knew of his character, the acceptance of them was very improbable. That whilst we could not agree to the measure he proposed without previous communication with our Allies, we were ready to communicate without delay all that had passed upon this subject to them for their consideration; to desire their most favourable attention to it, in the event of the negotiation being either broken off or any disposition appearing on the part of Buonaparte to evade peace on the only admissible principles. That we should be ready to concert with them upon the measures which it might be proper to adopt with a view to the interior of France, and that Louis XVIII. and Monsieur should be fully informed of the result of this communication. That all, therefore, which we now suggested was a short delay till we could receive an answer from Lord Castlereagh. That this delay appeared to me to be likely even to be advantageous to them, as it would enable Lord Wellington to procure further information. That they must be aware that much might be done by Lord Wellington, in the present state of things, both for learning and trying the opinion of the country, which he might be obliged to give up altogether if a French Prince should once arrive against the declared opinion of the government. That I conjured him not to put us under the painful necessity of giving an instruction to Lord Wellington to abstain from any communication with them in the event of their arrival in France—an instruction which it would be most distressing to us to be obliged to send, and which might, in its result, produce the most unfavourable impression upon their own cause. I added that, having formed this opinion after mature deliberation, I was sure he would see how impossible it was for us to assist indirectly and covertly a project which we felt it our duty to oppose till the sentiments of our Allies had been obtained; and that we felt, therefore, the same painful necessity in rejecting his second proposition as we had done in rejecting the first.

Monsieur thanked me for the frankness with which I had expressed myself. He said it was most painful for his brother and for him to differ on such a subject with a government to whom they owed so many obligations, and to which they were bound by so many ties. That we certainly were the best judges of what our honour and our engagements to our Allies required; but that their honour was likewise concerned in this business; and that they should not feel that they were justified either to themselves or to their country if, after such an intimation of the wishes of the French people, they did not immediately repair to the place where their duty obliged them to go. That all they therefore asked was their passports and their licence, under real or fictitious names. That we might certainly give what instructions to Lord Wellington we pleased, and if those instructions prohibited him from communicating with them, they would certainly abstain from such communication, and try their fortunes in other ways; but that, whatever were the consequences, they should in that case feel that they had done their duty. He further added, that in going to France, however improbable might be the chance of peace at this time, and he certainly thought so after what I had said, they were fully sensible that circumstances might arise in which it *might* be concluded with Buonaparte, and that they should think themselves most unjustifiable in going to France for the purpose of exciting the people to rise in their favour unless they had

entirely made up their minds, even in the event of a peace, not to abandon them, but to share the fortunes of those who declared in their favour, whatever they might be.

I again urged the advantage of delay; that though we differed now, events might arise, and very shortly, which might lead us entirely to agree; that even the public declaration of such a town as Bordeaux in favour of the Royal cause would in a great degree alter the question; and that whatever might be the policy of our government in such an event, which must depend upon circumstances, it might remove any objection to *his* going in person, as in that case he would not appear to go by our sanction to excite the people to rise against the government, but he would go to those who had taken the measure upon their own responsibility, and who were desirous of having him among them.

To this he replied, that it was the universal opinion of all those with whom they had communicated that there never would be an actual rising in France till a Prince actually arrived, and that it would take place as soon as he was known to be upon the French territory.

At the conclusion of our conversation he asked me whether they should receive the passports and licence for which they had applied. I answered I did not think the government, with the view which they had taken of the subject, would be justified in giving them; that they would certainly impose no personal indignity upon them, but that they would not be justified in giving facilities until such time as the communication with the Allies had taken place.

He then at first intimated, and afterwards plainly stated, that in that case his sons would go to Falmouth to embark on board the packet for Pasages; that they were aware they could not embark without a passport; but upon being refused permission to embark, it would be necessary for the King and him to publish to the whole world the actual state of the case, and to make it known to France and to Europe that it was not their fault that they were not actually in France, but that they were prevented from going by the act of the British government.

Monsieur said this without anything like the appearance of menace; and indeed I must do him the justice to say that his manner throughout, though earnest and on some occasions very affecting, was such as I have universally experienced from him, and that he was as candid as I could have expected any individual could be with the strong feelings which he possessed on the subject of our conversation.

In the course of what passed he gave me the enclosed official note and unofficial memorandum; to the former of which he requested an answer as early as was practicable.

LIVERPOOL.

IV.

The Earl of Liverpool to Monsieur.

5th Jan., 1814.

Lord Liverpool has communicated to His Majesty's government the note which he has received from His Royal Highness the Comte d'Artois.

His Majesty's government have reason to believe, from information recently received, that there exists in some parts of France a desire to promote the reestablishment of the House of Bourbon on the throne of that country; but they are not in possession of any proof which, in their own judgment or in that of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, has led to the conclusion that this disposition is as general throughout France as has been assumed in the

note delivered to Lord Liverpool; and it is material to observe, that whatever may be the sentiments of the people of France in favour of the ancient Royal dynasty, no public manifestation of those sentiments has yet appeared in any quarter.

His Majesty's government abstain from entering more particularly into this part of the subject, as they feel it incumbent upon them to declare that they consider themselves as precluded, in the present state of things, from acceding to the demands of the French Princes without previous communication with His Majesty's Allies.

The same considerations which restrain His Majesty's government from placing at this time at the disposal of the Princes of the House of Bourbon any of His Majesty's ships for the purpose of conveying them to France, prevent them likewise from affording the facilities desired in the latter part of the note, after the intimation which has been given of the intention with which they have been demanded.

Lord Liverpool has been authorised by His Majesty's government to express in the strongest terms the concern and regret with which they have felt themselves obliged to withhold their compliance with a request in which the feelings of the French Princes must be so deeply interested.

LIVERPOOL.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 6th Jan., 1814.

I have the honour of enclosing to your Lordship the copy of a letter which has been received from the Office for Foreign Affairs, with an enclosure relating to the wish of the Prince Royal of Sweden to confer upon your Lordship the highest military distinction of that kingdom, if it should be agreeable to you to accept this mark of His Royal Highness's estimation; and I request your Lordship would acquaint me with your sentiments upon this subject at your earliest leisure.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

W. Hamilton, Esq., to Colonel Bunbury.

SIR, Foreign Office, 30th Dec., 1813.

I am directed by the Secretary of State to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Bathurst, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Mr. Thornton, containing the Crown Prince of Sweden's offer to Lord Wellington of the highest distinction of the Order of the Tower and Sword.

I have, &c.,

W. HAMILTON.

II.

Edward Thornton, Esq., to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Kiel, 17th Dec., 1813.

In a conversation which I had a few days ago with the Prince Royal on the subject of the distinguishing achievements of the Marquess of Wellington, he asked me whether I thought it would be agreeable to his Lordship and to the Prince Regent's government to move his S. M. to present to his Lordship the Great Cross of the Order of the Sword, or rather that which is the highest distinction of the Order, and never granted but to very distinguished conduct in the field and to victorious generals. This latter distinction consists in a small sword worn perpendicularly with the point upwards, either alone or under the decoration of a superior order which the wearer may possess, such as in Sweden the Order of the Seraphim, and consequently in England the Orders of English Knighthood. M. de Rehausen will be able to explain these distinctions to your Lordship; but I have the personal knowledge that the late King Gustavus IV. was during his whole reign endeavouring to acquire this distinction without success, as it does not depend on the will of the Sovereign to grant it. I promised to mention this to your Lordship for the purpose of its being submitted, if it shall be judged proper, to the Marquess of Wellington, and I trust that I shall be honoured in due time with your Lordship's answer.

I take it for granted that it depends entirely upon Lord Wellington's choice to receive the distinction I have been speaking of, or the Great Cross and Ribbon of the Order.

I have, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing-street, 7th Jan., 1814.

It has occurred to me that if an insurrection were to break out in your part of France in favour of the House of Bourbon, the event might *possibly* be communicated by you to Lord Castlereagh by the common post, and that no inconvenience would arise from the attempt.

If such an event were to happen, you will direct your letter, under any signature you please, to Monsieur Antoine Reicherman, poste restante, Basle. You will write it in French. If Bordeaux shall have declared, you will inform him that you can furnish him with 20 hogsheads of excellent claret; a less quantity for smaller insurrections; 10 hogsheads for Toulouse; and an ample supply for more general demonstrations of a counter-revolutionary spirit. Lord Castlereagh will be apprised of this.

If the French Princes should resolve on going, and contrive to go without our consent, and this spirit should be manifested on their arrival, it will be necessary that you should have some instructions how to act under those circumstances. This cannot happen before Colonel Bunbury will have presented himself to you; and you shall have an instruction by him.

I am ever, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST

Major-Gen. Roche to the Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo.

MY LORD, Blockade of Sagonto, Puzol, 7th Jan., 1814.

As I seldom venture to obtrude myself upon your Lordship's attention, I trust you will excuse my presuming to do so upon the present occasion, it appearing to me to be my duty to make your Lordship well acquainted with the nature of this blockade, as well as to report to your Lordship, at the commencement of the year, upon the state of the troops under my command.

When I was destined to this service, on the 7th of August last, I brought with me two corps only of this division, extremely low in strength (Valencia and Alicante), the latter having suffered severely in the action of Carcaxente, and both in various others of less consequence upon the Zujar.

At this moment both these corps consist of upwards of 1300 men each, extremely well appointed, and wanting for nothing. I have also the complement of men necessary to complete the two other battalions of this division, which, by your Lordship's orders, I expect every moment from Catalonia; so that the four of which it is at present composed are fully complete in their establishment.

Respecting their discipline, a regular system of schools and academies has been constantly adopted for the instruction of the officers, serjeants, and corporals; the former class attending three times a-week, and the latter daily. The duty has been so combined as to give all the opportunities possible for exercise in the field, and which invariably has been, when the weather has permitted, two hours morning and evening daily. It results that I can take upon myself to assure your Lordship there are not at this moment in the Peninsula two finer battalions than those two which lately were skeletons.

General Clinton, I have no doubt, will have informed your Lordship that the two battalions which were with him in Catalonia have been exemplary in their conduct, and have obtained his highest praise and approbation, as he has repeatedly written to me, and which I trust will be a proof to your Lordship that I have omitted no labour or pains with them; finally, the utmost harmony and cordiality exist in the whole corps, in which there never has been the slightest dispute.

Weekly states of the strength of the division are sent to his Excellency Sir Henry Wellesley, and accounts every two months are transmitted to him of the receipts and expenditures of the public money, together also with states of the arms, accoutrements, clothing and appointments of all sorts, existing in the corps.

No man or officer not actually present with his corps, according to your Lordship's orders, has ever been paid, the salutary effect of which has been prodigious.

Respecting the service of this blockade, I had the satisfaction to remit to General Clinton copy of a letter which I lately received from General Elio (with whom I am upon the very best terms), expressing his fullest approbation of the manner in which, with a very limited force, I have conducted this service; and which will speak for itself when I acquaint your Lordship, during the whole period I have been here, although our piquets and sentries are constantly within musket-shot round the fort, I have only lost five men prisoners.

I have repeatedly represented to Generals Elio and Clinton how important it was that a sufficient force should be destined for this service to enable me to drive the enemy from the town of Murviedro, situated, as your Lordship will be informed, upon the easternmost base of the hill upon which the fort stands, and thus obliging him to take shelter within his works, and deprive him of the immense resource of water, wood, vegetables, &c., which the town supplies him. Had this measure been adopted at the commencement of the blockade, when General Sarsfield had six battalions upon this duty, no sort of doubt, I venture to assert, exists but that the enemy would at this hour have surrendered; for he could not absolutely have subsisted upon the water in the cisterns of the castle, which we know to be extremely bad and partly putrefied.

Mortars would have been of the most essential utility, for there are no magazines in the fort bomb-proof; but I never could get one sent to me.

With a proportion of these, I have solicited 12 pieces at least of heavy artillery in order to establish two batteries against the road which leads down from the castle to the town, with the view of protecting and maintaining our troops in the possession of it, which it is my intention to attempt effecting the moment the two battalions from Catalonia arrive, although the enemy have worked incessantly to make the town as strong as possible (knowing its value to him), and which is garrisoned every night by at least 300 men with artillery.

Your Lordship knows that the fort of Sagonto is situated 4 leagues east of Valencia, precisely in the junction of the two great roads to Catalonia and Aragon, and consequently that the occupation of it by the enemy, independent of all military considerations, causes the greatest inconvenience and detriment to the commerce and trade of the capital, to say nothing of the political effect it has upon the population of that great town; and your Lordship will therefore judge how important it is to direct that the necessary quantity of artillery and mortars should be sent for the service of its blockade.

The enemy have 70 pieces of artillery mounted, besides a park in reserve, and immense quantities of provisions, ammunition (arms in deposit), and stores and effects of all sorts to a great value. His force, about 2000 men.

I have already had the honour to acquaint your Lordship that this corps, composed only of four battalions, at present is fully complete, its total strength being about 5300 men.

If your Lordship will condescend to inquire from those who will speak truth, you will hear that the popularity I have acquired by long residence in these provinces gives me a decided preference, I will venture to assert, of getting fifty men who will voluntarily come to me, for one who will of his own free will enter into any other division.

I have, from beginning to ending, armed, clothed, and put into a useful state to the country, upwards of 18,000 Valencianos; and I therefore venture to propose to your Lordship that you would be pleased to direct four cuadros, or skeletons, of regiments to be now sent to me, and I will undertake to assure you that in two months, or at the same moment that this blockade is brought to a successful issue, your Lordship will have a reserve corps of not less than 10,000 of the finest men in the country, armed and equipped to march to any point you may be pleased to direct, under

the command of one who from gratitude is more attached to your family than perhaps most other individuals in this country, and who therefore earnestly solicits your Lordship's protection, and who has the honour to subscribe himself, with the highest respect and consideration,

Your Lordship's most devoted and faithful humble servant,

K. ROCHE.

P.S. My Lord, so convinced were Lord William Bentinck and General Elio of the influence I have in the province, that both agreed in the month of July that I should undertake forming a reserve of above 20,000 dispersos which then existed in this country, which I respectfully declined: first, on account of the nature of the conditions, which would not have been creditable to me; and secondly, because the measure was not authorized by your Lordship or Sir Henry Wellesley.

The same facility for me to form a corps of reserve without delay exists at this moment as it did then, should your Lordship approve of it.

K. ROCHE.

[725.] *To the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, St. Jean de Luz, 8th Jan., 1814.

I received by the last post your Lordship's letter of the 16th December, in which you have informed me, by desire of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, that the marriage between Her Royal Highness the Princess Charlotte and the Hereditary Prince of Orange is settled; and I beg your Lordship to make my most grateful acknowledgments to His Royal Highness for this mark of his confidence, and to present to him my humble congratulations on this event.

I don't believe it ever fell to the lot of any individual to have more frequent opportunities of becoming acquainted with the character and disposition of a Prince than I have had of knowing the Hereditary Prince of Orange; and I must say that during nearly three years that he was never absent from me for one day, I never saw or heard anything of him that was not good. His disposition is a most amiable one, he is beloved by every body who approaches him, and his understanding is excellent; and I consider the marriage to be not less desirable on account of the private virtues and good qualities of the Prince than it is on political grounds. I beg leave to congratulate you, my dear Lord, that this auspicious arrangement has been made during your administration.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Hereditary Prince of Orange. [726.]

MY DEAR SIR, St. Jean de Luz, 8th Jan., 1814.

I received by the last post your Highness's letter of the 16th December, for which I return you many thanks; and I sincerely congratulate you upon all the events which have occurred in your country and to your family since I took my leave of you at this place.

There is one, however, of which your Highness has very properly omitted to inform me, but of which the Prince Regent has been most graciously pleased to direct that I might be informed, knowing, I suppose, the sincere interest which I must feel in everything that concerns your Highness's happiness, upon which I beg leave also to congratulate you as one likely not only to contribute to it, but to promote the welfare and prosperity of your country and Great Britain, and through them the independence and peace of all Europe. I trust that you will believe that there is no person who rejoices at this event more sincerely than I do.

Your Highness's friends here are much flattered by your recollections of them, and all rejoice in the change which has taken place in your country, and will be still more rejoiced when I shall be at liberty to inform them of the event to which I have above referred. This letter will probably find you placed in an arduous situation, and I am afraid that your life can never be one of much ease; but I hope you will not consider me guilty of flattery when I tell you that there is no person more capable than yourself of acting the part which you will have to fill, if you will trust to the dictates of your own understanding and disposition. I hope your Highness will believe that I shall always feel the warmest interest in your welfare, and that you have not a more sincere friend than your most faithful and obedient servant,

WELLINGTON.

His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Horse Guards, 10th Jan., 1814.

I have had the pleasure to receive your Lordship's letter of the 15th ultimo, enclosing copies of letters you had addressed to the Secretary of State respecting the formation of certain weak battalions under your command.

In alluding generally to this correspondence in my letter of the 25th

November, I had no other view than a reference to your Lordship's desire to form provisional battalions from detachments of weak regiments, sending the officers and non-commissioned officers of a certain number of companies to England, against which I had repeatedly expressed an opinion that such an arrangement would be detrimental to the ulterior efficiency of these corps. But from a wish to give the utmost attention to the motives which suggested your proposal, I gave your Lordship the option of retaining the privates of the regiments stated in the margin,* by holding out the inducement of a small bounty to volunteer into other corps serving under your command.

However we may differ upon this trivial point of detail, we can only have the same object in view; and I assure your Lordship that in any arrangement I propose regarding your force, it is my utmost and invariable wish to give it efficiency, and to contribute all in my power to enable your Lordship to carry on with effect the important service committed to your care.

I wish to show your Lordship how far it is possible to augment the numbers of your weak regiments, and I therefore return copies of the lists you transmitted to me of those battalions which were less than 450 and 350 rank and file fit for duty, with remarks against each in red ink for your Lordship's information and guidance.

Your Lordship will perceive, as per margin,† that the strength of the detachments forming the provisional battalions, which were alluded to in my last letter, do not amount to more than 1372 men. Under these circumstances you will probably not consider the object of sufficient magnitude to call for the measure of inducing these privates to volunteer into other regiments upon the principle already alluded to. I leave it, however, to your Lordship's discretion to act in this respect as you think proper. But whether your Lordship may decide upon inducing these privates to volunteer, or upon leaving them with their regiments, you will, at all events, be pleased to break up the provisional battalions which they form, whenever you can do it without inconvenience to your present operations, and send the detachments to England.

I am, my Lord, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

Memorandum on the above in the handwriting of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

[This is like the others, no *order* to do anything.]

* 31st foot, 2nd battalion; 66th foot, 2nd battalion; Queen's regiment, 53rd foot, 2nd battalion; 24th foot, 2nd battalion; 58th foot, 2nd battalion.

	R. and F. fit for duty.
Queen's	279
24th	250.
31st	304
58th	184
66th	355
	1372

[ENCLOSURE.]

Regiments less than 450 rank and file fit for duty.			Remarks.
85th	Regiment	.. .. ..	.. Can be augmented from the depôt in this country.
50th	„	1st batt. ..	.. Do. from 2nd batt. do.
71st	„	„ ..	.. Do. do. do.
92nd	„	„ ..	.. Do. do. do.
45th	„	„ ..	.. Do. do. do.
27th	„	3rd batt. ..	.. The privates of this battalion can be transferred to the 1st and 2nd battalions should the latter arrive from Catalonia, and the officers and non-commissioned officers sent to England.
40th	„	1st batt. ..	.. Can be augmented from the 2nd battalion.
20th	„	.. .. ..	.. Can be augmented from the depôt.
38th	„	1st batt. ..	.. Can be augmented from the 2nd battalion.
59th	„	2nd batt. ..	.. The 1st battalion of this corps is in India. But exertions will be made to augment its numbers. Should they fail in the next six months, it must return to England.
11th	„	1st batt. ..	.. Can be augmented from the 2nd battalion.
32nd	„	„ ..	.. Do. do.
61st	„	„ ..	.. Do. do.
77th	„	.. .. ..	.. Has no 2nd battalion, and not much success in recruiting. But exertions will be made to augment it.

Regiments less than 350 rank and file fit for duty.			Remarks.
31st and 66th Foot, 2nd battalions.			Both the 1st battalions of these corps are upon foreign service, and it is not possible to keep them up: they must therefore return to England.
34th	Foot, 2nd batt.	.. ..	.. The 1st battalion of this corps is upon foreign service, but exertions will be made to augment the 2nd battalion.
74th	„	.. ..	.. Can be augmented from the depôt in this country.
83rd	„ 2nd batt.	.. ..	.. May remain in the Peninsula until the arrival of the 1st battalion from the Cape of Good Hope, when the privates can be transferred to it, and the officers and non-commissioned officers sent to England.
87th	„ 2nd batt.	.. ..	.. The 1st battalion of this corps is upon foreign service, but exertions will be made to augment the 2nd battalion.
94th	„	.. ..	.. There are only 20 men at the depôt of this corps, but exertions will be made to augment its numbers.
48th	„ 1st batt.	.. ..	.. Can be augmented from the 2nd battalion.
2nd	„ or Queen's	.. ..	.. To return to England.
53rd	„ 2nd batt.	.. ..	.. Can be augmented from the depôt in this country.
23rd	„ 1st batt.	.. ..	.. Do. from 2nd batt. do.
Royals,	3rd batt.	.. ..	.. Can be augmented from the depôt in this country.
47th	Foot, 2nd batt.	.. ..	.. The 1st battalion of this corps is upon foreign service, but exertions will be made to augment the 2nd battalion.

Regiments less than 350 rank and file fit for duty.	Remarks.
36th Foot, 1st batt.	Can be augmented from 2nd battalion.
24th „ 2nd batt.	The 1st battalion of this corps is upon foreign service, and it is not possible to keep it up. The 2nd battalion must therefore return to England.
58th „ 2nd batt.	The privates of this corps can be transferred to the 1st battalion, should the latter arrive from Catalonia, and the officers and non-commissioned officers sent to England. In any event the 2nd battalion must return home.
51st „	Can be augmented from the depôt in this country.
68th „	There are only 24 rank and file at the depôt of this corps, but exertions will be made to augment its numbers.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

My Lord, Friburg, 10th Jan., 1814.

If I venture to give your Lordship a very general view of the important affairs to which your attention will be immediately directed on your arrival at head-quarters, I am sure you will receive it with indulgence, and consider I am actuated by an anxious desire of affording the small aid in my power to the comprehensive and important decisions you will be called upon to make.

The subjects are of so extensive a nature, the arguments to be adduced so various, and, above all, the information I possess so limited to what you will receive from others, that I look with some dread to the undertaking of committing to the limits of a despatch even such prominent features as may be of service. Still, where a mass is to be digested, every little aid may avail; and a sketch from an observer will at least prove his mind has not been idle as far as his abilities would lead it. The rapid march of events is such, that even while I write all my actual reasonings may fall to the ground, and every day may produce a new light. As a memorandum, however, for the Prince Regent's government, of the principal points you will have before you when you arrive, I shall proceed as shortly as I can to give you the *carte du pays*.

If it is expedient to enter into negotiation with Buonaparte on the basis proposed by the Allies, which Caulaincourt's arrival at the advanced posts and the last communications must bring to a decision, the following may be some of the leading points to consider. I must, however, first premise that I shall ever deplore not only the manner, but the whole tenor of the Frankfort negotiations: we shall find them hang like a log round our neck, and we shall in vain try (now France is prostrate) to disembarrass ourselves from those premises we have voluntarily shackled ourselves with in a moment of neither cause nor necessity. We find even in the last note of M. de Caulaincourt that he relies upon our own proposed basis. Can nations (like Buonaparte) depart from the line they themselves chalk out? A despot without character may do anything. The Powers of Europe, on

the other hand, must in some degree uphold themselves by the great principles of faith, justice, and moderation.

Where was the necessity, if the state of France as to her beaten forces was actually ascertained (and that the Austrian Minister could be ignorant of this, one can hardly imagine), of a furtive negotiation at Frankfort which every hour brings on its more baneful effects? Is it not clear that the manner in which we are committed influences present ideas and future decisions on the most important points? This I shall hereafter more plainly elucidate. That Prince Metternich wishes his own peace, I cannot doubt; that the arrangements for Germany were made as he wished, is pretty evident; that he has his own game at heart nearer than any other, is defensible: but it is not to be permitted that, in order to play this as he fancies, the other Powers of Europe are to be confined in their natural views and objects, which the downfall of France and increased successes may in some degree vary and enlarge. When Buonaparte subdued Austria, did he not dictate peace? Did he not insist on heavy pecuniary contributions to save the people of France? At Tilsit, did he not in like manner drain Prussia of her last *sou* to support his army and alleviate the burthens of his nation? Would not a just principle of retaliation direct that, if we make peace now with France and confine France to her ancient limits, these robberies should be repaid? And yet when we had the game in our hands and the ball at our feet, and all this and much more might have been accomplished, we seem to have thrown it unnecessarily aside, and have closed ourselves within a fence from which we cannot bound far, and this, too, without having the merit of a bold and open line of conduct to Europe at large. Measures founded upon this basis would have been at least great, but we have in their room a secret and extraordinary mission and a demi-official declaration referring to propositions which the world are unacquainted with, and which seem now to be as binding on the minds of some as the most authentic State document. It is argued that the propositions made brought about the present result of the desire of peace and the humble state of France. How much more humble she would have been, and how much less embarrassing our predicament, can be best appreciated by remarking the effects produced by M. de St. Aignan's mission, all the explanations and defences since, and the shifts in supporting political doctrines and objects which it will oblige us in the course of negotiation to resort to.

If we negotiate now, I take it for granted it is determined: 1st. To make a peace with Buonaparte himself, in preference to holding out and attempting to obtain another government for France by his downfall; 2ndly. That we are content with getting the basis proposed in the most extended sense and latitude we can attach to it or argue for under its premises; and 3rdly. That this peace, such as we wish it, signed at Basle, is preferable to undertaking a march to the capital of the French Empire and incurring the hazard of another revolution in France, which might bring all the horrors of the former to be acted over again.

It seems the great Powers all lean to this general idea; and I conclude it arises from a difference of opinion amongst them, if Buonaparte were no more, what would be the best and wisest government for France. Austria would no doubt like the King of Rome under a Regency, which the deep

and ambitious spirit of her present Minister might in a great degree wield; England the Bourbons; the Emperor of Russia perhaps his friend Bernadotte. In short, there seems a dread of an anarchy, and a disunion in the coalition, if a choice were to be made, and it might produce a more convulsed state of Europe than has existed. I am well persuaded, and as far as I can obtain information and judge from what I see, that Prince Metternich, who is the ruling power, has been borne on by the rapid tide of events, and finds himself now committed further than he ever had imagined. It is true he may be borne on still further by more successes, by the firm counsels and persuasion of a British Minister; and departing from the notion that he is thus to be brought forward, that he at this moment fears the annihilation of Buonaparte, from the chaos it might entail, or from a certain feeling of fear and respect he has for him, I think a person who has to act on his *esprit* might produce considerable effect if Buonaparte were forced from the throne of France. It is greatly to be considered here whether the sentiments of all the Allies could not be brought to the same decision on the great question of succession. Should this be the case, a totally different line might be taken from that which is under contemplation. A movement in France might achieve this; it might get the better of a parent's feelings, of a Minister's fostered plan to deliver and regulate Europe as he has himself projected: without such aid, the only remaining chance that occurs is to work on the personal feelings of honour to his country that should guide a Sovereign, and to raise the vanity of the Minister by placing before him how much greater he would be by aiding such a proceeding than patching up his own plan which some few years hence may be destroyed by the ambition and restless spirit we have so long had to contend with; and, lastly, by holding out such individual advantages as he might not be proof to withstand. This reasoning is founded on the certainty that the re-establishment of the Bourbons would be more congenial to England than any other arrangement. If, however, as some maintain, England would like to see France reduced as much and as low as possible, it might be policy to keep Buonaparte on his throne with his wings clipped to the utmost extent, in preference to restoring the lawful heirs who might again shine as in the time of Louis XIV., and become formidable to England and the Continent. If, however, the present ideas prevail, the grand object in negotiation should be to get as much from France as possible under *our cordon*, and exclude her from all opinion in the settlement of Germany. This latter point may be difficult, but should be attempted. The nicety of negotiation is to have fundamental principles and points which must be obtained, but he that negotiates must get in the progress of the proceedings as much more as possible in addition to what is essential. A misfortune with us is, we have limited ourselves *in limine*, and we must force and argue our points as much beyond our limits as possible. I am quite convinced for this purpose your Lordship's own presence as the negotiator would not only be of the utmost moment, but I should almost say indispensable. It is true that neither Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, nor Baron Hardenberg will be the negotiators from the Powers here; but this should not regulate your Lordship. Not being the First Minister of England, it is to be conceived you receive your instructions; and that a reference which may be in the progress of business a desirable

thing could in your case as in others be made: but you could give those instructions here to no one with the same advantages. There are other considerations of a minor nature, but which, however, are not to be overlooked, such as the trifling jealousies among Powers and persons that might arise, which make me firmly of opinion you can delegate this duty to none with advantage; and you can alone see, in the progress of discussion, to what points the machine can be wound up, which is under the predicament of the Allies the general wish, although some have neither the boldness nor the will to avow it. I have said before how much our Frankfort proceedings influence the present tone; I am well informed that as in the declaration it is stated the Allies would yield to France a greater territory than she ever had under her kings, so much does Prince Metternich think it essential to adhere to this text, that he would not deprive France of all the Netherlands or Savoy, or all that he might be disposed to take in Italy, in order that this assertion should be borne out.

Having taken a hasty view of the probable train of negotiation founded on the principle of treating with Buonaparte under the projected basis, before I proceed to enter at large into what the Allies will have to contend for, or rather lay down as to their decision (for in fact it comes now to this), I shall just revert to what might be the policy if it should be decided to await the expression of public feeling in France in order to attempt the overthrow of the present dynasty and re-establish the Bourbons. Every delay in negotiation with Caulaincourt in such case should be made. It might fairly be stated, so long as the King of Spain and the Pope were in captivity the Allies would not send their propositions. Meanwhile the armies might continue their march, and six weeks or two months might give rise to a general impulse throughout the nation expressive of their wish, without positively departing from the first proposals. It is to be considered whether a plan of protraction under present circumstances might not make events march to the great object of a lasting peace for the world even more rapidly than they are actually advancing. How far this is politic will be the great object of all for your Lordship's most serious consideration. Great Britain's decisions expressed by you may change Austria, and persuade Russia and Prussia. As it is, your Lordship must be aware of the politics of these Courts, so anxious, so impatient, I may almost say so ravenous, for the blessings of peace, so long withheld from them. Austria desires it on *reasonable* terms even with France, and the Emperor must wish it for the sake of a daughter he very much loves. Russia so eagerly longs for it, that no man but the Emperor, who has stood alone as a sheet-anchor of *perseverance* and devotion to the cause, could have kept his generals, officers, and troops so long here. Prussia seeks for it after her sufferings, and the King after his misfortunes public and private, beyond any war that would ensure tenfold her present aggrandizement: the retired habits of the monarch lead him to long to bury himself again in Charlottenburg. To do his Minister the Chancellor Hardenberg justice, I must declare that his firmness and conviction of the policy of a vigorous prosecution of the contest have greatly tended to press forward the power of Prussia as it has appeared. But the wish nearest the heart of all the Powers becomes every day more and more evident; it is a general cry, and must, I conclude, now be obtained; delay in its accomplishment, and the neces-

sity of continuing the war for the Bourbons, are liable, in case of a slight reverse, to cause disunion if all the Powers are not agreed and warm in the principle of proceeding. A march to Paris for the Emperors to enter at the head of their Guards to sign the same peace with Buonaparte as they could at Basle would be for vain glory and parade; but a movement to Paris for a specific and an agreed object might from the present aspect of affairs accomplish that object; and, weighing well the accompanying risks of disunion, revolution, and anarchy (for I believe there is little military difficulty), it is to be decided whether it should be undertaken.

To resume this long reasoning. If we negotiate under former propositions, we cannot do it too rapidly; and it would be folly to go to Paris when we might have the peace we desire at Basle. If we look to depart from former proposals by the new successes and the march of events, we must settle what we will have—Buonaparte, the Bourbons, the King of Rome, or Bernadotte. We must be fixed in our ideas, commence our movements accordingly, and not stop until our objects are achieved. If we wish to take the chance of what events may bring about by delay in our negotiations, neither departing from what we have said, nor making new declarations, management is necessary; and although it may be the most difficult proceeding, I am not clear it may not be the most judicious, holding as I do the principle that we can never make a lasting peace with France so long as Buonaparte is at the head of the government.

Returning now to what I contemplate as the march of negotiations, I shall candidly declare to your Lordship that I think at the present moment two distinct parties exist. One party that would yield, under the basis proposed, the whole of the left bank of the Rhine even for a peace: at the head of this are Prince Metternich and all those who support his doctrines. The other party, in which Count Stadion, Baron Hardenberg, and I believe Count Nesselrode are included, are anxious for as large an extension on the left bank of the Rhine as possible. The latter are influenced by the following reasons: 1st. For the permanent security of Germany; for as long as France has the fortresses, even those in Alsace, Strasbourg, &c., she has it in her power, whenever it is her interest and she has the means, to make her incursions into Germany and produce a new warfare.

It is objected to this, that Alsace is so ancient a province of France, that it would be unjust and impossible to profit by the advantages of war to wrest it from her, particularly after the declaration made by the Allies. The Emperor of Austria has declared this in the most peremptory and solemn manner. It is answered by those who urge getting Alsace, that it is the *ne plus ultra* of what the Allies demand: if not obtained now, it will never be obtained; and why not avail ourselves of the present opportunity, which may be the only one ever favourable for securing it? Of course this idea admits of modification if it is not achieved. If all Alsace cannot be obtained, at least the fortresses might be, or they could be blown up and destroyed. Supposing insuperable difficulties arise which cannot be overcome, it becomes of the more importance to secure an extended frontier for Holland; and the ideas contained in a private letter of your Lordship's I have not failed strongly to impress on the minds of those with whom I have conversed. To draw a line for the present frontier of Holland by Luxembourg to Worms, or at least to Mayence, would be the most

to be wished; and this is the idea of the second party whom I have above designated. The former, however, equally admitting an extension, is for taking the line from Antwerp to Malines direct on Cologne. It appears to be apprehended there would be great difficulty for Luxembourg. If this idea of the first party were to be carried to its utmost extent into effect, it has been projected that the actual frontier of Holland might be confined to the Meuse, and Germany have for indemnities what lies between it and the Rhine, perhaps making a considerable Prussian possession in this quarter.

The next reason why it is essential to secure as large a territory as possible on the left bank of the Rhine is to afford indemnities to the Powers who have a right to receive them according to existing treaties and the general desire of the Allies. I shall revert shortly to those who have a right to look for indemnities, and consider how they are to be found. To do this at length would be a work of much labour and study: but to give your Lordship a general notion, I shall begin with Austria, whose demands are the Tyrol, Salzburg, and Innverztel; and no one has a right to object to these demands, which amount to a population of about 800,000 or a million of souls. It must then be considered to wrest these from Bavaria she can only be given the Grand Duchy of Frankfort and Wurtzburg, which do not contain half a million: it would therefore be necessary to take from Wurtemberg, and Wurtemberg could only be recompensed by Baaden. It is true Wurtemberg and Baaden do not merit much consideration; but if they are to have indemnities, they can only receive them from the left bank of the Rhine. But Wurtemberg and Bavaria are supported by the Emperor of Russia. Family reasons, or ruptures between them and Austria, may induce this protection, otherwise there would be less difficulty from their conduct to get something from them without remuneration, as I have heard even to the present day Wurtemberg has been discovered in correspondence with France, there has been even an idea of dethroning the King and placing his son in his room, and I believe Baaden's conduct is equally suspicious. In the north of Germany larger difficulties even than those already described arise. Prussia has not only a right, in consequence of her treaties, to be placed in the state in which she was in 1805, but, independently of this, all Powers are of opinion that Prussia should be placed on such a respectable footing as together with Austria to oppose a barrier to Russia on one side and to France on the other, in case either should at any moment be too preponderant. Austria, it is said, desires this. She would assign Prussia ten millions of souls; she has at present not more than between four and a half and five. If they were to give Prussia back all she had in Poland, it would give her two millions and a half of what is required; but Russia is only willing to give that part which joins Prussia with Silesia, and wants to carry her own frontier to the Vistula: hence arises to Prussia a deficit of two millions and a half. (The question of Poland would come here under discussion; but as it is of immense importance, and could only be treated at length, I shall not touch on it, as your Lordship must be fully in possession of every light upon it. I have equally avoided in any despatch alluding to the state of Switzerland, having seen all the able despatches of the Earl of Aberdeen upon it.) Russia, however, desires to draw a line from Johannisberg by

the Pilicca to the corner of Silesia, and she will not easily give up this plan for any consideration. Prussia may be permitted to possess as she desires Saxony, and there seems no objection, except to a part which the Emperor of Russia wishes to reserve for the Duke of Weimar: by this Prussia would acquire one million and a half of inhabitants; after it there would be wanting an indemnity for Hildesheim. There belong to Prussia all her Westphalian provinces, Anspach, Bayreuth, Neufchâtel, &c.; but if she repossessed all these, she would not come near to the extent of possession she has a just pretension to claim. If Prussia obtains Saxony, Anspach and Bayreuth would not be too far separated, and she might be glad to recover them; but even in this case more indemnity would be required for Bavaria. Prussia is not desirous of having these detached possessions, provided she could be remunerated in a collected body; but the difficulty to find this is the evil.

To enter into the future plans for Germany, to assure her lasting tranquillity, it is suggested, that it might be divided into large and small Powers: to secure this, Austria and Prussia are to be the two preponderating ones, and of the second order Bavaria in the south and Hanover in the north. This is the plan of those who declare their object to be the lasting happiness and independence of Germany. Prussia may be by such arrangement united to England by Hanover and Holland, while on the other hand Austria and Bavaria support each other. By treaty Hanover has an aggrandizement of 300,000 souls: Prussia would wish even to see Hanover more aggrandized, if she could do so without prejudice to herself; she wishes to push Hanover to the frontiers of Holland. Prussia cannot be aggrandized on the side of Hanover; she is separated from her Westphalian provinces by Hesse Cassel, Hanover, and the Duchy of Saxony, and these are split and divided. If territory could be obtained on the left bank of the Rhine, Prussia might form a possession in that quarter, while Hanover, extended by Bremen to the sea, possessing but Friesland and stretching near the frontier of Holland, would form, aided by Prussia, the northern support of the independence of Germany. The Duchy of Mecklenburg added to Prussia or Hanover would make a small addition, but the ties of blood might make even such a proposition difficult unless the Duke of Mecklenburg could receive ample indemnity elsewhere; and where can such indemnity come from but on the left bank of the Rhine? Austria would not oppose herself to the arrangements of the North of Germany. For Russia it is another question: in her heart she thinks only of Prussia, as she gets from her the frontier of the Vistula; and it would require the weight perhaps of England to make her view with tranquillity such a settlement in the north as is essential for the interests of Europe.

It may be considered how far Hanover would be inclined to change any of her provinces in any general arrangement: on this subject, however, I am not enabled to form the least opinion, never having had an idea on the subject from the Prince Regent's Ministers. The situation of some of her territories is so important for Prussia, that the latter might be inclined to give two of her Westphalian provinces for one of the others: this would aggrandize Hanover, but whether advantageously or not I cannot at all determine.

If, in addition to this review of indemnities required, we add Denmark's,

we shall find it still more difficult to discover where she is to be served; and it seems quite certain, from authority I cannot doubt, that Prussia would never consent to Denmark receiving Swedish Pomerania for indemnity, and Austria would support Prussia in such a decision. The history of this is, that Prussia would not by any act of peace prevent her obtaining what she inwardly would like to possess; and if both Sweden and Denmark were excluded from the Continent, Prussia and Austria would perhaps not be disposed to lament it.

The résumé of this may be, that for the dédommagemens of Bavaria 300,000 souls may be required, for Prussia five millions, for Denmark wherewithal to make up for Norway. And these difficulties are some of the few that are now to be met in a general arrangement. If it should happen by the good fortune of the Allies that France rejects the propositions that will be made, and that the war continues, there is every reason to calculate that our future successes would ensure more conquests for the indemnities required. The Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig would be available in this scale, and it might answer for a possession for the Duke of Mecklenburg.

Your Lordship must already complain of the length of this despatch, and I am ashamed myself of having taken up so much of your time. I should have studied to compress it much more, and express my ideas clearer, had I had the time; but my anxiety that you should receive it on the road before you come to meet all those persons who will so engross you on your arrival as possibly to prevent your reading anything has induced me to send this collection of ideas in their most crude state. The interests of the world which are now to be settled, the peace that is to be made which in all probable calculation will be for ages, and the sentiments of Great Britain which are so anxiously looked to even as edicts at the present moment, must be my apology for trespassing so very long on your attention. The crisis is the most important that has ever yet arisen. The result of events is left with a degree of confidence and expectation to England, which at once denotes this proud and exulting truth, that she stands unrivalled as the first nation of the world.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

CHARLES STEWART.

Sir C. W. Flint to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Irish Office, 11th Jan., 1814.

Since I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship I received a letter from a very intelligent friend of mine on the Continent (of which the enclosed is an extract), the contents of which are of so very interesting a nature that I cannot refuse myself the pleasure of communicating them to you. The writer has been an eyewitness of all the late events which have taken place in Germany, and nobody's information and opinions are en-

titled to more attention. I believe there is little, if any, exaggeration in the amount of the forces now in the field and about to be assembled; but what I think worth more than all the rest is the *Tour* of Buonaparte, and the general character of all his proceedings. Still the Allies must be on their guard; for the entrance into France is in itself rather a hazardous proceeding, and only to be attempted on the certainty that the spirit of the French nation, if not with them, is decidedly hostile to Buonaparte.

My own conjecture is in favour of peace, though I am ready to admit that it becomes every day more difficult, unless preceded by the downfall and destruction of Buonaparte, the consummation of all others the most devoutly to be wished, and without which we never can confidently expect a state of perfect tranquillity.

Ever, my dear Lord, your most obliged and faithful,

C. W. FLINT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Extract of a letter to Sir Charles Flint, dated Rotterdam, the 29th of December, 1813.

"My letters from the South of Germany of the 20th inst. state that Switzerland had declared itself for the Allies, and that Princes Metternich and Schwarzenberg were on the point of setting out to make some necessary arrangements with the Swiss governments respecting the mode in which the approaching campaign is to be conducted. Should these be terminated amicably, of which I see little reason to doubt, the Allies will be enabled to enter France by the passes of the Jura, an operation which will not only effectually secure their retreat in the event of any possible disaster, but will render nearly useless the four great fortresses which have been considered the bulwarks of France on the side of Germany, and the conquest of which seems to be the most profitable and permanent result of the French Revolution.

"I am convinced I do not exaggerate in estimating the force of the main army under Prince Schwarzenberg at 160,000 men. Wrede, who is to attack the tête-de-pont at Huningen, and Blücher, who is to observe Mayence, have between them from 90,000 to 100,000. Should either of those places fall, which is not unlikely, it is probable that the disposable part of the united corps will push on in the direction of Metz. Marshal Bellegarde, previous to accepting the command of the army of Italy, made an express condition that his army should be raised to 100,000 men, effective; and as he is President of the Aulic Military Council, he has had it in his power to ensure the fulfilment of this condition.

"At the same time Murat, who is arrived at Bologna with 20,000 Neapolitans, has signified to the Austrian government that if the Allies would guarantee his present possessions, with a part of the Roman territory to form a military frontier, he would enter the South of France with 40,000 men, and act in whatever manner the Allies should deem most eligible.

"These proposals have, I believe, been accepted, with some modifications. The Austrian plenipotentiary, General Neuperg, who left Frankfort on the 11th, and would probably reach Bologna about the 23rd instant, was to command the advanced guard of Murat's army, and the main body was to act under the eye and immediate orders of Bellegarde. In this state of things it seems probable that the army under Beauharnois will be obliged either to sur-

render or to retreat under circumstances which will be nearly equivalent to a dissolution; and I think I am founded in saying that the Allied army might in a very short time be increased to 200,000 by the wrecks of that of Beauharnois and by voluntary enrolments in Italy and Piedmont; but I shall not insist on the correctness of this calculation, as it has hitherto been the policy of the Allies, or at least of the Austrian government, to keep the people in the back ground, and to prevent them as much as possible from interfering in their own cause, a policy the wisdom of which I shall not discuss, for in fact we have no reason to complain of a system which has been so eminently successful in accomplishing the objects of the war. The efforts making in Germany are almost incredible; the contingent forces already armed and equipped amount to 110,000 men, and the reserves are organizing with all possible energy; in fact, there will be no want of physical force to obtain everything the most sanguine mind can wish for; and were I in the least inclined to doubt the moral energy of those who have the direction of the coalition, I should still rely with confidence on the extraordinary obstinacy of the man who justly (although in a different acceptation from mine) styled himself 'l'homme du destin,' an obstinacy to which the Continent is more indebted for its deliverance than to the wisdom of any statesman or the talents of any General.

"I am happy to inform you that any bad effects which might be expected to result in Brabant or on the left bank of the Rhine from the last declaration of the Allies are likely to be counteracted by an order of the day, addressed by Prince Schwarzenberg to the army on the 18th inst., which is in substance 'that the Emperor Napoleon having rejected the liberal terms of pacification offered to him, the Allies had determined to enter France in order to obtain by arms that peace which is the object of all their efforts.' I have not seen the order in question, nor do any correspondents speak of it; but as it has been published in several German papers, I do not entertain a doubt of its authenticity; and I confess I received the account of it with great pleasure, for I am not in the least apprehensive of the Allies being too much elated by those successes which I think they will obtain, and I should have considered a peace made on the Rhine as being little less dangerous to the future tranquillity of Europe than that which Buonaparte might have made after the battle of Bautzen: besides, I am a decided enemy of what it has been the fashion for some years to call 'natural frontiers,' as I am convinced that so long as Savoy and the left bank of the Rhine belong to the French Empire, Italy and Germany will be subject to a preponderating French influence, and the repose and independence of Europe will in consequence be continually in danger."

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 11th Jan., 1814.

I now enclose to you my despatches to Lord Castlereagh under a flying seal, with the comments referred to in my despatch, No. 1, of the 6th. The Regency are to send off their despatches announcing this event to the different Courts to-morrow night, and they beg that the packet may be detained for them; and I should wish mine to be sent by the same packet, unless you think them of sufficient importance to be sent by a ship of war, without waiting for the packet, supposing you to have one at your disposal.

The post from Pasages is come in, and I have not received a line from England relative to preliminaries of peace having been agreed upon.

You will perceive that I have followed your advice with regard to avoiding as much as possible any interference in the formation of a new government.

I am very sorry for the mistake respecting the money for the fourth army. As soon as I received your letter of the 19th, which followed me from Cadiz to Madrid, I wrote to Sir James Duff, begging that he would forward to Lisbon without delay 100,000 dollars for the fourth army.

I also forgot to mention that, in consequence of the impossibility of procuring a sufficient number of baggage carts for the conveyance of my baggage to Madrid, consisting of plate, &c., I applied to Colonel Capel to assist me with some artillery waggons, and he allowed me to have three, which I expect here immediately. Colonel Capel has desired that they may remain here until you shall say whether they are to proceed to the army or to return to Cadiz.

General Campbell wrote to me when I first came to Spain, saying that he had received orders from Lord Liverpool, who was then War Minister, on no account to evacuate Ceuta without orders from home; but I cannot think that we should be justified in keeping a garrison there if the Spanish government were to desire us to evacuate it.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.**

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 12th Jan., 1814.

Colonel Bunbury will have the honour of delivering this letter to your Lordship.

He is fully instructed on the following points:

1st. The extent of the reinforcements which you may expect from this country.

2nd. The amount of the money which we shall be able to furnish you, particularly in the course of the two ensuing months.

3rd. The provisions which may be sent from hence for your army, including any additional force you may have drawn from Spain.

4th. The state of the transport service on the coast of Spain.

5th. The nature and extent of co-operation which you may expect from the King.

All these subjects lead to so much detail that they cannot be satisfactorily explained but by a personal intercourse, and you will, I am sure, find Colonel Bunbury very deserving of your Lordship's confidence.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

* See Memorandum for Colonel Bunbury in *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 492, dated 1st Feb., 1814.

Louis (afterwards Louis XVIII.) to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Hartwell, Comté de Buckingham, le 13 Janvier, 1814.

Les événements, Mylord, se montrant de plus en plus favorables au dessein que vous avez eu le noble désir de seconder, je me hâte de vous envoyer mon neveu, le Duc d'Angoulême, qui, partant sous un nom supposé, ne sera qu'un volontaire dans l'armée du Marquis de Wellington, mais, en Béarn, et pour la France, le petit-fils de Henri IV. C'est là que, réveillant chez les Français d'ineffaçables souvenirs, sa présence peut réunir leurs efforts à ceux du vainqueur généreux dont la première pensée a été d'épargner leur malheur, la seconde de travailler à leur délivrance. Les sentimens que vous m'avez témoignés ainsi qu'à ma famille, en chargeant le Duc de Guiche de nous porter les invitations de mes sujets fidèles, me sont un sûr garant de l'appui que mon neveu recevra de vous. Guidé par le devoir, autorisé par la liberté dont les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique n'ont pas voulu le priver, lorsqu'ils lui ont refusé, ainsi qu'à son frère, des facilités demandées, *après avoir préalablement intimé l'intention dans laquelle cette demande étoit faite*, le Duc d'Angoulême s'embarque sans la participation du gouvernement, et ne songe qu'à donner, pour chef, à des Français opprimés, un Français, un Bourbon, armé contre l'oppresseur de sa patrie.

En mettant sous la sauvegarde de la gloire les intérêts de la justice et du malheur, il est superflu, Mylord, de vous renouveler l'assurance de mon estime, de ma confiance, et de mon admiration pour le libérateur de l'Espagne.

LOUIS.

To Lord Burghersh. [727.]

MY DEAR BURGHERSH, St. Jean de Luz, 14th Jan., 1814.

I have received your several letters to the 17th December,* and I am very much obliged to you for the interesting details which they contain.

You will have seen the official accounts of our proceedings; and the ministers will most probably have made you and Lord Aberdeen acquainted with the state of affairs here, as detailed to them in my reports.

I was obliged to put the Spanish army into cantonments as soon as I passed the Nivelle. It would have been useless to attempt to keep them in the state in which they were, and I should have lost them all. This circumstance, but more particularly the state of the roads from the constant bad weather, has cramped my operations since; but I hope that I shall soon be able to renew them in style. In the mean time Soult has

* See pp. 408, 442, 447, 452.

received another large reinforcement, being the third since the battle of Vitoria.

We have found the French people exactly what we might expect (not from the lying accounts in the French newspapers, copied into all the others of the world, and believed by everybody, notwithstanding the internal sense of every man of their falsehood, but) from what we knew of the government of Napoleon, and the oppression of all descriptions under which his subjects have laboured. It is not easy to describe the detestation of this man. What do you think of the French people running into our posts for protection from the French troops, with their bundles on their heads, and their *beds*, as you recollect to have seen the people of Portugal and Spain?

I entertain no doubt that, if the war should continue, and it should suit the policy of the Allied Powers to declare for the House of Bourbon, the whole of France will rise as one man in their favour, with the exception, possibly, of some of the préfets, and of the Senate, and that they will be replaced on the throne with the utmost ease. I think it probable that the Allies will at last be obliged to take this line, as you will see the trick that Bony has endeavoured to play by his treaty with King Ferdinand.

If Priscilla is with you, give my best love to her. I received her letter from Berlin; and I have sat to Mr. Heaphey for a picture for her, which I suppose will be sent to her, unless one of her sisters or her mother should seize it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[728.] G. O. St. Jean de Luz, 14th Jan., 1814.

7. The Commander of the Forces is apprehensive, from the complaints which he has received of damage done in the cantonments occupied by some of the troops, that the General Orders of the 18th December last, Nos. 2, 3, and 4, have not been attended to.

8. He particularly requests the attention of the General officers to those orders, and he begs them to ride through the cantonments occupied by their several brigades, and to inquire

from the inhabitants whether there are any complaints, and of whom, and at what time they occurred, in order that justice may be done them.

WELLINGTON.

Lord W. C. Bentinck to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Palermo, 14th Jan., 1814.

Austria has concluded a separate treaty with Murat, of which I send you a copy. It is on its way for the ratification of the Emperor. There are five secret articles. The 1st and 2nd are very strongly expressed, and undertake, on the part of Austria, to obtain from the Allied powers, particularly Sicily and Great Britain, an acknowledgment of Murat as King of Naples. The 2nd more than implies a threat of hostility against Sicily in case of a refusal. The 3rd is inserted at the end of the treaty. The 4th contains a mutual guarantee of all future possessions; and the 5th pledges to Naples a better military frontier at the close of the war.

I have this information from Mr. Graham, my private secretary, whom I sent to Naples in consequence of a communication made to me by Murat that the Allies were about to treat with him, and that he was desirous of an armistice with me. I availed myself of this pretext to obtain a quick passage for Graham through Naples to the head-quarters of the Allies, in order to let Lord Aberdeen know the exact state of the Neapolitan army and territories. He met Count Neuperg, the Austrian negotiator, at Naples. The Count was very anxious to engage him in it, and showed him his instructions, and subsequently the treaty, in the hope of my making an armistice with Murat, without which he said he could not leave his kingdom. I answered that I had no instructions from home, nor any communication from Lord Aberdeen authorizing me to take this step. The Austrian was very urgent. He said Bellegarde could only just maintain himself in Italy, and that any reinforcement to the Viceroy would oblige him to retreat. I suspect the treaty to have been made without the knowledge of the Allies. Count Neuperg, who came direct from head-quarters, must otherwise have brought me some intimation from Lord Aberdeen of an event in which, politically and militarily, I am so much concerned. The treaty is, in my mind, a very improvident one, and I expected no other from Neuperg. Murat should have been kept within his territories. As it is, he will have all the floating Italian force in Italy with him. The Italians hate both, but they will prefer him to Austria; and if Austria does not look sharp, instead of their ally, he will be their rival and master, and always ready to take part with the strongest.

I remain, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Frankfort, 15th Jan., 1814.

Having missed one or two couriers by changing my route, I am not sufficiently informed to write upon business. I could add nothing to your stock of knowledge, and my reasoning could only be the speculations of a traveller. A long passage and bad roads, cut up by artillery and frozen in masses, have encroached much upon my time; but I hope no prejudice will result therefrom, as the armies *are moving*, as well as events. I cannot reproach myself for indolence, as we only rested *one* night in our way here of the six which our journey by Munster and Cassel required. I am not sure whether the Prussian commandant at Arnheim did not give us unnecessarily a détour of 50 miles. I set out early to-morrow, and hope to reach Basle the third day.

I send these few lines by R. Gordon, who is returning to the Hague, merely to tell you that we are advancing towards our destination.

I am, dear Liverpool, ever sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Ustaritz, 16th Jan., 1814, 1 P.M.

I have just received the annexed note from Sir Henry Clinton. I am not sure, from the expressions, if the work begun by the enemy is on the heights on his own side of the Nive or rivulet that runs into it, or on the flat ground on our side of the two, and where he has established his piquet. However, he has no right to establish new posts beyond the decided marked limits, and particularly those that have been until now acquiesced in by both sides, and still less ought we to permit it where it would be inconvenient to us. I have therefore authorized Sir H. Clinton to dispossess him. Besides, if he established himself so as to be able to hold the ground between the rivulet and Nive, he might make a powerful diversion from it, in case of an attack on the front of the position, between the Adour and Nive, and he would oblige us under such position to keep, in case of attack, more troops on the Villefranque ridge. I send this by an opportunity which has just presented itself. As Sir Henry Clinton will not do anything till night, if you desire he should remain quiet, there will be time to stop him.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

MY DEAR MARSHAL, Villefranque, 15th Jan., 1814.

I mentioned to you some days ago that the enemy had passed a few troops across the Nive, at the houses below the Palace, and that he had established a

[*See p.* 515.] piquet

Brigading of the Army in the Peninsula.

Adjutant-General's Office, St. Jean de Luz, 16th Jan., 1814.

General Officers Commanding Divisions.	General Officers Commanding Brigades.	Regiments.	Effective Rank and File.	Sick Absent of the Division.	Total Strength of the Divisions.
Cavalry.					
	Major-Gen. O'Loghlin	1st Life Guards	217		
		2nd do.	260		
		Roy. Horse Gds., Blue	277		
	Major-Gen. the Hon. W. Ponsonby	5th Dragoon Guards	336		
		3rd Dragoons	358		
		4th do.	386		
	Major-Gen. Vandeleur	12th Light Dragoons	387		
		16th do. do.	415		
		13th do. do.	348		
	Major-Gen. Fane	14th do. do.	417		
		18th Hussars	427		
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Stapleton Cotton	Colonel Vivian	1st do. K.G.L.	426	292	10,179
		1st Dragoons, do.	339		
		2nd do. do.	332		
		3rd Dragoon Guards	350		
		1st Royal Dragoons	359		
	Major-Gen. Lord E. Somerset	7th Hussars	513		
		10th Royal Hussars	459		
		15th Hussars	466		
	Viscount Barbacena	1st Portuguese Cav.	255		
		6th do. do.	268		
		11th do. do.	172		
		12th do. do.	199		
	Col. Campbell	4th do. do.	264		
Infantry.					
		1st Guards, 1st Bat.	785		
		1st do. 3rd do.	776		
	Major-Gen. the Hon. E. Stopford	Cold. Gds., 1st do.	767		
		3rd do. 1st do.	864		
1st Division Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope, K.B., and Major-Gen. Howard		1 Co. 60th Foot, 5th do.	50	511	7401
	Major-Gen. Hinuber	1st Line Bat., K.G.L.	574		
		2nd do. do.	532		
		5th do. do.	482		
		1st Light Bat., do.	568		
		2nd do. do.	585		
	Major-Gen. Lord Aylmer	62nd Foot, 1st Bat.	427		
		76th do.	546	228	2349
		77th do.	170		
		85th do.	430		
	Major-Gen. Barnes	50th Foot, 1st Bat.	345		
		71st do. 1st do.	498		
		92nd do. 1st do.	391		
		1 Co. 60th Foot, 5th do.	49		
	Major-Gen. Byng	3rd Foot, 1st Bat.	530		
		57th do. 1st do.	438		
		31st 1st P. 2nd Bat.	271		
2nd Division Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill, K.B., and Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir William Stewart, K.B.		66th Bn. 1st do.	278	2670	10,629
		1 Co. 60th Foot, 5th do.	45		
	Major-Gen. Pringle	28th Foot, 1st Bat.	485		
		34th do. 2nd do.	410		
		39th do. 1st do.	565		
		1 Co. 60th Foot, 5th do.	47		
	Col. Harding	6th Line, Portuguese	715		
		18th do. do.	901		
		6th Caçadores	302		
Unattached Portuguese Division Major-Gen. Le Cor	Brig.-Gen. Da Costa	2nd Line, Portuguese	971		
		14th do. do.	831		
	Brig.-Gen. Buchan	4th do. do.	888	851	5019
		10th do. do.	909		
		10th Caçadores	172		
3rd Division Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Picton, K.B.	Major-Gen. Brisbane	45th Foot, 1st Bat.	496		
		74th do.	438		
		88th do. 1st Bat.	738		
		4 Cos. 60th Foot, 5th do.	197		
		5th Foot, 1st Bat.	640		
		83rd do. 2nd do.	371	1740	7797
		87th do. 2nd do.	305		
		94th do.	350		
	Major-Gen. Power	9th Line, Portuguese	783		
		21st do. do.	784		
		11th Caçadores	215		

BRIGADING OF THE ARMY—*continued.*

General Officers Commanding Divisions.	General Officers Commanding Brigades.	Regiments.	Effective Rank and File.	Sick Absent of the Division.	Total Strength of the Divisions.
Infantry.					
4th Division . . . Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. Sir G. L. Cole, K.B.	Major-Gen. Anson .	27th Foot, 3rd Bat.	564	2314	8434
		40th do. 1st do.	468		
		48th do. 1st do.	413		
		2nd do. } 2nd P. Bn.,	276		
		53rd do. } 2nd Bat.	204		
		1 Co. 60th Foot, 5th do.	45		
	Major-Gen. Ross' .	7th Foot, 1st Bat.	604		
		20th do.	395		
		23rd do. 1st Bat.	420		
		1 Co. Brunswick Oels	42		
	Col. Vasconcellos .	11th Line, Portuguese	794		
		23rd do. do.	899		
		7th Caçadores . . .	265		
5th Division . . . Major-Gen. the Hon. Charles Colville .	Major-Gen. Hay .	1st Foot, 3rd Bat.	320	2627	7515
		9th do. 1st do.	482		
		38th do. 1st do.	364		
		47th do. 2nd do.	256		
		1 Co. Brunswick Oels	25		
	Major-Gen. Robinson	4th Foot, 1st Bat.	344		
		59th do. 2nd do.	268		
		84th do. 2nd do.	294		
		1 Co. Brunswick Oels	20		
	Col. De Regoa . .	3rd Line, Portuguese	608		
		15th do. do.	427		
		8th Caçadores . . .	189		
6th Division . . . Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Clinton, K.B.	Major-Gen. Pack .	42nd Foot, 1st Bat.	669	1590	7687
		79th do. 1st do.	594		
		91st do. 1st do.	458		
		1 Co. 60th Foot, 5th do.	37		
	Major-Gen. Lambert	11th Foot, 1st Bat.	477		
		32nd do. 1st do.	464		
		36th do. 1st do.	365		
		61st do. 1st do.	438		
	Col. Douglas . . .	8th Line, Portuguese	724		
		12th do. do.	820		
		9th Caçadores . . .	231		
7th Division . . . Major-Gen. Walker	. .	6th Foot, 1st Bat.	709	1707	7756
		24th do. } 3rd P. Bn.,	271		
		58th do. } 2nd Bat.	184		
		9 Co. Brunswick Oels	259		
	Major-Gen. Inglis .	51st Foot	268		
		68th do. . . .	238		
		82nd do., 1st Bat.	489		
		Chass. Britanniques .	288		
	Col. Doyle . . .	7th Line, Portuguese	684		
		19th do. do.	854		
		2nd Caçadores . .	374		
Light Division . . . Major-Gen. C. Alten	Major-Gen. Kempt .	43rd Foot, 1st Bat.	724	1144	5827
		95th do. 1st do.	422		
		95th do. 3rd do.	365		
	. . .	52nd do. 1st do.	714		
		95th do. 2nd do.	350		
		17th Line, Portuguese	611		
	. .	1st Caçadores . . .	421		
		3rd do. . . .	318		
Unattached . . .	Major-Gen. Bradford	13th Line, Portuguese	547	696	2395
		24th do. do.	609		
		5th Caçadores . . .	293		
	Brig.-Gen. Campbell	1st Line, Portuguese	563	363	2295
		16th do. do.	676		
		4th Caçadores . . .	322		
	Lieut.-Col. Dundas .	Royal Staff Corps. .	154		
	Capt. Gibson . . .	13th Roy. Vet. Bat. .	871		

piquet in the meadow, in front of those houses; in the course of last night he began to throw up a work opposite to General Lambert's left advanced piquet; his establishing himself at those points, so as to command a secure communication across the Nive, upon our side of the rivulet which runs in front of General Lambert's woody ground, would be inconvenient.

His only present communication with the opposite side of the Nive is by one, or at most by two boats: it would not therefore be difficult to make prisoners the party which he has upon this side, and I think this service might be performed without loss, from the facility of effecting a surprise. I should not propose to establish a post at those houses, but merely to patrol there at night to prevent the enemy from returning there. A man belonging to this commune, who made his escape from the enemy last night, represents the troops upon this side of Bayonne to be very ill off for provisions. He says that in many instances the conscription has been successfully resisted in the Département des Landes; that at one place the Sous-Préfet had been beaten, and several of the gendarmes killed.

Believe me, my dear Marshal, faithfully yours,

W. H. CLINTON.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Ustaritz, 17th Jan., 1814, 5 P.M.

I enclose you another report from Sir Henry Clinton, by which you will see the enemy has re-occupied the post. I have not thought it prudent to make another attempt to-night, as he would undoubtedly be prepared, and as I find it is not on the hither side of the water that he is working, having merely a piquet there. To attempt to drive him out with guns I am not sure we should succeed in against a few men, and it is as well to be assured of it before undertaking it, and I shall go over to-morrow. I also would not undertake it with guns without informing you, as it might bring on a general annoyance along the front of the advanced posts, though I can scarcely think they would begin that. I have sent over the officers taken, and the sea officer is of St. Jean de Luz, who, I understand, has had the pleasure of being nine times a prisoner to the English.

Believe me yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

MY DEAR MARSHAL, Villefranque, 17th Jan., 1814.

I did not think it advisable, as I mentioned to you in my note of yesterday, to leave any post at the houses after taking the enemy's piquet; and the boats having been in the middle of the river, the enemy has this morning sent a piquet across. I therefore sent to the General commanding the enemy's posts, to say that, considering the river as the natural boundary between our posts, I had directed his piquet to be dislodged; and trusting to his seeing the case in the same point of view, I had abstained from destroying the houses, or taking any steps for preventing him from establishing himself there. The General has answered that he cannot acknowledge such a boundary, nor admit of any

neutral ground; that he has replaced the post, and cannot consent to withdraw it unless by force. I had ordered a couple of guns to be in readiness in case he should have come over in any force to drive him back, but his numbers are so small that I question if our fire would have any effect.

The ground around the houses can, in a high tide, I find from the captain of the gun-boat, be inundated: we could not therefore maintain ourselves on the bank if we were again to drive them away. Objectionable as I consider it to be to allow the enemy to establish himself at these houses, they are so completely under his guns that while they exist I think we cannot prevent his occupying them. The weather is so unfavourable that we have not been able to throw up a breast-work for the guns, which shall be done as early as possible, in case we should have occasion to use them; but I shall not have recourse to the measure of attempting to destroy the houses without your orders.

Believe me, my dear Marshal, faithfully yours,

W. H. CLINTON.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Ustaritz, 17th Jan., 1814.

I enclose you Sir Henry Clinton's report of his attempt last night, which I am glad has so well succeeded.

The prisoners, except two officers, one of the marine, the other of the 59th regiment, are already sent to St. Jean de Luz, and the officers I will send to-morrow. They give no information, and appear to know nothing.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

MY DEAR MARSHAL, Villefranque, 17th Jan., 1814.

I took advantage of last night being dark and stormy to attempt to surprise the post which the enemy had established at the houses upon the right of the Nive, and I have the pleasure to say that the enterprise had complete success. Small parties lined the bank of the river to prevent the enemy from crossing to support the piquet. To the challenge of the advanced party the leading man answered "Deserter;" and before he could be discovered, the advanced party rushed on and made prisoners, after a very slight resistance, all who were in the house. A detached piquet consisting of a corporal and 6 men effected their escape; the rest, consisting of an officer and 26 non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, were taken; the commander of a gun-boat was also in the house and is among the prisoners.

The manner in which this delicate enterprise was executed reflects honour upon the whole of the party. Not a shot was fired, nor had we a man wounded. I really think Captain Goraley of the 11th regiment, who commanded the party, deserving of being recommended to the notice of the Commander of the Forces, for the address and resolution which he evinced in the performance of this service; and I should wish to mention that Captain Goraley

makes a favourable report of the handsome conduct of Lieutenants Moore and Danchley of the 11th regiment, who were the other officers employed. The party consisted of the grenadiers of the 11th regiment increased to 100 men. The prisoners will proceed to St. Jean de Luz. The officers I send to you in case you should wish to ask them any questions.

Believe me, my dear Marshal, faithfully yours,

W. H. CLINTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

Bruchsall, 15 German miles from Frankfort,
17th Jan., 2 A.M., 1814.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

I have stopped to read Munroe's despatches, and lose no time in sending him on. I left Frankfort yesterday at 10 A.M., and have made about 70 English miles in the 16 hours. I do not wish to waste any time in comments on what I forward; by travelling all night I hope to get to Friedberg, 44 German miles from Frankfort, or 210 English, in the course of to-morrow night, or rather morning, and to reach Basle, about 40 English miles further, in the night of the 18th. I am anxious to lose no time, as they all impatiently await my arrival.

Aberdeen, in a private letter, says that Nugent has had a brilliant affair at Forlì, and is advancing towards Bologna. Murat expected at Rimini on the 1st: he has given orders to his troops to act in a friendly manner towards the Austrians and the English whenever they meet them. Neuperg had arrived at Rimini, but nothing had yet been received from him. An insurrection is in full activity in the mountains of Tuscany, which co-operates with Nugent. Bellegarde was to receive his reinforcements the 7th, and more immediately.

Dantzig capitulates; garrison prisoners. This in a private letter from Cathcart.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 17th Jan., 1814.

I enclose you a despatch which I shall be obliged to you to forward to England with yours. I suppose that this is some new trick of Buonaparte's. I will write to you as soon as I am informed of the object of Palafox's mission.

The Cortes met on the 15th. The Serviles have very much the upper hand in point of numbers, and they have elected a President and Vice-President from among themselves, but they do not know how to manage the galleries. This is all I can say at present for fear of my letter being opened. I have no farther information to give you relative to the reported change.

The Minister of War has been removed, and General Moreno is appointed to take charge of the Department for the present. The Regency have promoted General O'Donoju to the rank of Lieutenant-General.

I shall send you a courier if anything occurs of importance.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

[729.] G. O. St. Jean de Luz, 18th Jan., 1814.

1. * * * * * * *

The Court does, therefore, sentence the prisoner, Lieutenant ——, of the — regiment, *to be reprimanded*, in such manner as his Excellency the Commander of the Forces may be pleased to direct.

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The Commander of the Forces is much concerned that so much of the time of the officers of the General Court Martial should have been taken up in the investigation, and his own in the perusal of the evidence on the investigation, of charges so futile as those given in by Mr. —— against Lieutenant ——, and which had the good of the service so little for their object.

3. Lieutenant ——'s conduct was no doubt highly reprehensible, and it does appear extraordinary to the Commander of the Forces that, under circumstances in which there was so little room for choice of quarters as there appears to have been at Ahetze, any dispute should have existed, and any officer should have exposed his conduct to censure as Lieutenant —— did. The Commander of the Forces, however, concurs with the General Court Martial, that the offer to make any apology required ought to have satisfied Mr. ——; and so little does he think the subject deserving the attention and time which it has occupied, that if the Commander of the Forces had known that Mr. —— had offered to make an apology for his conduct, he would not have allowed him to be brought to trial.

4. Lieutenant —— is hereby reprimanded, and is to be released from his arrest.

5. The Commander of the Forces has observed in the perusal of the proceedings of the General Court Martial, that Mr. —— has been engaged in retail trade since he has been the Paymaster of the — regiment, which circumstance he will make

known to the Secretary at War; and in the mean time, as this conduct is contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the King's regulations, the Commander of the Forces requests the Commanding officers of regiments will take measures to prevent the Paymasters from trading in any manner whatever.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 18th Jan., 1814.

You will receive by this packet an instruction from me, which I think will put you more at liberty as to the receiving the French Princes, should they arrive, and be favourably received by a considerable body of the people.

Monsieur proposes to go to Switzerland, to put himself in communication with the Allies.

Messieurs de Pradel and de Luckerque are going to Pasages. I have reason to suspect that one of them is Monsieur de Berry.

It was this circumstance which induced me to bring the question again before the Cabinet to-day.

The rapid advance of the Allies, and the representations we have within this week received of the disposition in France becoming generally more favourable for the Bourbons, make me imagine that things must come to a crisis soon, and I was unwilling that you should feel your discretion embarrassed by my former instruction on this delicate point.

Monsieur is authorised by Louis XVIII. to declare to the Allies that he is ready to sign a peace on the basis of France before the Revolution as to territory.

I am, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 18th Jan., 1814.

The accounts which have been recently received from various quarters of France represent the disposition of that people strongly to incline to the re-establishment of the House of Bourbon.

Should this spirit be manifested in an unequivocal manner, your Lordship will consider those districts of France which shall have so declared themselves as being entitled to your Lordship's protection.

If any of the Princes of the House of Bourbon shall land, and be acknowledged by the people of France, or by any considerable portion of that people, your Lordship will, in that case, not decline receiving them at your head-quarters; and you will avail yourself of the advantages which such hostility manifested against the common enemy cannot fail to give to your operations in the field.

Your Lordship will, however, always take care that it be distinctly understood by such of the French Princes as may come to your head-quarters, that by receiving them and availing yourself of the advantages which a demonstration in their favour may afford to your operations, you do not thereby contract any engagement whatever on the part of this country to support their interests in any negotiation which may now, or hereafter, be carried on with the government of France for the restoration of peace.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Villafranca, 18th Jan., 1814.

In acknowledging the receipt of the letter your Lordship has done me the honour to write to me, in reply to that with which I troubled you relative to myself on the 19th ultimo, I find myself at a loss to express the gratification I feel at the manner in which your Lordship has been pleased to communicate your sentiments on this occasion.

To every military man such a testimony of approbation of his conduct must be most flattering and encouraging, and such, I can assure your Lordship, has been the effect produced in my mind. In reference to the subject of my former letter, I now beg to say that, if there be inconvenience in relieving me in the command I have at present the honour to hold, and that your Lordship shall continue to entertain the same favourable opinion of my services as you have been lately pleased to express, I am perfectly ready to use my best endeavours to carry on the duty to your satisfaction; although it becomes me again to submit to your Lordship that I am subject to occasional attacks of illness, which, for the time, render me incapable of any exertion; and that, moreover, I cannot but express my sincere wish for my country's, as well as for my own sake, that the command of this army were placed in more able hands than mine.

I cannot conclude this letter without requesting to be permitted to repeat to your Lordship the sense I have of the value of the favourable expressions you have made use of respecting my conduct in this command; and with unfeigned truth I beg to assure you that it will be my earnest wish and endeavour, so long as I may have the honour to serve under you, to merit your good opinion and approbation.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,

W. H. CLINTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Villafranca, 18th Jan., 1814.

I have to report to your Lordship the particulars and result of a movement made by a detachment of the 1st army, and a part of this, on the night of the 15th instant, and the following morning, against the posts of the enemy at the villages of St. Vicens and Molins del Rey, on the Llobregat, which, although not attended with the success that might have been reasonably looked for, has not been marked by any disgrace.

Having reason to suppose that the enemy had considerably diminished his force in the plain and vicinity of Barcelona, I had early in this month proposed to General Copons that if he could take up a position on the enemy's line of communication between Barcelona and Gerona, so as to keep in check the force Marshal Suchet might have at Gerona and in the Ampurdan, I would move with the whole of my force into the plain of Barcelona, and would endeavour to drive the remainder of the enemy's force into Barcelona and the adjoining works. To this General Copons had replied that he could not undertake with the force he had to curb so considerable a body of troops as Marshal Suchet still had on the line I wished the 1st army to act, and that in his opinion the only operation that could be attempted was the surprise of some of the enemy's posts on the Llobregat, by a conjunct movement of detachments of both armies.

With a view to concert such a plan the General sent Colonel Manso to me on the 11th instant, when, on talking over the subject with him, the idea of a *surprise* seemed to me to be out of the question, as the corps proposed to come from the position occupied by the 1st army could not possibly have arrived at the early hour proposed; but as all reports agreed that the enemy could not have more than from 3000 to 4000 men at the points in question, a *coup-de-main* might be attempted; and there appearing to be but little risk in making such an attempt, while considerable benefit might arise from its possible success, I determined to adopt the plan, and it was accordingly settled that on the 16th instant, at 8 A.M. precisely, two brigades of the 1st army were to be on the commanding ground in the rear of Molins del Rey, while the troops from hence, supported by a brigade of British, were to be formed on the main road to Barcelona, about a cannon shot from the bridge of Molins del Rey. The weather and every circumstance favoured us, and the troops from this side were assembled at the place and time as agreed. Finding, however, on our arrival, that the detachment of the 1st army did not make its appearance, I availed myself of the enemy being evidently ignorant of our force and intentions, and of his making a disposition to attack us, and to drive us from a hill on our right, to draw him on, and to endeavour to keep him in play, while the other corps should reach its point; and when finally obliged to bring up two guns to check the advance of two the enemy had brought on the road, the fire of which I apprehended would in fact enfilade our infantry, which was obliged, from the nature of the country, to remain in columns on the main road, I still forbore from making any direct attack until I should be able to do it in communication with the column of the 1st army. At length the firing of these troops was heard, but it was not until three hours past the time agreed on

that they could reach the ground destined for them to occupy, and by that time the enemy had ascertained our force to be very much his superior, and saw he must be caught, if he persisted in remaining in Molins del Rey, &c. He therefore withdrew rapidly on the road to Barcelona, taking up a position on the strong ground in front of San Julien de Llobregat, with his right to the village of St. Just, where, in the course of the afternoon, he was joined by every man that could be collected from Barcelona.

It is to be lamented that the column of the 1st army, gallantly led by Colonel Manso, but commanded by General Copons in person, could not execute that part of the movement allotted to it. I am convinced every possible exertion was made by Colonel Manso, and that the failure is to be imputed to the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of making such a march during the night, in the time which it was deemed proper to allot for the operation. Had the troops been posted as agreed on between Colonel Manso and myself, there was, I think, no doubt but that from 1500 to 2000 men must have fallen into our hands, which I trust your Lordship will think worthy the attempt that was made.

As it happened, the business concluded with the retreat of the enemy, circumstances not admitting the combined force assembled to push on, had even the enemy not been able to assemble a force, as he appeared to be.

I transmit to your Lordship a return of the killed and wounded on this occasion. The loss sustained by the regiment of Arragon was in the attack of a strong height on our right, which it became necessary to occupy, on which the enemy had a strong piquet, and which two companies, supported by the battalion, gallantly attacked and drove off. I should imagine the loss of the enemy cannot have been well less than ours. None of the British troops, except a detachment of artillery attached to the British cavalry, under Lieutenant Patton (a very promising officer), were engaged. These acquitted themselves with their usual spirit and good conduct; and I must not omit to state to your Lordship that I had every reason to be much pleased with what I witnessed of the conduct of the Spanish troops generally. Whatever movements General Sarsfield had to make were executed with precision and judgment, and a great deal of personal bravery and enterprising spirit was evinced by many individuals during the course of the day.

If the movement here reported to your Lordship has not had a happy issue, it may at least be considered as having tended to give the Spanish troops confidence in themselves, and that they may have judged from it that with steadiness and good discipline in the day of action, they have a right to expect to see the French retire before them as they witnessed on the present occasion.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your most obedient humble servant,
W. H. CLINTON.

The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, The Hague, 18th Jan., 1814.

The Count Viel-Castel, aide-de-camp of the Crown Prince of Sweden, going through Holland on his way to your head-quarters, I make him the bearer of these lines, to assure you with how much pleasure I heard of your Lordship's last successes against Soult, and of the desertion of the Nassau battalion. I daily regret not to be any longer with you, and hope you will believe me when I say that I shall always consider the time I passed at your head-quarters as the pleasantest and most interesting period of my life. Here I am something very like a Commander in Chief; and although, as your Lordship knows, I am very unfit for such a situation, yet I am very sorry to say that we have no one else that could undertake this charge. We are forming an army of 30,000 men, besides 20,000 militia, which are selected out of the Landsturm or the levy en masse, which is composed out of all the male inhabitants of the country, from the age of 18 to 50; but everything here goes so slow that I can as yet not foresee the moment at which we will be able to bring something into the field, and particularly since everything here must be newly formed and created, not even the idea of an army having been left. In this moment I am called to my father, and therefore must finish by requesting your Lordship to believe me

Your most affectionate and obliged,

WILLIAM, Hereditary Prince of Orange.

At St. Jean de Luz, this 19th day of January, 1814. [730.]

Know all men by these presents that I, Arthur Marquess of Wellington, &c. &c., have admitted, constituted, and appointed the Rev. Samuel Briscall, M.A., Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford, and Chaplain to the Forces, my domestic chaplain, to have, hold, and enjoy all and singular the benefits, privileges, liberties, and advantages due and of right granted to the chaplains of noblemen by the laws and statutes of this realm.

Given under my hand, &c. &c.

WELLINGTON.

Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Lisbon, 19th Jan., 1814.

It was understood at the time the Portuguese troops entered Spain that bills on the Portuguese Commissary-General should be received by the authorities of that country in half payment for every article of supply, provided the remainder was given in ready money; and arrangements were

accordingly adopted for the payment of these bills in preference to all others.

It appears, however, by Marshal Sir William C. Beresford's communications, and by a correspondence which has since taken place with M. Pezuela, in Lisbon, that the Spanish government consider the appropriation of hospitals to be the only species of assistance which it is in their power to render for the use of the Portuguese troops.

As the government allege these embarrassments to be a reason for delaying the departure of 7000 or 8000 recruits, who only wait for the necessary means of transport to proceed to the army, notwithstanding my own conviction that the delay arises from causes far less justifiable, I have requested Sir Henry Wellesley to support the representations of the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires, and I further comply with their wishes by expressing the hope that such orders as your Lordship may think proper on the subject be issued to the present local authorities near the seat of war.

Ever, my dear Lord, very truly yours,

C. STUART.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 20th Jan., 1814.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches, as stated in the margin.

Your Lordship will have already been apprised that, as soon as the British government had reason to know that you intended to push on beyond the Adour, and that an increased supply of money from this country would become necessary, every exertion was made for that purpose.

Colonel Bunbury will inform your Lordship of the success of these exertions. 400,000*l.* has been embarked, and is now under sailing orders for Pasages; thereby anticipating your Lordship's desire that a large supply should come at once to your relief.

Instructions have been also given by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the ships conveying money either from Lisbon or Cadiz to your Lordship should proceed at once to the port of destination; and I have desired directions to be given to place all those ships coming either from Lisbon or Cadiz for the forces under your Lordship's command, under a similar instruction.

Your Lordship, in your despatch No. 5, appears to consider my despatch No. 207 as unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it did not convey the formal approbation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to your Proclamation No. 1.

In the first place, I have to call your Lordship's attention to the despatch to which mine was an answer. It was one which did not enclose the Proclamation in question. The despatch which enclosed the Proclamation was not received at the time I had the honour of addressing myself to your Lordship. My despatch answered the only questions which you had asked. It stated that, in my opinion, the Proclamation (which I had seen

in a newspaper) could not be construed as including the vessels in question; that if any protection were to be given to French vessels, it must be done by an Order in Council, and a distinct description given of the vessels so protected. It also informed your Lordship that Lord Keith's consent appeared to be necessary for the release of the vessels named; and that in all probability that consent would be readily given. By my note of the 1st of January I have informed your Lordship of his Lordship's compliance with your wishes.

Your Lordship's despatch No. 132, enclosing several proclamations, and this amongst the rest, was received on the 30th December.

In that despatch the only Proclamation to which you particularly directed my attention was that which opened the port of St. Jean de Luz. I hastened to communicate to you the approbation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent on that point; and your Lordship will receive by Colonel Bunbury an Order in Council furnishing you with authority on all occasions of a similar description.

As your Lordship did not apply for a formal approbation of such Proclamation, I did not think it necessary to give it, except in the case last mentioned, to which you had drawn my particular attention, and which until approved finally might be subject to dispute.

Your Lordship did indeed desire an early decision on the subjects contained in the Proclamations, and it appeared to me that I had fully complied with that desire so far as the Proclamation No. 1 was concerned, by having in my despatch No. 207 fully answered the only points on which it appeared a decision was necessary.

With respect to the remaining part of the Proclamation, it related only to the manner in which your Lordship proposed to treat the inhabitants, which did not require the express approbation of the government to enable you to act upon it; and as your Lordship was fully aware that it was in conformity with the views of government, an approbation to that effect did not appear particularly requisite, especially as it had been implied in my previous despatch, No. 207. Nevertheless, in order to give your Lordship full satisfaction on that point, I have now the honour to communicate to you His Royal Highness's approbation of your Proclamations Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Your Lordship having expressed a wish to be provided with legal opinions as to the question how far His Majesty's naval force under the command of Lord Keith was to be considered as entitled, on the plea of a conjoint expedition, to share in the proceeds of prizes made by the force under your Lordship's command, I have submitted the question for the consideration of the King's Advocate, and will lose no time in transmitting to you his opinion as soon as it is received.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 20th Jan., 1814.

I enclose for your information the despatches received this morning from the Allied head-quarters.

Your despatches No. 5 to No. 10 inclusive, and your private letter of the 10th, were last night received. I have it not now in my power to answer them, or to enter into several particulars concerning the policy of a peace with Buonaparte at the present moment; and I am unwilling to lose the opportunity of the *Désiré* sailing to-morrow to communicate to you the intelligence which the enclosed copies of despatches will convey to you.

I am, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

P.S.—Your despatches Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 have not yet arrived.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Freibourg, 9th Jan., 1814.

It would be very needless and presuming in me on my return to these head-quarters to commence a detail of those operations which have occurred since the Allied armies have been again in motion, which detail I am persuaded your Lordship has already received in the most able and satisfactory manner. I shall confine myself therefore to a very hasty outline of the actual position of the combined armies, and shall venture to add the few observations which it occurs to my humble judgment to advance.

The head-quarters of Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg were at Montbelliard on the 7th. Count Bubna was at Dôle on the same day. The other Austrian corps between Dôle and Montbelliard, in the valley of the Daube, detachments occupying Vesoul, Epinal, &c. In the former place 200 prisoners were taken. Detachments are also in possession of the valley of Martigny, and parties occupying Simplon and St. Bernard. The 1st division of the Austrian army is at Ancy; the 2nd at Montarlot, near Besançon; the 3rd at Villersefel; the division Greenfeld at Mollans; the division Bianchi at Béfort. Two divisions of Austrian Grenadiers and two of Cuirassiers are in march for Besançon. The 4th division is at St. Umler. The 5th, composed of the Bavarians, forms the blockade of Huningen and Breisach, and extends to Scheldstadt.

Count Wittgenstein, before Kohl, occupies also Fort Louis, pushing his parties very far advanced on the other side of the Rhine, in the direction of Nancy. The Russian Grenadiers are in march to relieve Bianchi's division in the blockade of Béfort, and the latter will be enabled to move forward.

The Russian and Prussian Guards and reserves are still at Altkirch and Lorrach, but will immediately move on.

The main body of the Cossacks, under their conspicuous leaders, were on the 7th as far as Corimort and Saussure. Parties were beyond Vesoul and Langres, and they may already be said to be threatening the "good city of Napoleon."

The movements of Field Marshal Blücher's army are detailed in the official bulletin I have the honour to enclose, as also in my short despatch No. 5 from

Frankfort. The Marshal has since moved forward, and no army will outstrip that of Silesia in exertion. I look every moment for the most interesting intelligence from this quarter. The enemy, under Marshal Marmont, had already been fallen in with. This force is estimated at between 16,000 and 17,000 men. We occupied Kaiserslautern, which is the Nollendorff Pass (as it were) of the country. The environs are so intricate and mountainous that every step he takes, posted as the Silesian army will soon be, his situation becomes more precarious. General d'Yorck was on the 5th at Kussel, General Zachen between Franckenstein and Neustadt, and General St. Priest at Coblentz. By the advanced position of General d'Yorck on Marshal Marmont's flank, and by the march of the corps moving up in all directions, it would almost appear that if he delays much longer at Kaiserslautern, Marshal Blücher will give a good account of him.

The auspicious era that every day is opening to our view, the march of events as rapid as glorious, the success that under Divine Providence seems to attend the most trifling movement, military or political, render all remarks but those of admiration superfluous.

The project of the campaign hitherto seems to be producing the most brilliant consequences its projectors could have imagined. Buonaparte, for some time collected at Metz, by the march of General Bülow towards Holland thought the Allies were carrying all their forces there, and rapidly sent his Guards towards Breda on the 18th ultimo, when Prince Schwarzenberg crossed the Upper Rhine on the 21st. The enemy's troops were as rapidly countermanded; and thrown into uncertainty as to the plans of the combined armies, Buonaparte seems to have separated the remnants of his broken forces, and we now find them dispersed in corps, but have not yet discovered that mass (and it must be a large one) which can arrest in any manner the glorious career of the conquerors.

The importance of the possession of Huningen would be great, but I fear it will not be easily taken. From what I have lately learnt, the capture of Béfort would, however, be greater. From this base the grand army might be immediately at Paris, with perfect security against any possible event.

The march of the different columns all bearing to the central point where any force may be collected, without unnecessarily risking any corps, with a due regard to communications and the main points of appui, will be the system on which we shall act.

I predicted to your Lordship after the battle of Leipsic that Europe approached her deliverance. I feel perfect confidence that I shall soon have to announce that she is freed.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

II.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Freyburg, 9th Jan., 1814.

I have the honour of enclosing for your Lordship's information the copy of a letter from the Duke of Vicence to Prince Metternich, with the Prince's answer. I am the more anxious to draw your Lordship's attention to the answer, as Sir C. Stewart informs me that he transmitted a copy to your Lordship last night. This was only the project of an answer before it had been altered by me. The answer itself was not sent off until this day at two o'clock. I trust your Lordship will now find it satisfactory.

It is impossible to mistake the eagerness with which Buonaparte pursues the

object of negotiation. The motives of this conduct are not less obvious. From all the accounts which reach us from the interior of France, the public voice is so strongly pronounced in favour of peace that it would be dangerous to resist it. It appears that he has wholly failed in exciting anything like a spirit of enthusiasm among the people.

I have not given much credit to the sincerity of his overtures; but from the necessity of his actual situation, the state of the public feeling, and the deficiency of his military preparations, it is reasonable to believe that he desires peace as the only means of salvation.

Your Lordship will, I trust, so soon arrive at the head-quarters, and will so speedily learn the views and feelings of the different parties, that it may be superfluous to furnish your Lordship with any information connected with pacific overtures; at the same time I may shortly state for your Lordship's reflection what I believe to be the present intention of Prince Metternich should it meet with the approbation of your Lordship. He would propose to make the Duke of Vicenza come to some place in the neighbourhood of the head-quarters, and send the persons possessing full powers to meet him. He would then wish to come to a precise understanding relative to the French frontier. The proposition of which he would approve, and which he imagines would be accepted, is this:—To draw a line from Cologne or Coblentz through the country of Liège and Antwerp as a good military frontier for Holland; to follow the Rhine as the boundary of the French Empire to Basle, destroying the fortresses of Mentz, Breisach, and Hunningen; to restore the ancient Swiss frontier, and, continuing the line by Piedmont, to bring it to the Mediterranean in the country of Nice. As the means of greatly facilitating negotiation, he would propose to discuss nothing until the French frontier was determined, by which means the business must be brought to a speedy conclusion. I have had the honour of giving a sketch of the plan proposed: it will be for your Lordship to determine how far this may coincide with the views of the British government.

I am also prepared to state to your Lordship the outline of the future arrangement which will be submitted to your Lordship's consideration respecting the other important branches of this subject, but I think it better to abstain at the present moment, as your Lordship will soon be in a situation to embrace the whole plan of the Allies at once, and be in a condition to receive at the same time the necessary elucidations.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

III.

The Duke of Vicenza to Prince Metternich.

Lunéville, le 6 Janvier, 1814.

La lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 10 du mois dernier m'est parvenue.

L'Empereur ne veut rien préjuger sur les motifs qui ont pû faire que son adhésion pleine et entière aux bases que V.E. a proposées d'un commun accord avec les Ministres de Russie et d'Angleterre, et de l'aveu de la Prusse, ait eu besoin d'être communiqué aux Alliés avant l'ouverture du Congrès. Il est difficile de penser que Lord Aberdeen ait eu des pouvoirs pour proposer des bases sans en avoir pour négocier. Sa Majesté ne fait point aux Alliés l'injure de croire qu'ils ayent été incertains, et qu'ils délibèrent encore. Ils savent trop bien que toute offre conditionnelle devient un engagement absolu pour celui qui l'a faite dès que la condition qu'il y a mise est remplie. Dans tous

les cas nous devions nous attendre à avoir reçu le 6 Janvier la réponse que V.E. nous annoncoit le 10 Décembre. Sa correspondance et les déclarations réitérées des puissances alliées ne nous laissent point prévoir de difficultés, et les rapports de M. de Talleyrand à son retour de Suisse confirment que leurs intentions sont toujours les mêmes. D'où peuvent donc provenir les retards? S.M. n'ayant rien plus à cœur que le prompte rétablissement de la paix générale, a pensé qu'elle ne pouvoit donner une plus forte preuve de la sincérité de ses sentimens qu'en envoyant auprès des Souverains Alliés son Ministre de relations extérieurs, munis de pleins pouvoirs. Je m'empresse donc, Prince, de vous prévenir que j'attendrai à nos avant-postes les passeports nécessaires pour traverser ceux des armées alliées, et me rendre auprès de Votre Excellence.

Je la prie d'agréer les assurances de la haute considération, &c., &c.

IV.

Prince Metternich to the Duke of Vicenza.

MONSIEUR LE DUC, Fribourg, le 8 Janvier, 1814.

J'ai reçu aujourd'hui la lettre que V.E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Lunéville le 6 de ce mois.

Le retard qu'épreuve la communication que le Cabinet Français attendait en suite de mon offre du 10 Décembre résulte de la marche qui devaient tenir entre elles les puissances alliées. Les applications confidentielles avec M. le Baron de St. Aignan ayant conduit à des ouvertures officielles de la part de la France, leurs M. I. et R. ont jugé que la réponse de V.E. du 2 Décembre étoit de nature à devoir être portée à la connoissance de leurs alliés. Les suppositions que V.E. admet que ce soit Lord Aberdeen qui ait proposé des bases, et qu'il ait été muni de pleins pouvoirs à cet effet, ne sont nullement fondées.

La Cour de Londres vient de faire partir pour le Continent le Secrétaire d'Etat ayant le département des Affaires Etrangères. S.M.I. de toutes les Russies se trouvant momentanément éloignée d'ici, et le Lord Castlereagh étant attendu d'un moment à l'autre, l'Empereur, mon auguste maître, et Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse me chargent de prévenir V.E. qu'elle recevra le plutôt possible une réponse à sa proposition de se rendre au quartier-général des Souverains alliés.

Je prie V.E. d'agréer les assurances de ma haute considération.

METTERNICH.

V.

Eleventh Bulletin of the Silesian Army.

Kreutzenach, 4th Jan., 1814.

The Field Marshal had determined that the year 1814 and the new campaign should commence with the passage of the Rhine, and made the necessary dispositions for that purpose.

General St. Priest collected his troops at Ehrenbreitstein, and sent part over in the night of the 31st December, under General Bistram, to surprise the redoubts raised by the enemy opposite the river Lahm, which, after a short resistance, were taken. Upon this, General Bistram advanced to Coblentz, of which place he made himself master, taking seven pieces of cannon and 500 prisoners.

General Yorck's corps was collected at Caub. He sent infantry across in

boats, who surprised the piquets on the other side, and after a slight opposition gained possession of Bacharach and Oberwessel, on which the pontoon bridge was thrown across near Caub, at the island called Old Pfaltz. The difficulty of anchoring prevented the bridge from being practicable before the 2nd January, in the morning. General Hünerbein had meantime forced the enemy from Rheinbellen and Waldalgesheim, and entered Kreutzenach the evening of the 2nd. General Yorck followed with the whole of his corps.

The enemy's division Ricard, which occupied the Rhine from Mayence to Coblentz, attempted to defend Simmern, on the mountain Hundsruck. Colonel Count Henkel marched against it, forced the gates, and carried the place. In the skirmishes 200 prisoners were made. General Baron Sacken's troops were at Mannheim. The enemy had formed a strong, well-palisaded work, with four guns and two howitzers, opposite the mouth of the Neckar. Generals Sass and Taliesen crossed in boats, and took the works by storm. The commandant, seven officers, 300 privates, and the guns remained in the possession of these generals. In this fine attack our loss consisted in 200 killed and wounded. The enemy lost more. General Sacken marched with his corps on Frankenthal and Worms. The Prussian General, Prince Biron of Courland, was detached by him to open the communication over Alzei with the corps of Yorck and Langeron. He found the enemy in Alzei, defeated him, and took one lieutenant-colonel, five officers, and above 100 men prisoners. At the same time Major-General Karpaf had an affair of cavalry near Mutterstadt, in which he overthrew eight squadrons of the enemy's cavalry, and cut them to pieces, taking three Lieutenant-Colonels, twenty-two officers, and 198 men prisoners.

General Count Langeron on the 3rd January took Bingen, and drove the enemy to Mayence. Their loss was considerable. Lieutenant-General Olfusien was wounded by a grape-shot, but not dangerously. The enemy has thus in three days lost thirteen pieces of cannon and above 1,500 prisoners.

The Silesian army on the 4th January occupied the country between the Moselle and Mannheim. Mayence is cut off from the French Empire, and the enemy is retreating on the Saar.

The Allies are received everywhere with the greatest cordiality. The German inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine are not degenerated, in spite of nineteen years of slavery, and still show true German spirit.

The French douaniers are all fled, and the Field Marshal has, to the joy of the inhabitants, removed the prohibition of intercourse with the right bank of the Rhine.

VI.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Viscount Castlereagh.

(Extract.)

Freyburg, 6th Jan., 1814.

General Bubna has himself received orders to press forwards to Lyons without delay, where it is expected that the troops will be well received.

The General will, if possible, endeavour to put himself in communication with the Marquess of Wellington.

The main body of the Grand Army is assembling in the neighbourhood of Besançon. The advanced guard is at Remiremont, Langres, and Epinal, where no enemy has been found. Parties of Cossacks are advancing still further. Colmar is occupied. Ten thousand of the enemy who were in the place have retired towards Strasburg.

Marshal Blücher, since he crossed the Rhine, has met with no opposition, and continues his forward movement without interruption. From the last accounts from Holland it appears that a formidable force is at last collected on

that frontier, and that the picture which I had the honour of presenting to your Lordship in a former despatch seems on the point of being realized. I am still somewhat apprehensive that your Lordship may think me too sanguine; yet, sanguine as all my views have undoubtedly been of the military successes of the Allies, your Lordship will do me the justice to admit that hitherto they have been completely verified. It is a considerable time since I have had the boldness to name Paris to your Lordship as an attainable object; the course of events has only confirmed this opinion. From the present situation of affairs, taking into consideration the means we possess and the condition of the enemy, I have no hesitation in declaring that with only our usual degree of skill and prudence, and less than our usual fortune, there is no reason, military or political, why we should not be in Paris in the course of a very few weeks.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Downing Street, 21st Jan., 1814.

I had yesterday evening the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatches as per margin, No. 1 enclosing copy of some passes which your Lordship had been induced to grant for the importation of certain articles from Bordeaux, La Rochelle, and Nantes (places in France declared in a state of blockade) to St. Jean de Luz, and desiring that measures should be taken that these passes may be respected.

I will give immediate directions that vessels sailing on the faith of the validity of these passes, and conforming to the conditions therein expressed, be not interrupted by British cruisers in their progress from Bordeaux, La Rochelle, and Nantes to St. Jean de Luz.

I must, however, earnestly beg of your Lordship not to be induced to grant more licences of this description, declining to accede to all such applications according to the determination expressed in your despatch No. 132.

These passes or licences are liable to be much abused, because no vessel having one of them on board could be interrupted by our cruisers on its passage to Bayonne; and the same pass could thus be made to cover many such voyages. They are calculated to relieve the enemy from the pressure of the blockade of Bordeaux at the moment when it is desirable that the inhabitants should be made most sensible of it; as by that means they may be the more inclined to avail themselves of the advantages held out by the Order of Council of 14th January, on condition of placing themselves under your Lordship's protection.

But, above all, these licences may give occasion to our Allies to represent that while we are shutting the ports of the enemy to their trade, we are opening them for our own advantage. The Spanish government is that which will be the soonest acquainted with this proceeding, and the most ready to remonstrate if their licences or passes should not be equally respected. Against the complaints which they are now making that their vessels are captured because they are proceeding from blockaded ports, we have hitherto answered that the trade which we by blockade deny to their vessels we equally deny to our own. Your Lordship will at once see that

this plea is taken from us if a trade from blockaded ports to St. Jean de Luz be authorized by the British government and denied to that of Spain.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
BATHURST.

P.S. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has desired me to convey to you his approbation of your Proclamations Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 21st Jan., 1814.

As I understand that the *Désiré* will not sail until to-morrow, I have determined to send my despatches by her, instead of waiting for Lord Dalhousie's departure the beginning of next week.

The advance of the Allies has been so unexpectedly rapid hitherto, the opposition made to them so feeble, and the necessity for peace so urgent (apparently, at least) with Buonaparte, that it is not improbable that in six weeks from hence something decisive will be concluded. Under these circumstances, I should be unwilling to break up the army in Holland, were Antwerp even occupied, or the ships destroyed, neither of which events, however, are probable at the present moment. The interval between the breaking up that army, and the arrival at your head-quarters of such part of it as would be serviceable, would be precious time lost. At the expiration of six weeks we shall be able to judge whether the business will be immediately concluded, or be protracted for a length of time: nothing, I think, but our Allies experiencing a severe check will occasion the last. Under these circumstances it will be necessary to reinforce you by breaking up Sir Thomas Graham's army, leaving the defence of Holland to the Dutch and what number of Allied troops may then have arrived.

I confess I look with no confidence to a peace with Buonaparte on any terms; but if our Allies will make one, I think we shall do wisely by concurring in it. By the re-establishment of Holland as it was before the Revolution, the importance of Antwerp as a naval station would, I agree with you, be done away, if the free navigation of the Scheldt were to be also prohibited; but we should have as much difficulty in re-establishing that prohibition as procuring the surrender of Antwerp to the Dutch, or the giving it, together with Brabant, to any other Power not French. If, then, Antwerp, with the Scheldt free, remained at the peace a French naval station, nothing but Holland declaring war against France, whenever we were at war with France, would prevent that station being most formidable to us; and it cannot be imagined that Holland would not prefer neutrality, when the breach of it would instantly expose her to an invasion from Antwerp.

These are the reasons which make me still think that Antwerp is of vital importance to us.

Although this is represented to be a very unfavourable season for sending out reinforcements, and that it would be better to delay them, I am willing

to risk something, seeing how critical matters are becoming in France. You will, I hope, receive soon some considerable reinforcements in horses, which you will want in your advance.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

P.S. I have just heard that the last delivery of the money has been stopped at Godalming by the depth of the snow.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 21st Jan., 1814.

Adverting to the Order in Council issued on the 14th instant, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 5, authorizing your Lordship to open to the trade of all nations, not being at war with His Majesty or any of the Allied Powers, such ports as your Lordship may declare so far under the protection of His Majesty as that British subjects may freely trade thereat, it may perhaps be desirable to explain to your Lordship that the provisions of this order do neither enable you to protect any trade between any blockaded port and any port in your military occupation, or placed under your protection; nor do they authorize vessels belonging to Frenchmen to be considered as vessels in amity with His Majesty, and thereby coming within the benefit of that order.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Basle, 22nd Jan., 1814.

I have had during the last two days *several hours'* conversation with the three most leading ministers here, I mean Metternich, Stadion, and Hardenberg; but it is too soon to judge of them before I come to closer quarters with them upon the points of difficulty. I have every reason, however, so far to be satisfied, and they seem to feel my arrival as a valuable facility.

I have had a very full confidential communication with Metternich on the Bourbon question. He is highly conciliated by the line we have taken, and the forbearance with which we have used the discretion given to us by his government through Aberdeen. I am confident that I should have great additional influence over his mind on any practical question connected with this subject that may occur from the manner in which we have conducted ourselves upon it. My opinion is that if we meet this event *in our progress* as a French measure, Austria will not embarrass it from any family considerations, and the less so from the dread she feels of Bernadotte's elevation; but she will not speculate upon it, or commit

herself upon either loose or partial grounds: she will desire always to see the public act, and to frame her decision with reference to its nature and extent, and the state in which the Allied interests at the moment stand in the war. Metternich seems strongly impressed with the feeling, that to take our terms *high* against France, we must not encumber ourselves with anything that can bear the appearance of an initiative on such a question on the part of the Allies. I have always strongly felt this as applied to our own interests, and that we cannot press *our* demands to the utmost if we are at the same time *mixed* in a question which, so far as relates to the existing government of France, supersedes all terms: he also thinks, for the interest of the Bourbons themselves, that it is a question of doubtful policy, to say the least, whether they would not lose more than gain from showing themselves, in the first instance, in the camp of any of the Allied Sovereigns, and above all in the British camp. He seems to dread that great question being *ineffectually* stirred, and anxious that the Allies should not be encumbered with it, or responsible for it. In other respects I should not despair of his concurring with the other Allied Powers in turning any public effort the French nation may make in this sense to a good account; and I am sure my means of giving his mind such a direction will be in proportion to the delicacy we may observe in not precipitating any act on our part which might compromise the Allied councils prematurely on so vital a question. It is painful, and not fair, that the Bourbons should have their hands tied whilst Bernadotte's are free; but why should they not pursue their views in some quarter which does not locally and in appearance mix them with us? I shall write more precisely on this subject from head-quarters. I think it material to say thus much now, and the rather as we are endangered not a little in our internal councils by the number of great state problems that are at the same moment cast upon us.

I have not adverted to it in my general letter, but much controversy between Austria and Russia still prevails on the interior affairs of Switzerland. The Emperor, influenced by La Harpe, countenances the popular party. Austria is favourable to the ancient order of things, all happily hostile to France. Metternich has the merit of getting over the obstacle of the neutrality. It is desirable these *tracasseries* should transpire as little as possible, at least through the government in England, and especially the Emperor's *égarements* about Bernadotte, which I hope to dissipate.

Ever, my dear Liverpool, most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

P.S.—I do not conceive that our negotiations can well move with such speed as not to give sufficient time for military efforts to operate.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, Basle, 22nd Jan., 1814.

After closing my former letter I was anxious again to see Prince Metternich, in order to remove, if possible, any impression from his mind

which might check the movements of the armies, and I am happy to state that his alarms about Bernadotte are abated. The better to prepare his mind for our discussions at head-quarters, I stated to him what occurred to me on the four alternatives to be looked to as to the government of France. 1st, Buonaparte. 2nd, A French general, suppose Bernadotte. 3rd, A Regency. 4th, The Bourbons. I represented the 2nd and 3rd as both peculiarly objectionable, not stable in themselves, but likely to lead to some new change, in the mean time calculated to create disunion by appearing to throw an undue weight in the one case into the scale of Russia, in the other case of Austria, perhaps in both exciting jealousy rather than giving real power. I represented that if Austria refused to reassume the Imperial crown in order to avoid unsubstantial and odious authority, she ought doubly to deprecate a state of things in which an Austrian Regency in France would be involving her in endless jealousies and embarrassments. Prince Metternich entered fully into this reasoning, and said of the four alternatives he thought it was that which Austria should most deprecate.

With respect to the 2nd we considered it too objectionable to be very formidable; and from a note he had this day from head-quarters, he appeared relieved upon it, and hopes it is not a project which the Emperor attaches himself to with much eagerness.

I represented that the 1st and 4th alternatives had the advantage of leading to no disunion amongst ourselves. In the first case we agreed in forcing the best possible peace upon Buonaparte, and in preserving it by a defensive union when made. In the last the government of France would devolve to its ancient and legitimate Sovereigns, unconnected equally with any of the Allies, and likely to be too weak for years to molest any of them.

Prince Metternich admitted equally this view of the question, and said, if a wish could decide between these alternatives, he could not hesitate to prefer the Bourbons; but that he would not interfere to decide what belonged to France to regulate. I left the question here, having, I thought, done enough, when I brought him to admit that there were only two alternatives in fact, namely, Buonaparte or the Bourbons, and that the latter was the most desirable, if France took that tone upon it, and acted with that decision, which could alone lead to its successful accomplishment, accompanied with the good will and favourable sentiments of the nation.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

With great truth and regard, your faithful humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD, Basle, 22nd Jan., 1814.

As the shortness of my residence here enables me to speak but very generally, and liable, perhaps, to considerable misconception upon many points, I propose addressing you in an unofficial form.

Finding upon my arrival at Fribourg that the Emperor of Russia, after

delaying his departure for the army for some days in the expectation of my arrival, was upon the point of leaving Basle, I pushed on with all possible expedition, and arrived in fifty hours from Frankfort, but too late to see His Imperial Majesty. The Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia very graciously determined to await my arrival, and I had the honour of being presented to both Sovereigns. They were pleased to receive me with every mark of favour and distinction, and charged me with every assurance to the Prince Regent which could evince their attachment to His Royal Highness and the common cause.

I had received a confidential communication before I reached Basle that the Emperor of Russia desired to see me immediately on my arrival, before I had any communication with any other Court or any of his own Ministers, being desirous of personally opening to me his sentiments on the present state of affairs. I expressed by a courier that preceded me my sense of this gracious mark of confidence and favour; that my duty would be on my arrival to notify myself officially to the Ministers of the three Powers, but that I should be most anxious to receive at the very earliest moment His Imperial Majesty's sentiments from his own mouth, and should hold myself in readiness from the moment I got out of my carriage to obey any orders I might receive from His Imperial Majesty.

I found on my arrival a letter stating that the Emperor had been obliged to leave Basle to follow the movements of the army; that he was aware, under these circumstances, that I could not avoid whilst here entering upon business with the Ministers of other Powers, but that he wished the nature of the relations which had subsisted between His Imperial Majesty and the Prince Regent might be kept in view, and that I should reserve a place in my opinion for what His Imperial Majesty might have to state to me on many important topics. I took the earliest opportunity of assuring His Imperial Majesty that I should not fail to do so; and I have accordingly in the several interviews I have had with Prince Metternich, Count Stadion, and the Baron Hardenberg, desired to be understood as forming no conclusive opinion, much less declaring one, on the part of my government, till I had an opportunity of possessing myself of the views and sentiments of the respective Courts, and weighing them with due attention.

With respect to the spirit which animates the Allies, late events will have sufficiently established the military energy that pervades their councils. The deep and decisive pledge which they have taken with respect to the deliverance and re-integration of Switzerland, the rapidity with which the main army has effected a lateral movement of 250 miles from Frankfort to Basle, with the necessary establishment of supplies for carrying on offensive operations, and the boldness with which they have undertaken an immediate advance into the interior of France in the depth of winter, with the Rhine liable to have its communications interrupted by ice, is a sufficient proof that they were determined fully to redeem the pledge of not relaxing their military exertions pending discussions with the enemy. The decision with which these operations have been pressed, up to the present time, reducing within the power of the Allies, on the various frontiers of France, not less than twenty-eight departments, sufficiently attests the earnestness with which these operations have been conducted.

So far as the military means of the confederacy are concerned, I have every reason to believe the power of the Allies is largely upon the increase, both from the progressive levies in Germany and the numerous reserves which all the great Powers are bringing forward, as well as the corps that are successively liberated by the fall of the several blockaded fortresses in their rear.

I wish I could feel quite satisfied that nothing was likely to occur to suspend the energy of the offensive operations now in progress in the interior of France; but there are some questions pending of great importance, which, if not speedily and distinctly understood, may lead in this respect to the worst consequences. Some persons contemplate these circumstances with more apprehension than I can bring myself to entertain after the many difficulties we have already surmounted.

The first and most important, and that which will perhaps surprise you the most, is a disposition represented to be felt by the Emperor of Russia to favour the Prince Royal of Sweden's views to the throne of France. I can hardly yet bring myself to give credit to this statement, but it comes to me through so many channels of authority that I cannot hesitate to believe that the project has been countenanced by His Imperial Majesty, although I trust not to an extent that will induce a perseverance in it after the objections have been pressed upon his attention.

If there were no other evil in this scheme, its effect in paralysing the Allied arms must be conclusive. I have reason to believe that, until this intention is disavowed, the Austrian army will not advance much farther in the direction of Paris. Prince Metternich's language on this subject is the most decisive possible, and the Prussians feel not less warmly upon it.

The Austrian Minister's confidential language is, that his Court have no objection to bring forward, should the French nation think fit to restore, the ancient dynasty; but that it is another question to have Madame Bernadotte substituted in the room of a Princess of the House of Hapsburgh. He considers this, however, as only a subordinate objection, deeming such a connection between Russia and France to be formidable to the liberties of Europe, and precisely that evil to guard against which the Emperor gave his daughter in marriage to Napoleon.

I have understood, in addition to the éclat of dethroning Buonaparte, and getting rid of a troublesome neighbour, that the Emperor was led to contemplate such a change with more favour upon a late visit he made to the Court of Baden, where he met the Queen of Sweden, and was much struck both with her and her children, and soon after expressed an earnest desire to replace them in Sweden.

I still flatter myself that this impression has been a passing one, as nothing could be more discreditable, after extorting Norway from Denmark for the purpose of rendering Sweden independent, than to secure, through an intrigue with such a man, the control of both, and further to aim at establishing a preponderating influence in France itself.

It is certain that the Prince Royal has been actively following up some purpose of this nature in the interior of France. He has progressively liberated officers for the purpose of passing into France, and latterly, as he stated, with the Emperor of Russia's concurrence, liberated not less than

sixty in a mass. These officers were detained by a Prussian General on the frontier, and have, as I am informed, been since sent back by Prince Schwarzenberg's orders to remain on parole at Fulda.

That Bernadotte is actively engaged in measures to overturn Buonaparte is established by Mr. Thornton's correspondence. To him he professes to be desirous of restoring the Bourbons. The first suggestion I had on the subject of Bernadotte's translation to the throne of France reached me on the road. I deemed it prudent instantly to write to Thornton to order him to abstain from giving countenance without an express authority to any measures the Prince Royal might be disposed to engage in with respect to the interior of France; and I further prohibited him from entering into any engagements for subsidizing Danish troops, as he had expressed an intention of doing, considering that as a measure pressed by the Prince Royal principally to swell his own immediate command, already much too extensive. I should further wish that the command of the British and Dutch troops on the frontiers of Holland should upon no account be given to him, as they may, at a proper moment, serve to lay the foundation of a different arrangement of the command.

More than this I did not deem it prudent to attempt, under the circumstances stated, till I had seen the Emperor of Russia, when the question of the Bourbons and the pressing nature of the project above referred to must lead to an explanation, the nature of which will regulate the steps which it may be prudent for me to take on the subject of the command on the side of the Netherlands, a point now become of the utmost magnitude, if Bernadotte is, by a peace with Denmark, enabled to show himself there at the head of an army of 100,000 men.

The other questions of delicacy to which I have alluded (exclusive of that of the Bourbons, on which I shall write fully as soon as I see the Emperor) are those of Poland, Saxony, and others of a minor nature connected with interior arrangements. I do not like to flatter myself too much upon so short an observance of the temper in which these delicate questions are agitated, but I augur favourably of the result; and I am the more anxious, contrary to former impressions, to press an early decision on these arrangements, at least in all their leading features, for the reasons I shall now shortly state.

Hitherto no actual step has been taken towards negotiation. Caulaincourt came suddenly from Paris to Lunéville, and sent, as you know, for his passports to proceed to this place. He must have known of my departure, and probably came to try what the Allies could be persuaded to do before I joined. In this he was disappointed. You are acquainted with the answer he received, and also with the subsequent invitation to Châtillon. To this letter, written I believe on the 11th, no answer has yet been received.

It is, however, to be presumed that we shall soon hear of his being at hand, and the Allies are pledged to discussion. The objects in conducting this are felt to be two: first, peremptorily to resist any idea of congress as to the substance of the peace, and, as far as possible, negotiation; and secondly, to exclude France practically, but in the least offensive manner, from any interference in the arrangements beyond her own limits.

To speak of the last point first, I believe I apprised you before I left

London that this was a favourite idea of the Emperor of Russia's. I own it appeared to me then, as it does now, too strong a measure, calculated to give Buonaparte popular grounds on which to refuse the terms to be proposed, and bearing too much the character of a blind and dishonourable capitulation, as the security or insecurity of any given extent of limits must depend on the relative state of possession in which the other Powers, at least those of the first order, are to be left.

To obviate this difficulty, it is conceived that the relative state of Europe, at least in outline, as proposed by the Allies, might be presented to the enemy at the same time the proposition with respect to his own limits was tendered to him, and that, with this knowledge, he should be called upon within a time to be limited (as was done at Prague) for an answer Yes or No.

The advantage of this proceeding, if it can be satisfactorily executed in detail, would be, that all procrastination would be avoided, and the enemy obliged either to accept our own terms or to emancipate us by a refusal from the restraints and embarrassments of the *Frankfort basis*, the inconveniences of which we foresaw at the time, and feel still more now.

With respect to the nature of the arrangement which is looked to, there are various shades of sentiment. I can yet only speak generally; but I am happy to observe that Metternich's geographical notions are improved, and that he will *listen at least* to modifications of the Rhine in advance of Düsseldorf.

You will find the most satisfactory assurances as to Holland in a note addressed by Prince Metternich to Lord Aberdeen, who deserves every praise for the zeal with which he has followed up this object. The desire of Austria to conform herself to the Prince Regent's wishes in that quarter was expressed to me in the warmest terms by the Emperor himself, and I was asked both by Prince Metternich and by the Chancellor Hardenberg what were my ideas on this branch of the arrangement.

I stated generally that this question involved two considerations: first, what was necessary for the general interests, as well as for those of Holland, in that quarter of Europe; and secondly, the extent of concession which we were entitled to ask from the enemy. That, with respect to the latter question, I had no hesitation in contending that our present military pretensions (except so far as those pretensions might be controlled by the basis which had been accepted) fully warranted us in confining France within her ancient limits, but that, circumstanced as we now were, I was not prepared to recommend the adoption of so extensive a demand; but that, in the quarter alluded to, if we acquired anything, it ought to be reasonably effectual to the object, and that, considering the power of the enemy, and the fortified line which he possessed towards Flanders, it appeared to me that the least that could be required would be, that both Luxembourg and Mayence should fall within the frontier of the Allies, and that, with this view, following the ancient frontier of France from the sea to Longwy, a line should be drawn from that place embracing Luxembourg and following the Moselle by Treves to the nearest point on that river to Mayence, from whence a suitable line might be drawn to the latter fortress, which, as the bulwark of the north of Germany on that side, should be secured.

That, in considering this arrangement as essential against France, I did

not consider that it necessarily followed that the whole territory falling within this line should be given to Holland; that it might deserve consideration, as Austria had so handsomely waived her pretensions in that quarter, whether Prussia, as the second great military power in Germany, should not be brought forward and placed between the Meuse and the Moselle, holding Luxembourg and Mayence, but relinquishing, in consideration thereof, to Holland her possessions in the duchy of Cleves and on the west of the Lower Rhine. The Dutch frontier to follow the ancient frontier of France from the sea to Charleroi, and then to embrace Namur, Maestricht, Liège, Juliers, and Cologne. I was induced to throw out the idea of thus bringing forward Prussia, as I recollect it was a favourite scheme of Mr. Pitt. By this arrangement Holland would not be *enclavé* in Prussia, but stand in juxtaposition with her against France. I doubt much the policy of making Holland a power of the first order, to which she would approach if she possessed the whole of these territories. I should not wish to say that this projet was actually *countenanced*, but it did not seem to alarm, and I think a good victory at Châlons might make it popular. The point of Antwerp and an accession to Holland both of territory and military frontier was cordially and fully admitted as indispensable.

In arguing as to the importance of coming to a clear understanding amongst ourselves in the first instance, the point of our conquests was touched, but not pressed. I told them I should be fully prepared to open myself upon that part of the question whenever they gave me an outline of what they were prepared to require from France to guide my judgment. The question was not further urged.

Having acquired a general knowledge of the Austrian and Prussian Ministers' sentiments, I propose this evening to proceed to the Emperor of Russia's head-quarters in France. The King of Prussia is gone on. The Emperor of Austria moves to-morrow, and it is intended, as soon as we are all assembled, to endeavour to come to a distinct understanding on all the leading points.

I am, with great truth and regard, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

War Department, 26th Jan., 1814.

Lord Bathurst presents his compliments to Lord Wellington, and has the honour of transmitting herewith, for his Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch this day received from Lord Burghersh, dated Montbelliard, 8th January.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lord Burghersh to Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD, Montbelliard, 8th Jan., 1814.

I had the honour of reporting to your Lordship in my last despatch the capture of Geneva by the corps under the orders of General Count Bubna.

That officer found 117 pieces of cannon in the place. He has since succeeded in capturing the fort of l'Ecluse, a point of considerable importance towards securing the occupation of Geneva. General Bubna's corps is composed of 5 battalions of light infantry, 13 battalions of the line, and 30 squadrons of cavalry. He has sent detachments which occupy the valleys and the points of the Simplon, Mont St. Bernard, and Mont Blanc; he has directed a corps upon Lyons; and he will arrive this day with the remainder of his force at Dôle.

The Prince of Hesse, with the corps under his orders, composed of 10 battalions of light infantry, 13 of grenadiers, 8 regiments of cuirassiers, and 3 of light cavalry, has arrived this day in advance of Ornons, and to-morrow will attack whatever force he may find in front of Besançon, and will drive it within the walls of that place, of which he will afterwards form the blockade.

General Gyulay, with his corps of 22 battalions and 10 squadrons, is at Vesoul.

General Coloredo, with 25 battalions and 10 squadrons, will arrive at that place to-morrow.

General Biouchy forms the blockade of Béfort with the corps which he commands, composed of 12 battalions. That officer will to-morrow bombard that place, and will endeavour at least to obtain possession of the town. The citadel, it is feared, will be able to defend itself. If such should be the case, General Biouchy will be relieved from its blockade by a corps of Austrians which is arriving from the force lately employed in Saxony under the orders of General Count Klenau, when the corps under his command will advance upon Vesoul. The Russian reserves under General Barclay de Tolly, and amounting to 35,000 men, will arrive at Altkirch on the 13th, and form the support to the corps above mentioned.

The Prince Royal of Würtemberg, with his corps of 12,000 men, will be established at Remiremont on the 10th.

The Cossacks under Prince Scherbatoff will push along the valley of the Moselle as far as Epinal.

According to the plan I detailed to your Lordship in my last despatch, General Wrede advanced on the 3rd from Mulhausen to Colmar. The force with which the enemy had occupied that place, amounting to about 10,000 men, retired from it the day preceding. General Wrede pushed forward his advance to Schlestat, which place he now blockades, and from whence he will connect himself with General Wittgenstein.

Detachments from the corps of General Wrede blockade also New Breisach and Huningen. The fire upon this last place not having produced any considerable result, and a want of ammunition existing in the Allied armies, the siege of it has been discontinued.

I have the honour of reporting to your Lordship the capture of Fort Louis on the 5th, by the troops under the orders of General Wittgenstein. That officer passed the Rhine on that day, and pushed forward his corps on the roads to Schlestat and Soverne. He will blockade the fort of Kehl and the fortress of Strasburg with 10,000 men: the rest of his corps will be disposable to connect the armies of General Wrede and General Blücher. This last officer passed the Rhine in two columns, the right at Caub, the left at Mannheim; they have united at Kreuzenach, and will advance upon the same.

Prince Schwarzenberg removed his head-quarters to this place on the 6th. He will to-morrow move to Archy, and on the following day to Viller-sur-Luy. It is the intention of the Prince Marshal to push forward his army to Langres. General Platoff will form his right with the Cossacks at Neufchâteau. The Prince Royal of Würtemberg and General Wrede will pass by Remiremont to establish themselves on the right of Langres, while General Bubna will

form the left of the whole army at Dijon, and the reserves will be brought to Vesoul and Guay. By the occupation of this position, Prince Schwarzenberg will have possessed himself of the mountainous parts of the country which forms the great barrier of France on this side. He will be enabled to support his army from the fertile country in his rear, and will have no obstacle, in the nature of the ground, to oppose his further advance into the French empire.

It is with peculiar pleasure I am enabled to report to your Lordship that the troops of the Allies have universally been well received by the inhabitants since their entry on the territory of France. No single act of hostility has been committed against them, and in some places they have been received with acclamations. The people of the country express a most anxious hope of peace; they accuse their government of the misfortunes which at present, as for years past, have weighed upon their country, and they seem desirous of any change which would open to them a prospect of better times. The conscription lately decreed by Buonaparte has in no place in this part of the country been attended to. The spirit of the people is broken; they seem destitute of the means of any exertion.

I am unable to give your Lordship any information as to the preparations making by the enemy to resist the formidable invasion now in progress on his country. We have no details of the assembly of his troops; the country in front of us is as yet totally unprotected.

It is reported that Marshal Victor has united the troops that retired from Colmar to the corps under his orders, and that he occupies a position at Phalsburg. If that should prove to be correct, the corps of General Wrede, after leaving 10,000 men for the blockade of Huningen, New Breisach, and Schlestat, will be directed to change from his movement upon Remiremont to act in co-operation with General Wittgenstein upon the right of General Victor.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

BURGHERSH.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 26th Jan., 1814.

In answer to that part of your Lordship's despatch, No. 5, in which you request to be furnished with the advice of the Law Officers of the Crown whether Lord Keith and the Channel fleet under his command can be considered as engaged in a conjoint expedition with the army under your Lordship's command, I have the honour of enclosing for your Lordship's information and guidance a copy of the opinion which has been given on this subject by His Majesty's Advocate, to whom an extract of your Lordship's despatch, and a copy of the instructions given by the Admiralty to the officer commanding the naval forces on the coast of Spain, were submitted by my desire.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Sir C. Robinson to H. Goulburn, Esq.

SIR, Doctors' Commons, 25th Jan., 1814.

I am favoured with your letter of the 24th instant, transmitting an extract of a despatch from Lord Wellington, together with an extract of the instructions given by the Admiralty to the officer commanding the naval forces on the coast of Spain, and requesting my opinion upon the point referred to, for the information of Earl Bathurst.

In obedience to his Lordship's directions I have considered the same, and have the honour to report that the instructions which have been issued to the fleet by the Admiralty will not be sufficient to connect the fleet with the operations of His Majesty's forces in France, as in a conjoint expedition.

Such a connexion of His Majesty's land and sea forces must proceed, I conceive, either from specific orders and instructions issued by government to the forces jointly, or from some concert or co-operation between the commanders in particular cases, which may be supposed to be virtually sanctioned by His Majesty.

It will not grow otherwise out of the provisions of the Prize Act or Proclamation, which do not in their original and proper character respect military operations.

I am humbly of opinion, therefore, that under the circumstances stated, the fleet cannot be considered as engaged in a conjoint expedition with His Majesty's army in France, although if there should be joint operations of a specific nature between them, such a connexion may be formed incidentally, and will depend on the circumstances of their co-operation.

I have, &c.,

CHR. ROBINSON.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 26th Jan., 1814.

Your letter of the 2nd instant reached me in a most mutilated state a few days ago with many others that had been immersed in the snow between this and Falmouth. The cover of your letter was actually washed off, and they only knew at the Post Office that it was for me by your address to me at the commencement.

I confess I am not at all surprised at the account you give of Lieutenant-Colonel ——— of the ——, and he is wise to avoid the consequences of a court martial by giving in his resignation. The Duke leaves it to you to recommend the succession by purchase as you think proper. There is no absolute rule in regard to the succession to those who misbehave in action, unless such misconduct extends to the whole corps; and then upon a general principle it would be highly inexpedient to grant them promotion. But as you do not believe there is any reason for finding fault with the regiment upon this occasion, the case appears to His Royal Highness to be one that should be decided according to your own estimate of the pretensions of the officers in succession.

The vacant troops in the 18th have been filled up according to your re-

commendation. Until this corps is better commanded, I do not think it will ever improve; and if the Duke can so arrange it, he is inclined to place some cavalry officer at its head who is capable of putting it in order; and if you will officially represent the bad state of the regiment, he will do this at once.

A few weeks will now decide the fate of Buonaparte; whether his power as a monarch is to be annihilated, or established upon such a peace as the Allies will grant him. The interests of Europe will never be permanently preserved if his government is allowed to remain; but unless the people of France come forward, I fear nothing can be done for the Bourbons.

I am extremely sorry to learn that Sir J. Hope has suffered so much more from his wound than had been expected. Since I wrote to you last, Sir A. Hope has entreated me to request you would fulfil your intention of speaking to Sir John respecting the exposure of his person unnecessarily. He is confident that it alone will have the best effect.

I hope that when the three provisional battalions of militia now forming reach you, they will fight well; but at present they are more troublesome than the whole army put together.

Believe me, my dear Lord, to be
Yours ever most faithfully and sincerely,
H. TORRENS.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 27th Jan., 1814.

I hope that the orders sent to the Gefe Politico of Guipuzcoa will be satisfactory to you.

The Serviles had a triumph yesterday, having gained the first question relative to the powers of the Deputies from Gallicia by a majority of 81 to 54. The second question will come on to-morrow, and will probably be carried in the same way; and if so, the Serviles will add about fifteen to their numbers.

I cannot say, however, that I like the appearance of things. The Jacobin speeches in the Cortes and their daily publications have certainly made an impression upon the people. They act Jacobin plays almost every night at the theatre, and sing *coplas* against the Serviles, which are more applauded than I ever recollect them to have been at Cadiz.

Don José Palafox is not yet arrived, but is expected to night or to-morrow. I believe his journey has been delayed by illness. No one knows anything about him, excepting that he saw the King at Valençay the 25th of last month. I shall be made acquainted with the object of his journey a few hours after his arrival.

The government thinks it probable that Ferdinand will be sent back to Spain, and I understand that instructions are to be sent to you as Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies from the office of the Minister of State, as to the manner in which he is to be received in the event of his arrival. It is reported that he is at Paris, and government seems to be

under some apprehension of the effect which his being there may produce on the Cortes. I understand that the Jacobins are very anxious that his treaty with Napoleon and his letter to the Regency should be made public.

I have not written to England by this mail, having nothing particular to communicate.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of his Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 27th Jan., 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Field Officers	30	15	45
Captains	95	20	115
Subalterns	194	67	261
Staff	91	53	144
Quartermasters of Cavalry	18	4	22
Serjeants :—			
Present	540	75	615
Sick :—			
Present	8	..	8
Absent	7	..	7
Command	63	17	80
Prisoners of War and Missing	6	..	6
Trumpeters :—			
Present	101	45	146
Sick :—			
Present	5	1	6
Absent	2	..	2
Command	2	4	6
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File :—			
Present	7307	1219	8526
Sick :—			
Present	166	43	209
Absent	254	30	284
Command	574	389	963
Prisoners of War and Missing	191	..	191
Horses :—			
Present	6983	1156	8139
Sick	341	68	409
Command	309	247	556
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Dead	1	..	1
Horses :—			
Dead	6	..	6
Cast	3	..	3

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula, under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 27th Jan., 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	13	12	25
Lieutenant-Colonels	51	28	79
Majors	82	39	121
Captains	466	166	632
Lieutenants	929	199	1128
Cornets or Ensigns	295	314	609
Staff	396	470	866
Quartermasters of Cavalry	18	4	22
Serjeants :—			
Present	2725	1363	4088
Sick :—			
Present	109	55	164
Absent	516	145	661
Command	390	224	614
Prisoners of War and Missing	62	3	65
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1024	518	1542
Sick :—			
Present	27	9	36
Absent	110	21	131
Command	25	46	71
Prisoners of War and Missing	42	6	48
Rank and File :—			
Present	37,208	20,334	57,542
Sick :—			
Present	1937	907	2844
Absent	11,584	4631	16,215
Command	3076	1891	4967
Prisoners of War and Missing	2619	339	2958
Horses :—			
Present	6983	1156	8139
Sick	341	68	409
Command	309	247	556
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	1	..	1
Dead	26	7	33
Discharged	..	1	1
Deserted	1	1	2
Transferred	3	..	3
Promoted	1	3	4
Horses :—			
Dead	6	..	6
Cast	3	..	3

E. PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 28th Jan., 1814.

The rapid advances of the Allies will make Buonaparte's situation so very critical, that unless Austria has made up her mind (which she ought to do) to his overthrow, notwithstanding the family connection, we shall have preliminaries signed very soon; and I am afraid we shall hear of this before a fortnight is past.

It will undoubtedly not be prudent to withdraw or weaken your force in consequence of that event, until it be followed up by the restoration of whatever France may under the treaty be called upon to give up. But if the Allies act with common prudence, the execution of the terms will be made to follow very closely the termination of hostilities.

Supposing then the time to have arrived for breaking up your army, I wish to turn your Lordship's opinion on the expediency of detaching a force of not less than 20,000 men to America, in order to strike some blow which might immediately bring the war there to an honourable termination. If the war be not ended in a few months after the peace, Buonaparte will begin his hostilities by assisting the Americans, and our good Allies will wish him success.

I shall be very much obliged to you to turn this in your mind, and give me your opinion as to the best direction which such an expedition would take. It will require much time for preparing so large a detachment; and if we do anything, we should take care to do it effectually.

As you would not be expected to engage in an undertaking of this description, one of my difficulties arises from not knowing to whom the command should be given. Hope would be, I think, the best; but I doubt whether he would go. Sir R. Hill in that case appears to me the most eligible, although I have some doubt whether he does not shrink from responsibility.

I yet hope, however, that all this may become unnecessary, or at least very premature; but it rests with Austria whether she will make a family peace or a permanent one.

I am happy to tell you that our Jew returned from Paris yesterday. Although specie has begun to disappear there, he seems confident of success, and we have had a good arrival of specie from Jamaica, so that I hope there will be no doubt of our being able to realise to the utmost what Bunbury was authorised to hold out to you. You will certainly have a good remittance sent out again in the course of a week.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Baron de Mareschaff to Prince Metternich.

MONSEIGNEUR, Brienne, le 28 Janvier, 1814.

Le quartier-général a été porté le 27 jusqu'à Brienne, ville un peu plus considérable que Tremilli, où d'après la disposition le quartier-général devoit être avec le gros de la troupe.

L'avant-garde est sur la route d'Arcis. Le Général Lanskoy, qui occupoit St. Dizier, et devoit se porter vers Vitry, fut attaqué le 27 par un détachement assez considérable de l'ennemi, et forcé d'abandonner St. Dizier. En cas que l'ennemi continue ce mouvement offensif, qui semble cependant n'être qu'une reconnoissance, le Général Lanskoy se retirera sur Bar le Duc, où il se joindra au corps du Général Yorck.

Sans l'arrivé de M. de Steigenlesch, nous eussions poussé en avant aujourd'hui pour gagner Arcis, point intéressant pour tourner Châlons.

Les nouvelles que l'on a de l'ennemi sont jusqu'à présent trop peu sûr pour pouvoir en déduire s'il a le dessein de tenir ferme à Châlons. Cependant la plus grande partie des opinions se réunit à croire que ce point sera abandonné, et que ce ne sera que dans les environs de Paris qu'il tentera encore la fortune : en effet son armée recevra par ce mouvement un accroissement considérable. L'esprit public, qui dans les provinces n'est rien moins que tel que le gouvernement le désire, peut être travaillé par plus de ressorts près de la capitale, et une bataille gagné sur ce point par l'Empereur Napoléon pourroit rétablir entièrement ses affaires, et mettre les armées alliées dans une position bien terrible.

Le Maréchal Blücher, emporté par un courage bouillant en calculant que ce qui peut arriver à son armée, dont il croit être assez sûr pour pouvoir risquer un échec, n'est pas encore celui qui dans le moment présent est le plus difficile à empêcher de se jeter dans une entreprise hardie. C'est le Général Gneisenau. Ni les ordres du Roi ni les chances fâcheuses qui peut amener un échec, ni l'esprit du pays où il se trouve, n'entre en considération chez un homme qui ne connoit que son ambition, et le désir de se faire une réputation, et est toujours prêt à tout sacrifier à cela. Ses talents et son caractère si flexible peuvent le rendre aussi dangereux qu'il est utile. Le Général Müffling est le seul homme ici qui ne se laisse point entraîner par l'ivresse des succès, et qui est assez sage pour sentir que nous sommes moins que jamais dans le cas de hasarder, et qu'il ne faût point confondre une prudence sage avec de la pusillanimité.

Je suis, etc.,

MARESCHAFF.

The Earl of Clancarty to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY DEAR LORD, The Hague, 29th Jan., 1814.

You will see by the accompanying *private* note† from M. de Hogendorp that the subject of the undersigned memorial, transmitted with my last, will be brought immediately forward, and also that a representation which accompanied the enclosed note will also be brought before you. It appears to me, as far as I am able to form a judgment, that neither of the points solicited can be considered as matters of right; how far you may consider them as matters of favour will be for you to decide: there seems this distinction, however, between the two cases, viz., that in the matter contained in the memorial forwarded with my last *private* letter the loss seems to

* British Minister at the Hague.

† Not found among the Liverpool MSS.

have been incurred without any fault or misfeasance of the parties, whereas in the present instance a simulated flag, and simulated papers, in fraud of our regulations, is the foundation upon which the request is made. Whether this ought to make any distinction in your decision, when the points shall be brought more formally before you, you are better able to judge than I am. I am to-morrow to see M. Van Hogendorp upon these, and, as he sends me word, upon other matters, and shall then merely take them *ad referendum*.

The following intelligence has been transmitted to me from Rotterdam by a Mr. Johnson, sent there by Aberdeen, to communicate with some principal people at Brussels and its neighbourhood. The part scored under I do not think likely to be true, because we should probably have heard it, if correct, from some of the Prince of Orange's correspondents at Breda, especially as Mr. Johnson's informant writes from that place on the 26th, and D'Yvoz's report (sent with my public despatches) is dated from the same place on the 27th. The remainder of the intelligence is not improbable.

"*Les avants-postes de M. de Kleist ont poussé jusqu'à Namur.* Un officier de marine Hollandaise échappé de France a traversé le Hainault depuis Tournay jusqu'à Halle sans rencontrer un seul Français armé. A Bruxelles il n'y avait personne; à Louvain la garnison n'excédait pas mille hommes; ce qui se trouvait à Malines n'allait guères qu'à 1500; et 4000 commandés par le Général Maison se portoient sur Anvers. Il y a eu des mouvemens à Arras. Les forêts d'Artois sont remplis de conscrits refractaires, qui ont constamment repoussés les détachemens envoyés contre eux."

I have requested Gordon, to whom Johnson's note is addressed, to endeavour to open a communication with these *conscrits*, for the purpose, if possible, of furnishing them with arms, &c.

Mr. Johnson adds that there does not seem to have been any disturbances at Bruxelles; that the insurrection of Arras extends to Lille; and that nothing was known at Rotterdam of the disturbances at Ghent.

There is a report here of a victory obtained by Blücher, near Châlons sur Marne: it is, however, a mere report, at least at present unauthenticated by anything like official information; if true, such a victory would be invaluable.

Monsieur arrived here the night before last as Comte de Ponthieu, and dined yesterday with His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence and myself at His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange's. I had asked him to dine with me to-day, but he has proceeded on his journey towards Switzerland.

M. Fagel mentioned to me privately to-day that the Prince of Orange, in speaking to him of the projected marriage, seemed to think that it would be necessary that some instructions should be sent on his part to his ambassador in London, for the purpose of making a formal demand. I begged of M. Fagel to prevent this from being done till the sentiments of the British government should be taken upon the subject; that, no doubt, if the Prince Regent thought such a step necessary, he would have taken means to have it suggested to this government, and that the matter had surely be better left entirely to his management. To this M. Fagel assented, and has since acquainted me that he has again conversed with

the Prince of Orange on the point, and that His Royal Highness has assured him that he has no other thought than in all things relating to this matter to follow the wishes of the Prince Regent.

Your private letter to me of the 21st instant has never reached me, and the only way in which I became acquainted with its existence has been by finding a paper purporting to be a copy of it in a despatch sent here from the Foreign Office, under flying seal, addressed to Lord Castlereagh. As the subject of it is of much importance, you may probably think it necessary to make some inquiry for it, and to have it forwarded.

Yours, my dear Lord, very sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

Ensign O'Connell to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Jatsu, 29th Jan., 1814.

Impressed with a due sense of the high honour conferred on me in appointing me to a commission in the British army, I beg leave to offer my services to fight during life under your Lordship's banners in any quarter of the globe that the wisdom of His Majesty's councils may direct your Lordship to command. It is the pride of my heart to have the honour of invading France under your Lordship's command, than which nothing could redound more to the credit of the British soldier, and the immortal military fame of your Lordship, inasmuch as it could not be accomplished on any former occasion by the united efforts of the continental powers of Europe. Providence has been particularly propitious to the United Kingdom in endowing one of her noblemen (the pride of Ireland) with wisdom, genius, and military talents, adequate to the discipline and command of her formidable armies, and the complete defeat of the ablest generals that the imperial foe of the civilised world could oppose to her. I had the honour of soliciting to be attached to the battalion in this country on my appointment. I have been accordingly on service with it ever since, and am very happy to find that the united valour and discipline of General Inglis's brigade have not escaped your Lordship's notice. A strict adherence to your Lordship's commands in the field and the camp has been the invariable rule of our conduct; next to discipline, we attend to the protection of persons and private property; the natives seem content, and attend to their respective avocations.

Judge Day, and the other respectable characters who honoured me with testimonials, felt happy to hear of your Lordship's attention to my interest. The humble but loyal services rendered my King and country, at home and abroad, embolden me, with due deference, most humbly to solicit the honour of being recommended by your Lordship to promotion in any regiment of the British army or the Portuguese service, as may seem meet to your Lordship. Equally impatient for military fame at the post of honour, as for rank in the army, it is with profound respect and gratitude I implore your Lordship to take into your wise and humane consideration the circumstances, and I shall never cease to send up my ardent prayers to the Disposer of all Events, when he may close your glorious and ever memorable course in life, to take you to His heavenly mansion, where your Lordship

will meet an equal distribution of reward and justice as has been administered by your Lordship. I beg your Lordship's pardon, and

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's obliged and obedient servant,

MAURICE O'CONNELL.

[Tell him I shall be happy to have an opportunity of promoting him, and that I beg to know whether, if the number of officers present with the 82nd should allow of his absenting himself from it, he is disposed to take a Lieutenancy in the Portuguese service, if I should be able to prevail upon Sir William Beresford to appoint him.—WELLINGTON.]

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Villafranca, 29th Jan., 1814.

In my letter No. 17 of the 12th instant I had the honour to acquaint your Lordship that Lieutenant Zehnpfenning had reported to me from General Copons' head-quarters at Vich that he had reason to suppose the Duque de San Carlos had passed there *incognito* on his way to Madrid, having been escorted to the Spanish lines by French troops, and having proceeded on his road with a Spanish escort. I have also to report to your Lordship, that it having been stated to me on the 27th instant that the Duke had passed through this place on his return, and had gone on about two leagues to the front to the village of *San Sadurni*, and thinking it improper that such a personage should pass through my posts unnoticed, and that I should at least be informed whither he was going and with what passports, I sent the Deputy Quartermaster-General and a Spanish Lieutenant-Colonel attached to the head-quarters of this army to make my compliments to the Duke, to express my concern that I had not been aware when he had passed Villafranca, and at the same time requesting that I might be allowed to know the tenor of his passports, in order that I might apprise your Lordship of his having passed this way and by what authority. The Duke received Lieutenant-Colonel Coffin with much civility, said he was proceeding to the head-quarters of the 1st army, and expressed a wish that he might be made acquainted with any intelligence I might receive within a few days, *viâ* England, of the progress of the negotiations for peace, of which he implied he was generally ignorant, and that in France they knew nothing of what was transpiring in the way of politics; and he excused himself for not having taken up his quarters in Villafranca from having wished to avoid all form and ceremony, and giving trouble, which his high rank might have occasioned. Lieutenant-Colonel Coffin tells me the pass is in the name of *Carvajal*, the Duke's family name, and that it is for him to proceed to the head-quarters of the 1st army, and is signed by the Minister of War, M. *O'Donoju*.

I have thought it right to submit these circumstances for your Lordship's information.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your most obedient humble servant,
W. H. CLINTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oudenbosch, 29th Jan., 1814.

I have to thank your Lordship for your obliging letter of the 19th ultimo,* and for the duplicate of that of the 18th November (original never received), with the copies of the most interesting papers contained in the same cover. I feel, in common with all that part of the army concerned in the siege of St. Sebastian, most grateful for the pains your Lordship has taken to put the matter in the clearest point of view, and I should undoubtedly at once determine to avail myself of the permission your Lordship gives me to publish these undeniable proofs of the calumny, were I not withheld by the consideration of its being possibly very much the wish of government to let the matter rest, as it did not seem to make much impression on the public in England. I mean therefore to transmit them to a friend in England, desiring him to see Lord Bathurst, and to be guided a good deal in the use to be made of them by what passes on the occasion of their interview.

General Bülow has just sent me word that he will be ready to move forward again to-morrow; but he does not yet know the enemy's force towards Malines and Louvain with sufficient certainty to be able to decide whether he can at once undertake something against Antwerp, or whether he may not be obliged to pass on in support of a strong division that is to occupy Lier: in the latter case I shall halt at Calmthout till he has finished on that side, and can return on Antwerp. Meanwhile we are threatened to-day with a thaw, and at all events we must not expect to get Merxhem as easily as we did a fortnight ago. We are in daily expectation of hearing of the result of a general action, expected to have taken place at Langres on the 18th instant.

Should we succeed in destroying the Antwerp fleet, and afterwards perhaps in getting hold of Bergen-op-Zoom (but feebly garrisoned), it is not improbable that this unexpected service will be sooner concluded than I imagined, for the points they are most interested about at home would be gained.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
THOMAS GRAHAM.

P.S.—There is this moment arrived here a Deputy Commissary-General Schmidhein, who supersedes Spiller, of whom I wrote to your Lordship.

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* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 377.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 29th Jan., 1814.

I have this moment received your letter of the 26th instant. General Palafox arrived on the night of the 27th, so that I only learnt the object of his mission yesterday; and as it is of some importance as throwing light upon Buonaparte's views, I have sent my despatch by a courier, in hopes of its reaching you in time to go by the packet.

If the government would always conduct itself as it has done since its arrival at Madrid, I should think it better not to change it; but this change of conduct is partly owing to its apprehension of being turned out, and partly to there being a very good man at the head of foreign affairs. The whole management of the late negotiation respecting peace is Luyando's. The government have certainly the merit of having adopted his suggestions, and since their arrival at Madrid they have manifested a more conciliatory disposition towards us; but I fear that they would return to their old habits as soon as they should get rid of their fears of being removed. It is besides necessary that the other party should have the upper hand in order if possible to check the Jacobin disposition which is certainly gaining ground among the people. You know exactly the line of conduct which I have pursued, and to which I think it will be better to adhere. Indeed I am persuaded that no effort of mine would induce the Serviles to abandon the idea of removing the government. A new government will certainly be considered in the country as more friendly to us, but that it will be more efficient than the present government is a question upon which no man who knows anything of Spain will venture to give an opinion.

The Serviles begin to act with a little more prudence and judgment, and they certainly have some good speakers on their side. Their newspapers are likewise better managed than they used to be. I am assured that they mean to bring on the question relative to a change, immediately.

I will write to Duff as you desire. I suppose he has by this time got a ship for the money he had collected, which I believe amounted to nearly 600,000 dollars.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 31st Jan., 1814.

I have reflected fully upon the contents of your letter to me of the 26th instant,* and I really do not think that there is anything in the conduct of the Regency which ought to induce us to wish for its continuance in office. I have before mentioned that unless passive acquiescence be deemed a merit, the merit of the late transactions is entirely due to M. Luyando; and

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 478.

so much am I convinced of this, that had M. Labrador or M. Cano Manuel been in office and advised different measures, I have no doubt that they would have been acquiesced in. I should have been kept in ignorance of the whole transaction, and we should have suffered the greatest anxiety from the quibbling policy which would have been observed by these gentlemen.

I mention this in order to show that no merit belongs to the present Regents on account of the late transactions, for the good management of which we are really indebted to an individual who happens to be in temporary charge of the Foreign Department.

Now there are numberless reasons why it is most important that these men should be removed; and I beg you to reflect upon what their conduct has been from the moment of their appointment to the Regency to the period of their arrival at Madrid, and then to say whether they can possibly be depended upon. They are in fact the tools of the Jacobin party, and they must stand or fall with that party; and if they once succeed in fixing themselves permanently in their seats at Madrid, there is an end to all hope of checking that propensity to Jacobinism among the people which has already made so considerable a progress here. Even if the period of the King's arrival were not far distant, I should still think it a misfortune if he were to find the government in such hands, because it may be doubted whether he would have firmness enough to remove from office those who are in possession of the principal Departments of the State.

It may be relied upon likewise that if the Regency are permanently fixed in their seats, all their employés in the different provinces, who seem to have been selected for their dislike of the English, will think they can with safety indulge this adverse disposition towards us; and with reference to the projects of Napoleon, it is of no small importance that the public officers in the provinces should be firm and steady friends to the alliance.

I now come to the point which I conceive to be of the greatest moment: I mean the conduct of the Spanish government towards you. I agree with you that the removal of the Minister of War alters the question in some degree; but recollect the manner in which he was removed, or rather the manner in which his resignation was accepted. The Regents not only went out of their way to lavish praises upon him, they were not contented with expressing their entire approbation of his services, and their regret at being deprived of them, but they conferred upon him the rank of Lieutenant-General, which rank they had refused to many other officers whom you had recommended for their services in the field. As the principal and indeed the only feature of General O'Donoju's administration was his persecution of you, the rewards and praises which he has received from the Regents can only be considered as so many testimonies that his conduct towards you was approved and sanctioned by them.

But I do not want this proof of their being adverse to your holding the command. Conversations have been repeated to me by more than one friend of Agar's, in which he has stated the determination of the Regents to compel you to resign or to go out themselves; and it is notorious that Ciscar, long before he was a Regent, quarrelled with his brother for having made the motion in the Cortes for conferring the command upon you, and I believe is now upon bad terms with him on that account. This same

Ciscar, when the question relative to your command was discussed in the Cortes on the 29th of November last, wrote to the President to say that the Regency could not be answerable for the public tranquillity if that question were decided in your favour, and I believe that this had considerable influence upon the division. Add to this all the publications at Cadiz against us, all of which were sanctioned by the government.

I forbear to notice all the instances of bad faith which I experienced at Cadiz in my transactions with the government, as well as the numerous complaints which I received from the British consuls and agents residing in Spain, and even at the Canaries, of the treatment they received from the public authorities upon the spot where they were residing; but I own I cannot have any confidence in persons whose conduct has been marked for so long a period by so much hostility, although circumstances may have led them to dissemble for the moment; for there is too much reason to believe that if once they get rid of their apprehensions of being removed, they will revert to their old habits and principles.

I have been anxious to state to you my view of this question, because Luyando told me yesterday that he knew from good authority that you had expressed your approbation of the conduct of the Regency, and seemed disposed to believe that you had meant to express it generally of their conduct since they had been in office. I took the liberty, however, of telling him that I was certain your approbation was confined to the transactions which had taken place relative to the negotiation with Napoleon, for that previous to that, you had more reason to complain of their conduct than any other person. Everything that is reported of your saying produces the greatest effect; but I do not think that in the present instance the rumour which has reached Luyando would have the effect of keeping in the government. It might give the Serviles some uneasiness, but I am not of opinion that it would prevent them from bringing forward in the Cortes the question relative to the change of the government.

You know exactly the part which I have taken in this business, and I do not think it would have been possible, under the circumstances in which I was placed, to have interfered less. I shall endeavour, however, if possible to abstain still more from all interference.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I put this with the despatch to Lord Castlereagh under one cover with a ribbon round it.

Captain Servier to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR, Burgos, Février, 1814.

Dans la demande que j'ai l'honneur de faire à Votre Excellence, je compte plus sur la générosité qui caractérise la nation Anglaise que sur la légitime cause qui m'y force.

En effet, si l'homme vertueux juge ses semblables d'après lui-même, je n'ai nul doute que vous m'accordiez la grâce que j'ai l'honneur de vous demander.

Mon père étant mort sur les plaines de Moscou, et ma mère se trouvant seule et sans consolation, ignorant absolument si j'existe, je désirerai que Votre Excellence m'accorda la permission de rentrer en France pour vingt jours seulement. Je jure de retourner en Espagne au bout de ce temps-là. Comptez sur mon honneur. Quel seroit l'homme d'ailleurs qui après une aussi grande marque de confiance pourroit manquer à sa parole? Non, Monseigneur. Croyez, quoique nous nous trouvions dans un siècle corrumpu, qu'il se trouve encore les hommes qui chérissent la vertu.

Je n'ignore pas, Monseigneur, que ma demande est indiscrète, mais la bonté avec laquelle vous traitez les Français, la grandeur d'âme que vous mettez à les soustraire aux horreurs de la guerre, tout enfin m'a porté à croire que vous ne rejetteriez pas la grâce que j'ai l'honneur de vous demander. Au nom de la piété filiale, prenez ma demande en considération.

Il me sera doux de publier ce trait de votre générosité, et il n'y a nulle doute qu'il vous fera plus de partisans parmi mes compatriotes que la force de vos armes.

Dans l'entière persuasion où je suis que vous exaucerez mes vœux, j'ai l'honneur de vous saluer avec un profond respect.

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

G. SERVIER.

[Tell him that I am sorry I cannot grant his request. There is no instance of such a request having been granted by the French government to any British officer; and I am sorry to add that there are too frequent instances of such indulgence granted to French officers having been abused by the breach of their parole.—WELLINGTON.]

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Villa Franca, 1st Feb., 1814.

I have detained the courier another day in the hope that the *Carlotta* brig, hourly expected from Sicily, might arrive, by which possibly there might be other despatches from Lord William Bentinck for your Lordship. As the brig has not, to my knowledge, arrived, I am unwilling any longer to keep the courier. In the meanwhile a report has reached me, the truth of which I have every reason to depend on, that Marshal Suchet left Barcelona last night, accompanied by 4000 men; and I am also informed that the enemy has abandoned the post and destroyed the work he had at the bridge of Molins del Rey, which he had made very strong; and also that he has abandoned all the line of the Llobregat, holding only one or two of the villages on the road from Barcelona as outposts.

I shall endeavour immediately to ascertain this; and, should it prove to be the case, I propose, if Major-General Sarsfield can subsist his division in advance, to take up the line of the Llobregat forthwith, pushing posts on the Barcelona road, and holding, with the Spanish division of General Sarsfield, two battalions of Major-General Whittingham's division, and the

British reserve, together with the cavalry, the line of the Llobregat from San Berg to Molins del Rey, Papiol, &c.; and further, I shall propose to General Copons to approach as near as he can to my left, and to endeavour to prevent, or to render very difficult, any approach of the enemy to Barcelona from the side of the Bezos, unless it be covered by a considerable body of troops. For the present I mean to leave Major-General Smith with the 1st division at and near Tarragona, both with a view to aid in the execution of the service to which my letter No. 20 refers (should his co-operation perchance be required), and at all events in order that, so long as the weather permits, the troops may assist in expediting the completing what yet remains to be done to the repairs of the works of Tarragona.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,

W. H. CLINTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 2nd Feb., 1814.

In answer to your Lordship's letter of the 16th ultimo, I have to inform you that the sending the detachments of cavalry destined for the Catalonian army to Pasages was on the representation of the Horse Guards, who I took it for granted would have instructed your Lordship on the subject. I have communicated to them your difficulties, and it is arranged that you should take the horses, and the men be sent back. This will be officially transmitted to you by the Horse Guards. You will gain 163 horses by the arrangement.

With regard to the 482,000 dollars arrived in the *Medina*, the amount was calculated in the manner in which it is always calculated here when money is sent out—by what it cost, not at the rate it will be accepted with you. The 482,000 dollars cost government 149,800*l.*, and the 50,000*l.* destined for Catalonia was included therefore in it. I was aware of there being some loss in dollars; but I had not imagined that the difference would have been so great as your Lordship has stated it. I am happy to think that as the 400,000*l.* sent out by the *Désiré* is in guineas, you will not suffer any loss in that remittance.

I sent the 50,000*l.* to Pasages instead of sending it to the eastern coast of Spain by sea, because I thought the probability was that the Eastern army would have been broken up before it would have arrived by sea at the place of its destination, in which case it must have come back again to Pasages, and I was not aware of the difficulty you have in transmitting it by land. I was encouraged in this error by General Clinton having applied to your Lordship in the first instance, as a more expeditious mode of obtaining a supply than by having it sent out from here.

I shall wish you now to take the whole of it. Your army is that to which we must now look exclusively. I will send some to the Catalonian army by sea, if your Lordship advises it; but as it must be taken out of that which would otherwise go to you, and would not arrive for more than

two months hence, the contest would probably be at an end (if my speculations are right) before it would be turned to account.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 2nd Feb., 1814.

In reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 17, I am commanded to acquaint you that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to approve of your accepting the Order of the Sword, the highest military distinction in Sweden. The communication suggested by your Lordship has been accordingly made to Mr. Thornton.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most humble servant,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 2nd Feb., 1814.

I enclose to you the answer which the Treasury has just sent me respecting the moveable hospitals; and I think it better to call your attention to it, as there seems to be a difference of opinion, as to the advantage to be derived from these hospitals, between Dr. M'Grigor and the Commissary-General Kennedy. Preparations, however, shall be making for constructing them, so that no time shall be lost between the time of my writing this letter and your answering it.

I am, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

G. Harrison, Esq., to Colonel Bunbury.

SIR, Treasury Chambers, 1st Feb., 1814.

In answer to your letter of the 30th ultimo respecting a further supply of moveable hospitals for the use of the army under the Marquess of Wellington, I have it in command from the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a letter from Commissary-General Kennedy, and I am to desire you will submit the same to the consideration of Earl Bathurst, and suggest for his Lordship's consideration whether he would not deem it advisable, under the circumstances stated by Commissary-General Kennedy, that the actual provision of these hospitals should be suspended until his Lordship can have a further communication with the Marquess of Wellington thereon: at the same time my Lords will give directions that such measures of preparation may be taken as may

prevent as much as possible any inconvenience to the service from the delay which may be occasioned by this further communication.

I am, &c.,

GEO. HARRISON.

II.

Sir R. H. Kennedy to J. C. Herries, Esq.

SIR, Head-Quarters, Lesaca, 19th Aug., 1813.

With reference to your letter of the 5th May, respecting the field hospitals provided by you for this army, I have the honour to acquaint you they have been landed at Oporto, and are now ordered to be sent round to Santander.

They will probably be found useful at the seaports, but I consider it totally impracticable to employ them with the army; as I have never yet found it possible to collect a fourth part of the number of carts, for the general service of the army, requisite for their conveyance, and since we entered Spain I am very sorry to say that we have not been able to obtain carts or any kind of conveyance from the authorities of the country; nor indeed assistance from them of any kind.

It is a remarkable fact that not one cart or mule has been supplied by the magistrates at Vitoria, where the great accumulation of sick and wounded men made it so necessary that conveyance should be provided for their removal to the rear, to the general hospital at Bilboa.

I have, &c.,

R. H. KENNEDY.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, 2 Février, 1814.

Je suis sûr que le Duc de Guiche ne vous aura pas laissé ignorer le vif désir que j'éprouve depuis longtems de vous joindre, et de connoître le héros à qui j'espère que le Roi, mon oncle, devra en grande partie son rétablissement sur son trône. Vous ne devez pas ignorer non plus, Mylord, que votre gouvernement, après m'avoir refusé officiellement des passeports, m'en a donné sous des noms supposés. Mon premier désir étoit de me rendre sur le champ auprès de vous comme Comte de Pradel; mais ayant éprouvé quelques retards pour des chevaux à St. Sébastien, n'étant arrivé ici que fort tard, et désirant par dessus tout n'agir que parfaitement d'accord et avec une entière confiance en vous, Mylord, soyez assez bon pour me faire dire si vous voulez que j'arrive à votre quartier-général comme Comte de Pradel, gentilhomme François, ou comme Duc d'Angoulême. J'attendrai ici votre réponse avec une grande impatience.

Ce sera un vrai bonheur pour moi, Mylord, de me trouver auprès de vous, et de pouvoir vous témoigner verbalement tous les sentiments d'admiration, de reconnoissance, et d'attachement que toute ma famille éprouve pour vous, et avec lesquels je vous prie de me croire,

Mylord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Commodore Sir G. R. Collier to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Pasages, 2nd Feb., 1814.

I have just now delivered to Mr. Strachan, of the Commissariat, the barometer which has been so useful to me, and, if it arrives safe, will perhaps prove as useful to your Lordship. It will go by a man on foot, as I wish it to be taken up with the end kept uppermost as marked. When taken out of its case it must be inverted with a quick turn; after which the bottom screws will be gradually loosened till it stops; and as the mercury may not run down (from the contraction of the leather sack) very quickly, the tube may be gently struck with a key or finger. I have sent my brass crane to support it, as observed in my first letter of this day, as the barometer would not fit in the one your Lordship returned.

In a room it may be suspended by a ribbon or line from the centre, so as to be just clear of the ground or wall. Zero on the nonius will be set equal with the mercury, as in common barometers. I will presume to give some of its indications as to changes of weather before I sail, but it may be as well just to observe for the present that previous to south-west or south winds it begins to fall, and that the harder it is to blow, or the worse the weather is, the lower the mercury falls. The least intended change of wind to the north shows itself by a small rise in the mercury; if it continues, fine weather may be expected, though sometimes blowing strong from the northward. If it rises half an inch above change, settled weather may be expected, or calm; and if thence it continues to rise, an easterly wind is certain. The dry east wind, and blowing hard, makes the quicksilver mount to its greatest height, from which, whenever it begins to fall, calm, or bad weather, is certain; and reckoning upon 24 to 48 hours' notice from the first moment you observe the mercury to fall, will be generally right; but if it falls very gradually and slowly, 12 to 24 hours may be added; after which, if five-tenths below CHANGE, *a heavy gale of wind and bad weather* is as certain as that I am now writing. If it falls low and suddenly, lightning may sometimes be the cause; the electric fluid acting very strongly upon the mercury, though confined within glass. In replacing it, the tube must be inverted with a quick motion after one turn of the lower screw has been given, and then gently screwed till you feel a resistance, and, if possible, carried in that inverted perpendicular position, to prevent the jerk of the quicksilver from breaking the tube. I have made these comments much longer than I intended, so that it is scarcely necessary to add anything more than that, if no mercury has been lost on the journey, your Lordship may depend upon the indications of this glass, and most particularly from dry weather to the opposite change. If small specks are observed in the quicksilver, it is to be apprehended that air has insinuated itself into the bag during the journey, and many of these derange the barometer.

I have received the miniature painting, and shall take great care of the same. I beg to repeat my sense of obligation to your Lordship, and to express the hope that, if a frigate is offered your Lordship at any future time, you will select the *Leander*.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
GEORGE R. COLLIER.

A fair wind for England is promised.

Sir C. W. Flint to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Irish Office, 2nd Feb., 1814.

Whenever your Lordship has a moment to throw away, the enclosed extract will afford you some amusement, although the picture of Holland is not exactly what one could wish.

Did the *envoi* of preserved meat ever reach your Lordship? If it did not, I must get my friend to send you another case, as he is most desirous of knowing your opinion respecting the discovery.

I keep my packet open for a letter which Mr. Pole gave me reason to expect he would send me to-day for your Lordship.

I hear nothing new; but we may expect something *decisive* either one way or the other in the course of the week. I fear peace myself. But should a battle take place and Buonaparte be defeated, the result may yet be what every good man must devoutly desire.

Ever your Lordship's most obliged and devoted servant,

C. W. FLINT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Extract of a Private Letter from Holland.

Hague, 25th Dec., 1813.

I doubt whether it ever fell to the lot of an obscure individual like myself to be a witness of so many interesting scenes as have forced themselves as it were on my attention in the course of the journey which I have now performed from the Adriatic to the North Sea, and during the period that I remained at head-quarters. This varied picture comprehends the extremes of human splendour and human misery.

Emperors, kings, princes, statesmen, and generals of all countries, covered with stars, crosses, and decorations of every kind, form the principal group; next come the troops, of which the most remarkable for military appearances are the Hungarian grenadiers, Russian and Prussian guards, Cossacks of the Don and Black Sea. The most singular are the Bashkirs, Calmucks, and all the tribes of greasy Tartars, with their bows and arrows slung at the back and their provisions and booty under the saddle. You may always calculate the wealth of a Bashkir by the distance between his breech and the horse's back. The most interesting, the bravest and the best conducted in every respect, are the Prussian troops, which consist of persons belonging to all classes of society, from the highest to the lowest. I have not unfrequently found professors from the Prussian Universities, with their pupils, fighting side by side in the ranks and sharing the fare of the common soldiers. This was the case with the nephew of the Prussian Prime Minister, Hardenberg, and the son of the minister Humboldt, both boys who were wounded at Culm. Koerner, a celebrated German poet, with whom I was well acquainted, after having successfully endeavoured to rouse the patriotism of the Germans by his verses, resolved to defend the independence of his country with his sword. He escaped from the treacherous massacre of the corps of Lutzow by swimming over a river, and was killed after the battle of Katzbach by a French officer, his prisoner, whom he had neglected to disarm. I mention these little anecdotes merely

to show you the kind of personal interest which I feel in the events that are daily occurring; and it is with the same view and not from any motive of vanity I inform you that I am acquainted personally with almost every man of distinction in the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Cabinets and armies. It is not necessary, nor indeed would it be agreeable, to dwell on the gloomy side of the picture: its principal features are devastation in every form, ruined and smoking villages, fields covered with the dead bodies of men and horses, the air infected with their stench, and the roads occasionally lined for several miles with sick and wounded. This is, in my opinion, the most dreadful feature of war. The first time I ever saw a dead soldier on the road I got out of my carriage, felt his pulse, poured wine into his mouth, and turned him over and over again to see if there was no spark of life remaining. On seeing a second and third I reflected on the inconvenience and inutility of getting out of my carriage, and I believe I could now ride over a field of slain with something approaching to indifference; but although I have seen thousands and thousands of sick and wounded in the wars of 1806, 1809, and the present, the sight still chills me with horror, and I am unable for several days to banish the dismal image from my mind. Surely nothing in nature can be so distressing as to see intense bodily suffering depicted in several thousand varieties of the human countenance, particularly where the sufferers, as is the case in the present war, are for the most part young. Previous to the battle of Leipsic there were 27,000 sick and wounded in the hospitals of that city, the population of which only amounted to 30,000: after the battle there were in Leipsic and its neighbourhood upwards of 90,000 of the same unfortunate description. Although the Cossacks have shown the most undaunted courage and have rendered very important services in the present war, I have scarcely ever seen one of them wounded, and have heard the same observation made by several persons who, like myself, have visited the hospitals to ascertain the fact, which can only be accounted for by their well-known address both in fighting and running away, which latter qualification they turn to as much account as the former. They steal in through the woods or ravines behind the enemy's outposts, attack if they are considerably superior in number; if not, they alarm him, then hurrah and ride off to another part of the line to play the same trick. This they repeat several times during the day and night, so that the enemy's horses get galled from being constantly saddled, and the men worn out from being kept in perpetual alarm. The fondness of Cossacks for children is a remarkable trait in their character, and contrasts singularly with that ferocity which they have shown on many occasions. In an hour or two after a pulk of Cossacks have entered a town or village, they are sure to be acquainted with every child in the place, and seem delighted to play with their little companions whilst the Russian and German soldiers are drinking or sleeping. I saw the celebrated Hettman Platow for the first time at Frankfort: he speaks no language but Russian, and observed the ancient simplicity of costume so faithfully when I saw him, that I should not have distinguished him from a common Cossack had I not been told who he was. I was walking at the time with Sir Robert Wilson, whom he stopped to tell him, through an interpreter, that it was evident he (Sir Robert) no longer loved him, and he wished to know the reason why. Orlow Denisow, second in command, is very different in appearance from the Hettman, although still perfectly Cossack: he always rides a beautiful Arabian charger, and is perhaps the most perfect specimen of Cossack splendour that it is possible to see. On the 7th instant, the day previous to my departure from Frankfort, I was in company with General Wrede, who you will recollect received a ball in his abdomen at the

battle of Hanau. He is perfectly recovered, and told me that having determined to get on horseback contrary to the advice of his surgeon, the effort which he made to get into the saddle forced the ball into a position where it does not give him the least pain. You will have great pleasure in hearing that although the flower of chivalry may be said to be collected together from all parts of Europe, the few English officers who are with the armies decidedly bear away the palm of superior courage and enterprise. The Honourable Sir C. Stewart and Sir R. Wilson, with their aides-de-camp, are always at the post of danger, and seem to have no other object in view than to go in quest of death wherever it is most likely to be found. This appears the more remarkable, as one is now a diplomatist and the other is merely an amateur, without any official appointment, military or civil; but, as the Yorkshireman says, "they takes deloight in foighting." Sir Robert wears five stars and two medals, which he has received from different sovereigns; Sir Charles wears a constellation.

I know not whether the wretched state of my health makes me see everything with a jaundiced eye, but I think this the most disagreeable country I ever was in. The Hague, it is true, is pretty; a native of the fens of Lincolnshire might call it beautiful: it looks like a scenic decoration, and one expects every moment to see groups of shepherds and shepherdesses start out from under the trees; but as I have lately visited the finest parts of Europe, the bold and beautiful mountains of Albania, the lovely Zante, flower of the Levant, I cannot relish a country which seems destined by nature to be the domain of fishes. The distorted trees, bent fences, triangular grass-plats, and the whole artificial arrangements of this country, remind me of an epigram which was written on a garden at Cambridge:—

"This little garden little Joet made,
And fenced it with a little palisade;
A little taste hath little Doctor Joet;
This little garden doth a little show it."

The women here all look fishy, the men spongy: the canals, of which I had heard so much, are more like stagnant masses of barley-broth than that pure element which in other countries gives such a charm to picturesque scenery. I have heard Amsterdam compared to Venice—a comparison which holds good only so far as they are both the productions of human industry in defiance of nature, and are both intersected by numerous canals; but Venice bears the stamp of genius, taste, and enterprise, whereas in Holland the mind is continually brought back to the contemplation of mud in various degrees of consistency. I read a great deal about the enthusiasm of the Dutch in the English papers; but I have not seen anything of the kind amongst these lively turtles, and am assured by people established in this country that it never has existed. But the English are so given to enthusiasm, that they think all the world must be like themselves: for my part, I have seen more of what is usually called enthusiasm in England in one month, whether the object was Buonaparte or Burdett, Lord Wellington or Mrs. Clarke, than I have witnessed on the Continent in six years.

I believe that a very proper kind of enthusiasm existed in Prussia some months ago; but I was not in time to be a witness of it: in every other part of the Continent that I have been in, the government have taken good care to suppress it. But to return to Holland. It was not the Dutch who rose against their oppressors; but the French who, thinking the game lost, threw up their cards. So long as a French authority remained at its post, the Dutch

were obedient. The history of Amsterdam will give you that of all Holland; for the capital generally gives the tone of feeling to the whole country.

The moment the Governor-General, Le Brun, heard of the approach of General Bülow, he took French leave, without appointing a deputy or nominating any provisional government. His underlings followed his example; and as soon as the coast was perfectly clear, the loyal and virtuous mob rose in wrath, which it vented on the houses that had been occupied by the French douaniers, and would probably have extended its patriotic fury to the whole city, had not the people of respectability armed themselves for the protection of their property. Some conflicts took place in the streets, in which about twenty-five Dutchmen were killed or wounded: no Frenchman of course suffered, as they had previously made their escape. The provisional government which was formed conceived the romantic idea that an army might be raised and maintained by voluntary offers of service and voluntary contributions; but the Dutch seeming to think that the cheapest independence is the best, the measure fell to the ground. The Prince has adopted the wise resolution of continuing the conscription in force under another name and raising money by loan, so that we may hope to see in a short time an army formed which will be capable of contributing, at least, to the defence of the country; but as to any disposable force for operations out of the country, that is completely out of the question.

[731.] *To Senhor Joaquin Severino Gomez.*

SENHOR, St. Jean de Luz, 3rd Feb., 1814.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 24th January, in which you have enclosed one addressed to me by Her Royal Highness the Princess of Brazil. I perfectly recollect the conversation which I had with you when I was at Cadiz in January, 1813. It related to certain measures then supposed to be in the contemplation of some members of the Cortes to appoint the Princess Regent of Spain, in favour of which you wished that I should exert any influence I might be supposed to possess. My answer was, that as a foreigner I could have nothing to do with such an arrangement; that I was the servant of the three Powers in alliance in the Peninsula; that I had not been made acquainted with the wishes of the three Powers or of any one of them on that subject; and that till I should be so, it was impossible for me to give an opinion or to express a wish upon it: that I had besides been informed that the Princess had entertained and delivered very strong opinions against the alliance of the Powers of the Peninsula with His Majesty; that I was not so prejudiced in favour of the English nation as to think that it was impossible that such opinions

could be really and with propriety entertained in the ordinary circumstances of either country, but that a person under the present existing circumstances of Spain and Portugal thinking of breaking the alliance with Great Britain must be either "fool or knave," as it was obvious that the inevitable consequence must be to throw both the countries into the hands of France.

This was, as well as I recollect, the purport of what I said; and I am quite certain of the last part.

In answer to that part of your letter in which you state that you have orders to promote the establishment of a government in Spain "which shall be respected by the nation and favourable to the interests of Great Britain," I have to inform you that, in my opinion, Great Britain can have no interest in the question that is not the same as that of Spain herself, viz., to have a strong and permanent government capable of conducting the measures for carrying on the war. Such a government is the greatest blessing that can be enjoyed by any nation. But I conceive that as a foreigner I have no business to interfere in any manner in such concerns, and I beg leave to recommend this consideration to your attention.

As you have written to me upon the subject, I will also candidly confess to you that, knowing the disinclination of the Spanish nation that any foreigner shall interfere in their concerns, I am decidedly of opinion that if your predecessor and yourself had never interfered at all, the claims of the Princess to the Regency would have been much nearer a favourable decision than they are at present.

I enclose a letter for the Princess in answer to that which she did me the honour of addressing me; and as you did me the favour of mentioning to Her Royal Highness what you thought passed between us in January last, I shall be much obliged to you if you will send her this statement of what I recollect of it.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Oyarzun, ce 3 Fév., 1814, à 8 h. du matin.

Je reçois dans ce moment votre lettre par M. Fremantle.* Ayant une entière confiance en vous, Mylord, et malgré mon empressement désirant me conformer en tout à vos sentiments, je m'arrêterai à Urun, comme vous le dira M. Fremantle, pour attendre ce que vous jugerez le plus convenable, et je vous prie de vouloir bien m'y faire connoître vos désirs. Je suppose y être sur les midi.

Agréez, je vous prie, l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle je suis, Mylord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL, Langres, 3rd Feb., 1814.

I delayed my departure to receive and forward the official reports of the victory, which I trust will yet fructify to greater results, and I am now just setting off to Châtillon. The effects of this battle cannot fail to be most advantageous in all points of view, as well in confirming the improved temper of the Allied councils as in dissipating much of the alarm that was felt by some of the highest military authorities on the possible embarrassment of the Allied positions. It is unfortunate that Knesebeck's memoir fell into the enemy's hands: it was taken upon a courier by the peasants passing to Blücher's army.

I dined yesterday with the Emperor of Austria, and had a long and very unreserved conversation with him after we broke up. It was evident from His Imperial Majesty's conversation that Prince Metternich had reported to him what passed between us at Basle. The Emperor spoke very openly upon the different alternatives to which the events in progress might lead, and seemed earnestly to deprecate, for his own interest, its taking the shape of a regency. His Imperial Majesty spoke so unreservedly, and is in his nature so entirely above all disguise, that I am sure, with reasonable councils as to the conduct of our interests, he will not embarrass any course of policy to which events may lead, and which can be made subservient to his main object, which is a solid, and, if possible, an early peace.

I am just returned from Prince Metternich, to whom I communicated your private letter relative to Monsieur's visit to Switzerland, mentioning at the same time that you understood he would be authorised, on the part of Louis XVIII., to declare his readiness, if restored, to conclude a peace with the Allies upon the basis of 1789. His observation was "Voilà la question bien placée, et nous verrons que la nation en dira." I think these two anecdotes will satisfy you that Austria is not disposed to be unreasonable on this question, if not pushed too far or too fast.

In haste, my dear Liverpool, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

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* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, letter dated 2nd February, 1814, vol. xi. p. 494.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 3rd Feb., 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Field Officers	31	14	45
Captains	96	20	116
Subalterns	199	68	267
Staff	93	51	144
Quartermasters of Cavalry	18	5	23
Serjeants :—			
Present	549	74	623
Sick :—			
Present	6	..	6
Absent	6	.	6
Command	58	18	76
Prisoners of War and Missing	6	..	6
Trumpeters :—			
Present	101	45	146
Sick :—			
Present	4	1	5
Absent	2	1	3
Command	3	4	7
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File :—			
Present	7309	1206	8515
Sick :—			
Present	175	48	223
Absent	245	27	272
Command	554	394	948
Prisoners of War and Missing	197	..	197
Horses :—			
Present	6978	1129	8107
Sick	311	67	378
Command	310	270	580
Alterations :—			
Horses :—			
Dead	4	..	4

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 3rd Feb., 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	14	12	26
Lieutenant-Colonels	50	23	73
Majors	84	40	124
Captains	465	166	631
Lieutenants	928	200	1128
Cornets or Ensigns	296	314	610
Staff	396	462	858
Quartermasters of Cavalry	18	5	23
Serjeants :—			
Present	2725	1376	4101
Sick :—			
Present	105	55	160
Absent	497	139	636
Command	399	220	619
Prisoners of War and Missing	62	3	65
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1020	517	1537
Sick :—			
Present	29	11	40
Absent	105	19	124
Command	30	46	76
Prisoners of War and Missing	42	6	48
Rank and File :—			
Present	37,006	20,274	57,280
Sick :—			
Present	1951	912	2863
Absent	11,409	4394	15,803
Command	3152	1881	5033
Prisoners of War and Missing	2648	332	2980
Horses :—			
Present	6978	1129	8107
Sick	311	67	378
Command	310	270	580
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	..	1	1
Dead	13	5	18
Deserted	9	1	10
Transferred	10	5	15
Promoted	..	1	1
Reduced	2	1	3
Horses :—			
Dead	4	..	4

E. PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

The Earl of Clancarty to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD, The Hague, 5th Feb., 1814.

I most sincerely congratulate you on the capitulation of Gorcum, which, now that I am informed of the general outline of the terms, I the more rejoice at in consequence of some conversation which I had on Thursday last, both with M. Fagel (the Ambassador) and the Prince of Orange. The former called upon me at an early hour on that day, stating that he came to me directly from the Prince in order to represent to me that hostilities had been renewed, after a short cessation of arms, between the troops blockading that place and the garrison of Gorcum; that the power of overflooding the whole of the rich country of the Albesser Waert was in the hands of the enemy; that an exertion of this power would ruin thousands, and necessitate advances from the state which must necessarily crush their exertions in the common cause unless aided by us; that the tenacity of the garrison could only be attributed to their fear of being made prisoners of war; and that he was commissioned by the Prince to consult me upon the propriety of offering terms to the garrison, by which, upon their surrender, they should be allowed to return to France. I told M. Fagel that to admit of this would be highly objectionable; that he must be aware how anxious the Allies had shown themselves, and with good reason, to prevent the return of troops composing the garrisons of blockaded places to France, there again to make efficient head against them; that, however much it was the Prince's duty to watch over the interests of those immediately confided to his care, these interests would be best consulted by acting on the general principles of the alliance; and that if he had a duty to perform to those immediately under his care, he had also one of a no less pressing, and in my mind more important nature to perform to the Allies, without whose means the liberation of these countries could never have been effected or maintained. M. Fagel seemed to enter completely into my arguments on this subject; and as I was just going to His Royal Highness's audience, he told me that the Prince would probably address me upon this point, and requested me to state the arguments I had urged in conversation with him to His Royal Highness. Almost immediately upon my entering the room the Prince of Orange asked me whether I had seen M. Fagel, and what the result had been. I answered by stating among others the arguments I had urged to M. Fagel, and the conclusion I was of opinion ought to be drawn therefrom. He replied that in that case I was responsible for all the losses which might be incurred by his people and all the damage they must sustain from the inundations, which would necessarily oblige his treasury to make advances from its funds to indemnify the sufferers, and thereby prevent those funds from being applied in aid of the general cause. To this I observed that it was a little hard to place me thus between a doubled responsibility: that in the one case, if I should admit the offer of the terms suggested to the garrison of Gorcum, His Royal Highness would ride off upon my responsibility *vis-à-vis* the Allies; that in the other case my responsibility might also eventually be brought forth to exempt His Royal

Highness from those efforts which I was sure a moment's reflection would sufficiently persuade him ought under every circumstance to be made by his government for the general cause. That the Russian, the Prussian, and the British governments had also made sacrifices abundantly great, of which the Dutch government were now actually enjoying the fruits; and should it be said, or could it stand to reason, that no sacrifice whatever was to be made by the Dutch for the maintenance of their independence? His Royal Highness said that he had no intention of placing me in a state of irksome responsibility, but of consulting with me on the expediency of a measure, and that he would not act in this instance in opposition to my opinion. I told him that without caring much for responsibility in matters wherein I conceived myself as at present in the right, I had no hesitation in giving it as my decided opinion to His Royal Highness that no terms ought to be offered to the commandant at Gorcum which should permit the garrison to return to France. From what I have above written you may judge whether it does not give me satisfaction to have heard that the garrison are to surrender prisoners of war on the 20th, and that in the mean time the Digues are to be repaired.

Before the messenger who left Sir Thomas Graham with the note addressed to me quoted in my despatch quitted Merxem, which was at ½ past 12 yesterday, he says that one of the great towers of the church had fallen in consequence of our fire: what credit is to be placed to this account I know not; the messenger is a Dutchman, otherwise unknown to me.

It was strongly reported at Rotterdam this morning that Buonaparte immediately upon leaving Paris visited the northern fortifications, and had been at Lisle. You will recollect that there have been considerable movements among the populace in these districts on account of the conscriptions.

Yours, my dear Lord, very sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

[732.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL, St. Jean de Luz, 6th Feb., 1814.

The gentleman who will deliver you this letter has come out from Bayonne, and is desirous of getting back again across the Adour if he possibly can. Having spoken to Fane, he appears to think it not impossible that he might be sent across in the neighbourhood of La Hurce; and I therefore send him to you, and beg you to send him over the Adour if you can.

If you should not think it possible to send him over the Adour so as to enable him to pass through the French sentries before the moon will rise to-morrow night, that is about 7 P.M., I will then request you to send him to Sir Stapleton Cotton, at Has-

parren, and request him to endeavour to pass him through the French vedettes so that he may be able to reach Bayonne.

He has no apprehensions if he can pass the first vedettes unperceived.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

He may as well reconnoitre the opposite banks of the river during the day to-morrow.

Lord W. C. Bentinck to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Naples, 7th Feb., 1814.

I came here on the 31st, and have signed an Armistice with Murat. The treaty between him and Austria has been ratified. I have agreed with Count Neipperg, the Austrian General, who made the peace, that the disposable force of Sicily should land at Leghorn and operate along the Rivière de Gênes. The Austrians are to act on the north side of the Po, and Murat with the Neapolitans on the right bank. Upon a separate paper you will find the positions of the French and of the Allies according to our latest accounts. Bellegarde was to attack the enemy on the Adige on the 28th. I have received your letter of the 10th January.

I remain, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

W. C. BENTINCK.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Allied Army.

Left wing of Prince Schwarzenberg's army rested on Lyons, occupies Macon and Châlons.

Head-quarters of the Prince at Langres.

Imperial head-quarters at Vesoul.

Right wing of Prince Schwarzenberg's army, formed by the Bavarians, rested on Lunéville.

Maréchal Blücher and the Prussians before Menz; occupies Luxembourg, and has detachments at Louvain.

Sir Thomas Graham and General Bülow, in Holland, have opened their communication by Louvain, and their line extends from thence to Anvers.

The Prince Royal of Sweden is advancing; his head-quarters, when heard of last, were at Kiel in Holstein.

French Army

Is strongly posted behind the Marne, and occupies the line of Troyes, Châlons, and Dijon.

Châlons the head-quarters of Buonaparte.

All his army concentrated.

Davoust excepted, who is blockaded in Hamburgh by the army of Sweden.

Allied Army of Italy.

Maréchal Bellegarde's right is rested on the Tyrol, and extends as far as Trente.

His head-quarters at Vicenza.

His left is in conjunction with the Neapolitans, and is commanded by General Nugent; they are on the right bank of the Po.

Communication preserved with the main body by the bridges of Ferrara and Talia di Po; main road through Cammerchio. This force, composed of Austrians only, is 60,000 men.

The Neapolitan Army.

Advance at Modena.

Occupies the line of Bologna, Forlì, Ferrara, and Cesena.

Head-quarters of Murat at Rimini.

Rear at Pesaro, Fano, along the Adriatic to Ancona, where a French garrison of 2000 men is blockaded.

The Château of St. Ange, at Rome, has also a French garrison of 2500, and is likewise blockaded.

Murat has declared he will not prolong his operations against these fortresses; but his batteries have for a fortnight been established, and not a shot been fired.

Beyond the frontier of the kingdom of Naples he has in motion 80,000 men.

Of these 12,000 are occupied by Rome and Ancona.

One division between Rimini and Ancona; second, in conjunction with General Nugent, between Rimini and Bologna; third, in advance, between Bologna and Modena.

The Viceroy's Army.

His left extends along Lake Guarda to Rivoli, a mountain pass in the Tyrol.

His head-quarters and centre are at Verona.

His right at Legnago: Mantua and Peschiera both are garrisoned: Alexandria and Genoa imperfectly.

The Viceroy's strength was 45,000 effective, but in this is included part of the garrison of Mantua: he is said, within the last week, to have received a reinforcement of 14,000 men; 10,000 of these conscripts from Toulon, 4000 Italians from the army of Suchet: this would render his force on the Adige equal to Maréchal Bellegarde's.

In Venice there is a French garrison of 8000 men, well supplied, but sickly; blockaded by a force nearly equal of Austrians.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 7th Feb., 1814.

I received yesterday morning your letter announcing the arrival of the Duc d'Angoulême, which I immediately communicated to M. de Luyando, who expressed himself to be much gratified by the intelligence. The courier, however, had anticipated my communication by proclaiming in the streets that Louis XVIII. was arrived with 45,000 men, and in the Concejo of to-day the arrival of the Duc d'Angoulême is announced. I have been

asked what is the ultimate object of the Duke's arrival? and whether the British government propose to support the claim of his family to the throne?

We have this moment received the intelligence of Suchet's having evacuated Catalonia, having left small garrisons in Barcelona and the other principal fortified places. I conclude that this intelligence has long since reached you.

I was told to-day that General Moreno, who is to succeed General O'Donoju, had been ordered not to leave his command until the arrival of his successor, which, if it be true, sufficiently accounts for his not having yet reached Madrid. General O'Donoju, in a communication which he was directed to make to the Cortes lately, made a violent attack upon General Freyre, whom he declared to have 70,000 men under his command. He also observed that the residence of the Inspector-General at the army was attended with great inconvenience.

Things go on much as usual. I hear that the Serviles are determined to change the government before the 15th of this month, on which day the Cortes are to adjourn to the 1st of March. They have brought forward the question relative to your command, the papers relating to which have been laid on the table for the information of those Deputies who have not yet seen them. I conclude that some resolution will be passed upon them immediately. For these ten days past I have not seen any of the Deputies.

I conclude you have heard of the arrestation of Lieutenant-General Probert at Baza, who it seems was sent here with a very large sum of money to forward the views of Buonaparte. It is reported that some of the Jacobins are a good deal implicated in this affair, and I am not without hopes that his examination may lead to the detection of all Buonaparte's agents, and of most of the enemies to Great Britain. General Probert is to be conveyed to Madrid in order to be examined, several questions having been put to him which he has declined answering excepting to the government. My despatches by the next packet which will be sent to you will contain all I know relative to this affair.

I enclose the decree of the Cortes relative to the measures to be adopted in the event of the arrival of the King upon the frontier. It is much more respectful to the King than the paper transmitted with my last despatches.

I have agreed with M. Luyando that I should write to him suggesting the expediency of granting you a power of liberating all officers and soldiers subjects of the powers actually at war with France, and I hope to forward this permission to you by the next post.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Rear-Admiral Penrose to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, *Porcupine*, Pasages, 8th Feb., 1814.

I have the honour to enclose a hasty sketch of a plan for a boom, which I, some time since, submitted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, calculated to obviate many of the objections to which booms in general have been liable.

The length and size of each log or float must depend upon the materials to be procured, and the enemy to be guarded against, as well as the time allowed for preparation.

They may be formed of small spars frapped together, junks of old masts, or the spare spars of ships of war, but these varieties do not affect the principle of the boom proposed.

I will however add, from some trial and experience, that where they can be got, junks of lower masts, of the length most convenient, are the best materials; and if those are well pitched, and thickly stuck with gravel while hot, the composition will offer the best resistance to the stroke of an axe. If there is time, of course the farther and usual precautions of casing and frapping with iron hoops, bars, &c. &c. may be resorted to.

To construct the boom sketched in the plan, one line of spars of the respective length is to be formed by anchoring each separately by an anchor or other weight sufficient to ride them, and offer some resistance in case of the boom being attempted. The spars should not be more than half their length asunder.

At a convenient distance within this first line, anchor other spars in the same manner with anchors or weights in the opposite direction; but these anchors need only be sufficient to ride or steady the spars, as no resistance can come against them, but the weight of tide. The length of cable, &c.; must of course depend on the depth of water; and chains are certainly preferable if to be had, or at least some few feet from the spars.

Some distance within the extremes of the spars are to be fixed, so as to be all under water, chains connecting them together.

The ends of the outer line may be secured according to situation. A loose chain hanging from the ends of the spars may be an additional precaution.

The line thus formed would offer to the ship attempting to break it an obstacle yielding in all its parts, and offering the spars in every variety of oblique and changeable directions to every succeeding vessel that attempts the boom.

The sketch of the boom will, I conceive, show this clearer than any extended description I could offer.

A chevaux de frise, near the shore, and under water, between the first and second lines, would be desirable.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
W. PENROSE.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 9th Feb., 1814.

Herewith I have the honour of transmitting for your information and guidance the copy of a despatch which I have received from Lord Castlereagh, enclosing the copy of a treaty of peace and alliance which has been concluded between Austria and Naples, and was signed at Naples on the 8th ultimo.

I am to request that your Lordship will be pleased to communicate the same to Sir Henry Wellesley.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD, Basle, 22nd Jan., 1814.

Having received from Prince Metternich an official communication that the Emperor of Austria has concluded a treaty with the person exercising the government of Naples, of which your Lordship will receive a copy enclosed, I have instructed Lord William Bentinck to the effect contained in the despatch herewith sent, which I trust the Prince Regent will approve under the circumstances of the case, and the importance of accumulating every possible exertion at this great crisis against the common enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

II.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck.

MY LORD, Basle, 22nd Jan., 1814.

The Emperor of Austria having entered into engagements with the person now exercising the government of Naples, by the tenor of which engagements it is agreed that a corps of Neapolitan troops, of not less than 30,000 men, should immediately join the Austrian army of Italy for the purpose of acting offensively against the common enemy, I am to signify to your Lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure that so soon as you receive from His Imperial Majesty s Minister at Naples, the Count Neipperg, a copy of this treaty, your Lordship do immediately, upon the faith of that instrument, suspend hostilities against the government of Naples on the part of Great Britain; and I am also to direct that you will take measures for prevailing upon His Sicilian Majesty to do the same.

I shall, as soon as I arrive at the head-quarters at Chaumont, procure from the Earl of Aberdeen the correspondence which has passed upon this subject between the Courts of Vienna and St. James's, and furnish your Lordship with the instructions necessary for the direction of your conduct upon this important subject.

The treaty actually signed having been returned by Count Metternich to Count Neipperg to have some alterations made in its details, I enclose a copy of it as it is proposed to be amended, in order that your Lordship may see that the act as executed is substantially conformable to the intentions of the Austrian government as notified to me.

You will signify to His Britannic Majesty's officers by sea and land, as far as circumstances will permit, the armistice, should it be concluded, for the direction of their conduct.

I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

III.

Traité entre les Cours de Vienne et Naples.

Au nom de la Très-Sainte et Indivisible Trinité :

S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, et S.M. le Roi de Naples, désirant cémenter par l'union la plus intime le bien-être de leurs états respectifs, et aviser en même tems aux moyens les plus propres d'assurer à l'Europe, et en particulier aux peuples de l'Italie, un état de paix durable fondé sur l'indépendance et l'équilibre des puissances, ont résolu de stipuler entr'eux un traité d'alliance pour réunir leurs efforts à l'effet d'obtenir le but qu'ils se proposent. En conséquence ils ont nommé, savoir :—

S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Sieur Adam Albert Comte de Neipperg, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Marie Thérèse, Grand, Croix des Ordres de Ste. Anne de Russie, Chevalier de l'Ordre Militaire de St. George, Commandeur de l'Ordre Militaire de l'Epée de Suède, Chambellan actuel, son Lieutenant-Général ; et S.M. le Roi de Naples, le Sieur Martino Mastielli, Duc de Gallo, Grand Dignitaire de l'Ordre des Deux Siciles et de celui de la Couronne de Fer, Chevalier de l'Ordre de la Toison d'Or, Conseiller d'Etat, et son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, sont convenus des articles suivans—

ART. 1.

Il y aura, à dater du jour de la signature du présent traité, amitié, alliance, et union sincère entre S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, et S.M. le Roi de Naples, leurs héritiers et successeurs, leurs états et sujets respectifs, à toute perpétuité. Les hautes parties contractantes apporteront la plus grande attention à maintenir entr'elles une amitié et correspondance réciproques, en évitant tout ce qui pourroit altérer l'union et la bonne intelligence si heureusement subsistantes entr'elles.

ART. 2.

L'alliance entre les hautes parties contractantes aura pour but la poursuite de la présente guerre, pour concourir, par la réunion de leurs efforts, au rétablissement d'un juste équilibre entre les puissances, et pour assurer un état de paix véritable à l'Europe, et en particulier à l'Italie, où les deux hautes puissances contractantes se garantissent la défense de leurs états et intérêts respectifs.

ART. 3.

Par suite de l'article précédent, les hautes parties contractantes sont convenues de s'aider avec tous les moyens que la Providence a mis à leur disposition, et de ne jamais poser les armes que d'un commun accord.

ART. 4.

S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, garantit à S.M. le Roi de Naples, et à ses héritiers et successeurs, la jouissance libre et paisible, ainsi que la souveraineté pleine et entière de tous les états que S.M. possède actuellement en Italie. S.M.I. et R.A. emploiera ses bons offices pour faire accéder ses Alliées à la présente garantie.

Par contre, S.M. le Roi de Naples renonce, pour lui et ses successeurs, à toute prétention sur le royaume de Sicile, et se déclare prêt à en garantir la possession à la dynastie actuellement régnante.

ART. 5.

Pour préciser davantage les secours qui les hautes parties contractantes fourniront à la cause commune, S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, s'engage à tenir constamment en campagne 150,000 hommes, dont au moins 60,000 hommes pour agir en Italie. S.M. le Roi de Naples promet également de mettre en campagne un corps de 30,000 hommes effectifs. Ces troupes, partagées en un nombre proportionné d'infanterie, de cavalerie, et d'artillerie, seront constamment tenues au grand complet pendant la durée de la présente guerre.

ART. 6.

Dans les cas où les forces stipulées dans l'article précédent ne seroient pas suffisantes pour la défense des états et des intérêts communs, S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, et S.M. le Roi de Naples se promettent réciproquement d'augmenter leurs forces auxiliaires suivant l'exigeance du cas, et gardant toujours la même proportion établie dans l'article précédent.

ART. 7.

Dans le cas que S.M. le Roi de Naples se trouve à la tête de son armée, les troupes Autrichiennes qui se trouveront en ligne avec le corps Napolitain seront sous les ordres immédiats de ce monarque.

Dans le cas contraire, la grande armée Autrichienne en Italie se trouvant commandée par un Général, Feld Maréchal, ou Général Feldzeugmeister de S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, le corps Napolitain destiné à agir avec elle sera sous les ordres du dit Général.

Dans le cas de la présence de S.M. le Roi, les opérations seront réciproquement combinées et concertées de la manière la plus analogue aux intérêts communs et aux succès des armes des deux Alliés.

Dans le cas que S.M. le Roi ne soit pas présent à l'armée, le Général commandant les troupes Napolitaines aura à suivre les ordres du Général en chef de l'armée Autrichienne, d'après le plan concerté entre les deux armées.

ART. 8.

A cet effet il sera conclu de suite, après la signature du présent traité, une Convention militaire pour régler tout ce qui est relatif aux opérations des deux armées, aux lignes qu'elles auront à tenir, ainsi qu'à l'approvisionnement et à la subsistence des troupes respectives; mettant en principe que chacune des deux armées usera, de la manière qu'elle jugera à propos, des ressources des pays compris dans la ligne qui lui est assignée.

ART. 9.

Les trophées, butin, et prisonniers qu'on aura faits sur l'ennemi appartiendront aux troupes qui les auront pris.

ART. 10.

Les hautes parties contractantes se promettent réciproquement que ni l'une ni l'autre ne conclura ni trève ni paix sans y comprendre son allié.

ART. 11.

Il sera donné ordre aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres des hautes parties contractantes auprès des Cours étrangères de se prêter réciproquement leurs bons offices, et d'agir d'un parfait concert dans toutes les occurrences qui pourront regarder les intérêts de leurs souverains.

ART. 12.

S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, promet la restitution de tous les prisonniers Napolitains qui se trouvent en son pouvoir, et emploiera ses bons offices pour la restitution de ceux détenus par les puissances alliées.

ART. 13.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications seront échangées à Naples dans le plus court délai possible.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Naples, le 8 Janvier, 1814.

[L.S.] Le Comte de NEIPPERG. [L.S.] Le Duc de GALLO.

Articles Secrets.

ART. 1.

Afin de prévenir tout prétexte de contestation entre LL.MM. le Roi de Sicile et le Roi de Naples, S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, s'engage à employer tous les moyens pour obtenir en faveur de S.M. le Roi Joachim Napoléon et de sa descendance un acte de rénonciation formelle de S.M. le Roi de Sicile pour lui et ses successeurs à perpétuité à toutes ses prétentions sur le royaume de Naples. Cette rénonciation sera reconnue et garantie par S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche à S.M. le Roi de Naples, et S.M.I. s'emploiera près des autres puissances alliées pour en obtenir une égale reconnoissance et garantie. Les puissances alliées ne pouvant, cependant, admettre la garantie du royaume de Naples au Roi Joachim que contre l'engagement réciproquement contracté entr'elles de procurer de S.M. le Roi de Sicile une indemnité convenable, S.M. le Roi de Naples s'engage dès à présent à admettre le principe de cette indemnité; et les efforts de S.M. Napolitaine devant être dirigés vers tous les objets de la grande Alliance Européenne, elle prend spécialement l'engagement de les étendre à l'indemnité à procurer au Roi de Sicile.

ART. 2.

S.M.I. et R.A. s'engage pareillement à employer ses bons offices pour hâter la conclusion de la paix entre S.M. le Roi de Naples et S.M. le Roi de la Grande Bretagne sur des bases justes, solides, et mutuellement honorables, ainsi que pour le rétablissement de l'amitié et de la bonne intelligence entre S.M. le Roi de Naples et les autres puissances alliées de l'Autriche.

ART. 3.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes reconnoissant que S.M. le Roi de Naples ne peut éloigner ses troupes de son royaume plus qu'elles ne le sont à présent sans avoir la certitude qu'il n'y a pas à craindre de débarquement sur ses côtes, il demeure expressément convenu que S.M. Napolitaine ne pourra être dans l'obligation de faire agir activement son armée sur les plans d'opération à combiner qu'autant que la cessation des hostilités de la part de la Grande Bretagne aura été complètement assurée à S.M. Napolitaine.

ART. 4.

S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, s'engage à s'employer efficacement, à la paix générale, à l'effet de procurer à S.M. le Roi de

Naples, en indemnités des sacrifices et efforts que S.M. le Roi de Naples aura faits pour le soutien de la cause commune, une bonne frontière militaire, conforme aux intérêts politiques des deux puissances, et à leurs relations d'amitié et d'union, établies par le présent traité.

ART. 5.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes se réservent, à la paix générale, de se concerter plus particulièrement et avec la plus grande confiance pour conclure entr'elles un traité d'alliance défensive dans le but de se garantir réciproquement leurs états en Italie, et de concourir mutuellement aux avantages réciproques de leurs couronnes et de leurs sujets.

ART. 6.

Pour donner à S.M. le Roi de Naples une nouvelle preuve de son amitié et de son intérêt, S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, promet de garantir la souveraineté et la pleine jouissance des états que possède en Allemagne S.A. le Prince de Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, et d'employer ses bons offices pour obtenir des puissances ses alliés la même garantie, ainsi que les avantages qui sont compatibles avec les circonstances.

ART. 7.

La ligne militaire que l'armée Napolitaine prendra pour base, en vertu de l'Art. 8, sera le Bâs-Po, sur la rive droite du Presnars, jusqu'à son embouchure dans la mer.

Les articles secrets seront ratifiés séparément, et les ratifications en seront échangées en même tems que celles du traité de ce jour.

Fait à Naples le 8 Jan., 1814.

[L.S.] Comte de NEIPPERG. [L.S.] Duc de GALLO.

Article additionnel et secret.

S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, et S.M. le Roi de Naples, désirant dès à présent convenir d'un arrangement définitif, résultant des stipulations de l'Art. 4 du traité secret, signé à Naples le 8 Janvier, sont convenues, savoir : S.M.I. et R.A. d'assurer à S.M. Napolitaine une acquisition calculée sur l'échelle de 400,000 arpens, à prendre sur l'état Romain, et d'après la convenance mutuelle des deux états.

S.M.I. et R.A. prêtera ses bons offices pour faire admettre et sanctionner, par le St. Père et par ses Alliés, cette concession. S.M. le Roi de Naples, par contre, prend l'engagement formel de regarder cet engagement comme remplissant toutes ses prétentions à une acquisition territoriale.

Le présent article additionnel sera ratifié séparément, et les ratifications en seront échangées en même tems que celles des traités patent et secret de ce jour.

Fait à Naples le 8 Janvier, 1814.

[L.S.] Comte de NEIPPERG. [L.S.] Duc de GALLO.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Fife House, 9th Feb., 1814.

I enclose for your information a copy of a private letter from Lord Castlereagh, written after his first communications at Basle with the Austrian and Prussian governments.*

The Emperor of Russia and his Minister were in advance at Vesoul, and he had not therefore had an opportunity of personally knowing their sentiments upon the points to which this letter refers.

As far as we have been able to judge of the disposition of the people of France in the eastern provinces of that country which are now occupied by the Allies, and which include Lorraine, Alsace, Franche Comté, Burgundy, part of the Lyonnois, and part of Champagne, there appears to be a general abhorrence of the tyranny of Buonaparte, but there has not yet been manifested any sentiment whatever towards the Bourbons. The only part of France in which we have heard of any disposition of this nature (except in the district occupied by the army under your command), is in the lower part of Brittany, and in that district which was formerly denominated La Vendée; and even here the sentiment is by no means so prevalent as might have been expected, considering the tremendous conflict which subsisted for so considerable a length of time in that country.

At the same time I should not be surprised, if the Allies were so fortunate as to obtain another battle of Leipsic at Châlons, that the French nation would feel the advantage of returning to an order of things which would be more satisfactory to the Allied Powers than any other which could be adopted, and would certainly give to the French nation and to Europe the best chance of what they all want—a lasting peace.

The extreme imprudence of the French Princes renders any secret communication with them very hazardous. Could you have believed it possible that when the Prince Regent visited the Comte d'Artois, a few days before his departure for Switzerland, in consequence of his being confined by the gout, and chose to say civil things to him about his present prospects and the re-establishment of his brother on the throne of France, that the whole of what was said by the Prince upon that occasion was verbatim in one of the morning papers a few days after?

I can understand their wishing to commit us to their cause, if possible; but they must have known that words of that sort mean nothing, and that the publication of them could have no other effect than to mark their own imprudence.

I think that many weeks, and perhaps even days, cannot elapse before we hear of a great battle having taken place between the Allied armies and the French in the neighbourhood of Châlons. The reports from our officers at head-quarters are very encouraging. I confess I wish, however, that the line of operations of the Allies was not so extended.

If the Allies should gain a great battle in their present situation, either Buonaparte's power will be overturned, or he will be obliged to accept the terms of peace which they may think proper to dictate.

The belief at Paris I know to be that he will not return alive unless as conqueror.

* See page 533.

If, on the other hand, the Allies should receive a check, the advantages which they possess in numbers, in the discipline of their troops, in their artillery, and particularly in their cavalry, will probably enable them to make a retreat which the enemy would find great difficulty in materially impeding; and in the situation in which Buonaparte now is, with the conscription resisted throughout a great part of the country, without any national enthusiasm in his favour, and with all payments to the civil and ecclesiastical servants of government suspended, he will probably be too glad to avail himself of such an opportunity to agree to peace.

I do not see, therefore, at present any probability of the continuance of the war, unless some dissension should arise amongst the Allies; and though there are certainly seeds of disunion in this, as well as in all other great alliances, I am not apprehensive that they would break out under such circumstances so as to prevent the conclusion of peace, though I think they might in some degree affect the terms of it.

I have thus fully explained to you my view of our present prospects. We are thoroughly satisfied that the weather and state of the roads have been the impediments to your advancing.

If the money which has now been sent shall enable you to equip the Spaniards, and you can safely take a much more forward position in the country, great advantages might arise from it, even in the event of peace. The period between a preliminary and a definitive treaty is always critical, and the French would either have to negotiate with great disadvantage, the Allied armies being in possession of a considerable part of their territory, or they must purchase the evacuation of it by some such sacrifice as Buonaparte exacted at Marengo: that is, by a preliminary surrender of some strong places.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord,

Yours very faithfully,

LIVERPOOL.

MOVEMENT OF A PART OF THE ARMY. [733.*]

St. Jean de Luz, 10th Feb., 1814.

With a view to the troops under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill becoming disposable, the following arrangements are to take place:—

The 7th division is to move to the neighbourhood of the Adour, and is to be replaced in its present cantonments by either the 2nd division or the Portuguese division, as Sir Rowland Hill may direct.

Marshal Beresford will be pleased then to arrange the distribution of the 6th and 7th divisions with a view to these two divisions being charged with the defence of the position fronting Bayonne, between the rivers Nive and Adour; as also with the maintaining of the posts in the direction of Urt (now occupied by the troops under Sir Rowland Hill), and with the obstructing of the navigation of the Adour.

Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton will at the same time relieve the brigade of cavalry (13th and 14th regiments) which is towards Urt, and will canton it in the direction of Hasparren, replacing that brigade by such other body of cavalry as he may judge necessary to do the duties on the left of the line of outposts on the Laran river; the commanding officer of which cavalry is to be instructed by Sir Stapleton Cotton to report direct to the General officer commanding the 7th division.

Sir Rowland Hill will retain one of his divisions in the neighbourhood of the 7th division, and will canton it in the most advantageous manner for moving upon Hasparren; that division will do the outpost duties towards La Bastide, connecting its posts on the right with those of the 3rd division, and on the left with those of the 7th division.

The movement for the change of quarters of the 7th division with one of the divisions under Sir Rowland Hill is to take place on the 12th instant, as is also the relief of the brigade of cavalry, 13th and 14th regiments.

The General officers concerned in the above movements will be so good as communicate with each other respecting the most convenient mode of carrying them into effect, as also respecting the other details of this arrangement.

A separate instruction will be communicated relative to the arrangements connected with the further destination of the troops under the immediate orders of Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE ARTILLERY.

The half brigade of mountain guns at Urt is to remain there, and to be attached to the 7th division.

The half brigade of mountain guns with the 4th division is to join the troops under Sir Rowland Hill when sent for.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ross's troop of Horse Artillery will continue attached to the troops occupying the position fronting Bayonne, between the rivers Nive and Adour.

The brigade of artillery of the 2nd division will move with the troops under Sir Rowland Hill, and Captain Browne's troop of Horse Artillery will join the troops under Sir Rowland Hill on the 13th instant, at Urcaray.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 10th Feb., 1814.

Lord Liverpool will have written to you on what has passed at Basle on the subject of the Bourbons. The 'Moniteur' of the 6th instant announces negotiations having begun at Châtillon; and as it appears that Buonaparte has been obliged to retire to Troyes, if the Allies choose to treat with him peace must be made, as he is not in a situation to reject any terms which the Allies are likely to offer.

Your Lordship will know the result before you can receive my speculations, so I will only add that 150,000*l.* in dollars, and 50,000*l.* in foreign gold coin, have been purchased by the Bank, part of the cargo which came from Jamaica. But as they could not purchase it until it came to London, we shall be obliged to lose some days before it gets down to Portsmouth. On Tuesday next I hope it will sail, and I hope by that time another frigate will sail from Helvoet with about 200,000*l.* in gold; but of that I cannot be so certain.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Prince Metternich to Viscount Castlereagh.

Troyes, le 15 Février, 1814.

Le soussigné, Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrangères, a reçu la note par laquelle son Excellence Mylord Vicomte Castlereagh, principal Secrétaire de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères, lui demande, au nom de sa Cour, des explications sur les arrangemens convenus pour le Continent, et principalement à l'égard des trois puissances principales, et des assurances satisfaisantes sur les intérêts spécialement confiés à l'honneur et à l'intervention de la Grande Bretagne.

Il a reçu en même tems un projet de convention de la part de son Excellence, qui énonce les désirs du gouvernement Britannique sous ce dernier rapport.

Le soussigné, en déclarant qu'il est prêt à donner, de concert avec les autres Cabinets alliés, les explications les plus franches sur le premier objet, s'empresse de prévenir Mylord Castlereagh qu'ayant soumis le projet de convention en question à l'Empereur, il a été autorisé par Sa Majesté Impériale à en accepter le contenu, et à faire expédier un acte d'acceptation, qu'il a l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à son Excellence, et qui sera suivi le plutôt possible par une expédition dans les formes d'usage.

Le soussigné a l'honneur, etc.,

METTERNICH.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 16th Feb., 1814.

Colonel Bunbury, who arrived yesterday, will settle everything at the Admiralty as you wish. With respect to the provisional brigades and the

German corps, this is not the moment for making any alteration. If the war is to last beyond the spring, some arrangements must then be made on those subjects.

Lord Castlereagh's arrival at head-quarters was of great use. He has at least prevented a quarrel between the two Emperors. That of Russia disliked both Napoleon and the old family. He has just suspended the negotiations.

Lord Castlereagh has left Châtillon for Troyes, where the two Emperors and, I believe, the King of Prussia, are.

I doubt very much whether it is necessary to trouble you with any intelligence from France, as you will probably know much more than I can tell you by the time this letter reaches your Lordship.

I beg to return you my thanks for your civilities to my son.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 17th Feb., 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers:—			
Field Officers	30	15	45
Captains	98	21	119
Subalterns	196	68	264
Staff	95	51	146
Quartermasters of Cavalry	20	5	25
Serjeants:—			
Present	555	75	630
Sick:—			
Present	6	1	7
Absent	4	..	4
Command	52	17	69
Prisoners of War and Missing	7	..	7
Trumpeters:—			
Present	103	45	148
Sick:—			
Present	2	1	3
Absent	2	1	3
Command	2	4	6
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File:—			
Present	7315	1210	8525
Sick:—			
Present	189	37	226
Absent	219	22	241
Command	545	399	944
Prisoners of War and Missing	198	..	198
Horses:—			
Present	6978	1126	8104
Sick	278	66	344
Command	292	269	561

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, St. Jean de Luz, 17th Feb., 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	14	12	26
Lieutenant-Colonels	48	25	73
Majors	89	44	133
Captains	474	172	646
Lieutenants	940	206	1146
Cornets or Ensigns	281	317	598
Staff	396	457	853
Quartermasters of Cavalry	20	5	25
Serjeants :—			
Present	2760	1366	4126
Sick :—			
Present	92	56	148
Absent	494	134	628
Command	376	232	608
Prisoners of War and Missing	64	2	66
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1026	522	1548
Sick :—			
Present	24	7	31
Absent	105	19	124
Command	23	46	69
Prisoners of War and Missing	42	5	47
Rank and File :—			
Present	36,934	20,219	57,153
Sick :—			
Present	1864	859	2723
Absent	11,305	3537	14,842
Command	2923	2036	4959
Prisoners of War and Missing	2655	302	2957
Horses :—			
Present	6978	1126	8104
Sick	278	66	344
Command	292	269	561
Alterations :—			
Joined	..	2	2
Dead	17	1	18
Discharged	73	1	74
Deserted	4	151	155
Transferred	1	1	2
Promoted	1	..	1
Reduced	..	1	1

E. PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MYLORD, St. Jean de Luz, le 18 Février, 1814.

J'ai eu le plaisir de recevoir hier par le Colonel Sturgeon votre lettre du 16, et je vous remercie des bonnes nouvelles que vous m'y donnez. Je re-

grette seulement vivement de ne m'y être pas trouvé, et pour moi-même et pour les intérêts du Roi mon oncle. Je vous prie de me dire franchement si cela vous déplairoit que j'allasse vous faire une visite. Je viens de voir M. Maioz, dont j'ai été content. J'ai entendu dire qu'il étoit arrivé plus de 100 prisonniers ensemble. Je voudrois bien pouvoir les avoir, ainsi que tous les autres qui viendraient, et pouvoir leur faire arborer la cocarde blanche. Je regarderois comme très important en entrant dans une ville comme Pau, par exemple, d'y arriver à la tête d'un corps de François, ne fut-ce que de 200 hommes, avec la cocarde blanche. Quelques demandes que l'on m'ait faites je n'ai encore voulu répandre aucune de nos proclamations : n'en seroit-il pas bien tems, Mylord ? Je crains en différant encore de nuire aux intérêts du Roi, d'être désapprouvé par lui et de refroidir les braves dispositions que je trouve, car plusieurs maires me répondent de m'amener du monde. Peut-être aussi si les places étaient sommées par moi au nom du Roi, se rendroient-elles facilement. Veuillez bien me répondre sur tous ces points ; j'attendrais votre réponse avec impatience. Vous voyez, Mylord, la confiance et la franchise avec lesquels j'en ai agi envers vous depuis mon arrivé, puisque je n'ai rien voulu faire ni publier sans vous en parler et en être convenu avec vous. Soyez assuré de mon intention de continuer à me conduire de même. Vous avez en peu de jours presque doublé le pays que vous occupiez en France, cela me donneroit plus de facilités pour rassembler du monde, et pour y agir au nom du Roi.

Agréez, je vous prie, l'assurance de l'admiration qui me causent vos grands talents, toute la gloire que vous vous êtes acquise, et croyez au bien véritable attachement que vous m'avez inspiré, et avec lequel

Je suis, Mylord, votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

[734.] *To Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL, Garris, 19th Feb., 1814, 6 A.M.

Churchill has just left me.

If you can retake the Red House in the manner you took it yesterday morning, it is desirable to have it; but I should think the enemy would have covered themselves during the night from the effect of the fire of your artillery ; and it will not be very easy then to dislodge them, or to prevent them from working at the tête de pont, as it is most probable that our guns in the wood would be under the fire of theirs from the right bank of the river.

If you can't take the Red House, you had better hold the village of Arriverete as a tête de pont; the village on the right of the same river, where the Barca was, in the same manner,

in order to secure those passages; and St. Gloire, Barrante, &c., as advanced posts from them.

Your position in this case would be on the heights on the left of the Gave de Mauleon; and it is a very good one.

Morillo would occupy the upper fords and bridges in the same manner.

I think you had best leave the 3rd division where they are; those at St. Palais cover you from any movement by Mauleon, and the others your left. However, you will move them if you think proper.

I mention all this in case the enemy should undertake any enterprise against you, which is not very probable.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

In the position above mentioned, concealing your troops, and not making any movement of large bodies in sight of the enemy, you will be able to reconnoitre all the passages of the river within your reach.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MYLORD, St. Jean de Luz, le 19 Février, 1814.

Je n'ai reçu qu'hier au soir, par la poste militaire, votre lettre d'Hasparre du 15, au matin, qui répond à un des principaux articles de celle que je vous ai écrite hier matin. Si ce n'est que pour les incommodités et les fatigues, je puis vous assurer que je ne les crains pas. Sans vouloir faire de questions sur vos opérations ultérieures, j'espère, Mylord, que si quelqu'une de vos colonnes devoit pousser sur Pau, vous voudriez bien m'en prévenir, attachant un grand prix à entrer le plutôt possible dans cette ville, qui est le berceau d'Henri IV. et de toute notre famille.

Vous me dites un terrible mot sur la paix. Les nouvelles que M. St. Jean a reçues par Bayonne portent que le Congrès est dissous, et qu'il n'en est plus question. Je le désire vivement; mais j'avoue que vos craintes, Mylord, me donnent une vive inquiétude.

Je vous remercie infiniment les détails que vous avez chargé le Colonel Sturgeon et Lord G. Lennox de me donner sur l'affaire qui a eu lieu, ainsi que sur vos opérations, qui sont celles d'un grand homme.

Je dois vous prévenir qu'on a vu entre les mains d'un habitant un exemplaire imprimé de mon adresse aux François, et je puis vous certifier qu'il n'en est pas sorti un seul de chez moi de ceux qui m'ont été remis.

J'ai une véritable impatience de pouvoir vous renouveler de vive voix l'assurance de la haute considération et de tout l'attachement avec lesquels je suis, Mylord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Au Nom du Roi.

Le Duc d'Angoulême à l'Armée Française.

SOLDATS ! St. Jean de Luz, le 11 Février, 1814.

J'arrive ; je suis en France ; dans cette France qui m'est si chère ! je viens briser vos fers. Je viens déployer le drapeau blanc, ce drapeau sans tache, que vos pères suivoient avec transport. Ralliez vous y, braves Français, et marchons tous ensemble au renversement de la tyrannie.

Généraux, officiers, et soldats, qui vous rangerez sous l'antique bannière des Lys, au nom du Roi, mon oncle, qui m'a chargé de vous faire connoître ses intentions paternelles, je vous garantis vos grades, vos traitements, et des récompenses proportionnées à la fidélité de vos services.

Soldats Français ! c'est le petit-fils de Henri IV., c'est l'époux d'une Princesse dont les infortunes sont sans égales, mais dont tous les vœux sont pour le bonheur de la France ; c'est un Prince, oubliant ses peines à l'exemple de votre Roi, pour ne s'occuper que des vôtres, qui vient avec confiance se jeter dans vos bras.

Soldats ! mon espoir ne sera point trompé. Je suis le fils de vos Rois, et vous êtes Français.

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Par ordre de S. A. Royale,

Le Comte ETIENNE DE DAMAS.

Prince Metternich to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, Troyes, le 20 Février, 1814.

L'Empereur a écrit lui-même à Votre Excellence pour lui annoncer qu'il croit devoir aux services éminens qu'elle a rendus à la cause de l'Europe la marque la plus distinguée de son estime, et la récompense la plus brillante qu'il puisse décerner au mérite militaire.

Sa Majesté Impériale m'impose une obligation bien flatteuse, Mylord, en me chargeant, en ma qualité de Chancelier de l'Ordre de Marie-Thérèse, d'en transmettre la Grande Décoration à Votre Excellence. Je suis fier de remettre ce dépôt de l'honneur et de la bravoure entre des mains qui réfléchiront sur lui un nouveau lustre ; et je suis persuadé que les braves de toutes les nations aspireront désormais doublement à devenir membres du corps illustre dont Votre Excellence est l'un des principaux ornemens.

Recevez, Mylord, je vous prie, avec l'expression de tous les sentimens d'admiration que je vous ai voués depuis longtemps, celle de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être

De Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

METTERNICH.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, St. Jean de Luz, le 22 Février, 1814.

Je m'empresse de vous envoyer le Marquis de la Rochejaquelein et M. de Guériaux, qui arrivent de Bordeaux; et connoissant comme je le fais votre attachement pour notre cause, je suis sûr que vous serez content de ce qu'ils vous diront, et qu'ils dissiperont toutes vos inquiétudes sur la paix avec Buonaparte. M. de la Rochejaquelein est un homme très marquant et très dévoué, frère de celui qui a été tué à la Vendée, où il étoit un des principaux chefs. Je savois qu'il étoit à Bordeaux, et je connoissois ses principes et ses sentiments. J'attendrois votre retour, Mylord, avec une grande impatience, pour faire, de concert avec vous, les démarches qui me sont à présent commandées par mon devoir le plus strict. Le Duc de Guiche étant ici, j'ai pensé que vous ne désapprouveriez pas que je le chargeasse de vous mêner ces Messieurs.

Le Colonel Burgh m'a remis hier la lettre que vous m'avez écrite pour me faire part de votre départ.

C'est avec la plus haute considération, attachement, et confiance que je suis, Mylord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Sandhills at the mouth of the Adour,

MY DEAR LORD, 23rd Feb., 1814, 5 P.M.

I beg leave to inform you that yesterday forenoon, although the wind was not so favourable for getting out as might have been wished, the Admiral determined to endeavour to get the flotilla to sea, which was accomplished before dark. As soon as I was aware of this decision, every arrangement was made for moving the artillery, pontoons, and troops.

The extreme heaviness of the sand rendered it impracticable, though every exertion was used, to bring up the pontoons and 18-pounders to their stations till some hours after daybreak. Finding this state of things, I determined to occupy the enemy's attention by firing at the frigate and by threatening an attack at various points on his intrenched camp, and to make use of such boats as could be got up to pass over a few men to seize the opposite point of the mouth of the river.

This latter enterprise was accomplished, without opposition from the enemy, about noon this day. At this moment there is not the smallest appearance of the flotilla being able to get in, and a pilot who has come in to us informs me that as the surf on the bar now is, no vessels can come over it.

Notwithstanding this untoward circumstance, and the consequent want of naval means, I am in hopes that, with such rafts and flying bridges as we shall be able to construct or as are already constructed, I may be able this evening to pass over such a force as may maintain itself for a short time, and that to-morrow morning I may get the rest of the troops also to the right bank. The largest number that I expect to be able to withdraw from the blockade on this side will amount to about 10,000 men; and if

circumstances favour us, I hope to be able to move on with that force to-morrow. I feel that in persevering without the expected naval co-operations to enable us to maintain the communication, I am incurring considerable responsibility; but, as the object is desirable, I have determined to persevere, and your Lordship will judge of the expediency of reinforcing me or not.

I have been under the necessity of bringing back one brigade of the 5th division to the bridge of Urdain. General Freyre will place his corps in two lines: the first occupying the ground from the Château de Bellevue towards Anglet; the second from Arcangues towards the mayor's house. Lord Aylmer I propose to place at Bas Anglet, it being of the utmost importance to keep in check any attempt which the enemy might make from the right of his intrenched camp upon our communication across the river.

The enemy appears to have a considerable number of gunboats in the river, but I hope to keep them at a distance by occupying both banks with artillery.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Yours very faithfully,

JOHN HOPE.

[735.] G. O. Garris, 24th Feb., 1814.

1. * * * * * *

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The Commander of the Forces cannot but feel that the time of himself, and of the officers composing the General Court Martial, is occupied in a manner very little to the advantage of the public service in considering such subjects as the unbecoming and ungentlemanlike behaviour of officers towards each other.

The Orders of the Army, the Articles of War, and the rules of society forbid such conduct; and the Commander of the Forces is astonished that any man claiming the character of a gentleman could be provoked to use such language as that proved to have been used by Lieutenant —— and Lieutenant ——, of the — regiment, on the 9th January.

The Commander of the Forces trusts that what has passed will be a warning to them in future.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Sandhills, mouth of the Adour,
MY DEAR LORD, 24th Feb., 4 P.M., 1814.

I last night reported to you that we were in possession of the mouth of the river; about 600 men of the 2nd brigade of Guards having been then ferried over, and posted in the sandhills on the right bank, under the command of Major-General Stopford. Late in the evening this corps was attacked by a superior force of the enemy, which appears to have marched from the citadel of Bayonne for that purpose, but which was immediately repulsed in a very gallant manner. I understand that the artillery had on this occasion an opportunity of trying the effect of the rockets, which contributed much to the repulse of the enemy.

As I foresaw, the Admiral found it impracticable to get the flotilla up, nor would the state of the bar probably have admitted of the vessels entering.

The opinion which I gave your Lordship yesterday as to the facility of getting over troops was formed upon the first operations of the rafts. It was, however, found that at particular times of the tide the stream in the river was so rapid and unmanageable that the rafts became of no service, and from that circumstance, as well as the extreme fatigue which the men employed with them had undergone, and the scarcity of means which we possessed, the passage has been very materially retarded. With every exertion that it has been possible to use, we have only got across at this moment the 2nd brigade of Guards and nearly the five battalions of the German Legion, with two guns and a few dragoons. I am happy, however, to be able to say that the flotilla is now getting over with considerable success.

Our patrols have been in front on the right bank some way without falling in with the enemy.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,
Your faithful, humble servant,
JOHN HOPE.

I have at present my quarters at Biaritz.

Rear-Admiral Penrose to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, *Porcupine*, off the Adour, 24th Feb., 1814, (6 P.M.)

I have in a former letter done myself the honour of stating to your Lordship the motives which induced me to sail at the time I did, and of the vexatious delay which retarded the execution of my wishes, and it will accord both with my inclination and duty at another time to offer some intermediate details of our proceedings.

I had, however, availed myself of a favourable breeze which just enabled me to be off the Adour at daybreak this morning, and seeing the troops in possession of both shores was a powerful inducement to attempt immediately to assist in the process of crossing the river which had been so ably begun.

In this attempt the boat with Captain O'Reilly and our best pilot was unfortunately swamped, and I have not yet heard the loss we have sustained, but hope I saw Captain O'Reilly and most of his men safe.

About noon I heard from Sir John Hope of the situation of the troops; and although the bar was by no means safe, the object was too great to calculate risk, and I sent round to prepare and encourage the masters of the vessels.

I hoisted my flag in the *Gleaner* close to the bar for the afternoon, and am just returned after having seen all the vessels under convoy over the bar. I cannot say without many casualties, though even these are less than I had calculated upon; but I am not yet acquainted with the particulars.

If the weather continues fit for it, I shall attempt communication again to-morrow; but it has been impossible to pass the smallest vessel of war I have over the bar to-day.

To have passed over, I have reason to believe, all the materials of the bridge and boom, has exceeded my expectations.

It is highly satisfactory to me to find that, at whatever period we had sailed, the wind would not have admitted our approach to the bar an hour sooner.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

C. T. PENROSE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to the Quartermaster-General.

Boucault, right bank of the Adour,
25th Feb., 1814.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

I have reported to Lord Wellington from time to time the progress of our operations here. It was at first, I can assure you, rather a nervous operation. The first day we missed the surprise by the pontoons sticking in the sand, and we did not get them up till 10 A.M. We had that day only five small boats belonging to the pontoons to work with, and they did not take each more than six or eight men at a trip. The rapidity of the tide for a great part of the day rendered the rafts of no service. All that day we had no prospect of the flotilla getting in for several days. Fortunately we had no opposition at the passage, for the guard at the battery ran away without firing a shot, and the guns had been removed. In the evening the eight companies of the 2nd brigade of Guards that had then crossed were attacked by about 1200 or 1400 men, and repulsed them immediately. The rockets were used on this occasion, as well as against the gunboats, with good effect. It appears to me that where the object is near, and the ground not intersected by fences, and upon the water, they may be useful; but when they have an elevation given them, they appear a most uncertain weapon indeed.

Yesterday we contrived to get some boats in the river and seamen from Biaritz, &c., and the passage of the river went on better. In the afternoon most of the bridge vessels got in, and four gunboats; one gunboat was

stranded. You can hardly form an idea of the surf on the bar, even when fine weather prevails. Many boats were swamped, and a good many officers and seamen lost. I hardly think the town can be depended upon for obtaining stores, or as a post from whence to carry on future operations.

We have crossed the 1st division; General Wilson's Portuguese and Bradford's are crossing. Don Carlos will cross to-morrow. Two squadrons of cavalry are over, and two guns. The position we occupy is strong, but very extensive; too much so for our numbers if we had any serious danger to apprehend. It is about four miles from the point of the Adour at the proposed bridge to that near the left. The line runs from the front of Boucault across the Bordeaux road, near the Château de Matignon, and should cross the Putile Larne road at the Château de St. Etienne to the Adour opposite Vieux Merezène. That part of it, however, we can at present only observe and watch, and keep some small posts on it.

It may be right I should inform you how the troops on the left are now situated. One British and the Portuguese brigade of the 5th division are between the Adour and Nive. The other brigade (British) of the 5th division I was obliged to bring back to Urdain. Freyre's corps has the blockade from Urdain to Anglet, and Lord Anglesea is at Anglet. I did not like to trust to the Spaniards entirely to cover the great road to St. Jean de Luz; besides, I have never been able to learn their numbers. I propose to bring over here, including what is already across, the 1st division, Wilson's, Bradford's, Don Carlos, Vandeleur's brigade, and Webber Smith's and Cairnes's troops of horse artillery. I have settled with Colonel Dickson that the 18-pounders shall be placed on the left bank to keep the enemy's gunboats in check, which is indispensably necessary for the safety of the bridge, as we have only four gunboats for its defence, and that must, I think, depend on musketry and artillery from the land. I think if the enemy is active, the bridge will be endangered by fire vessels, as the tide is so strong that nothing will stop them.

Most of the accounts I have obtained state the enemy's force to amount in all in Bayonne to about 10,000 men.

I remain, my dear Murray, yours very faithfully,

JOHN HOPE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Boucault, right bank of the Adour,
MY DEAR LORD, 25th Feb., 1814, 3 P.M.

I beg to report to you that yesterday evening a considerable part of the bridge vessels and three or four gunboats got over the bar, and that the passage of the river was continued through the night with so much activity that this morning above 5000 men were across. At 10 o'clock A.M. therefore I was enabled to move on towards the citadel and town of Bayonne, and the troops that have crossed to this side are now on their ground, and consist of the whole of the 1st division, the Portuguese brigade of General Wilson, about one squadron of cavalry, and two guns. The brigade com-

manded by General Bradford and the corps of Don Carlos de España will be brought over as soon as some more cavalry has passed. The position which I have taken up rests its right on the Adour a little in front of this village, and, crossing the Bordeaux road about three-quarters of a mile in front of the church of Tarnos, takes the direction of the Peyrehorade road and the Upper Adour opposite to Vieux Mouguerre. As far as I have seen the ground, and as it is actually occupied by the troops, it is very strong, but extremely extensive. On our left I do not foresee that it will be possible for me to close the investment with the corps I proposed to pass over, and that, for the present at least, I can only observe it by posts and patrols.

Every preparation is making for laying down the bridge and boom, and the former, it is hoped, may be ready for use to-morrow night. It is impossible for me to express adequately my sense of the exertions made by the officers of the navy on this occasion, which has been a very trying one for them. The perseverance of the Admiral in keeping the fleet together and seizing the favourable moment to send it in, and the intrepid exertions of Captain O'Reilly, of the *Lyra*, and the officers and seamen employed under him, in braving the most tremendous surf, were such as to require that I should state them in the most favourable point of view to your Lordship. Lieutenant , agent for transports, was in the first boat which came over the bar, and set the most excellent example, and afforded afterwards the most useful service. Several valuable officers and men, I am concerned to say, have been lost to that service, and Captain O'Reilly was himself saved with difficulty after his boat was upset.

The enemy hitherto have shown only some light piquets in our front, and I believe are not in force. Count Reille is said to have left this some days ago with a corps of troops, and I am told General Thevenot commands in his place. Cavalry patrols are on the great roads to Bordeaux and Peyrehorade, but I have not yet received any reports.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your faithful humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

P.S. I am sorry I cannot get the name of the agent of transports mentioned above, but I shall take care to furnish your Lordship with it. He appears to be a very meritorious man.

J. H.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Boucault, 25th Feb., 1814, 8 P.M.

About an hour ago I had the honour of receiving yours of this morning by Lord George Lennox.* I had then just sent off a letter for you to say that we had moved forward to invest the citadel with about 5000 men, viz. the 1st division and part of General Wilson's brigade. We are in strong ground, but it is extensive; I think rather more than four miles

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi. p. 528.

from the situation of the proposed bridge to the point of the Adour nearest our left. I have already reported the operations of the flotilla. I have not heard that any vessel has got in this afternoon, and I understand that it will now, from the state of the tides, be some time before the entrance of the river can be attempted. It is hardly possible to have any communication with the Admiral by the bar, for no small undecked boat can attempt the bar; almost all those that did so yesterday were lost. I have no doubt that you will have a communication from the Admiral with his opinion; but I am afraid you will be disappointed in regard to the use that may be made of this river as a post, for, from anything I can learn, it is very seldom that the bar is practicable. The flying bridge and rafts, from the rapidity of the tide, can seldom be used; and the bridge of boats when established, which will not be sooner than to-morrow night, is the only useful communication I think we can have.

I shall take care to give De Lancey and Colonel Elphinstone the instructions you have sent for them.

I am now happy to be able to lay before you the name of the agent of transports whose exertions were conspicuous yesterday: Lieutenant Debenham, as will appear by the enclosed note sent me by Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne.

This has not been an operation distinguished on account of any opposition offered by the enemy, but it has been one of considerable exertion; and in justice to those who have hitherto had charge of that branch of it which respects the passage of the river, I am bound to mention to your Lordship Lieutenant-Colonel Elphinstone for the arrangements he made, and Lieutenant-Colonels Burgoyne and Sturgeon, and the officers employed under them, for the zeal with which they executed his orders. Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson and the officers of the Royal Artillery were throughout most zealous and active in getting up the guns and in carrying on the service of their department.

I beg most sincerely to congratulate you on the success your operations have had on the right.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord, yours faithfully,

JOHN HOPE.

I enclose the report of a deserter from the garrison as to the strength in the place.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Col. J. F. Burgoyne to Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope.

SIR, 25th Feb., 1814.

The name of the agent of transports who has been so active and dashing on the present service is Lieutenant Debenham, Royal Navy, a very old officer and the senior lieutenant on this station.

I take the liberty also of recommending to your notice the severe duty which has fallen to Lieutenant Tapp, Royal Engineers, and a small corps of Portuguese pontoneers; the zeal and activity they have shown in going through it, and

the spirit with which they threw over the advanced party, which would, I am convinced, have been very conspicuous had they been opposed.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

II.

Aide-de-Camp Dartmouth to Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope.

Château, on the Great Road, 25th Feb., 1814.

Louis Dubois, of the 34me régiment de ligne, a deserter from Bayonne to-day, states that there are the following regiments: 5me légère, 85 de ligne, 34me ligne, 66me de ligne, about 800 strong each, in the town and the intrenched camp. In the citadel, the 82nd and three other battalions, also a great many conscripts, who are at least equal in number to the old troops; forming altogether about 10,000 men in the town and citadel.

They say, from Marshal Soult having sent all the troops away from Bayonne, that they are abandoned by him, and do not intend to make much resistance.

There appears to be no expectation of their receiving reinforcements.

T. DARTMOUTH.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Madrid, 25th Feb., 1814.

My despatches for several months past will have afforded your Lordship reason to believe that the government would be changed immediately after the assembling of the Cortes at Madrid. The Jacobin party has, however, successfully resisted the feeble efforts of their opponents to effect a change, nor does it appear probable that these efforts will be renewed with more vigour or with a greater probability of success.

In my despatch No. ,* I informed your Lordship of the substance of a conversation which I had had with some of the deputies on the day after my arrival at Madrid. I have since most strictly adhered to the resolution which I then announced to them of not interfering in any change; but there were two points which, upon that and upon several subsequent occasions, I strongly recommended to their attention: 1st. That they should not suffer their opponents to gain strength by delay; and 2ndly. That they should, under no pretence whatever, make the conduct of the government towards Lord Wellington a pretext for its removal. In neither of these points has my advice been attended to.

Nearly a month was expended in discussions relative to the powers of deputies which tended to throw discredit on the Serviles; while the delay thus occasioned afforded time to the government and its agents and supporters to establish an influence among the people which they certainly did not possess upon their arrival here. At length the Serviles brought forward the question relative to Lord Wellington's command, with an intention, which they scarcely took the trouble to conceal, of making it one of the charges upon which the government was to be removed. The

* Blank in manuscript.

Minister of State, M. Luyando, was directed to attend at this discussion, and he declared that everything relating to the command of the Spanish army had been settled by the Regency to the complete satisfaction of Lord Wellington. The Serviles immediately gave up the question, and the attempts which they have since made to bring forward subjects which should inculpate the government have only tended to display their own incapacity and to increase the triumph of their opponents.

Under the circumstances which I have stated, it may be considered as fortunate that I am not in any way committed with a party which, with a majority of two to one in the Cortes, has neither the courage, the activity, nor the intelligence requisite to effect the object which they have in view.

My opinion, however, with respect to the present Regents is by no means altered. Even admitting that they have manifested a more conciliatory disposition towards Great Britain since their arrival at Madrid, and that they are now willing to acquiesce in the conditions under which Lord Wellington consented to accept the command, I must attribute these changes in their sentiments to their apprehension of being removed from office; and there is reason to fear that, when once they get rid of that apprehension, they will revert to their old habits and principles.

They are, in fact, the tools of the Jacobin party, with which they must stand or fall. Even if the period of the King's return were not far distant, I should still think it a misfortune if he were to find the government in such hands; because it may be doubted whether he would have firmness enough to remove from office those who occupy the principal departments of the State, and who are the great supporters of the revolutionary doctrines which have made so much progress in Spain.

It would be unjust, however, to the Minister of State, M. Luyando, if I did not admit that I have every reason to be satisfied with the manner in which the affairs of his department are conducted, and with the disposition which he invariably manifests to maintain a good understanding with me.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Crown Prince of Sweden to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

A mon Quartier-Général de Cologne, le 26 Février, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL MARQUIS DE WELLINGTON,

La Suède a vu avec admiration les talens et la persévérance que vous avez déployés dans la lutte glorieuse dont le but et l'issue se sont réunis pour ajouter un nouveau lustre sur les armes Britanniques. En vous décernant son Epée la Suède paye la dette de sa reconnaissance au héros d'une cause devenue la sienne, puisqu'elle est celle de la liberté et de l'indépendance des peuples. C'est avec une satisfaction bien vive, Monsieur le Maréchal, que je vous transmets de la part du Roi ce témoignage de son estime, et de celle de la nation Suédoise. Je suis heureux, Monsieur le Maréchal, que cette circonstance m'offre l'occasion de vous assurer de mes

sentimens distingués. Sur ce, je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait, Monsieur le Maréchal Marquis de Wellington, en sa sainte et digne garde, étant

Votre bien affectionné,

CHARLES JEAN.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Boucault, 26th Feb., 1814, 6 A.M.

Since quitting you last night I have received two notes from the Admiral, which I think it right to send you, because they partly show his opinion of the Bar.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, yours very faithfully,

JOHN HOPE.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Rear-Admiral C. J. Penrose to Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope.

MY DEAR SIR, 24th Feb., 1 P.M.

This Bar is rather worse than it had been described, for our weather is most favourable for the season; yet from the surf this morning, when Captain O'Reilly made his attempt, I am certain that not one boat out of fifty could have succeeded.

I hope the bridge boats will pass, many of them this evening, and that it will be our good fortune to cooperate.

Two boats' crews are already with the troops, and will, I trust, be of use.

Very faithfully, my dear Sir, yours truly,

C. J. PENROSE.

II.

Rear-Admiral C. J. Penrose to Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope.

MY DEAR SIR, 24th Feb., 1814, ½ past 6 P.M.

I am just returned from the Bar of the Adour, after having seen all the materials (I believe) for the bridge and boom, and many officers and seamen safe in. So great was the surf on the Bar, that the casualties were even less than I expected; but it was with great regret that I found that the water on the Bar would not admit our smallest vessels of war.

I want to-morrow to see whether more favourable times will await us; but it has been a great relief to me to see our naval means within your reach.

Several vessels are lost, as I expected, but I trust not many lives. Of this, however, you will be better informed than I am at present, for to return over the Bar was impracticable.

Very faithfully, my dear Sir, yours truly,

C. J. PENROSE.

MEMORANDUM OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE TROOPS IN THE ATTACK OF THE ENEMY AT ORTHEZ ON THE 27TH FEB., 1814. [736.]

On the morning of the 26th the 2nd division, the Portuguese division, and the 13th and 14th Light Dragoons, with one troop of Horse Artillery, were under the orders of Sir Rowland Hill upon the heights above the suburb and village of Depart, opposite to the town of Orthez.

The remainder of the army was in column upon the great road from Peyrehorade to Orthez, near the village of Baigts.

This column consisted of—

The Hussar Brigade, with one troop of Horse Artillery.

The 3rd division, with its artillery.

The 6th division, with a brigade of artillery.

The Light division, with a troop of Horse Artillery.

The 4th division, with its artillery.

Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry.

The 7th division, without artillery.

The brigade of artillery of the 2nd division.

A bridge had been established by a detachment of the pontoon train at Berenx on the night of the 26th, and there was a similar detachment of the pontoon train with Sir Rowland Hill.

The position of the enemy was upon the ridge along which the road runs from Orthez towards the village of Thilh; the right opposite to St. Boes, the left at Orthez.

ARRANGEMENT MADE FOR THE ATTACK ON 27TH FEBRUARY.

The 4th division, the 7th division, Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, and the brigade of artillery of the 2nd division, were ordered to move out from the column to the left, under the orders of Marshal Beresford, who was instructed to gain the heights, and to direct his attack against the extremity of the enemy's right.

The 3rd division, the 6th division, and the Hussar brigade were ordered to move forward in the first instance by the great road, and thence to direct their attacks against the centre of the enemy's position by the tongues of land which originate from the ridge on which the French were posted, and fall towards the great road and the river Gave.

The Light division, with its artillery, was placed in the first

instance in reserve, upon a commanding wooded height between the village of St. Boes and the great road, and it was afterwards moved forward and acted in support of the attack of Marshal Beresford's column, immediately on the right of the 4th division.

Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill had instructions to effect the passage of the river near Orthez as soon as he could, and co-operate with the rest of the army.

The cavalry and the 2nd division passed the river by the ford of Biron, and one brigade of the Portuguese division, which had threatened a ford lower down, followed afterwards by the same route.

These troops moved by the ridge which lies to the right of the great road from Orthez to Sault de Navailles; and when the column arrived opposite to Sallespisse it was directed upon that village and into the great road between Sallespisse and Sault de Navailles, forcing the rear of the enemy's army by that means, in great confusion, into the lanes and enclosed country beyond the road.

One brigade of the Portuguese division had been ordered to attempt to penetrate into the town of Orthez by the bridge, which the enemy had but imperfectly destroyed. This brigade was unable to force its way, however, until the enemy evacuated the town, and it continued its march afterwards, by the great road, to the village of Sallespisse.

The advantages of the ground at Sault de Navailles enabled the enemy to make a short stand there, and he continued his retreat towards St. Séver in the night.

WELLINGTON.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MYLORD, St. Jean de Luz, le 27 Février, 1814.

J'ai reçu hier votre lettre du 25* par M. de la Rochejaquelein, et j'y ai vu avec plaisir que vous aviez passé le Gave d'Oléron. J'en ai eu un grand Mercredi dernier à être témoin de l'exécution du plus beau et du plus hardi projet qu'il fut possible de concevoir, je veux dire le passage de l'Adour à son embouchure. La postérité ne pourra le croire, qu'en pensant aux grands talents de celui qui l'a conçu, et à toute sa gloire qu'il s'est acquise. Les troupes se sont montrées dignes du chef qui les mène de victoire en victoire, par l'ardeur dont elles étoient animées.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 529.

C'est avec la plus haute considération, admiration, et attachement que je suis, Mylord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Chevalier Gennotte to Prince Metternich.

Madrid, le 27 Février, 1814.

En même temps que j'ai l'honneur de présenter à V.A. le duplicat de mon très humble rapport 284, en chiffres, j'ai celui de lui accuser la réception de sa très gracieuse dépêche du 18 Janvier, à laquelle je me fais un devoir de satisfaire au moyen du P.S. ci-joint.

Les Cortes, après s'être occupées dans leurs séances du 10 au 19 de Février spécialement du mauvais état de l'armée, et des moyens de pourvoir à son amélioration, particulièrement par un meilleur système économique, terminèrent le 19 leur première législature, pour commencer la seconde après demain, 1 Mars.

Les Juntes préparatoires prescrites par la Constitution ont eu lieu paisiblement, et le choix de ce que les Cortes appellent la *table*, c'est-à-dire du Président, Vice-Président, et des quatre Secrétaires, a eu lieu dans les formes usitées.

Je suis parvenu à me procurer le recueil contenant le manifeste des Cortes à la nation, le Traité de Valençay, et les pièces connues ici pour y être relatives.

Le manifeste des Cortes à ce sujet mérite tout entier l'attention de V.A. Le commentaire qui y est fait sur le traité, et son objet de la part de la France, semble éclaircir toutes les trames de l'Empereur Napoléon; on y voit de plus, dans les Cortes, l'intention de ne point se désunir de la cause commune de l'indépendance de l'Europe, et de ne point déconcerter par un abandon le plan des grandes puissances alliées pour l'assurer sur les bases d'une paix solide, honorable, et générale; on les y voit même disposées à y concourir avec force. Les lettres du Roi à la Régence non moins que les réponses de celle-ci et les pleins-pouvoirs donnés à M. Palafox, qui a prêté ces jours-ci serment à la constitution, présentent aussi à V.A. un sujet de méditation.

Je crois bien faire de joindre ici quelques feuilles d'une feuille intitulé *l'Universel*, où il est question, dans les articles 'Variétés de l'Etat,' de la situation de l'Espagne et de celle de sa principale armée. J'en ajoute une autre contenant un nouveau manifeste des habitans de St. Sébastien contre la conduite des troupes alliées lors de la prise de cette ville; il a été distribué en profusion par un des partis qui divisent l'Espagne, je ne sais trop dans quelle vue, au moment où il est encore question des différens entre la Régence et le Lord Wellington et la demande éventuelle du Lord de sa démission du commandement de l'armée Espagnole.

L'affaire d'Audinot, dont j'ai rendu compte dans mon avant dernier No., occupe et divise de plus en plus les partis. Le Tribunal de Justice et le Conseil d'Etat la regarde comme très serieuse et digne de l'attention spéciale des Cortes et de la Régence.

C'est un brandon de discord jeté selon toutes les apparences par l'Em-

pereur Napoléon dans ce pays; le fait par lui-même engage à ce qu'il soit pris dans les autres pays des précautions éventuelles contre de pareilles ruses.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer à V.A., dans mon très humble No. 283, le second départ du Maréchal Suchet de Catalogne pour la France le 1 Février. Peu après, un de ses aides de camp et son secrétaire de confiance, un ancien officier Espagnol, qui étoit d'intelligence avec le Général Baron d'Eroles, trouva moyen de se détacher du Maréchal avec les chiffres et quelques blancs signés et de passer aux Espagnols; des ordres y furent, dit on, fabriqués et envoyés aux commandans des places de Lerida, Monzon, Mequinenza, et Tortose, ainsi qu'à celles de Peñiscola et de Murviedro, de remettre aux Espagnols en conséquence du traité de paix de Valençay les places confiées jusqu'ici à leurs soins, mais de s'assurer préalablement par une convention formelle avec les généraux Espagnols de pouvoir se retirer librement avec leurs armes et bagages et quelques pièces d'artillerie de campagne provisoirement à Barcelone. Le commandant de Tortose traitoit en conséquence; mais ayant eu dans le cours des négociations des raisons de soupçonner quelque superchérie dans les ordres qu'il reconnoissoit néanmoins munis de la signature du Maréchal Suchet, il refusa d'entrer dans d'ultérieurs pourparlers et d'obtempérer aux sommations, qu'en conformité des dites ordres le Général Espagnol lui avoit faites. Les commandans de Lerida, de Mequinenza, et de Monzon ne furent pas aussi réfléchis que celui de Tortose; ils n'hésitèrent point de traiter pour la remise des forteresses aux conditions apparemment prescrites par le Maréchal avec le Baron d'Eroles qui y souscrivit. Les places furent remises; les trois garnisons, fortes en tout de 2,800, en partirent avec quelques pièces de canon de campagne, et 50 cartouches, pour se rendre à Barcelone; mais elles étoient à peine à deux marches des forteresses remises qu'elles furent entourées par des forces supérieures, et obligées à se rendre, sous le prétexte, dit-on, que le commandant-en-chef n'approuvoit point la capitulation. Elles furent conduites de là à Tarragone comme prisonniers de guerre. On n'a point de nouvelles de l'issue de semblables tentatives faites près des commandans de Murviedro et de Peñiscola. Depuis lors Barcelone est bloqué par deux divisions de l'armée Anglo-Sicilienne, la 3ème étant restée à Tarragone, et par une division Catalane aux ordres du Général Sarsfield, et par mer par une escadre Angloise. Quant au reste de l'armée Catalane, il observe un corps de 4000 à 5000 François formé de détachements de garnisons qu'ils ont conservés dans les forts de Figueras, Gerone, et Olot, et qui manœuvre entre ces places. La seconde armée Espagnole a resserré le blocus de Tortose, dont la garnison faisoit des sortis assez avantageuses, et a redoublé de vigueur aux siéges de Peñiscola et de Murviedro, ce qui fait croire que les tentatives près des commandans de ces places n'ont point réussi.

Le Général Mina a pris le fort de Jaca le 17 de Février; il s'y trouvoit 84 pièces d'artillerie de bronze dans le meilleur état, et 800 hommes de garnison, qui furent faits prisonniers de guerre, mais renvoyés en France jusqu'à échange. L'Arragon est tout-à-fait libre.

Le Lord Wellington a commencé des opérations actives le 14, particulièrement sur sa droite. Son objet étoit de déloger les ennemis de bons postes qu'ils occupoient encore en deça de l'Adour. Le Maréchal Soult, qui le 5 de Février avoit quitté son armée à l'Adour avec un gros corps

pour se rendre vers Paris, venoit en suite de nouveaux ordres, donnés vraisemblablement en conséquence du refus des Cortes et de la Régence de ratifier le traité de Valençay, d'y revenir, mais seulement avec une partie des forces qu'il avoit prises avec lui, le restant ayant continué sa route. Le Maréchal Soult ayant garni Bayonne et son camp retranché de 15,000 hommes environ, faisoit mine de vouloir manœuvrer sur sa gauche. On lui supposoit 45,000 hommes d'infanterie et 10,000 chevaux.

G. F. GENNOTTE.

Chevalier Gennotte to Prince Metternich.

Madrid, le 27 Février, 1814.

L'affaire de la démission demandée éventuellement par le Lord Wellington du commandement général de l'armée Espagnole fut remise sur le tapis en séance secrette. La discussion se prolongeoit d'une séance à l'autre. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères se présenta comme ayant des choses intéressantes et relatives à la question à communiquer. Il dit qu'il pouvoit assurer que la question dont il s'agissoit étoit maintenant sans objet, que la Régence étoit parfaitement d'accord avec le Lord Wellington, qu'elle étoit même disposée à donner aux conditions sous lesquelles il avoit eu jusqu'ici le commandement plus de latitude, et de lui suppéditer plus de moyens d'agir; que le Lord s'étoit expliqué dans des termes, exprimant la plus grande satisfaction de la Régence, et combien il regarderoit comme préjudiciable aux intérêts de l'Espagne que la Régence actuelle vint à être changée. Un membre du parti Servile contredit le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et le somma à produire la pièce où le Lord Wellington s'étoit exprimé dans un tel sens. M. Luyando avoua qu'il n'avoit pas telle pièce, mais il lut une lettre confidentielle du Général Alava, attaché de la part de la Régence au Lord. Il y étoit dit que le Lord s'étoit montré très satisfait de la Régence à l'occasion de sa conduite sur l'affaire du Traité de Valençay, et s'étoit expliqué dans le sens rapporté par le Ministre d'Etat. L'affaire fut ajournée indéterminément. M. O'Donoju, toujours chargé du Ministère de la Guerre, interpellé à s'expliquer sur l'état des armées, et la représentation du Général Freyre, eut la hardiesse de dire que les représentations du Général étoient exagérées; que la Régence avoit fait toutes les dispositions convenables pour pourvoir à ses besoins, et que l'armée consistoit, suivant les états, en 200,000 hommes d'environ, quoique tout le monde fut convaincu que si la Régence avoit fait des dispositions semblables, elles n'avoient pas été exécutées, et qu'il fut faux que l'armée consistoit en 200,000 hommes. Comme le Ministre étoit armé de pièces, ses partisans firent suspendre tout recrutement, puisque l'armée ne devoit consister qu'en 150,000 hommes; néanmoins jusqu'à ce que la Régence ait plus particulièrement vérifié l'état numérique de l'armée, le recrutement, en cas d'infériorité à ce nombre, devant l'y porter immédiatement. Nous ne manquâmes point tous, d'accord avec Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de l'Angleterre, de faire à ce sujet de vives représentations au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, surtout qu'il nous constoit que le Lord Wellington avoit été obligé à défaut de moyens de renvoyer des troupes Espagnoles jusqu'en Estremadure et à

Zamora, et qu'entre les Pyrénées et l'Ebro il n'existoit pas 70,000 hommes de troupes Espagnoles; que puisque la nation Espagnole étoit résolue de ne point séparer sa cause des puissances alliées, soit pour la guerre, soit pour la paix, elle devoit être prête à faire vigoureusement la guerre pour obtenir la paix solide, honorable, et convenable que l'on désiroit. Mettez-moi franchement, Monsieur, dis-je, à M. Luyando, en état de dire à ma Cour au juste quel sera l'état de forces actives contre les Français pour l'ouverture de la campagne, dans le cas où elle dût avoir lieu. Je vous assure, me répondit-il, qu'avant deux mois elles consisteront en 140,000 hommes, dont 12,000 de bonne cavalerie.

Les Cortes dans leurs dernières séances décrétèrent 17 articles tendant à ramener l'ordre, et à établir promptement une meilleure organisation dans l'armée. Elles mettront la dernière main à cet objet au commencement de la nouvelle Législature, et M. de Moreno, nouveau Ministre de la Guerre, qui vient d'arriver, est en état de les seconder. J'ai cru devoir entrer dans ces détails pour suppléer à ce que les feuilles ont d'incomplet sur les séances des Cortes.

G. F. GENNOTTE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Boucault, 27th Feb., 1814.

I have had the honour of your letters of yesterday evening and this morning, and I have given the orders relative to the movements of the Portuguese 9-pounders and the 18-pounder brigade, and shall immediately send the letter addressed to General Freyre. When the Spanish corps marches, I believe we shall have some difficulty in keeping up the blockade in the great extent we have to guard: however, I shall endeavour to make the best arrangement in my power for that purpose.

I beg leave to acquaint you that this afternoon, with a view to afford the officers of engineers an opportunity of reconnoitring the citadel, and to obtain some ground of which it seemed to be of importance we should have possession, the enemy's posts were all driven in, and we have remained masters of the heights and church of St. Etienne on our left, a point of the utmost importance, and in fact the key of the whole ground, which the enemy in a very few days would have made extremely strong. We have also occupied on our right a height above the river, from which it seemed not improbable that the enemy might annoy our bridge with shells.

The possession of these points I hope will be found to be of much use in any future operations, and our line is thereby very materially shortened and the place most closely invested. The troops behaved as well as possible upon this occasion, and although the opposition of the enemy was greater than I expected, yet I hope our loss has not been great. I am, however, sorry to say that Major-General Hinuber has been wounded.

I am happy to inform your Lordship that this forenoon the bridge of boats was opened for cavalry and artillery.

The 16th Light Dragoons are advanced on the Peyrehorade road to St. Jean de Marsac, and yesterday communicated by a patrol at Peyrehorade with the 7th division.

The 12th Dragoons are advanced on the Bordeaux and Dax road to St.

Vincent, and yesterday Lieutenant-Colonel Ponsonby patrolled to St. Paul, opposite to Dax.

The enemy had then a piquet of infantry at St. Paul, and Ponsonby was informed they were working at a tête-de-pont at Dax.

I shall order the cavalry parties you direct. I have not heard from Sir George Murray respecting the heavy German cavalry.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

JOHN HOPE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, Boucault, 27th Feb., 1814.

The enemy were working hard at the church and height of St. Etienne in front of our left, and would very shortly have rendered it very formidable. It is the key, I may say, of the ground on which the citadel stands, and it was therefore necessary we should get it. Opposite to our right there is another height, which, while occupied by the enemy, might have given him the means to annoy our bridge with shells. To obtain possession of these, and give the engineers the means of looking closer at the citadel, we drove in the enemy's posts this afternoon, and, after some resistance, established ourselves anywhere as we wished. St. Etienne appears a very important point, and would have proved hereafter difficult to obtain. I hope we shall maintain ourselves, and our line will be thereby shortened.

Lord Wellington, I find, has ordered Freyre away from this. When he goes, we shall have a great extent to keep, and not, I fear, be very strong anywhere. What appears to me to be the best arrangement I can make is to send Don Carlos's corps to the position of Villefranque, and place the whole of the 5th division in the ground from Urdain by Bellevue to Anglet, keeping Lord Aylmer at Bas Anglet. I am disposed to rely more on the 5th division and Lord Aylmer for these important points than on the Spaniards, and I think Don Carlos will be equal to Villefranque, as he is considerably stronger than the 5th division was when sent to that quarter, and we can best spare him here.

The bridge was opened this forenoon.

Our cavalry patrols have been to St. Paul, opposite Dax. At the former the enemy had yesterday an infantry piquet. Also to Peyrehorade, where they yesterday communicated with the 7th division. The 16th Light Dragoons at St. Jean de Marsac, on the Peyrehorade road, and the 12th Light Dragoons at St. Vincent, on the Dax road. Lord Wellington says he has ordered up the heavy German cavalry.

I remain, my dear Murray, yours faithfully,

JOHN HOPE.

Rear-Admiral C. J. Penrose to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Pasages, 27th Feb., 1814, 5 P.M.

Owing to the current and variable winds, your Lordship's letter of the 25th, 7 A.M., only reached me this instant as I was entering this harbour.

The state of the Bar of the Adour is such, that it is not possible to depend upon it for *time* on any occasion. The transports which have the battering train could only go over the Bar in the most favourable circumstances that ever occur, and I apprehend the Bar is at present shallower than usual. Not till after the next full moon (March 6th) could a vessel of any burden be taken over the vile Bar. It will be the best way, if your Lordship wishes the artillery to be ready to send there, to shift some into vessels of the lightest draught of water; but on the 24th, when we passed the vessels in, no heavy-laden vessel of even 8 feet water could have withstood the surf. For naval supplies of provisions a large number of country boats or vessels, which can use Socoa as a port, as they might sometimes get to the Adour from thence, when they could not from this place. But I will make instant inquiries, and the result shall follow directly. In the finest weather, which was the case on the 24th, we lost one captain, one surgeon, and fourteen men; Captain O'Reilly and two others hurt. Three transport-boats, with their crews, also suffered.

I doubt not, however, but that we shall find pilots to carry supplies, though not to run risks on such an occasion as the late.

I sincerely congratulate your Lordship on your continued progress, and shall be most happy whenever our small aid can contribute to it.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Very faithfully yours,

C. J. PENROSE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Dune, 28th Feb., 1814.

I conceive it my duty and but justice to the arm I have the honour to command, to report to your Lordship that the cavalry engaged with the enemy yesterday have conducted themselves much to my satisfaction, and that I am much indebted to Major-General Lord Edward Somerset for the manner in which he conducted his brigade; and I have to recommend to your Lordship's notice Colonel Kerrison and the 7th Hussars, to whose steadiness and gallantry I am indebted for having made so many prisoners. I beg to recommend particularly to your Lordship's notice Major Gardiner and the officers of the Royal Horse Artillery.

I have upon several occasions had the satisfaction of mentioning the great assistance I have derived from the zeal and ability of my Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel Elley, to whose activity I was yesterday much indebted. I have also the honour to recommend to your Lordship's notice Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon and the rest of my Staff.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

STAPLETON COTTON.

To the Marquess Wellesley. [737.]

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, St. Sever, 1st March, 1814.

I write you two lines just to let you know that we beat Marshal Soult, near Orthez, on the 27th. The action was for some time very warm, but I never saw troops get such a beating as they did; and they were saved at all only by the night. I expect to have my posts on the Garonne immediately.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

Extract of a Letter from Count d'Escartes, transmitted by Sir C. Flint.

London, 1st March, 1814.

Le Comte François est arrivé à Basle le Samedi soir. Le Dimanche matin il est arrivé en Franche Comté, et il écrit de Vesoul le 22 Février:

"Nous avons été reçus dans toutes les villes et villages aux acclamations de tout le peuple, avec les cris de 'Vive Louis XVIII. et les Bourbons!' Ils ont été enchanté de notre cher Prince, qui a été parfait et touchant. Les vieillards, les femmes, les enfans, c'est à qui baiserait ses mains, ses habits; le bonheur était peint sur leurs visages; ils étaient si touchés de l'affabilité de Monsieur, que des larmes de joie se répandaient de tous côtés. Les vieillards et les vieilles femmes disaient 'Nous mourrons contents, puisque nous avons le bonheur de nous revoir sous nos anciens maîtres, qui ont toujours été dans notre cœur.' D'autres disaient 'Je vous donne mon cœur, car le monstre ne nous a laissé que cela.' En arrivant ici cela a été bien autre chose. La population de cette ville n'est que de 5000 âmes. Ils sont tous venus hors de la ville et au devant de nous. Ils ont désiré que nous puissions entrer à pied, afin de pouvoir mieux voir leur Prince. C'était une ivresse! La noblesse est parfaite dans toutes les provinces; des gentilshommes arrivent de toute part, annonçant que tous les paysans demandent à marcher pour leur Souverain légitime. Il nous est arrivé aujourd'hui un émissaire venant d'Alsace, demandant aux puissances de lever une légion avec la cocarde blanche, pour contribuer à la restauration de leur maître légitime. Des places demandent à se rendre à Louis XVIII. Toute la France est prête à se lever. Je n'ai jamais rien vu de pareil; pour le premier jour de l'entrée de Monsieur en France nous avons fait trente lieux dans le domaine de nos augustes maîtres. Ce serait le bon Dieu qu'on ne mettrait pas plus d'empressement à venir le voir. Je ne vous cache pas qu'en vous écrivant cela je pleure à chaudes larmes."

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 26th Feb., 1814.

I enclose the terms on which the Allies have expressed themselves willing to sign preliminaries of peace. I have every reason to believe that these

terms will not be lowered. If they shall be refused, probably their refusal will be notified to the people of France, whereby they may judge of the moderation of the Allies, more especially that of Great Britain. In what terms this appeal will be made is not settled. The Allies cannot agree who to favour. It is therefore difficult to protest against the existing government if we cannot agree on the successor.

Your Lordship may, however, be assured that if either before the signing of the preliminaries or after its refusal the case should arise as stated in my instruction of the 18th Jan., marked "Secret," Lord Castlereagh will not be hampered in the course he is to pursue.

Yours ever, my dear Lord, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

1st March, 1814.

We have instructed Lord Castlereagh that in the notification of the refusal of our terms a recommendation should be inserted of the ancient dynasty, assuring the people of France that in that case the same terms should be given, whatever were the successes of the Allies, but not otherwise. I think this advice will be accepted by the Allies.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Projet d'un Traité Préliminaire entre les Hautes Puissances Alliées et la France.

Au nom de la Très-Sainte et Indivisible Trinité.

Leurs Majestés Impériales d'Autriche et de Russie, Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande, et S.M. le Roi de Prusse, agissant au nom de tous leurs Alliés, d'une part; et S.M. l'Empereur des Français de l'autre, désirant ciménter le répos et le bien-être futur de l'Europe par une paix solide et durable sur terre et sur mer, et ayant nommé pour atteindre à ce but salutaire leurs plénipotentiaires actuellement réunis à Châtillon-sur-Seine pour discuter les conditions de cette paix, les dits plénipotentiaires sont convenus des articles suivans :—

ART. 1.

Il y aura paix et amitié entre Leurs Majestés Impériales d'Autriche et de Russie, S.M. le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande, et S.M. le Roi de Prusse, agissant en même tems au nom de tous leurs Alliés, et S.M. l'Empereur des Français, leurs héritiers et successeurs à perpétuité.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à apporter tous leurs soins à maintenir, pour le bonheur futur de l'Europe, la bonne harmonie si heureusement rétablie entre elles.

ART. 2.

S.M. l'Empereur des Français renonce pour lui et ses successeurs à la totalité des acquisitions, réunions, ou incorporations de territoires faites par la France depuis le commencement de la guerre de 1792.

S.M.I. renonce également à toute influence constitutionnelle, directe ou indirecte, hors des anciennes limites de la France, telles qu'elles se trouvaient établies avant la guerre de 1792, et aux titres qui en dérivent, et nommément à ceux de Roi d'Italie, Roi de Rome, Protecteur de la Confédération du Rhin, et Médiateur de la Fédération Suisse.

ART. 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes reconnaissent formellement et solennellement le principe de la souveraineté, liberté, et indépendance de tous les états de l'Europe, tels qu'ils seront constitués à la paix définitive.

ART. 4.

S.M. l'Empereur des Français reconnait formellement la reconstruction suivante des pays limitrophes de la France :—

1. L'Allemagne composée d'états indépendans unis par un lien fédératif.

2. L'Italie divisée en états indépendans placés entre les possessions Autrichiennes en Italie et la France.

3. La Hollande, sous la souveraineté de la maison d'Orange, avec un accroissement de territoire.

4. La Suisse, étant libre et indépendante, replacée dans ses anciennes limites, sous la garantie de toutes les grandes puissances, la France y comprise.

5. L'Espagne, sous la domination de Ferdinand VII., dans ses anciennes limites.

S.M. l'Empereur des Français reconnait de plus le droit des puissances alliées de déterminer d'après les traités existans entre les puissances, les limites et rapports tant des pays cédés par la France que de leurs états entre eux, sans que la France puisse aucunement y intervenir.

ART. 5.

Par contre, S.M. Britannique consent à restituer à la France, à l'exception des Iles nommées les Saintes, toutes les conquêtes qui ont été faites par elles sur la France pendant la guerre, et qui se trouvent à présent au pouvoir de S.M. Britannique dans les Indes Occidentales, en Afrique, et en Amérique.

L'Ile de Tobago, conformément à l'Article 2 du présent traité, restera à la Grande Bretagne ; et les Alliées promettent d'employer leurs bons offices pour engager LL.MM. Suédoise et Portugaise à ne point mettre d'obstacle à la restitution de la Guadeloupe et de Cayenne à la France.

Tous les établissemens et toutes les factoreries conquises sur la France à l'est du Cap de Bonne Espérance, à l'exception des Iles de St. Maurice (Ile de France), de Bourbon, et de leurs dépendances, lui seront restitués. La France ne rentrera dans ceux des susdits établissemens et factoreries qui sont situés dans le continent des Indes et dans les limites des possessions Britanniques, que sous la condition qu'elle les possédera à titre d'établissemens commerciaux, et elle promet en conséquence de n'y point faire construire des fortifications, et de n'y entretenir des garnisons ni forces militaires quelconque au delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour maintenir la police dans les dits établissemens.

Les institutions ci-dessus mentionnées en Asie, en Afrique, et en Amérique ne s'étendront à aucune possession qui n'était point effectivement au pouvoir de la France avant le commencement de la guerre de l'année 1792.

Le gouvernement Français s'engage à prohiber l'importation des esclaves dans toutes les colonies et possessions restituées par le présent traité, et à défendre à ses sujets de la manière la plus efficace le trafic des nègres en général.

L'Ile de Malthe, avec ses dépendances, restera en pleine souveraineté à S.M. Britannique.

ART. 6.

S.M. l'Empereur des Français remettra aussitôt après la ratification du présent traité préliminaire, les forteresses et les forts des pays cédés, et ceux qui

sont encore occupés par ses troupes en Allemagne sans exception, et nommément la place de Mayence dans six jours; celles de Luxembourg, Anvers, Bergen-op- Zoom dans l'espace de dix jours; Mantoue, Palma Nuova, Venise, et Peschiera, les places de l'Oder et de l'Elbe dans quinze jours; et les autres places et forts dans le plus court délai possible, qui ne pourra pas excéder celui de quinze jours. Ces places et forts seront remis dans l'état où ils se trouvent présentement, avec toute leur artillerie, munitions de guerre et de bouche, archives, etc. Les garnisons Françaises de cés places sortiront avec armes et bagages, et avec leurs propriétés particulières.

S.M. l'Empereur des Français fera également remettre, dans l'espace de quatre jours, aux armées alliées, les places de Besançon, Béfort, et Huningue, qui resteront en dépôt jusqu'à la ratification de la paix définitive, et qui seront remises dans l'état dans lequel elles auront été cédées, à mesure que les Alliées évacueront le territoire Français.

ART. 7.

Les généraux commandans en chef nommeront sans délai des commissaires chargés de déterminer la ligne de démarcation entre les armées réciproques.

ART. 8.

Aussitôt que le présent traité préliminaire aura été accepté et ratifié de part et d'autre, les hostilités cesseront sur terre et sur mer.

ART. 9.

Le présent traité préliminaire sera suivi, dans le plus court délai possible, par la signature d'un traité définitif.

ART. 10.

Les ratifications du traité préliminaire seront échangées dans quatre jours ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, etc.

Fait à Châtillon, etc., etc.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, A Orthez, ce 1 Mars, 1814.

Je profite avec empressement du départ de Colonel Burgh pour vous faire mon compliment sur le passage du Gave de Pau, et sur le victoire que vous avez remportée avant hier auprès de cette ville-ci, que vous avez bien voulu m'apprendre par vos deux lettres d'hier et d'avant hier. Permettez-moi de vous reprocher de ne m'avoir point parlé de votre blessure, et de me joindre à toute l'armée pour vous dire que vous exposez trop une vie qui est si précieuse à tous ceux qui vous connoissent, et dont la conservation est si importante.

Je suis arrivé ici ce soir, et je comptai aller vous faire une visite demain à St. Sever; mais Sir Edouard Pakenham m'ayant fait dire qu'il ne savoit pas si je vous y trouverois, j'attendois pour partir les nouvelles qu'il compte avoir de vous demain matin. J'ai un grand désir de vous revoir. Je ne

saurais trop me louer des attentions du Colonel Shaw, qui a bien voulu venir ici avec moi de St. Jean de Luz.

C'est avec la plus haute considération et le plus sincère attachement que je suis,

My Lord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Mont de Marsan, 3rd March, 1814.

I have the honour to transmit the report of Major-General Walker on the conduct of the 7th division of the Allied army on the 27th ultimo.

Your Lordship was so immediately on the spot, that it renders it unnecessary for me to detail the distinct operations of the two divisions most immediately under my directions on the above occasion. I will barely observe that the 7th division was ordered, and only took the lead of the 4th, after that division, under the directions of its commander, Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir L. Cole, had in the most gallant manner resisted the attack of the enemy, and driven him from his main position. The severe loss the 4th division had sustained, and the mixture of its troops with each other that had unavoidably taken place in the hard contests it had had, induced me to direct it to halt and reform, and the 7th division to advance.

Your Lordship will have seen that the gallantry of both divisions was conspicuous, and their commanders are entitled to my best approbation. The officers and soldiers of the divisions are equally so. When I receive the report from Sir L. Cole (perhaps he may transmit it direct to your Lordship, as he has been separated from my immediate command since the day of the action), I will transmit it in justice to such officers as he may report to have distinguished themselves.

I was much indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Hope, A.A.G., and to Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey, A.Q.M.G., for the quick and zealous assistance I received from them in the line of their respective duties; and I must particularly express my sense of the services of Major Dyer, R.A., for the direction given to the brigades of that arm attached or that came to act with the part of the army your Lordship placed under my directions. To Brigadier-General Mozinho, Adjutant-General to the Portuguese army, I was also much indebted; and from Colonel Arbuthnot and my personal Staff, both Portuguese and British, I received the most ready assistance, and beg to recommend my aide-de-camp, Major Jewell, captain in the British service, to your Lordship's favourable recommendation.

I enclose to your Lordship the report of Major Dyer on the conduct of the artillery he had to direct during the course of the day, and have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Major-General G. T. Walker to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

SIR, St. Sever, 1st March, 1814.

The distinguished gallantry of the corps under my command in the action of Orthez on the 27th ult. deserves that I should make a particular report of their conduct to you. Acquainted, however, Sir, as you are with the earlier part of the action, it will only be necessary to mention that having according to your orders left the Portuguese brigade to watch a party of the enemy that had been advanced on one of the tongues on the right of the ridge occupied by the enemy, I moved forward myself with the two British brigades of the 7th division to support and replace the 4th division, that had been severely engaged in endeavouring to carry the main ridge, occupied by the principal force of the enemy. Previous, however, to reaching this point, I received instructions through an aide-de-camp of the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to detach the regiment of Brunswick Oels and the provisional battalion, consisting of part of the 24th and 58th regiments, to attack an advanced party of the enemy on our left, which was driven in by them with great good order and gallantry. The 6th regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, then the only one of the 2nd brigade, was rapidly advanced to cover the formation of the 1st brigade at a point where the road, running over a narrow neck of the ridge (with ravines on each side), connected it with that on which the enemy were posted, and where our troops were consequently under the necessity of deploying under all the fire of the enemy; and I can hardly sufficiently praise the steadiness and gallantry with which the regiment performed this severe duty, notwithstanding the loss it sustained, as from the very steep banks which the 1st brigade was under the necessity of ascending from the road it was a considerable time before it was enabled to form, to move upon the enemy's line, which, however, it then immediately charged in a most gallant manner and drove them before it, and these troops never afterwards were able to maintain another position. The concentrated fire of a very large body of the enemy during the whole of this operation upon this narrow point, evidently considered as the key of their position, and which for some hours they had obstinately maintained against every previous attack, and considering the very small force with which it was ultimately carried, will, I trust, entitle the corps engaged to your approbation and recommendation to his Excellency the Commander in Chief. The regiment of Brunswick Oels under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hertzberg, and the provisional battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, of the 58th regiment, are particularly entitled to praise. The 51st regiment, having been left by the 1st brigade at Oergave after the affair at that place to watch Peyrehorade, had not yet rejoined it; but the 68th regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, the 82nd regiment by Major Conyers, and the Chasseurs Britanniques by Lieutenant-Colonel de Hautoy, were all distinguished by their gallantry on this trying occasion; and Major-General Inglis, commanding the brigade, particularly notices the great exertions of Major Vincent, to whom the command of the 82nd regiment devolved on Major Conyers unfortunately receiving a severe wound early in the action. To the judgment and gallantry of the Major-General himself, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner, of the 6th regiment, in temporary command of the 2nd brigade, I feel greatly indebted; and I beg particularly to submit for your recommendation the attentive, active, and gallant conduct both of Captain Fitzgerald, Brigade Major of the 2nd brigade, whose severe wounds I have deeply to regret, and that of Lieutenant Elliot,

51st regiment, acting Brigade Major of the 1st brigade. Nor can I close this statement without expressing my strong sense of the activity, intelligence, and gallantry with which I was assisted by the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Abercrombie, Assistant Quartermaster-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel Doyley, Assistant Adjutant-General of the division, and of the services rendered me by my aide-de-camp, Captain Johnston, who accompanied me during the whole of the action. Permit me then to solicit, Sir, that you will have the goodness to submit this statement of the conduct of the 7th division to the favourable consideration of his Excellency the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, and to believe me, Sir, with the highest consideration,

Your very obedient and very humble servant,

G. T. WALKER.

II.

Major J. Dyer to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

SIR, Mont de Marsan, 3rd March, 1814.

Called upon as I have been by your Excellency to make a report of the brigades of artillery engaged with the column under your orders, I feel that I have a pleasing task in performing that duty when I have to mention two troops of horse artillery and a brigade whose reputations were already so well established in this army, and whose state, which enabled them to follow with such rapidity the movements of your column on that day, would be of itself sufficient to call for strong and marked approbation; but it must have been obvious to all that their excellent practice and the forward positions they took were of the utmost service to the army, and assisted in driving the enemy from their position.

The regular and gallant style in which the two troops and brigade were formed in line as soon as the ground would admit of it, did not, I trust, escape your notice, and reflects the greatest credit on the officers in command, and I trust will be thought to merit your Excellency's recommendation of them to the Commander of the Forces.

I should really feel that I omitted a duty imposed upon me if I did not recommend to your Excellency's notice the conduct of Major Sympher, Major Gardiner, and Major Jenkinson, on that brilliant day.

The brigades commanded by Captains Michell and Turner merit also my warmest approbation, and though not brought into action at so early a period, from not having received their orders until late, yet were towards the end of the day of the most important service.

Captain Maxwell's brigade did not arrive in time to come into action, and I have to lament that we thereby lost the services of an officer and brigade of such well-established merit.

You will, I am sure, Sir, excuse my calling your attention in the most particular manner to the loss of Major Sympher, an equal ornament to his corps and his country: both will, I trust, ever regret the fall of one whose services have so frequently excited admiration during the period he has been with this army; and I have no doubt you will have the goodness to request his Excellency the Commander of the Forces to recommend that such provision may be made for his wife and family as may in some measure compensate for the loss of one so justly esteemed in private and valued in public life. His brigade was admirably conducted by Captain Daniel after his fall.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

J. DYER.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Boucaut, 4th March, 1814.

I have the honour to lay before you a report received from Major-General Howard, and to say that I entirely concur with the Major-General in the opinion he expresses respecting the good conduct of the troops of the King's German Legion.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your obedient, humble servant,
John Hope.

[Enclosures.]

I.

Major-General Howard to Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope.

Sir, Château de Matignon, 2nd March, 1814.

Enclosed I do myself the honour of transmitting a report I have received from Major-General Hinuber relative to the share that was taken by the line battalions of the King's German Legion in the operations of the 27th ultimo against the village and position of St. Etienne. I have only to add to it, that they fully deserve the commendations bestowed on them by the Major-General; officers, non-commissioned officers, and men behaving with the greatest gallantry, the Major-General himself setting the example.

The two light battalions of that brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bussche, co-operated in the attack on the left of the line battalions, and materially assisted in the capture and subsequent defence of the village. Indeed, on every occasion Lieutenant-Colonel Bussche and the Light Brigade have behaved in a distinguished manner.

I received every assistance during the affair from Lieutenant-Colonel Dashwood and Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Arthur Upton, the Assistant Adjutant-General and the Assistant Quartermaster-General of the division, and from my aide-de-camp Captain Battersby.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient, humble servant,
W. Howard.

II.

Major-General Hinuber to Major-General Howard.

Sir, Before Bayonne, 1st March, 1814.

I beg leave to report to you the particulars of the attack by the line brigade, King's German Legion, on the enemy's intrenched position at the village of St. Etienne on the 27th ult. After you had, Sir, ordered the attack of that village, Lieutenant-Colonel Bodaker with six companies of the 1st battalion charged against it, and in the most gallant manner carried the churchyard and church, where the enemy was very strongly posted, and which seemed to be the key of his position. At the same time the riflemen of the 1st and 5th battalions, headed by Lieutenants Brandis and Wilding, supported by two companies of Captain Borstell, and Holle of the 1st battalion, extended to the right towards the great road from Bayonne to Dax, where the enemy had covered himself with an intrenchment, in which he had posted a field-piece. The contiguous houses had also been all loopholed, which made the position very strong.

It was, however, immediately attacked, and carried on being supported by the 2nd battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Beck. Many prisoners were taken, and also the field-piece, which, however, it was impossible to remove at that moment, as a very heavy fire was kept up upon it from the advanced works of the citadel of Bayonne to prevent us from taking it away.

About 5 o'clock P.M. a considerable column moved from the citadel, and after keeping up a brisk fire upon us, advanced at the pas de charge to retake the gun. This was observed, and no time lost. Part of the riflemen, and the 5th battalion under the command of Colonel Ompteda, charged the enemy's column, and succeeded in driving it back, being herein assisted, on their right, by the riflemen of the 1st and 5th battalions, and one company of the 2nd under Captain Winkstern.

Half an hour after, however, the enemy had rallied, and advancing as before, made a second attempt. He was again charged, and broken; and being pursued farther than at first, the gun was in the mean time brought to the rear, and saved. The object of contention having been now secured to our possession, the fire of the enemy diminished, and the French troops retired within their formidable intrenchments. At nightfall the firing ceased altogether.

During the whole attack, as well as afterwards in maintaining the position we had gained, the battalions of the brigade behaved with the greatest gallantry and perseverance, the officers setting the most laudable example, and in consequence their loss has been considerable.

I should not do justice to Brigade-Major Drechsell and my aide-de-camp Lieutenant Heimburg if on this occasion I did not acknowledge the assistance I have received from them in terms of the highest commendation.

As this attack, Sir, has taken place under your eye, I flatter myself that the conduct of the brigade may have met with your approbation, and in consequence I venture to request that you would be pleased to mention the same to Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

HINUBER.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Boucaut, 4th March, 1814, 10 A.M.

I had last night the honour of yours by Wedderburn. I send by this opportunity to Sir George Murray for your information Lieutenant-Colonel Elphinstone's more detailed report relative to the attack of the citadel.

We have had two days violent gales of wind, which have somewhat damaged our bridge; and till the weather moderates, of which there is some appearance, the passage must be interrupted.

The 18-pounders are now, I understand, prepared to move on, and the pontoons either are or will be the same immediately. Considerable delay has occurred from the weather being such as to prevent them from using the rafts for passing carriages.

I am sorry to say that the Spaniards spread dismay by their conduct wherever they move.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord, yours very faithfully,

JOHN HOPE.

Monsieur to the Duc de Berri.

[Extract.]

"Vesoul, le 4 Mars, 1814.

"Je suis arrivé ici le 4 Février, et depuis Bâle j'ai été reçu comme il y a 30 ans, et même avec plus d'affection. Il y a cependant des mauvais, mais ce jour-là ils faisoient comme les autres. Je ne comptois pas rester aussi longtems ici, mais la politique est bien lente, et toujours bien contrariante. Cependant, j'espère que par la force des choses, et surtout d'après la conduite admirable de l'ennemi, qui est aussi insolent à 20 lieues de Paris qu'à Moscow, j'espère, dis-je, que tout finisse bien. J'ai déjà établi des relations avec sept ou huit provinces, les unes plus avancées que les autres, mais présentant toutes de très grandes ressources. On assure que la Bretagne et la Vendée sont tout ce qu'il y a de mieux. Quel bonheur pour la chose, et pour le vieux père si tu as pu y descendre! Je connois ton ardeur; je crains seulement que la côte ne soit trop bien gardée.

"DE MONSIEUR."

Monsieur to the King of France.

Vesoul, le 4 Mars, 1814.

J'aurais bien voulu vous écrire plutôt, mon cher frère, et j'aurois surtout désiré dater ma lettre d'un endroit plus rapproché du centre des opérations, mais les mêmes obstacles qui m'ont retenu subsistent encore, et d'après tout ce qui s'est passé depuis mon arrivée ici je dois m'estimer heureux d'avoir maintenu ma position, et d'avoir évité jusqu'ici un éclat que je dois retarder afin de le conserver pour dernière ressource.

Je joins ici les copies de ce que j'ai fait de plus marquant depuis mon séjour ici. Elles consistent, 1, dans ma lettre à l'Empereur de Russie du 22 Février. Le Prince de Rohan, qui la portoit, n'a pas pu joindre l'Empereur de Russie à l'époque de la marche rétrograde; il est revenu me joindre, et il est reparti le 28. 2, dans deux copies de lettres à MM. de Simonville et Clermot, ainsi qu'une formule de pouvoir provisoire: ceci mérite explication, mais comme mes occupations me laissent bien peu de liberté, je vous prie de permettre que tous les détails de ma position et les motifs de mes démarches vous soient donnés par ma belle fille, et que j'évite ainsi des répétitions. Je vous envoye même, 3, la copie d'une lettre que j'ai écrite au Général Augereau. Je ne compte pas beaucoup sur une réponse favorable, mais le succès de ma démarche pourroit être décisif pour la cause, et dans tous les cas elle ne peut avoir aucun inconvénient. 4, les copies des lettres du Conseil Secret de Berne et de l'Avoyer de Watteville, ainsi que celles de mes réponses. 5, enfin, la copie de ma dernière lettre à l'Empereur de Russie.

Ma belle fille vous instruira en même tems de ce que je pense de ma position, de mes projets, et de mes résolutions.

Ma situation peut devenir belle et utile, mais le début est difficile et pénible, et j'ai terriblement besoin de l'aide du Ciel pour m'en tirer. Tout ce dont je puis répondre, c'est de mon zèle.

J'ai eu plusieurs conversations avec M. de Manuel, celui qui a été Ministre de l'Intérieur avant le 10 Août. Il jouit de l'estime et de la confiance de toute la province, il a une grande habitude des affaires, et comme j'ai été content de ses principes et de sa manière de voir, je compte l'employer d'une façon ou d'une autre, soit pour le garder avec moi, et le charger des détails dans lesquels je ne pourrois pas entrer, soit pour le placer auprès de Souverains et Ministres, afin d'y servir, et d'y défendre nos intérêts. Quelques heures de conversation ne suffisent sûrement pas pour connoître un homme, aussi ou ferai-je que l'essayer. Il m'a paru content de moi, ce qui peut me disposer en sa faveur, et en retournant hier chez moi il m'a dit qu'il étoit entièrement à mes ordres et que je pouvois disposer de lui.

Samedi, 5 Mars.

M. de Trogoff est arrivé cette nuit, mon cher frère. Je joins ici la copie de la lettre de l'Empereur de Russie, et celle de ma réponse. La lettre de l'Empereur étant absolument officielle, et ayant été combinée avec les Ministres de ses alliées, je crois devoir renoncer pour le moment un projet que j'avois formé d'aller secrètement au quartier-général; si on m'y recevoit, ce ne pourroit être que pour me dire ce qu'on m'écrit, et ce ne seroit que du tems de perdu. Mais comme je le mande à l'Empereur, je vais travailler avec la juste confiance qu'au moins on n'empêchera pas ce que pourrai faire.

Jules de Polignac, qui a déjà vu le quartier-général, et qui a gagné beaucoup de sagesse et d'aplomb depuis dix ans, est celui qui me paroit le plus propre à être chargé de cette commission délicate, et j'espère qu'il s'en acquittera bien. Quant à moi, je vais réunir tous mes moyens pour produire un éclat, soit hors de la ligne, soit dans la ligne, puisqu'on m'assure que l'on n'empêchera rien. Le résultat de cette démarche réglera ma marche ultérieure. La seule chose dont je puisse répondre, c'est qu'elle ne sera pas rétrograde.

Toujours à vous revoir, mon cher frère, j'en ai la ferme confiance, et quelques que soient les obstacles je n'en suis pas effrayé. Je vous embrasse comme je vous aime du plus tendre de mon cœur.

De Monsieur.

[Enclosures.]

I.

Monsieur to the Emperor of Russia.

Vesoul, le 22 Février, 1814.

Mon entière confiance dans V.M.I. me porteroit seule à m'ouvrir à elle sans réserve, mais un devoir impérieux m'en prescrit aujourd'hui la loi.

V.M.I. est déjà instruite des événements qui se sont passés, et de l'enthousiasme avec lequel les habitans de cette ville et des environs ont accueilli le frère de leur Roi légitime. Connoissant les désirs de V.M.I., et voulant m'y informer dans tous ce qui dépendroit de moi, j'ai calmé, j'ai contenu le zèle des loyaux Français qui vouloient tous arborer à l'instant la cocarde blanche. Par une suite du même principe je voulois me porter aujourd'hui à Langres et demain à Dijon pour recevoir dans ces deux villes et dans les environs l'expression touchante de l'amour des habitans pour leur Roi, et me conduire comme je l'ai fait ici en contenant un zèle qui ne demande qu'à éclater.

Ensuite je comptois m'écarter de la ligne occupée par les Alliées, et de

déployer alors l'étendard Royal en invitant tous les Français à suivre mon exemple, et à donner un juste effort aux sentimens qui les animent.

Mais le Général Hirsch, Autrichien, qui commande ici, soit par un excès d'ignorance, soit par mauvaise volonté, a paru effrayé du mouvement que ma présence excitoit, et non-seulement il a refusé de me procurer des passeports et des chevaux pour partir, mais il a osé dire à deux officiers qui m'accompagnent que l'effet inattendu que je produisois pourroit être dangereux pour l'armée des Alliées, et qu'il pourroit être obligé par son devoir à me forcer de retourner à Bâle.

Heureusement, Sire, cet homme n'a pas cherché exécuter un tel projet, car rien ne m'eut déterminé à céder, et les Français de toutes les classes n'eussent pas souffert que l'on fit violence au frère de leur Roi. Mais voulant employer tous les moyens de douceur et de prudence, j'ai consenti à suspendre mon départ, et j'ai fait passer sur-le-champ le Comte de Wall pour le quartier-général avec des lettres pour le Prince de Metternich et pour le Prince Schwarzenberg, afin de les instruire de ce qui se passe et de leur demander les ordres nécessaires pour que je jouisse de la liberté qui m'est due si justement au milieu de la France et des fidèles sujets du Roi, mon frère. Le Comte de Wall a reçu en même temps l'ordre d'instruire le Comte de Rochechouart d'un fait aussi extraordinaire, afin qu'il en donne connoissance à V.M.I. Mais le Prince Louis de Rohan devant partir aujourd'hui pour le quartier-général, je profite de cette occasion pour donner moi-même à V.M.I. le détail de tout ce qui s'est passé. Je dois ajouter que j'ai eu beaucoup à me louer sous tous les rapports du Prince Jouvakoff et des officiers Russes qui se trouve ici. A moins d'événemens que je ne puis pas prévoir, j'attendrai dans cette ville les réponses et les ordres qu'il est si nécessaire que je reçoive promptement.

Maintenant, Sire, je puis dire, je puis attester à V.M.I. que les nobles vœux de son âme grande et généreuse sont accomplis, que la France a prononcé son vœu le plus formel pour son Roi, et pour reprendre un gouvernement légitime et paternel.

L'accueil que j'ai reçu dans une des villes qui avoit le moins marqué jusqu'ici en seroit déjà une preuve suffisante, mais dans le moment actuel j'ai le droit d'assurer à V.M.I. de la manière la plus positive que la Franche Comté, la Bourgogne, l'Alsace, la Lorraine, le Berri, le Nivernois, et l'Auvergne n'attendent qu'un ordre, qu'un mot de moi au nom du Roi pour faire éclater les sentimens d'amour et d'enthousiasme de tous les habitans, et que loin de les exciter, mon unique occupation est de les calmer et de contenir les esprits jusqu'au moment où je connoîtrai directement ou indirectement par V.M.I. quelle sera la nature de l'appui politique et militaire sur lequel les fidèles Français pourront compter de la part des puissances alliées. Je dois encore ajouter, Sire, que les moments sont beaucoup plus pressés qu'on ne peut le croire, et que je perdrai nécessairement les moyens qui me restent pour suspendre un éclat inévitable si j'étois obligé de chercher à le différer trop longtemps.

Je sais tout ce que V.M.I. a déjà fait pour la noble cause qu'elle a adopté si généreusement; il ne s'agit plus que de finir ce grand ouvrage, et l'expression libre du vœu des Français lui donne l'heureux droit d'arracher à l'ennemi public sa dernière ressource, celle de faire croire et craindre que l'on ne puisse encore traiter avec lui.

Qu'il me soit permis, Sire, d'être ici l'organe de tous les Français en offrant à V.M.I. l'hommage de tous les sentimens d'admiration, de reconnoissance, et de respect, avec lesquels, etc.

DE MONSIEUR.

II.

The Emperor of Russia to Monsieur.

MONSIEUR MON COUSIN, Chaumont, le 19 Février (3 Mars), 1814.

La lettre de V.A.R. du 28 Février m'a été remise exactement. J'en apprécie vivement le motif et l'intention, et dans toutes autres circonstances que celles où je me trouve je me serois fait un plaisir de convenir immédiatement du tems et du lieu d'une entrevue qui ne pourroit être que d'un grand intérêt. Mais V.A.R. connoit les principes adoptés par les puissances alliées relativement à l'objet qui a motivé son entrée en France. Elles mettent trop de prix à ce que toutes leurs démarches portent l'empreinte de la plus grande loyauté pour ne point déclarer, dans chaque occasion, qu'une paix solide et durable forme jusqu'ici l'unique but de leurs efforts. Par conséquent elles s'abstiennent de prendre la moindre part aux mouvemens intérieurs qui pourroient avoir lieu en France. Elles ne se trouvent dans le cas ni de les encourager ni de les empêcher. Tel a été le principe qui a été énoncé par le gouvernement Britannique à V.A.R. à son départ de Londres. C'est celui qui de tout tems a guidé la marche politique que j'ai cru devoir observer dans des conjonctures aussi délicates, et qui m'empêche encore aujourd'hui de prononcer une opinion quelconque sur les vues de V.A.R. Cependant si elle avoit quelque communication à me faire trop instante pour pouvoir être différée, je l'invite à m'envoyer une personne sûre, ou à me la faire parvenir par écrit. Vous trouverez dans cette réponse un retour entier de confiance, ainsi que la preuve renouvelée des sentimens distingués avec lesquels je suis, etc.,

ALEXANDRE.

III.

Réponse de S.A.R. à S.M. Impériale.

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE ET COUSIN, Vesoul, le 5 Mars, 1814.

J'ai reçu ce matin la lettre de V.M.I. du 3 Mars. C'est avec le plus vif regret que je me soumets pour le moment à renoncer au bonheur de lui faire ma cour; mais, conformément à ses intentions, je charge le Comte Jules de Polignac de se rendre immédiatement auprès de V.M. pour lui remettre cette lettre, et lui communiquer tout ce dont je désirois si vivement de l'entretenir. Je supplie V.M.I. de daigner recevoir le Comte Jules de Polignac avec bonté, et de l'écouter avec autant de confiance que si j'avois l'honneur de lui parler moi-même. Je ne me permettrai point de discuter ici le plan de conduite qu'il a plu aux Souverains Alliées d'adopter; mais V.M.I. daignant me marquer que les puissances alliées ne veulent jusqu'ici ni encourager ni empêcher les mouvemens intérieurs en faveur du Souverain légitime, je vais régler ma conduite en conséquence.

DE MONSIEUR.

IV.

Monsieur to General Augereau.

GÉNÉRAL, Vesoul, le 25 Février, 1814.

Vous êtes Français, et militaire; vous voyez tous les maux dont votre patrie est menacée et accablée. J'ai donc la ferme certitude que vous voulez avoir la gloire de contribuer efficacement à sa délivrance. Le tyran, qui est la seule cause de tous nos malheurs, est au moment de succomber, non-seulement sous le poids des puissantes armées réunies contre lui, mais bien plus encore sous

celui de l'opinion des Français de toutes les classes, qui se démontre généralement en faveur du gouvernement légitime et paternel du Roi Louis XVIII., mon frère. Je n'entrerai point ici dans les détails qui vous seront donnés par l'officier qui vous porte cette lettre. Vous pouvez le croire comme si je vous parlois moi-même. Il vous remettra les proclamations et déclarations du Roi, mon frère; elles suffiront pour vous montrer la sagesse de votre Souverain, et jusqu'où s'étend la bonté de son cœur, et son amour pour ses sujets. Revêtu par le Roi des pouvoirs les plus étendus, c'est en son nom, Général, que je vous ouvre les bras; je les ouvre également à tous les officiers et soldats qui sont sous vos ordres. Le sang d'Henri IV. coule dans nos veines; jugez si vous pouvez compter sur les promesses des descendans de ce grand Roi. Venez avec tous les braves qui vous obéissent m'aider par vos talens et par leur courage à mettre un terme aux maux affreux de la France, et à lui assurer promptement une paix stable et durable, qui lui rendra le bonheur dont elle est si cruellement privée. Puisse votre réponse, Général, me donner l'heureux droit de confirmer, au nom de notre Roi, le titre et le grade honorable que vous avez acquis par vos services et par votre brillante valeur.

DE MONSIEUR.

Monsieur to the Comte de la Châtre.

"Vesoul, le 4 Mars, 1814.

"D'un mot la grande querelle seroit finie, mais ce mot n'est pas dit, et si le silence dure encore il deviendra bien dangereux pour tout le monde. Espérons que Paris, où les Alliées doivent être déjà entrés, se prononcera de manière à entraîner les plus incertains.

"J'ai reçu vos deux lettres du 1 et 8 Février. J'espère que le patron de l'homme qui a parlé à M. de Blacas et à vous tiendra tout ce qu'il promet. C'est tout ce que je puis dire. Je sais qu'il s'est approché du centre des opérations, mais je n'en ai pas entendu parler. Je désire vivement que le Roi eût fait partir M. le Duc de Bourbon, car il faut des Princes de tous les côtés, et leur présence est bien nécessaire.

"Vous ferez mes complimens à Lord Liverpool, et vous ne lui cacherez pas que les personnes que j'ai envoyées à Lord Castlereagh pour lui parler de nos affaires, et pour en obtenir des secours pécuniaires qui nous seroient si nécessaires, l'ont trouvé bien froid, et ne m'ont rapporté que des refus. J'espère que l'état actuel des choses lui permettra de se laisser aller plus librement aux sentiments que je lui connois, et à ceux de son gouvernement.

"Dites au Comte de Blacas que j'espère et désire que mon fils cadet ne sera pas dans le cas de faire l'indication qu'on lui a donnée, à moins d'une impossibilité absolue de réussir où il est.

"DE MONSIEUR."

Rear-Admiral Penrose to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Pasages, 5th March, 1814.

I would not have troubled your Lordship with any details of losses at Socoa, or delays in unloading the vessels there, had not the heavy gales cut

us off from the use of the Adour, and your Lordship's advance rendered the quick despatch at Socoa more and more material.

Most heartily do I congratulate you on your rapid and admirable advance, and most sincerely do I hope the report of your having received a hurt is unfounded.

The gale and a *range* in this port have done vast damage, and we have to labour with double energy to get again efficient. Two of the licensed ships from Bordeaux are arrived here. I hear from the passengers that your Lordship is fully expected at that town, and I really believe you would be vastly welcome, as I hardly know whether they dread most the Spaniards or the return of their own troops.

One of the ships was much hurt in the late *range* here, and the passengers took refuge here at midnight. One of them is a sister of a Captain Gledstanes, of the 68th, and niece of General and Colonel Gledstanes. Most of the wealthy, I understand, were about to move, but have changed their minds. They believe that Napoleon has gained some late advantages, but that the Allies are at *Fontainebleau*. The *Regulus*, 74, was off Castillon. They left Bordeaux on the 27th ultimo. They mention some caricatures which show more freedom of the pencil than I should have expected.

There is a vessel of war off in distress; but if I can communicate, I must order her off for England. I shall mention the date of your Lordship's letter, and the information I have received from Captain O'Reilly of Sir John Hope's advance on the 27th, in a private letter to Lord Keith, if I am able to send her off. She has thrown all her guns overboard.

I remain most faithfully your Lordship's obedient servant,

C. J. PENROSE.

The Duc d'Angoulême to the Duchesse d'Angoulême.

St. Sever, le 6 Mars, 1814, à 4½ h.

Le Maréchal Beresford est venu chez moi pendant que je n'y étois pas, pour prendre mes ordres. Je regrette beaucoup de ne l'avoir pas vu. Il part demain de Mont de Marsan pour Bordeaux; il doit y être le 13. J'espère que le drapeau blanc y flottera un jour ou deux avant, et alors je m'y rendrai tout de suite à Pantaléon, si les choses y vont bien. Sinon, j'y arriverai beaucoup plutôt, parceque j'irai rejoindre le Maréchal; mais s'il ne se passe rien ni à Peuplier ni à Manique, alors Lolo n'ira ni à l'un ni à l'autre. Le tout est entre les mains de Dieu, qui en ordonnera pour le mieux; tout ce qui a été possible de faire a été fait, et le Marché a fait tout ce que sa position lui permettoit de faire. Voilà les trois questions que j'ai faites aujourd'hui à Lord W., et j'y ai joint ses réponses. Si le drapeau blanc est déployé à Pau, et que j'y prenne le gouvernement au nom du Roi: 1. Ne vous opposerez vous point à ce que je lève des troupes, volontaires ou autres, et me fourniriez-vous des fonds pour les payer?—Je ne vous en empêcherai point, mais je ne payerai aucunes troupes, à moins que ce ne soit les bataillons ou régiments quittant les rangs de l'ennemi. 2. Si j'avois un crédit pour trouver des fonds, voulez vous en cas de besoin vous rendre garant du remboursement au nom du gouvernement Britan-

nique?—Non, je ne le puis point. 3. Ayant conquis par les armes la partie du pays que votre armée occupe, me laisserez-vous en prendre l'administration sans vous y opposer, ni aux nominations de préfets, sous-préfets, maires, etc., que je jugerois à propos de faire?—Oui, sans difficulté; je vous remettrai le gouvernement du pays occupé.

Tu diras tout cela au Roi, mais je demande que cela ne soit su que de lui et de Blacas. . . . . .

Du Duc d'Angoulême.

[Enclosure.]

Rapport sur l'Exécution des Ordres de Monseigneur pour Pau.

Le 6 Mars.

J'ai quitté Orthez à environ 11 heures, escorté par M. Malinquer et ses deux gendarmes, ce qui n'a pas laissé d'étonner ceux qui nous voyoient passer dans les rues, et j'ai remarqué un véritable air de satisfaction sur les personnes qui divinoient ou étoient informés du but de mon voyage; mais ce n'étoit rien en comparaison de ce que j'ai éprouvé le long de la route. On avoit su le passage de M. Malinquer pendant la nuit. Partout les habitans des communes, et dans deux le curé à leur tête, s'étoient réunis en groupes. Partout les saluts des hommes, femmes et enfans, l'air de la joie et du bonheur, des vivats, des souhaits, des exclamations contre la tyrannie, des espérances d'en être délivrés et de revenir sous les loix d'une famille chérie, m'ont fait goûter un bonheur que je ne puis décrire. A environ deux lieues nous avons vu arrivant vers nous quatre cavaliers Français; mes gendarmes les ont reconnu pour être de leurs camarades. Ils se sont ralliés à nous, et ont ôté leur cocarde. Ainsi mon escorte me donnoit une apparence de petite pompe triomphale. Dans les groupes où étoient les curés je me suis arrêté, et j'ai parlé au nom de Monseigneur dans des termes qui m'ont paru produire leur effet, et les rendre heureux du moins par l'espérance. A Artix, où M. Malinquer a voulu faire halte pour faire rafraîchir les chevaux de ses quatre derniers gendarmes, j'ai été accosté par le maire, vieillard de 80 ans, ancien Conseiller au Parlement de Pau, un M. de la Fargue, qui, les larmes aux yeux, vouloit me baiser les mains. Sa femme fondant en larmes de joie de voir le précurseur du Prince si désiré depuis si longtems, a saisi ma main par un mouvement auquel je ne m'attendois pas, et malgré moi, l'a couverte de ses pleurs. Ils m'ont accompagné à l'auberge, et rien n'est plus touchant que l'expression de leur dévouement, de leur joie, et de leurs espérances d'être enfin délivrés de la plus insupportable tyrannie.

Jusques là tout alloit au gré de mes souhaits; mais je n'ai pas tardé à concevoir des inquiétudes sur le succès de mon entreprise pour le moment, aux réponses peu satisfaisantes de M. de Malinquer. Rien n'étoit préparé pour le moment que je désirois opérer. Il ne connoissoit dans la ville ni dans aucune branche de l'administration un homme influant par son caractère, son rang, ou ses principes. Tout le monde désiroit le renversement de la tyrannie, mais personne n'oseroit attacher le grelot; on frémissoit au nom de Buonaparte, on craignoit le retour des troupes parties seulement dans la nuit, et cent autres réponses aussi décourageantes. La tentative m'a venue d'ajourner l'entreprise, mais j'ai été retenu par la connoissance que je venois d'acquérir du peu d'étendue de vues et de lumières de l'homme, et par l'espoir de trouver quelque chef en état de conduire la chose. J'ai donc poursuivi mon chemin, et me suis même soumis à des mesures de prudence que prenoit le timide Malinquer, et qui m'ont paru de bien mauvais augure. Il a commencé par envoyant en avant les quatre gendarmes derniers arrivés, avec ordre de dire qu'ils ne

l'avoient pas trouvé, et de revenir à la nuit en dehors de la ville lui dire ce qui s'y passoit. Il a réglé notre allure de manière à ce que nous n'arrivassions qu'à la nuit : plus nous approchions, plus mon homme devenoit rêveur. Enfin à 6½h. nous avons trouvé les gendarmes dont le rapport a commencé à le mettre plus à son aise, tout étoit tranquille, et le seul sentiment qu'éprouvoient les habitans étoit la joie d'être délivrés de la présence des troupes. Malgré cela il m'a fait mettre pied à terre, un gendarme s'est emparé de mon cheval, un autre du sien, et par un détour il m'a conduit chez lui. J'ai envoyé aussitôt chercher le Commandant de la Garde Nationale. Il s'est trouvé que c'est un M. le Chevalier de Borie, ancien capitaine au Régiment d'Orléans Infanterie, que j'avois connu à Maestricht, où il avoit été blessé pendant le siége. Je lui ai annoncé l'objet de mon arrivée, et le projet de Monseigneur de se rendre lui-même à Pau, si les habitans étoient disposés à recevoir le petit-fils de Henri IV. d'une manière digne de lui. J'ai ajouté que S.A.R. avoit conservé jusqu'à présent l'incognito, ayant réservé à la ville de Pau l'honneur de donner la première l'exemple de sa fidélité au sang du père des Français ; qu'elle ne vouloit pas y entrer entouré de soldats étrangers, et qu'elle espéroit tout devoir au dévouement des braves Béarnois ; enfin j'ai cherché à ranimer dans le cœur d'un gentilhomme, ancien officier, les sentimens que je trouvois dans le mien. M. de Borie m'a fait les protestations les plus fortes de son zèle personnel, mais a ajouté qu'il étoit par sa place dans la dépendance du maire, M. de Bordenave, vieillard de 73 ou 74 ans, infirme et même malade dans ce moment-ci, homme d'un caractère timide et foible, qui avoit fait le jour même une proclamation pour que les habitans se tinssent tranquilles chez eux, et dans laquelle il avoit protesté de son respect personnel pour la sainteté de son serment au gouvernement. Je crains fort qu'en me signalant M. de Bordenave, il ne soit signalé lui-même. Il m'a mis en avant que l'on pouvoit craindre que la colonne partie pour Tarbes, en apprenant que Pau se prononçoit pour la bonne cause, ne fit une contre-marche, et ne tirât une vengeance éclatante en mettant pour l'exemple la ville à feu et à sang. J'ai traité cette crainte de chimère, et l'ai fort assuré que cette colonne qui lui faisoit ombrage avoit elle-même, et non sans fondement, la peur d'être coupée, et faisoit sûrement sa retraite à tire-d'ailes. J'ai su depuis que cette terreur provenoit de l'apparition de deux gendarmes qui étoient arrivés à deux heures à l'Hôtel de Ville, venant de Tarbes pour s'informer où étoient les ennemis, et que sur la réponse qu'ils n'avoient point paru, ils étoient repartis sur-le-champ. M. de Borie m'a quitté pour aller conférer avec le maire. Je l'ai chargé de lui dire que c'étoit par égard pour son âge et son état de maladie, et parceque ma vue ne lui donnât pas le tourment de l'inquiétude, je m'abstenois d'aller chez lui. M. de Borie, qui m'avoit dit que s'il y avoit seulement 200 Anglois dans la ville on pourroit donner cours à l'opinion publique, et qu'alors Monseigneur seroit reçu d'une manière convenable, est revenu de chez le maire, et m'a dit qu'au lieu de 200 hommes, M. de Bordenave en demandoit 2000; qu'au surplus il exigeoit que M. Malinquer s'éloignât sur le champ, parcequ'il seroit obligé de le faire arrêter, et que du reste il me supplioit de rendre justice à ses sentimens. J'ai répondu à M. de Borie qu'il me mettoit dans le cas de faire plus que d'en douter ; que je ne voyois là qu'une Phraze démentie par le fait de la persécution contre un fidèle serviteur comme le commandant de la gendarmerie, qui lui avoit fait preuve de dévouement. Celui-ci a été tellement effrayé de cette menace, qu'il a sur-le-champ ordonné de seller son cheval; il pouvoit être 9½h. ; pendant qu'il se préparoit pour partir, on est venu lui dire qu'on s'assembloit à la municipalité. Je lui ai dit que j'allois y aller. Gardez-vous bien de faire cette sottise, a-t-il repris, et aussitôt a disparu de la Chambre. J'ai prié M. de Borie d'aller à l'hôtel-de-ville, et de venir me dire ce qui s'y

passoit. Au bout d'une demi-heure, ne le voyant pas revenir, j'y ai envoyé le neveu de M. Malinquer, jeune homme plus formé et plus prononcé que son oncle. Au bout de dix minutes il est revenu, et m'a rapporté qu'en effet il y avoit cinq ou six membres du Conseil Municipal réunis; mais que les MM., loin d'être en délibération, étoient occupés à jouer aux cartes. Alors je me suis fait conduire chez M. de Borie. Ma vue a fait sur lui l'effet de la tête de Méduse; il en pâli d'effroi, et m'a dit qu'il alloit se trouver compris. Je l'ai rassuré en lui disant, 1, que M. Malinquer étoit parti; 2, que ne pouvant compter ni sur le maire ni sur lui, j'allois le délivrer de toute crainte, que les habitans exprimassent malgré eux les bons sentimens dont je les savois animés, et que j'allois également partir. Il m'a protesté de nouveau que pour son compte il étoit prêt à donner toutes les preuves de son dévouement, mais qu'il me supplioit d'obtenir une force armée qui peut soutenir les biens-intentionnes. J'ai pris congé de lui, et à 11 heures je suis en effet parti. J'ai trouvé M. Malinquer, qui m'attendoit à une demie lieue; nous avons été ensemble jusqu'à l'Escar, où, brisé de fatigue, il est resté, et j'ai continué mon chemin avec mon dragon d'ordonnance et un guide, et suis arrivé à 3 heures à St. Sever. J'ai rendu compte à Monseigneur, qui m'a envoyé ensuite rendre également compte à Lord Wellington. Le Feld-Maréchal m'assure qu'il alloit faire marcher des troupes à Pau, et en effet il a donné ordre à un régiment de cavalerie et deux bataillons d'infanterie de s'y rendre avec quatre pièces de canon. Deux habitans de Pau m'ont apporté ce soir une lettre de M. Malinquer pour demander également des troupes. Ces messieurs m'ont appris que le maire avoit fait arrêter et mettre en prison par le commandant de la Garde Nationale le gendarme de confiance de M. Malinquer, un des deux qui l'avoient accompagné.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Mont de Marsan, 6th March, 1814.

The Allies are no doubt retiring. The reason does not appear so clear, for I cannot find out there has been any great battle, but the Bordeaux papers of the 1st and 2nd speak of a great number of small affairs, of course always in favour of Buonaparte, and taking 500 here, 1000 there, and 2000 at another place, and so on; but, as I said, the motive for the retreat of the Allies is not visible. The only thing that looks as if something more than these partial actions or skirmishes had taken place is that an extract of the 'Moniteur' names a day on which the Minister of War is to present to the Empress the colours taken 'dans les dernières affaires.' What they were is not stated. I send you some extracts taken from those papers, as the person who brought them was obliged to return them immediately to one, he said, that was of different opinions to him, and who did not wish us to see them. The report of any part of Soult's force having retired by Villeneuve towards Roquefort was quite unfounded. There is nothing whatever on that road.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Extraits du 'Moniteur.'

Paris, le 26 Février, 1814.

Du 22 au 25 l'Empereur a eu son quartier-général au petit bourg de Châtres.

Le 23 le Prince de Wenzel-Lichtenstein est arrivé au quartier-général. Ce nouveau parlementaire étoit envoyé par le Prince Schwarzenberg pour proposer un armistice.

Le Général Milhaud, commandant la cavalerie du 5me corps, a fait prisonniers 200 hommes entre Pavillon et Troyes.

Le 23 nos troupes investaient Troyes de tous côtés. La ville a été évacuée dans la nuit, et nous sommes entrés ce matin.

Le Sieur Gau, ancien émigré, et un autre qui ont porté la croix de St. Louis, ont été condamnés à mort.

Le Comte de Valmy s'est dirigé, le 24, sur Bar-sur-Seine. Il a fait 1200 prisonniers de l'arrière garde de l'ennemi.

Le Général Gérard est parti du Pont de la Guillotière, soutenu par le Duc de Reggio; il s'est porté sur Lusigny, et a passé la Barre. Le Général Duhesme a pris position à Montieramay, près Vandœurre.

Un aide-de-camp de l'Empereur Napoléon, un de l'Empereur de Russie, un de l'Empereur d'Autriche, un du Roi de Prusse, sont réunis à Lusigny pour traiter des conditions d'une suspension d'armes. (*Ces aides-de-camp sont nommés.*)

Ainsi dans la journée du 24 la capitale de la Champagne a été délivrée, et nous avons fait 2,000 prisonniers.

Bourse, 26 Février.

Actions de la Banque de France, jouissance du 1er Janvier, 750f. à 760f.

Le 20 l'ennemi s'est retiré de près de Lyons, et nous lui avons fait un bon nombre de prisonniers.

Les villes de Bourg et de Macon sont occupées par une partie des troupes aux ordres du Maréchal Duc de Castiglione. L'ennemi se retire.—(*Journal de Paris.*)

The Aides-de-Camp said to have met at Lusigny:—Le Comte Flahaut, of Napoléon; le Comte Ducca, of Austria; le Comte Schouvaloff, of Russia; Général de Rauch, for Prussia, being Chef du Corps de Génie du Roi de Prusse.

G. O. St. Sever, 7th March, 1814. [738.]

1. The Commander of the Forces begs to call the attention of the General officers of the army, and the Commanding officers of regiments, to the orders repeatedly given respecting requisitions, respecting receipts, and respecting foraging.

2. The greatest abuses and outrages are committed daily, in consequence of the inattention of the officers of the army to these orders, to the loss and injury of the inhabitants of the country, and to the disgrace of the character of the army.

4. The Commander of the Forces again desires that the churches may not be used by the troops without permission of

the inhabitants and clergy; and that when they are used, the utmost care should be taken of the sacred vessels, and of every article that serves for religious purposes.

5. Neither horses nor other animals are to be put into the churches on any account whatever.

WELLINGTON.

[739.] *To Colonel Torrens.*

SIR, St. Sever, 8th March, 1814.

I have the honour of enclosing papers which have been transmitted to me by Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill, being a letter from Major-General Byng, two from Sir William Stewart, and a division order by the latter on the conduct of the troops; and complaining particularly of Colonel ———— of the —— and of Colonel ———— of the ——.

I concur in all the complaints of the irregularity of the troops. Till lately I could not say too much in favour of their conduct; but I am sorry to say that since their late operations they have been as bad, if not worse than ever; and I have no doubt the inhabitants of this country, however at first well inclined towards us, will be as much our enemies as the Spaniards and Portuguese ever were to the French army.

I attribute the conduct of the troops entirely to the regimental officers. They neither read nor understand nor endeavour to carry into execution any of the orders of the army which have for their object the prevention of the committal of crimes. In ordinary circumstances, that is to say, when the army is quietly encamped in a position or in cantonments, all goes on well enough, and the ordinary regimental discipline is sufficient to keep the soldiers in tolerable order; but when an exertion of any kind is to be made, the whole machine falls to pieces.

The officers and non-commissioned officers have no authority over their men; indeed the latter are as bad as the soldiers: and when we come after a victory to pursue our enemy, we find that our loss from irregularity is greater in the pursuit than his in the flight.

Then there is no crime recorded in the Newgate Calendar that is not committed by these soldiers, who quit their ranks in

search of plunder; and if the Staff Corps were three times as numerous and active as they are, they would not be sufficient either to prevent the mischief or detect those guilty of it.

I have no hesitation in attributing the evil to the utter incapacity of some officers at the head of regiments to perform the duties of their situation, and the apathy and unwillingness of others; to the promotion of officers in regiments by regular rotation, thus holding forth no reward to merit or exertion, and leaving all in a state of equal indifference and apathy whether their superiors have, or not, reason to be displeased with them; and to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of punishing any officer for *neglect of duty*, when he is to be tried by others, each and all of whom have been guilty of the same, if not of greater neglects. In general such neglects are punished by sentencing the Commander-in-Chief to reprimand the officer, which is just so much waste paper; or if the more extended punishment of suspension from rank and pay for three or six months is sentenced, it is considered another mode of being idle and generally absent; and at the end of the period the officer returns to his regiment in as good a situation as ever.

This evil might perhaps in some degree be remedied by placing those at the bottom of the list who should have been suspended from rank and pay by sentence of a General Court Martial; but it must likewise be observed that any additional severe consequences attached to this punishment would only render still more frequent the more favourite one with courts martial, that of reprimand by the Commander-in-Chief.

There is not much difficulty in posting a British army for a general action, or in getting the officers and men to do their duty in the action. The difficulty consists in bringing them to the point where the action can be fought, and in the exertion to be made afterwards to derive all the advantages which any other troops in the world would derive from victory. These exertions require order and discipline among the men; and habits of obedience to order, attention, exertion, and intelligence and authority among the officers. But both fail; and I have always found that we lose more men in a pursuit than we do in any general action.

I beg you to lay the enclosed papers before His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, together with my request that Lieutenant-Colonel ——— and Colonel ——— may

be removed from the command of their regiments to some other situation, in which their want of fitness will not be so detrimental to the service.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[740.] G. O. St. Sever, 8th March, 1814.

1. The Commander of the Forces wishes the officers of the army to observe that the orders of the army uniformly require that requisitions, whether for forage or other articles, should be made by a commissary on a magistrate.

2. Those of the 4th May and 17th June, 1809, are positive on this point; and the Commander of the Forces particularly requests that they may be attended to in all requisitions in future.

3. Articles of any kind are to be taken from individuals on requisition only when the magistrate is absent and cannot be found.

4. The General officers commanding divisions of infantry, and brigades of cavalry, are requested to direct the Commissaries attached to their several divisions and brigades to settle with the magistrates of the places in which they may be cantoned or encamped, where the horses and other animals attached to the division or brigade may be turned to grass, and at what rate of expense.

WELLINGTON.

A Monseigneur le Feld Maréchal Marquis de Wellington, Général en Chef des Armées Alliées.

EXCELLENCE, Orthez, le 8 Mars, 1814.

Votre Seigneurie a eu la bonté de faire passer une dépêche à l'adresse d'un des notables de cette ville relative à l'indication des membres du Corps Municipal.

Cette dépêche, quels qu'ayent été nos recherches, d'après les avis d'un de vos aides-de-camp, ne s'est point trouvée. Nous ne savons où elle a passé; la position où nous nous trouvons nous ayant jeté dans quelque désordre.

Cependant, si, comme on nous le dit, votre Excellence, pénétrée de la nécessité de l'organisation d'une municipalité en cette ville, désire connoître notre vœu, et l'indication des membres qui doivent la composer, votre Seigneurie trouvera ce vœu exprimé dans la pièce incluse.

Nous supplions votre Excellence d'excuser le retard apporté dans cette remise; la cause en est prise de l'égarement de la dépêche.

Nous la conjurons encore de donner à la cité une autorité municipale, d'après le mouvement de sa justice ; la ville en éprouve le besoin le plus urgent, et les troupes de votre Excellence y trouveront ce qu'elles ne peuvent y chercher dans l'état actuel. Malgré tout le zèle dont nous faisons preuve, l'autorité municipale et la police devant avoir nécessairement un signe distinctif pour l'exercice de leurs fonctions, nous sollicitons de vôtre Excellence qu'elle veuille bien le prescrire.

Nous prions enfin votre Excellence de donner des ordres au Commandant de la place, ou autre représentant, de secourir l'autorité municipale, d'accueillir ses demandes fondées, et de concourir à tout ce que le bien du service, la sûreté des personnes et des propriétés pourront exiger.

Nous sommes, avec respect, de Votre Excellence,

Vos très humbles et très obéissants serviteurs.

(*Here follow the signatures.*)

[ENCLOSURE.]

Ville d'Orthez, le 8 Mars, 1814.

Les notables Membres du Conseil Municipal de la ville d'Orthez, assemblés au lieu des Séances de la Municipalité.

Il a été dit : Que la ville étant occupée par les troupes alliées, sous les ordres de S.E. le Lord Wellington, et les autorités établies ayant cessé leurs fonctions, conformément aux instructions qu'elles avaient reçu de l'autorité supérieure, il doit être pourvû aux besoins de la cité, d'après le vœu de S.E. Lord Wellington.

En conséquence, s'étant occupé de l'indication provoquée par S.E. le Général commandant les armées alliées, pour remplir à Orthez les fonctions de maire, adjoints au nombre de deux, et de commissaire de police, le Conseil Municipal désigne les individus ci-après pour remplir les fonctions suivantes :—M. Henri Darnaudat, propriétaire, pour remplir les fonctions de maire ; M. Pierre Loustaunau, propriétaire, pour celles d'adjoint ; M. Louis Lamatabois, propriétaire, pour idem ; M. ———— pour commissaire de police.

Il a été déterminé aussi que l'administration actuelle aura l'honneur d'adresser un collationné de ce dessus à Son Excellence le Lord Wellington, et les membres présent ont signé.

(*Here follow the signatures.*)

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Mont de Marsan, 8th March, 1814.

I am just setting out for Roquefort, and I write merely to say that as the 7th division will only close up to Langon on the 11th instant, and the advance move from there that day, it is probable we shall not reach Bordeaux with any infantry till the 13th, as I understand it is from Langon to there two very long marches ; and as I said, I would not approach that large town, or allow our troops to enter it, late in the evening : but I shall move in this as you have directed, by circumstances. However, I think it would be as well that the cavalry from General Vandeleur's brigade going by the road of the Great Landes did not show itself in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux sooner than the day before we should arrive, from various considerations which it is unnecessary to enumerate to you. As those squadrons

have their orders, I think it right to mention this, and to ask if I may regulate their movements according to the period of our own approach to Bordeaux.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[Send this letter to General Murray, and request him to send orders accordingly to the squadrons of General Vandeleur's brigade.

WELLINGTON.]

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Captieux, 9th March, 1814.

I have just received your two letters of yesterday. It will be of great benefit to us the doing away with this contractor. In respect to the requisitions signed by me, I have already explained the circumstance to Lord FitzRoy Somerset; and I was quite annoyed at having put my name to one where was your head-quarters. Those requisitions, however, were made out by the Mayor, and by an officer of the Prefecture, the latter a respectable person; and he insists the *Juges de Paix* have acted extremely improper in making any difficulties on the point; that under the circumstances of the country they must have known themselves to be the proper persons to be applied to. Most of them have complied. The requisition was for Mr. Ogilvie, and by the advice of the former he requested I would sign it. I am sure we shall want for nothing, and the sum that lasted us a week will now serve us for a month: a serious thing, independent of the final economy.

I sent you this morning a French paper, and I now send you others. The accounts are most confused, almost as much as the various reports there are of the state of things in the North. By Blücher's movement on Ferté la Gauche it would almost appear that Buonaparte was cut off from Paris; and as he did not fight his way into Troyes, arriving on the 24th, and being still there on the 27th, it would appear but a movement of position of the Allies. It is, however, difficult to decypher. It is said that two couriers are due at Bordeaux from Paris. I do not hear of any troops being at or moving on Bordeaux, or any of the intermediate places; and, as I conceived, the report of two companies of voltigeurs at Bazas was unfounded. This day's march has been long, but the weather so fine and the roads good, the troops get in in good time. I shall be to-morrow at Langon with the left brigade of the 7th division, two guns, and Vivian's cavalry, leaving a squadron at Bazas with the other two brigades. The squadron will remain there with Sir L. Cole, and I shall judge at Langon if more will be necessary there. I can, if the weather holds good, be at Bordeaux with the advance on the 12th; but it will depend on circumstances if I enter it that day or wait till the next morning. Our people are behaving very well.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 9th March, 1814.

In order to put you in possession of what is going on at Châtillon, I send you the Protocol of the 28th.

With respect to the armistice, it seems to have been an ill-considered measure of Prince Schwarzenberg, which had no other effect than elating Buonaparte, and making him insist on the resumption of the Frankfort basis as the first article of the armistice. This was instantly refused.

In consequence of the ice on the coast of Holland, the gold I promised you from thence has not been shipped as soon as I could have wished. The enclosed has just been received on that subject, in answer to inquiries I have repeatedly made about it.

In consequence of a convention with Spain, the property of recaptured ships is restored to the original owners, the re-captors being only entitled to the salvage of an eighth. Understanding that there was much money on board the recaptured ship the *Juan Baptiste*, I prevailed on the Spanish claimants and the British recaptors to consent to sell the whole to government. An agent from each of the parties and an agent from government were to go down to Plymouth to take an account of the money; and a frigate was ordered down there to take as much as could be conveniently packed, and proceed to your Lordship. In order to induce Fernan Nuñez to consent to this, I assured him that the Spanish army under your command would be included in the distribution. I enclose you the account which I have just received on this point, and am much disappointed at it. I hope, however, still to get a good deal.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

J. Drummond, Esq., to H. E. Bunbury, Esq.

SIR, Commissary in Chief's Office, 9th March, 1814.

For the information of Lord Bathurst I have the honour to acquaint you that H.M.S. *Comus* arrived at Helvoet on Saturday last, and will probably be despatched in the course of this week with from 100,000*l.* to 150,000*l.* of specie, chiefly gold Napoleons and five-franc pieces.

At the same time I beg to mention that it is extremely uncertain what quantity of specie is on board of the ship at Plymouth, as you will perceive by the enclosed extract of a letter from the person sent from this office to assist in counting it.

I have the honour to be

Your most obedient servant,

JAMES DRUMMOND.

Mr. Ashton writes from Plymouth Dock, 4th March, that "at the recapture of the St. *Juan Baptiste*, it was discovered that the French seamen had plundered the ship of gold bars, doubloons, and dollars. What remains cannot be deposited in store until a ratification of Lord Keith's permission shall be received from the Admiralty. No vestige of any invoice or document has been

preserved, and it is not expected that the weighing and counting can commence till Monday." He will not fail to report the probable length of time which this operation will require as soon as experience enables him to form a tolerably correct judgment.

II.

Confidential Report of a Conference at Châtillon.

Châtillon-sur-Seine, 28th Feb., 1814.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts having demanded a conference, they met the Duke of Vicenza this day at half-past two o'clock. After signing the protocol of the preceding conference, the Austrian Plenipotentiary read the following declaration:—

"Plusieurs jours s'étant écoulés depuis que le projet de préliminaires d'une paix générale a été présenté par les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées à M. le Plénipotentiaire Français, et aucune réponse n'ayant été donnée, ni dans la forme d'une acceptation ni dans celle d'une modification du dit projet, Leurs Majestés Impériales et Royales ont jugé convenable d'enjoindre à leurs Plénipotentiaires de demander à M. le Plénipotentiaire Français une déclaration distincte et explicite de son gouvernement sur le projet en question. Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées pensent qu'il y a d'autant moins de motifs de délai de la part du gouvernement Français à l'égard d'une décision sur les préliminaires proposés, que le projet présenté par eux était basé en substance sur une offre faite par M. le Plénipotentiaire Français dans sa lettre au Prince de Metternich, datée du 9 de ce mois, que le Prince a soumise aux Cours Alliées.

"De plus, les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées sont chargés de déclarer au nom de leurs Souverains qu'adhérant pleinement à la substance des demandes contenus dans ces conditions qu'ils regardent comme aussi essentielles à la sûreté de l'Europe que nécessaires à l'arrangement d'une paix générale, ils ne pourraient interpréter tout rétard ultérieur d'une réponse à leurs propositions que comme un refus de la part du gouvernement Français.

"En conséquence, les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées, prêts à se concerter avec M. le Plénipotentiaire Français à l'égard du tems indispensablement nécessaire pour communiquer avec son gouvernement, ont ordre de déclarer que si à l'expiration du terme reconnu suffisant, et dont on sera convenu conjointement avec M. le Plénipotentiaire Français, il n'était pas arrivée de réponse qui fût en substance d'accord avec la base établie dans le projet des Alliées, la négociation serait regardée comme terminée, et que les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées retourneraient au quartier-général."

The Austrian Plenipotentiary added verbally that the Ministers of the Allied Courts would be willing to receive and discuss in the spirit of conciliation any modifications which might be proposed of the project of the preliminary treaty delivered to the French Minister, provided these modifications did not affect the substance of the treaty. The Duke of Vicenza observed it could not be doubted that his government had a sincere desire of peace. He had already proved it. He had at once given up the maritime question, which must be considered as a concession of great importance; and in every possible manner he had testified his anxiety to hasten the negotiation. His government was occupied in considering the subject, and he had no doubt that an answer would soon arrive. On being informed that it was necessary to name some day on which the Allies might expect a decision, he said that the Allies had suspended the conference for nine days without any reason whatever, and notwithstanding their previous understanding and concert; that he had only

received the project eleven days, and it was rather hard in an affair of such importance to press for so hasty a decision. He observed that since he had transmitted the project to his government the armies had been continually in movement; that it was difficult to say where the French head-quarters might be; and that a sovereign could not be expected to decide in one day on a proposition of such importance, especially while employed as his master was at present. The Duke of Vicenza was again told that the instructions received by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts were positive. On which he mentioned the obstructions given to the journeys of his couriers, and the time necessary to go and return from his master. He thought that ten days did not comprise too large a space. It was not that he thought ten days necessary; on the contrary, he hoped to receive an answer long before; but in such a case he preferred giving a greater extension than might be absolutely indispensable. Some observation was made upon this; and the period of eight days was suggested as a sufficient time for the purpose; but the proposition of the French Minister was finally accepted.

ABERDEEN.

Major-Gen. Lord E. Somerset to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, St. Germe, 10th March, 1814.

I had yesterday evening the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 6th instant, enclosing a representation of very irregular conduct on the part of the 7th Hussars and the horse artillery of my brigade in a house near Grenade. I shall not fail to make immediate inquiry into the circumstances, and shall see that justice is done to the complainant.

At the same time I beg to assure you that I am extremely concerned that there should be any foundation for such complaints in my brigade, and that I shall adopt every measure in my power to prevent similar occurrences in future.

Believe me, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

R. E. H. SOMERSET.

Earl Bathurst to Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 10th March, 1814.

The latest advices which have been received from Viscount Castlereagh lead me to suppose that your Lordship has proceeded with a considerable body of troops to the coast, either of Tuscany or of Genoa, in order to co-operate with the Allied forces in the object of expelling the French from Italy. It is not improbable that the French forces under Beauharnois' command may be withdrawn from Italy to assist in the more vital struggle in which Buonaparte is engaged for the preservation of his power in France. Indeed the latest reports incline me to suppose that Beauharnois is marching upon Savoy, in order to unite with the army commanded by Marshal Augereau.

I have reason to think that the Marquess of Wellington has passed the Adour, and is penetrating into the interior of France; and the disposition

of the people in those provinces through which the British army is advancing is represented to be far from hostile.

It appears to His Majesty's government that the most important object at the present crisis is to reinforce Lord Wellington's army with good troops to such an extent that he may have nothing to apprehend from following up his successes and establishing himself in the heart of France.

The returns in my possession lead me to calculate the force now in Catalonia, under the command of Lieutenant-General William Clinton, at about 12,000 men, exclusive of the regiments belonging to His Sicilian Majesty's service.

Of the force actually employed under your Lordship's command, I have no account; but I conjecture that after leaving 4000 or 5000 British and Germans in garrison, you may have carried with you about 8000 men (in gross numbers), exclusively of Sicilian troops. The junction of your own and of General Clinton's corps with the army under the Marquess of Wellington would consequently add 20,000 men in British pay to his Lordship's force. I consider this junction under present circumstances to be highly desirable; and in case the French forces shall have been withdrawn from Italy, or that the enemy shall have carried his disposable force across the Alps, after leaving only garrisons to protract the defence of the principal fortresses, I have to desire that your Lordship will take your measures for joining the Marquess of Wellington without the least loss of time.

I do not propose that the troops of His Sicilian Majesty should accompany the British forces upon this service. It appears preferable to leave them in garrison in such towns as may have been occupied upon the coasts of Tuscany or Genoa, and to place them provisionally under the General officer commanding the Austrian army in that neighbourhood. The Sicilian troops now serving in Catalonia may be transported to the same quarter.

It will be for your Lordship to judge whether your presence will be required in Sicily, and you will decide accordingly whether you will proceed in person with the British forces to join Lord Wellington's army. A duplicate of this despatch will be sent under a flying seal to his Lordship, who will forward it to your head-quarters; and I have requested his Lordship to communicate to you and to Lieutenant-General Clinton his opinions and wishes as to the course to be pursued in accomplishing the intended junction, particularly with regard to the place at which he may judge it expedient that the corps under your Lordship's command should be disembarked.

The existing treaties with the Court of Palermo stipulate that 10,000 men in British pay should be stationed in Sicily for the defence of that island. These treaties, however, were framed at a time when the circumstances of Europe were very different from the present; and their spirit went simply to provide for the protection of the island. Its security is at present insured by the reduced condition of Buonaparte, and by the engagements into which Murat has entered with the Austrian government. I notice this subject in order that your Lordship may be prepared to meet any representations which may be made by the Court of Palermo in case your Lordship shall think proper to reduce during the present crisis the

British and German troops in Sicily to the mere garrisons necessary for the defence of Messina, and of any other fortress which you may deem it necessary to occupy.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 10th March, 1814.

Your Lordship will receive herewith a despatch addressed to Lord William Bentinck, which is sent under a flying seal in order that you may peruse the contents; and I am to request you would then forward the despatch to Lord William, accompanying it by a communication of your opinion and wishes as to the place at which his corps should be disembarked, and what route he should pursue in order to join the army under your Lordship's command. I am not informed exactly as to the place to which it was Lord William's intention to proceed with his expedition from Sicily; but I imagine your Lordship's instructions would find him either at Leghorn or on the coast of Genoa, and I submit to your Lordship's consideration that it might be advisable to send forward these despatches by some intelligent officer, on board a fast sailing vessel from the coast of Catalufia.

Your Lordship's despatch No. 25 mentions the retreat of Marshal Suchet to Gerona, and the accounts from France agree in representing that the larger part of that officer's troops had been detached to Lyons. I am ignorant as yet whether these circumstances will have induced your Lordship to break up Lieutenant-General Clinton's corps or to give it a new destination; but my letter to Lord William Bentinck will show the intention of His Majesty's government that both corps should be placed at your disposal and serve to strengthen your army. Your Lordship will be pleased to instruct both these officers accordingly.

I apprehend that Lord William Bentinck is sufficiently provided with troop ships and transports for the conveyance of his entire corps to the Gulf of Rosas, or to such other part of the coast as your Lordship may point out: but I fear that very few transports remain at the disposition of Lieutenant-General Clinton; and if the latter has to march by land, he will require a large sum of money to provide the necessary means of conveying his baggage and stores.

I think it proper to mention to your Lordship that upon some former occasions certain French emigrants who appear to have been consulted by my predecessors in this department have pointed out the coast near *Cette* and *Narbonne* as eligible for the landing of troops in case of operations in the south of France. They are situated near the mouth of the Canal Royal; and if the positions of the enemy and the state of the weather should allow of the disembarking the British forces upon that coast, they could proceed conveniently along the course of the canal in the direction of Toulouse.

I take this opportunity of acquainting your Lordship that the three provisional battalions of militia are now embarking for Pasages, as are also about 700 recruits for your infantry regiments in addition to the 3600 of whom your Lordship has been apprised already; and in the course of a fortnight an additional brigade of heavy cavalry will be prepared for embarkation.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, Boucaut, 10th March, 1814.

Many thanks for your private letter of the 7th, as also for the details you sent me respecting the action at Orthez, which I now return.

I confess I very much regret that any Bourbon ever came here, unless it had been absolutely determined on to hold up that cause openly. Any movement of theirs unsupported can never benefit them, and will only tend to commit unfortunate individuals or districts who may show dispositions favourable to them.

A few days ago I was shown a proclamation, in *manuscript*, in the name of the Duke d'Angoulême, which I was told has been circulated, but I was inclined to doubt its authenticity.

The Crown Prince, I think, seems also inclined to carry on some little intrigue in this country, or why should his missions to this army be so numerous? There are two more French officers in the suite of his General passing here to-day.

Soult, I think, seems to have made as judicious a defence of this frontier as his means permitted, and certainly has left us a puzzling concern here, inasmuch as it will probably lock up a useful portion of the army; and if we occupy Bordeaux, I should suppose we could not at the same time push advantages very far on the right, or in any case venture to uncover this place much.

We have no occurrence here worth mentioning.

Vandeleur has pushed his patrols already a very considerable way in the direction of Bordeaux, and cannot hear of a French soldier being in his front. Some small magazines which they had on the road have been destroyed by them when they retired.

My leg suffered a little from the exercise I was obliged to take here at first, and they alarmed me about it, but a little rest has brought it round again. I can only walk, however, with a crutch.

I always am, my dear Murray, yours sincerely,

JOHN HOPE.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Langon, 10th March, 1814.

We arrived here without any occurrence. The enemy had about 60 infantry of the 34th, which passed yesterday to the other side of the river, and what magazines there were here were taken away. The enemy has a few small piquets on the river, but I do not understand he has more than one or two hundred men on the other side. He has taken all the boats to the opposite side, and he destroys what are within our reach, though it would not be difficult to get those from the other bank.

I was sorry to learn to-day that the enemy sent about 200 cavalry and destroyed the magazine at La Peyriade. He, I am told, put some people to death there, and killed a Spanish officer, who, I suppose, was escaping. Some gendarmes had the impudence just now to attack our advanced piquet of cavalry on the Bordeaux road: we have taken one of them, who is pretty badly wounded. I send you the two last Bordeaux papers, though they have little or no news. The Empress, you will see, does not mention where Buonaparte was when he last wrote, and you will see he has left Troyes, and the general report is here that he has returned to Nogent, and that Blücher was at Meaux: so private letters are said to say. I have not had any communication from our friends at Bordeaux. I shall be to-morrow at Castres with the advance. Monsieur Rochejaquelein came here with the advance of cavalry this morning, and went on immediately.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

P.S.—I have not received any communication from the two squadrons going by the Grandes Landes.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Langon, 11th March, 1814.

As I before informed you, I shall be at Castres this evening. After my letter to you of yesterday from this place, a gentleman came to me introduced by a note from the person you introduced to me at St. Sever, and by what he said it appears the people of Bordeaux do not mean to wait to ask us any questions, as they intend to come out to meet the troops in form and ceremony. I shall to-night at Castres have better information on this head, and shall see some of the Bordeaux gentlemen, when I shall communicate to them what part you propose taking in this business conformably to the instructions you have given me.

The sentiments and opinions of the people of all classes in proportion as we advance are obviously stronger in favour of their ancient Princes and violent against Buonaparte.

I send you the Bordeaux papers to the 9th. I have not seen that of the 10th, but it contains Paris news of the 6th, and communicates that Buonaparte has had another considerable advantage over the Allies, I suppose

Blücher, in the vicinity of Meaux. He says he gained a complete victory, and that the result would have been very great but for the treachery of the inhabitants of Soissons, who opened their gates to the retreating army and thereby gave them a passage to escape at, and from this it does not appear he made any prisoners. I mention this from what was verbally stated to me, which may not be even accurately what was in the papers.

I propose, under present circumstances, going with the advance of a brigade of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and two guns to Bordeaux. I will place a squadron of cavalry and the centre brigade 7th division at Castres, and the right brigade in the villages near to this on its left, and bring up to this place one of Sir L. Cole's brigades, leaving the other two, with a squadron of cavalry, at Bazas; and I will leave two squadrons of cavalry here. Half of Sir L. Cole's brigade of artillery will come forward to this place, the other half remain with the two brigades of infantry at Bazas. If you occupy Auch, then the troops at Bazas will be more disposable should it be necessary to bring more towards Bordeaux, though Auch is so distant; and as Lord Edward Somerset's cavalry will be on the great road leading from it to Bazas, we need not have much anxiety that anything will be sent that way. There is a very good road which leads all along the right bank of the river to Agen, &c.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 11th March, 1814.

I only received your despatch of the 20th this morning,* and I hardly now know how it came.

You will see that things are again taking a good turn with the Allies. It has been determined at Châtillon to place Bülow's, Winzingerode's, and Woronzow's corps under Blücher, and to give the Crown Prince the destination of Antwerp, the siege of which is to be undertaken. Buonaparte has, in his letter to the Emperor of Austria, declared that he will never consent to give up that place. It is therefore thought very desirable to take it, as that will make the negotiation on that point much more easy. If the Crown Prince should decline this task, the Hanoverian corps under General Walmoden, some Dutch troops, and our own will, I trust, be sufficient. Lord Castlereagh states several political reasons for this military operation.

I am in hopes the Spanish re-captured ships will, after all, turn out pretty well; and that I shall be able to send out 100,000*l.* in dollars by the *Venus* early next week, and a good deal more in the next cargo.

I am yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 521.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

From Lord Burghersh.

Troyes, 4th March, 1814.

The enemy having taken up a position covering the approach to Troyes, was attacked on the 3rd by Prince Schwarzenberg. The French (who were commanded by Oudinot) were driven with heavy loss into Troyes: 10 guns, 54 officers, and 3000 prisoners were taken.

The enemy evacuated Troyes the next morning, and was closely pursued by the Allied cavalry towards Nogent. Many prisoners were taken.

Prince Schwarzenberg is pushing the enemy with four corps d'armée only, reduced by sickness and casualties to 50,000 men. The Russian Guards and reserves are left near Chaumont. The Austrian reserve and German contingents (27,000) are marching upon Dôle to support General Bianchi, who is advancing with the intention of attacking Lyons.

Count Platow has been sent forward to Lezanne, in order to harass the rear of Buonaparte's army acting against Marshal Blücher. The latter is upon the Marne, but no accounts had been received from him later than the 28th of February.

II.

From Viscount Castlereagh.

Chaumont, 4th and 5th March, 1814.

The negotiations for an armistice are at an end. The French Commissioner had agreed to the lines of demarcation proposed by the Allies for the armies in the north,* and that under Lord Wellington; * but he insisted upon a line on the side of Savoy, which would have left the French a free communication with Italy. Upon this, the Allies put an end to the negotiation.

A private letter from Sir Charles Stewart of the 5th mentions the expectation that a great battle would be fought upon the Marne. Marshal Blücher, when joined by Bülow, Winzingerode, and Woronzow, would have about 100,000 effectives.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 11th March, 1814.

The arrival of Colonel Croquembourg relieved us all from our anxiety about your wound. You seem to have done for Marshal Soult, and I should hope that your battles in this war are drawing to a close.

On the 8th an express arrived from General Copons, stating that he had received intelligence of the King having passed through Toulouse on his way to Perpignan, and that there were even reports of his having passed the frontier, to which, however, he did not give any credit. The Cortes were immediately assembled, and, after a speech from M. Martinez de la Rosa, in which he dwelt upon the necessity of adhering strictly to the decree of the 2nd February, a resolution was passed expressive of the satis-

* The status quo.

faction of the Cortes at the expected arrival of the King, and ordering that prayers should be offered up in all the churches of the kingdom for his speedy arrival at the capital and for the success of his government under the safeguard of the Constitution. No despatches have, however, since been received from General Copons, and considerable doubts are now entertained of the truth of any part of the intelligence. The Serviles say it is a trick of the Regency to keep themselves in.

I send a packet which General O'Lawlor sent to me for you, with a desire that I would read it. M. Luyando informs me that the orders required by General O'Lawlor have been sent to him.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, ce 12 Mars, 1814.

Je me hâte vous apprendre que j'ai été reçu d'une manière qui passe tout ce que je pouvois espérer. Je suppose que le Maréchal Beresford vous a déjà rendu compte de l'unanimité, de la joie, et des acclamations de ce bon peuple. D'après cela je vais prendre l'administration du pays au nom du Roi, et former le plutôt que je pourrois un petit corps de troupes. Pouvez-vous me fournir quelques fonds si j'en aurois besoin, et combien? Je regrette vivement que vous n'ayez pas été témoin de l'enthousiasme des habitans; votre cœur en auroit joui. Mon projet est d'envoyer d'ici à vingt-quatre heures quelqu'un au Roi en Angleterre pour lui rendre compte que la ville de Bordeaux l'a proclamé avec la plus vive joie. C'est avec la plus haute considération et bien véritable attachement que je suis,

My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Baron de Hardenberg to Baron de Jacobi.

Chaumont, le 12 Mars, 1814.

Vous ne cessez de combattre un fantôme, chère Excellence. Milord Castlereagh, à qui j'ai plusieurs fois parlé de ce mal-entendu qui vous est tant au cœur, est tout-à-fait de mon sentiment. Il vous estime comme moi et tous ses collègues beaucoup trop, tous connoissent trop bien vos principes, pour pouvoir conserver la moindre mauvaise impression de ce mal-entendu, et la dépêche ostensible que vous avez reçu de ma part doit effacer toute espèce de trace de cette affaire. Comme imaginer que la manière dont M. Robinson, très affairé probablement pendant son séjour en Angleterre, s'y est pris envers vous en ait été l'effet.

J'espère que votre note à Lord Bathurst sur les armes à accorder aux troupes Allemandes aura réussi, car Lord Castlereagh a bien voulu se charger également d'appuyer la chose. Je ne puis assez me louer de sa confiance et de l'amitié qu'il me témoigne.

HARDENBERG.

Baron de Hardenberg to Baron de Jacobi.

Chaumont, le 12 Mars, 1814.

Je profite du départ d'un courrier expédié par Milord Castlereagh pour vous accuser la réception de vos dépêches depuis No. 10 jusqu'au No. 17 inclus. Vous aurez reçu en attendant les miennes en date du 19 Février et du 1 Mars.

Après les combats que le Maréchal Blücher a eu à soutenir dans la première moitié du mois de Février contre des forces très supérieures, et dont lui et ses troupes se sont tirés avec un héroïsme et une bravoure dont il y a peu d'exemples, les armées firent un mouvement rétrograde sur leur gauche, d'autant plus nécessaire que l'extrémité de celle-ci étoit menacé par des corps ennemis rassemblés à Lyon et dans les environs. La droite, sous le dit Maréchal, conserva non-seulement sa position sur la Seine et au confluent de l'Aube avec cette rivière, mais se porta en avant jusqu'à Meaux. Le Prince Schwarzenberg reprit bientôt l'offensive, battit l'ennemi à Bar-sur-Aube et vers Troyes, et le repoussa jusqu'au delà de la Yonne et de la Seine. Le Maréchal Blücher, afin de se réunir aux corps de Bülow, de Winzingerode, et de Woronzow, dont le commandement lui fut confié, se porta de Meaux sur Soissons. Il fut suivi de près par Napoléon, avec toutes les forces que celui-ci avoit pû rassembler. Le 5, le 6, et le 7, il y eut des affaires très sanglantes à Soissons et dans les environs de Corbery. L'ennemi avoit le projet de tourner le Maréchal et de s'emparer de Laon, pour lui couper ses communications. Il n'y a pas réussi; le Maréchal se trouvoit, le 8, dans une bonne position, et réuni avec les corps susmentionnés, derrière Laon, prêt à offrir ou recevoir la bataille, d'après les circonstances. Nous pouvons nous attendre journellement à des événements décisifs. En attendant, nous sommes tranquilles. Sur la situation des affaires au Midi, des renforts considérables de troupes Autrichiennes étant arrivés, on espéroit d'être bientôt en possession de Lyon.

Nos rapports politiques ont pris une nouvelle consistance par un traité conclu le 1er du mois courant entre les Cours de Berlin, de Vienne, de St. Pétersbourg, et de Londres. Je m'empresse d'en communiquer ci-joint la copie à V.E., ainsi que celle des articles séparés et secrets. Elle verra que cette alliance a un double but: 1, de poursuivre la guerre actuelle par des efforts communs, et de ne poser les armes qu'après avoir assuré l'indépendance de l'Europe sur des bases solides et durables; 2, d'assurer après la paix l'état de possession qui en sera le résultat et l'indépendance établie contre de nouvelles entreprises de la part de la France.

La Prusse, replacée au rang des grandes puissances, obtient par ce traité une nouvelle garantie pour son existence et son ancienne splendeur. Votre Excellence verra en même tems de quels principes les hautes puissances alliées sont convenues pour les bases de la paix future.

Les conférences de Châtillon ne sont pas avancées depuis la remise du projet de traité de paix préliminaire, proposé par les alliés, dont j'ai parlé à V.E. dans ma dépêche du 19 Février. Comme il importe, cependant, d'en venir à une décision, ou bien d'obtenir promptement la paix telle qu'il nous la faut, ou de rompre des négociations inutiles, qui ne donneroient des avantages qu'à notre adversaire et paralyseroient les opérations de la guerre, nos plénipotentiaires vient de recevoir l'ordre de déclarer, que si le

Duc de Vicence ne remet pas un contre projet ou une réponse positive par laquelle il accepte ou rejette le nôtre, on se verroit à regret obligé de regarder la négociation comme rompue par le gouvernement Français. Nous allons donc voir clair sur cet objet dans un très court espace de tems.

Le Ministre des Finances, M. le Baron de Bülow, se met en rapport avec V.E. pour ce qui concerne les subsides.

HARDENBERG.

Prince Metternich to General Count Meerveldt.

Chaumont, le 12 Mars, 1814.

Lord Castlereagh veut bien m'offrir l'occasion d'un courrier qu'il expédie à Londres. J'en profite pour envoyer à V.E. la copie d'un traité arrêté entre les quatre Cours au moment où elles ont fait parvenir au gouvernement Français la demande d'une réponse catégorique à leurs propositions de paix daté du 1er Mars, et signé le 9, entre le Comte de Nesselrode, Lord Castlereagh, le Baron Hardenberg, et moi. La lecture de ce traité, le plus important, le plus étendu peut-être qui ait jamais été conclu, vous prouvera, Monsieur, qu'il est destiné à remplir le double objet d'une coopération plus forte, plus intime encore, pour le cas où nos efforts pour le rétablissement de la paix resteroient sans effet, et d'une garantie mutuelle entre les puissances pour le maintien de l'ordre des choses qui sera le résultat de la pacification.

La position militaire du moment est la suivante :—Après la séparation des deux grandes armées, le Prince de Schwarzenberg a repris l'offensive, et après la victoire de Bar sur Aube il a occupé de nouveau à peu près toutes les anciennes positions sur la Seine. Le Maréchal Blücher a passé la Marne à la Ferté sous Jouarre. Napoléon s'est mis à le suivre. Le Maréchal Blücher s'est retiré très sagement sur les corps de Winzingerode et de Bülow, placé sous son commandement. Il a pris position près de Soissons. Napoléon, après avoir passé la Marne également à la Ferté, s'est porté à travers champs sur la route de Rheims à Laon. Blücher a suivi ce mouvement, et il a pris position à Laon, offrant la bataille à Napoléon. Napoléon avoit le 8 son quartier-général à Bray, en Laonnois. Nos nouvelles vont jusqu'au 10. Il ne s'étoit rien passé entre les deux armées en présence. Il est possible que Napoléon, en face d'une armée très supérieure en nombre à la sienne et très différemment disposée, ne veuille pas placer sa fortune sur une seule carte. Le Prince de Schwarzenberg dirige ses mouvemens vers la droite pour être en mesure de soutenir les opérations du Maréchal Prussien, et pour pouvoir se conduire en conséquence de celles de l'ennemi. L'armée se concentre entre Arcis sur Aube et Vitry le François.

Une armée a été organisée dans le Sud pour assurer notre flanc et le dos de la grande armée. Elle est en pleine opération contre Augereau, qui s'étant avancé à peu près jusqu'à Genève, bat maintenant en retraite. Il est à espérer que d'ici à peu de jours nous serons dans Lyon.

Les négociations de Châtillon continuent. Le Duc de Vicence ayant tardé à répondre au projet de paix préliminaire qui lui a été remis le 17 Février par nos plénipotentiaires, on est convenu avec lui le 27 que sa réponse ne pourroit être différée au delà du 10 Mars. Les explications que

le plénipotentiaire Français a données en conséquence avant-hier n'accordent ni ne refusent rien, et sont visiblement calculées pour traîner la négociation en longueur. Nos plénipotentiaires ont eu ordre de demander itérativement et dans les 24 heures ou l'acceptation ou le refus pure et simple de nos propositions, ou bien un contre projet conforme aux bases établies par nous.

Les puissances alliées sont décidées ou à obtenir sur le champ les avantages de la paix ou à s'assurer par une prompte rupture des négociations ceux que leur offre la force et la position de leurs armées et la continuation la plus vigoureuse des opérations.

Lord Castlereagh ne pourra que rendre justice à l'harmonie parfaite qui subsiste entre lui et notre Cabinet.

METTERNICH.

The Chevalier Pizarro to the Secretary of State.

Chaumont, 12th March, 1814.

Lord Castlereagh has communicated to me, with a frankness highly flattering to me, the treaty which was signed on the 10th between the four Powers, intended to unite them together for peace, as they are united already for war. One of the articles stipulates that Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Holland shall be invited to accede to the same, therefore your Excellency will see the treaty altogether. I will only say that this was an idea of Lord Castlereagh's, upon which he has bestowed no little labour, and that it may be looked upon as one of the most famous and useful diplomatic acts that were ever conceived. The Powers united in the war thereby strengthen their alliance while it continues; and for twenty years after peace they maintain an imposing attitude, and perpetuate a coalition which is in itself a prodigy, by a mode as new as unexpected.

The treaty takes up the bases of Châtillon; that is to say, is made in the supposition that the dynasty of Napoleon continues in France, in which case nothing else could render a peace solid but this safeguard, in consequence of which Buonaparte would see the Coalition revived the moment he attacked any one of its parts.

JOSÉ PIZARRO.

The Chevalier Pizarro to the Secretary of State.

Chaumont, 12th March, 1814.

Within these few days the proposals of Châtillon have been renewed. Buonaparte's answer arrived to-day. It is vague, and proposes some modifications (nothing but to gain time). There is a grand meeting of the Ministers to-night. Of course delays will not be allowed.

The Count d'Artois is at Vesoul, a few leagues from this place, without creating by his presence the least sensation of any kind. This cause is little liked by strangers, and most wretchedly served by its own people.

JOSÉ PIZARRO.

Baron de Hardenberg to Baron de Jacobi.

Chaumont, le 12 Mars, 1814.

Vous me demandez, dans votre rapport No. 11, du 8 d. m. p., ce qui sur les fournitures et approvisionnemens que le gouvernement Britannique s'est engagé à nous livrer, est effectivement arrivé sur le Continent et à sa destination.

Je m'empresse de mettre sous les yeux de V.E. le mémoire qui m'a été remis à cet effet par M. le Général Rauch, chargé du Département de la Guerre.

Vous y trouverez un aperçu détaillé de tous les objets qui ont été débarqués à Stralsund, avec le tableau de ce qui a été délivré en armes, munitions, et objets d'habillement et d'équipement.

J'ai écrit à Milord Castlereagh relativement aux objets mentionnés dans ce mémoire, qui se trouvent déjà sur le Continent, mais qui exigent encore une injonction préalable au Commissaire Anglois pour que nous puissions en disposer.

Je vous prie, Monsieur le Baron, de presser l'expédition des fournitures qui doivent encore nous être remises. Nous en avons le besoin le plus urgent.

HARDENBERG.

The Chevalier Pizarro to the Secretary of State.

Chaumont, 12th March, 1814.

The purport of Buonaparte's answer was to revive the propositions of Frankfort, and even with some abatement. He will give up Holland to the Prince of Orange, but says nothing of its aggrandizement. In Italy he says Beauharnois may keep Piedmont: he talks of arrangements in Germany, whereas it is meant to exclude his influence there entirely; and after all, he says nothing of boundaries; and the cause of Spain is that upon which he speaks in most precise terms. Such is the force and the justice of that cause! As this was his reply to the intimation sent him to deliver his resolution by the 10th, the Congress should have been dissolved; but it was settled that his reply not being categorically yes or no, which was what had been required, he should be told to give a definitive answer within a very short time, in failure of which the negotiations would be broken off. The most thinking politicians say he will make no answer, others still expect he will. At all events this ultimatum must soon arrive and put an end to our doubts.

JOSÉ PIZARRO.

The Chevalier Pizarro to the Secretary of State.

Chaumont, 12th March, 1814.

Brabant has been conquered this campaign partly by the Dutch, partly by the Prussian army under Bülow. The chief people of the country were directed by the latter to form a temporary government, and they have sent

deputies here to solicit some declaration respecting their future fate. I do not think they will get an answer yet, for, on the one hand, it is not meant that those states should revert to Austria; they do not wish to be united to Holland; and on the other, aggrandizements, as your Excellency knows, have been offered to Holland, which naturally must be taken from Flanders. There are reasons for this indecision on the part of the Allies; but in the mean time a reinforcement of 50,000 men, which Brabant would furnish, is lost to the cause.

JOSÉ PIZARRO.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Bordeaux, 13th March, 1814.

The Duke d'Angoulême has requested I would transmit to you the accompanying letter. He has also requested I would give a passport to a person he proposes sending to England, to enable him to land immediately, as he says he is not certain where to find you, and that waiting your passport would occasion delay: under these circumstances, though without your instructions, or, indeed, authority, I have not hesitated to say I would give him a passport if he would trust to the validity it might have; but probably you would send one to St. Jean de Luz, if there is any person there of your confidence to fill up a vacant space with his name, which at present I do not know myself.

I have not heard of any news to-day. I was glad to find on speaking with the Duke d'Angoulême and the mayor, that they did not think it necessary to bring any more troops into town, and I have therefore but one brigade of infantry, three squadrons of Colonel Vivian's cavalry, and Ponsonby has arrived with two this morning. It appears that General Vandeleur only received the order for their march on the 10th. The road by the Great Landes would appear to be generally, at least during the winter, impassable for infantry, as it is almost all covered with water: even now, after these last days' dry weather, it was not very deep, and the bottom always hard. I am sending a patrol towards La Teste, a small harbour on the shortest line from this to the sea; there is there a small garrison, and the Duke d'Angoulême requested of me to permit him to send an officer to summon it in the King's name. I told him I was sending a patrol, and that I had no objection any person accompanied it; but that on my part I merely sent a patrol to ascertain what we could of the state and force of the place. I would, however, be glad to receive your instructions how far I am to admit such a nature of summons. This town is as tranquil as any town can be. The Duke was yesterday well received, and is most satisfied. I went to the opera, or what was called one, and the applause was loud and long. I am endeavouring to get every information respecting the defences of the river.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

The Inhabitants of Mar to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR, 13 Mars, 1814.

Les habitans du Mar qui avoisinent le champ de bataille, craignant une contagion funeste pour eux à raison des cadavres dont la corruption commence à infecter l'air, supplient Votre Excellence d'ordonner que ces morts soient inhumés dans le plus court délai.

(*Here follow the signatures.*)

[Send an order to bury the dead.—W.]

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Bordeaux, 14th March, 1814.

I have seen the commanding officer and some of the captains of the Garde Urbane, and on my explanation of the terms on which they were to do the duty here, which was precisely those of their institution, namely, simply the police of the town, they most willingly agreed to it, and rather desired it. I told them that I only objected to the three-coloured cockade, but did not intend to constrain them to wear any particular badge, my object being to preserve good order and tranquillity in the town, and that I did not consider them as military, but an authorized association for that object. In the conversation I had with them it was obvious they disapproved of the proceedings on the part of the Royalists, who, I must confess, I think are injuring themselves by a precipitate, and, in some instances, rash conduct. I have done all I could by advice to induce them to a more moderate demeanour, which is obviously the wish of the Duke of Angoulême; but they think themselves so certain of attaining their object, that their heads are really wild, and it is difficult to restrain them. I had scarcely expressed my dissatisfaction to the mayor at the order he gave relative to white cockades, than the proclamation of which I sent you a copy was issued without my knowledge. As to information from Paris, I have not received any since I entered this town, nor during the ferment in the heads of those from whom it might be expected can I hope for any. I learn that the fort of Médoc is abandoned, but I must wait the report of my patrols to be sure of it. The distance from here is five leagues, and I scarcely think it worth occupying till our ships come into the river. The Portuguese brigade of the 7th division has marched in here to-day, as the brigade here was by no means equal to the duty. I detain the two squadrons of cavalry brought by Colonel Ponsonby until I receive your orders for the 4th division, when probably you will send directions for the disposition of all this force. Lord Dalhousie will be very well able to make all future arrangements you can desire, and I shall proceed with or after the 4th division.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 14th March, 1814.

I send you some more papers from M. Vallejo.

I am told that there have been disturbances in some of the great towns in consequence of the countenance shown to the Afrancesados, and the tax called the unica contribucion. The towns which have manifested their discontent are Seville, Toledo, Valencia, and Saragossa, and the Regency have thought the reports received from them of sufficient consequence to be referred to the Council of State.

This place will soon be worse than Cadiz. Upon a late occasion in the Cortes the President made use of his privilege of adjourning the Cortes when he thought the public business of the day was at an end; but he was absolutely compelled to resume his seat, principally by the clamours and threats of the galleries: and when he left the Assembly, after having been permitted to put an end to the Session, he was hooted and insulted by the mob the whole way to his house. I know not how all this will end, but I wish to God I was relieved from a situation which is becoming every day more disagreeable. At the same time I cannot help feeling anxious to see the return of the King.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Bordeaux, 14th March, 1814.

I received yesterday your letter of the 12th,* and am prepared to proceed with the 4th division whenever you shall judge the circumstances here will permit its march to the right. Two brigades of it are still at Bazas, and one at Langon. I hear nothing of any intention of the enemy to disturb us here; indeed I know of no force he has or can get in this neighbourhood; and I have this morning passed over some infantry to the other side of the Garonne, opposite the town, to protect the retreat of a few cavalry in case it should be obliged to retire, which I do not suspect. I send this cavalry to patrol towards Libourne, and get what information we can from that side; and it gives confidence to and tranquillizes the town to see our troops on the opposite side. I am sorry to say the mayor has committed a great folly in spite of my directions to him, and I am endeavouring to rectify it as well as I can, which I hope to succeed in, though I cannot be certain. The Garde Urbane, which was composed of the most respectable people of the town, and to the number of 1200 men, had made no difficulty, as I made no conditions but what the principles of their institution demanded, to continue their functions and protect the tranquillity of the town; and though the number is such, they could be the more depended on, as not many days since, when the French General, wanting to augment his means of defence against us, required this Garde

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 572.

Urbane to place itself under his orders, they positively refused, and said they were not military, but merely the civil guards of the town for its internal tranquillity, and under the command of the civil magistrates. Upon the same principles they consented at my desire to continue the guard. Some of them, though I believe very few, put up the white cockade after our entrance; and unfortunately the impetuous young men who have taken the white cockade, and more particularly those who have got immediately about the Duke d'Angoulême, thought it necessary that all should wear this distinctive mark, and persuaded the mayor, who is really a very good man, to give an order to the Garde Urbane to wear the white cockade, he being persuaded it was only form they wanted to put it up, whilst they had never been consulted. The consequence has been that the guard dissolved itself, and the officers came to represent the circumstance to me. This has had a very bad effect for the Royalist party, as the very act has put a number on their guard as to adopting a decided line under the circumstances, and particularly as they are all aware we are neutral in reality. They fairly and candidly told me that, being men with families, they feared committing themselves, and that, under their circumstances, they owed it to their families to put their feelings out of the question. Had these people been left to continue the duty under the actual state of things, the generality would have considered them attached to the ruling parties. However, I have hopes of bringing the thing, in some degree, to rights, but not by forcing distinctions upon any one.

I wrote to you that it was the Duke d'Angoulême's wish to send a person to England, and I have heard, though not from him, or, indeed, any of his family, that the object of this messenger is to invite Louis XVIII. to come over here; but I cannot assure you that it is so, though I think it right to mention the report to you. The Baron de Barthe and Mons. * are those he sends; and under the circumstance of your distance from him, I have, as I said yesterday, thought it expedient to give him a passport, as certainly you will be able to stop it at St. Jean de Luz, if you do not approve of it, and if you do you can send him more regular passports.

I have been promised these two days plans and information on the state of the Fort de Blaye, but people's heads are here running on anything but business. From what I learn, however, your information is not very good, as the Blaye side of the river is the high one, and the Médoc the low land side; and though I believe the town, or part of it, is near the water, the citadel of Blaye is on the height, and consequently it is not probable that shipping would do much against it, whilst I am told the land side is weak. Whatever breadth the channel may be, the Island of Blaye, or the Paté, is in the centre, and being commanded by the citadel of Blaye, it again commands the passage between it and the left bank; so that I doubt we could use the river without the possession of the Fort of Blaye. Nor do I think we can well attack this latter till we have got possession of the lower part of the river, except with a force that would be greater than could be given under the idea of withdrawing the 4th division.

I do not think there is any danger of any disturbance in this town, but

* Blank in manuscript.

I am far from being sure that the majority of the respectable merchants and people have declared for the white cockade: their motives we can only guess at.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

P.S.—We have found considerable magazines of provisions here, and in some other towns along the river; but the Commissary-General has sent an order that nothing is to be delivered from them, which we cannot attend to, and I should think a mistake.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 14th March, 1814.

The misfortune which we have experienced before Bergen-op-Zoom has made it necessary to reinforce Sir Thomas Graham. I am therefore under the necessity of informing you that the Militia Brigade, which was destined for you, will receive directions to proceed to Helvoet.

I hope in your arrangements you have not so counted upon this reinforcement as to be any way embarrassed by the change.

I shall be much obliged to you to let me know whether the detachments which we shall continue to send to you, and more particularly the cavalry, are to proceed to Pasages, if we should hear of Bordeaux being open.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Bordeaux, 15th March, 1814.

I am in hourly expectation of receiving your instructions for the march of the 4th division, and consequently for my own. Our patrols went yesterday to more than half way to Libourne (Canning came in as I had written thus far) and saw nothing of the enemy, and by a gentleman who had just left that town the officer was informed there were no troops in it. The enemy is assembling at Blaye, where I am told he has about 2,000 men; and General L'Huillier was there himself. This infantry is, I understand, got together from depôts, and is very ill-organised, and it is said scarcely armed. Between the two rivers opposite this appears free from the enemy, which gives a confidence to the town, and all is remarkably quiet. We have found here two very fine frigates on, or rather run off, the stocks, which were nearly ready for launching. The enemy the day before we entered cut away their supports, and they are both fallen on their sides, and relative to which you will give such directions as you see fit. Mr. Ogilvie has to-day gone to what shipping remains, to take possession of such as may be considered enemy's property. There is also, I understand, much property here in the custom and excise house, belonging some to government, some to Americans, and on all which considerable sums are due to government. I have been informed that just previous to

our entry the colonial goods were given to the proprietors under bonds of their paying the duties, and that much which was the property of the government the merchants were obliged to buy, though I doubt their having paid for it; and a case in question has just occurred of Mr. Ogilvie having discovered a considerable depôt of wine, which was immediately claimed by merchants, though they confess this wine was given as a pledge to the government for a sum of money lent to the merchants. "Then," I have said, "pay the amount of the money due to Buonaparte and you shall have your wine." However, you will judge as you see fit; and there ought to be some person particularly charged with the discovering and arranging with the mayor relative to what is and what is not government property.

The American ships had gone farther down the river before our arrival, but there are yet several American merchants relative to whom I have said nothing, though, under the retaliating act against prisoners of war, you may perhaps desire these merchants to be taken up, as that government may be more alarmed on their account than on that of their officers and soldiers. However, I thought it most prudent, till you should give directions on this head, to leave them unmolested.

In consequence of your letter by Lieutenant-Colonel Canning I shall put Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry in movement to-morrow morning, and I shall accompany the two squadrons that go from here, as about Villeneuve I hear the road is not quite safe.

I have not a word of information from towards Paris.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

P.S. I had omitted to answer that part of your letter received yesterday relative to the Portuguese troops and to Harvey. I am much annoyed about the conduct of that division of Le Cor's, and I very much fear with you that he does not govern it well, not from want of talent or capability, but what I have had so much to fight against, a want of energy and exertion. I will, however, send for him on my arrival with the army, and see if I cannot urge him to act with more energy. As to Da Costa, I have long since ordered him to leave the brigade and return to Portugal. Harvey may now as well accompany the army, where he may join you; and, if D'Urban does not rejoin me, Murray can appropriate me some one.

The capture of the officer in Pau is a most curious thing under every consideration, and the fellow ought to be shot. However, a parlementaire taking prisoners is against every law of war; and though these fellows conform to no principle of justice, yet I suppose you will reclaim the whole of what was taken in so unjustifiable a manner. Perhaps you may think it makes some distinction if the flag of truce was not to us, but to the town of Pau; in which case I should consider the town of Pau as responsible for the unjustifiableness of the act, and accountable for the loss sustained by it.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, 15 Mars, 1814.

Sur différentes questions que je vous ai lues un jour à St. Sever, vous m'avez répondu verbalement sur la dernière qu'aussitôt que l'autorité du Roi seroit reconnue, et que j'aurois pris le gouvernement en son nom, vous me remettriez celui de tout le pays occupé par les armées alliées. Je vous demande d'avoir la bonté de donner des ordres en conséquence au Général commandant les troupes alliées ici, parceque quoique je n'aye qu'infiniment à me louer du Maréchal Béresford, il m'a dit n'avoir reçu aucunes instructions de vous sur ce point.

L'enthousiasme des habitans ici continue tout comme le premier jour: vous en jouirez si vous en étiez témoin.

C'est avec la plus haute considération et bien véritable attachement que je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

G. O. Aire, 16th March, 1814. [741.]

3. The Commander of the Forces has given orders, which are at all the post houses, that neither officers, soldiers, nor horses should be billeted at the post houses, which orders are to be attended to.

4. The Commander of the Forces entreats the attention of the officers of the army to his orders.

5. Orders have been repeatedly given that bâtmen and others proceeding with baggage, cattle guards, and other escorts, shall march regularly with their arms in their hands, and that they shall by no means be put on the mules.

6. From the constant inattention to these orders, a detachment of the 7th division, consisting of an officer and 70 men, were taken by a small party of the enemy near Roquefort.

7. A detachment of the Portuguese brigade of the 7th division, consisting of an officer and 35 men, were likewise, from similar inattention to orders, and neglect of duty and of all military precaution, taken a few days ago in the town of Pau, by an officer and four French dragoons.

8. Very little attention to order, and to the common principles of military duty, would prevent such accidents, which are disgraceful to the character of the army, and very injurious to the service, and the Commander of the Forces requests the General officers to attend to these matters.

9. If orders are not obeyed upon all occasions, it is impossible

to be certain that such misfortunes will not happen. The inconvenience of disobedience of orders and inattention to duty will certainly be experienced sooner or later.

10. The Commander of the Forces desires that every officer going with a foraging party, or with any detachment whatever, may have a copy of the order for the march of detachments.

WELLINGTON.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Bordeaux, 16th March, 1814.

I have sent off my baggage, and shall overtake it to-morrow at Bazas. The fort of Médoc was, as I had before heard, evacuated, and the few cannon (four) there spiked. It is in a ruinous state, and at present not tenable. I have reason to think our vessels are at the mouth of the river, and that they had got possession of the Point de Grave, which I know, at all events, the enemy to have abandoned, so that the left bank to the sea is quite clear of them. You will see by the various reports you will have got that there are roving parties of cavalry in almost all directions on the road from Mont de Marsan to Langon. I have a report that the enemy has reoccupied La Réole, and will proceed to St. Macaire; therefore the principal part of General Inglis's brigade must be at Langon, and a squadron of cavalry. It is said the force come to La Réole is 2000 men, but either that is much exaggerated or they must be unarmed conscripts. Under the present circumstances you will see the impossibility of Lord Dalhousie attempting anything against Blaye; as to go by his right, crossing the river here, and marching to cross the Dordogne at Cubsac, he would be quite cut off from here, and would leave this place too much exposed. Until our fleet enters the river nothing can be done that way, as the enemy has a very powerful maritime force in it, a 74, two brigs of war, and a great number of manned and armed privateers, with gunboats, &c. But when our fleet comes in, it will be a powerful diversion of itself to all their little schemes of annoyance against this place. If you once get on and over the Upper Garonne, it will be greatly in favour of this place, as the provisions come by the river to it.

The two frigates which I mentioned to you yesterday are, one nearly, if not quite, ready for launching; this has been let down on its side, but is very little injured, and the dockyard people say she can be righted and set up again. The other is not by any means in the same forward state, but is still on the stocks, and would take considerable time, the materials being all ready, to be in a state to launch. You will give such directions as you see fit to Lord Dalhousie respecting these two vessels.

In the dockyard and arsenals there are great quantities of stores, and particularly cables and rope.

I am glad to tell you things remain extremely quiet here, and I think the Royal party gains ground, and if they will be moderate it will gain partisans rapidly. Nobody can be more disposed to act reasonably than the Duke d'Angoulême, but I have had difficulty in restraining many of the Royal party, and I think the Mayor acts imprudently in giving orders

in His Royal Highness's name; and though I cannot sanction that, yet, as they tell me, if Bordeaux declared itself, you would place it under the administration of the Duke d'Angoulême, and as also if I publicly decry or oppose such pretensions, it would immediately check the growth of the party, I have judged it best, when the thing is done, merely to rémonstrate with the Mayor, until you shall give your decided directions, which, of course, will now be to Lord Dalhousie. I have pointed out to the Duke, to whom, as far as he personally takes a part, it was indeed unnecessary, and to all those attached to him, the foolishness and impolicy of committing us by direct assertions as to our intentions, as if they do it to the extent to oblige you to contradict them, it will be of the utmost injury to their cause, whilst the same effect in its favour could be obtained by more guarded and less direct expositions of our object, which, being left to the construction of the world, with my having kept a good deal in the back-ground and keeping the Duke forward in the eyes of the people, would be favourably construed. However, this party is much more moderate than it was, and things are going proportionally well, and I am in hopes it will end well.

There has been a 'Moniteur' of the 10th in town, but I could not get hold of it; however, I know it did not speak of the armies, which is good news, and the Actions of the Bank of Paris had fallen to 660. Two or three days before they were floating from 720 to 760. That looks well; and the rumour still is that the Allies are in Paris; but you know the atmosphere I am in is now quite Royalist, and the exaggerations on both sides seem pretty equal.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, ce 16 Mars, 1814, à 11 h. du matin.

J'ai reçu il y a une heure votre lettre d'avant-hier, qui m'a fait le plus grand plaisir. Le Maréchal Beresford me fait dire qu'il fait partir un dragon, qui est à la porte, et je n'ai que le tems de vous en accuser la réception. J'ai des pièces intéressantes à vous communiquer que j'ai reçue il y a une heure par M. de Narbonne, venant d'Angleterre; mais je ne puis encore vous les envoyer parceque je les fais copier. Je vous remercie des excellents conseils que vous me donnez. Je les suivrai le plus que je pourrois. Je rencontre beaucoup de lenteurs et de difficultés pour faire marcher l'administration, mais j'espère en venir à bout. Je tâcherai d'avoir de l'argent, mais pourtant de 5,000*l.* à 10,000*l.* me seroit assez nécessaires dans le premier moment, quitte à les rembourser après. Je m'occupe aussi de lever des troupes, mais il y a plus d'ardeur à être officiers que soldats. Je compte vous écrire ce soir ou demain matin. J'ai appris avec grand plaisir par le Colonel Canning que vous vous portiez fort bien, et que vous ne rien sentiez pas de votre blessure. Je suis avec autant d'admiration que de confiance et d'attachement, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Boucaut, 16th March, 1814.

Since I last wrote you I have had nothing material to report.

The enemy has been on the whole pretty quiet, firing chiefly on the working parties furnished by Lord Aylmer's brigade for the works going on in the sand-hills, but without effect.

Two days ago Major-General Colville found it necessary to occupy some houses in front of the line of his piquets, but which gave some advantages to the enemy, which brought on a fire of musketry, but was effected without loss. Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton, of the 85th, however, who on the occasion commanded the piquets of Lord Aylmer's brigade, received a slight wound.

Desertion from the garrison continues at the rate of from three to five in a day. Three days ago a subaltern officer deserted to us from a working party in front of the citadel.

Every account I have leads me to believe that the lower orders of the inhabitants, at least, begin already to feel the effects of scarcity, and that the richer class apprehend the same. Some accounts state the garrison to have supplies for three months, others for six; almost all agree that the troops have been lately put on a diminished ration of provisions, and that they receive no fresh meat, the animal food issued being chiefly lard. A very exact perquisition has lately been made into all the stores of flour or grain in the hands of bakers and others in the place; and on a consideration of all the circumstances attending the situation of the corps shut up in Bayonne, I am of opinion that its reduction will be effected almost as soon by blockade as by siege.

The bar at the mouth of the river has of late been very favourable, and such vessels as were here empty have been got out to assist in bringing up supplies from Socoa and Pasages. Unfortunately there were none ready at Socoa to come here, and the weather, as the Admiral writes, has prevented him from getting any out of Pasages.

My last letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartman at Pasages is of the 14th. Very few vessels have yet been procured for the ordnance, the late gales having destroyed many, and the state of the weather and tides had prevented much work being done. I shall be glad to be instructed whether I shall put the heavy ordnance in motion for the siege when it is parked, or wait further orders.

While I was writing Lieutenant-Colonel Hartman has arrived here from Pasages to report his progress and make some other arrangements here. As he informs me he has sent all the details of his proceedings to Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon, I beg to refer to him for your information. It appears to me that no exertion has been wanting.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your faithful humble servant,

JOHN HOPE.

Admiral Penrose has sent me some English papers for your Lordship, which I forward as he desires.

I am happy to say that our sick, instead of increasing, are rapidly diminishing.

Colonel Bunbury to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, London, 16th March, 1814.

I am desired by Lord Bathurst to acquaint you that His Majesty's ship *Comus* has taken on board at Helvoet about 200,000*l.* in French gold, with which she is on the point of sailing for Pasages; and that the *Venus* is receiving 150,000*l.* (chiefly in dollars) from the Lima ship at Plymouth, which will go to the same port.

The homeward-bound fleet of transports under the *Ethalion* has been damaged and dispersed in a storm. I fear this may occasion some little delay in the embarking of the Bays and Greys.

I enclose, for your Lordship's information, the news which has been published this afternoon. No accounts from France or Holland have been received by government, but a private letter from Paris of the 12th says, "les choses vont très mal."

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most faithful and much obliged servant,

H. E. BUNBURY.

P.S. Accounts from the coast of Brittany, transmitted by Lieutenant-General Don from Jersey, assert that there are from 20,000 to 25,000 prisoners of war in that province, guarded only by bourgeois and douaniers. The same accounts represent the people of Brittany, and particularly those of the department Morbihan, to be ripe for revolt, and ready to release and join the prisoners of war if arms could be conveyed to them. Lord Bathurst desires me to mention this, though your Lordship is probably aware that the accounts from the French coast are not to be relied upon implicitly.

H. E. B.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Bordeaux, 16th March, 1814.

Since writing my letter of this date, I have heard of a 'Moniteur' of the 11th being in town, and in which Buonaparte claims considerable advantages over the Allies somewhere to the north-east of Soissons, but I could not get the name of the place. He says he made 4000 prisoners. The public funds also rose, the 5 per cents. from 53 to 56. I could not learn anything of the Actions of the Bank of Paris.

Yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 16th March, 1814.

The medals and badges for the battle of Vitoria are ready for distribution, but, before they are issued, the Duke has desired me to consult with you re-

specting some names contained in the returns which are apparently at variance with the regulations. In making this remark, however, I ought to premise that His Royal Highness is quite satisfied with your Lordship's recommendation, upon the principle approved by the King, being made the criterion of an officer's claim to this distinction; but he wishes you to take into consideration whether, in reference to your letter to me of the 28th of November and my reply of the 15th of December, 1813, some embarrassment would not arise in the admission of the claims of certain cavalry officers at the battle of Vitoria, and particularly the officers of the Life Guards. Some of the latter are returned for medals, though it does not appear they were engaged with the enemy. What will Sir W. Stewart say to this after the decision upon his application in the correspondence above alluded to? The question appears worth the consultation which is the object of this letter, and I shall await your answer, which I request you will give me with your earliest convenience.

We are anxiously looking for the accounts of your advance, which various reports state to be at Bordeaux. You never can be more successful than I wish you.

We have got this day, by the way of the Hague, authentic accounts of a splendid victory gained by Blücher over Buonaparte at Laon on the 9th instant: seventy pieces of cannon, and prisoners innumerable! The only thing now to dread is a peace with Buonaparte. You will have this news from Downing Street if it should not have otherwise reached you: therefore I need say no more upon the glorious subject.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully and sincerely yours,

H. TORRENS.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, ce 16 Mars, 1814.

Je joins ici les pièces dont je vous ai parlé ce matin, et qui j'espère vous feront plaisir. Vous y verrez qu'on me recommande de ne parler qu'avec beaucoup de discrétion des lettres de France.

La ville de Bordeaux est excellente, et elle l'a bien mérité; mais sur une grande population il est impossible qu'il n'y ait pas des malintentionnés, et, ils font tout ce qu'ils peuvent pour inquiéter le peuple, tantôt par un bruit, tantôt par un autre; cela cause de la peur, et la peur fait que je n'ai encore pu trouver un sol.

Je viens de voir le commandant du fort La Teste, le Chevalier de Mauléon, qui s'est déclaré pour le Roi. Sa troupe, qui est tout au plus de 100 hommes, doit de être parti. J'y ai envoyé hier le Duc de Guiche, qui y est allé avec une patrouille, et il n'est pas encore revenu.

Je suis, avec la plus haute considération et bien véritable attachement,

My Lord, votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

P.S.—On ne me parle plus de l'arrivée de mon frère.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

SIRE, Du Quartier-Général des Armées Alliées, Langres, ce * 1814.

Nous venons de porter aux pieds des Souverains alliés les vœux de nos frères, qui dans toutes les provinces sont prêts à arborer les couleurs royales, et à déclarer qu'ils ne veulent d'autre maître que votre Majesté. Nous partons en ce moment pour nous armer en Bourgogne, réunir nos frères, et crier Vive le Roi!

En offrant à votre Majesté nos premiers hommages, nous vous supplions, Sire, de nous envoyer en toute hâte un Prince de votre maison pour devancer votre Majesté, marcher à notre tête, et nous conduire à la délivrance de notre patrie sur les traces des alliés.

Nous sommes, avec le plus profond respect, Sire,

De Votre Majesté,

Les très humbles et très obéissants serviteurs et sujets,

(*Here follow the signatures.*)

II.

Count Blacas to the Duc d'Angoulême.

MONSEIGNEUR, Hartwell, ce 20 Février, 1814.

Le Roi ayant désiré avoir à Madrid une personne de confiance qui fut à portée de lui rendre compte des événements, et de recevoir les ordres de Sa Majesté, pour transmettre confidentiellement au Ministre de S.M. Catholique les communications que le Roi ou Votre Altesse Royale peuvent avoir à faire au gouvernement Espagnol, elle a choisi M. le Comte de Narbonne, dont la circonspection et l'extrême modestie ne feront nullement ombrage à la Régence, qui paroit vouloir mettre une grande réserve dans ses rapports avec les agens du Roi. M. de Narbonne pouvant de même quitter Londres sans que son départ y fasse sensation, S.M. lui a ordonné de se rendre le plus promptement possible au lieu de sa destination, et de passer par le quartier-général du Feld-Maréchal le Marquis de Wellington pour remettre à Votre Altesse Royale les lettres de Madame, toutes les dépêches dont il est porteur, et pour recevoir les ordres de Monseigneur avant de continuer son voyage.

Le Comte de Narbonne ne s'arrêtera donc au quartier-général qu'autant que Votre Altesse Royale voudra l'y retenir, et je pense qu'elle ne tardera pas à le réexpédier.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à Monseigneur par M. Vieil-Castel et par M. de Bigu, et l'importance de cette seconde lettre me fait désirer vivement pour le service du Roi qu'elle lui soit parvenue promptement. Sa Majesté me charge d'ailleurs de répéter à Votre Altesse Royale qu'elle ne scauroit agir avec trop de circonspection et de prudence dans tout ce qui regarde l'objet de la mission de M. de Vieil-Castel; que c'est avec Lord Wellington que Monseigneur doit s'entendre sur tous les points; qu'il est nécessaire cependant qu'il témoigne en apparence beaucoup de confiance à M. de Vieil-Castel, et surtout dans les intentions de son commettant, mais qu'après la première impulsion donnée pour faire rentrer dans le devoir les généraux et les soldats de l'usurpateur, Votre Altesse Royale ne doit laisser donner aucun ordre ni prendre aucune délibération quelconque sans sa participation, quoiqu'en laissant aux généraux le commandement de leurs différents corps ainsi que le Roi en a pris l'engagement.

* Blank in manuscript.

Le Roi a reçu depuis quelques jours les rapports les plus satisfaisants sur les dispositions qui règnent en France, et sur les intentions des alliés. Votre Altesse Royale verra par la lettre adressée au Roi, dont j'ai l'honneur de lui faire passer une copie, que le nom, et l'autorité de Sa Majesté doivent être maintenant proclamé dans plusieurs provinces, et que l'arrivée de Monsieur aura donnée à ce prémier mouvement en faveur de la légitimité un appui et une force dont l'heureux effet doit être d'assurer le retour de l'ordre, et la délivrance des Français. J'adresse encore à Votre Altesse Royale l'extrait de deux lettres de Ropatot qui ne laissent rien à désirer tant sur les mesures qui ont été prises que sur les sentiments exprimés par l'Empereur de Russie avec autant de sensibilité que de noblesse dans sa réponse à MM. de Ropatot et de Rochechouard.

La prochaine arrivée de Monsieur au quartier-général des alliés, et les pouvoirs de Lieutenant-Général du royaume le mettant à même de pourvoir à tout ce qui peut être nécessaire dans les circonstances présentes, le Roi n'a eu aucune nouvelle démarche à faire, si ce n'est de donner connoissance à Monsieur le Prince Régent (sous le sceau du secret) de tout ce que Sa Majesté venoit d'apprendre.

Le Roi désire que Votre Altesse Royale ne parle qu'avec réserve des lettres que S.M. a reçu de France. Lord Wellington les verra certainement avec plaisir.

Le Comte de Penne Villemur m'a écrit pour me témoigner le désir qu'il auroit d'être utile au service du Roi : il propose plusieurs plans pour l'exécution desquels je le renvoye à Votre Altesse Royale, qui voudra bien lui donner ses ordres.

Nous avons appris que Monsieur avoit passé le 7 à Francfort. Les dernières nouvelles de M. le Duc de Berri sont du 13. Son Altesse Royale n'avoit encore aucune nouvelle de Normandie, où le mauvais tems n'avoit point permis au Chevalier de Brulart de se rendre.

La santé du Roi est meilleure. S.M. commence à s'apercevoir de l'effet avantageux que produisent sur son bras et sur sa main les bains locaux d'eau de Barèges.

Je prie Monseigneur d'agréer un nouvel hommage du dévouement et du profonde respect avec lequel je suis, Monseigneur,

De Votre Altesse Royale

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

BLACAS.

III.

Extrait d'une Lettre du 31 *Janvier*, 1814.

Je vous mandois dans ma dernière lettre que le Comte de Rochechouard et moi avions écrit à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, pour lui demander la permission de co-opérer aux vœux que manifestent aujourd'hui la nation Française, ou de seconder, comme officier attaché à son service, les efforts que vouloient faire nos braves et malheureux compatriotes, las du joug du tyran, et pleins du désir de rendre à notre patrie son légitime Souverain et la tranquillité, après laquelle elle soupire depuis si longtems. Voici la réponse, que je vous prie de mettre sous les yeux de nos Princes :—

"J'ai lu votre lettre. Je ne puis qu'applaudir aux sentiments que vous témoignez, mais il ne faut pas agir en enfants. J'ai déjà devant les yeux les affreux résultats qui ont suivi la déclaration trop prompte des peuples, et je ne me pardonnerois jamais de causer le malheur de ceux qui pensent comme vous, et que le sort des armes peut faire retomber dans les mains de Buonaparte.

Je me suis cru obligé de dire à tous ces messieurs qui se sont présentés à moi à ce sujet, que j'approuvois et seconderois de tous mes efforts tous les mouvements qui se feroient devant notre ligne, mais que je ne me rendois responsable d'aucuns de ceux qui s'exécuteroient sur mes derrières, parceque une affaire perdue pourroit influencer sur la paix, et peut être l'amener. Si la Providence ne nous abandonne pas, j'espère que nous gagnerons la première bataille. Je scai que le vœu des Français est pour les Bourbons, mais je veux que la nation en décide, afin de n'être jamais exposé à en recevoir un reproche. Quant à vous, restez auprès de moi; je scaurai vous employer. Si nous frappons le dernier coup, c'est alors que je vous permettrai de vous repandre dans toute la France, comme les apôtres de la belle cause que vous désirez servir, et que nous servirons ensemble. Jusqu'à ce que l'occasion soit plus favorable pour elle, restez auprès de moi; et quoique les Princes n'ayent pas de meilleur ambassadeur auprès de ma personne que moi-même, je vous autorise l'un et l'autre à en faire les fonctions, et à me faire connoître de suite tout ce que vos compagnons voudront me demander. Dites leur que le fantôme de Caulaincourt ne les effraye pas. Je ne veux point de paix avec Buonaparte, mais je suis prêt à la faire avec la nation."

Le Prince Schwarzenberg se conduit parfaitement; c'est un honnête homme. Metternich me fait peur, mais si nous avons un succès il ne m'inquiétera plus. Le Prince Schwarzenberg a pris le bon moyen pour faire prononcer ce dernier, ainsi que S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche: il a rendu un compte de sa campagne depuis notre passage du Rhin, et fait sentir à l'Empereur d'Autriche que la situation de nos armées dans ce pays ne peut s'améliorer qu'en voulant coopérer avec les Français aux vœux que semblent prononcer toute la nation. Qu'il seroit dangereux de ne pas s'entendre avec elle, parceque la crainte de retomber au pouvoir de Buonaparte, si on vouloit s'opposer à son désir, pourroit la déterminer, en cas de revers, à agir contre nous. Cela a produit un très bon effet, et Metternich a consenti à ce que voudroient les Français. Le Comte de Noailles part demain pour Dijon, où nos braves camarades, qui sont venus en députation à Langres, n'attendent que son arrivée pour éclater. De là on expédiera un courrier au Roi, on enverra des députés à notre Empereur, et des envoyés à toutes les autres villes qui se sont manifestées pour la bonne cause. Nous avons choisi Dijon pour notre quartier-général, d'où partira notre première proclamation au nom du Roi. Nous faisons imprimer la proclamation de Louis XVIII. en changeant la date; mais il nous faut un Bourbon; qu'ils se partagent les provinces, que l'un des Princes aillent au Midi, et qu'il en arrive un ici promptement, parceque nous serons les premiers à Paris si nous avions le premier succès. Je serois d'avis que l'on prépara la Bretagne et la Normandie, mais qu'elles ne se déclarassent qu'avec la certitude qu'il a été battu, et que les provinces de ce côté sont en pleine insurrection.

Donnez-moi de vos nouvelles, et pressez un des Princes de venir se joindre à nous. Demain nous partons pour Bar-sur-Aube, et peut-être nous battrons nous dans deux ou trois jours au plus tard.

2 Février.

Hier nous avons eu une affaire avec Buonaparte. Il a perdu 65 canons, et il se retire sur Troyes. Nous avons pris près de 6000 prisonniers, et ils n'en sont pas fâchés. L'un d'eux répondit à l'Empereur, qui lui disoit, "Vous avez eu une mauvaise affaire?" "Oui, V.M., *très mauvaise et très bonne.*"

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Bazas, 17th March, 1814.

I have just arrived here, and saw the Duc d'Angoulême before leaving Bordeaux. He had seen and read a letter from Paris of the 13th, which stated that Buonaparte had been completely defeated near Soissons; he did not recollect the day, but it stated that all his guns, caissons, baggage, &c., were lost. It said the Allied cavalry decided the day, and that the Allies were very near to Paris, but had not entered it. So the Duke told me; and I have heard from Colonel Mitchell that a man also had arrived from Paris, which he had left on the 13th, corroborating this intelligence, and adding that Buonaparte had sent to Paris to say that he had been defeated, but that he had peace signed in his pocket. It will be well to hear all this confirmed, except the peace; and I should rather think the latter an addition, if he has in truth been so completely defeated, and there is more foundation for believing this report than most we have lately had. I met at Langon an officer who was sent by Colonel Bronz de Asarac, who commands a partisan corps of 100 men, to say he intended to come over to the King, and that you were aware of it, but that if I could send him one or two squadrons of cavalry he could release 1500 English prisoners, and take all the treasure of the army that is to pass to-morrow near St. Fay. Of course I excused sending any cavalry, but encouraged him to make an attempt to liberate the prisoners. However, I do not expect much from it, except that the corps will itself all come over. I did not hear anything from our fleet before I came away, though I had sent by two different ways to communicate with it, and a firing has been heard towards the mouth of the river the two last nights. Our patrols of cavalry would be yesterday at the Point de Grave. I left everything very quiet at Bordeaux, although my coming away made a considerable sensation and occasioned a good deal of alarm in the Royal party, thinking many troops were going, but I gave out I was sent for by you to consult on what had occurred, and perhaps I might come back. However, this little alarm will soon subside. Some infantry were to go down to-day to Fort Médoc, though it is, without our shipping in the river, a dangerous post; but the shipping must be in before anything could be undertaken against it, and the enemy is not in a very enterprising state. I shall be to-morrow at Roquefort, and the next day at Aire; but if there was anything likely to be done sooner, I would be at Aire to-morrow, if you would write, or tell any of your family to do it, to Roquefort.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

P.S.—I have just learnt what confirms the loss of the battle by Buonaparte. It appears certain; and I annex a paper I have just received of the consequences.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Les fonds à 625 francs. Le Général Grouchy et le Général Letort tués. Le Général Marmont, commandant la Garde, ayant commis de grandes fautes, et

perdu le matériel. L'ordre donné de diriger sur Orléans le grand parc d'artillerie qui étoit à Paris. Le quartier-général François d'abord à Laon, ensuite à Soissons, puis à Provins. Tels sont en peu de mots les nouvelles extraites du *Moniteur* du 13 courant.

G. O. Viella, 18th March, 1814. [742.]

1. The officers in charge of the baggage of the 74th, 83rd, 87th, 88th, 91st, and the Paymaster of the 88th regiment, are to be put in arrest for neglect of duty in allowing the bâtmen attached to the baggage of their several regiments to put their arms on the mules, contrary to orders to which their attention was again called only two days ago.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the General officers commanding the divisions to march their divisions in columns of three men abreast upon all occasions when practicable, excepting when forming to attack an enemy.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the following measures may be taken to prevent the baggage from filling and impeding the roads.

4. The General officers commanding divisions are requested to order one man of the Staff Corps to attend the baggage on the march.

5. The officer who will be with the baggage of the leading brigade is to march on one side of the road, and all the baggage is to follow him.

6. The soldiers of the Staff Corps are to keep clear on the opposite side of the road a sufficient space for a carriage to pass: this must be done whether the baggage is moving or halting.

WELLINGTON.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Roquefort, 18th March, 1814.

As I find your head-quarters have moved, and that my seeing you becomes uncertain, I will not delay sending you the annexed paper, which, though it treats of divers subjects, I place it before you on account of what regards the American property in the town of Bordeaux. There are, besides the two frigates, several very fine privateers on the stocks, and which, being vessels of war, though the property of individuals, I conceive become seizable.

I send you another account of the battle in which Buonaparte has been defeated, and of which I confess I have no doubt. I am following in the

track of the 4th division, and I have requested of Sir G. Murray what you propose for me, that I may make direct to it, as these stern chases are terrible long ones; but if you are not very far in advance of Barcelona tomorrow, I will be with you.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

From Sir James Ogilvie.

La position particulière dans laquelle le commerce de Bordeaux s'est placé à la suite des événements qui ont eu lieu le 12 Mars nécessite de la part du gouvernement Britannique des mesures extraordinaires. Il est de principe que le pavillon blanc arboré dans cette journée a garanti la totalité des propriétés d'une contribution de guerre que les conquérants alliés étoient autorisés à frapper sur la ville et le département. Comme conquêtes faites sur Buonaparte, le commerce, et plus particulièrement encore la garde urbaine de la ville ayant déclaré qu'elle ne pouvoit et ne vouloit pas arborer n'y reconnoître la couleur blanche comme sa garantie, par une suite de cette déclaration s'est constituée en état de dissidence avec les conditions premières en vertu desquelles S.E. le Maréchal Beresford a occupé la ville.

Sans aucun doute les armées alliées ont reconnu le principe, et l'ont observé dans toute sa latitude; mais ce seroit tromper leur bonnefoi, et abuser de leur loyauté, que de leur dissimuler que la majeure partie du commerce aujourd'hui en état de dissidence avec la majorité des habitants de Bordeaux, se trouveroit seul profiter de la bienveillance et de la générosité des armées alliées.

Il est de fait—

1. Qu'il existoit environ huit jours avant l'occupation de Bordeaux par les armées alliées pour une somme de près de quarante millions en denrées coloniales, comme indigo, café, sucre, coton, etc.

2. Que ces denrées provenoient soit de bâtiments Américains, soit de prises faites par les corsaires *L'Eugénie* et la *Comète*, etc., soit enfin par des vaisseaux expédiés sous licences.

3. Que ces denrées étoient déposées à l'entrepôt général des douanes pour y acquitter un droit déterminé à la suite du payement duquel elles seroient admises en circulation.

4. Qu'au moment de l'occupation de Bordeaux par les armées combinées les négociants ont obtenu la permission de retirer leurs denrées, en prenant l'obligation de payer au gouvernement de Buonaparte les droits dont ils étoient débiteurs, dans le cas où ce même gouvernement viendroit à rentrer à Bordeaux.

5. Que le fait seul de leur refus de reconnoître le gouvernement de leur Prince légitime doit les faire considérer et traiter comme sujets conquis sur Buonaparte.

Je crois qu'il seroit convenable que le gouvernement Britannique fît poser une imposition extraordinaire de guerre sur les individus reconnus détenteurs de denrées coloniales, comme débiteurs de Buonaparte, et que le produit en fut tenu à la disposition de Son Altesse Royale Monsieur le Duc d'Angoulême, pour être employé par lui de la manière qu'il jugera convenable pour la destruction de la tirannie.

Jean-Jacques Bosq, détenteur de denrées coloniales Américaines.
——— Brown, idem.
Justin Foussat, idem.
Moreton et Russel, idem.
Otard a retiré pour une somme considérable de l'entrepôt.
Robles et Bousquet, confréteurs de *L'Eugénie* corsaire, ont fait entrer beaucoup de prises, dont les marchandises étoient à l'entrepôt.
MM. Balguerie Junior, armateurs de *La Comète* corsaire, idem.
M. Sarget et Balguerie, détenteurs de denrées coloniales.
M. Rubichon, idem.
M. Lopès Dubec, idem.
M. Jona Jones, Américain naturalisé, idem.
M. Appiau de Cabarrus, grand Buonapartiste, détenteur de marchandises.
M. Martini, idem, idem.

II.

Il est entré à Blaye dans la nuit du 15 au 16 Mars environ 800 hommes, provenants de l'équipage du vaisseau le *Formidable*, de Rochefort, avec une bombarde, trois chaloupes canonnières, et cinq caïques.

La marine avoit commencé à évacuer sur Royau 900 ballots de drap et toiles. Les papiers étoient dirigés sur La Rochelle.

On porte la garnison de Blaye à trois milles hommes, mais beaucoup de conscrits ou marins prêts à déserter.

III.

Un négociant, arrivé hier soir de Paris, rapporte que le .... (probablement le 11) l'Empereur, ayant appris que l'armée alliée avoit fait ses dispositions pour l'attaquer, s'étoit porté lui-même en avant avec l'élite de ses troupes.

Il paroît que le Général Grouchy commandoit le centre, composé en grande partie de la Garde Impériale, et étoit opposé au Général Blücher. Le Général Letort une des ailes (on ne se rappelle pas laquelle). Le Maréchal Marmont commandoit un corps de réserve.

Bernadotte commandoit l'aile droite des alliés.

Dans le principe de la bataille le corps de Général Blücher a été enfoncé, mais l'Empereur ayant reconnu que son aile gauche l'avoit été attaqué par Bernadotte, fit marcher Marmont pour la soutenir. Ce Maréchal fut lui-même enfoncé, ou plutôt culbuté.

L'Empereur s'en plaint beaucoup. Il se décida alors à tenter un dernier effort en chargeant à la tête de sa cavalerie, commandée par le Général Grouchy ; mais au commencement de la charge ce général eut une cuisse emporté par un boulet. La confusion s'ensuivit. Le Général Letort ayant été blessé d'un autre côté, la confusion devint générale, et la déroute complète.

L'affaire a eu lieu dans le voisinage de Laon.

L'Empereur s'est retiré sous les murs de Soissons (à 12 lieues en arrière) avec les débris de son armée.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Esplugas, 18th March, 1814.

General Copons writes word it is impossible for him to detach any troops to this place, because Marshal Suchet still has a force of 10,000 men in his front. I am thus for the moment prevented from executing your com-

mands, unless I can induce General Sarsfield to undertake to contain the garrison of Barcelona with the troops to be left with him, viz., about 10,000, which measure I shall propose; and if he consents, and I do not find the information relative to Suchet's supposed force of 10,000 men confirmed, I shall think myself at liberty to follow your instructions. I lament this delay, which, however, may possibly cause some alteration in the route of the troops to you.

General Copons besides tells me that General Zayas had arrived from France, and had brought the intelligence that Ferdinand VII. was to arrive at Perpignan on the 19th instant, and is to be at Gerona on the 21st. I hope to hear further from your Lordship, and possibly to be directed to pass the Pyrenees from this side.

I reckon General Copons has 6000 disposable force in front, of which 900 cavalry.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
W. H. CLINTON.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, 18th March, 1814.

I received last night your Lordship's despatch of the 16th in cypher. I shall do everything in my power to attain the object your Lordship points out. I believe Marshal Beresford, before leaving this, stated fully the obstacles alluded to, and will more fully himself explain the state of things here. Since he left this I have ascertained that the enemy has reoccupied the Point de Grave with 400 men, and it is their only post on this side. It is upwards of 20 leagues from this, which appears too great a distance for me to detach to under present circumstances. I am also positively informed that these batteries never stopped Lord Cochrane when he thought proper to run his frigate into the Gironde, and therefore our squadron will force its passage as soon as it appears. A 74-gun ship, with several armed vessels, are moored at Le Verdon.

The reports from Blaye and St. André de Cubsac are daily confirmed in the increasing force of the enemy there.

5000 men in Blaye; 3000 of these are conscripts. 2000 at St. André, arrived from Montlieu on the 16th, with several General officers. This last report I consider exaggerated much. The consternation of the people here is extreme; so much so, that were I to move any part of my force, I should fear commotions among them.

The fort of La Teste, at the Bassin d'Arcachon, capitulated with the Duc de Guiche. Two officers were allowed to join their regiment at Blaye; all the rest have assumed the white cockade.

I have not had any report from General Inglis, at Langon, since he went there. I am told there are 3000 men at Réole, few of them armed.

The Brunswick regiment is on my left at Castelnau, and occupies Médoc; a strong piquet at La Bastide, opposite this city; and a troop of cavalry that patrols to the bank of the Dordogne, on which the enemy have their

advance: the rest of my force is in town, out of which I shall move the moment I hear of our naval people in the river, and which I expect every moment.

The immense stores found here by Mr. Ogilvie, Deputy Commissary-General, and the activity of that gentleman, induce me to beg your Lordship would order him to remain here for the present. My division commissaries are quite unequal to the task.

I beg to enclose a letter just received from the mayor, to which I have no other answer to give than that I cannot extend my force further at present. Your movement, however, will, I trust, soon effect the remedy.

I have yielded to the Duc d'Angoulême everything concerning the civil authorities and administration. He yesterday put the question to me, whether I would assist him with "main forte" to levy taxes on the city, if it should be found necessary. I declined to do so without your Lordship's particular instructions, which I beg to have.

Moniteurs of the 13th and various letters from Paris yesterday announce that a severe action had been fought at Soissons and Laon by Buonaparte in person, with 45,000 men. On the 9th he was successful; on the 10th he was beaten and routed, with the loss of his whole artillery. It is generally believed here, even by those who differ from us in politics.

I shall be most anxious to hear of your Lordship's movements, were it only to quiet the terrors of this population.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's most faithful

DALHOUSIE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Mayor of Bordeaux to Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, Bordeaux, le 18 Mars, 1814.

Depuis que notre ville est en votre pouvoir les approvisionnements de tout genre qu'on avait l'habitude d'y apporter très abondamment des divers lieux circonvoisins deviennent successivement fort rares; et cette fâcheuse circonstance est l'effet de l'interception de nos communications ordinaires avec ces mêmes contrées.

La majeure partie de ce qu'il nous faut, notamment en grains et farines, et en bois de chauffage, ne peut nous venir que des parties hautes du fleuve de la Garonne; et il paraît qu'en beaucoup d'endroits, en remontant à dix ou douze lieues, les habitants des villes et bourgs situés sur les deux rives arrêtent tous ces approvisionnements, dont sont chargés des bâteaux destinés pour notre port. Il en est absolument de même à l'égard de pareilles denrées qui peuvent, pour la même destination, venir par la rivière de Dordogne.

Comme il y a très peu à espérer de ce qui peut nous arriver par terre, il est donc de la plus haute importance, pour assurer à la nombreuse population de Bordeaux les approvisionnements de toute espèce qui lui sont nécessaires, de rétablir promptement toute la liberté des communications qui existaient précédemment entre cette ville et tous les lieux situés sur l'un et l'autre côté des deux rivières.

Les mesures à prendre dans cet objet étant toutes en votre pouvoir, Monsieur le Général, il m'a paru que je ne devais point négliger de vous soumettre ces observations, afin que vous veuilliez bien aviser, dans votre sagesse, aux moyens d'opérer un heureux changement dans ce qui existe sous ce rapport.

Je ne dois pas omettre de vous faire savoir encore, Monsieur le Général, que dans l'entre deux mers, notamment dans la partie qui s'étend vers Cubsac et Ambès, il existe, dit-on, un corps de partisans qui enlèvent tout ce qui, de ce

côté, se dirige sur Bordeaux, et vient aboutir à notre passage de La Bastide. C'est principalement de cette contrée que nous arrive la plupart du bétail pour la consommation de la ville; et depuis bien des jours, par l'effet de l'obstacle que je signale, les arrivages de cette espèce et tous autres sont infiniment rares. Hier, sur la demande que me fit M. le Commissaire Ordonnateur de l'armée, je lui procurai un fournisseur pour une certaine quantité de bœufs par semaine. Ce particulier, après avoir traité avec M. l'Ordonnateur, et s'être mis en mesure pour commencer sa fourniture, vint me faire part des difficultés qu'on lui avait dit exister dans l'entre deux mers pour en faire venir du bétail, et il me témoigna son irrésolution sur l'entreprise qu'il avait faite, déclarant qu'il allait s'en expliquer avec M. l'Ordonnateur.

Cette circonstance particulière, ajoutée à tout ce qui précède, ne peut que vous déterminer, Monsieur le Général, à user de tous les moyens qui sont en votre pouvoir pour rétablir la libre circulation dans tous les lieux par lesquels doivent passer les divers objets de nos approvisionnements. Ainsi d'amples ressources seront assurées pour tous, tant sous le rapport des besoins de votre armée que pour ceux de nos nombreux habitants.

Agréez, Monsieur le Général, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

L'Adjoint du Maire, DE PUIS.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, ce 18 Mars, 1814.

Votre lettre d'avant-hier soir que je viens de recevoir m'a fait une vraie peine, parceque je suis affligé de vous voir mécontent, et surtout d'un homme qui s'est montré si dévoué au parti du Roi, et qui m'a été bien utile depuis mon arrivée ici.

Si j'ai vu sa proclamation avant qu'elle ait été imprimée, ce que je crois sans être sûr, j'avoue que je suis tellement accablé d'affaires, et de demandes, et d'audiences depuis que je suis ici, que je ne l'aurois pas lue avec l'attention que j'aurois dû y apporter, et que ce qui vous y a déplu ne m'a pas frappé. J'en ai donné une depuis qu'on m'a demandée avec instance. Conformément aux instructions que j'avois du Roi, j'ai permis qu'on portat le ruban de la Légion d'Honneur.

Je vous demande de n'être plus fâché outre le main, parce que c'est un homme respectable, et qui vraiment m'est très utile. Notre affaire va lentement, mais commence à marcher. Je n'ai point encore d'argent, mais j'espère en avoir bientôt quelque part. Je n'ai eu qu'à me louer du Maréchal Beresford, et je ne demande rien des troupes si ce n'est ce que Lord Dalhousie a dû vous demander.

Il peut y avoir ici quelques mal-intentionnés et un plus grande nombre de craintifs, mais le peuple est excellent, et me témoigne toujours une grande joie toutes les fois que je parais.

C'est avec la plus haute considération et bien véritable attachement que je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Soyez sûr qu'à l'avenir je veillerai avec la plus scrupuleuse attention à ce qu'il ne soit rien publié qui ne soit parfaitement dans le sens de votre lettre.

M. de Tatistcheff to Comte de Romanzow.

Londres, le 6 (18) Mars, 1814.

Par la dépêche de V.E. du 19 (31) Novembre dernier j'ai appris avec la plus vive satisfaction la conclusion de la paix définitive entre la Russie et la Perse. Cet événement heureux, en ajoutant par des acquisitions importantes à la puissance de l'empire, établit sa sûreté extérieure sur des bases plus solides, et prête un nouveau lustre au règne déjà si glorieux de l'Empereur, notre auguste maître. Je m'empresse d'offrir à V.E. mes félicitations sur des résultats aussi avantageux obtenus sous son ministère, et certainement par son habilité et sa persévérance à ne point se départir de la ligne éventuelle qu'on avoit fixée entre la Russie et la Perse lorsque les opérations militaires ont commencé dans ces contrées.

TATISTCHEFF.

Edward Thornton, Esq., to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Liège, 19th March, 1814.

Your Lordship will receive with this letter one from the Prince Royal of Sweden, conveying to your Lordship the insignia of the highest Order of the Sword, which is in general given only to commanding officers gaining a victory at the head of their troops, and which, if conferred on the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, was not so conferred until after the battle of Leipsig, where both these Sovereigns acted so distinguished a part.

It is a great satisfaction to me to have this occasion of expressing, in common with my countrymen and with all Europe, my admiration of the eminent talents which have saved the world, and of assuring you of the esteem and respect with which I have the honour to be,

My Lord, your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

EDWARD THORNTON.

P.S.—The small sword (contained in the box) is worn on the left breast, perpendicularly with the point upwards, under the star of any other order which may be borne by the wearer. The cross is worn round the neck; and if that is occasionally not used, the colours of the Order of the Sword may be shown by wearing a strip of the narrow riband through the button-holes of the left breast.

E. T.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, Bordeaux, 19th March, 1814.

I have just now received yours of the 17th. The Hussar squadron shall be sent off as soon as the other of the 12th arrives.

The good example of Bordeaux does not spread at all, and to judge by

their long and sour faces I would imagine they had already repented the step. You cannot conceive the terrors and alarms under which all descriptions of people tremble at present. They seem to place no sort of confidence in the force I have here, and I find it quite impossible to stir them up to any exertion or risk on their part to provide for their defence. 10 or 12 gunboats at Blaye and at the junction of the Dordogne threaten to run up and bombard us. I cannot get them to man or furnish anything of the kind to oppose them. Fortunately the river for two miles below this is narrow enough for Jenkinson's guns to afford protection. Two of them and a battalion of infantry put me quite at ease, but not so the town.

Yesterday 200 men who gave up the fort of La Teste, on the Bassin d'Arcachon, came in here, marched in with arms, accoutrements, and clothing. The Duc d'Angoulême tells me they have assumed the white cockade, and entered for the King's service.

May I beg of you to obtain for me Lord Wellington's instructions how I am to act towards any force His Royal Highness may gather together in the name of Louis XVIII.

No account yet of any British cruiser or fleet having approached the mouth of La Gironde, which surprises me, as Marshal Beresford led me to expect them every hour. Until they appear I must be stationary here.

I am sorry to enclose a report received late last night from General Inglis at Langon, stating the loss of his advanced piquet at St. Macaire: the hussars effected their escape. It appears to be a most shameful neglect of duty, and disobedience of his orders, on the part of Captain Bren, Chasseurs Britanniques.

Ponsonby and Abercrombie are just returned from a patrol towards the Dordogne, St. André, &c. General L'Huillier, with 800 or 900 men there, in great alarm that we advance. I am not willing to cross in that direction, as I would not like to remain there, and I should only draw down mischief upon the villages I might pass through, without protecting.

As soon as any vessel comes into the Gironde I will cross to the Dordogne, and start from it the naval force of gunboats which they have gathered there.

No arrival from Paris for two days.

Yours most sincerely,

DALHOUSIE.

I shall continue to report to you for the information of my Lord Wellington.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-Gen. Inglis to Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

MY LORD, Langon, 18th March, 1814.

It is with regret I report that the Captain's guard, consisting of 2 subalterns and 50 men, with a patrol of 4 hussars, have been surrounded and taken by a party of the enemy, consisting of about 50 gendarmes and 200 infantry.

The Captain's instructions were to take up the best position in the town;

or if, from his small force, it should be dangerous to remain in it, such as he might think best adapted for defence and the security of his retreat to the boats, which would be covered by the guns posted on the bank of the river for that purpose, and to be careful not to commit himself, or run the risk of losing men.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient servant,

W. INGLIS.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, Bordeaux, 20th March, 1814.

Things were getting very violent and inclined to mischief yesterday. During the night the mayor seized five of the chief partisans in town, and to-day I have taken the arms from the Garde Urbaine, as it is called. The great proportion of them are quiet citizens, but it was found a sad mixture. To-morrow a new guard will be formed, and I trust may restore matters a little.

No account yet or appearance of any British ship of war.

No post from Paris since that which brought the 'Moniteur' of the 13th.

I do not believe that any force can be brought against me here. All reports from the banks of the Dordogne assure me that we are most anxiously wished for there. In the mean time the French gendarmerie and small corps at Réole, and along that bank of the Garonne, are plundering and laying waste the country. We most anxiously look to the change that will operate by Lord Wellington's move to the upper Garonne.

To-morrow I hope to hear something of you.

Yours always,

DALHOUSIE.

I don't imagine Lord Wellington wishes to be plagued by copies of all their proclamations or squabbles here. I'll send you anything of my own, if I find it necessary to publish.

The Mayor of Dax to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR, Dax, le 21 Mars, 1814.

J'ai reçu l'avis que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser de votre proclamation, portant que je remplirai les fonctions de sous-préfet du district de Dax jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Je me soumettrai, Monseigneur, à tous les ordres qu'il vous plaira me donner, et vous pouvez compter sur mon dévouement et mon zèle à les faire exécuter.

Mais dans mon intérêt, celui de mon administration, et de toutes nos familles, je me permettrai, Monseigneur, de réclamer votre protection et votre appui pour que notre dévouement sans bornes ne soit pas un motif

de proscription pour nos contrées, et les familles des fonctionnaires publics, qui vous servent.

Daignez, Monseigneur, nous assurer que quelque soit le sort des armes ou des négociations, vous ne nous abandonnerez point à un esprit de réaction ou de vengeance.

Je viens, Monseigneur, d'être entraîné à une démarche qui m'a été commandée par Monsieur de Carrère, en qualité de préfet nommé par Son Altesse le Duc d'Angoulême.

J'ai fait publier, d'après ses ordres, les lettres patentes de Louis XVIII., et les proclamations de Son Altesse le Duc d'Angoulême, tendantes à le faire reconnoître pour Roi des Français.

Ces diverses proclamations se sont faites sans opposition, et ont été bien accueillies dans l'arrondissement; mais j'ai appris que cette mesure avoit été improuvée par vous, Monseigneur; que vous aviez même revoqué les pouvoirs donnés à Monsieur de Carrère, en qualité de préfet des Landes, par Son Altesse Royale le Duc d'Angoulême.

Quelque soit le résultat de cette démarche, je vous conjurerai, Monseigneur, de nous considérer comme des sujets et fonctionnaires soumis aux ordres qu'on nous transmet; que notre premier devoir est d'obéir; que nous ne saurions être abandonnés à nous-mêmes, pour tout prix de nos services.

Veuillez donc m'assurer dans tout ce que je ferai, comme homme public, de votre puissante protection, ou le désespoir seroit notre partage, et l'éloignement de toutes les places publiques en seroit la suite.

Veuillez nous rassurer, sur les suites et l'exécution d'une mesure, que nous avons cru autorisés par vous, Monseigneur, et nous bénirons à jamais votre nom.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monseigneur, avec respect,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

F. HARRIGAN.

The Mayor of Dax to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR, Dax, le 22 Mars, 1814.

Je dois vous prévenir que plusieurs fonctionnaires publics, tels qu'un adjoint au maire de Dax, les membres du conseil municipal de Dax, et tous les juges du tribunal de Dax, ont refusé de continuer leurs fonctions, et s'en abstiennent entièrement, depuis qu'ils ont appris que par une lettre écrite au maire et sous-préfet de St. Sever vous ne promettiez aucune protection à ceux qui auraient émis leurs vœux en faveur de Louis XVIII., quoique cependant il paraisse avoir été reconnu sans opposition par la plus grande partie de ce département.

Je ne saurai vous taire que toute suspension dans la distribution de la justice est une calamité publique, et amène le désordre et l'anarchie; qu'il faut que tous ces fonctionnaires publics soient forcés de les continuer, ou qu'ils doivent être remplacés par vous.

Il en est de même du préfet du département des Landes, chef de l'administration de ce département, dont la place ne saurait rester vacante sans les plus graves inconvénients, et entraver la marche de l'administration.

J'ose, Monseigneur, vous présenter ces observations et vous transmettre ces renseignemens, bien persuadé que votre prévoyance et votre sagesse vous feront prendre des mesures pour prévenir tout désordre dans un pays soumis à vos armes.

J'ai cru également, Monseigneur, remplir vos intentions en ordonnant l'exécution de toutes les lois en vigueur en France : j'y tiens la main, mais il faut des tribunaux pour réprimer ceux qui s'y refusent.

Je vous demanderai, Monseigneur, de vouloir bien accorder quelque attention à ce que j'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre ; et vous prierai de nous accorder encore votre puissante protection, sans laquelle nos contrées ne sauraient obtenir quelque tranquillité.

Agréez, Monseigneur, l'hommage de mon respect, avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être

Votre très humble et dévoué serviteur,

F. HARRIGAN.

General Dumouriez to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MON CHER LORD, Le 22 Mars, 1814.

J'ai respecté votre repos, étant sûr du reveil du lion, dès que la saison vous permettrait d'agir, aussi la reprise de ma correspondance est une nouvelle félicitation sur de nouvelles victoires. Votre passage de l'Adour au dessus et au dessous de Bayonne est digne de vous. Le franchissement de la Barre est caractéristique de la marine Anglaise. Je vous crois depuis longtems à Bordeaux, puisque votre rapport est daté de Roquefort.

J'espère que vous trouverez le pays bien disposé. La présence de l'intéressant Prince Français qui a l'avantage de vous accompagner peut être très utile, si, comme je l'espère, il détermine les bons Français de ces provinces à déployer l'étendard de France contre le tyran détesté qu'ils ne craindront point marchant sous votre égide. J'espère qu'il se formera autour de vous des corps d'armée Royalistes qui deviendront vos pourvoyeurs pour le reste de votre route.

Votre marche est la pierre de touche qui fera connaître exactement à quel degré les Français aiment encore la vénérable dynastie qui les a gouvernés tant de siècles. Elle ramenera à son vrai point la politique égarée, vacillante, et timide des puissances alliées ; elle rompra le cours honteux des négociations entamées avec le dangereux et insolent usurpateur du plus riche et plus beau pays du Continent. Vous jouerez le rôle du dictateur Camillus venant rompre la capitulation de Rome. C'est un Général Anglais, c'est mon cher et respecté Wellington, qui, après avoir rendu la liberté et l'existence aux deux peuples de la Péninsule, renforcé de ces deux peuples librés, achevera sa carrière immortelle de vengeur des Rois, en ramenant à Paris les Princes légitimes qui, sans l'Angleterre et son immortel Général, auraient été sacrifiés à jamais par des intérêts particuliers et mal étendus à un misérable aventurier dont l'anéantissement est indispensable pour assurer une paix durable fondée sur la vraie liberté des peuples, et la légitimité des souverains. Voilà, mon cher Lord, votre destinée telle que je vous l'ai prédite dès vos premiers succès. C'est celle de votre nation, et

vous serez secondé par votre gouvernement, qui n'a pu que se prêter avec répugnance à la politique faible et tortueuse de ses alliés du continent.

Je vous félicite des riches prises que vous avez dû faire dans Bordeaux. Vous punissez sévèrement les imprudents Américains, et vous trouvez de grandes ressources pour la continuation de vos propres opérations militaires et pour l'armement des Royalistes. Je suis instruit que ceux du Saintonge, du Poitou, et de la Bretagne n'attendent que des armes pour se lever et se ranger sous les drapeaux du Duc de Berri, qui est à Jersey, d'où il sollicite les moyens d'agir. Vous communiquerez facilement avec eux, et vous établirez cette utile diversion à votre gauche.

Vous êtes trop occupé pour que j'abuse plus longtems de votre complaisance. Continuez votre glorieuse carrière, dans laquelle mes vœux les plus ardents vous accompagnent. C'est par vous que dans le mois prochain, sous, ou dans, les murs de Paris, se décidera la paix générale et le sort du monde.

Votre fidèle serviteur et ami,

DUMOURIEZ.

J'ai frémi en lisant que vous avez été un peu blessé à votre bataille d'Orthez. La gloire a amorti la balle; elle vous destine encore d'autres succès.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Monrejeau, 22nd March, 9 P.M., 1814.

I have the satisfaction to forward to you a report just received from Major-General Fane of a gallant affair which took place this evening near St. Gaudens, between our advanced guard and the rear guard of the enemy; and I beg to assure your Lordship that I perfectly coincide with the Major-General in the praise bestowed upon the 13th Regiment, which was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Doherty.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's very faithful and obedient servant,

R. HILL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-Gen. H. Fane to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

SIR, Borde, 9 P.M., 22nd March.

Having advanced as ordered, I came up with the enemy's rear guard about one league from St. Gaudens. It was supported by four or five squadrons of dragoons, formed upon the height in front of the town.

With two squadrons of the 13th Light Dragoons, supported by part of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, I drove in their advance, and their support having remained too long in front of St. Gaudens, the 13th Dragoons were enabled to come up with it. They charged the enemy's squadrons with the greatest gallantry, and drove them through the town. The enemy having again formed

beyond the town, they were again attacked, and pursued more than two miles. A number of the enemy have been killed, and 102 men and about the same number of horses taken. Thirty of the men are badly wounded.

Captain M'Alister, who led the advance, much distinguished himself, and nothing could exceed the bravery and good conduct of the whole of the regiment.

I had reason to be much satisfied with the conduct of Brigade-Major Dunbar, who was amongst the foremost in the attack.

My loss has been very trifling; I hope not more than four or five wounded.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. FANE.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY in the Peninsula under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Tournay, 22nd March, 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers:—			
Field Officers	30	14	44
Captains	96	21	117
Subalterns	196	67	263
Staff	94	53	147
Quartermasters of Cavalry	20	5	25
Serjeants:—			
Present	536	70	606
Sick:—			
Present	3	3	6
Absent	11	..	11
Command	68	20	88
Prisoners of War and Missing	8	..	8
Trumpeters:—			
Present	99	46	145
Sick:—			
Present	2	1	3
Absent	6	1	7
Command	1	3	4
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File:—			
Present	6892	1220	8112
Sick:—			
Present	101	45	146
Absent	310	21	331
Command	942	378	1320
Prisoners of War and Missing	206	..	206
Horses:—			
Present	6704	1118	7822
Sick	293	73	366
Command	518	262	780

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the Peninsula, under the Command of His Excellency Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Tournay, 22nd March, 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	13	12	25
Lieutenant-Colonels	51	23	74
Majors	82	39	121
Captains	453	162	615
Lieutenants	881	194	1075
Cornets or Ensigns	286	286	572
Staff	379	447	826
Quartermasters of Cavalry	20	5	25
Serjeants :—			
Present	2696	1290	3986
Sick :—			
Present	81	54	135
Absent	540	173	713
Command	402	258	660
Prisoners of War and Missing	67	4	71
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1010	502	1512
Sick :—			
Present	16	3	19
Absent	121	34	155
Command	23	47	70
Prisoners of War and Missing	44	7	51
Rank and File :—			
Present	35,673	18,310	53,983
Sick :—			
Present	1232	936	2168
Absent	11,000	4506	15,506
Command	3217	2425	5642
Prisoners of War and Missing	2718	361	3079
Horses :—			
Present	6704	1118	7822
Sick	293	73	366
Command	518	262	780
Alterations :—			
Joined	..	2	2
Dead	47	13	60
Discharged	..	1	1
Deserted	1	1	2
Transferred	16	..	16
Promoted	2	..	2
Reduced	2	4	6

E. PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

G. O. Boulogne, 23rd March, 1814. [743.]

1. The Commander of the Forces observes that bullock carts are following many of the regiments of the army, as well of cavalry as of infantry, unattended by their owners or their servants, and driven by soldiers.

2. It is obvious that these carts have been detained in the service contrary to orders, and the owners have abandoned them rather than continue to follow the army.

3. The officers of the army must be aware how injurious this system is, not only to the country, but to the army itself; the means of transport in the country must be thus destroyed, and probably when the army will be most in want of these means they will fail entirely.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that immediately after the receipt of this order, the Commissaries attached to the divisions and brigades of infantry, and to regiments of cavalry, will take measures to ascertain what carts there are following the brigades and regiments to which they are attached respectively.

5. If the owners or their servants should be with the carts, they are forthwith to be paid their hire, and sent to their homes. If the owners or their servants are not with the carts, the Commissary attached to the brigade or regiment is to do every thing in his power to discover at what place and on what day they were taken into the service, and he is to deliver over to the mayor of the nearest village all the carts with their bullocks not attended by the owners or their servants, taking his receipt for them, and specifying as far as may be in his power to what village each belongs.

6. The Commissary will by letter apprise the mayor of the village to which any cart belongs, at what place and in whose possession it will be found when sent for.

7. In future the Commander of the Forces desires that the Commissaries attached to brigades of infantry, and regiments of cavalry, will make their requisitions on the mayors of the villages for any number of carts they may require for a movement, if possible on the preceding day; and he holds them and the Commanding officers of regiments responsible that no cart is kept longer than for the day's march, and that the owner is forthwith paid and discharged.

9. The Commander of the Forces desires that the Commis-

saries attached to brigades of infantry, and regiments of cavalry, will report to the Commissary-General, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, in detail the measures which they will have adopted in consequence of this order, specifying what number of carts they have given up, belonging to what villages, when taken, and to the mayor of what village given up.

10. The Commander of the Forces expects this report by the 26th inst.

11. This order is to be attended to by the Portuguese as well as by the British troops.

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Mansfield Street, 23rd March, 1814.

I think the enclosed instruction of such urgent importance, that I shall attempt to send one copy of it to your Lordship straight to Bordeaux.

By the packet, which I find will be detained one day later than usual, you will receive copies of the papers relating to the negotiation at Châtillon. We received your despatches of the 13th and 14th yesterday.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 23rd March, 1814.

I am commanded by the Prince Regent to convey to your Lordship His Royal Highness's approbation of the instruction which your Lordship gave to Marshal Sir W. Beresford in the event of any disposition being manifested by the inhabitants of Bordeaux to declare for the House of Bourbon, such instruction being in conformity with those which I had the honour to communicate to your Lordship.

Your Lordship will consider yourself authorized to avail yourself of the advantages which this opposition to the power of Buonaparte (if it becomes general) cannot fail to afford to your operations.

I am further commanded to instruct your Lordship that, in the event of your Lordship's receiving intelligence from Châtillon of preliminaries of peace having been signed by the Allied Powers with the existing government of France, your Lordship will not consider yourself thereby obliged to give up any of the territory of France which you may occupy at the time you receive such intelligence, or withdraw your protection from the inhabitants who may have placed themselves under it, until your Lordship shall have received instructions from this country.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Horse Guards, 23rd March, 1814.

I have great satisfaction in acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant,* forwarding copies of your despatches of the 1st and 4th March to Earl Bathurst, with a detail of the operations of the army under your command in the passage of the Gaves de Pau and d'Oléron, of the attack and defeat of the enemy's force in their strong position at Orthez, and of your subsequent advance to St. Sever, Mont de Marsan, and Aire; and I lose no time in conveying to your Lordship my high sense of the important victory which has been gained by your ability and superior military judgment, so evidently manifested by the complete rout of the enemy, and the heavy loss they have sustained upon this occasion; and in requesting your Lordship to express to the troops under your orders my warmest approbation for the distinguished bravery they have displayed throughout the whole of these operations, I beg you will accept my sincere congratulations upon a success which adds so much to the renown of your Lordship and the army under your command.

I am, my Lord, yours,

FREDERICK.

Count Fernan Nuñez to Viscount Castlereagh.

Grafton Street, 23rd March, 1814.

The undersigned Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Catholic Majesty Don Ferdinand VII., in consequence of an order from his government, has the honour of communicating to His Excellency Viscount Castlereagh, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the enclosed copy of the manifesto which the ordinary Cortes have published, with a view of explaining to the nation the motive and object of their decree of the 2nd of February, in which is set forth the method to be pursued in receiving the Señor Don Ferdinand VII. whenever he shall present himself on the frontiers of the Peninsula.

The undersigned, in transmitting this manifesto to His Excellency, flatters himself that His Britannic Majesty's government will view it with particular interest and satisfaction when it discovers in the representatives of the Spanish nation the same sentiments which directed the Spanish Regency in its resolution respecting a matter of such moment, and which not only met with the approbation, but were thought deserving the eulogiums, of the British Cabinet.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity, &c.

COUNT DE FERNAN NUÑEZ,
DUKE OF MONTELLANO.

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* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 546.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Horse Guards, 23rd March, 1814.

I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 8th instant, and its enclosures.

That part of your letter which alludes to the conduct of the troops, and to Colonels ——•—— of the —— and ———————— of the ——, has been answered specially by the Commander-in-Chief; but I have received His Royal Highness's command to reply to the other points of your Lordship's despatch.

His Royal Highness has been a long time aware of the difficulties which offer in the attainment of a due course of punishment for crimes brought under the investigation of courts martial; and, in considering a remedy, His Royal Highness is glad to find that he has anticipated the inconvenience you represent respecting the suspension of officers, by having already submitted to the Prince Regent that the power of passing such sentences should be taken from courts martial; and that in substitution thereof, they should be empowered to adjudge the punishment of placing officers at the bottom of the list for crimes that might have only called for suspension. This arrangement is only awaiting the final opinion of the law officers to be inserted in the Articles of War and communicated to the army.

His Royal Highness quite agrees with your Lordship that the disorders which too frequently attend the progress of British troops in actual operations are attributable to the neglect and inattention of regimental officers.

The military service of this country is, like its constitution, widely different from that of any other nation in Europe, and does not admit, to a full extent, the arbitrary exercise of discretion, either in the infliction of punishment or the selection of individuals for professional reward without restrictive regulations; but, at the same time, His Royal Highness desires me to repeat to your Lordship that the most prompt attention will be given to all instances of misconduct you may represent; and with regard to the evil which your Lordship represents as arising in promotion by regimental rotation, I am to assure you that the Commander-in-Chief has never, and will never, recommend an officer for successional advancement against whom the commanding officer of his regiment, or the General of his brigade or division, makes the least representation. His Royal Highness only wants such representation to be made in order that he may act upon it; and with such a power, which may even be acted upon where a passive performance of duty is unaccompanied by an active zeal, His Royal Highness would hope that a great portion of the inconvenience attending the system of advancement by regimental seniority would be removed.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

H. TORRENS.

E. Cooke, Esq., to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Foreign Office, 23rd March, 1814.

It is a very long time since I wrote to you, but I broke down last year, was forced to quit office, and am now but half reestablished, though I am beginning to resume activity.

Your last despatches have electrified us here; for the general current is against any peace with Buonaparte; and the display at Bordeaux and at Pau, and the general disposition you have found, raise hopes that his reign may soon expire.

I know you are completely put in possession of the progress of negotiations. To-day we have French papers of the 19th; not a word as to negotiations: yet I hardly see upon what ground they could have been protracted. It is possible Caulaincourt's contre projet, which was to have been given in on the 14th, might have admitted all the points of the ultimatum under modification, and that the modification may have been referred to Chaumont, and there may have remained still a disposition to temporise; but when closing the negotiation was evidently the interest of the Allies, I should hope it may have broken off. Could we feel assured this were the case, you could proceed at your ease.

The only difficulties at present seem to be, first, that you cannot make common cause; secondly, that you cannot hold out absolute indemnity: all that you can hold out at the present moment is that every exertion will be made to secure indemnity in case of failure.

This restraint under which the circumstances of the moment place us, must, I fear, in some measure, check the enthusiasm which is the soul of counter revolutions; though I think it should not, for I think you will be able to show that the only chance of fixing the Allies in the Bourbon cause is to make the demonstration as universal as possible, so as to give us the argument that we no longer can consider Buonaparte as able to execute what he may pledge himself to in any stipulations. The more rapid therefore and extensive that the declaration for the Bourbons can be made, the greater power we shall have to detach the Allies from arranging with Buonaparte.

I should think Marshal Beresford will have no difficulty in getting the Bourbon spirit spread into the maritime provinces to the north; and if you could raise the cockade at Toulouse, it would be followed at Marseilles, and I think at Lyons, though it has been checked there.

Nothing will do without enthusiasm, proclamations, addresses, songs, music, &c.

My object in writing to your Lordship was about Viel Castel. I never saw him. I have heard much of him, and he has too much of the Bavarde. I know by a secret channel that he told Fernan Nuñez that the Crown Prince was in secret correspondence with Suchet and Soult, and that they had promised him to assist in restoring the Bourbons. I would advise your Lordship to examine him closely.

I should not think it impossible that were Toulouse and Marseilles to declare, Soult and Suchet would treat with your Lordship or the Duc d'Angoulême, and I believe you have the powers.

As on the return of the messenger things here will, I trust, be ripe for an

ultimate decision, it would be well if you sent over a pretty detailed tableau of affairs.

I feel some presentiment that the arrangement with Buonaparte will break off, and that we shall be at liberty to play the whole game; and then, as you were the person to begin it, you will be able to give it the finishing stroke: a most natural object for your ambition, and very little for you to expect after the great things you have performed.

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful humble servant,

E. COOKE.

[744.] G. O. L'Isle en Dodon, 24th March, 1814.

1. In consideration of the bad weather during which the troops have carried on their operations during the winter, and of the consequent wear and tear of shoes, the Commander of the Forces has determined that each non-commissioned officer and soldier of the infantry, who was present with his regiment between the 8th and 14th December, 1813, between the 2nd and 8th January, or between the 14th February and 24th March, 1814, shall receive from the Commissariat a pair of shoes gratis.

2. The Commanding officers of regiments are to have lists made of the several men having claims for shoes under this order.

3. Requisitions will be made upon the Commissary-General for the number of pairs of shoes required, which will be issued as circumstances will permit. In the mean time the General officers commanding divisions and brigades will direct the officers commanding regiments to make every exertion in the towns and villages through which they will pass, to provide shoes for the men, for which the Commissaries attached to the brigades will pay, and they will be received as part of those due under this order.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Fife House, 24th March, 1814.

I am much obliged to you for your letter, which I received a few days ago by Major Fremantle. We have since received your letters of the 14th, with the important intelligence of the occupation of Bordeaux by a division

of your army under Marshal Beresford, and of the declaration of the civil authorities and people of that city in favour of the House of Bourbon.

I shall direct a copy of the instructions which have been sent in consequence to Lord Castlereagh, to be forwarded to you.

The case which has arisen has been foreseen from the beginning as possible; and, as far as was practicable, provision has been made for it.

At a meeting of the ministers of the Allied Sovereigns at Langres, on the 29th of January, when they settled the principles on which they were ready to negotiate with Buonaparte, Lord Castlereagh declared that though he was ready to negotiate and conclude peace with Buonaparte on the part of his government, as the Sovereign *de facto* of France, yet if anything should occur in the course of the negotiations to call his power in question, he reserved to himself the right of suspending the negotiations, or of adopting such course as, according to circumstances, might then be expedient.

That the declaration of the second or third city in France, as Bordeaux may be said to be, in favour of the Bourbons, combined with the account you have given us of a similar sentiment pervading the adjoining country, does in a *degree* call Buonaparte's power in question cannot be denied. The question is altogether one of *degree*. Every effort of this nature must have a beginning: a more promising one could not have been expected; and it remains to be seen to what extent it spreads.

Whilst we are determined, however, under present circumstances to keep off the conclusion of any treaty of peace with Buonaparte, we must endeavour to manage our Allies. Our decision may at first alarm them. I entertain confident expectations that they will be reconciled to it if the preliminaries shall not actually have been signed before they receive the communications of yesterday. If the preliminaries shall have been signed upon our own terms, the business will be more difficult; and their decision will very probably then depend upon the *degree* in which the spirit which has manifested itself at Bordeaux extends itself. At all events, much will be done by gaining time; and I am sure you will see the importance of furnishing us with the most early information on the following points: First, on the progress of the Royalist spirit throughout the south and other parts of France within your observation or cognizance. Secondly, the resources which the country can afford for the support and furtherance of that cause. Thirdly, what would be the prospect of ultimate success if the other Allied Powers were to withdraw from the contest, either by making a separate peace, or by retiring with their armies to the frontier, and Great Britain should be left to carry it on unsupported by any power except the nations of the Peninsula and the Royalists themselves. The last alternative is one which must be most seriously considered.

If the Austrians were determined either on withdrawing from the interior of France, or on making their separate peace, the Russians and Prussians would never attempt to preserve their present station; and we should then have to decide whether we would make peace jointly with the Allies, or continue the war in France, under such circumstances, in support of the Royalist cause.

I have not the least apprehension of the Emperor of Austria being actuated by any tenderness towards Buonaparte on account of the connexion with his daughter. I can even say that in my judgment he has been dis-

posed to act more fairly about the Bourbons than either of the other great military powers. But the Austrians of all descriptions, military and political, dread the power of France; and with resources far more considerable, and a better organized military system, than either Russia or Prussia, they want the spirit of enterprise and self-confidence which belong in a very considerable degree to both the other powers.

We shall wait with the most anxious solicitude for the next intelligence from you; and we must only now hope (as so considerable a portion of territory and population has already committed itself against Buonaparte) that the flame will extend itself so widely as to leave no doubt of the insufficiency of Buonaparte to answer for the French nation.

I have thus communicated to you freely my sentiments on the present most singular and important crisis. I have no apprehension of any difficulties in Parliament at present, whatever may exist hereafter, if the line of policy adopted by the government should prove unsuccessful.

Believe me to be, with great truth, my dear Lord,

Very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Lombes, 24th March, 1814.

Though I must conclude you will have seen the paper of the 16th, as I have heard of it these two last days, yet I send it to you in case you should not; for though the papers are got, they are frequently all taken by the young officers in front, and no one ever hears of them. You will see the assertion that St. Priest has been beaten, but there are no particulars, and at least the extent may be doubted. The Allies appear going on Lyons in the rear of Augereau, and the Sub-Prefect's proclamation makes him appear extremely frightened. We have no news whatever of the enemy on this side, except that yesterday morning he had not arrived at Toulouse, even in part, but a good deal of baggage had; and they are fortifying the bridge head and placing cannon in it, as also, they say, round the town.

Yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Esplugas, 24th March, 1814.

I had hoped that by this day at latest the two brigades of British troops directed by your Lordship to proceed from hence to your army would have been in movement. Everything was prepared for this, as well as for carrying into execution the other instructions contained in your letters dated the 4th and 8th of this month.

The following circumstances have caused delay, and seem to point out the propriety of the intended measure of breaking up this army being

for *the present* suspended, until I shall be enabled to do so from the state of things here being conformable to what was to have guided my conduct, or until I may receive further instructions from your Lordship.

In my last letter, Number 33, of the 15th instant, I had the honour to apprise your Lordship that, with a view to ascertain the state of things and the real force of the enemy, I had sent Lieutenant-Colonel Coffin to the front. His letters of the 15th and 16th, from Gerona, gave me strong grounds for hoping that, on his return here, I should be enabled to proceed immediately in the carrying into effect your orders; in the meanwhile, however, a letter reached me from General Copons, to whom I had written to acquaint him that I had received orders from your Lordship relative to the Anglo-Sicilian army which required the movement of that part of it employed in the blockade of Barcelona, urging him at the same time to adopt measures for taking up the ground in this neighbourhood which I was about to leave, and inviting the General to meet me here, or at any intermediate place, to confer on such subjects as might be requisite; to which letter General Copons replied that it was quite impossible for him to relieve the British force occupied in blockading Barcelona, Marshal Suchet being in his front with from 8000 to 10,000 disposable troops.

That in consequence of the communication made to him by Colonel Coffin in my name, he had proposed to meet me at Mataro, but that since the departure of the Colonel from Gerona, the Spanish General Zayas had arrived from France, bringing him the intelligence that King Ferdinand VII. was to arrive at Perpignan on the 19th, and would probably be at Gerona on the 21st of this month, which circumstance would prevent him from meeting me as proposed. In reference to this letter I replied to General Copons, expressing my regret that he could not meet me as proposed, and that he did not feel himself enabled to take measures relative to the blockade of Barcelona, observing that the intelligence I had received of the enemy's force differed very much from the statement he had made to me, and requesting he would state to me precisely what grounds he had for supposing Marshal Suchet still to be in such considerable force, which, after the late great success of your Lordship on the Adour, appeared to me so extraordinary, and again urging the General on the subject of the necessity there appeared to me to be that I should be enabled to execute the orders I had received from your Lordship. The same day I sent this reply to General Copons' letter, namely, on the 18th, I despatched a cyphered letter to your Lordship, a copy of which, in writing, I beg now to enclose, the original Colonel Manso having very obligingly undertaken at my request to forward to your Lordship, and on the 19th I again sent off Lieutenant-Colonel Coffin and Lieutenant-Colonel Hezeta (of the Spanish staff) to Gerona, both to endeavour to ascertain what really might be the force of the enemy on this side the Pyrenees, and also that it might be seen whether Ferdinand VII. should actually arrive at Gerona.

I at the same time desired Colonel Coffin to acquaint General Copons that, although the blockade of Barcelona could not be strict, nevertheless if some artillery and a small addition of cavalry were made to the force that would be left here, comprising the two Spanish divisions of Generals Sarsfield and Whittingham united, together with Colonel Manso's brigade, with the detachment of cavalry now with it, I was of opinion that

the enemy's force in Barcelona might at least be kept in check without risk of his being able to make his way to the Spanish frontier, should such be his intention; and I desired the Colonel to press General Copons (should he find the enemy's force to be as diminished as it had been before reported to him) to take prompt measures for enabling me to attend without delay to the orders I had received relative to the force under my command here.

On the 21st instant I received another letter from General Copons, dated the 19th, copy of which I have the honour to transmit for your information, having to observe to your Lordship that, in my answer to the General, I confined myself to the noticing the last paragraph only, observing that having sent Colonels Coffin and Hezeta to him, who were fully instructed on all points, it did not appear to me to be necessary to say more than to communicate to him the extract of that part of your Lordship's instructions to me relative to my arranging with him for the occupying the posts in the blockade of Barcelona which I should leave. Things remained in this state till yesterday, when I received the accompanying very interesting letter from Colonel Coffin of the 20th instant, which I have felt it my duty to lose no time in expediting to you, as it is possible such may induce you to take a different view with respect to operations on this side; and as it has necessarily obliged me for the moment to postpone the march of any troops towards your Lordship, which I apprehend I could not do without losing sight of your instructions on this head.

I am hourly expecting to see or to hear further from Colonel Coffin. I shall not fail to communicate such farther intelligence as I may receive, only anxious that the measures which I have been most reluctantly induced to adopt, in not proceeding as I had earnestly hoped to have been able to do in the execution of your orders, will nevertheless meet your approbation.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

W. H. CLINTON.

MEMORANDUM BY M. VILLENEUVE ON THE STATE OF FRANCE.

24 Mars, 1814.

Il faut partir de ce principe: La maison de Bourbon est aussi nécessaire à l'Europe que l'Europe s'est à la maison de Bourbon. Car ce serait une grande erreur d'attribuer les maux actuels du genre humain au seul caractère de Napoléon; il n'a fait qu'attirer à lui et concentrer dans ses mains le pouvoir et les ressorts du principe révolutionnaire. Mais ce principe survivra à l'homme; il est inhérent à sa race, à son usurpation, à ses institutions fondées sur la violence et l'imposture; il consiste à armer sans cesse les dernières classes contre les premières, les prolétaires contre les propriétaires, les sujets hardis contre les princes faibles, les princes ambitieux contre leurs sujets tyrannisés ou contre leurs voisins effrayés; et pour tous à ne connaître en réalité ni serment, ni foi, ni aucune loi positive, soit religieuse, soit civile.

Voilà le germe qu'il faut étouffer; il fermentera éternellement en Europe

si l'exemple de la France, si le triomphe de Napoléon ou de sa race (ce qui est en quelque sorte la révolution personnifiée) prouve sans cesse aux autres contrées que son développement est possible. La maison de Bourbon au contraire personnifie en elle les droits dont le respect et le maintien garantissent l'ordre général ; elle sauve l'Europe du malheur de croire qu'il n'y a plus désormais de milieu entre la révolte des peuples et la tyrannie des chefs. Avec elle tout se retrouve sur le pied antique : toutes les idées saines et pacifiques refleurissent ; et ce torrent de principes perturbateurs et mensonges qui menaçait le monde est refoulé dans son lit, et y est contenu par le pouvoir légitime pour y tarir avec le temps.

Il est inutile de s'étendre davantage sur cette première idée, qui semble être aujourd'hui le mobile des puissances alliées, et surtout de la noble Angleterre.

Mais le principe posé, comment ensuite atteindre le but? Comment les puissances alliées employeront-elles la force de leurs armes au dénouement de cette affreuse tragédie? Diront-elles impérieusement à la France : Voici votre Roi : nous vous le ramenons : tous ceux qui sont pour lui sont Français ; tous ceux qui seront contre lui sont des rebelles, et seront traités comme tels : ou bien se borneront-elles à montrer le Roi, laissant à la nation la faculté de s'approcher ou de s'éloigner, de rendre ou d'ôter aux Princes Bourbons leur sainte autorité ?

Voilà en ce moment le point de la question ; elle ne parait point encore résolue dans les conseils étrangers.

Pour la résoudre il faut considérer avec précision l'état présent de la nation Française.

Et d'abord il est vrai de dire que notre nation est aujourd'hui réduite à un épuisement physique et moral dont il y a peu d'exemples dans l'histoire.

Physique.—Car presque toute la génération de 20 à 40 ans est ou détruite ou traînée aux armées, ou prisonnière ; ainsi la partie militante, la partie libre d'affaires, de femmes et d'enfans, celle qui pourrait prendre sans trop calculer une résolution avec chaleur, et la soutenir par la force, n'existe plus à peu près.

Moral.—Car la génération qui passe 40 ans, celle qui a les propriétés et la famille, a vu se succéder tant de partis vainqueurs et vaincus, a vu si souvent la cause légitime réduite à l'extrémité, qu'elle se prête difficilement à l'espérance. La terreur pétrifie les hommes de cet âge, et ceux qui seraient susceptibles de quelque témérité sont contenus sur tous les points par un système d'administration qui plie de force à la même règle toutes les pièces qui le composent, qui atteint le grand et le petit, et tel que depuis Paris jusqu'au dernier village, jusqu'à la dernière chaumière, chaque personne est isolée, chaque fait est éclairé, chaque parole équivoque notée, toute lettre interceptée, tel qu'en un mot toute chose est connue en huit jours au ministère et réprimée à l'instant sans forme de procès dans le plus profond silence.

Dans un pareil état de choses, il est sensible qu'il peut y avoir des opinions différentes et secrettes, mais il est difficile qu'il se forme de parti extérieur, nombreux, actif.

Voilà donc la nation considérée en masse.

Entrons ensuite dans le détail, et examinons les facilités ou les obstacles

que la disposition des esprits présente à la restauration des Princes légitimes.

On peut diviser sous ce rapport les habitans de la France en trois classes, les partisans du Roi, les ennemis, les indifférens.

Je regarderai comme partisans de notre ancienne monarchie et de nos Princes, à quelques exceptions près de jour en jour moins nombreuses :

1. La noblesse ancienne.
2. Le clergé, surtout le clergé du second ordre.
3. La magistrature et cette foule d'hommes qui marchent à la suite, comme avocats, procureurs, etc.
4. Presque tous les négocians, moins pourtant par un amour aussi décidé pour nos Rois, que l'est celui de la bonne noblesse qui par ressentiment de leur mine sous le règne de Napoléon et par la conviction que la paix et lui sont deux idées inconciliables.
5. Tous les hommes attachés à leur religion, ceux-ci presque sans exception.
6. Une grande partie des bourgeois qui ont des propriétés patrimoniales.
7. Presque tous les artisans des villes un peu considérables.

On peut regarder au contraire comme attachés au régime actuel, sauf toujours les exceptions :

1. Presque tous les membres de l'administration supérieure qui ont un traitement, jusqu'aux sous-préfets inclusivement.
2. Presque tous les officiers, surtout ceux d'un rang élevé.
3. Tous les employés de finances en général.
4. Tous les détenteurs des biens appelés nationaux.
5. Quelques restes de la faction des Jacobins, déjà presque tous compris dans les classes ci-dessus désignées, et en y ajoutant quelques artisans, et quelques bourgeois de petites villes, ceux qui ont des pensions des retraits, etc.
6. La Garde dite Impériale.

Enfin on peut regarder comme indifférens :

1. Les trois quarts de Paris.
2. L'armée et les bas officiers. Elle se bat, non pour aucun sentiment pour Napoléon, mais parcequ'elle croit se battre pour la France ; elle veut être une armée Française, et du moment que Napoléon serait dénationalisé elle se battra, je crois, contre lui. Il est probable même que les officiers au dessous du grade de colonel suivraient alors spontanément la même direction.
3. Le peuple des campagnes. Il est presqu'impossible d'être plus désolé qu'il ne l'est par Napoléon, mais il n'entrevoit la fin de ses maux que dans une paix quelleconque, tant par ignorance que par les manœuvres des agens de Napoléon, pour qui toutes les voies de séduction sont ouvertes, tandis que toutes les issues sont fermées à la vérité. Mais il est infiniment probable que l'affection pour nos Rois est chez le peuple des campagnes un feu caché sous la cendre. On en peut juger et par la rapidité avec laquelle se propagea dans nos contrées l'insurrection royale en 1800, et par cette sorte de triomphe qu'il vient de décerner pendant cent lieues au pape pour qui l'on ignorait de même ses dispositions réelles. Il est, dis-je, mille fois probable que le feu qui couve de même pour nos Rois, éclatera de même à leur aspect, surtout lorsqu'ils sont accompagnés de l'annonce qu'il n'y a plus de

conscription, plus de colonnes mobiles, plus de réquisitions, plus de droits réunis, etc.; mais il est douteux qu'il en résulte des armements considérables; l'épuisement des campagnes rend les levées extrêmement difficiles.

De ce coup d'œil sur l'état de la nation, il suit que prise en masse elle est épuisée au moral comme au physique, que si on l'examine en détail et si on la divise en trois classes:

La partie noble et éclairée est pour nos Princes.

La partie soldé par Napoléon ou enrichie par la révolution est contr'eux, et qu'elle se trouve momentanément plus puissante que la première, étant dépositaire de tous les moyens de l'autorité et inspirant de l'effroi pour l'avenir.

La partie nombreuse enfin et dans un état d'incertie causée pourtant plus par l'ignorance que par l'indifférence.

C'est donc cette dernière partie qu'il faut entraîner pour déterminer la balance. Je dis entraîner, car attendre qu'elle se meuve d'elle même, c'est évidemment, ce me semble, une illusion.

Si ces aperçus qu'il seroit trop long de développer sont exacts, la question objet de ce mémoire est résolue.

Et en effet, qui fera-t-on en se bornant à présenter à la France ses Princes légitimes avec une sorte de mystère, presque dans l'isolement accompagnant les puissances étrangères et étayées de leur appui, mais non de leur volonté prononcée et irrevocable? hélas! rien peut-être. Les amis du Roi comme ses ennemis sont les uns et les autres à peu près tous dans l'âge où on raisonne avant d'agir. Les amis pensiront que si Napoléon triomphe, ils perdent et la vie et les biens. Son décret de Fismes l'annonce, et l'exécution de M. de Gau à Troyes, de Rougeville à Rheims, le prouve. Le Congrès de Châtillon, la proposition de l'armistice de Lusigny, ne sont pas propres à étouffer leur prudence. Les ennemis du Roi, au contraire, pensiront que s'il est repoussé, ils gagnent tout; que s'il emporte, ils sont sûr d'une armistice, peut être même d'être maintenus en possession de leurs acquisitions illégitimes, soit biens, soit honneurs. Fatale et déplorable système, dont l'effet très probable seroit l'éloigneur des amis, sans gagner ses ennemis, les premiers ayant tout à perdre, les seconds ne pouvant que gagner sans rien perdre, et ne mettant ainsi presque rien au jeu! Ces raisonnemens sautent aux yeux de tous les intéressés. On s'exposera donc à voir les partisans du Roi immobiles; les opposans au Roi seules agir avec confiance; les Princes réduits à fuir encore ce malheureux territoire, où ils auraient paru sans autre effet que de faire perdre aux plus téméraires de leurs partisans la tête et la fortune, et cependant on appellerait ce résultat infernal le vœu de la nation Française, et on l'accuseroit d'apathie ou de complicité.

Dire qu'on ne veut point commander à la volonté de la nation ce serait adopter un principe généreux en apparence, mais réellement bien faux, bien illusoire, et bien funeste. De quoi se compose la nation? Du peuple qui ne doit, qui ne peut, qui ne sait délibérer; et de la partie éclairée dont une portion tient l'autre, les fers aux pieds et aux mains, et le bâillon à la bouche.

Non, non qu'il n'en soit pas ainsi. Entraînons la classe inerte dans la cause qui au fait lui est commune avec la partie saine de la nation.

Et si le principe par lequel j'ai commencé, savoir, que la maison de

Bourbon est aussi nécessaire à la sécurité de l'Europe que l'Europe l'est à la restauration de cette auguste maison, est convenu; si ce principe est rigoreusement vrai, et doit être le mobile des Cabinets, que les puissances étrangères veuillent bien le consacrer incontestablement par leur conduite; qu'elles déclarent sans hésitation leur volonté immuable; qu'elles comptent plus sur leurs armes que sur la co-opération nécessairement faible des Français épuisés; qu'elles ne manquent point au moment peut-être unique où la Providence a réuni tant de circonstances inespérées pour ramener la justice, et étouffer la flamme révolutionnaire, qui depuis 25 ans dévore l'Europe; qu'elles élèvent et montrent sur le pavois les Princes Bourbons; qu'elles opposent chef à chef, menaces à menaces, intérêts privés à intérêts privés; qu'en un mot leur plan réel et effectif soit de *Royaliser* sans délai tous les pays qu'elles occupent, et de *Dénapoléoniser* d'avance par la crainte ceux où Napoléon domine encore, et dont il appelle toutes les ressources au maintien de son usurpation.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, War Department, 24th March, 1814.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches, as noted in the margin, detailing the operations which led to the signal defeat of the enemy at Orthez on the 27th of February last, and to the subsequent occupation of Bordeaux by the Allied troops.

I have had such frequent occasions of conveying to your Lordship the high sense which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent entertains of your distinguished services, that I know not in what manner I can obey the commands of His Royal Highness without a recurrence to the same expressions which have already been used in some of the many instances given of your Lordship's eminent military qualities, and of the uniform valour displayed by the officers and men under your Lordship's command.

I have not now, however, to congratulate your Lordship on a victory over the enemy in the heart of Spain, which they had so unwarrantably invaded, or on a battle still more signally successful on the borders of that country, in which the invaders were afterwards no longer able to maintain any position, or on your Lordship's subsequent attack upon them within their own territory, posted as it were on its confines, to be ready (if not disturbed) again to invade a nation which seems to have incurred their peculiar resentment for no other reason than the spirit which she has manifested in her determined resistance against aggression.

The military operations which have called for the approbation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent on this occasion are those which have led to the occupation of the first commercial city in France.

The energy, the skill, the enterprise, and the perseverance, which enabled you to surmount the many difficulties which nature and the season opposed to your advance, are well understood and duly appreciated by His Royal Highness.

Your Lordship will, I am sure, not fail to convey to Marshal Sir William Beresford, to Lieutenant-Generals Sir Rowland Hill, Sir John Hope, and to Sir Stapleton Cotton, the sense which His Royal Highness entertains of

their merits, and of the zeal and ability with which they have executed the detail of the various operations which you had committed to their charge.

The distinguished bravery evinced by the several divisions under the command of Lieutenant-Generals Sir Lowry Cole, Sir Thomas Picton, Sir H. Clinton, and of Major-Generals Charles Baron Alten and Walker, equally entitles them to the approbation of their country, and the acknowledgment of His Royal Highness.

You will also express to Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart, and to the General and other officers of the 2nd division, and of the troops acting under the orders of Sir Rowland Hill, His Royal Highness's entire approbation of their gallant and unremitting exertions.

You will also communicate to the General officers commanding the Portuguese troops, and to the other officers and men of the Portuguese army, His Royal Highness's sense of the conduct and valour which the battle of Orthez has afforded them another opportunity of displaying.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,
BATHURST.

Lieut.-Col. Sir H. Sullivan to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington

MY LORD, Renteria, 24th March, 1814.

I think it necessary to acquaint your Lordship that, during the period the draft for the Guards under my command and some small detachments for the army were detained in Santander by contrary winds, Captain Dundas, of the *Pyramus* frigate, and myself, received such intelligence as led us to believe that, should a British force appear before Santoña (however inconsiderable it might be in point of numbers), the French General commanding would be induced to surrender. I immediately determined to co-operate with Captain Dundas (who had several King's ships under his orders) in making a feint upon the place, before which, however, we could not arrive, notwithstanding the exertions of the squadron, before the 21st inst.

Upon sending a flag of truce on shore, we found that the French commandant had just concluded a capitulation with the Spaniards, the terms of which we were informed had been sent to the British head quarters for your Lordship's final ratification.

I have to hope that the step I took in proceeding before Santoña will not meet with your Lordship's disapprobation; for, in fact, no time was lost in the detachments proceeding to their destination, as the convoy was obliged to pass Santoña on its way from Santander to Pasages; nor would any lives have been risked, as a feint upon the place was only in contemplation had we found it still holding out.

Captain Dundas despatched a vessel to England with the accounts of the capitulation of the place, but stating at the same time that some days must elapse before your Lordship's decision as to the terms could be received.

I have the honour, my Lord, to remain
Your Lordship's obedient servant,
HENRY SULLIVAN.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, ce 24 Mars, 1814.

Je n'ai point eu le plaisir de recevoir de vos nouvelles depuis votre lettre du 16. J'en attends avec impatience, d'autant que je vous ai écrit plusieurs lettres aux quelles j'avais désiré avoir réponse. Je vous envoye ici trois pièces qui ont été rédigées par mon conseil. Je les soumets à votre examen, et je vous demande avec instance de m'y répondre le plutôt qu'il vous sera possible, parceque cela est de la plus grande importance pour la marche des affaires publiques ici. J'ai toujours agi et agirai toujours avec la plus grande confiance et franchise envers vous. J'ai beaucoup regretté que les distances ne m'ayent pas permis de vous consulter sur plusieurs déterminations que le bien du service du Roi ne m'a pas permis de retarder, mais je n'ai rien fait qui ne fut conforme à ce que vous m'avez toujours dit :

1. Que j'étois le maître d'agir comme je l'entendrai.

2. Que quand une grande ville se seroit déclarée, vous me remettriez le gouvernement civil du pays occupé par les armées alliées sous votre commandement.

3. Que quand le mouvement seroit fait, il falloit qu'il se répandit rapidement.

En conséquence je n'ai pas perdu un instant pour nommer Monsieur de Carrère (d'après l'estime publique dont il jouissoit) préfet du département des Landes. L'autorité du Roi a été reconnue dans tout le département, sauf dans la sous-préfecture de St. Sever, où le maire s'est refusé de se soumettre à mes ordres ; et vous pouvez juger, My Lord, quel a été mon étonnement lorsque j'ai appris que M. Toulouset avoit intimé de votre part à M. de Carrère l'ordre de cesser ses fonctions. Il y a sûrement du mal entendu sur cela, dont je vous prie de vouloir bien me donner l'explication.

En attendant, comme il est indispensable pour le bien des peuples que le service public marche, j'envoye l'ordre à M. de Carrère de continuer ses fonctions.

Je suis fâché, My Lord, de vous ennuyer de tout ce détail au milieu de vos grandes et importantes occupations, mais il étoit devenu nécessaire par la résistance de M. Toulouset.

Si ce n'est pas une indiscrétion, j'ai aussi à vous demander ce que vous avez dit à M. de Viel Castel par rapport à Pau.

Comme je vous l'ai déjà demandé, si vous pouviez me donner environ 10,000*l*., cela feroit beaucoup de bien. Si vous ne le pouvez pas, il faudra s'en passer.

Je joins ici une note qui répondra, j'espère, à votre satisfaction à différentes difficultés. Permettez que j'insiste pour avoir une prompte réponse sur tous ces pointes. Si vous n'aviez pas le tems, ce que je trouverois tout naturel, vous me feriez plaisir d'en charger Lord FitzRoy, parceque cela presse beaucoup.

C'est avec la plus haute considération, confiance, et attachement que je serai pour la vie, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Note.

L'adresse du maire de Bordeaux n'a pas le nom de proclamation; c'est une exposition de ses motifs publié de son propre mouvement. Ce sont des vœux, des espérances, c'est la suite des acclamations.

La proclamation que j'ai faite exigeoit plus de mesures. Elle a été communiquée au Maréchal Beresford avant d'être imprimée.

J'ai toujours pensé que Lord Wellington trouvoit bon que du moment de mon entrée publique à Bordeaux l'administration résidat en mes mains.

Lord Wellington, comme son gouvernement, ont facilité par la marche des armées Britanniques l'expression des peuples en faveur de la maison des Bourbons. Cette expression ayant été permise, il paroit suivre comme conséquence que la force publique militaire doit prêter secours à l'administration civile.

Si Lord Wellington n'avoit pas souffert et protégé le mouvement de Bordeaux, cette ville n'en seroit pas moins occupée par l'armée Angloise. En ce cas l'administration civile seroit sous son nom, et l'autorité militaire prêteroit main forte à tous les actes de cette administration civile.

Cette administration m'étant laissée, ne peut marcher seule. On ne peut supposer une société composée d'êtres absolument du même avis, et empressés d'exécuter sans contrainte les mesures de l'autorité et de la justice. C'est pour obliger à payer les charges et exécuter les jugements que dans toute société il y a une force exécutive.

Cette force réside ici dans les mains de l'autorité militaire Angloise. Je n'ai pas des troupes à ma disposition. Je n'ai pas encore de force publique; des fondes sont nécessaires pour en organiser une.

Arrivée avec des libérateurs, je ne dois ni ne peux employer le moyen des taxes. Ce n'est donc que par la rentrée des contributions ordinaires même adoucies qu'il est possible d'avoir des fonds, et je m'occupe du tarif dès douanes que Lord Wellington m'a recommandé de faire, pour être exécuté au moment où la rivière sera ouverte.

Afin de recouvrer les impôts, il faut ou faire revenir ou remplacer les administrateurs de tout genre que l'autorité Française fait rentrer dans l'intérieur à l'approche des armées. C'est donc une nécessité que celui qui a l'administration civile puisse les nommer, que ses nominations ne soient pas contredites, et que les actes des administrateurs soient ensuite soutenus par la force publique.

Mon apparition solennel à Bordeaux a concouru avec l'occupation du territoire par l'armée Angloise, et son chef protecteur par le fait doit naturellement assistance pour tous les actes de l'administration civile.

Ma proclamation fait bien voir que j'ai évité de compromettre aucun gouvernement. J'agis, je prépare les voies, je fais éclater le vœu du peuple naturellement encouragé par la générosité de Lord Wellington et du gouvernement Anglois. Il est par conséquent de leur loyauté de soutenir les populations qui se sont prononcées à l'apparition de leur secours.

Je crois donc devoir continuer à faire agir les administrateurs ou autres préposés qui sont restés ou revenus; à remplacer ceux qui manquent; à veiller à l'administration de la justice, et à l'action de la police; à pourvoir à la perception des contributions, dont je ne supprime quant à présent que les plus intolérables; à m'occuper du tarif des douanes d'après la recommandation de Lord Wellington.

Mais aussi il est indispensable que l'autorité militaire paroisse soutenir mon administration civile, comme elle la soutiendroit si Lord Wellington ne l'avoit pas laissée en mes mains.

The Mayor of Boulogne to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

SON EXCELLENCE, Boulogne, 25 Mars, 1814.

Vous avez daigné prêter l'oreille à mes réclamations. Vous les avez trouvées justes. Je continuerai donc mes fonctions d'adjoint du maire, et je me conformerai à toutes les instructions que vous m'avez données et pourrez me donner.

J'ai consulté plusieurs de mes concitoyens les plus recommandables de ma commune sur le sujet le plus digne d'occuper la place de premier magistrat de cette ville. Tous ont jeté les yeux sur Monsieur Pelleport d'Anhaut, citoyen juste et probre.

Son Excellence, je suis votre dévoué et sincère serviteur,

L'adjoint du Maire de la ville de Boulogne,
faisant les fonctions de Maire,
V. STE. COLOMBE

The Lord Chancellor to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, London, 25th March, 1814.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the enclosed Resolutions of the House of Lords.

I cannot express to your Lordship in adequate terms the high satisfaction I feel in conveying to your Lordship so frequently testimonies of national gratitude so universally felt and so eminently merited.

I have the honour to be,
With all possible respect and regard,
Your Lordship's most faithful servant,
ELDON, C.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Die Jovis 24° Martij, 1814.

Resolved, nemine dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that the Thanks of this House be given to Field Marshal the Most Honourable Arthur Marquess of Wellington for the additional proofs of his consummate ability, experience, and distinguished valour displayed in the late battle at Orthez, on the 27th of February last, and in the operations leading to and immediately connected with that engagement, which terminated in the signal defeat of the enemy, and in the occupation of Bordeaux by the Allied forces.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Jovis 24° Martij, 1814.

Resolved, nemine dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that the Thanks of this House be given to Lieutenant-Generals Sir Stapleton Cotton, Sir Rowland Hill, Sir William Carr Beresford, Sir Thomas Picton, the Honourable Sir G. Lowry Cole, the Honourable Sir William Stewart, Sir Henry Clinton, Knights of the Most Honourable Order

of the Bath; to Major-Generals Charles Baron Alten, Henry Fane, William Anson, George Townsend Walker, Sir George Murray, Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; James Kempt; the Honourable Sir Edward M. Pakenham, Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; William Henry Pringle, Edward Barnes, William Inglis, John Byng, Thomas Brisbane, Denis Pack, Lord Edward Somerset, Robert Ross, John Lambert, and to the several other officers serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, for their able and distinguished conduct throughout the operations which concluded with the entire defeat of the enemy at Orthez on the 27th of February last, and the occupation of Bordeaux by the Allied forces.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Jovis 24° Martij, 1814.

Resolved, nemine dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that this House doth highly acknowledge and approve the zeal, courage, and discipline manifested by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of His Majesty's forces serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington in the operations which concluded with the entire defeat of the enemy at Orthez on the 27th of February last.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Jovis 24° Martij, 1814.

Resolved, nemine dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that this House doth highly acknowledge the zeal and continued exertions manifested by the General officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the Portuguese Army, serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, in the battle at Orthez, on the 27th of last month, and in the operations immediately leading to that engagement, in which the enemy's forces were completely defeated.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

Die Jovis 24° Martij, 1814.

Resolved, nemine dissentiente, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that this House doth highly acknowledge the meritorious exertions and good conduct of the General officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of such part of the Spanish forces serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington as were employed in co-operating in the movements which immediately led to the entire defeat of the enemy at Orthez on the 27th of February last.

Die Jovis 24° Martij, 1814.

Ordered, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that the Lord Chancellor do communicate the said Resolutions to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, and that the Marquess of Wellington be requested to signify the same to the Generals and other officers referred to therein.

GEORGE ROSE, Cler. Parliamentor.

The Speaker of the House of Commons to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, House of Commons, 25th March, 1814.

In the name and by the command of the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, I have the honour to communicate to your Lordship their unanimous thanks for the additional proofs of your consummate ability, experience, and distinguished valour displayed in the late battle at Orthez, on the 27th of February last, and in the operations leading to and immediately connected with that engagement, which terminated in the signal defeat of the enemy, and in the occupation of Bordeaux by the Allied forces.

I have further to communicate to your Lordship their unanimous thanks to the several General officers and other officers of the Allied armies serving under your command, for their able and distinguished conduct throughout those operations; and also their unanimous acknowledgment and approbation of the zeal, courage, discipline, and meritorious exertions of the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the Allied armies upon that memorable occasion; requesting that the same may be signified to them by your Lordship, as expressed in the several resolutions which I have the honour to enclose.

Long and often accustomed to congratulate your Lordship upon the splendid succession of victories by which you have driven the enemy before you through Portugal and Spain, I have still a higher satisfaction in now conveying to you these expressions of the gratitude of your country for the achievement of this new triumph, by which you have advanced its standards into the central provinces of France.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most faithful and obedient servant,
CHARLES ABBOT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Jovis, 24° die Martij, 1814.

Resolved, nemine contradicente, that the thanks of this House be given to Field Marshal the Most Noble Arthur Marquess of Wellington for the additional proofs of his consummate ability, experience, and distinguished valour displayed in the late battle at Orthez on the 27th of February last, and in the operations leading to and immediately connected with that engagement, which terminated in the signal defeat of the enemy and in the occupation of Bordeaux by the Allied forces.

Resolved, nemine contradicente, that the thanks of this House be given to Lieutenant-Generals Sir Stapleton Cotton, Sir Rowland Hill, Sir William Carr Beresford, Sir Thomas Picton, the Honourable Sir Galbraith Lowry Cole, the Honourable Sir William Stewart, and Sir Henry Clinton, Knights of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; to Major-Generals Charles Baron Alten, Henry Fane, William Anson, George Townsend Walker, Sir George Murray, Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; James Kempt; the Honourable Sir Edward M. Pakenham, Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; William Henry Pringle, Edward Barnes, William Inglis, John Byng, Thomas Brisbane, Denis Pack, Lord Edward Somerset, Robert

Ross, John Lambert, and to the several other officers serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, for their able and distinguished conduct throughout the operations which concluded with the entire defeat of the enemy at Orthez on the 27th of February last, and the occupation of Bordeaux by the Allied forces.

Resolved, nemine contradicente, that this House doth highly acknowledge and approve the zeal, courage, and discipline manifested by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of His Majesty's forces serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington in the operations which concluded with the entire defeat of the enemy at Orthez on the 27th of February last.

Resolved, nemine contradicente, that this House doth highly acknowledge the zeal and continued exertions manifested by the General officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the Portuguese Army serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington in the battle at Orthez, on the 27th of last month, and in the operations immediately leading to that engagement, in which the enemy's forces were completely defeated.

Resolved, nemine contradicente, that this House doth highly acknowledge the meritorious exertions and good conduct of the General officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of such part of the Spanish forces serving under the command of Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington as were employed in co-operating in the movements which immediately led to the entire defeat of the enemy at Orthez on the 27th of February last.

Ordered, that Mr. Speaker do communicate the said Resolutions to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, and that he be requested by Mr. Speaker to signify the same to Major-Generals Charles Baron Alten, William Anson, George Townsend Walker, Sir George Murray, James Kempt, the Honourable Sir Edward M. Pakenham, Edward Barnes, William Inglis, John Byng, Thomas Brisbane, Denis Pack, Robert Ross, and John Lambert, and to the several officers and corps of the Allied armies serving under his command.

J. LEY, Cl. D. Dom. Com.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Esplugas, 25th March, 1814.

I avail myself of an officer going across the Peninsula to write a few lines for the chance of this letter reaching your Lordship before the courier, whom I mean, nevertheless, to send off in a few hours. I am desirous your Lordship should be aware that I have been prevented from putting the troops here in motion for their intended destination, both because it has appeared that Marshal Suchet has still a considerable force on this side the Pyrenees, and also on account of a discussion which has taken place between General Copons and the Marshal relative to Ferdinand VII., who is said to have arrived at Perpignan, and who, Marshal Suchet tells General Copons, he has orders to take to Barcelona under the title of Count of Barcelona, and then to put him in possession of the capital of Catalonia; but which General Copons, I understand, has told Marshal Suchet cannot be permitted, and that the King, if he be to come, must be delivered to him at his outposts, and no French troops allowed to pass with His Majesty.

Lieutenant-Colonel Coffin is at Gerona, waiting the result of this discussion. In the mean time everything was prepared for the breaking up of this army on the 24th instant; and the moment that the state of things shall appear to justify my moving this force, no time shall be lost in attending to the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's letters of the 4th and 8th of this month, which I had the honour to reply to on the 15th instant.

Your Lordship will thus be pleased to understand that I propose to remain stationary till either Marshal Suchet marches or leaves a disposable force not exceeding from 5000 to 6000 men, which force General Copons has, I presume, wherewithal to keep in check; this army being in the mean while held in readiness to obey any further orders your Lordship may send; though, as all the brigades of artillery, except one, have necessarily been broken up to enable me to collect the draught horses and mules to send to your army, it must take some few days ere we could act offensively here, should such perchance be your Lordship's intentions.

I hope it may have been convenient to your Lordship to send me orders relative to the disposition of the troops in the castle of Alicante. On the 18th instant at night I addressed a cyphered despatch to your Lordship, having just then received intelligence which seemed to render probable the decision I have been obliged since to make of not moving this army. Colonel Manso obligingly forwarded this despatch by Puycerda. I trust it may have arrived safe at its intended destination.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,

W. H. CLINTON.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, 25th March, 1814, 2 o'clock.

I am truly happy to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 21st from Tournay. We have been in a state of great anxiety from not hearing of you for some days.

The town is perfectly quiet, but in that gloomy suspense that I stated in my last to Murray.

I reported that I had thought it advisable to take the arms from the Garde Urbaine and form a new Garde Communale. In doing so I wrote a letter to their commanders to assure them and do away any impression in their mind that I was displeased with them, or that I made myself party in politics; that I saw the mind of the public was not pleased, and that a change was necessary; public tranquillity was my only object, and therefore I adopted the measure. Everything has been done in perfect good humour, and day after day settles and satisfies the people more and more.

The regularity and excellent conduct of the troops astonish the city, and even myself. I assure your Lordship I don't mean to pay them compliments in saying so.

Being quite assured that the enemy has no force within reach of me to

give uneasiness, and even that the troops they have are in a state of discontent and mutiny nearly, and being assured of the good will of the city, I passed over yesterday Gardiner's brigade with two of my guns, and a squadron with Ponsonby: he patrolled to the bank at Libourne, while Gardiner cleared that at St. André. I also detached down the right of the Garonne to the Bec d'Ambés. Gardiner will now stretch his front (perhaps to-morrow) from St. Macaire to Libourne, keeping, however, active and centrical to retire on this.

Inglis at Langon will hold there steady. The Chasseurs Britanniques I have sent to Bazas, with orders to join hands with Colonel Campbell, and repress the partisans, who are apparently bold and active, from Castel Jaloux. I shall go up there to-morrow.

No appearance nor have I any communication from our cruisers. All those men whom Marshal Beresford sent with letters have been skulking along the sandhills on the coast, and now return with their letters, demanding the rewards promised. Their answer is short, as I conceive they merit nothing.

With regard to the Duc d'Angoulême, there is no energy nor activity among those who have declared for him. He says the want of money is the cause: certainly that is a principal one, but the chief is in the political doubts and dreads of the intentions of the Congress.

I have urged him repeatedly to call on the mayors to form gardes communales for their self-defence against these partisan corps. He has written them and given orders, but they are attended with no effect.

He has no information whatever from La Vendée.

Some British prisoners marched in here last night from Perigueux. They state that when the news of our entering Bordeaux reached that town, the mob tore down the eagles, and great riots took place. They were kindly treated, and helped forward by the country people.

Agen is the only point on which the enemy seems to rest. Enclosed is a state I have received this morning as worthy of confidence.

My chief objects shall be:

1st. To keep Bordeaux in good humour.

2nd. To threaten towards Blaye. My Caçadores and 19th Portuguese are directed on that. 7th Portuguese, in excellent order, under Elder, the only garrison of Bordeaux, with two guns.

3rd. To hold every point from Bazas to Langon, and across to Libourne, by Inglis and Gardiner's brigades, ready to assemble at any point of it on short notice.

I trust this arrangement will meet your Lordship's approbation; and as all supplies necessary to Bordeaux come from the Upper Garonne, Réole, Agen, we shall most anxiously look for your Lordship's approach towards those points.

I can only assure your Lordship that to merit your approbation is my highest personal ambition.

I have the honour to be yours most faithfully,

DALHOUSIE.

I ought to explain that yesterday, when over at St. Vincent, opposite St. André, I satisfied myself of the impossibility of any force forming on

the left of the Dordogne, a broader river than the Garonne, from thence to the junction.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Etat des Forces dans les différentes Villes des Bords de la Garonne.

La ville de Tonneins, 1 capitaine, 3 officiers, et 100 hommes, dont moitié armé.

Marmande, 1 capitaine, 3 officiers, et 100 hommes, moitié armé.

La Réole, 300 hommes, qui fournit un détachement à Gironde.

A St. Macaire, 400 hommes, qui a envoyé un détachement de 80 hommes à Cadillac.

Il ni a point de canon, et les hommes ont fort peu de cartouche.

Ce détail est fourni le 23 Mars.

A Aiguillon il y a également fort peu de monde.

A Agen, chef lieu du département de Lot et Garonne, n'a également que fort peu de monde. Le Général Gallard fait sa résidence à Agen, et commande toutes ces troupes.

On s'occupe de l'organisation de 2000 hommes de Garde Nationale.

Il y a quelques brigades de cavalerie dans toutes ces villes.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, 26 Mars, 1814.

J'espère que vous apprendrez avec plaisir le choix que j'ai fait hier de M. Lainé pour préfet du département de la Gironde. L'estime publique l'y portoit, mais ce n'est qu'après les plus vives instances que j'ai pu le déterminer à accepter.

J'ai appris avec grand plaisir de vos marches par Lord Dalhousie.

Je joins ici deux lettres, une pour Masséna, que je vous serai très obligé de lui faire passer par Sir Edward Pellew. Elle est d'un de ses amis intimes, qui me répond de l'effet qu'elle produira sur lui. Par la seconde vous la reconnoîtriez elle m'a été remise hier par celui à qui vous l'aviez donnée. Il ne m'a rien appris. Il m'a dit qu'il n'avoit point été fouillé, qu'on n'avoit pas reconnu le dragon que vous lui aviez donné pour Anglais, et qu'ayant demandé tout de suite son frère qui étoit près delà dans un régiment, on ne l'a ni inquiété ni recherché. D'avoir rapporté la lettre fermée me fait croire à son honnêteté.

C'est avec la plus haute considération et bien sincère attachement que je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, 26th March, 1814.

On reading over your Lordship's letter of yesterday with more attention, I feel my disposition of my division at present does not meet your

instructions of keeping my force together. I beg, however, that you will understand my intention to be moveable only for a very few days. I shall reassemble my brigades, and hold them so situated as to form always on Bordeaux on very short notice.

I am harassed by pressing requests that we would move up the two rivers and give the country protection; but I hold off, and desire them to await the effect of your Lordship moving to the Upper Garonne.

Ponsonby's squadron of the 12th from Bayonne arrives here to-morrow. I have desired him to-day to bring a squadron to Langon, and with that of the hussars I shall send to Castel Jaloux, and clear away the corps of partisans in that neighbourhood: from thence the hussars will proceed to join their brigade, and Ponsonby will return to Langon, where I'll put two squadrons, as the cavalry are not at all required here.

I am told there are letters in town from Paris of the 18th. I have not been able to see them, but it is stated that the public mind is at the lowest ebb; that there is no government; orders given, but none obeyed. The Duc d'Angoulême has letters from the Comte d'Escars with Monsieur from Vesoul of 19th February, describing his reception there as most gratifying, and that he was going forward to the Allied Emperors.

Here the change in the public mind is most evident daily. All is tranquillity, and apprehension disappears.

I beg your Lordship will believe me

Your most faithful and obedient,

DALHOUSIE.

P.S.—A deserter from the French guard ship at the entrance of the river has just been with me: he states that three days ago nine sail of ships were seen in the offing, but since then the wind has been against their entering. Two English corvettes are daily seen cruising off the coast.

As the wind is to-day southerly with rain, I hope to hear of them every hour.

The deserter also states that the battery on the left of the river has been abandoned, and blown up some days ago.

The Inhabitants of Bazet to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR, A Bazet, ce 27 Mars, 1814.

Les habitants de la commune de Bazet, département des Hautes-Pyrénées, ont l'honneur de vous exposer que Dominique Bazerque, maire de leur commune, instruit de l'approche de votre armée, s'empressa de quitter son poste et de déserter la commune; aussi, Monsieur votre Commissaire à son passage improuva la conduite de ce maire infidèle. Il fit appeler auprès de lui l'adjoint, auquel il délégua les fonctions de maire, et lui confia spécialement la police locale. L'adjoint déféra à l'ordre de votre Commissaire, il pourvut à l'entretien de vos soldats, et parvint par sa vigilance à maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans sa commune pendant leur séjour.

Le Sieur Bazerque, maire fugitif, reparut le lendemain dans la commune,

reprit ses fonctions déléguées la veille à l'adjoint par Monsieur votre Commissaire, et voulut recommencer ses actes vexatoires. Sous le vain prétexte que quelque militaire de votre armée s'étoit dévié de sa route et pouvoit se livrer au pillage, il donna l'ordre de sonner le toscin. Cette mesure arbitraire fut désavouée hautement par les habitants, qui ne partagent nullement les principes de ce maire, dont la conduite coupable auroit pu attirer sur la commune les plus grands malheurs, et laisser dans votre esprit des impressions défavorables, si les habitants, pleins d'intentions pures, ne s'étoient réposés sur votre bonté paternelle.

Fatigués du joug dominateur de leur maire, opprimés par ses injustices et ses vexations journalières, les habitants de la commune de Bazet viennent se placer sous votre protection; ils sollicitent de votre justice la destitution du Sieur Bazerque, maire, qui exerce ses fonctions contre le vœu général des habitants. Il a démérité depuis longtemps leur confiance, ou pour mieux dire, il ne s'en est jamais rendu digne.

En provoquant le renvoi de leur maire, les exposants vous prient, Monseigneur, de le faire remplacer par l'adjoint François Dizac, que votre Commissaire a déjà désigné à cette place. Son zèle et son intégrité sont le garant de ses bonnes intentions. En portant leurs réclamations aux pieds de votre justice, les exposants étoient persuadés que vous les accueilleriez avec bienveillance, et c'est dans cet espoir flatteur qu'ils les ont adressée avec confiance à Votre Excellence.

(*Here follow the signatures.*)

Les habitants de la commune de Bazet sont ordonnés de me faire dire qui ils désirent avoir pour maire au lieu de Monsieur Dominique Bazerque, qui s'est dénué de sa charge, et s'est enfuit au passage de l'armée.

Send this to the officer in command of the troops at Tarbes, and desire him to go to Bazet and seize the mayor, and send him to me, desiring the people to name another, whom I will appoint.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Langon, 27th March, 1814.

I beg to enclose the report of a confidential person attached to the Duc d'Angoulême who came in from Agen yesterday. Another person gave me the same information who came here late last night. I am further informed that the enemy has quitted Castel Jaloux and crossed at Caumont. In consequence of this I have directed Ponsonby to move to Castel Jaloux, and 200 of the Chasseurs Britanniques to go with him from Bazas: he will send forward the hussar squadron to your Lordship from Castel Jaloux.

As our little move near Bordeaux has created great alarm on the other side, I have directed General Inglis to cross his brigade with two guns from this, and drive back those conscripts from La Réole, and his retreat is on the great road on that side of the river to Cadillac, which is an easy point on which I can form my three brigades at very few hours' notice.

The perfect tranquillity of Bordeaux, the earnest desire of the country to be under our protection, and the spirit as well as composition of such troops as the enemy has scattered about, give me full confidence that I am not risking any thing in thus moving a little, and I shall anxiously hope your Lordship may not disapprove of it.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most faithful and obedient,
DALHOUSIE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Les habitants des villes d'Agen, Aiguillon, et de Tonneins sont tous portés de cœur pour leur Souverain légitime et pour son auguste famille. Il y a dans ces trois villes ainsi qu'à Clairac, Villeneuve, Marmande, et La Réole, beaucoup de conscrits de la dernière levée qui ne savent pas encore marcher, et dont les trois quarts ne sont ni armés ni habillés. La désertion parmi eux est au comble. Il y a à Tonneins un chef de division dont l'intention était de faire quelque résistance avec quelques bas officiers et quelques soldats qui étaient dans la ville pour montrer l'exercice aux nouveaux conscrits, dont le nombre s'était augmenté par l'évacuation des autres dépôts à l'arrivée des troupes Anglaises à Castels, Baries, et Meilhan.

Le maire de Tonneins, ainsi que le commissaire du gouvernement, qui ne veulent point exposer les habitants, se sont opposés fortement aux mesures que voulait prendre le chef de division, et en les contrariant même autant qu'il était en leur pouvoir. Une crise très forte a eu lieu entr'eux, mais cela n'a pas empêché le maire de faire évacuer les conscrits, auxquels le chef de division avait fait donner des fusils qui avaient été envoyés d'Agen par eau. Les maires des autres villes en font de même à l'exception de ceux de Marmande et de La Réole.

Samedi dernier, 19, un piquet de cinquante conscrits et de quelques gendarmes vint à Meilhan, où ce jour-là il ne se trouvait aucun Anglais (quoiqu'ils y fussent entrés quelques jours auparavant), et fit couler bas tous les bâteaux généralement quelconques. Cette opération faite, ils s'en retournèrent à Marmande. Il y avait alors neuf jours que trois Anglais étaient entrés à Castel Jaloux, où il se trouvait quatre gendarmes, qui prirent l'épouvante à leur arrivée, et s'enfuirent. Cependant, s'étant aperçus quelque tems après que les Anglais n'étaient que trois, ils revinrent sur leurs pas pour leur tomber dessus, mais les habitants les en empêchèrent. Ils y ont resté bien tranquilles jusqu'à Vendredi, 18 du courant, qu'ils furent pris par une cinquantaine de partisans jadis membres de la bande noire, ou employés dans les douanes.

Le même jour étaient arrivés d'Agen à Aiguillon les Généraux Darricau et Gessard, mais sans troupes. Dans cette dernière ville j'ai laissé un grand nombre d'employés de la règle des tabacs, et de l'enregistrement; plusieurs de ces derniers ont déposé les archives à la mairie.

Il n'y avait, au Port Ste. Marie, à Aiguillon, ni à Tonneins aucun canon, quoique les officiers généraux eussent témoigné le désir de défendre le passage du Lot et de la Garonne à la jonction de ces deux rivières tout près du pas-

sage d'Aiguillon. Tous les bateaux depuis Agen jusqu'à St. Macaire ont tous été conduits dans les villes qui se trouvent de ce côté de la Garonne, ainsi que les bacs de passage, à l'exception de ceux du port de Caseau, d'Aiguillon, et de Tonneins, qui, cependant, sont tous enchaînés à six heures du soir sur la rive gauche, et les clefs sont déposées pendant la nuit dans un corps de garde établi à cet effet.

Les tabacs qui se trouvaient à la fabrique de Tonneins sont tous transportés à Cahors.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Colomiers, 29th March, 1814.

The officer who patrolled down the river has just returned. He went near to Verdun, and he learnt that 5000 or 6000 men had marched from Toulouse on the right bank of the river; but by his general information it would appear they went to Montauban, and that in this number was a great proportion of conscripts. There was cavalry with this corps. There are posts and vedettes of cavalry all down the river, and the mayor of Grénade informed him the enemy meant to pass the river at Verdun, and gave the annexed paper, which he was afraid of giving in his own name or as if from himself, though he wrote it. This must be some marauding object, if true at all. I had some hopes from what I learnt after I left you that we might get one if not both the other boats to this side, and I desired the engineer officer should visit them to decide if it were possible. There are no others so low down as Grénade.

Yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 29th March, 1814.

If your Lordship shall receive authentic intelligence of the negotiations at Châtillon having broken off, your Lordship will consider yourself at liberty to give every encouragement you may think expedient to the disposition already manifested by the people of France in favour of the House of Bourbon, without waiting for instructions from hence to that effect.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 29th March, 1814.

We have heard nothing later from Châtillon than the 15th, at which time every thing remained uncertain. Different conjectures are formed of the cause of this long silence; and as they can only be conjectures, I will not trouble your Lordship with them.

We cannot encourage risings until we are sure that preliminaries of peace have not been signed by us; and of this we cannot be sure until Lord Castlereagh shall have received our instruction of the 22nd, a copy of which I sent you. If our messenger through France has been stopped (which is not improbable), the despatch, through Holland, will not reach him until the 1st of next month, and possibly later. It has therefore been judged unsafe for you to act as if the preliminaries could not be signed, before the 10th. My object in giving you the instruction is to enable you to play the whole game as soon as possible. I trust circumstances will have enabled you to do so before this date.

As Bordeaux must be the place of depôt, I have ordered 13,000 stand of arms to sail from Portsmouth, and 20,000 from the Downs. Those from Portsmouth will have sailed to-day, those from the Downs to-morrow. We are getting together about thirty six-pounders with ammunition complete also for Bordeaux. All this I think we may do without waiting for intelligence from Châtillon.

It will be a very difficult question to decide what we can do if preliminaries are signed, and the Allies declare an intention of abiding by them. If they are not signed, I think we shall be able to carry our Allies along with us for a time at least. If not, and we have to decide between signing a peace with Buonaparte in conjunction with them and separating ourselves from them and fighting the Bourbon cause alone, I should be inclined to fight it alone (provided things continued to look well with you) if we could get Holland and Spain off our hands; but to have to defend them also would, I am afraid, be too much for us.

The *Venus* from Plymouth with the money did not sail until last Sunday the 27th. The *Comus* from Holland has been detained there by the Duke of Clarence choosing to detain her for the Duchess of Oldenburg. The captain is to be called to a court martial for disobedience of orders.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

I hope Sir Watkin, &c., sailed for Bordeaux this *morning*.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Downing Street, 29th March, 1814.

If your Lordship shall not have received by the 10th of April an account of the preliminaries of peace having been signed by the four Allied Powers, and if your Lordship shall have reason to be persuaded that it is the general wish of the inhabitants of France (as far as your Lordship may have opportunities of collecting it) to restore the ancient dynasty, your Lordship will no longer withhold giving encouragement to the manifestation of this sentiment. Your Lordship will furnish arms, ammunition, and every other assistance which you can spare consistent with a due regard to the wants of the troops under your command, to the levies which may be made in favour of the Royal cause. You cannot sufficiently impress upon them the conviction that it is not to a foreign force, but to their own exertions, that the people of France must mainly look for the

restoration of their ancient monarchy and the re-establishment of the happiness which they enjoyed under it; and you will in every respect act as if you had received information which we may not have it in our power to communicate to you as soon as we could wish, that Great Britain at least is no longer treating with the government of France; always recollecting that however much the Prince Regent must wish for the restoration of the House of Bourbon, and be willing to contribute his assistance thereto, yet His Royal Highness will never enter into engagements not to treat with the present or any other government which may be established in that country if the circumstances of the war should hereafter render it clearly expedient for the general interests of Europe.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 29th March, 1814.

I have written a letter to the Horse Guards conveying the Regent's pleasure that medals, &c., should be given for the battle of Orthez, and the Commander-in-Chief will write to you; the Commander-in-Chief thinking, that though the Secretary of State was to take the Regent's pleasure in the first instance, the detail rested with him, and the Secretary of State not thinking it of importance to dispute the point. My only reason for troubling you with this is that Fremantle has just now suggested to me that the medals should be extended to your staff; and if to yours, I should imagine also to that of the Generals.

If your Lordship is of that opinion, to which I think there may be objections, though in many respects it is desirable, you should express your wishes to the Commander-in-Chief.

I am yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Esplugas, 31st March, 1814.

On the 27th instant I had the honour to communicate to your Lordship the state of things here to that time. I avail myself now of General Copons sending off a courier to your Lordship to write shortly to report to you the arrival of His Majesty King Ferdinand here yesterday, and that he proceeds to-day on his road to Madrid. I considered it to be my duty to show His Majesty, and the Infant Don Carlos who accompanied him, every possible attention: the whole blockading force was therefore formed to receive His Majesty; all the customary honours were paid; and I have directed that as he passes Villafranca and Tarragona, he shall in like manner be received by the British troops in those places with the same attention.

As His Majesty was proceeding yesterday to Molins del Rey, where he

was to pass the night, he was seen by General Zayas, who had preceded him from the French frontier, and had been sent with despatches to Madrid to announce His Majesty's departure from France. I understand the General was the bearer of despatches to His Majesty, but of course nothing of the contents transpired. The King was received here by all ranks with enthusiasm. Marshal Suchet had sent directions to the Governor of Barcelona not to suffer any hostilities to take place during His Majesty's passing, so that the cavalcade moved along within short cannon-shot range of the city undisturbed.

In respect to this army, and to the orders given to me by your Lordship for its being broken up, things remain as when I last had the honour of writing to you. An officer has been stationed at Gerona since Colonel Coffin's return, and means taken for ascertaining Marshal Suchet's movements; but at this moment I know nothing more of him than that when he brought down Don Carlos on the 27th instant to the Fluvio, he showed from 1000 to 1200 infantry, and near 1000 cavalry.

In the meanwhile everything is prepared to put this army in motion for the destination your Lordship has ordered, the instant circumstances point out the time for the execution of those orders, to which moment I can assure your Lordship I am looking with anxious attention, having only to trust that your Lordship will see that the impediment which has hitherto arisen in the fulfilling of the measure proposed has been unavoidable.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

W. H. CLINTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 31st March, 1814.

We have received no intelligence from France on which we can rely respecting the negotiations. Many conjectures are formed as to the reason of this silence; but as they are only conjectures, I shall not trouble you with them. We are anxious to get the Prince Royal down to protect the Netherlands, and assist in the siege of Antwerp. By the statement of his declarations, which I have enclosed, I do not think we shall succeed. I ought, however, to observe that the Marquess de Chabanes is as great a *Bavard* as the Prince to whom he is accredited.

The Prince Royal is gone to head quarters. He had heard through Paris, I believe, of what you are doing in the south; and as, next to being King himself, which we know to have been his object, and with which he had nearly got the Emperor of Russia to concur, he wishes to be the great mover of the restoration of the Bourbons, he probably is not a little jealous of your proceedings.

Monsieur de Viel Castel, being an instrument of his, may perhaps become every day more troublesome, if he does not submit to go with the tide. If you wish to get rid of him, cannot you send him back to me with communications of importance?

I have ordered transports to proceed immediately to Lisbon for the 40,000 stand of arms to be ready, if you should order them from thence. The 30,000 on their passage from Lisbon, and the 41,000 on their passage from hence, together with what you had on the spot, will be enough to answer all immediate demands.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MINUTE of REMARKS and DECLARATIONS made by the PRINCE ROYAL of SWEDEN, in a conversation with the MARQUESS DE CHABANES, first Aide-de-Camp and Plenipotentiary of Louis XVIII., on the 19th of March, 1814.

"I wish well to the cause of the Bourbons, and I alone have the means of ensuring the triumph of that cause. The Allies can do nothing without me, for the people of France have confidence in me, and they distrust the Allies. I have rendered the greatest possible services to Europe and the cause of the Allies. I am at this moment occupied with plans of the greatest importance to the general interest: in a few days Maestricht and Bergen-op-Zoom will be in my possession. I have given the necessary orders to General Walmoden. But what has been the conduct of the Allies to me? They have not adhered to one of their engagements; they have withdrawn all the troops which they had formally promised to leave under my command; they have left me nothing worth mentioning but the Swedes, amongst whom my life is in constant danger. The Norwegians are in open insurrection, and the Hereditary Prince of Denmark has put himself at the head of the insurgents. I must return to Sweden with my army. I should have done so some time ago, but have been prevailed on to defer my departure. I am still willing to enter France and terminate the war; I will act in favour of the Bourbons, or in any other manner that the Allies point out to me, provided they give me back the troops that belong to me by right: if they will not, I must go back to Sweden. I will in no case undertake the defence of the Netherlands, although from my connection in the French army I could do so with effect. Maison was eleven years my aide-de-camp. I have only to summon the commandants of the fortresses, and they will every one surrender. I might have had Maestricht long since if I had wished it. Such are the advantages which the Allies may obtain if they will act fairly. The Ministers of Great Britain and Russia have written to head quarters on this subject. My movements will be guided by the answer to their despatches. But I will in no case enter France with Swedish troops alone: it would be beneath my character.

"Let no person know of this interview; for if the Swedes suspected that I was attached to the Bourbons, they would assassinate me."

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Madrid, 31st March, 1814.

You have of course heard of the King's arrival at Gerona. I am going to meet him at Valencia, where he is to be about the 4th of April, and I

suppose he will make his public entry into Madrid about the 15th of the same month.

I cannot give you an idea of the joy and enthusiasm of the inhabitants of this place upon the news being received of his arrival. The disposition manifested by them was not confined to mere expressions of loyalty and attachment to his person; there was a very general feeling of indignation manifested towards the Jacobins, and occasionally some expressions of dislike to the Constitution. These have increased the hopes of many of those who call themselves the King's friends, that, upon being apprised of the disposition of the people here, he may be induced to decline the acceptance of the Constitution; and if he were to do so, it is very possible that, in the first moments of joy and enthusiasm occasioned by his arrival, he would be supported by the inhabitants of Madrid. I cannot, however, but think that if he reject the Constitution, he will shortly be involved in the greatest difficulties. It is not at all clear that he would be supported in his rejection of it by the provinces, certainly not in many parts of Andalusia, particularly Cadiz. He has nothing to offer to the nation in its room, nor has he an army or funds to enable him to act with vigour if any disturbances should take place in consequence of his refusal to swear to the Constitution. I know, however, that there are people supposed to be in his confidence who are gone to Valencia with a determination to advise him not to swear to it; and I am equally certain that these people will be the first to abandon him in his difficulties.

I have read to M. Luyando your letter about the pictures, and he desired me to tell you that he thought it would be better to wait the arrival of the Catalogue before any decision was taken, as the Catalogue would probably show if there were any pictures belonging to the King.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Horse Guards, 31st March, 1814.

You will receive by the present opportunity the official communication of the Prince Regent's approval of the sentence of a General Court Martial held at St. Jean de Luz on the 31st January and 1st February, for the trial of certain non-commissioned officers and privates of the 1st line battalion of the King's German Legion, by which four of the prisoners were sentenced to suffer death.

It did not appear that there were any circumstances upon the face of the proceedings to justify the Court in their recommendation of the prisoners to mercy; and therefore it was submitted to the Prince Regent that the sentence should be confirmed without adverting to the Court's appeal in their behalf.

It occurs to the Commander in Chief, however, that in transmitting the sentence for final approval, it was your Lordship's wish to give the recommendation of the Court the chance of consideration; and as the example attending their execution would lose its effect by the delay which has

occurred, His Royal Highness leaves it to your Lordship's discretion to send the prisoners to this country, with the view of commuting their punishment for transportation, or general service abroad for life.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful servant,

H. TORRENS.

Viscount Castlereagh to *

Dijon, 31st March, 1814.

The advance guard of the Prince of Hesse Homburg, whose head quarters were on the 27th at Versailles, in Dauphiny, was on the same day at St. Vallier.

The enemy was to be forced from the Isère, and to be compelled to retire by Valence upon Avignon. General Bubna joined the army upon the Isère. This took place on the 29th or 30th.

Bianchi then to be detached with 10,000 or 12,000 men by the right bank of the Rhone into the upper valley of Montbrison and Moulins, and attack the enemy in that quarter, estimated at 10,000. While Bianchi moves by Moulins upon Clermont, advancing as much as possible, he will endeavour, by pushing detachments on the side of Limoges, Tulle, and Aurillac, to open, if possible, a communication with Lord Wellington. It is supposed probable the English army may march by Angoulême and Limoges upon Tours and Orleans. Circumstances will decide whether that portion of this army which moves to the right of Châteauroux towards Tours, or that which forms the left, direct itself from the environs of Poitiers upon Orleans, and which ~~in this latter case would form~~ its junction with Bianchi; and acceptable to these circumstances detachments will arrive, made from the left to facilitate this junction. Care will be taken to reinforce Bianchi to 20,000 before Wellington reaches the country of the Loire. This reinforcement must, however, depend upon the left bank of the Rhone being strengthened.

The Prince Royal intrigues for power improperly in France.

My dear Lord, the Congress is over. The Allies support the King; in the mode of doing so making it as much as possible the act of the nation. We are in communication with the capital and with Prince † on this side. Everything you have done has been approved. The Allies will transfer all the cities and provinces that declare to be administered for the King. The army are close to the capital. The bearer will give you all necessary information as to events, and as to what will best conciliate the good will of the nation to the cause. The old family must take the government as they find it, confirm proprietors without reserve, preserve and use the public men, civil and military, of the latter time. I hope soon to be in more flush communication with you.

On the 25th of March Schwarzenberg defeated three divisions at Fère Champenoise: viz., Macdonald's, Oudinot's, and Victor's. He took 6000 prisoners, 8 generals, and 100 pieces of cannon. Enemy pursued to Ferté

* This letter is in cypher, and was probably addressed to Lord Bathurst.

† Blank in manuscript.

Gauche, where they lost 600 prisoners more. Buonaparte, driven by Blücher from the Aisne, attempted to cross the Aube at Arcis. He was driven back with loss. He then moved upon St. Dizier, probably afraid of meeting Blücher if he retired by Lezanne. He gave out that he was moving on Metz, but on the 28th he was at Doulevent, on his return towards Paris, by Vaudeuvras and Troyes. The Allied armies are consequently between him and Paris.

CASTLEREAGH.

Address of the Garde Urbaine of Toulouse to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MILORD,

Les officiers de la Légion Urbaine de cette ville ont l'honneur de vous présenter l'assurance de leur respect et de leur dévouement. Ils viennent vous remercier de la générosité avec laquelle vous voulez bien traiter une ville dont les vœux hâtoient votre triomphe, et qui doit aux succès de vos armées sa délivrance de la tyrannie odieuse sous laquelle elle gémissoit.

Toulouse conservera à perpétuité le souvenir des bienfaits dont Votre Excellence l'honore. L'époque de votre heureuse arrivée dans cette ville, pourroit-elle jamais être oubliée? Elle nous fait connoître notre héroïque libérateur; elle fixe le terme de nos maux. Elle rend à la France gloire, ses Rois, ses vrais Souverains, qui ont fait si longtems son bonheur. Nos vœux sont unanimes.

Daignez, Milord, en agréer l'hommage.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY, Bordeaux, 2nd April, 1814.

I went down yesterday about thirty-five miles to try to see the Admiral, but failed: he was at Castillon. I forward to-day his despatch to Lord Wellington. It appears the Paté is too tough a morsel, and I believe it is; standing in the stream, a martello tower, with 36-pounders à fleur d'eau. However, I don't think it material now that the Admiral should come higher at present.

The Commissaire de Marine came over to the Prince yesterday. He is a man much respected here, and has much influence. His report of Blaye is, that everything is in the greatest disorder, and crying aloud for the English. I have it, therefore, in contemplation to pass all my disposable men over at Braune or St. André, and try what a show of our force at the gate may do. I will not, however, wish you to entertain hopes of success. I did a few days ago cross at Braune, and passed through Libourne; but it is a prodigious river the Dordogne, and thought it right to gather ourselves together again. I find that little show has had its effect, and it encourages me to try again. I shall have with me Gardiner's brigade entire; 7th Portuguese, and Caçadores, under Elder; Jenkinson's four guns, and a squadron of the 12th. With all that, I am a formidable army among the *conscripts* hereabouts.

Reports here of a great and general fight near Paris on the 26th, in which Buonaparte was routed, his "garde d'honneur" cut to pieces; and the words of the letter, to a person in Blaye, were, "Nous sommes aux abois." We have no papers.

Yours most truly,

DALHOUSIE.

[745.]
*

ARRANGEMENT FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE GARONNE.

Colomiers, 3rd April, 1814.

The pontoon train, accompanied by one brigade of the 4th division, will move, as soon as it is dark this evening, by the great road leading from Toulouse towards Grenade, to the place fixed upon for establishing the pontoon bridge.

The remainder of the 4th division will follow the pontoon train.

Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry will follow the 4th division.

The 6th division will follow Colonel Vivian's brigade.

Marshal Beresford will be so good as give directions for the artillery of the division being moved in such manner as to be as little heard as possible upon the opposite side of the river.

The pontoon bridge is to be laid at daybreak to-morrow morning. Lieutenant Wright, of the Royal Engineers, will point out the situation fixed upon for it.

Marshal Beresford will be pleased to order the necessary assistance to be given by the troops in the laying of the bridge, and will also give orders for covering the operation by passing over such number of troops as he may think proper for that service.

Lieutenant-Colonel Goldfinch, of the Royal Engineers, will communicate with Marshal Beresford respecting these arrangements.

The Hussar brigade will assemble at 9 P.M., and will follow the march of the 6th division.

The piquets of the brigade, as well as those of the troops under the immediate orders of Marshal Beresford, which are towards Toulouse, are to remain until relieved by troops under the command of Sir Rowland Hill.

The baggage of the troops under Marshal Beresford's orders, as also that of the Hussar brigade, is to move at the same time

with the troops, and in the same order of march; but it is all to move by the road which leads from St. Martin du Touch by Aussonne and Merville to Grenade, to which latter place it is to proceed, and there halt.

Marshal Beresford will be so good as take care, when the 4th and 6th divisions and Colonel Vivian's brigade arrive near the place where the bridge is to be laid, that they are closed up and formed out of the way of interfering with the work, but at hand, to be prepared to pass as soon as the bridge is completed.

Lord Edward Somerset will be so good as observe the same precautions in placing the Hussar brigade.

Sir Rowland Hill will be so good as put the troops under his orders in march as soon after dark as possible this evening, and will move them forward to occupy the position fronting Toulouse, which is now held by the 4th, 6th, and Light divisions, the right of which position is in front of the village of St. Simon, and its left in front of St. Martin du Touch, extending to the junction of the Touch rivulet with the Garonne.

The piquets of the 4th, 6th, and Light divisions, now in front of the position, will remain until relieved by Sir Rowland Hill's troops, as will also the cavalry piquets furnished by the hussars and by Colonel Vivian's brigade.

The Light division has orders not to quit the position until the arrival of Sir Rowland Hill's infantry. Sir Rowland Hill will be so good, therefore, as apprise Major-General Alten, as soon as his troops come up.

When the 4th and 6th divisions are put in motion this evening to march towards Grenade, Major-General Alten will place the Light division in the following manner, for the security of the position fronting Toulouse:—

One brigade to be formed in the road which leads from the village of Cugneaux through St. Simon to Toulouse. The other brigade to be formed to the left of the road which leads from Tournefeuille to Toulouse.

The Light division is to continue posted in this manner until the arrival of the infantry under Sir Rowland Hill's orders, which will occupy the position and relieve the piquets, as well those of the Light division as those of the 4th and 6th divisions and of the cavalry, which have all orders to remain till replaced by Sir Rowland Hill's troops.

As soon as Sir Rowland Hill's infantry has arrived to take

up the position, Major-General Alten will march off the Light division by the great road which leads from Toulouse to Grenade, and will halt about halfway to Grenade, near where the great road passes between the villages of Aussonne and Seilh, where the division will receive further orders to-morrow morning.

The baggage of the division is to move at the same time by the road which leads from St. Martin du Touch to Aussonne, and is to be parked clear of the road near that village.

The 3rd division will move at midnight, and will proceed by the route of St. Martin du Touch, and thence by Blagnac along the great road from Toulouse to Grenade. The division will halt about half-way between Toulouse and Grenade, where the great road passes between the villages of Aussonne and Seilh. The Light division is ordered to the same situation, and both will receive further instructions to-morrow morning.

Sir T. Picton will be so good as order the baggage of the division to move immediately after the troops, and to take the road which leads direct from St. Martin du Touch to Aussonne, beyond which village it is to be parked clear of the road.

Major-General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, followed by Colonel Arentschildt's brigade, will move off from their cantonments exactly at dawn to-morrow morning.

These two brigades are to march by the villages of Fontsorbes, La Salvetat, Cornebarrien, and Aussonne, to Merville. The baggage is to follow in rear of the two brigades.

The officers commanding these brigades will be so good as send forward to Merville to report the approach of the brigades and to receive further orders.

Le Général Freyre aura la bonté de faire assembler ses troupes demain matin de manière à pouvoir les mettre en marche à la pointe du jour. Le corps d'armée marchera par Pibrac, Mondonville, et Daux à Merville.

Le Général Freyre aura la bonté d'envoyer un officier un peu en avant vers Merville, pour annoncer au Général en Chef ou au Q.M.G. l'approche de la colonne. En tout cas la colonne doit faire halte à Merville jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

L'artillerie Portugaise doit se mettre en marche à une heure du matin aussi pour Merville.

Le Colonel Arentschildt prendra des informations sur la meil-

leure route pour la marche de l'artillerie, et le Général Freyre aura la bonté d'envoyer un bataillon pour aider sa marche.

On croit que l'artillerie peut passer par Pibrac, Cornebarrieu, et Aussonne à Merville.

The baggage of head-quarters is to be loaded at daybreak, and to move to the village of Cornebarrieu, there to wait further orders.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, 3rd April, 1814.

After occupying Branne, and ascertaining the state of the troops opposed to us on the Dordogne to be such as would offer little opposition to any movement we might make, I directed Colonel Gardiner to occupy Libourne, and proceed to St. André de Cubsac. Finding, however, that a strong country, and General L'Huillier there with 1500 men, I thought it imprudent to risk my little brigade on that side of a very formidable river, and made him repass two days afterwards. On the 31st he had a smart affair in front of Fronsac, the Brunswicks alone engaged. His report I have not yet received; but though he obeyed my order from this to recross the Dordogne, the consequences of that little affair have induced General L'Huillier to draw off entirely towards Saintes, his conscripts leaving him every hour. Blaye is left to its fate; and I am now induced to cross the Dordogne to-day at St. André, and shall attempt to get possession of Blaye by summons, and offering the honours of war. I trust your Lordship will consider the possession of it and opening of the river as sufficient reasons for my making that offer.

The Admiral has pushed his small vessels up to Blaye; and yesterday the enemy's flotilla of two brigs and six or eight gunboats, having attempted to run from that to join the *Regulus* off Talmont, were gallantly attacked by the launches and boats of this advance squadron. The whole of them were destroyed. This will materially facilitate our communications from Bordeaux to the immediate neighbourhood of Blaye; and I now trust to be able to report all clear in a very few days.

My 1st brigade with two guns, and Colonel Ponsonby with two squadrons of the 12th, are at La Réole and Sauveterre. The enemy's few conscripts at Bergerac neither prepared nor inclined to move from that.

A gentleman from La Vendée, arrived yesterday, reports that country quite ready to take arms, but are in total want of them. No chief has yet declared openly for the Bourbons.

A person from Paris was sent to me last night. He left it on the 25th, and came by the diligence to Libourne. Everybody was flying from Paris, the Prussians being hourly expected to enter it.

A letter of the 29th to M. Guetier, a rich merchant here, states that on the 27th Caulaincourt with his suite returned to Paris. The Congress

being dissolved, I believe this letter to be authentic intelligence. At the same time I beg your Lordship to receive all this as the news of the day.

I enclose the Gazette Extraordinary which the Admiral has just sent me up.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's most faithfully,

DALHOUSIE.

P.S.—I take with me to Blaye my 2nd brigade, Colonel Gardiner, a squadron of the 12th, and Major Jenkinson's four guns.

7th Portuguese, Colonel Elder.

2nd Caçadores, Colonel Zulke.

In all perhaps 2,000 men.

The 19th Portuguese, Colonel Doyle, I leave with the duties of Bordeaux, Macan, and Médoc.

D.

The Quarter-master-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Hill.

MY DEAR SIR ROWLAND, Colomiers, 3rd April, 1814.

In the event of the enemy moving out a large force against you to-morrow, and that it appears to you that there might be considerable risk in attempting to maintain the positions opposite Toulouse, Lord Wellington desires that you will be so good as fall back in the first instance behind the Touch river; and should you deem it expedient to retire still further, you will be so good as retire by the Auch road, behind the rivulet between this place and Leguevin.

Lord Wellington wishes you to send your baggage, at all events, in the morning behind the Touch river to Tournefeuille.

No orders have been sent to Brigadier-General D'Urban's cavalry, which is at Noé, and beyond it. I beg you will be good enough to send General D'Urban any orders in the morning that you may deem most expedient under existing circumstances.

G. MURRAY.

In case the enemy appears to move almost all his force to his right to oppose the passage of the river, Lord Wellington wishes you to make a show of attacking the suburb on this side of the bridge. It is desirable that you should send intimations at the same time of your intention of doing so, that the cause of the firing it will occasion may be understood.

G. M.

Admiral Lord Keith to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, 4th April, 1814.

By letters from Lord Melville I am this day informed that all negotiation is at an end, of which your Lordship is to be informed in every possible way, and that there remains no difficulty in distressing the enemy by encouraging the Bourbons.

I have the honour to be, with the most perfect regard,

Your Lordship's most faithful servant,

KEITH.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Bordeaux, ce 4 Avril, 1814.

My Lord,

Il me reste encore à vous envoyer les pièces ci-jointes que je soumets à votre approbation comme les précédentes, et sur lesquelles je vous prie de me faire connoître votre opinion le plutôt possible. M. de Polignac, qui est porteur de cette lettre, vous fera connoître les dispositions des habitants du département du Gers, et le désir qu'on y a d'y proclamer le Roi. Je le charge de s'en entendre avec vous, My Lord, et d'agir d'après ce que vous lui direz. Je regrette vivement d'être si loin de vous, et de ne pas pouvoir vous consulter sur beaucoup de choses.

Dans le cas bien probable où vous seriez en ce moment maître de Toulouse, mon projet serait de partir de demain en huit pour m'y rendre, et établir, ainsi que je l'ai fait à Bordeaux, le gouvernement du Roi dans les différents départements dont vos troupes victorieuses ont chassé celles de l'ennemi; mais pour cela j'ai besoin de votre approbation, et cela me fait attendre avec une bien vive impatience votre réponse à ma lettre du 24. Connoissant vos sentiments élevés, qui sont à l'égal de votre gloire, j'ai la confiance qu'elle sera conforme à mes désirs.

Bordeaux, qui a été si parfait pour nous, n'aura-t-il donc pas le bonheur de posséder dans ses murs le héros à qui cette ville importante doit sa délivrance, et qui y seroit reçu avec tant d'enthousiasme? Voilà bientôt quatre semaines que je suis séparé de vous, My Lord; ce tems me paroit bien long, et j'espère après le moment où je pourroi vous revoir et vous renouveler l'assurance de la haute considération, de l'admiration, et du bien véritable attachement avec lesquels je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Bordeaux, ce 4 Avril, 1814.

My Lord,

Je profite de l'occasion de M. Okeley pour avoir le plaisir de vous écrire. J'attends de vos nouvelles avec une bien grande impatience en étant privé depuis votre lettre du 16. Il m'est arrivé deux députés du département du Gers, qui me demandent à le faire déclarer pour le Roi, mais je ne puis pas leur en donner l'ordre avant d'avoir reçu votre réponse à ma lettre du 24. J'ai appris avec beaucoup de peine que le pauvre Colonel Sturgeon avoit été tué. Cette perte a dû vous être très sensible. C'est avec la plus haute considération et le plus sincère attachement que je resterai pour la vie, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

The Quartermaster-General to the Officer commanding troops on the right bank of the Garonne.

Pontoon Bridge, 5th April, 1814, 7½ A.M.

It has not been thought expedient to attempt using the pontoon bridge this morning, on account of the increased rapidity of the current; and the

boards which were taken up last night have not been relaid. A flying bridge will, however, be immediately established.

The senior General officer of the troops on the right bank will be so good as send an immediate report of anything of importance, and will send, at all events, occasional reports during the course of the day. Lord Wellington will be either at the pontoon bridge or at Grenade. The officer commanding the cavalry on the right bank will send out patrols as well towards Toulouse as on the road to Montauban, and into the country which lies beyond the Ers rivulet, and will send reports to head-quarters of what information is obtained. It is advisable to have strong piquets covering the front of the troops towards Toulouse, and also to hold the heights from which the enemy could reconnoitre, in order that he may be prevented as much as possible from ascertaining the amount of the force which has been passed over the river.

It will be expedient to prevent the people of the country from going towards Toulouse, that the enemy may less easily obtain information.

G. MURRAY.

The Quartermaster-General to Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Picton.

MY DEAR GENERAL, Pontoon Bridge, 5th April, 1814.

I do not think it very likely that the enemy will attempt anything serious against you, although he may push out some pretty strong patrols perhaps, upon finding that we do not advance to attack him. At all events, however, it may be a proper precaution to look out for the more defensible ground on which the troops could be formed in case of an attack, and also to have it ascertained how they could best draw back towards the pontoon bridge if ordered, and what line could be taken up with most advantage as an extensive tête-de-pont, having its flanks supported by artillery on this side of the river.

G. MURRAY.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

On the Heights near Blaye or Plassack,

MY LORD, 6th April, 1814.

On the 4th I crossed the Dordogne at St. André de Cubsac, and advanced next morning with the troops I stated in my last letter to your Lordship: my 2nd brigade, my Caçadores, and 7th Portuguese, four guns, and one squadron of the 12th. I learned that Generals L'Huillier and Desbareaux with 300 cavalry and 1200 infantry had retired by Etauliers: I therefore moved on that point, intending to turn back again on Blaye if I found these officers had continued their retreat on Saintes. General L'Huillier, commanding, thought proper to remain at Etauliers, and drew out his corps on a large open common near that, occupying some woods in front of it. The flank companies of the 6th and Brunswickers soon cleared these woods, and Major Jenkinson's guns had a fair field for his practice. The infantry and cavalry gave way, and retired through Etauliers, leaving scattered

parties to shift for themselves: one of these, about 80 men, was gallantly charged by the weak squadron of the 12th, under Major Bridger, and taken prisoners. In all, we took about 30 officers, 250 or 300 men. Great numbers dispersed in the woods, and in a short time it is thought the whole of their infantry conscripts will leave them.

I come here to-day, leaving the 2nd brigade to look out at Etauliers. I have summoned the citadel, and received a refusal. I shall therefore return to Bordeaux to-morrow, to arrange with the Admiral what means can be got to proceed against it.

I find the best disposition towards us on this side, and several respectable people from La Vendée and St. Aunge state to me the anxious desire of all that part of the country to see the British arms among them. An officer of La Garde d'Honneur of Buonaparte is just come in from Paris and Nantes, which last place he left on the 31st March. He states that he has been personally engaged in all the late general actions; that Buonaparte has no army worthy of that name; that the Congress was dissolved on the 31st; that Prince Schwarzenberg has resigned the command, and General Bianchi has been appointed to it; that on the route he has come the Paris post has not arrived these last three days, which persuades the country that the Allies are in that capital. He also states that La Vendée has organised a rising of 40,000 on the 11th to assemble near Nantes, which circumstance he has been despatched to announce to the Duke d'Angoulême.

All this I hasten to report to your Lordship.

I have the honour to be most faithfully yours,

DALHOUSIE.

My loss yesterday very trifling.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 6th April, 1814.

I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatches as noted in the margin.

In reply to that marked No. 37, I feel it necessary to explain that my letter of the 10th ultimo was not written under the expectation that your Lordship should extend your forces towards the coast of the Mediterranean in order to cover the landing of Lord William Bentinck's corps; but I certainly had in my view the probability that your Lordship's movements towards the Garonne, and the operations of the Austrian forces on the side of Lyons, would induce Marshals Soult and Suchet to retire so far into the interior of France, that the debarkation of a corps consisting of 7000 effective men might be made with security in the Bay of Rosas, or even more to the northward upon the French coast; and that the junction of this corps with your Lordship's army might have been effected without any serious risk. Your Lordship will see, by the annexed extract from the embarkation return of Lord William Bentinck's army (dated Palermo, the 16th of February), that I have not over-rated the force which he might bring with him. I have to add that, as the whole of the British and German troops belonging to the Mediterranean army (excepting such garrisons as may be

found indispensable in Sicily) are now destined to reinforce your Lordship, the 1st battalion of the 10th regiment, a detachment of Calabrese, and about 600 light cavalry which have been serving in Catalonia, may likewise proceed to join your army without delay.

I have to request your Lordship would communicate your intentions to Lord William Bentinck as soon as possible; but if your Lordship shall still deem it impracticable to bring his corps into junction with the Allied army under your command by any other route than by sea to Bordeaux, it appears to me that so much valuable time would be lost at this important crisis of the war, that it would be preferable to leave Lord William to carry on operations with his present army in the neighbourhood of Genoa or of Nice.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Extract from the Embarkation Return of Lord William Bentinck's army, dated Palermo, 16th February, 1814.

	Rank and File.
Artillery	269
Engineers and Staff Corps	49
14th regiment	1020
21st "	1094
31st "	640
62nd "	916
3rd battalion German Legion	908
6th ditto	866
8th ditto	886
Calabrese Sharpshooters	529
Greek Light Infantry	222
Total	7398

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, 6th April, 1814.

I have lost no time in laying before the Prince Regent your Lordship's despatch No. 35, and I am commanded to acquaint you that His Royal Highness has derived particular pleasure from the highly honourable conduct which has been held by the Spanish government upon this occasion. The frankness and promptitude with which the Regency of Spain communicated to your Lordship the offers made by Marshal Suchet marks in the most satisfactory manner the confidence which the Regency justly place in your Lordship, and the steadiness with which they are prepared to maintain their alliance with Great Britain.

The opinion which your Lordship has delivered upon this occasion, that

the surrender of the fortresses in Catalonia and Valencia should not be accepted but upon the condition that the French garrisons should remain prisoners of war, has met the entire approbation of the Prince Regent.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
BATHURST.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Clinton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

My Lord, Esplug[illegible]h April, 1814.

Since writing to your Lordship [illegible] 31st ultimo by a courier going from hence with despatches from G[illegible]pons, I have received accounts from Gerona, which lead me to im[illegible] Marsh[illegible] Suchet has at length quitted Catalonia, and that the d[illegible]eld force he has left does not exceed 6000 men.

In consequence of this, I have [illegible]res for putting this army in motion, with a view to its being [illegible]s directed by your Lordship in your letters of the 4th and 8th [illegible] I hope in three or four days from hence I shall be able to anno[illegible]ou that the troops will be in movement from hence.

In my letter, No. 36, of the 27[illegible] adverting to the then state of things, I submitted to your Lords[illegible]porary measure that I might be permitted to detain the regim[illegible]on, then just arrived from Carthagena, that that battalion mi[illegible]ployed in garrisoning Tarragona. Since then, reflecting that [illegible]ents might have been made at Gibraltar on the calculation of th[illegible] of this regiment, I have concerted with Admiral Hallowell th[illegible] it should proceed to its destination, and I have directed the detachmen[illegible] battalion, consisting of the 67th, four companies of Dillon's, and four of [illegible]e Roll's, to march from hence to Tarragona, to take the duties of that g[illegible]rison for the present; having nevertheless urged both Generals Elio and [illegible]opons to send forthwith a Spanish force to relieve the British troops: an[illegible] I have felt the less difficulty in adopting this measure, as at this moment [illegible]here would not be tonnage for the shipment of the 67th regiment and t[illegible]se companies of Dillon's. I shall, however, not fail to repeat to Genera[illegible]opons the necessity of his providing for the defence of Tarragona, as the detachment battalion temporarily left there must embark so soon as the means for its conveyance shall arrive.

As soon as I am enabled to [illegible]t the troops in march from hence, I intend to despatch a courier to your Lordship with the details of the movement. A letter has in the meanwhile been written to the Commissary-General, Sir H. Kennedy, apprising him of the total number of souls and animals which will move from hence, and which will be provided for by the Deputy Commissary-General h[illegible]re as far as Tudela, from whence forward I understand by your Lordship's letter of the 4th of March the Commissary-General will be prepared to provision them.

As I am closing this letter, I receive one from the Baron Eroles, dated Gerona yesterday. In this he confirms the reports which had already reached me, that Marshal Suchet had gone to Perpignan, with about 3000

infantry and the 29th Dragoons. He adds that it is said the Marshal is destined to take the command of the army at Lyons, and that what remains of the French disposable force in this province is to be placed under the orders of Marshal Soult: that it is confidently said the enemy mean to blow up the works at Rosas. From all these reports I am indeced to think that the enemy will not h a greater *field force* in Catalonia than about 6000 infantry and 300 c ry. A report has been made to me to-day that in Barcelona the French selling their provisions, and publicly say they are shortly to return t rance, and that the city is to be delivered to the Spaniards.

I have no further accounts fr rd William Bentinck since I last wrote. The It brigade will om hence to join his Lordship at Leghorn on or abo he 9th inst.

I have t r to be, my Lord,

obedient, humble servant,

W. H. CLINTON.

Sir C. W. Flint to Fie the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Irish Office, 6th April, 1814.

I cannot send you the encl ordinary Gazette without offering your Lordship my best congr on the great and glorious events which are detailed by Lord B d Sir C. Stewart, and which afford strong ground for hoping th pproaching fast to the close of the struggle in which we have b d, and in a way that will ensure most effectually the peace an llity of the world. Montalembert was to have set off to-night wit hes for your Lordship, his ultimate destination being Sicily; but he h been detained till the arrival of Colonel Lowe, who is expected in the arse of to-night or to-morrow with further particulars of what has pass t Paris. I trust the people will follow the example of Bordeaux.

I hear Buonaparte was in a most wr hed plight, many officers even of his Guard having deserted him.

The enclosed communication from Br sels comes from a good source, and may be depended on.

Ever your Lordship's most d ged and faithful servant,

C. W. FLINT.

Montalembert will embark at Plymouth, and proceed direct to the Garonne.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Brussels, 19th March, 1814.

I doubt not you will be a good deal surprised to learn that another rival to the French throne has started up, who hopes to triumph over the legitimate claims of one of his opponents, and the energetic efforts of the other. But as I tread on hot ashes, I must premise by saying that you are almost the only person with whom I would enter into these details. Verbum sat. The person to whom I allude is no other than the illustrious "hero of the North," who, not

being calculated by early education to trust to the engagements of Sovereigns, determined to take the law into his own hands, sacrificed the general interests to his own private and paltry views, and now entertains the somewhat romantic hope of being able to appear as a mediator between his allies and the French people, and receiving from the latter the sceptre in testimony of its gratitude. In this hope he is supported by the assurances and promises of hundreds of French officers whom he has restored to liberty and sent to France since he separated himself from the Allied armies; and I have no doubt the bulletin which is to appear on this brilliant occasion is already composed. Had he led the way into France, as he might have done, with 80,000, he would perhaps have stood some chance: but I am inclined to think that cunning is not the only requisite quality in a crisis like the present; and I fear that he will not only lose the object of the present campaign, but the unripe fruits of the last, and that the history of modern Scandinavia will no more be embellished by the martial deeds of a King Oscar, than (I trust) that of Magna Grecia will be by those of King Achilles, son of Gioachino.

Rear-Admiral Penrose to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Garonne, 7th April, 1814.

As I approach the higher parts of the river I perceive the white flag both on vessels and houses multiplying fast; but, as I have never heard a word from the Admiralty on this delicate subject, I am most anxious to know how best I can conform to your Lordship's views and wishes. I have hitherto held the most friendly communication with the left bank.

I am much afraid that some of my communications to your Lordship from Passages must have missed, particularly one in which I mentioned the sending off the persons sent from the Duke of Angoulême to proceed to England, and enclosing a letter to His Royal Highness to inform him of it.

Your Lordship's faithful servant,

C. J. PENROSE.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Valencia, 7th April, 1814.

I received this morning your letter of the 22nd March.

It was settled that the King should be here on the 5th, but he is gone to Saragossa, and is not expected here for some days. The Infant Don Antonio arrived here this morning, and was well received by the people. The Cardinal de Bourbon is likewise here.

There is a great deal of speculation as to what the King will do upon his arrival at Madrid, and I fear that some of the persons who are about him, and some of those whom he will see before he reaches the capital, will give him bad advice. The Jacobins at Madrid are doing all in their power to raise a spirit against him, and I am sure that their wish is that he should reject the Constitution. I think he has done wrong to delay his journey to the capital.

Parties run very high at this place, but they say that the Serviles have the upper hand, and that the troops are with them. Most of the members of the Cortes, however, returned for Valencia are Liberales.

I shall stay here until the King comes, having no means of getting on to Saragossa in time to meet him there. I am told that he has been received with the greatest enthusiasm in all the towns through which he has passed.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Duke of Infantado is gone on to Saragossa to meet the King, but I will either send him your letter or deliver it to him on his return.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

London, 7th April, 1814.

Lord Bathurst presents his compliments to the Marquess of Wellington, and encloses for his Lordship's information the substance of the intelligence recently received from Italy.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Intelligence extracted from Sir Robert Wilson's Despatches to Lord Castlereagh.—Received in London 2nd April, 1814.

Villa Franca, 17th Feb.

Murat has sent to acquaint Count Bellegarde that he will add a Neapolitan division to General Nugent's force and collect another at Modena to cover Parma and Piacenza when Marshal Bellegarde shall have passed the Mincio. The promised force is insufficient, and Murat's changes have been so frequent that no reliance can be placed on him. He has made a convention with the French, allowing mutually the free return of French and Neapolitans to their respective countries till the 1st March. A return of the enemy's army in Italy is enclosed: it appears to consist of 34,550 men, including 2100 cavalry.

Villa Franca, 19th Feb.

In a partial action near Casema an Austrian division has taken about 300 French.

Villa Franca, 20th Feb.

Ancona has surrendered to the Neapolitans, the garrison returning to France. The Castle of St. Angelo is expected to be given up on the same terms. These terms are more beneficial to the French than to the Allies. Murat protests against Lord William Bentinck's coming to Tuscany; insists on his going to Genoa. Objects likewise to the proposed movement on Piacenza. His troops are few, and not trustworthy. The enemy has collected a formidable force in position, good either for offence or defence.

Villa Franca, 5th March.

General Nugent, while retiring to the Secchia, has been overtaken and defeated by General Grenier's army with much loss. Murat remains at Modena, complaining of the Austrians and showing much discontent.

Villa Franca, 6th March.

Murat has received the ratification of his treaty with Austria, and has in consequence declared his intention of uniting his army with the remains of Nugent's corps, and assuming the offensive immediately.

Verona, 9th March.

Marshal Bellegarde's army had been greatly reduced by sickness: no less than 29,000 men are in hospital. The enemy, leaving Grenier's division to observe Murat and General Nugent, concentrated his forces for a general attack upon the Austrian army. Marshal Bellegarde has fallen back in consequence to an excellent position already prepared, two miles in front of Verona. The advanced posts continue on the Mincio.

Verona, 9th March.

The arrival of the ratification of his treaty has caused a complete change in Murat's tone, and he appears decided to give his cordial cooperation. He has formed his army in three columns and advanced upon Reggio, making about 300 prisoners on the march. Fouché, after a long conference with Murat, has passed through the posts on his return to France.

Verona, 10th March.

Murat has taken Reggio, where General Severoli (wounded) and some French soldiers were left behind. An officer has arrived from Palermo, which he left on the 20th February. The forces had been embarked; but three transports caught fire, and disturbances had broken out in the town. The sailing of the fleet was delayed. The roads in Naples are so infested by banditti, that the courier cannot pass.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Bordeaux, 7th April, 1814.

I beg now, my Lord, to report generally our operations in this neighbourhood since your Lordship did me the honour to place me in command here.

General L'Huillier, after retiring from Bordeaux on the approach of the column under Marshal Beresford, has occupied the right bank of the Dordogne from Libourne to Blaye.

On the 30th I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner, commanding my 2nd brigade, to cross the river at Brunne and reconnoitre on to Libourne and St. André de Cubsac. In doing so he had a sharp affair near Fronsac in crossing the L'Isle, a small but very deep river: on that occasion the Brunswick regiment, about 200 men, dislodged and drove before them 400 of the enemy from a very strong post.

General L'Huillier was at St. André. I thought proper to draw Colonel Gardiner across the river again.

On the 2nd April I learned that the enemy had retired on Blaye. On the 3rd and 4th I crossed at St. André Colonel Gardiner's brigade, 7th Portuguese, and 2nd Caçadores, under Sir George Elder, Major Jenkinson with four of his guns, and one squadron of the 12th dragoons under Major Bridger.

I then learned that Generals L'Huillier and Desoteux had collected their best force, taking from the garrison of the citadel all the disciplined troops, and that they were at Etauliers, about [illegible] cavalry, 1200 infantry, and 2 guns.

On the 5th we moved on that point, and found they had occupied a line of woods near the village of Campugnan, between which and Etauliers lies a wide clear common, two miles broad every way: on this they meant to act with their cavalry.

The Brunswickers and flank companies of the 6th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell, soon drove them out of the woods, and Major Jenkinson's guns followed them up so fast and so pressing, that they had scarcely time to form a line of retreat. The infantry threw down their arms and broke away; the cavalry showed a good front across the plain, retiring through Etauliers and St. Aubin, where the country again became close and wooded. As they were in full retreat, we left them go. I since learn that General L'Huillier is at Saintes, with 400 or 500 men: his corps dispersed.

I ought particularly to mention a charge made by Major Bridger with 40 men on a party of the enemy separated, but defending themselves: passing through them, he formed in an instant, and was prepared for the cavalry still in his front. Several officers and 100 men surrendered to him.

The enemy's loss is considerable: the c[illegible] the 105th killed; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 20 officers, and 300 men [illegible]s. Our own loss very trifling.

In the morning I detached the Cac[illegible]ards Blaye to watch that road. The commanding officer imp[illegible]pproached to the gates of the citadel, provoked the enemy to sally [illegible]him, and he was driven off with the loss of three officers and twenty men killed and wounded.

Yesterday I turned back on Blaye, and summoned the garrison to surrender: that being refused, I now closely invest it. It is a very strong and regular fortress, in excellent order; of course will demand the regular proceedings of a siege.

I will only say that, in all our operations, I feel myself infinitely indebted to Colonel Gardiner and Major Jenkinson, as also to Lieutenant-Colonel Abercromby, Assistant Quartermaster-General, and to my personal staff. The conduct of the troops both in the field and in their quarters does them great honour; their regularity and their quiet, [illegible]lending behaviour, contrasted with that of the French troops among their countrymen, create astonishment wherever we go.

From Bergerac the 2000 conscripts have all deserted, and I cannot inform your Lordship now where any enemy is formed in this part of France.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most faithful and obedient servant,

DALHOUSIE.

Lord Burghersh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON, Paris, 7th April, 1814, 7 o'clock.

Glory to God and to yourself, the great man has fallen. What you see on the other side is the line of demarcation just arranged between Ney, Macdonald, Caulaincourt, and Schwarzenberg. The southern limits of the departments named are to form the line behind which the Allies occupy everything. You are to form your own line upon the ground you stand on. I have not time for more. I hope you will come to this place. Priscilla will, I expect, be here in a few days.

Your most affectionate,

BURGHERSH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Ligne de Démarcation pour les Troupes Alliées.

L'Embouchure de la Seine le long des limites des Départements suivans :—

1. Département de la Seine Inférieure.
2. „ de l'Oise.
3. „ de la Seine et Oise.
4. „ de la Seine et Marne.
5. „ de l'Yonne.
6. „ de la Côte d'Or.
7. „ de la Saône et Loire.
8. „ du Rhône.
9. „ d'Isère jusqu'au Mont Cenis.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, 8 Avril, 1814.

Je reçois dans le moment les duplicata de vos lettres du 29 et 30, qui ne me sont point encore parvenues. J'ai reçu il y a trois jours celle que vous m'avez écrite le 1er. Permettez-moi de me borner aujourd'hui à vous accuser leur réception. Je ne conçois pas ce qui a pu les retarder autant ; je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire qu'elles m'affligent profondément, mais elles ne diminueront rien à la haute considération et à l'attachement avec lesquels je vous prie de me croire, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Lord Tweeddale to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Plymouth, 8th April, 1814.

After failing in one or two attempts to effect an exchange into the cavalry, and being refused leave to return to your army, I have been ordered to join my regiment in North America. However unpleasant to give up the

service on which I have been fortunate enough to be employed in your army, yet I thought it right cheerfully to obey the orders I received to join my regiment, perfectly aware of the despicable warfare I shall see; but shall not easily forget the manner in which I have been obliged to go there. I expect to sail every day in the *Cyane* sloop of war. Believe me how much I regret not being allowed to return to serve in your army, but hope that when I am going I shall endeavour to show myself worthy of having served in it. Wishing you a continual success,

Believe me yours most faithfully,

TWEEDDALE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Paris, 9th April, 1814.

I have the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter which I have this day written and despatched to England by Colonel Lowe to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Serene Highness the Prince of Benevent being desirous of sending an officer to Marshals Soult and Suchet, and having requested me to name an officer of weight and experience to accompany the French officer to your Lordship's head quarters, after having had communication with Marshal Soult, I have selected Colonel Cooke, who has been attached to me, for this service, and I hope he will be able to give your Lordship much information.

Lord Castlereagh not being arrived, and there being as yet no accredited channel of communication with the French government, I am not enabled to make any official communication. But I hope you will approve of the measure I have adopted. The return of Colonel Cooke with news of your Lordship and all the recent events of your army will be most highly gratifying to the city of Paris. As we have heard nothing for a long period, may I beg the favour of you, therefore, to send the Colonel back as soon as convenient.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your very obedient servant,

CHARLES STEWART.

[746.] INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIEUT.-GEN. SIR ROWLAND HILL.

St. Jory, 9th April, 1814.

It is intended to move against the enemy's positions on this side of the river to-morrow morning soon after daybreak.

Lord Wellington wishes therefore that you should make such arrangements, threatening the suburb of Toulouse on the left bank of the river, as circumstances admit of, in order to draw a part of the attention and force of the enemy to that side. You will be able to see the commencement and progress of the

operations on this side, and you will be good enough to regulate yours accordingly.

It is Lord Wellington's desire that the pontoons last arrived should be moved to Blagnac in the course of this night, and that a flying bridge at least should be established near that place, to communicate between your troops and the right of the 3rd division.

I beg you will send over reports in the course of the morning of your own operations, and of what is seen from your side of the movements and force of the enemy.

G. MURRAY.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE BATTLE OF TOULOUSE. [747.]

9th April, 1814.

Major-General Ponsonby's brigade will move forward at 11 A.M. by St. Jory and L'Espinasse towards Toulouse. It will receive further orders on the march. The baggage of the brigade is not to advance further than St. Jory in the first instance.

Lord C. Manners will be so good as leave one squadron to observe the roads which come from Montauban and Montech. This squadron is to be in communication with the detachment of Colonel Vivian's brigade left at Fronton to observe the road which comes from Montauban through that place.

Le Général Freyre aura la bonté de mettre les troupes Espagnoles en marche aujourd'hui à onze heures du matin.

La colonne Espagnole doit prendre à gauche à Espinasse, pour entrer dans la route qui conduit du village de Brugnières à Toulouse. En entrant sur cette route la colonne s'avancera vers Toulouse en passant par les villages de St. Alban et par celle de La Lande, où elle recevra des nouveaux ordres.

Les équipages des troupes doivent rester à Espinasse jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

The Spaniards ordered to suspend their march till further instructed as to the hour.

Lord C. Manners authorized to move only at 12, and not to pass L'Espinasse until the Spaniards move on also.

WELLINGTON.

[748.] St. Jory, 9th April, 1814.

The Light division will move to-morrow morning at 3 o'clock, and after passing the river it will move forward as directed by the instruction of this morning, near to the 3rd division. Having arrived there, it will keep to its left, and proceed to the church of the village of La Lande, where the division will receive further orders.

Major-General Bock's brigade of cavalry will follow immediately in the rear of the Light division.

The baggage of these troops is to be disposed of as directed by the instructions of this morning.

Major-General Alten will be so good as communicate these instructions to the officer commanding Major-General Bock's brigade of cavalry, and will send a copy of them to Sir Rowland Hill.

The 4th division will move at 12 o'clock to-night in the direction which has been already pointed out to Marshal Beresford.

The 6th division will move at 3 o'clock to-morrow morning to the village of Launaguet, and is to be placed in a situation favourable for moving forward by the bridge over the Ers rivulet leading to Croix Dorade, which bridge should be occupied by the advance of the 6th division by daybreak.

Marshal Beresford will cause the troops of the 4th division at the bridge of Croix Dorade, as well as the other posts which that division has in the vicinity of its present encampment, to be replaced by the 6th division either to-night or early to-morrow morning, as he may judge most expedient.

Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry is to be employed in part with the 4th division, and in part in the country on the right bank of the Ers rivulet, in which country it will be necessary to observe the roads in rear of the troops acting against the enemy's force at Toulouse.

The baggage of the 6th division is to remain parked near the present encampment of the division till further orders. Marshal Beresford will be so good as give such instructions as he thinks necessary respecting the baggage of the 4th division and of Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry.

Major-General Ponsonby's brigade has been ordered to move at 3 o'clock to-morrow morning, and proceed by St. Jory and L'Espinasse towards Toulouse.

Major-General Bock's brigade has been ordered to pass the

Garonne immediately in rear of the Light division, which crosses the river at 3 in the morning, and to follow that division to the church of La Lande.

Sir S. Cotton will be so good as order the Hussar brigade and its artillery to be at daybreak in a situation from which it can move by the left bank of the Ers rivulet in the direction of Croix Dorade.

Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry is ordered to move in part with the 4th division, which is to pass the Ers rivulet by the bridges higher up, and it will in part be employed in observing the country on the right bank of the Ers rivulet.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR, Valencia, 9th April, 1814.

I have just received your letter of the 31st ult.

M. Luyando told me before I left Madrid that positive orders had been sent to General Copons not to treat with the garrisons in Catalonia upon any terms but those of their surrendering prisoners of war. He added that a courier had been despatched to you to apprise you of these orders.

I was presented yesterday to the Infant Don Antonio, who seems very good-natured. He talked a great deal of the obligations the King was under to you.

The King is expected here on the 13th or 14th. He ought not to delay his journey to Madrid, for the Jacobins are doing all in their power to excite a spirit against him.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bruquires, 9th April, 1814.

I have great satisfaction in reporting to your Lordship the very soldier-like and steady conduct as well as the gallantry displayed by the 18th Hussars in an affair with a superior force of the enemy's cavalry yesterday. Colonel Vivian (commanding the brigade) was unfortunately wounded at the commencement of the attack, but I had great pleasure in witnessing the judgment with which Major Hughes conducted himself; and I feel it my duty to recommend to your Lordship's favourable notice the conduct of Major Hughes and the officers of the 18th Hussars upon

this occasion. I was much satisfied with the steadiness of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the 18th Hussars.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

STAPLETON COTTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Head Quarters, Paris, 9th April, 1814.

I send you copies of all my last despatches by Colonel Cooke. I hope the Spanish officer sent may have reached you.

You will receive the official copies of all the acts of the government. In sending Cooke, who is intelligent, to you, I offer the best means of communication in my power. I shall be very much obliged to you to send him back as soon as you can to me.

Castlereagh must arrive in a day or two with the Emperor of Austria. I hope you will soon come here. Every one is talking of you, and to you alone everything is attributed. How truly you have prophesied with regard to Napoleon! What a miserable end to such a career as he has run! Though we have been separated, I hope you believe how much I rejoice at your greater exploits than those that went before since we parted, and that I am

Ever yours most affectionately,

CHARLES STEWART.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Paris, 4th April, 1814.

I have much gratification in detailing to your Lordship that upon a communication which has been made to Marshal Marmont, he has consented to pass over with his whole corps d'armée, amounting to between 9000 and 10,000 men, and enrol himself and his followers in the cause of their legitimate Sovereign. I understand he stipulated two principal conditions: the one, that Buonaparte's person, if taken, should not be sacrificed; the other, that if in his march he should be attacked, the Allied troops were to support him. This very favourable event so decidedly denotes the downfall of the last hopes of Buonaparte, that the peace of the world is at hand.

I have been but hastily and imperfectly informed of these circumstances; but they appear to me of so interesting a nature as to induce me to incur the risk of sending information of them even by a private conveyance via Calais.

I have also the satisfaction to acquaint you that Marshals Victor, Nansouty, and Kellermann, and several other officers of note in Paris, have all declared themselves in favour of the good cause.

The Allied army remains in position at Chevillet.

The army of Silesia has experienced by the illness of its gallant and veteran leader an irreparable loss; but all the armies fervently hope that the Almighty will restore him to that state of health that will enable him to enjoy those wreaths of laurels which encircle his head.

General Barclay de Tolly is placed at the head of that army, with General Diebitsch as chief of his staff. General Gneisenau has succeeded to General Kneesebeck's situation about the King, the latter officer being left ill at Chaumont. The head quarters of General Barclay de Tolly are at Massy. Buonaparte was behind the Essolles, with his head quarters at Coudray.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Paris, 5th April, 1814.

In addition to the corps d'armée of Marshal Marmont of 10,000 men, armed and fully equipped, which have passed to the standard of the liberators of France, and which are arrived at Versailles, Marshals Ney and Macdonald, together with M. Caulaincourt, are now in Paris endeavouring to treat for any sort of terms and existence for Buonaparte.

I believe they have been endeavouring to have a decision for a Regency for Buonaparte's son. This has been most peremptorily refused; and if there were no other reasons, there is indisputable proof, I am told, that this child is not the son of Maria Louisa, but that she was delivered of a dead child, and this infant was substituted from a girl of one or two that Buonaparte had at the moment at hand in case of accidents. I have heard this from such authority I can hardly doubt it.

It is now said we are treating for a peace with the army, assuring Buonaparte some lot, and providing for many. I am not acquainted with all that is going on; but I venture to urge your Lordship, in the strongest manner, to arrive here with the utmost expedition, or to send some instructions which can authorize Lord Cathcart or myself to present ourselves for the necessary information.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Paris, 5th April, 1814.

I hope you will receive a more perfect and detailed account from Lord Cathcart than I am enabled to furnish you with of the proceedings of last night and this day. The conferences of the Marshals with the Emperor of Russia collectively and separately led to the determination of offering Buonaparte the island of Elba as a retreat, with an income of six millions of livres, of which three were for himself and Maria Louisa, and three to be divided between his brothers and sisters. It is supposed he is fallen so low as to accept of this. M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Ney were very violent and strong in their entreaties for a Regency, Buonaparte having abdicated with that view. The Emperor of Russia was, however, firm, and gained Macdonald, Marmont having been already secured. His Imperial Majesty declared the Allies had already announced they would not treat with Napoleon Buonaparte or any of his family, and that they were determined by the voice of the nation to proclaim Louis XVIII. Buonaparte's decision is expected to-morrow.

I beg your Lordship's excuse for these few hasty lines, which I write very

late at the moment of the departure of the messenger, and have the honour to be, with great respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES STEWART.

IV.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Paris, 6th April, 1814.

In announcing to your Lordship that Napoleon Buonaparte has accepted the terms offered by the Allies for his future existence and that of his family, I cannot resist offering my humble congratulations that the tragedy which has desolated Europe has come to a close, and that the exit of the individual from the stage where he has so long exhibited should be marked by that degradation which his atrocious career has so deservedly entailed upon him. Almighty God has been pleased to teach the nations of the world a lesson which future ages will record, and the events of the French Revolution connected with that of 1814 will hand down to posterity an awful and an instructive example.

Marshal Ney writes that Napoleon Buonaparte will proceed to such place as may be indicated, accepting the island of Elba and the pensions granted by the bounty of the Allies. He requests to have his family sent to him without delay.

The French army will move to the environs of Paris.

Every individual officer, even Berthier, I am informed, has left Buonaparte, whose predicament now can only deserve that pity which is extended by Christians to the most atrocious as well as to the most unfortunate of their fellow-creatures.

When I have details I will write to your Lordship at length, and have the honour to be, with great respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES STEWART.

V.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD, Paris, 7th April, 1814.

In despatching Colonel Lowe, who has been attached to me during the last campaign, by Calais to England, and in furnishing him with copies of every official document of the government which I have been able to procure, as well as the Act of the Constitution, which I have the honour to enclose, in the handwriting of the Prince of Benevent, I hope I afford your Lordship the best information of the great events which have occurred here within the last few days. So much has been done, so various are the important objects to consider, and so multiplied are the reasonings that might be brought forward on every proceeding, that I deem it most prudent to be silent, and confine myself merely to a transmissal of the papers.

It would be presumption, indeed, at such a moment to offer any observations. Colonel Lowe, who has been an eye-witness of all these great events and this wonderful revolution, will afford your Lordship every information that can be derived from an observer of much intelligence, experience, and ability. To him, therefore, I beg to refer you for all further details of the close of Napoleon Buonaparte's reign, "which, like the baseless fabric of a vision, will leave not a wreck behind."

I have, at the request of the Prince of Bénévent, sent Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, with a French officer of the same rank, to the Marquess of Wellington and Marshal Soult.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES STEWART.

E. Cooke, Esq., to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, London, 9th April, 1814.

This letter will find you almost at the termination of your labours, but not of your glory. The splendid termination to this great contest we chiefly owe to the example you displayed to Europe. I have seen so little and so lightly during the rapid interval which has taken place since the occupation of Paris, that I am not by any means capable of forming a judgment upon what has been done. I hope, however, we shall not throw away the advantages of the moment, nor suffer any one else to do so for us. I hope we shall be able to keep Talleyrand out of the part of negotiator.

I know not whether your Lordship is acquainted with Colonel de Montalembert, who carries this letter. He is a clever man, and a good officer, and intelligent. He was in Cradock's family.

Ever most truly your Lordship's servant,

E. COOKE.

Sir C. W. Flint to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Irish Office, 9th April, 1814.

I avail myself of Montalembert's departure to send you the newspapers and letters which have come since last Wednesday, together with the 'Gazette Extraordinary' of this morning, which announces Buonaparte's downfall, and eventually the restoration of the Bourbons.

To congratulate your Lordship on the consummation of so gigantic an event is not sufficient, especially as it is to you, and you alone, that Europe owes the progress of its salvation. Without your firmness and splendid successes Europe would have been long ere now at the feet of the detestable tyrant. Every thinking man feels this; and the page of history will confirm it. I thank God that I have been permitted to live long enough to witness the completion of a fabric of which your Lordship laid the foundation and became the corner stone.

Montalembert having been sent down yesterday by Lord Bathurst to inform the King of France of the proceedings of the Senate, he will be able to give you a very interesting account of everything that passed on that remarkable occasion.

Two deputies are arrived to offer the Crown to Louis XVIII. Buonaparte has abdicated, and is destined (as I hear) to go to the island of Elba.

But as you will be much better informed of all these matters than I can possibly pretend to, I shall merely add that I remain, with the highest respect,

Ever your Lordship's most obliged and devoted servant,

C. W. FLINT.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, War Department, London, 9th April, 1814.

If your Lordship shall not have signed an armistice in consequence of the counter-revolution which has taken place at Paris before this despatch shall reach you, you will consider yourself as authorised to do so if your Lordship shall deem it expedient for the cause in which we are embarked, always taking care that the principles upon which it is founded shall be such as to secure to you a safe and direct communication with this country, even in the event of hostilities being renewed.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, directing them to take off the blockade of all ports and places in France which shall hoist the Bourbon flag, and declare for peace with this country and our Allies.

If upon communication of the intelligence of the counter-revolution at Paris to the Commandant of Bayonne (in case that fortress should continue to hold out), the Commandant should not be willing to march out or to hoist the white flag, you will direct Sir John Hope to consent to an armistice for a given time, for the purpose of enabling the Commandant to ascertain the truth of such intelligence, provided he shall consent to march out or to hoist the white flag at the expiration of the given time, upon being satisfied of the truth of the intelligence which Sir John Hope will have been enabled to communicate to him.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Colonel H. E. Bunbury to J. W. Croker, Esq.

SIR, War Department, 9th April, 1814.

I am directed by Earl Bathurst to desire you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that intelligence has been received this morning by which it is known that the town of Dunkirk has displayed the white flag, and has professed sentiments of friendship towards Great Britain and her Allies; and you will move their Lordships to give orders that the blockade of Dunkirk should be suspended immediately, and generally that whatever ports in France should declare for the Bourbon family, and for peace with this country, should be relieved immediately from the naval blockade.

I am, &c.,

H. E. BUNBURY.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, 9th April, 1814, 5 P.M.

Since I wrote my despatch of this morning, which is sent under a flying seal to Sir John Hope, a messenger has arrived from Paris with despatches of the 7th instant. The declaration of the army in favour of the House of Bourbon, and the abdication of Buonaparte, will probably have caused a cessation of hostilities throughout France. But isolated garrisons and obstinate individuals may still resist; and I therefore still send my despatch of this day, in case the commandant of Bayonne should make it necessary to act upon these instructions. I send the despatch under a flying seal, through Sir John Hope, conceiving that your Lordship may be distant from Bayonne, and that he may find a favourable opportunity of communicating with the governor or garrison before he could receive your Lordship's further instructions.

A frigate (the *Thais*) is taking on board at Helvoet 220,000*l.* in French gold, and will probably sail in the course of next week for Bordeaux.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully yours,

BATHURST.

To General Freyre. [749.]

Le 10 Avril, 1814.

La 4me et la 6me divisions ont ordres de passer le pont par la grande route qui mène à l'église de Croix Dorade.

Ces deux divisions sortiront de la grande route vers la gauche au village de Croix Dorade, et après avoir suivi pour quelque tems cette direction, ces divisions formeront leurs lignes, et attaqueront la droite de la position de l'ennemi sur les hauteurs.

Le Général Freyre aura la bonté de diriger la colonne Espagnole, en premier lieu, vers le village de Croix Dorade, en jetant des tirailleurs vers la droite pour couvrir sa marche. Après être arrivé près du village de Croix Dorade, les troupes Espagnoles doivent former deux colonnes, dont celle de la droite doit se diriger sur la Pujade, vers une grande allée de cyprès, se tenant toujours sur la droite de la grande route.

La colonne de la gauche doit entrer dans la grande route près de l'église de Croix Dorade, et s'avancer ensuite assez pour combiner ses opérations avec la colonne de droite.

Il y a une hauteur à gauche de la grande route à peu près où l'allée des arbres cyprès aboutit. Il sera convenable que les troupes Espagnoles s'emparassent de cette hauteur, qui fournira

probablement une position avantageuse pour l'artillerie Portugaise au commencement de l'attaque.

Le Général Freyre formera ses troupes en deux lignes, avec une réserve, et les fera avancer à l'attaque en même tems qu'il verra avancer la 4me et la 6me divisions sur sa gauche pour faire leur attaque.

La division légère est sur la droite des troupes Espagnoles, faisant front vers la ville de Toulouse, et sera toujours en communication avec la droite des troupes de Général Freyre. Il y aura de la cavalerie sur la gauche des troupes Espagnoles, pour lier leur attaque avec celle de la 6me division ; et il y aura aussi une réserve de cavalerie dans les environs de Croix Dorade.

WELLINGTON.

[750.]
*

To Lieut.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton.

10th April, 1814, 8 A.M.

The 4th and 6th divisions have orders to move to the left from Croix Dorade, and after advancing some distance in that direction they will move up against the heights which the enemy occupies. Sir Stapleton Cotton will cause the Hussar brigade to co-operate with these divisions, and support their attack, taking care also to cover the left flank of the 4th division, as it is doubtful whether the 18th or 1st Hussars will be able to come round by the bridges higher up to act in that quarter. Sir Stapleton Cotton will order forward Major-General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry to the village of Croix Dorade, and will cause that brigade to act to the right of the Hussars. It will be in a particular manner the business of this brigade to give immediate support to the Spanish troops, and to be at all times near these troops for that purpose.

Sir Stapleton Cotton will take care that the cavalry connect the attack of the 4th and 6th divisions with that of the Spaniards. The Spanish troops are ordered to form for the attack near La Pujade, where the alley of cypress trees meets the great road.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, 10th April, 1814, 6 P.M.

The French papers of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of April have this moment been received by the Duc d'Angoulême. I hasten to send your Lordship a few extracts of them. At the same time I feel almost sure they have already reached your head-quarters.

The declaration of the Emperor Alexander in Paris, the Senate throwing off their allegiance to Buonaparte, and their call upon the people of France to return to their legitimate Sovereign, induce me to send an officer express with this.

Colonel Ponsonby has requested to be the bearer of this letter: his activity assures me it will reach you sooner by him than by any other person.

In haste, your Lordship's most faithfully,

DALHOUSIE.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Boucaut, 10th April, 1814.

I had last the honour of writing you on the 2nd instant, since which nothing worth reporting has occurred here.

A proportion of the stores moving from St. Jean de Luz by land has arrived, and the rest is in progress of being moved.

I learn that about thirty small vessels are at Pasages, and loading.

This state of things, and the consideration that it will take probably not less than sixteen days to have the whole of the guns ready for the batteries, have determined me to send for the guns to-morrow or next day; so that if the stores are not detained by foul winds or other circumstances, we shall be able to break ground about the 27th or 28th.

There is, I find, an unexpected want of shells, and they must be husbanded.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord, yours very faithfully,

JOHN HOPE.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, Bordeaux, ce 10 Avril, 1814.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous répéter combien j'ai été profondément affecté de vos deux lettres de 29 et 30 Mars.* C'est avec beaucoup de peine que je vois que vous désapprouvez les mesures que j'ai prises pour établir au nom du Roi le gouvernement civil dans le pays où j'ai passé, où j'ai été géné-

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 608, 612.

ralement parfaitement bien reçu, et avec les témoignages les plus vifs d'attachement pour le Souverain légitime. Non seulement tous les jours, mais plusieurs fois par jour, il me vient des députés des villes et départements voisins pour me demander mes ordres et de prendre le gouvernement au nom du Roi. Ma réponse est uniforme, qu'ils ne doivent rien faire avant l'arrivée des troupes alliées pour ne pas exposer inutilement la vie des fidèles sujets du Roi. Dans le département des Landes tout auroit été parfaitement sans la résistance d'un seul individu à St. Sever. Cette résistance a été cause du schisme qui règne actuellement dans ce département. Au reste, M. de Carrère est ici, et il y restera jusqu'à ce que vous lui permettiez d'aller reprendre les fonctions auxquelles je l'ai appelé au nom du Roi. Je ne puis pas vous empêcher de proclamer ce que vous jugerez nécessaire, quelque douloureux qu'il fut pour moi de vous voir agir en opposition aux vues paternelles du Roi. Pour moi, je ne dirai rien, et je ne puis pas m'opposer à ce que le peuple se déclare en faveur d'un cause pour laquelle j'ai été envoyé ici. Le vœu de Bordeaux a été beaucoup plus unanime que vous ne semblez le croire, et les excellents habitants m'en donnent chaque jour les témoignages les plus touchants. Vous dites, My Lord, que vous désirez que mon autorité soit restrainte à Bordeaux, mais je ne puis rien faire si elle l'est autant, car Bordeaux dépend même pour sa subsistance d'un grand nombre d'arrondissements. Je ne puis avoir de troupes sans les payer; je ne puis les payer sans impôts. J'ai pris avec mon conseil toutes les mesures pour leur levée: ils commencent déjà à rentrer. Voulez vous donc que je renonce à cette mesure? Le gouvernement s'établit fort bien dans le département, tout marche à ma satisfaction, et à Bazas ainsi que dans toutes les villes et villages jusqu'ici je n'ai pas été reçu avec moins de joie et d'enthousiasme qu'ici. Faites-moi connoître, je vous prie, l'étendue de l'autorité que vous voulez me laisser, et soyez bien persuadé du vif désir que j'ai d'allier autant que possible ce que vous désirez avec mes devoirs envers le Roi et envers ma patrie. Pour ce qui est de la Vendée, jusqu'à présent j'y ai contenu les bonnes intentions, mais j'en ai reçu les rapports les plus satisfaisants, et autant que je puis m'en rapporter à une chose que je n'ai pas vue de mes propres yeux, on doit y être sous les armes incessamment. On me fait pour cette partie des demandes d'armes et de munitions. Je dois m'en entendre aujourd'hui avec l'Amiral Penrose, et je crois que M. de la Rochejaquelein partira sous très peu de jours pour s'y rendre avec les secours que l'Amiral voudra bien nous accorder. Ne dois-je donc plus compter à cet égard sur aucun concours de votre part, My Lord? On indique St. Gilles comme le point de débarquement. Cette partie regarde mon frère, mais jusqu'à ce qu'il y soit arrivé je m'en occuperai. Il m'est très important d'avoir votre réponse aux différentes notes que je vous ai envoyées, particulièrement pour les sels (parceque on en manque ici) et pour le tarif des douanes, car il est déjà arrivé plusieurs bâtiments dans la rivière.

Je n'ai pas jugé devoir rien communiquer à mon conseil ni de vos lettres ni de ma réponse. Mettez-vous, je vous prie, à ma place, My Lord, et vous sentirez combien ma position est pénible et affligeante pour mon cœur. Au reste, le seul but qui m'anime, qui est de travailler pour le bonheur de la France, me fera toujours renfermer au dedans de moi toutes les peines que j'éprouverai, quelques vives et fortement senties qu'elles puissent être.

M. de Viel Castel est parti il y a peu de jours pour Pau. Je le laisse faire ce qui lui convient. Il m'a dit qu'il y alloit pour y faire déclarer la ville, et me faire envoyer des députés; tant mieux si cela réussit, mais il n'a pas une ligne de pouvoir de moi. Il n'a qu'un pouvoir signé de Damas pour la levée à ses frais d'un corps de 3000 hommes, qu'il compte m'offrir quand il sera formé. Il ne m'a plus reparlé des lettres que je devois écrire à Soult, Suchet, et Harispe; en conséquence je ne les lui ai pas remises; mais comme je pense pourtant qu'il est plus que tems que je fasse quelques démarches auprès de ces Généraux, je compte vous envoyer sous peu de jours un Monsieur de Perrin, qui m'a été envoyé d'Angleterre par le Roi pour agir à Toulouse, et à qui ou je remettrai les lettres ou je donnerai un pouvoir pour faire des démarches auprès de ces Généraux. Il m'a été envoyé d'Angleterre comme ayant beaucoup de rapports avec Toulouse, et pouvant m'y être très utile pour le service du Roi. Le Monsieur de la lettre de Sir R. Hill est reparti d'ici il y a huit ou dix jours, avec quelqu'argent que je lui ai donné avant d'avoir reçu votre lettre du 1er. Je ne sais pas trop où il est allé, mais il est porteur d'un billet du Duc de Guiche, qui ne dit pas grand chose.

Comme je vous écrivois cette lettre, My Lord, je viens de recevoir un courrier de Paris, qui m'annonce que le Roi y a été proclamé, et que Buonaparte a cessé de régner. J'ai toutes les Gazettes du 1er au 4, qui en contiennent tous les détails. Je suis sûr que vous en partagerez toute ma joie. Bordeaux est dans l'ivresse.

C'est avec la plus haute considération et bien véritable attachement que je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

MOVEMENTS. [751.]

Toulouse, 12th April, 1814.

Sir Rowland Hill will be so good as continue his movement to-morrow by the Carcassonne road, but will make only a short march.

The 4th and 6th divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, will halt to-morrow. Sir Stapleton Cotton will be so good as order the Hussar brigade to proceed towards Caraman, and upon the road of Alby, according to the instructions of yesterday and of this morning.

WELLINGTON.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD, La Bastide, 13th April, 1814.

In reporting on the conduct of the officers and soldiers of the 4th and 6th divisions of infantry in the attack of the enemy's position near Tou-

louse on the 10th instant, it is not necessary to say more than to give to the Commanding Generals, Generals, officers, and soldiers of those divisions my highest approbation and admiration. Though perhaps, from your Lordship's attention being necessarily directed to many different points during the period, you could not be a witness to the conduct of these two divisions during the whole of the contest, yet, having seen the line of march they had to proceed on to reach the point of attack, and the severe fire to which they were exposed, I need only testify that it was done with the greatest coolness and order to enable your Lordship to appreciate the state of discipline and the merit of those divisions. Their formation under the fire of the enemy for the attack was most regular, and their advance most gallant, and consequently successful. The force opposed to them near the right redoubt of the enemy appeared to me much superior to what these two divisions amounted to, as the whole of the enemy's troops which your Lordship saw filing from the left of this position to the rear were brought to his right, and formed on each side of the redoubt two very strong columns, one of which came partly down the hill to attack our right flank on the march; but Sir L. Cole threw out the provisional battalion of his division to check it until Sir H. Clinton came up, who was very near, Sir L. Cole continuing his march to turn the enemy's right. This provisional battalion behaved extremely well. Sir L. Cole, on passing the redoubt, formed; and Sir H. Clinton, having arrived in front of it, made the correspondent movement, as had been directed, and the height and redoubt were immediately carried. That we did not proceed immediately to the attack of the succeeding redoubts your Lordship is already aware of the reasons; and it was principally that, after the failure of the Spaniards, knowing nothing could dislodge us from where we were, I did not think it prudent to risk any the slightest failure on our part, and therefore waited to collect all the means possible for the assistance of the troops, though I will not doubt they would, under such officers, have carried the redoubts; but it would have been most probably with a still severer loss than we suffered. When the artillery had come up, and our left was quite secure by Sir S. Cotton having there placed his cavalry, the second line of redoubts were carried equally gallantly with the first, though a little confusion, which occurred after the carrying of them, was the cause of some loss of gallant men.

Your Lordship was present at what afterwards occurred, and at the carrying of the last redoubts, which were abandoned by the enemy before our troops got to them. I need not apologise to your Lordship for having put in practice your first arrangement for the attack, instead of going up the hill, as subsequently directed, from the village of Mont Blanc, as on arriving at this place I saw the enemy posted precisely in the manner you had made your first arrangements to meet; and therefore I followed but the spirit of your orders in reverting to your first arrangements.

I enclose the reports, or rather recommendations, of Sir L. Cole and Sir H. Clinton; and to these two officers, who, for their close attention to the directions given, and their excellent execution of them, merit my warmest praise, I would fail in what is due to them did I not second their recommendations to your Lordship's most favourable consideration. Though mentioned by Sir H. Clinton, it was impossible for me not to observe the gallant conduct of the leaders of his brigades; and though in the second

attack the same opportunity was not offered, yet during the whole course of the day the same praise is due to the leaders of the brigades of the 4th division.

I cannot conclude without bringing to your Lordship's notice Brigadier-General D'Urban, Quartermaster-General to the Portuguese troops, and expressing to you how much I consider the general service indebted to his zeal and talents; to Lieutenant-Colonel Hope, Assistant Adjutant-General, I am also much indebted; and to Brigadier-General Mozinho, Adjutant-General to the Portuguese forces; I am equally so to Colonel Arbuthnot and the officers of my personal staff.

I have further the honour to inform you that the 1st German hussars, on the 11th instant, with a reconnoitring party, under Captain Decken, fell in with a party of gendarmes near Caraman, of which they took an officer, 21 men, and 27 horses.

Part of this regiment yesterday charged the enemy's rear-guard of cavalry between Baziège and Villenouvelle, routed it, and took 30 or 40 prisoners; and I cannot let escape this opportunity of praising the conduct of this regiment on all occasions.

I have the honour to be
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
W. C. BERESFORD.

P.S.—I have omitted to mention to your Lordship Major Dyer of the Royal Artillery, whose exertions in bringing up and placing the guns I had every reason to be satisfied with, and I beg to recommend him to your Lordship's favourable consideration.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Lowry Cole to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

SIR, Bridge of Las Bordes, 11th April, 1814.

Agreeable to your desire, I have the honour to submit the names of officers whose conduct in the action of yesterday is deserving of your notice and protection, and who, I trust, through your recommendation may share in that promotion which usually attends splendid victories:—

Major Henderson, of the Queen's.

Major Ahmuty, of the 7th Fusiliers, in command of the light companies of the left brigade.

Major Balfour, of the 40th regiment.

Captain Derenzie, of the 7th Caçadores, who succeeded early in the day to the command of the battalion on Major Little's being wounded.

And I beg to add the names of the corps principally engaged and distinguished:—The provisional battalion, commanded by Brigadier Lieutenant-Colonel Mansel; the 27th regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Maclean; and the 40th, Lieutenant-Colonel Thornton.

I have the honour to be your most obedient servant,
G. LOWRY COLE.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Clinton to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

SIR, Montblanc, 11th April, 1814.

The manner in which the 2nd corps of the 6th division performed the task allotted to them yesterday induces me to request your Excellency will lay before the Commander of the Forces the names of those officers, a list of which I have the honour to enclose; and I trust that his Lordship will recommend them for promotion.

The circumstances particularly deserving of notice and of approbation in the proceedings of the 6th division yesterday are, the ready formation of the prescribed disposition for the attack, although I had been constrained to form the three columns upon the march, and without any halt of the leading brigade; the gallantry of Major-General Lambert's brigade in the attack of that part of the enemy's position defended by his right redoubt and by two considerable bodies of infantry; the steady support afforded upon this occasion by the Portuguese brigade under Colonel Douglas, and by Major-General Pack's brigade, of which the 79th regiment was required to form column and afterwards square to check a body of the enemy's cavalry which menaced the right flank of our brigades in the advance up the hill; the resolute charge made by the 61st regiment, in which, though completely successful, its excellent and gallant leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Coghlan, lost his life; and, subsequently to these, the attacks made by the Highland brigade, under Major-General Pack, upon the redoubts of the Mas des Augustins, to which the Portuguese brigade again formed a useful support. In this service Colonel Douglas, who had previously been wounded, but had remained at the head of his brigade, lost his leg; and I have to lament the death of another valuable officer in Lieutenant-Colonel Bermingham of the 8th Portuguese regiment. Major-General Pack was also wounded, but did not quit the field. I have also to notice the same meritorious conduct in Lieutenant-Colonel Cuyler of the 11th regiment, who was wounded in the first attack, but did not for a moment leave the command of his regiment.

It is quite unnecessary for me to make any general report of our proceedings, as they took place under your immediate direction and observation: I have only therefore to add that I received every assistance from Captain Obins, of the 20th regiment, the Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, who is a very zealous and deserving officer; from Lieutenant-Colonel Woodford, the Assistant Quartermaster-General; Captain Boteler of the Royal Engineers; and from my personal staff.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

H. CLINTON.

LIST of OFFICERS in the 6th Division who are recommended to the favourable notice of the Commander of the Forces.

Captain Wingfield	36th Regt.
„ Walker	42nd „
„ J. Campbell	
„ Green	61st „
Major Cameron	79th „
Captain Walsh	91st „
„ Obins	20th „
Lieutenant Maher	87th „

H. CLINTON.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, La Bastide, 13th April, 1814.

Since shutting up my letters I have received the enclosed report from Major Dyer of the Royal Artillery; and those two brigades merit my recommendation of them to your Lordship for their exertions and services on the 10th instant.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's very humble servant,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major J. Dyer to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford.

SIR, La Bastide, 13th April, 1814.

I have the honour to inform you that the troop of Horse Artillery commanded by Major Gardiner, and the brigades of artillery commanded by Captains Brandreth and Daniel, assisted the column under your Excellency's orders in driving the enemy from their strong position near Toulouse on the 10th instant.

The difficulties these brigades had to encounter before they could ascend the heights, and the forward positions they took, did not, I hope, escape your notice, and reflect the greatest credit on the officers in command, and, I trust, will be thought to merit your Excellency's recommendation of them to the Commander of the Forces.

I have to lament the loss of Lieutenant Blumenbach, a very promising officer, and many valuable artillerymen.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. DYER.

MEMORANDUM BY GENERAL SIR GEORGE MURRAY ON THE BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

When Lord Wellington was about to open the campaign of 1814, he perceived that if he engaged in the siege of Bayonne, a place of great strength, and very advantageously situated, he would deprive the other Allied armies, acting against the northern and eastern frontiers of France, of that active and efficient co-operation which the then state of the war rendered it essential that he should endeavour to afford to them. Moved chiefly by this consideration, he determined to leave Sir John Hope with the left wing of the army to force the passage of the river Adour between Bayonne and the sea, and carry on an attack against the citadel only situated on the right bank of the Adour, and to advance himself, with the centre and the right of his army, by a more circuitous route into France. In pursuance of this plan Lord Wellington put the right wing of his army in motion about the middle of February; and with the 2nd British division drove the French General Harispe from a strong post which he occupied at Garris, not far from St. Palais, on the Bidouze. Returning from thence to St. Jean de Luz, to give his final instructions to General

Hope, Lord Wellington again joined the right wing of his army on the 21st of February, and having successively forced the passage of the Soison, the Gave d'Oléron, and the Gave de Pau, he attacked and defeated Marshal Soult at Orthez on the 27th of February.

Sir John Hope had, in the mean time, effected the passage of the Adour, near its entrance into the sea, on the 23rd and 24th of February, and established a bridge of boats upon the river, with the assistance of the navy.

Lord Wellington advanced, after the battle of Orthez, to St. Sever, from whence he detached a portion of his force to Bordeaux. He then, by a combined movement along both banks of the Adour, dislodged Marshal Soult from Aire; and having waited to learn the result of the movement against Bordeaux, he followed the enemy to Tarbes, and drove him from a strong position he had taken up on the commanding heights to the eastward of that town. From Tarbes Lord Wellington continued the pursuit of the enemy, who fell back rapidly to Toulouse, in the neighbourhood of which place the Allied army arrived at the end of the month of March.

The town of Toulouse and its environs present a military position of very great natural strength, and in which the assailant has numerous important obstacles to overcome. This is especially the case when it is approached, as it was by the Allied army in 1814, from the south-west; for, the town being situated on the eastern side of the Garonne, that broad and rapid river is to be passed before it can be attacked. But as the Garonne forms at Toulouse a re-entering angle with respect to an enemy on the left bank, the suburb of St. Cyprien, which is opposite to the town, in that re-entering angle, forms a tête de pont most advantageously situated for covering the stone bridge, and renders Toulouse quite unassailable in that direction. Neither could an attempt to force the passage of the river against a strong and vigilant enemy be made with any prospect of success in the immediate vicinity of Toulouse. But even if the Garonne were passed above the junction with it of the Arriège, and afterwards that river also, then the corps sent across would be separated from the rest of the army by two great rivers, and would get likewise into a very difficult, hilly country, traversed only by bad roads, which, after rainy weather, are almost totally impracticable for an army; the enemy having the power at the same time, by means of the bridge of Toulouse, of acting upon either side of the river he pleased with his whole force, and having also excellent roads to move by.

The passage of the Garonne below Toulouse, for example, near Grenade, where it was effected by Lord Wellington, is liable to fewer disadvantages: for the left bank has a considerable command over the other; and the troops which have crossed get at once into a level country, of no great breadth, through the middle of which runs the great road from Paris to Toulouse, and in which the right flank is secured by the Garonne, and the left and rear are protected by the Ers, which, in wet weather, such as then prevailed, forms a very considerable stream, nowhere fordable.

We shall now mention the disadvantages to which the assailant of an army posted at Toulouse is still exposed after he has effected the passage of the Garonne. First, there is that already adverted to, of the enemy having it in his power to act with promptitude on either side of the river

by means of the bridge of Toulouse. But besides that disadvantage the corps which has passed to the right bank of the river has to overcome two very formidable obstacles. 1st. The canal of Languedoc, which covers three-fourths of the town; and 2nd. The wall flanked with towers, which formed the ancient defences of the place, and which still existed in 1814. And in addition to these two formidable obstacles Marshal Soult had placed the bulk of his army upon a hill very advantageously situated between the canal of Languedoc and the Ers river, and which he had already made considerable progress in intrenching when Lord Wellington approached to attack him. This hill, besides the command it has over all the ground near it, derives great additional strength from its situation: for the left extremity of the hill is sufficiently near the canal and the works of the town to render it impossible to turn it in that quarter; and the extreme right of it, which is protected by the Ers river, derived additional security from the low meadows in that quarter being still partially inundated in consequence of the heavy rains which had recently fallen. The Ers river also runs along the whole front of the position the French occupied; the distance between the position and the river increasing, however, as the latter advances in its course.

The object of the British General was to dislodge the enemy from Toulouse and its neighbourhood, but there was no other mode of effecting this than by forcing his intrenched position. Lord Wellington reconnoitred the enemy's position from the high grounds on the Alby road on the 9th of April, and the British took possession at that time also of the bridge by which the Alby road passes the river Ers. The bridges higher up were too distant to be secured, and they were afterwards destroyed by the French.

The following is the disposition, as drawn up by the Quartermaster-General, for the operations of the troops on the 10th of April:—

Third Division and Light Division.

"The front of attack of the 3rd division is to extend from the river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban), inclusive of that road. The Light division will be immediately on the left of the 3rd division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road above mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of the Spanish troops.

"The operations of these two divisions are meant, however, more as diversions than as real attacks, it not being expected that they will be able to force any of the passes of the canal which covers Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened chiefly at the bridges and at the locks; or at any other points where the form of the ground, or other circumstances, most favour the advance of the troops. A considerable part both of the 3rd and of the Light division must be kept in reserve."

The Spanish Division.

"Lieutenant-General Freyre will be so good as direct the movement of the Spanish troops, in the first instance, towards the village of Croix Dorade, throwing out skirmishers from the right flank to cover his march. On arriving at Croix Dorade General Freyre will form his troops into two columns. The right column, keeping on the right of the Alby road, will

advance to an alley of cypress trees, which there is between that road and La Pujade. The left Spanish column will enter the Alby road near the church of Croix Dorade, and it will thence move forward and gain possession of a height which there is to the left of that road, nearly in a line with the alley of cypress trees already mentioned."

Portuguese Artillery.

"The Portuguese artillery will be also placed upon the same height, preparatory to the attack."

"General Freyre is informed that the British Light division will be immediately upon his right. A brigade of cavalry will connect his left with the right of the 6th British division, and another brigade of cavalry will be in reserve, to support the Spaniards, near Croix Dorade. General Freyre will form his troops in two lines, with a reserve, and he will advance to the attack when he perceives that the 4th and 6th British divisions (Beresford's) are moving up to attack the right of the enemy."

Fourth Division and Sixth Division.

"The 4th and 6th British divisions, under Marshal Beresford, are to act against the right of the enemy's position. They will therefore march to their left from Croix Dorade, and when they have continued their movement to a sufficient distance along the plain, between the Ers river and the enemy's position, Marshal Beresford will then move them up to the attack.

"Sir Stapleton Cotton will order the Hussar brigade of cavalry to cooperate with the 4th and 6th divisions, taking particular care to cover the left flank of the 4th division when the infantry move up to make their attack."

Instructions for the troops on the left of the Garonne, dated at St. Jory, 9th April.

"It being intended to move against the enemy's positions on this side of the Garonne to-morrow morning, soon after day-break, Sir Rowland Hill will be so good as make such arrangements to threaten the suburb of Toulouse, situated on the left bank of the river, as circumstances admit of, in order to draw a part of the attention and force of the enemy to that side. He will be able to see the commencement and the progress of the operations on the right bank, and will be so good as to regulate his own accordingly.

"The pontoons which have recently arrived * should be moved to Blagnac this night, and a flying bridge, at least, should be established there to keep up the communication between General Hill's corps and the right of the 3rd division.

"G. MURRAY, Quartermaster-General."

* Very considerable delays took place in the march of the pontoons and the convoys of ammunition which followed the army, owing partly to the badness of the cross-roads from Bayonne as far as Orthez, and partly to the rivers being rendered frequently impassable by the rains; the bridges having been destroyed by the enemy.

Some delay took place in commencing the attack directed by Marshal Beresford. The Spanish division had, however, in the mean time, been moved forward, which they did in good order, and with apparent confidence; but a hollow road occurring within musket-shot of the enemy's intrenchment, they halted there and began to fire. The French soon brought a part of their reserves into a situation to take the Spaniards in flank, and to enfilade the hollow road, which speedily forced the Spaniards to make a rapid retreat; but being protected by the fire of the Portuguese artillery, which had remained in the position allotted to it, and supported by the brigade of British cavalry held in reserve for that purpose, they were soon rallied, the Light division having also promptly come to their aid.

Affairs being thus re-arranged in the vicinity of the Alby road, the general attack upon the enemy's position was carried into effect with complete success, but with considerable loss on the part of the regiments of the 6th division, to whose lot it fell to storm the redoubts and fortified buildings, by which the centre of the French position was strengthened.

Towards the right some loss was sustained by the 3rd division, in consequence of General Picton having exceeded his instructions, in causing a serious attack to be made upon one of the bridges over the canal.

The result of carrying the enemy's intrenched position was, that Marshal Soult abandoned Toulouse and its environs during the night of the 11th, and the British General thus effected the object of his enterprise.

A few Remarks upon Choumara's Book.

Marshal Soult is the hero of M. Choumara's tale, and on the altar of this idol he first sacrifices Suchet, another French Marshal, and next the Duke of Wellington, from whom he abstracts the victory of Toulouse, and adds it to Soult's triumphs. We shall leave the question raised between the two French Marshals to be settled in France, contenting ourselves with a brief inquiry into the claims on both sides to the victory of Toulouse. M. Choumara says:—

"Prévoyant le cas où Lord Wellington . . . . du mur d'enceinte du faubourg."—P. 178.

It is very true that Marshal Soult caused an advanced line of works to be thrown up in front of the suburb of St. Cyprien, but it is equally certain that the British General never contemplated making an attack upon that suburb, which it would have been very difficult to carry, and the carrying of which would not have facilitated at all Lord Wellington's object, viz., to dislodge the French army from Toulouse.

"Il suffit de jeter un coup-d'œil . . . . particulièrement au pont Jumeau."—P. 179.

Lord Wellington never had any such project as is here imputed to him.

"En effet le corps du Général Hill . . . . celui des Minimes."—P. 179.

It never was contemplated that an attack should be made by the divisions under Picton and Alten, and the partial attack made by General Picton was an infraction of the instruction given to him. The operation allotted to General Hill was merely as a diversion, in order to attract the attention of the enemy; the same being the object allotted to Picton and Alten.

"Le Général Freyre est placé en face . . . . tête du pont Matabiau."—P. 179.

It never was intended to attack the bridge of Matabiau, nor was it attacked. The Spanish division was placed upon the Mamelon de la Pujada, with instructions not to advance from thence until the attack upon the right of the enemy's position should commence.

"Le Général Beresford couvre la gauche . . . l'armée du centre du platéau."—P. 179.

This is a complete mistake. General Beresford did not cover the left of the Spaniards; nor was his own left thrown back. His destination from the first was to move along the plain between the Ers river and the French position, preceded by Sir Stapleton Cotton, with a part of the cavalry, for the purpose of turning the right of the enemy's position. So that in fact the position of the Spaniards covered General Beresford's movement, and was intended to do so, in place of Beresford covering the Spaniards, as erroneously stated by M. Choumara.

"Assurément si jamais . . . . ce qu'il y avoit de mieux à faire."—P. 179.

M. Choumara is at perfect liberty, of course, to form his own opinion, or to make his own statement, whether it be in accordance with his real opinion or not, as to what was *best to be done;* but this liberty, as he uses it, is like that which some men have exercised in this country also, of calling black white, and white black. M. Choumara's statement is, however, directly at variance with fact, when he represents his own *project of attack* as having been at any time that of the British General.

"Le Général Anglais avec . . . . quand et où bon lui sembleroit."—Pp. 179, 180.

The immediate object of Lord Wellington's operations at Toulouse was to compel Marshal Soult's army to evacuate that city and its environs. He succeeded in that object. But M. Choumara says that after the battle the French General retained the liberty of retiring *when*, and *whither*, he pleased. That he could retire *whither* he pleased is not the fact, for every issue from Toulouse, that by Castelnaudary to Montpellier *alone* excepted, was already closed by the Allies. But neither had Marshal Soult the option of retiring *when* he pleased; for had he not retired when he did, viz., in the night between the 11th and 12th of April, the road by Castelnaudary, as well as all the other roads, would have been closed by the Allies. Two divisions of British infantry and a great part of the cavalry

were in the neighbourhood of La Bastide on the 12th, and but for the expedition with which the French army retreated from Toulouse, these troops would have been in possession of the bridge, near Baziège, by which the Montpellier road crosses the canal of Languedoc. The British cavalry did in fact attack the French rear-guard on the 12th of April, between Baziège and Villeneuville, upon that road. So near was the only line of retreat left them being closed to this army, which, according to M. Choumara, had the liberty of retiring *when* and *whither* it pleased.

In the passage above quoted, and also in the return which he inserts at page 185, M. Choumara exaggerates *enormously* the numbers of the Allied army in the neighbourhood of Toulouse; and he exaggerates in like manner the amount of the loss sustained by it in the battle. He makes, for example, the Spanish corps under General Freyre amount to 18,000 infantry and 900 cavalry, whereas the real amount of that corps was only 8000 infantry. He also puts down a Spanish reserve of 18,000 infantry and 900 cavalry, which, he says, *n'a point pris part à l'action*, implying by that mode of expression that this Spanish reserve was near enough to have taken part in the action, although from circumstances it did not do so. But the truth is, that besides Freyre's corps of 8000 infantry at the utmost, and one brigade of Spanish infantry under Morillo, not amounting to 2000 men, there were no Spanish troops of any description within less than ten days' march of Toulouse. There is a similar exaggeration in the amount of the cavalry. If the whole cavalry of the army had been at Toulouse, it would not have amounted to the force stated by M. Choumara. But the fact is, that those brigades of cavalry even which were at Toulouse had considerable detachments employed upon the long lines of communication in rear of the army. The strength of the British and Portuguese infantry is also stated by M. Choumara very considerably above its real amount. This *veracious* writer makes the loss of the Allies amount to 10,000 or 12,000 of their best troops. Their real loss was, however, as follows:—

	Killed.	Wounded.
British and Hanoverians	278	1564
Spanish	193	1631
Portuguese	70	465
	541	3660
Total Rank and File	4201	

If the statement be true which M. Choumara gives of the French force, viz., that it consisted of 25,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 7000 conscripts, and that of that force no more than 1640 men remained on the left bank of the Garonne to hold the suburb of St. Cyprien against General Hill, then, M. Choumara's exaggerations being deducted from the Allied force, there could not be on the right bank of the Garonne any numerical superiority over the French, who had the advantage besides of holding a position unattackable in many parts, and strong both by nature and by art in that part which was attacked and carried.

We shall here insert the original instructions given for the attack of the French position at Toulouse on the 10th of April, 1814.*

* See p. 745.

With reference to the events of the battle M. Choumara says:—

"Le Général Hill a-t-il été . . . . il a manqué son but, il a été battu."—Pp. 184-5-6.

We have seen by the instructions given to General Hill, that he was to limit his operations to "*threatening* the suburb of Toulouse on the left bank of the river."

"Sur la rive droite . . . . l'armée Française a été victorieuse."—P. 186.

We have seen that the operations of the 3rd division and the Light division were limited to drawing the enemy's attention to the line of the canal; that they were not expected to force any of the passages over it; and that a considerable part of each division was to be kept in reserve; the object of which was, that these reserves might be in readiness to move to the aid of the Spaniards. The brigade of cavalry in rear of these divisions was merely a reserve, it being necessary to guard the whole of the rear of the army against any attempts which might be made to create alarm, either from the garrison of Montauban or from any other quarter.

"Le 3me corps, composé de dix-huit mille . . . . le centre de l'armée Française a été victorieuse."—P. 187.

We have already stated that the Spanish force under Freyre consisted not of 18,000, but of 8000 *at the utmost*. It had a reserve of one brigade of cavalry (Ponsonby's brigade, then commanded by Lord Charles Manners) consisting, not of 2400, but of 1100. There was no attack upon the bridge of Matabiau; and there was but one attack made upon the works which, on the plateau of Calvinet, formed the left of the enemy's intrenched position. The loss of the Spaniards we have already given.

"Le 4me corps, composé de dix mille . . . . de quitter de son entreprise."—P. 187.

There was no demonstration made, nor desired to be made, against the centre of the enemy's position. The instruction given to this part of the Allied force was, to turn the right of the enemy's intrenched position; and any attempts to attack the enemy before effecting that object would have been in contravention of the instruction given.

It would be superfluous to add anything more in order to expose the very disreputable fabrications which M. Choumara has had the effrontery to publish, and which we have no doubt will be as much reprobated by every French officer to whom the real circumstances are known as they have been despised and reprobated by ourselves. We shall conclude by stating that in this brief campaign, which opened in the middle of February and ended by the middle of April, Lord Wellington, setting out from the neighbourhood of St. Jean de Luz, close upon the Spanish frontier, succeeded in occupying Bordeaux with the left of his army, and Toulouse with its right; and in dislodging the French troops from every part of the extensive territory between the river Garonne and the Pyrenees, with the exception only of those who were cooped up in the strong places of Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, and the small fort of Navarreins; thus causing a diversion in favour of the other Allied armies, and the success of the common cause, beyond what there could have been any reasonable hope or expectation that he would be able to effect.

MEMORANDUM of the Force of the British and Hanoverians at Toulouse.

16th May, 1814.

Cavalry.

	Horses Present.	
Household Brigade		1094
Ponsonby's Brigade	1111	
Vivian's or Arentschildt's	895	
Arentschildt's or Bock's	745	
Hussars	1611	
	——	4362
		5456

Infantry.

	Rank and File Present.	
2nd Division		4815
3rd Do.	2931	
4th Do.	3451	
6th Do.	2989	
Light Division	2867	
	——	12,248
		17,053

British and Hanoverians:—

	Rank and File.
Killed	278
Wounded	1574
	1852

Spanish Loss:—

Killed	193
Wounded	1631
	1824

Portuguese Loss:—

Killed	70
Wounded	465
	535

Suppose each Division to have had a Portuguese Brigade of 2000 Rank and File, which will make for the Four Divisions on the right bank	8,000
Add	13,248
	21,248
Total (16th May) Rank and File of the Divisions which had acted on the right bank ..	12,248
Suppose we add for the killed and for those too badly wounded to have rejoined by the 16th May	1,000
	13,248

[752.]

MEMORANDUM

*On ' Considérations Militaires sur les Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet, et sur la Bataille de Toulouse : par T. Choumara, ancien Capitaine du Génie.' **

1. The object is to maintain the character of Marshal Soult : 1st, in relation to his communications with Marshal Suchet during the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, and to the publication, by the latter, of parts of the correspondence between the Marshals, and of the correspondence of the latter with the Ministre de la Guerre, in the history of his life ; 2ndly, in relation to the battle of Toulouse.

2. It is on the last point only that this publication would be interesting to the mass of English readers.

3. The work is, however, well worthy of attention, as showing the evils with which these great military establishments and systems are pregnant, and which must destroy them.

4. Here we find two republican Generals, with great titles and fortunes, and holding the highest military rank and exercising the greatest authority, quarrelling as did the sons, legitimate and illegitimate, and the Marshals in the service of Louis XIV. ; neither party ever thinking of the public interest, excepting as connected with his own personal objects of ambition and aggrandizement ; and each appealing to Buonaparte, as the others did heretofore to Louis XIV., and Buonaparte following the example of Louis XIV. in giving no answer.

5. But there are some curious details worthy of attention, as tending to show that but few of the publications are calculated to afford materials for history.

6. It will be seen (*letter, page* 113 †) that when Marshal Suchet wished to avoid engaging himself to carry on an operation proposed by Marshal Soult, he did not scruple to transmit a false statement of the amount of the disposable force under his command. This is clearly proved by M. Choumara (*Résumé et Conclusion, page* 97 †).

7. Then he exaggerates the force employed against him (*page* 114 †) : " *Rowland Hill avait rejoint Bentinck avec*

* M. Choumara published, in 1837, ' Considérations Militaires sur la Bataille de Toulouse,' in which he has endeavoured to prove that battle to have been a French victory : Colonel Gurwood laid it before the Duke of Wellington for his consideration, in May, 1838, when his Grace wrote this Memorandum.

† Choumara.

24,000 *hommes; que le Comte de La Bisbal arrivait de la Navarre avec* 15,000 *hommes . . . . Il suffit pour en être convaincu de savoir que les ennemis ont réunis plus de* 200,000 *hommes au-delà de l'Ebre. . . . .*" All this is either false or exaggerated; and Marshal Soult's aide-de-camp, who saw the army which was employed against Suchet, says that there were never 25,000 or 30,000 men, of which 10,000 were English or Sicilians, the rest Spaniards. In truth, the Empecinado believed that after the corps under the Duque del Parque was sent away, the Allied army did not amount to 30,000 men, of which two-thirds were Spaniards.

8. Then Marshal Soult, on his side, corrects the mistakes of Marshal Suchet, so far that he will not suffer the latter to take into the account a man from the amount of those employed against himself. Accordingly, he shows that Hill and Morillo, and La Bisbal, were in his front; but he, as well as the other, exaggerates the amount of that force. In his letter, 27th September, to the Ministre de la Guerre, he calls it 120,000, and, including other arms, 140,000 men. In a letter* to Suchet, of the 14th October, he says that Lord Wellington has 115,000 infantry, a great quantity of artillery, and a numerous cavalry.

9. This matter is of no importance, excepting to show how little faith can be given to such details.

10. The Allied army, opposed to the French army called "L'Armée d'Espagne," consisted at the battle of Vitoria of 60,000 British and Portuguese, 20,000 Spaniards, 80,000 all included.

The British and Portuguese army never had afterwards more than 50,000 men under arms. They were joined at first by 5000 Spaniards, then 10,000 Spaniards, and afterwards another 10,000 Spaniards, which last came from Catalonia, and are mentioned as the corps under the Duque del Parque; making in the whole 45,000 Spaniards and 50,000 British and Portuguese employed in the operations in the western Pyrenees. It will be seen that these are called 140,000 men (*see page* 132,* *despatch to the Ministre de la Guerre*).

11. The force of British and Portuguese can be accurately ascertained at any given period.

12. Marshal Soult likewise talks of the Empecinado and Duran as being in his front. They were so, to be sure; so

* Choumara.

were the troops in Gibraltar and Africa. Both were at a great distance from the scene of operations. Mina, Longa, Morillo, and Don Carlos de España are reckoned in the number of 45,000 Spaniards.

13. It is not so easy to ascertain Soult's force in the army called "L'Armée d'Espagne." It appears that he intended and proposed to form in Aragon an army of 85,000 men, of which 32,000 were to come from Catalonia; 53,000 must have been from his own army. He was to leave 20,000 men in the intrenched camp at Bayonne, and 15,000 in the garrison of Bayonne, besides a garrison in St. Jean Pied de Port. This would give him an army of 73,000 men in the field, besides the Catalonian army. His last proposition was to go into Aragon with 45,000, which would give him an army of 65,000 men in the field, besides the garrisons and the Catalonian army. In this number General Paris' division, say 5000 men, are not included, as they were to be sent into Catalonia to join Marshal Suchet. But when he came to the operations in February, 1814, he had not sent away General Paris. He had, therefore, at that time an army of 70,000 or of 78,000 men: unless, indeed, he had sustained enormous losses between the month of November, 1813, when he was in correspondence with Marshal Suchet and the Ministre de la Guerre, and the month of February, 1814, when the Allied army commenced its operations. The revision of all this will show that no reliance can be placed upon such details.

14. The question is then discussed, who won the battle of Toulouse? Toulouse is surrounded by an ancient wall with towers. It stands upon the Garonne, over which there is a bridge protected by an ancient *tête de pont*. The Canal de Languedoc joins the Garonne about a mile below the town. Its course is about 1000 yards distant from the river; and less than half that distance from the wall of the town from the point at which it approaches the town. The town then was protected not only by its walls, but by the river Garonne on one side, and by the canal on two others. It was protected by its wall only on the side of the Faubourg St. Michel and the road from Montpellier. The ground near the town was there more open. Thus situated, and occupied by an army called "L'Armée d'Espagne," the town of Toulouse might have been considered inexpugnable.

15. But to these defences of the town of Toulouse, which may be called permanent and natural, Marshal Soult added other works, described very minutely by M. Choumara. He augmented and extended the works of the *tête de pont* over the Garonne. He formed *têtes de pont* on all the bridges over the canal, within reach of fire from the wall of the town. He fortified convents and houses in the neighbourhood of these bridges. He formed a line of fortification, consisting of redoubts, connected by intrenchments, on the heights of Calvinet beyond the canal, of which the summit was about the same or little greater distance from the canal, as the canal was from the wall of the town.

16. It is obvious from his manœuvres, as reported by himself, that the Commander in Chief of the Allied army saw clearly that he could obtain possession of Toulouse only by becoming master of the approaches to the town from Montpellier. His first measure was to endeavour to form a bridge over the Garonne, above the town. The number of boats was not sufficient. He could not expect to supply the deficiency by *chevalets* or other means, and to secure the bridge prepared for passage and the troops across in time to resist the attack which might so easily have been made upon them from Toulouse. He then laid a bridge over the Garonne, above the junction of the Arriège with that river. A part of the army crossed the Garonne and the Arriège, and reached Ville Franche in the very country which it was wished to occupy. But the roads and country were found impracticable, owing to the fall of rain, and the detachment returned to the left of the Garonne.

17. It was then necessary to endeavour, by other means, to attain the same object, viz., access to the ground in the neighbourhood of the Faubourg St. Michel, between the canal and the Garonne.

18. It appears that Marshal Soult was aware of the importance of the position on Mont Calvinet. He ordered it to be fortified on the 2nd April. As soon as he heard that that part of the army which had passed the Garonne and Arriège had returned, he was sensible of the probability that an attempt would be made to pass the river below the town. It was obvious that he was aware that Mont Calvinet was the key of the position. He stationed upon it for its defence three-fourths of his army, leaving but few to defend the *tête de pont* of the Garonne,

and the bridges and fortified houses of the canal, and he ordered that all should be brought eventually to the defence of that position. He conceived that the attack would be made by the other side of the Ers; and he particularly ordered General Soult, his brother, to defend that ground with his cavalry; and, above all, he instructed General Taupin to attack the corps which should attempt to gain the heights, by turning his right flank. In his letter to the Ministre de la Guerre (*page* 257 *), after the battle, dated the 11th April, Marshal Soult says, "*L'armée était en position la droite appuyée à l'Ers, et la gauche au Canal de Languedoc jusqu'à son embouchure. La tête de pont du Faubourg St. Cyprien* (that is upon the Garonne) *était occupée.*" Considering that the principal attack would be made upon Mont Calvinet, he had fortified it.

19. The battle was fought on the 10th April: it ended by the Allied army being in possession of all the works on Mont Calvinet, and (with the exception of the Faubourg-Guillemerie and its fortified posts at Sacarin and Cambon) of all the ground on the right of the Canal de Languedoc, and their posts of cavalry on the bridges of the canal above the town.

20. On the 11th April Marshal Soult wrote a letter to the Ministre de la Guerre, and to Marshal Suchet, in which he clearly indicated what must be the result of the previous day's battle. He states the probability of his retiring from Toulouse. On the same day he made all the preparations, arrangements, and dispositions for the retreat which was made on that night.

21. The battle of the 10th had been a most desperate one. The position, naturally strong, was the strongest that could be formed by all the additional defence that art could devise. The canal could not be attacked by main force, nor the bridge over the Garonne. The country beyond the Ers had been reconnaitred, and it was found impossible to manœuvre on it, for the purpose of repairing or forming new bridges, with a view to the passage of the river. It was necessary to march between Mont Calvinet and the river Ers, the distance not being greater from the works upon the summit anywhere than 2000 yards, diminishing to 1000 yards, and in some places to 500 yards. The distance marched was not less than 2 miles under the fire of the enemy's position. In the mean time the Spanish corps which was to attack the enemy's position in front, while Marshal

* Choumara.

Beresford was marching along its front, made their attack, but failed, and gave way. The Marshal's corps was, therefore, exposed to the attack of all the enemy's troops on Mont Calvinet. They were attacked by General Taupin, whose division they defeated, and then got possession of "La Redoute Sypière," the farthest on the enemy's right. The Light division was called to the support of the Spaniards; these were brought back, reformed, and again ordered to attack the heights, which were at length carried, as originally intended, by the co-operation of an attack moving along the summit from the enemy's right of them, with the attack of them from the front.

22. These operations took up a great length of time. It was necessary to cover and protect, by a very heavy fire of artillery, the march of the troops to turn the flank; the advance, the retreat, the re-formation, and subsequent attack by the troops on the front of Mont Calvinet.

23. It happened also by mistake, that General Picton, who had been ordered to make a false attack upon one of the bridges of the canal, and whose division it was intended to keep in reserve, as well as the Light division, was involved in a real attack upon the fortified convent "Les Minimes," which failed, and the Allies suffered much loss. This caused a heavy cannonade.

24. The consequence of this continued fire of artillery was the necessity of making a fresh distribution of gun and musket ammunition before the battle could be renewed; and the Commander in Chief crossed the Garonne to see the exact state of the *tête de pont* after the attack of its exterior works by the troops under Sir R. Hill on the 10th, and to make the arrangements for the ulterior movements of the army. He did not get back to Mont Calvinet till the evening of the 11th. All the dispositions were made for passing the canal above the town on the morning of the 12th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated, having marched by the very road of which we must have had possession.

25. M. Choumara pretends that the position of Toulouse was the whole position; that is to say, the town, the *tête de pont* on the Garonne, the canal, its fortified bridges and houses, the works on Mont Calvinet. The last only were taken. Marshal Soult remained during the night of the 10th and the day of the 11th in possession of the remainder: therefore he won the battle.

If Toulouse was to be considered as a fortress, of which possession was to be held till the body of the place should be entered, M. Choumara's idea would be correct. In that case Marshal Soult must have been prepared with means of all descriptions to enable him to remain in the town. Even in that case the possession of Mont Calvinet would have given the Allies the means of a fire by enfilade upon the canal, very near to its junction with the Garonne. But Toulouse could not be considered as a fortress. It was a field of battle, of which the principal fortified position, most important in the view of those who attacked, as well as of those who defended it, was taken by the Allied army after a desperate combat. The consequence of the battle was that the Allied army took possession of the passages of the Canal de Languedoc above the town. In his letter to the Ministre de la Guerre (*page* 265 *), of the 12th April, Marshal Soult says that the Allied army occupied the heights of Baziège, by which he was to retire. In his letter of the 11th, he had expressed to the same minister, and to Marshal Suchet, his apprehension that he should have to fight his way out of Toulouse, as he certainly would if he had not marched when he did.

26. But M. Choumara contends that Marshal Soult, having remained in Toulouse for 24 hours after the battle, won the battle of Toulouse, as the Allies had, in 1810, won the battle of Busaco, their position having been turned by Marshal Masséna after his army had been repulsed, and the Allies having abandoned Coimbra. There is this difference in the two cases:—The battle of Busaco was fought 15 miles from Coimbra. The French army gained no part of the position of the Allies in the battle of Busaco, not even a *mamelon*. They were totally and entirely defeated and repulsed at all points. The result of the battle gave Marshal Masséna no facility in making his subsequent movement to turn the position of the Allies. In the battle of Toulouse the Allies carried, after a most desperate struggle, the key of the fortified position of the French army; the most important point in it, according to the opinion of Marshal Soult, the Commander in Chief of the Allies, and every officer concerned on either side. The Allies remained possession of this position. From their ground [illegible]

* Choumara.

fire, prevent the occupation of the remainder of the position of their enemy. The possession of it gave them the means, of which advantage was taken, to cut off the retreat of their enemy; and their advanced troops were actually, on the night of the 11th, on the ground over which Marshal Soult was under the necessity of passing on the same night in his retreat. Marshal Soult left in Toulouse about 1600 prisoners, 3 General officers, and several pieces of cannon. None were in Coimbra, in 1810, after Busaco. But there is another remarkable difference between the affairs at Toulouse and at Busaco. The French army left at Coimbra, when they passed that town after the battle, not less than 6000 sick and wounded, who were captured in the town in little more than a week by General Trant. The battle of Toulouse had no resemblance to the battle of Busaco. M. Choumara's readers will judge which party won it.

27. As usual in all such works, this one contains much more misrepresentation respecting the numbers engaged on each side. The Allied army at Toulouse consisted of Freyre's Spanish corps, about 10,000; Morillo's Spanish division, about 5000; Le Cor's Portuguese division, about 5000; the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and Light divisions of the British and Portuguese army, about 25,000: total 45,000 men. There were besides 4 brigades of cavalry, each from 1000 to 1200 or 1500 men, and a sufficient artillery. General Giron's reserve, as it is called, was in Spain. It is stated in M. Choumara's work that the French army consisted of 32,288 infantry and 2583 cavalry; but it does not appear that General Paris' division, which certainly was at Toulouse, is included. This division would add 5000 to the number.

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END OF VOL. VIII.

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